 |
 |
 |
 |
|
|
|
|
 |
|
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||||||||
|
|||||||||||||||||
|
Research Modeling Potential Responses to Smallpox as a Bioterrorist WeaponMartin I. Meltzer,* Inger Damon,* James W. LeDuc,* and J. Donald Millar† |
|
|
|
| Back to article Figure 5. Daily and total cases of smallpox for two vaccine-induced rates of transmission and three postrelease start dates. The graphs show that, while reducing the transmission rate to 0.99 persons infected per infectious person reduces the daily number of cases over the period studied, vaccination must reduce the rate of transmission to 0.85 persons infected per infectious person to stop the outbreak within 365 days postrelease. Data were generated by assuming 100 initially infected persons and an initial transmission rate of 3 persons infected per infectious person. For clarity, the graphs of daily cases do not include the assumed 100 initially infected persons. The graphs of total cases include those initially infected. |
|
|
|
|
|
This page last reviewed December 08, 2001 Emerging
Infectious Diseases Journal
|
|
|
