IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
____________________________________
) 
ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, et al., )
) No. 1:96CV01285 
(Judge Lamberth) Plaintiffs, 
v. 
GALE A. NORTON, Secretary of 
the Interior, et al., 
) 
) 
)
)
)
) 
Defendants. 
)
) 
DEFENDANTS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY OF JULY 12, 2005 
ORDER PENDING APPEAL AND FOR EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION 
Pursuant to Rule 7(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Civil Rule 7, 
Defendants respectfully ask this Court to stay the Order it entered on July 12, 2005 (Dkt. No. 
3072) (“July 12 Order”), pending Defendants’ appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit. In addition, because the July 12 Order requires compliance by 
August 2, 2005, Defendants respectfully request expedited consideration of this motion.1 
The following factors are to be considered in determining whether a stay pending appeal 
is warranted: 
(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the 
merits of the appeal; (2) the likelihood that the moving party will 
be irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) the prospect that others 
will be harmed if the court grants the stay; and (4) the public 
interest in granting the stay. 
Cuomo v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 772 F.2d 972, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1985). A 
stay may be granted with either a high probability of success and some injury, or vice versa. Id. 
1 Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(m), counsel for Defendants attempted to confer with 
counsel for Plaintiffs regarding this motion, but was unsuccessful. Defendants assume Plaintiffs 
will oppose this motion. 
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Defendants Are Likely To Prevail On The Merits Of Their Appeal. 
Because Defendants are likely to prevail on the merits of their appeal, and because both the 
balance of harms and the public interest favor a stay, Defendants’ motion should be granted. 
I. 
The July 12 Order is an injunction appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a). See Avery v. 
Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 762 F.2d 158, 160-61 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Great Rivers 
Coop. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 59 F.3d 764, 766 (8th Cir. 1995). The Order “compel[s] 
affirmative agency conduct,” imposes a significant “burden on the Secretary,” and is 
“enforceable by contempt sanctions.” Avery, 762 F.2d at 160 (citing 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. 
Cooper & E. Gressman, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3922 (1977)). On its face, 
it is “not purely ‘a matter of [litigation] procedure’” but reflects a substantive determination and 
orders substantive relief. Id. at 160-61. Harm resulting from the Order could not be undone on 
appeal from final judgment. See id. at 161. The July 12 Order is a also a final order subject to 
immediate review under the collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 
417 U.S. 156, 171-77 (1974) (holding that an order allocating 90% of the costs of a class notice 
to the defendants was appealable under the collateral order doctrine and proceeding to review the 
notice requirement on the merits); In re School Asbestos Litig., 842 F.2d 671, 677-79 (3d Cir. 
1988) (order requiring an association of asbestos manufacturers to disclose in communications 
with class members its relationship to the defendants was reviewable under the collateral order 
doctrine). 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d) authorizes a district court in class action litigation 
to require a notice advising the class “of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the 
judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation 
fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the 
action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2). The notice required by the July 12 Order is not limited to such 
procedural matters, and therefore is not authorized by Rule 23(d). Communications with class 
members may be regulated to protect against the types of abuses associated with class actions, 
such as barratry-like solicitation of nonparty class members, though only in a “carefully drawn 
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order that limits speech as little as possible” and that is based on a “clear record and specific 
findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the 
rights of the parties.” Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 & n.12, 101, 102 (1981). No 
precedent exists for an order requiring a defendant to give class members notice of the district 
court’s preliminary unfavorable assessment of the evidence introduced in the case, with the stated 
purpose of influencing the decisions of class members. 
Moreover, the July 12 Order is linked to the now-reissued structural injunction that is the 
subject of a pending appeal and has been stayed. Among the issues on appeal are whether 
Interior’s accounting obligations under the American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform 
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-412, 108 Stat. 4239 (“1994 Act”), extend beyond an accounting for the 
balance of funds in IIM accounts, and whether those obligations extend to former account 
holders whose accounts were closed before enactment of the 1994 Act. The July 12 Order 
requires the Court’s notice to be included with all communications, without regard to subject 
matter, Mem. Op. at 22, to all present and former IIM account holders. In the memorandum 
opinion accompanying the July 12 Order, the Court determined that all such communications 
“threaten class members’ right to make fully informed decisions about their trust assets.” Mem. 
Op. at 21. The Court explained that “[t]he court-ordered accounting is designed to promote class 
members’ rights to make fully informed choices about their trust assets” and that “[i]f there are 
no more informed decisions to be made, or if all the trust assets are gone, then the court-ordered 
accounting will be useless to the Indians.” Mem. Op. at 20. Indeed, the Court described the July 
12 Order as the practical alternative to an order “suspend[ing] all trust-related decision-making 
until this case concludes and Interior actually provides the required accounting,” which the Court 
stated would be “the only way to fully safeguard” the right to the court-ordered accounting. Id. at 
20 n.8; see also id. at 18 (“the trust beneficiaries should retain all or most of their trust assets in 
as unaltered a state as is practicable, until Interior completes the required accounting”) (quotation 
marks omitted). Inasmuch as the scope of the court-ordered accounting is currently on appeal, 
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The Balance Of Harms And The Public Interest Favor Entry Of A Stay Pending 
the July 12 Order should, at a minimum, be stayed until Defendants’ appeal from the structural 
injunction is resolved. 
II. 
Appeal. 
Both the balance of harms and the public interest favor entry of a stay pending appeal. A 
stay that preserves the status quo will not harm the class. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ principal argument 
in the pending appeal of this Court’s structural injunction is that the case should be remanded 
because the injunction is “impossible” to implement. As Plaintiffs do not suggest that the 
accounting ordered by the district court will ever be implemented, they could not plausibly 
contend that the class should be warned to avoid trust-related transactions pending the 
completion of that accounting. 
Nor could Plaintiffs identify any other pressing need for a class-wide notice. Plaintiffs’ 
motion for a class-wide notice was filed in October 2004, eight years into the litigation. Their 
motion did not cite any specific development in the litigation as its impetus. Nor did this Court 
identify any specific impetus for the July 12 Order other than Plaintiffs’ motion. 
Harm to the class is more likely to result from implementation of the July 12 Order than 
from a stay of the Order. A notice declaring that “any” trust-related information “may be 
unreliable” is certain to cause confusion, and is not likely to facilitate informed decision-making 
even if its distribution is narrowly targeted. The July 12 Order is not narrowly targeted; it 
requires the notice to be included with every written communication to every current and former 
IIM account holder without regard to subject matter. 
The risk of irreparable harm to Defendants absent a stay is great. If Defendants are 
correct that the notice is improper and confusing, dissemination of the notice to hundreds of 
thousands of beneficiaries will irreparably damage the relationship between the agency and those 
it is responsible to serve. That the Order does not limit distribution of the notice to 
communications related to the IIM trust further exacerbates the potential harm. The Court 
expressly indicates that the notice is to be attached to communications regarding health care, 
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education, and other topics unrelated to the subject matter of this case. Mem. Op. at 22-23 & 
n.10. The harm that dissemination of the notice would cause could not be undone if Defendants 
prevail in their appeal. 
Finally, because implementation of the July 12 Order would directly undermine the 
relationship between an executive branch agency and the beneficiaries it serves, the public 
interest favors a stay. 
III. Expedited Consideration Of This Motion Is Needed Because The July 12 Order 
Requires Compliance By August 2, 2005. 
The July 12 Order requires Interior to “complete all preparations and distribute all 
instructions necessary to ensure the implementation” of the Order within twenty days, or by 
August 1, 2005. Beginning twenty-one days from the date of the Order, or August 2, 2005, 
Interior, its agents, representatives, employees, officials, and counsel are required to include the 
prescribed notice with all communications to current and former IIM account holders. 
Defendants recognize the Court’s demanding schedule during the current proceeding on 
Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Nonetheless, Defendants believe a stay of the 
July 12 Order is warranted for the reasons set forth above and must be obtained no later than 
August 1, 2005 to provide meaningful relief. Accordingly, Defendants respectfully request 
expedited consideration of this motion so that Defendants may seek emergency relief from the 
Court of Appeals in the event this Court does not agree that a stay is warranted. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court stay its July 12, 
2005 Order pending Defendants’ appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit. Because compliance with the Order is required by August 2, 2005, 
Defendants respectfully request expedited consideration of this motion. 
Date: July 25, 2005 Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. McCALLUM, Jr. 
Associate Attorney General 
PETER D. KEISLER 
Assistant Attorney General 
STUART E. SCHIFFER 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
J. CHRISTOPHER KOHN 
Director 
/s/ Cynthia L. Alexander 
ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, Jr. 
(D.C. Bar No. 406635) 
Assistant Director 
CYNTHIA L. ALEXANDER 
Trial Attorney 
Commercial Litigation Branch 
Civil Division 
Mailing Address: 
P.O. Box 875 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044-0875 
Phone (202) 616-0328 
Fax (202) 514-9163 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on July 25, 2005 the foregoing Defendants' Emergency Motion for Stay 
of July 12, 2005 Order Pending Appeal and for Expedited Consideration was served by 
Electronic Case Filing, and on the following who is not registered for Electronic Case Filing, by 
facsimile: 
Earl Old Person (Pro se) 
Blackfeet Tribe 
P.O. Box 850 
Browning, MT 59417 
Fax (406) 338-7530 
/s/ Kevin P. Kingston 
Kevin P. Kingston
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
__________________________________________
) 
ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, et al., ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. Case No. 1:96CV01285 
(Judge Lamberth) 
)
)
)
)
) 
GALE NORTON, Secretary of the Interior, et al., ) 
Defendants. 
)
) 
__________________________________________) 
ORDER 
Upon consideration of Defendants’ Emergency Motion For Stay Of July 12, 2005 Order 
Pending Appeal And For Expedited Consideration (Dkt. No. _____), any response thereto, and 
the record of this case, it is hereby 
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion is GRANTED, and it is 
FURTHER ORDERED that the Court’s July 12, 2005 Order (Dkt. No. 3072) is stayed 
pending completion of the appeal of that Order. 
SO ORDERED this _____ day of _____________, 2005. 
__________________________ 
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH 
United States District Judge
cc: 
Robert E. Kirschman, Jr. 
John T. Stemplewicz 
Commercial Litigation Branch 
Civil Division 
P.O. Box 875 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044-0875 
Fax (202) 514-9163 
Dennis M Gingold, Esq. 
Mark Brown, Esq. 
1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Ninth Floor 
Washington, D.C. 20004 
Fax (202) 318-2372 
Keith Harper, Esq. 
Richard A. Guest, Esq. 
Native American Rights Fund 
1712 N Street, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20036-2976 
Fax (202) 822-0068 
Elliott Levitas, Esq. 
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 
Atlanta, GA 30309-4530 
Earl Old Person (Pro se) 
Blackfeet Tribe 
P.O. Box 850 
Browning, MT 59417 
(406) 338-7530