Detailed Information on the
National Nuclear Security Administration: Nonproliferation and International Security Assessment

Conducting an independent evaluation of sufficient scope and quality to indicate if the program is effectively achieving results.

Creating and finalizing an updated programmatic strategic plan.

Developing and implementing a web-based, state-of-the-art program management information system to track performance measures, funds management and costs.

Measure: Cumulative metric tons of Russian weapons-usable HEU that U.S. experts have confirmed as permanently eliminated from the Russian stockpile under the HEU Purchase Agreement.

Explanation:By 2014, confirm that 500 metric tons of weapons-usable HEU has been permanently eliminated from the Russian stockpile. This measure supports the NIS program mission to implement and monitor transparent WMD reductions under the1993 U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement.

Measure: Cumulative percentage of non-United States Government (private sector and foreign government) project funding contributions obtained relative to cumulative USG Global Initiatives Proliferation Prevention funding contributions.

Explanation:By 2019, obtain non-USG funding contributions equal to 100% of the cumulative USG Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention funding contributions. This measure supports the NIS program mission to transition WMD expertise and infrastructure in partner countries to peaceful purposes.

Measure: Cumulative number of countries where International Nuclear Export Control program is engaged that have export control systems that meet critical requirements

Explanation:The critical requirements are: (1) have control lists consistent with the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) regimes; (2) initiated outreach to producers of WMD-related commodities; (3) developed links between technical experts and license reviewers and front-line enforcement officers; and (4) have begun customization of WMD Commodity Identification Training materials and technical guides. International Nuclear Export Control program engages a total of 41 countries. A panel of experts scores each country on a scale of 1-5 in each of the four critical requirements that have been defined by the program. A country must reach level 3 in each requirement before to be considered acceptable. Engagement is defined as conducting training with and for partners, establishing working groups and conducting meetings, and providing technical assistance. This measure supports the NIS program mission to strengthen export control systems in other countries.

Measure: Annual number of safeguards systems deployed and used in international regimes and other countries that addresses an identified safeguards deficiency.

Explanation:Safeguards systems are defined as a piece of equipment used for the timely detection of the diversion of nuclear material or information from its declared purpose for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, including instruments for measuring quantities and forms of materials, surveillance techniques, and other methods of accounting. This measure supports the NIS program mission to strengthen nuclear safeguards in other countries and improve international regimes, agreements and arrangements.

Measure: Annual number of special monitoring visits completed to the four Russian processing facilities that downblend highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium to monitor and confirm the permanent elimination of 30 metric tons of Russian HEU from the Russian weapons stockpile under the HEU Purchase Agreement.

Explanation:The special monitoring visits, as stipulated under the HEU Purchase Agreement, provide the US Government with the means to monitor and confirm that the HEU being downblended at Russian processing facilities is taken from Russian weapons. This measure supports the NIS program mission to implement and monitor transparent WMD reductions under the1993 U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program prevents and counters weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation by providing policy and technical support to: implement and monitor transparent WMD reductions; strengthen nuclear safeguards, physical protection and export control systems in other countries; transition WMD expertise and infrastructure in partner countries to peaceful purposes; and improve international nonproliferation regimes, agreements and arrangements.

Evidence: The National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Plan (11/04) states the NIS program's purpose is to, "Strengthen the global nonproliferation regime by (1) limiting sensitive exports; (2) supporting international safeguards; and (3) providing policy recommendations and policy and technical advice to develop and implement US policy (treaties, agreements, and mutual inspections)."

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program brings technical and political expertise across the broad spectrum of US efforts to prevent and counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. Several challenges to the nonproliferation regime exist in the post-9/11 world, including sub-state terrorists, clandestine WMD programs in countries such as Iran and North Korea, and the clandestine network of nuclear suppliers uncovered in Pakistan. The NIS program addresses these issues by managing several sub-programs that work to: eliminate proliferation programs and stockpiles of WMD materials as well as redirect WMD scientists to peaceful work thereby reducing the threat of WMD terrorism; expand the reach of the nonproliferation regime by promoting foreign compliance with norms and commitments; and strengthen nonproliferation regimes, agreements and arrangements.

Evidence: The problems that the program addresses were identified in President George W. Bush's speech at the National Defense University (2/04). The National Security Strategy (3/06) and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-17/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-4) (12/02) establish the US comprehensive strategy to combat WMD; the NIS program plays a role in implementing that strategy.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program focuses the unique highly technical expertise of the Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) national laboratories on resolving global nonproliferation issues. This expertise, the need for which does arise in international nonproliferation contexts, is unique from that of the Departments of Defense (DoD) or State because of the NNSA's sole responsibility for development of nuclear weapons. The NIS program is the only DOE/NNSA program responsible for expanding safeguards human capital, performing the technical review of export control licenses, leading verification of the North Korean disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, and confirming the permanent elimination of 500 metric tons of weapons-usable highly enriched uranium from the Russian stockpile - more material than any other US Government program. Furthermore, it is the only U.S. program that has access rights to Russian uranium processing facilities to perform independent monitoring required by the 1993 Agreement. While there is marginal redundancy in overall mission between some of the NIS sub-programs and DoD's Defense Treat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the State Department's Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related (NADR) program, the specific activities are generally complementary and non-overlapping.

Evidence: The program manages unique sub-programs that have been established by specific legislation, regulations, and treaties. The 1969 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Nuclear Suppliers Group; Zangger Committee; the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242); the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329); Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 75, 100, and 810; various U.S. Agreements for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy direct the work on safeguards and export control. The Six Party Talks establish the program's responsibility for verifying the North Korean denuclearization. The 1993 U.S.-Russian Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement requires the program, on behalf of the US Government, to conduct transparency activities related to the elimination of highly enriched uranium from nuclear weapons from the Russian stockpile. In addition, Executive Order 13159 states that "a major national security goal of the United States is to ensure that fissile material removed from Russian nuclear weapons pursuant to various... agreements is dedicated to peaceful uses, subject to transparency measures, and protected from diversion to activities of proliferation concern."

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program is free of major flaws that would limit its effectiveness and efficiency and has been restructured to better address evolving proliferation threats. The new structure enhances the program's ability to manage its broad scope that includes both policy and implementation functions, and to have launched successfully the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative that has cross-cutting activities. The NIS program improved the guidance it provides to the national laboratories on its annual process for submitting proposals for continuing work and new activities under existing elements in order to streamline the review and acceptance of proposals. Providing clear and directed guidance on how to respond to the call for proposals for new activities to address changing priorities and emerging proliferation issues that fall under existing NIS program elements decreases the number of proposals received and increases the chances that proposals will be accepted and funded with the limited budget set aside for these new activities.

Evidence: The program's FY 2008 Budget Request and FY 2009 Budget Request identify the new program structure and the safeguards initiative. As part of the launch of this important new initiative, the program is developing a Roadmap to ensure that each sub-program understands its role, is not duplicating efforts, and is working towards common objectives. Two memos were issued conveying guidance to the labs for the FY 2009 Planning Process (4/08 and 5/08).

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: Annual program reviews and explicit prioritization of activities prove that Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program's resources are allocated to specific sub-programs and to the national laboratories, contractors, and foreign entities that implement the overall NIS program's projects. Funding priorities are based on National Nuclear Security Administration's Strategic Planning Guidance, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and risk-based decision making. Project Work Plans with detailed statements of work, performance targets and schedules serve as the tool to ensure that approved work is aligned with the mission and goals of the program. In 2007, the program conducted the fundamental safeguards review which resulted in clarifying the needs for the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), identifying where to target resources more effectively to meet the current and future challenges facing international safeguards, and steering the NGSI Roadmap exercise that will establish NGSI's goals, objectives and activity plans.

Evidence: The NNSA Strategic Planning Guidance for FY 2010-2014 (4/08) specifically calls for strengthening the safeguards system and strengthening international nonproliferation and export control regimes. Project Work Plans containing scope, schedule and costs finalized in coordination with the national labs demonstrate that the program resources are targeted to address the program's purpose and reach the intended beneficiaries. The fundamental safeguards review documented in the report titled, "International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century" (10/07) and the draft outline for the safeguards Roadmap are laying the foundation for the safeguards initiative to be designed so that resources are directed to achieve the purpose and reach the intended beneficiaries.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program has a limited number of long-term measures that focus on outcomes to meaningfully address progress in achieving the program's purpose. They are: (1) by 2014, confirm that 500 metric tons of weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) (enough material for 20,000 nuclear weapons) has been permanently eliminated from the Russian stockpile under the HEU Purchase Agreement; (2) by 2019, obtain 100% in cumulative matching funds for the scientist redirection program from private sector and foreign governments relative to the cumulative US Government funding contributions; and (3) by 2020, all 41 countries where the International Nonproliferation Export Control sub-program is providing weapons of mass destruction-related training and technical assistance have export control systems that meet critical requirements. The measures reflect the purpose of the NIS program by: (1) monitoring the transparent elimination of stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); (2) transitioning WMD expertise to peaceful purposes; and (3) strengthening export control systems in other countries.

Evidence: The NIS program's draft FY10 Budget Request, FY09 Budget Request, and FY08 Budget Request contain the program's performance measures. The 1993 U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement specifies the total material quantity as 500 metric tons and the timeframe to end in 2013; current processing rates of 30 metric tons per year provide a steady and practical plan to complete the program on schedule. The scientist redirection sub-program maintains a spreadsheet that tracks the contributions from non-US Government sources. The export control training sub-program publishes an Engagement Plan (INECP Engagement Plan dated April 2008) that explains its risk-based engagement strategy and identifies its long-term goals for outreach to countries that seek to improve its export control systems. The safeguards sub-program tracks each year the number of safeguards systems that are deployed and used; the data is confirmed through bilateral communications and/or the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: All of the Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program's targets and timeframes for its long-term measures are ambitious, particularly given the technical and political challenges of the work, unexpected opportunities or delays caused by global events, and the voluntary nature of international participation (for example, North Korea's recent decision to dismantle its nuclear program and the impact of this on program activities). Comprehensive planning and reviews, as well as progress to date, indicate that the targets are ambitious, but are still realistic and achievable.

Evidence: The NIS program's FY08 Budget Request, FY09 Budget Request, and Draft FY 2010 Budget Request contain the measures and show progress to date. The 1993 U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement specifies the total material quantity as 500 metric tons and the timeframe to end in 2013 -- in comparison to other US Government program's that eliminate nuclear material, this sub-program addresses more material than any of the others and accomplishes annual targets at a very high rate.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program's long-term measures, as defined, contain annual targets to meaningfully demonstrate progress in achieving the program's long-term measures; therefore, the long-term measures also are considered annual measures. In addition, NIS has two other new annual measures. Both are being reported for the first time in this PART, and past data from prior years is being included to indicate their recent historical baselines and consistency with future goals. Future evaluations will assess the utility of these measures. The first is the number of safeguards systems deployed and used in international regimes and other countries that address safeguards deficiencies. The second is the number of special monitoring visits (SMVs) completed annually to the four Russian processing facilities that convert highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium to monitor and confirm the permanent elimination of 30 metric tons of Russian HEU from the Russian weapons stockpile under the HEU Purchase Agreement. From 2006, 24 SMVs are planned annually through 2013, and thus far 24 have been completed annually through 2007. NIS believes that defining an annual metric to measure identified safeguards deficiencies is hindered by traditional courses of action that do not proscribe NIS involvement as a first or required solution. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identifies safeguards deficiencies, and this information is categorized as "safeguards confidential" and not shared with third countries without the member country's permission. Once a safeguards deficiency is identified by the IAEA, member countries traditionally attempt to first overcome internally. Then, the IAEA may turn to member countries, such as the United States, to develop solutions. These solutions often involve new safeguards concepts or equipment. Thus, the intermittency of NIS involvement has made an annual performance measure for safeguard deficiencies difficult to define. NIS also considered defining an annual measure related to its long-term outcome measure on improving export control systems worldwide. The challenge to developing meaningful annual measures includes heavy and unpredictable foreign involvement and the unevenness of the standards and protocols employed in export control systems. Problematic candidate measures include counts of trained export-control enforcement officers, license reviewers, nonproliferation-trained exporters of dual-use commodities and courses or workshops on licensing procedures. Annually, such measures are subject to foreign interference or cancellation, funding shares with the State Department have been uneven, and the rigor of field evaluations has been questioned.

Evidence: The NIS program's FY 2008 Budget Request, FY 2009 Budget Request, and Draft FY 2010 Budget Request contain the measures and show progress to date. The 1993 U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement and its implementing contract lay out the annual targets for that sub-program, and receipts from the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant document the amount of low enriched uranium shipped from Russia to date. The scientist redirection sub-program tracks the contributions from non-US Government sources. The International Nonproliferation Export Control sub-program has developed four critical requirements against which a panel of experts determine at what level a country has reached based on experience in country, meetings with partners and other information. The safeguards sub-program tracks each year the number of safeguards systems that are deployed and used; the data is confirmed through bilateral communications and/or the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program maintains a detailed set of baselines and ambitious annual targets for each of its performance measures to ensure continued improvement and efficiency over the long term. Annual targets are documented in project work plans and statements of work, while baseline information is contained in project work plans and assumptions about the performance measures are documented by the subprograms. For example, in FY10, one sub-program will confirm annually that an additional 30 metric tons of Russian weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (enough material to make 1,200 nuclear weapons) is eliminated from Russia's stockpile until the endpoint target of 500 metric tons is achieved by 2014.

Evidence: The NIS program's FY08 Budget Request, FY 2009 Budget Request, and Draft FY 2010 Budget Request contain the measures and show progress to date. The Project Work Plans and sub-program Performance Measure Assumptions Documents contain baselines and targets for annual measures accomplished and projected.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program's federal personnel, staff from the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's National Laboratories and other contractors work together to establish aggressive project budgets and milestones to achieve baseline targets. The NIS program communicates annual and long-term performance goals to implementing partners through project work plans, statements of work, and annual program guidance. Contractors and National Laboratory partners are held accountable for meeting project milestones in support of these goals, which are reported in quarterly reviews, annual program reviews, and National Laboratory performance reviews. Performance targets are incorporated into the National Laboratories' Performance Evaluation Plans. Meetings are held on a regular basis with domestic and foreign partners (including foreign governments) to continually reinforce performance goals and track progress. Agreements on annual work plans and long-term goals are reached with foreign partners through action sheets, bilateral agreements, joint statements of intent, and in records from Joint Coordinating Committees. Agreements with other US Government agencies are coordinated through the interagency process led by the National Security Council.

Evidence: The Project Work Plans and National Laboratories' Performance Evaluation Plans (PEPs) ensure that the NIS program and its National Laboratory partners are committed to the same goals. These documents identify milestones to keep the program and its partners on track. Joint Coordinating Committees records of meeting, other records of meetings with foreign parties, and formal agreements with countries and organizations are written and signed evidence that program participants commit to and work toward annual and long-term performance goals.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: Independent evaluations are conducted as needed on the Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program. In 1999, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) evaluated the sub-program responsible for eliminating Russian highly enriched uranium (GAO/RCED-99-194) as an effective program. This program is a mature program that meets its annual performance target each year, therefore, the NIS program does not consider it necessary to request an independent review. While the GAO reviewed the scientist redirection sub-program and pointed out numerous issues, the sub-program is working to address these and already sees improvements, such as the Institute Threat Assessment approach, the development of Terms of Reference for vetting each proposed project, and the need to revise its performance measure to one that can be validated with data available to the program. The export control sub-program was part of a larger GAO review in 2007, and we expect that the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, launched in 2008, will be the subject of a comprehensive review in the next year or two to ensure that it is meeting its intended goals. Each year, the NIS program conducts a two-day nonproliferation policy review in which mostly peers participate. In 2007, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory evaluated the program's project management with constructive comments that resulted in a Project Management Requirements Document that identifies roles and responsibilities as well as program management processes. The program also conducted the Fundamental Safeguards Review in 2007 which designated safeguards as a priority.

Evidence: External independent reviews conducted by Government Accountability Office (GAO) of the scientist redirection sub-program (GAO 08-189 dated 12/07) and of the program's efforts to improve the export controls of countries in which nuclear proliferation network activities were reported (GAO 08-21 dated 10/07). External review was conducted for drafting the Project Management Requirements Document. The Fundamental Safeguards Review (10/07) involved peer review.

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program works with the Office of the Administrator on budget requests through National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation (PPBE) process. The NIS program's long-term performance goals with annual targets cascade from the Department of Energy and NNSA strategic plans. Performance measures help to form resource allocation decisions. Annually, the Administrator's Final Recommendation reports the budget decisions that were made and is used to develop the budget requests. NNSA corporate financial officers monitor and assess performance on meeting program measures and tracking accounting data. All direct and indirect costs on program measures are reported separately from the costs associated with the NNSA Federal employees, as required by Congress. In the FY 2009-2013 President's Budget, NNSA continued to use a budget request format that includes the current 3 years plus 4 additional years of performance and budget data for each program.

Evidence: The NNSA PPBE process and guidance documents, Administrator's Final Recommendation, and FY 2008 and FY 2009 DOE Program Decision Memoranda provide evidence that budget requests are linked to the accomplishment of goals and resource needs are presented in a complete, transparent manner in the program's budget.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program has taken meaningful steps to correct strategic planning deficiencies. The program brings political and technical expertise across the broad spectrum of U.S. efforts to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. The program recently restructured to better address evolving proliferation threats and improve its ability to manage a broad scope of both policy and implementation functions. The program is engaged in a continual, long-term effort to strengthen its strategic planning, and it aims to update its strategic plan every five years. The NIS sub-programs conduct strategic planning on a regular basis in order to set annual priorities and stay on track to achieve long-term goals. The NIS sub-program responsible for eliminating 500 metric tons of Russian WMD material meets with its partners individually and as a group at least once per year to discuss and plan each year's activities. The NIS export control training sub-program drafts annual country plans that link to its Engagement Plan. The scientist redirection sub-program conducts meetings with its partners, such as the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow and the National Laboratories to decide which projects to fund. Further, this sub-program has developed an Institute Threat Assessment in order to implement its new strategy of engaging WMD scientists at high risk institutes in Russia, as directed by Congress. The safeguards sub-program is part of the NIS program's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, which is developing a Roadmap to plan the completion of several short-term activities as well as ensure that all activities address the Initiative's overall goals. The Roadmap is based on the Fundamental Review of Safeguards which was conducted in 2007.

Evidence: The program's Strategic Plan (1/03) and NNSA Strategic Plan (11/04) are evidence of the program's overall strategic planning. The NIS sub-programs conduct strategic planning on a regular basis, and the plans are contained in the meeting notes of annual sub-program reviews, country plans, the Institute Threat Assessment, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Roadmap and Fundamental Review. The program's Work Breakdown Structure and Project Work Plans are tools to help the program conduct a scheduled revision this year of its comprehensive strategic plan.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program receives timely and credible monthly and quarterly reporting against baseline program milestones and costing targets from its national laboratory and other contractors. This performance information is used to determine whether corrective action is necessary. Contractor performance is reviewed quarterly and annually to correct systematic project management deficiencies. Official DOE accounting data is reviewed monthly by Federal managers as a check on contractor reports. In June 2007, the program completed the Project Management Requirements Document that lays the foundation for refining the Work Breakdown Structure in order to improve planning, tracking performance and budget, and accomplishing long term goals. Starting in July 2008, all project work plans and performance reporting are tracked in the new Strategic Management and Results Tracking (SMART) system instead of being deposited on the Program Management Information System (PMIS). The new project management system includes a menu of reports with selected data to provide insight into progress and spending in order to make necessary adjustments over the course of the year. Progress against annual performance target baselines is evaluated and reported quarterly to the DOE Joule system for inclusion in the annual Performance and Accountability Report.

Evidence: The NIS sub-program that is responsible for confirming the elimination of Russian weapons material collects data during its Special Monitoring Visits at Russian sites, and the Russian sites provide data from Russian records; this data is used to verify that the material was derived from Russian nuclear weapons. The composition of the team on the Visits includes representatives from key program partners (i.e., the National Laboratories). The collected data is brought back to the United States where it is analyzed extensively and cross-checked against receipts from the Paducah Gasseous Diffusion Plant and historical data to further confirm results. Other NIS sub-programs collect monthly and quarterly reports from key partners that are evaluated in order to make adjustments to the sub-program's performance.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program Federal managers are held accountable for meeting performance cost, scope, and schedule through measures in their annual performance appraisal plans. Milestones supporting the annual program performance targets are incorporated into the National Laboratories' Performance Evaluation Plans. Federal managers monitor the progress of the National Laboratories and other contractors on a monthly basis and formally evaluate it semiannually. Past performance is considered when determining annual M&O performance and fee.

Evidence: The program's Approved Funding Plan and Work Authorization records; Program Implementation Plan; National Laboratories' Performance Evaluation Plans -- all provide evidence that Federal managers and program partners at the National Laboratories are held accountable for performance results. Federal program managers know that if their sub-programs are not performing or spending at an acceptable rate, then funding may become available to other sub-programs. The program's National Laboratory partners consistently meet performance goals, and the standards that are set remain high.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program's funding is allocated at the start of the fiscal year and obligated as needed throughout the fiscal year via the Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Approved Funding Program and is matched to work requirements and cost plans in the Implementation Plan via Work Authorizations. Expenditures and commitments are tracked monthly, and uncommitted carryover balances are carefully managed through the DOE financial reporting system. The amount of funding that the NIS program does not commit to contracts in a given year and, thus, is carried into the next year has been slightly high, but acceptable, because of previous slow receipt of invoices in the scientist redirection program, continuing resolutions (some carryover is needed to continue some activities into the next fiscal year), and mid-year budget supplementals. The FY07 Financial Statements Audit gave an unqualified opinion that DOE financial systems are in good standing.

Evidence: The Program Implementation Plan, Approved Funding Plans, Work Authorization records, and monthly financial reports demonstrate that funds are obligated in a timely manner, used for the intended purpose, and accurately reported. The NIS program generally stays within the NNSA threshold of 13% of annual budgeted funds being carried over into the next year. In most cases, the funds are required to continue activities into the next fiscal year if an appropriations bill is not passed on time, as has been the case for the last several years. The FY07 Financial Statements Audit resulting in a favorable rating of the DOE financial systems appears in the DOE FY07 Agency Financial Report.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program has procedures and tools in place to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effective program execution. The NIS program tracks costs and schedules on a monthly basis to allow program managers to validate costs and schedules in order to identify and correct problems early before they impact efficiencies. In July 2008, the program started using a new project management system, called SMART, for tracking project performance, cost and schedule. The program's efficiency measure tracks the cumulative matching funds for the scientist redirection sub-program from private sector and foreign governments relative to the cumulative US Government funding contributions. The matching funds allow the program to accelerate projects and expand the number of projects implemented, but the matching funds do not replace the US Government funding. It also allows the U.S. industry partner to be involved from the start of the project thereby increasing the probability that the product may be commercialized because it is more likely to be in the context of Western profitability and commercially-oriented research (rather than something that the researchers are merely interested in and for which commercialization is not considered).

Evidence: Project Work Plans, quarterly reporting and quarterly reviews are some of the procedures used to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in NIS program execution. The scientist redirection sub-program employs the Institute Assessment database to ensure that it is targeting high-priority institutes and a project database. While NIS continues to solicit private sector and foreign government contributions, it is in discussions with the Russian Government to increase Russia's cost share. If Russia agrees to cost share, this would allow NIS to accelerate the rate of obtaining non-USG funding. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Roadmap will serve as a tool for ensuring that activities relate to one of the main themes and their objectives, reducing the chance of duplication of effort, and tracking progress.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program is in nearly-daily coordination with colleagues elsewhere in the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Department of Energy, and other agencies (especially the State Department). State Department is cognizant of and has representation at many of the NIS program's international meetings. The program works closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and foreign government officials on all its sub-programs. For example, the NIS program is coordinating with State Department and NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative as the technical lead for verifying the North Korean disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. In addition, the program is leading the international working group to revise IAEA physical protection guidelines to improve the security of nuclear material worldwide. The NIS program and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) missions are very similar; however, the NIS sub-programs are uniquely targeted and are related to civilian threat reduction, which differs from DTRA's focus on the defense/military side. DTRA's International Counterproliferation Program is the primary tool Combatant Commanders use in their theater security cooperation strategy to combat trafficking of weapons of mass destruction. The NIS program is aimed at helping international partners to create and enhance their export control systems to combat trafficking of weapons of mass destruction. The programs do not duplicate efforts, coordinate closely with each other, and conduct quarterly DOE-DTRA Bridge meetings.

Evidence: ProStrat Policy Coordination Committee meeting notes, IAEA Guidelines for Physical Protection Revision Working Group meeting notes, Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear Energy Cooperation meeting minutes, and action sheets all contain information on the program's collaboration with related programs. The export control training and outreach sub-program coordinates with the State Department's Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program, and both programs participate in an interagency group to coordinate all U.S. Government export control assistance programs. The program develops technology, instrumentation, and analytical methodologies to support implementation of international safeguards at all types of nuclear facilities. The purpose of these technologies is to verify that nuclear materials are not being diverted to non-peaceful applications and to detect undeclared nuclear activities. The program also develops verification tools and technologies for use in verifying the nuclear programs of countries of proliferation concern. Safeguards and verification technologies do more than just detect and identify materials; they allow us to know how much material is there, its isotopic composition, and even its geographic origin. The program draws heavily upon the expertise at the national laboratories in the areas of reactor physics, the fuel cycle, non-destructive assay, and mass spectrometry. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) focuses on in-theater (ie, battlefield) technologies to detect unconventional weapons. This includes nuclear devices, but DTRA's true specialty is chemical/biological detection. The goal of these technologies is primarily to alert on-ground personnel that they may be exposed to unconventional weapons.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program is covered by the Department of Energy's (DOE) financial management policies, procedures, and practices that meet all statutory requirements. DOE provides the accounting services for all programs in the National Nuclear Security Administration, and DOE's financial management processes are free of material internal control weaknesses. The NIS program staff reviews accounting reports on a monthly basis to monitor obligations and costs for all projects and sites. The FY07 Financial Statements Audit gave an unqualified opinion that DOE financial systems, to include all NNSA programs, are in good standing.

Evidence: The DOE Financial Management Orders and PPBE Guidance Documents provide evidence of the strong financial management practices employed by the program. The FY07 Financial Statements Audit resulting in a favorable rating of the DOE financial systems appears in the DOE FY07 Agency Financial Report.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program has taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies. For example, the NIS program significantly overhauled its scientist redirection sub-program's invoice system in order to reduce the amount of funding that is not obligated in a given year and, thus, is carried over into the next year. Since making several small changes, the amount of this unobligated carryover funding has been reduced by 62% from FY 2003 to FY 2007 and continues to decrease. To ensure that deficiencies are limited, the NIS program issued the Project Management Requirements Document to improve management by identifying roles and responsibilities and explaining processes. Since FY 2007, the program has implemented a personnel training program at no cost that is tailored to the needs of the staff with courses focusing on project management.

Evidence: The NIS program invited a national lab to review its project management and then issued the Project Management Requirements Document to improve management deficiencies. The program also established a Training Program with several courses on project management to improve the development of its staff.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program has demonstrated significant progress in achieving three of its three long-term performance goals. In FY07, the program confirmed that 315 cumulative metric tons of Russian highly enriched uranium (equivalent to 12,600 nuclear weapons) has been permanently eliminated and is on track to confirm a cumulative total of 500 metric tons by 2014. In addition, it obtained 75% in cumulative matching funds for the scientist engagement sub-program from private sector and foreign governments relative to the cumulative US Government funding contributions and is on track to have 100% cumulative matching funds by 2019. In FY07, the NIS program scored 7 of 41 countries where the export control outreach sub-program is engaged to have export control systems that meet critical requirements.

Evidence: The sub-program that is responsible for confirming the elimination of Russian weapons material conducts Special Monitoring Visits at Russian sites and analyzes data it collects along with data it receives from Russian records. These data are analyzed extensively and cross-checked against receipts from the Paducah Gasseous Diffusion Plant and historical data to confirm that, to date, 315 cumulative metric tons has been permanently eliminated. The scientist redirection sub-program tracks the contributions from non-US Government sources relative to US Government funding using its Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADA). The export control outreach sub-program maintains the scores in each critical element for the countries where it is engaged to improve export control systems.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program has achieved and, in some cases, exceeded its performance goals for five of its five annual performance measures. In FY 2006 and 2007, the NIS program exceeded its outcome target for confirmation of cumulative metric tons of Russian weapons-usable HEU as permanently eliminated. The program met all of its FY 2004 through FY 2007 annual targets for cumulative non-USG funding contributions relative to cumulative USG funding contributions to redirect WMD scientists/personnel to peaceful purposes. In FY07, the export control outreach sub-program met its target of 7 of 41 countries where it is engaged having export control systems that meet critical requirements. In FY07, the program met its target to deploy and use 3 safeguards systems in international regimes and other countries to address safeguards deficiencies. In FY93 through FY07, the NIS program met its annual target to conduct 24 annual Special Monitoring Visits to confirm the permanent elimination of Russian HEU taken from the Russian weapons stockpile. With this PART, there are two additional annual performance measures: the number of annual special monitoring visits and the annual number of safeguard systems deployed. However, because these measures are new, they will have no performance until the end of FY 2008. While these measures are new and there are no established targets before FY08, the NIS program does have data available that demonstrates results for previous year(s) that are in line with current targets.

Evidence: For the nuclear material elimination sub-program, the 1993 U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement and its implementing contract record the goals, the Special Monitoring Visits at Russian sites confirm that material was downblended, and receipts from the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant serve as evidence that material subsequently is received in the United States.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program has improved efficiencies to achieve its goals as well as other efficiencies in implementing its sub-programs. After years of working to eliminate an annual 30 metric tons of Russian nuclear material, the sub-program achieved three metric tons, or 1,000 kilograms, over target in 2006. The NIS program is increasing the cumulative non-US Government funding to achieve cost effectiveness for its program to redirect weapons scientists/personnel to peaceful purposes. In FY 2007, the program had 75% matching funds from non-US Government sources. The non-US Government funding allows the sub-program to accelerate and expand projects, as well as involve U.S. industry partners at the start of the project to increase the chances of commercialization. In developing its new program management system, the NIS program took advantage of the effort already conducted by the Global Threat Reduction Initiative resulting in cost savings for NIS.

Evidence: The scientist redirection sub-program uses its Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADA) to track the matching funds it receives from non-US Government sources. A CRADA is a written agreement between a private company and a government agency to work together on a project. The cumulative amount of matching funds are tracked on a spreadsheet and compared with the sub-program's federal budget.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: No other government or private agency has a purpose or goals similar to the Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program, nor the plans or specialized infrastructure to meet the goals. However, the program does monitor the execution of other DOE/NNSA programs and non-DOE programs with related processes to improve program management and execution. The program is unique in that it brings technical and political expertise across the broad spectrum of U.S. efforts to prevent and counter WMD proliferation. The sub-program responsible for eliminating Russian nuclear material has eliminated more than 330 metric tons of highly enriched uranium, which is more material than any other US Government program. The NIS program's performance compares favorably to the complementary programs at DoD's Defense Treat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the State Department where there is marginal redundancy in overall mission. In some cases, the NIS program's performance is superior. DTRA's International Counterproliferation Program (ICP) does provide some training to deter, detect, investigate, and respond to the attempted proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The ICP contacted the NIS' export control training and outreach sub-program to review training materials and use NIS national lab experts on occasion. The ICP training materials contained inaccuracies that were corrected cost-free by NIS experts, and the ICP trainers were not commodity specialists and had no task to develop sustainable trainings.

Evidence: NNSA Strategic Plan and Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) Annual Program Reviews describe the unique goals and capabilities of the program. The International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) is recognized as the world-wide weapons of mass destruction-related technology training expert and employs a team of over 45 technical specialists from eight national laboratories. INECP develops annual country engagement plans that measure proliferation threats and risks to tailor its long-term activities. Its Commodity Identification Training program was developed in 2002 and has been provided in over 40 countries, with 25 of these countries now in the process of developing their own trainers to provide this curriculum to thousands of frontline inspectors. GAO 08-21 recognized that INECP was the only US Government program able to demonstrate an ability to have a measured impact on the capability of countries to prevent the illicit transfer of weapons of mass destruction-related commodities.

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: A 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of the Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program's export control outreach sub-program, known as the International Nonproliferation Export Control program (INECP), found that the sub-program's risk analysis processes are documented more thoroughly than those at the State Department. GAO determined that INECP not only requires annual program assessments but conducted them for all of its assistance recipients for FY03-06. However, a 2007 GAO audit of the program's scientist redirection sub-program questioned the credibility of one of the critical measures used to assess its progress and performance, the continuing need for the sub-program given the growth of the Russian economy, and the large unobligated carryover in recent years. Several U.S. industry and Congressional representatives have expressed support for scientist redirection and continue to place value on efforts to redirect scientists to peaceful work. NNSA plans to work with all stakeholders, including U.S. industry and Congress, to reach a consensus on strategic direction as the program goes forward. The sub-program responsible for eliminating 500 MT of highly enriched uranium is in year 15 of a 20-year program, has never missed an annual performance target, and, though not recently, was evaluated by GAO in 1999 (GAO/RCED-99-194) as an effective program. With the installation of the Blend Down Monitoring System (BDMS) in 2004 at the third and final downblending site, every kilogram of HEU downblended to LEU is continuously monitored. The NIS program does not consider the need for an independent evaluation of this mature sub-program because it maintains steady state mode and continues to meet performance targets and, more importantly, because independent confirmation is received from the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC) documenting the amount of downblended material delivered to the United States.

Evidence: GAO 08-189 reviewed the scientist redirection sub-program and reported that the sub-program overstated its results, does not have an exit strategy, and has poor funds management resulting in excess unobligated balances. In conclusion, GAO made 11 recommendations, including reassessment of the program. GAO 08-21 reviewed the export control outreach sub-program as part of a larger report on multilateral and bilateral efforts and proposals to counter nuclear proliferation networks, and concluded that DOE's risk analysis and country assessments are a good method for measuring the impact of our efforts to strengthen export control systems. There have been no other recent GAO or independent evaluations, and the program is working to arrange independent evaluations to take place at least on an annual basis.