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This is an archived USAID document retained on this web site as a matter of public record.
II. The Current Situation in the Region
V. The Future of the GHAI: A Strategic Framework
VI. Implementation of the GHAI
The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) was launched in 1994 following a visit to the region by USAID Administrator J. Brian Atwood and a determination by President Clinton that the USG must develop a new framework for addressing post-Cold War realities in that troubled part of the world.
A GHAI Concept Paper setting forth the twin goals of crisis prevention, mitigation and resolution and the pursuit of food security was shared with over 800 representatives of GHA governments, regional institutions, donor governments, international and indigenous NGOs and the U.S. Congress. Since that time, USG agencies have been involved in supporting the re-organization of the regionally-based Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and in adapting or developing the internal mechanisms required to meet GHAI goals.
As a Presidential Initiative, GHAI operates under the direct authority and policy guidance of the President and the Secretary of State. The USAID Administrator is the designated head of the Initiative. In January 1996 it was agreed by U.S. Ambassadors and USAID Mission Directors in the GHA region that the development of a strategy for GHAI implementation would be coordinated by USAID's/Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (REDSO/ESA), outlining the involvement of USAID, the Department of State, the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce and Defense, U.S. Government intelligence agencies. The following draft strategy, which will be shared with a wide range of GHAI partners, applies to the over-arching strategic framework for the implementation of the GHAI, which is endorsed by all participating USG agencies, and individual agency Action Plans.
Comprising Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, the Greater Horn of Africa region has for the last decade been viewed as an "arc of crisis" characterized by war and famine. At the root of continued crisis lie widespread poverty and instability.
The causes of crisis in the Greater Horn are multiple and their relative importance is widely debated. There is growing consensus, however, on a number of causal factors. Governance in the region too often has been characterized by over-centralization, the exclusion of large segments of the civil society in the decision-making that affects them, and ill-conceived economic policies. Population growth has continued to outpace national economic growth. Regional trade and cooperation, as well as national development, have been constrained by limited infrastructural development and maintenance. During the Cold War, the region was beset by external interference and flooded with weapons.
These factors result in a Greater Horn beset by crises. There are today more countries at war than at peace, many of the conflicts in the GHA are regional in scope and impact, and the level of violence has increased. Development problems, natural disasters and complex political emergencies have given rise to chronic food insecurity; of the region's 200 million people, roughly half are undernourished. Overall conditions are further exacerbated by massive population movements triggered by the loss of physical or food security and by increased competition for access to resources. Over 10 million people in the region are either refugees, internally displaced, or recent returnees. Ongoing crisis has meant that governments have been unable, or unwilling, to direct limited resources towards social and economic development, and in many countries the limited infrastructure that exists has deteriorated. Over the period, AIDS -- a crisis in itself -- has spread while the provision of health and other social services has declined in many GHA countries.
The response of the international community, while frequently bountiful, has in most cases failed to address the root causes of crisis and food insecurity and in some cases exacerbated conditions on the ground. In the process of developing and adapting the tools required to respond to the new post-Cold War environment in the region, the international community remains better-equipped to react than to be proactive. With the flow of private capital to the Greater Horn remaining extremely low, foreign assistance remains critical. But the crises in the region mean that assistance provided by the U.S. Government and other donor nations is skewed towards relief needs as opposed to development goals. The U.S. spent significantly more on humanitarian assistance than it did on developmental investments each year since 1991, and in particularly bad years, as much as three times as much.
The end of the Cold War has triggered tremendous change in the Greater Horn. With political priorities now less frequently determined by external alliances or dependencies, new struggles over the nature and organization of the state have emerged. At one end of the spectrum, war continues to be viewed as a legitimate means of social and political change. A majority of governments in the region have come to power either by winning wars or by staging military coups, some continue to deploy force in order to remain in power, and opposition forces frequently opt for violence over and above more peaceful means of channeling dissent -- often because legal means to change or influence the political process are closed to them. At the other end of the spectrum, however, is a burgeoning and relatively peaceful struggle for democracy and wider social, economic and political participation.
At present, all of the countries of the region are in transition either from crisis or face ongoing or potential instability:
At the same time, drought has returned to the region, following a predictable cycle, with Somalia set to face another food shortage and Kenya, often a surplus producer, declaring an emergency and appealing for increased international food aid. The ongoing civil strife in Uganda's economically-deprived north, meanwhile, has caused that government to officially declare an emergency.
On a brighter note, the post-Cold War era has brought some good news to the region. National or local elections, though receiving mixed results from the international community and some internal constituents, have been held in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. The Government of Rwanda has publicly debated the judicial response to the genocide in a new parliament and has initiated trials. Several governments in the region are attempting to build democratic institutions; support for the development of the judiciary, for example, has become a central area of focus for international donors for the first time.
Ethiopia has shown that with good rains it can produce a food surplus, though there is still need for strengthening in famine early warning for cyclical drought years. Ethiopia is undertaking a complete overhaul of its civil service and, along with Uganda and others, registered significant economic growth. With varying degrees of success and with some risk, the governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda are attempting to devolve power from the capitals to the rural areas. While international capital flows to the region remain depressed when compared to other regions of the world, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia and even Rwanda have attracted new sources of private capital.
Several governments in the region have demonstrated a commitment to taking responsibility for their own difficulties and their own mistakes. While far from "perfect," the governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda have demonstrated considerable progress towards a more equitable and stable future. While progress has been uneven, democracy has -- for the first time -- become the subject of increasingly public political debate.
At the regional level, six governments of the Greater Horn have worked together -- against considerable odds -- to revitalize the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), providing it with a new mandate to address food security, conflict prevention and resolution, and infrastructural development. This development, along with the creation in 1993 of the OAU's Conflict Resolution Mechanism, marks the first time that conflict -- heretofore considered the sole purview of individual states -- might be subjected to a regional or continental forum. IGAD, though still in the process of consolidating its reorganization, has mounted new efforts to address the conflicts in Sudan and Somalia.
Kenya and Uganda overcame their differences to re-establish, along with Tanzania, the East African Cooperation (EAC) group; the role of COMESA is under review; and the Kagera Basin Organization is similarly poised to play a new role in the Great Lakes region. Under new leadership, the UN's Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) may prove a relevant force in the region's development future. The OAU, as well, has grown both more active and more relevant in recent years, in part through the increased utilization of its Conflict Resolution Mechanism.
In summary, the region is characterized by competing trends. On the one hand, there is a sharp increase in the incidence and scope of crisis, whether economic or political in nature. In recent years this region has witnessed more conflict than at any other time in the recent past, and dependency is growing, not decreasing. On the other hand, there are growing signs that the region is recognizing and acting on the need for both regional economic cooperation and regional solutions to regional problems. Finally, and most important, there are increasing signs that the pursuit of democracy is gaining currency, both at the governmental and non-governmental levels. While far from consolidated, this trend provides hope for a troubled region.
The GHAI does not represent a panacea for the problems of the region. More appropriately, it represents a "laboratory" in which the USG, in tandem with its partners, can adopt new tools and adapt existing ones for the tasks at hand. Specifically, the GHAI is unique in that it is geographically subscribed; it aims to promote non-traditional methods; it focuses on partnership and capacity-building in and with the region; and it is less dependent on providing new resources than on managing existing resources differently.
Since its inception, the GHAI has registered some significant results. The USG now has a growing working partnership with IGAD, to which it is providing significant technical assistance during the revitalization process. USAID programs in Sudan, Eritrea, Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda have been re-examined to give greater attention to crisis prevention, ensure more effective utilization of humanitarian assistance, and develop partnerships with both government and non-governmental actors. Donors are improving coordination in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Rwanda as well as on a regional basis to achieve greater efficiency and reduce duplication of effort.
The USAID Integrated Strategic Planning (ISP) process adopted under the GHAI, which fosters the integration of USG resources within a common framework and based on a range of possible "scenarios," has been undertaken in Eritrea, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan. Coordinated by the State Department, the GHAI has also developed a portfolio of options for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution, and supported conflict prevention training exercises in the field.
Effective implementation of the GHAI will derive from the USG's ability to utilize a wide range of tools and to engage a significant number of actors.
Each participating agency in the USG will develop its own Action Plan and mechanism(s) for managing its involvement in the Initiative; each supporting agency will ensure through coordination with participating agencies that their approaches towards and programs in the GHA region reflect the goals and principles of the Initiative. Action Plans will be shared across agencies. Coordination, at the level of implementation, will be ensured at the Washington and Country Team levels through traditional clearance process as appropriate.
Partners include international colleagues such as the International Financial Institutions, the UN agencies, including the ECA, the EU, bilateral colleagues and NGOs. Within the region, partners include: GHA host governments; regional and sub-regional governmental organizations including IGAD, the OAU, EAC, the Kagera Basin Organization, and others; regional NGOs, technical and professional associations, and networks; and national NGOs and local community groups.
The GHAI principles are perhaps one of its most effective tools. These include the following:
a) African ownership. This principle aims to ensure that GHAI efforts have a constituency in the region and build upon and respond to the growing evidence of African leadership in the GHA. GHAI efforts should be rooted in local priorities and realities, and its activities should be designed on the basis of widespread consultation. Further, the principle suggests that opportunities to build local, national and regional capacity be taken advantage of wherever possible.
b) Strategic coordination. This principle entails not only the more effective coordination of USG assets and actions, but also between the U.S. and other international and local partners. It aims to ensure that GHAI activities are undertaken within the context of a framework or set of agreed-upon parameters, that comparative advantage is applied, and that duplication of effort and contradictory actions are minimized.
c) Linking relief to development. This principle entails both investing humanitarian assistance with an aim to reinforcing longer-term development goals, and deploying development assistance in such a manner as to prevent or reduce potential crises and the attendant need for humanitarian assistance. It also aims to ensure that transitions are better understood and more effectively supported.
d) Regional perspective. This principle involves analyzing and responding to events within the context of a regional perspective, and ensuring that GHAI activities achieve optimal regional impact where possible. Further, it aims to promote joint activities -- in two or more GHA countries -- where possible.
e) Prepare for instability. This principle aims to ensure that all GHAI activities reflect an awareness of the fact that all of the GHA countries may be in transition and thus vulnerable to significant economic or political change. As such, one of its purposes is to promote advance planning and preparedness where possible. Further, this principle aims to ensure that, where possible, GHAI activities take advantage of opportunities to promote positive change in advance of, or in the midst of, crisis.
The goals of the GHAI are to increase food security and more effectively promote crisis prevention, mitigation and resolution through application of the GHAI programming principles.
For the purposes of the strategy, food security exists "when all people at all times have physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life." There are three distinct variables which are central to the attainment of food security, namely food availability, access and utilization: availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports; access by households and individuals to adequate resources to acquire appropriate foods for a nutritious diet; and utilization of food through adequate diet, sanitation and health care.
Crisis prevention is meant to represent short- as well as long-term interventions or actions designed to alleviate economic, environmental, or political conditions that might, over time, give rise to conflict or food emergencies. Mitigation involves responding to existing crises in such a manner as to prevent their expansion and, where possible, support the positive management of their outcomes. Resolution refers to "real-time" measures aimed at directly confronting outright economic or political emergencies with a view to bringing them to an end.
The objectives of the GHAI are:
a) to support the capacity at regional, governmental and non-governmental levels to lead efforts to prevent, mitigate and resolve crises in the GHA and seek the assistance of other international partners to these ends;
b) to support the capacity at regional, governmental, and non-governmental levels to lead efforts to establish and implement appropriate food security policies and programs; and,
c) to incorporate the GHAI programming principles into USG approaches towards the region and all GHAI activities.
The combined inter-agency GHAI strategy aims to achieve broad results through its implementation. The strategy covers a multi-year period, during which time progress will be assessed. Progress will be shown by:
a) an increased involvement of, capacity for and leadership by the region, at both governmental and non-governmental levels, in the management of the GHA's political and economic development, particularly as this involves the GHAI goals of food security and crisis prevention, mitigation and resolution; and
b) the application of GHAI programming principles in relevant USG policies and programs affecting the GHA region.
Given the enormous scope of the GHAI's goals, it is critical that its implementation recognize that it cannot be all things to all countries and that, given that the abilities and resources of the USG are limited, effort will be focused in a few key areas and, assuming progress, expanded over time. For this reason, it is important to use existing assets -- whether they be internal mechanisms for analysis and decision-making or human and financial resources -- more effectively. This entails, for example, employing the USG Integrated Strategic Planning process and Mission Program Plans to further GHAI goals. GHAI activities will focus initially on Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda.
Although the GHAI is not considered to be "additive," meaning that significant additional resources are not attached to it, there are some resources specifically allocated for its implementation. These include resources provided by the USAID Horn of Africa Support Project (HASP) to IGAD, as well as USAID and other USG resources, including those of the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, that might be deployed towards IGAD's project portfolio. In addition, the GHAI includes limited "facilitative" funds made available by USAID which will be targeted to foster regional cooperation at all levels and will be managed by USAID in a process designed to ensure that GHAI goals and principles are reflected, clear priorities are set, and inter-agency consultation is fostered.
As a Presidential Initiative, the GHAI can be most effective when all interested Agencies coordinate their efforts in the region, towards the mutual joint goals of food and physical security. We look forward to a time when the convergence and synergies fostered by the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative become the normal means for the USG to accomplish its business in the region.