<DOC>
[108th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:96473.wais]
CATHOLICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA
=======================================================================
ROUNDTABLE
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 17, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
______
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House
Senate
JIM LEACH, Iowa, Chairman CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska, Co-Chairman
DAVID DREIER, California CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming
FRANK WOLF, Virginia SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOE PITTS, Pennsylvania PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
SANDER LEVIN, Michigan GORDON SMITH, Oregon
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio MAX BAUCUS, Montana
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
DAVID WU, Oregon DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce
JAMES KELLY, Department of State
STEPHEN J. LAW, Department of Labor
John Foarde, Staff Director
David Dorman, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
Madsen, Richard, professor of sociology, University of California
at San Diego, San Diego, CA.................................... 2
Carroll, Sister Janet, program associate, U.S. Catholic China
Bureau, South Orange, NJ....................................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Madsen, Richard.................................................. 28
Carroll, Sister Janet............................................ 30
CATHOLICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA
----------
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2004
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China
Washington, DC.
The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10
a.m., in room 2515, Rayburn House Office Building, John Foarde
[staff director] presiding.
Also present: David Dorman, deputy staff director; Erin
Mewhirter, office of Grant Aldonas, Under Secretary of Commerce
for International Trade; Susan Weld, general counsel; and Mark
Milosch, special advisor.
Mr. Foarde. Good morning to everyone, and thank you for
coming to this issues roundtable of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China. My name is John Foarde. I am the staff
director and represent Chairman Jim Leach.
We will have some other CECC staff, and we hope some
personal staff from some of our commissioners, coming in due
course to attend this morning. I would like to thank everybody
who has come out on this cloudy, rainy day to join us.
We are here this morning to examine Catholics and civil
society in China. Most experts agree that Chinese citizens will
not enjoy substantial religious freedom until they are free to
form unsupervised religious associations and organizations.
Between 1949 and 1978, the Chinese Government destroyed China's
relatively under-developed civil society. But since 1978, the
Chinese people have
rebuilt some of the institutions of civil society, despite
strict government limits.
The government generally gives little latitude to religious
believers to form private voluntary associations, but in recent
years has permitted the formation of a network of Catholic
social services, while tightening restrictions on Catholics in
other areas.
This morning we want to examine recent developments in
Catholic institutions of civil society in China, and assess in
what areas there might be some scope for future liberalization,
or might be the possibility of additional restrictions.
We have two distinguished panelists to help us this
morning. Richard Madsen is professor of sociology at the
University of California at San Diego, and we are grateful for
him coming all this way to share his expertise with us, and
Sister Janet Carroll, the program associate with the U.S.
Catholic China Bureau, who is here on the east coast, but also
had to travel to Washington to join us, and we are grateful for
that as well.
As we have at our roundtables over the last three years, we
will give each panelist 10 minutes for an opening presentation,
and then launch a round of questions from the staff panel until
we either run out of steam or get to 11:30, whichever comes
first.
So, without further ado, let me recognize Professor Madsen
for his presentation, please.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD MADSEN, PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA AT SAN DIEGO, SAN DIEGO, CA
Mr. Madsen. It is a great honor for me to speak at this
roundtable and to have a chance to share what expertise I have
on the situation of the Catholic Church in China.
The first thing I would say, very briefly, is that the
Catholic Church in China in many ways is an extremely vital
institution. Many people had pretty much given it up for dead
after the Communists took over in China in 1949, including many
foreign missionaries who thought that many of their Catholics
were basically ``rice Christians,'' poorly educated in the
faith, who would not stand up to the tremendous persecution
they ended up facing. So it was to the surprise even of
Catholic missionaries, I think, as well as to secular scholars
and to other people, to see how, in the 1980s, the church
rebounded and has become a very dynamic, very vital
institution.
The Catholic Church in China is characterized in many
places by enormous fervent devotion and commitment to the
faith, sometimes, of course, under daunting obstacles. The
church is developing new forms of organization of social
services, as we are going to talk about later, and is ordaining
a steady stream of new priests; religious sisters are being
professed; and the numbers of Catholics are steadily, although
somewhat slowly, growing. There are approximately 12 million
Catholics in China today.
At the same time, the church is faced with some severe
problems. There is a problem of factionalization between the
so-called underground church and the official church, and also
problems related to the lack of numbers of new priests that
would be needed to fill the gap caused by the retirements and
deaths of an older generation of priests, because there were
not that many priests ordained in the middle period during the
repressive Mao Zedong years. So, there is a lack of priests, a
lack of money, and factionalism.
Over and above that, there is a problem, I think, with the
capacity of the church to sometimes adapt itself to the dynamic
secularizing influences of modernization and of urbanization in
the coastal areas of China.
The Catholic Church is strongest in China in the
countryside, in the hinterlands. In major cities like Shanghai,
even though the city is a site of a long-lasting Catholic
community, the number of young people willing to become priests
and the level of commitment begins to pale in comparison with
the countryside, because for some reason the way the faith has
been formulated and organized does not seem to match the
experience and aspirations of people who are caught up in
modernizing or urbanizing society. So, these are challenges
that the Catholic Church faces, daunting challenges.
But in my written statement, I mentioned that in some
respects the Catholic Church in China is more dynamic,
flourishing, and in better shape than, say, the Catholic Church
in America or Europe, where, by many measures, the Church is in
somewhat of a decline, reeling from scandal in the United
States, whereas in China, it is on an upward trajectory, in
spite of all its problems.
Comparing the Church in China with the Church in America is
like comparing apples and oranges. But there is no reason to
say that the Catholic Church in China is in terrible shape,
especially in comparison with us. In many ways, it is an
inspiration to us all.
The development of the Catholic Church in China is part and
parcel of very dynamic development of civil society in China.
The way I defined civil society in my written statement is a
very simple, basic kind of definition: whenever you have a
market economy, whenever you have mobility and the capacity of
people to transcend family and local community, and form new
kinds of associations, whenever you have these kinds of
opportunities created by a dynamic market economy, you are
going to have a civil society. You are going to have all sorts
of new forms of organizations. And you have this in China.
The classic problem of western social theory has been how
you take a civil society, which is an inevitable thing, and
make sure that this works toward stability, justice, and peace.
All our great thinkers, from John Locke to Alexis de
Tocqueville and even to Karl Marx tried to deal with this
problem. In China, they are wrestling with this problem, too.
In an earlier period, the basic instinct of the Chinese
Government was to suppress civil society. The government saw
this as a fundamental problem. Now, they basically, I think,
have come to the point where they realize that you cannot
suppress it. The issue is how they channel it. To do that, they
are going to have a rule of law. They are going to have to have
a framework within which a civil society can be set free, but
also regulated so that it works for the common good.
The framework through which the Chinese are going to do
this is inevitably going to be different from the one in our
society. I gave a talk about civil society, kind of a testimony
to the Political Consultative Congress of Shanghai, which is a
quasi-legislative body--I was the first foreigner to do this
two years ago. After the talk, one of the members came up to me
and said, ``I think I misunderstood you. It sounded to me like
you said that in America the laws and the government allow
groups in civil society to do whatever they want as long as
they do not hurt anybody, and they make no effort to make sure
they cohere into the common public good.'' I said, ``That is
exactly what I said.'' And she said, ``This cannot be.'' This
was totally outside the orbit of her way of thinking. She
assumed that the government has the responsibility to make
these groups work together for the common good.''
So the fundamental mentality we have at work here is
different from ours. I think it is very possible that this
mentality will change, but as China develops a framework for
civil society, it would probably be more directive and more
corporatist than we have here. However, I think it may
eventually allow for a greater degree of flexibility and
freedom than we have today. So the Catholic Church is part of
the civil society.
Because civil society in China is both very active, but
poorly regulated and poorly protected, because guarantees of
freedom of association are not truly guaranteed under the law--
there are no rights of association that are firmly guaranteed
in the law; and because civil society flourishes in an
ambiguous legal limbo--because of all this, very messy kind of
tendencies develop. For one thing, groups in civil society
establish themselves and maintain themselves only through
sometimes extra-legal means, and even corrupt means, by buying
off people so as to gain freedom to act. The capacity of such
groups to organize themselves and to keep going is always
contingent on very particularistic and complicated kinds of
events.
The religious organizations in China are part and parcel of
this whole situation. So, religious organizations in China lead
a very perilous kind of existence. There are areas of freedom,
but they can be arbitrarily taken away. This creates,
sometimes, paranoid and closed attitudes. Sometimes they get
involved in complicated, messy sorts of compromises.
What I would say, therefore, is that religious
organizations in China, including the Catholic Church, are part
and parcel of this kind of civil society. You cannot see the
Church as kind of an island of moral and religious purity in
the midst of a corrupt, messy society. The Church is part of
the world. The world is complicated and messy, and the Church
engages in all that messiness. At the same time, Catholics,
like other non-Christian people in China, are searching for new
ways to live a decent life and to serve people in new ways. I
am sure Sister Janet will talk about all the new Catholic
organizations that are being created with the social service
organizations.
The Catholic Church in China is faced with particular
challenges that maybe are somewhat special to the Catholic
Church in comparison, say, with certain kinds of Protestant
communities. One issue is that the Catholic Church tends to be
more rooted in local village and family organizations, and has
a more difficult time transcending these. Another problem is
that, because of the situation with the Vatican, it is very
difficult for the Catholic Church to organize itself and speak
with one voice.
Because of all this, you cannot have a unified Catholic
presence, and it would be more difficult to develop large-scale
civil society organizations, such as Catholic Charities, in
China. So this makes the Catholic situation in China somewhat
special, but in general it is part of the overall situation
about a messy, but emerging, civil society.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Madsen appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Foarde. Thank you for giving us a good start and a lot
of food for thought as we go into the question and answer
session a little later.
Let us go on. Let me recognize Sister Janet Carroll. Sister
Janet served as the executive director of the U.S. Catholic
China Bureau from 1989 to 2003, and continues to serve as a
program associate. She is widely published on Church and China
issues, and has been a panelist and lecturer on these subjects,
and we are delighted to have her with us this morning.
Please go ahead.
STATEMENT OF JANET CARROLL, M.M., PROGRAM ASSOCIATE, U.S.
CATHOLIC CHINA BUREAU, SOUTH ORANGE, NJ
Sister Janet Carroll. Thank you, Mr. Foarde. Let me also
express my gratitude to be able to be here this morning. We
have been aware of the work of this Commission for several
years and been in contact previously during the hearings and
other things that we follow very closely.
I would like to certainly commend the Commission for that
work. In the words of your co-chair, Senator Hagel, this idea
that, as the United States Government and the Government of
China, we can work closely together for the common good and
common interest, not only of our own national interests, but
also for the people. Second, as I have said as a caveat, that
it is also important for the American people and the Chinese
people to work together. That is where I think the civil
society issue is best engaged.
Professor Madsen has already sketched out the background on
the Church situation, and the Church, as it struggles forward
in China today, as it does, indeed, in many lands, our own
included.
My experience has always been grounded in my own personal
experience of having worked in the field, albeit not in China
proper, but rather in Taiwan, many years in the mid-1950s,
1960s, and into the 1970s. But that experience of working with
the people at the grassroots level colors everything I do, and
even today when I visit China, my interest is always just to be
with the ordinary folks. I think it is there that the hope lies
for the future of the Church, indeed, for the future of the
country.
I will try to stick more closely to the statement I
prepared and simply lift up a few aspects of it that perhaps
will complement what Mr. Madsen has already shared with us. I
think, as he has indicated, no matter how you construe the
developments in the last quarter century, the signs of renewed
opportunities for social services and civil society certainly
exist. I use these two words interchangeably in the sense that,
insofar as the Church will organize social services and social
welfare programs, that is in my view the contribution for the
moment that the Church will make to civil society. It is always
important to remember that in China, everything you hear is
true in one place and in one time, but may not be true in the
next place and the next time, which makes it difficult
sometimes for us to deal with all that ambiguity. There are a
lot of contextual perspectives which we have to bear in mind
when we are going to look at the situation, and I think Dick
has already raised some of them.
But I would just highlight that the cultural and social
traditions, as they are evolving in China, give an opportunity
for Christianity, in general--certainly the Catholic Church--to
also engage in providing new ethical and moral foundations for
the emergence of a civil society. The civil society has to be
grounded in these underpinnings. While there is cause for
concern and caution about the situation, there certainly are
these unparalleled opportunities which the churches can take.
Christianity can make an important contribution to a life
ethic, as a philosophy, but also through the very services that
the churches can render.
Many of us would be familiar with the extensive program of
social services: schools, hospitals, clinics, all manner of
social ministries, orphanages, and so forth, that the
missionary church provided in China until the 1950s. Today, of
course, the local Catholic Church in China has the prerogative
to establish its own ministries in that regard. I think that,
given the limited resources, both material resources as well as
human resources, they are doing an outstanding job in getting
started. I have left, on the distribution table for people to
take, four or five samples of so-called Catholic social service
centers which are already functioning in China today, some of
them more or less developed. Perhaps the best known one, with
the most structure, is the Beifang Jinde Center in Hebei
Province in northern China, about three hours from Beijing.
They work extensively throughout the country trying to respond
to rescue and relief needs when there are tragedies like
flooding and earthquake and other disasters. They are trying to
make an effort to respond to the HIV/AIDS crisis, and other
programs of interest, and they are doing quite well.
There is another center getting under way in the northeast
of China in the city of Shenyang, organized by the Liaoning
Diocese. You can read about their programs and what they are
envisioning, and the perspective they take on engaging in the
society and in service. I also brought along a copy of a
newsletter of another very well-established social service
agency in the diocese of Xi'an in western China, which has
quite a bit of work underway, spread out very extensively in
the village areas of Shaanxi Province. I've already brought to
your attention the well-known Catholic Intelligentsia
Association of Shanghai. Under a rather archaic title they have
existed in Shanghai since the mid-1980s--soon after the Church
there reopened. A small group of Catholic professionals came
together to offer pro bono services in the fields of legal,
medical, and social service.
Another area in which I think the Catholic Church can
contribute in China, where they are indeed struggling, is to
look at the culture as it engages with modernity and the whole
new development of a market economy. How can Christianity
become a living interlocutor with Chinese culture, and help it
to reinterpret its history, prepare for the New China that the
government is seeking to bring into existence? A famous slogan
that Chinese political leaders use as a challenge to the people
is ``to create a new spiritual civilization.'' This is our kind
of religious language, yet it is interesting to hear this kind
of language coming from the so-called atheistic authorities in
China. So I would say that the post-1978 People's Republic of
China, the ``New China,'' already now passing its first quarter
century of existence, is facing this challenge of creatively
reinventing its traditional value system and its moral
categories in order to have new interpretive models. With these
models, they can not only make sense of their past and find
common ground in the present for the good of the people, but
also can move toward the future, which will enable them to play
their rightful role in the international community.
Civil society will be an integral part of the
transformation that is happening in China. It has to be
structured in a manner consistent with the values, virtues, and
cultures of that ancient and great civilization. One of the
things those of us who have tried to engage and work with the
Chinese churches must remember, and I think it is one of the
ways you will see organizations working in China, is to give
priority to the principles of harmony and right relationships
that are central to the Chinese psyche. Those two elements of
seeking harmony and the smooth way to go, and of being in right
relationships, whether it is with the government or one's
peers, or caring for the needy and the poor in society, have to
bear great weight in the restructuring of China's civil
society. It is time, I think, for a new dialogue, not only
within China, but internationally with China, to move in this
direction.
Finally, I would like to speak a little bit about the needs
that are out there, about how the programs are organized, and
why these programs have the character that they do when you
look at the literature.
There are many needs and many ways that the Church could
serve if it had the resources, if it had the support and
assistance from sister churches, and from other organizations
in the social services sector.
Before our roundtable this morning, we were talking about
developments in the field of law. The Chinese welcome and are
open to work together with those who can assist them in
preparing their own human resources to meet the goal of
creating a rule of law.
In the field of general education, while the churches are
not yet permitted to sponsor schools as such, a great deal of
work is being done in the field of informal and supplementary
education. Similarly, collaborative efforts would be welcome in
the social and medical fields. I mention the HIV/AIDS pandemic,
which necessarily needs help from every quarter. The churches
are already playing a tremendous role--both Catholic and
Protestant groups--in trying to respond to this crisis, mainly
by training personnel and collaborating with local health
bureaus in designing programs.
I have included in the packet of materials on the
distribution table for those who may find it of interest, a
response to some questions that might be asked as we think
about religiously sponsored social service projects in China.
How do these organizations function? What kinds of limitations
do they struggle under?, and so forth.
I think direct responses are always valuable: verbatim from
one of the directors of such programs regarding these concerns.
What sorts of supervision and restrictions that these agencies
work under simply because they are church sponsored? My
interluctor noted that strictly speaking, there were no written
rules that make them any different from other organizations.
But they indeed are supervised, especially those agencies and
organizations that try to relate internationally and have
funding from foreign contacts and foreign personnel coming in
to assist them with their programs. These are delicate areas,
and there is a lot of government supervision when a social
service agency in China functions in that way. Other people may
ask if it depends on who's in charge? Indeed, it does. My
source mentioned that, again, harmony and right relationships
are very important. When there are competent people in both a
local government ministry as well as in the Church side of the
organization and they can discuss and agree on common concerns,
things go well.
Another question that is asked is, ``What is the primary
concern that the government might have about these kinds of
religiously affiliated organizations? ''
I would say, as the Xi'an director said, that the primary
concern--and this is something we have certainly not been shy
about in the past--is that these programs would be used for
what they would judge to be ulterior purposes. In other words,
to put it very bluntly, a social service program whose real
goal was to proselytize or convert people to Christianity
rather than to just altruistically serve the people. We know
that, unfortunately, some overly zealous groups use these
methods. Regrettably, the Chinese Government perceives them as
detrimental to its interests.
If I might, just one final comment in terms of what kind of
restrictions, perhaps, these groups appear to be under. I
interviewed a young woman doctor who is currently doing her
studies at Pace University in hospital administration and has
been working in the diocese in Hebei. She mentioned that,
coming up now, it appears that there is much stricter control
in terms of the objectivity of the social services that I
already alluded to, but more importantly, that standards are
rising all the time. In the old days, the missionaries could do
whatever as long as they were doing good deeds. But now it is
not sufficient that the Church just have a clinic that perhaps
is not staffed with personnel with high professional standards,
and does not use up-to-norm methods, pharmaceuticals, or
clinical tests, and so forth. So she mentioned to me that more
and more small clinics run by the churches in the countryside
are being closed because they lack these standards and
capacities to follow the local norms. She was of the opinion
that this situation was probably good, because the churches
need to bring them up to modern standards. In fact, her being
here finishing her degree in this field is a function of her
local bishop's concern about having adequately credentialed
professional staff who will administer these social service
programs for that diocese.
Thank you very much for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Sister Janet Carroll appears in
the appendix.]
Mr. Foarde. Sister Janet, thank you very much. Both
presentations have given us a lot of ideas and concepts to
discuss. I will let you both rest your voices for a minute
while I make an administrative announcement or two. The
Congressional-Executive Commission on China will have a formal
hearing on Thursday,
September 23, beginning at 10:30 a.m. in this room, 2255. The
subject will be the situation in Hong Kong after the
Legislative Council elections on September 12. We will try to
take a look at constitutional development and universal
suffrage in Hong Kong, and what the prospects are for that.
The Commission will meet in a closed session in this room
at 10 a.m. on that same day, and so we will not admit people to
the room until just before the 10:30 hearing begins. But you
are all welcome to come, and we would very much like to see you
there.
The Commission is charged by statute to issue a report each
year, which may contain recommendations to the President and to
the Congressional leadership. In keeping with that statutory
mandate, we will release the annual report for 2004 on Tuesday,
October 5. The room, I think, will be room 1116 Longworth, but
please look at the Web site. Of course, we will send out an
announcement in a couple of weeks to remind people about that
date and time for the Annual Report press conference.
Chairman Leach and Co-Chairman Hagel will preside at the
hearing next week, and also at the press conference to
introduce the report on October 5.
With that, let us go to the question and answer session. I
will exercise the prerogative of the chair to leap right into
it.
Our Commission members are very interested in the dynamics
between the underground Church and the open Church. We wondered
if communities of underground believers have tried to form any
voluntary associations or band together to do the sort of
social service work that is apparently being done in the open
Church by the groups that Sister Janet and Dick alluded to
during their presentations. Can you comment on that?
Mr. Madsen. First of all, I would say they have a
tremendous, quite sophisticated capacity for organization that
transcends just local villages and communities. There is an
underground Catholic bishops conference that gets interrupted
by the police. Over and above that, if by civil society you
include all sorts of voluntary organizations, they do lots of
work in getting the money together to build churches and other
buildings in places such as Wenzhou. There are all these
beautiful churches that they have built. Some of them have been
destroyed recently, but there is the capacity to get themselves
organized to build the churches and to raise money, sometimes
from foreign sources. A lot of that kind of activity goes on.
I think, because they are not officially registered, they
are under pressure and are more concerned about survival than
about expanding social services such as works of charity,
although I think there is a fair amount of work that goes on in
helping each other in local communities. But they would have a
difficult time doing so in the formalized way that the official
Church can do it.
Mr. Foarde. Useful. Sister Janet, please.
Sister Janet Carroll. I would also--and Dick, in his own
paper made a point on this which I would respond also to--say,
just to clarify that these, these hard-line distinctions that
we make between underground and open, or whatever terms you
want to use, registered and unregistered is what I prefer to
use, are not always useful. None of the activities we have been
talking about happened without the acquiescence, formal or
informal, of the local authorities. So in our understanding,
there is no such thing as things happening that nobody knows
about.
However, to address your question, would a church in a
given city or a countryside area that is not registered--could
that church start a social service program? Maybe not formally,
I think, in the sense of having it have a name like Catholic
Social Service Center of x location, but in fact they are doing
it. The work is going on.
More importantly, a lot of these organizations that are
formally established--and I would say that there are probably
more than just the four or five that we have illustrated here
this morning--the people working in them are Catholics who
belong, across the board, to different communities which choose
one position or the other. I know, myself, for many of the
young sisters, for example, that would be doing a lot of this
ministry, their natural sympathies would be with the
unregistered communities because their families belong to those
traditions and that is where they come from. But in terms of
the objective work they do, they are there working in the
structures that enable them to do the ministry.
Mr. Foarde. Thank you. And thank you for bringing up
another point which I would like to follow up on a little bit,
and that is the blurring distinction between registered and
unregistered Catholics, open or underground, or however we
might describe them. That is something that we on the
Commission staff have only begun to understand a lot better
this year. I am glad you brought that up.
I am very short on time, so I think I am just going to pass
the questioning on to my friend and colleague, Dave Dorman, who
represents Senator Chuck Hagel, our Co-chairman.
Dave.
Mr. Dorman. Well, first of all, thank you, to both of you,
for coming today. The issues of religious freedom, freedom of
association, and civil society in China are all ones that I
know Senator Hagel considers very important, and very important
to the Commission. I am sure that all of our Commissioners
share this view. I do not think you have testified before the
Commission before, and we
always try to draw the greatest variety of viewpoints and the
greatest variety of expertise that we possibly can. So, thank
you for coming today.
I had the opportunity to read your written statement last
night, Professor Madsen. I wanted to ask you something that has
been puzzling many of us here on the dais for quite some time.
You mention in your written statement that many of the
activities of the Church would not be possible without the
informal acquiescence of government officials. This is
something that many of us here have actually experienced during
travel in China: the differences between provinces, the
differences between regions, sometimes subtle, sometimes quite
apparent.
We have our own theories of why that, in fact, is the case.
But I wonder if you could give us your views on whether you
believe there are variations from province to province and from
region to region regarding the degree of control, the degree of
regulation, and the degree of harassment, and if so why these
variations exist.
Mr. Madsen. Again, this speaks to a point that Sister Janet
just made about the way in which underground and above-ground
factions in the Church blend together. There is a huge gray
area between the extreme members of either side.
If you look at the formal structures of China at provisions
guaranteeing the hegemony of the Communist Party, and even look
at the Constitution, on paper it looks like a classic
totalitarian system. But in reality, the capacity of the
central government to control the society is rather weak and
becoming weaker all the time, partly because of the dynamism of
this market economy, partly because of corruption and other
factors. So there is a lot of practical space for people in
different places to organize themselves in ways that go beyond
the government's written regulations. People throughout China
find ways to make their own kinds of peace with the system. The
capacity to do this varies with many different factors
involved, one of which is distance from Beijing. But other
factors enter in as well.
So what you get is enormous variability across China, and
in some places, as far as religious groups are concerned, there
is tremendous freedom to practice whatever you want,
underground or above-ground.
With respect to these so-called underground churches, in
many places people are not living in the catacombs, you know.
They are not doing what they are doing in hiding. They are
building beautiful churches that everyone can see. They are
publicly visible, even though they are not officially
registered. To make this all happen, you have to have local
officials at least be willing to look the other way. Sometimes
it is done through bribery, pay offs, and so forth. Sometimes
it is done simply because local officials do not have the
energy to go after some of these churches. They have other
priorities. Sometimes a combination of the above. But this
happens in contingent ways, in ways that are variable across
the board. The problem however, is that none of this activity
is protected by rights under the law, so that if local
officials change, if the national situation changes for some
reason, this can be taken away from them. So that is why you
get this tremendous instability.
But, in general, there is enormous variation in China and
enormous areas of practical freedom, although freedom is not
guaranteed under the law. That, itself, causes problems.
Mr. Dorman. Thank you.
Sister Janet Carroll. If I might build on that response. I
think that it is the old ``glass half empty or half full''
paradigm that comes into play. I think that my experience with
the young people, meaning the new younger leadership among the
clergy, religious, and the laity who are taking the leadership
in the churches, they tend to be future-oriented people. They
are not looking back, or even being constricted by present
realities. But they are trying to prepare themselves for the
future. It is much more important that they be given the
capacity to act and enabled so that when, indeed, a more viable
field for them to function comes into the rule of law in China,
they will be ready to do it. So, they make the necessary
adjustments.
I would not say it is all being opportunistic or pragmatic,
or anything like that, or just compromising, but they try to
work realistically in that situation. Thus, they are less
concerned about what they are not able to do, and they are much
more concerned--as I remember Father Chen said to me when I
recently visited the Social Service Center at Xi'an--there is
so much to do that they can do, that they really are not going
to get themselves all in a snit about what they cannot do.
Mr. Foarde. Useful. Thank you. I would like to recognize
Susan Roosevelt Weld, the general counsel of the Commission,
for some questions.
Susan.
Ms. Weld. My first question has to do with what Sister
Janet said about a person from a traditionally Catholic family,
which is unregistered, deciding to register and serve in some
of the official organizations. Is that typical? It seems to me
that is one reason, a very strong reason, why there would be
blurring of the two communities.
Sister Janet Carroll. Absolutely. And, strictly speaking,
individuals--and Dick can correct me on this if necessary--do
not have to register, in other words, the average Catholic who
just wants to go to Mass on Sunday or take part in some
activity. It is the leadership and those who are responsible
for the Church in an institutional, juridical sense, and the
Church itself as a place of worship, and so forth. But an
average Catholic does not even necessarily have to belong to
the Catholic Patriotic Association, although obviously they are
encouraged to join.
So that explains it. Many of the young graduate students
that we now are sponsoring in this country for studies--there
are quite a few of them here right in the Washington area--
clergy, religious, and others, come from those types of
families. But they know that the future requires them to be
prepared. And the way they can have that opportunity for
preparation is to go through the system and seize the
opportunity. So, yes, it is quite common, I would say.
Mr. Madsen. I would just reiterate what Sister Janet said,
that as far as individuals are concerned, they do not have to
be registered. It is just the institution that has to be
registered. And individuals have different approaches to this.
Some people in the
so-called underground faction of the Church would not be caught
dead inside an official Church, and that is all there is to it.
But others want to receive the sacraments and want to be part
of it, so they would attend if it were convenient and
available. Sometimes they make distinctions. For instance, I
think when I did a research project in the 1990s--it may have
changed in the last few years--sometimes Catholics, for
instance, go to confession. They might not want to go to
confession to a priest in the official church because they
might be afraid that the priest might be under pressure to tell
somebody, and so forth. They could not trust them. But they
would go to Mass, maybe, in an official church, but not to
confession. And in some cases, if someone were dying and wanted
to receive the Last Rites, they would want to be 100 percent
sure that the Rites were going to be sacramentally effective,
and thus they might go to an underground priest rather than an
above-ground priest. But then in the other circumstances they
would go into the official Church, et cetera. So, individual
Catholics would span the spectrum and there would be a lot of
gray areas, and very complicated sorts of things that would go
on.
Ms. Weld. Thank you. I am also interested in another thing.
Is there great suspicion of either unregistered or registered
Church members who have links, strong links, with, for example,
people from abroad who are working in China? I ask this
question because of that case recently in which communications
abroad were found to be a violation of laws against disclosing
state secrets. Is that a common situation? What is meant by
``state secrets'' in those cases? Do you know the cases I am
talking about? From Zhejiang Province.
Mr. Madsen. Communication abroad is always a sensitive
issue. You are not supposed to have communications abroad
without being officially supervised and receiving permission.
People have them anyway, of course. But that is one thing that
can always be used against you, so everyone violates that in a
way, but that gives government officials leverage to get rid of
anybody they do not like. Many of the underground and official
churches still depend a lot on foreign donations and foreign
help in various ways. They get a lot of help that comes from
different sources, sometimes from Taiwan, the Philippines, and
of course the United States. However,
because of the way China is set up, there is always an inherent
suspicion about foreign contacts, and they can be used against
you.
Sister Janet Carroll. Yes. Of course, some of this is
grounded in history and the experience--even our Holy Father
himself has apologized for certain excesses in the past where,
you know, apparently missionaries operating in good will were
also compromised in their way of functioning in China. We
frequently visit China. We take study groups over, what we call
religious study groups. I have led nine of them myself in the
last 10 or 12 years. We visit the churches. We spend time with
people there. It is very open, very above-board. To my
knowledge--I am certain they would tell us if it was the case--
that does not compromise our friends and those we meet with
locally. So, we have those kinds of contexts and
communications.
Nowadays, we regularly receive invitations to attend church
ceremonies, the taking of vows of sisters, dedication of new
churches, all these normal activities that churches have, and
we are invited to participate, and so on. So, I do no think
that they are penalized for being in contact with us. I think
those areas that you refer to are more a reaction by
authorities who were aware of things that were being done. As
we know, long documents governing foreigners' activities in the
field of religion in China have been elaborated, describing who
can preach, and so forth. And if those rules are violated,
well, then of course you then lend yourself to problems. In
many cases, as is true in every country, there are many laws on
the books that we do not like, but it does not mean that we can
violate them with impunity. So, you have to wait until the law
gets changed, and work for the change.
Mr. Foarde. Again, very useful. I would like now to
recognize our colleague who is responsible for organizing this
roundtable this morning and who has been looking at Catholicism
in China this past year for us, Mark Milosch, for some
questions. Mark.
Mr. Milosch. Sister Janet and Professor Madsen, I am very
glad to have met both of you today. My question is about civil
society as much as religion. I think many of us are concerned
with this issue because we want to learn the lessons from the
decline of Communism in eastern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s,
and its fall in 1989. I am wondering if you could compare the
position of civil society in China today, with particular
reference to the Catholic Church in China, with its position in
eastern Europe, particularly Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and
Czechoslovakia, in the 1980s.
Mr. Madsen. I think, around 1989, there were some people in
the Catholic Church, especially in the underground part of it,
who thought that they could make a contribution similar to that
of the church in Poland and perhaps in Hungary, in the 1980s.
That is, the church could bring down Communism. Some of them--
at least a few of them--thought that way. They had almost
apocalyptic understandings of this. This is one reason why the
government was so eager to crush them when it cracked down in
the early 1990s. I think that idea was certainly unrealistic,
because the Catholic Church in China is a small entity, 1
percent of the population, perhaps. In eastern Europe, in
Poland, especially, it was very large and identified closely
with Polish nationalism. The Catholic Church is too small in
China to really be a force that could totally transform the
Communist system.
But perhaps the problem is that Chinese society is somewhat
fragile these days. I think social stability and government
control are increasingly tenuous. In some respects, the
government is afraid that even little things can help breakdown
occur. ``A single spark can light a prairie fire,'' as Mao
Zedong said. So, they are on the lookout for any kinds of signs
of independent activity that would have the capacity to be a
nucleus of resistance of disaffected people. Since so much of
the Chinese Catholic Church is rural, and since the farmers
have so many reasons to be discontented, and there are
thousands of peasant riots every year, the government is afraid
that groups like the Catholic Church that do have the capacity
to organize beyond villages could be the nucleus of trouble.
As a matter of fact, although there have been literally
thousands of these peasant riots and disturbances in the last
several years, in no instance have Catholic organizations
directed them. So, while the government has lots of reasons to
fear instability, the Church generally has not been one of
them, but I think the authorities are wary and they are on the
lookout. I think this dynamic leads you to this situation, that
in general the authorities have not bothered the Church as much
as they might because they have other problems to deal with.
But if they have reason to be suspicious, then they can move
in, so you have an ebb and flow of repression and loosening up.
Sister Janet Carroll. The only thing I would add, perhaps,
to that, Mark--and I addressed this issue on the bottom of page
8 in my statement--is I think the Chinese Government is at
pains to learn the lessons from eastern Europe, certainly not
to repeat the political mistakes that were made. To my
understanding, the authorities are concerned about learning the
socio-economic lessons, to avoid the fragmentation and the
terrible factionalism, the ethnocentricity, and so forth, that
has exploded all over eastern Europe and is causing such grief.
They want to ensure that it not happen in a country such as
China, which could lend itself to that type of tension, and to
the great detriment of everyone concerned. On the economic
side, the government has made such progress, relatively
speaking, in the economic area, that they want to be sure that
it not all be lost or destroyed.
Frankly, I think what we often label as repression of
religious movements, even such as Falun Gong and so forth--
although I do not recognize Falun Gong as a religious movement
myself--should more properly be labeled as much more official
concern about the organizing capacity of those groups. It has
very little to do with religion and ideology. It has everything
to do with the fact that churches and spiritual groups can
organize vast numbers of people who could be used for something
other than the religious or spiritual purpose for which they
are initially organized.
Mr. Foarde. Really useful. Let me pick up the questioning
now. I want to go back to a couple of things that each of you
said in your opening statements. Sister Janet, you alluded to
the contribution of the missionary Church before the Revolution
in 1949 in building the institutions of civil society. But can
you tell us what happened to those institutions? Did they
disappear entirely? Are there vestiges of them today that were
picked up and invigorated in the 1970s? What was the dynamic of
that?
Sister Janet Carroll. Probably the most obvious would be
schools and a few hospitals. Let me say that, from the Catholic
side, the Catholic Church in China, as Dick has said many
times, was much more rural, and therefore was not as known for
large
institutions in the major cities, with the exception of Fudan
University in Shanghai, and so forth. However, there are more
institutions in the countryside. I think a lot of those, when
the properties were taken, and so forth, they just all went
away.
A lot of those properties are what is now being recovered,
actually through the services of the Catholic Patriotic
Association. So I think maybe it applies more to Protestant
Christianity, which had far more established colleges,
universities, and hospitals, and so forth. For example Peking
Medical College was originally a Protestant institution. A lot
of the buildings, of course, are back being what they were,
hospitals and schools. For example, the famous School of the
Sisters of the Sacred Heart, who were very famous for their
work. That school is still a school, but it is not any longer a
Catholic school. One of my very favorite ones, though, is the
very large building that the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary
had quite close to Tiananmen Square, a building that is now a
McDonald's.
Let me add one more point, though, about reparations. I
work with the United Board for Christian Education in Asia on
the China subcommittee, and I understand that a lot of
reparations were received for Christian colleges that had been
confiscated in China. I do not know if ``reparations'' is the
correct word. Nonetheless, money was received by the sponsoring
agencies among Protestant groups--which was held in trust and
is being used for programs to strengthen and develop tertiary
education all over the country today.
To my knowledge, and maybe Dick could speak to that, I know
certainly speaking for the Maryknoll Congregation now--I belong
to the Maryknoll order--we never received any funds or anything
like that for the properties that were taken. But we are happy
now that a lot of them are reverting to the Church and the
properties are being used again by the Church.
Mr. Foarde. If you have a comment, Dick, I would love to
hear it.
Mr. Madsen. One issue that also sometimes becomes a bone of
contention with the official and underground churches has to do
with the recovery of property that was confiscated in the 1950s
by the Communists. As part of the new policies on religion,
some of that property is supposed to come back to the churches.
The churches are being rebuilt and they are supposed to get
some of the property. Of course, the property, if it goes
anywhere, is going to go to registered churches, the official
churches. Sometimes the underground feels that it ought to be
getting this property instead. It is complicated, because some
of this property has become very valuable. For instance, the
property around the main cathedral in Shanghai was basically a
rural area in the early 20th century, but now it is the heart
of the commercial district of Shanghai. The real estate is
worth a fortune there. If the Church in Shanghai got all the
property back that it owned before 1949, it would be fabulously
wealthy. Even so, it has gotten a portion back and actually it
is quite well off because it has developed that into office
buildings, and so forth. The government is not going to give it
all back because it has become too valuable now, but then there
is contention about how much it should give back, and so forth.
This is one source of some of the controversies that you have
over the church money.
Mr. Foarde. Interesting.
Sister Janet Carroll. Frequently they will trade
properties, too. At Fushun in Liaoning Province, they have just
traded what had been Maryknoll property located in the heart of
the city for a large tract of land on the edge of town, given
to the Community of Sisters where they have now just built a
monumental building. They had to do that because the scope of
the land dictates the size of the building. So they built a
center, a home for their elderly sisters, and a formation and
training center for the young sisters, and so on. It was a
tradeoff. In fact, it was of interest to them. They really did
not want to be in the hubbub of the downtown market, anyway, so
they were glad to be rid of the property.
Mr. Foarde. Interesting. Let me go to Dave Dorman for more
questions.
Dave.
Mr. Dorman. Sister Janet, I wanted to refer to your written
statement. I appreciate your introduction and your reference to
the importance of seeking ways to build bridges and
opportunities with the Chinese Government and the Chinese
people, and to use these bridges in a constructive and
cooperative way to help China realize a democratic future. I am
sure that Senator Hagel would agree as well. I use that as an
opening because this Commission is dealing with some of the
most difficult and contentious issues in the U.S.-China
relationship. Some of those fall within the area of religion.
In your written statement, you build a very nuanced argument
that I found interesting.
In one paragraph, in particular, you refer to times where
Chinese Christians and other believers find themselves in
political conflict with the state, and then suggest that their
actions are too confrontational. Now, it seems to me--and I
emphasize the word ``seems''--that this sort of argument does
not take into account individuals in China who peacefully
express their religious views and find themselves in prison.
This is a difficult issue for the Commission. As both of you
have pointed out today, there are positive developments in
China regarding Catholics. At the same time, many religious
believers in China are suffering severe repression.
How would you add this piece to the argument that you
present in your written testimony? Also, I would ask, could you
offer some guidance to the Commission in terms of building
opportunities and bridges with China on the issue of religious
freedom.
Sister Janet Carroll. Well, it is very broad. Anyway, let
me just try to speak to a few things. Thank you for
acknowledging that. Again, one cannot say everything that one
wants to say, so I sometimes tend to want to say the things
that I feel have not been said clearly enough, in place of
other things that are said often.
First of all, let me make this clear: No one wants, in any
sense of the word, to gainsay the sufferings and the
difficulties of any people in China--religious believers
certainly among them--who have suffered simply because of their
conscience and their beliefs. We all know that this repression
is something that is just outright reprehensible, and people
should not be held in any way and made to suffer for their
beliefs.
It is not my intention ever to gainsay any of that. Indeed,
no matter how you got there, if you are the one that is in
these dire straits, there is nothing else that matters but
that, so you cannot really relativize it and say, ``Oh, well,
but on the large scale of things, you know. . .'' So I do not
mean in any way to imply that view.
But what I am talking about is this--and I think Dick made
a reference to it--I mean the poles that tend to exist in the
Catholic communities on the two ends of the spectrum, which is
this whole large thing called the Catholic Church in China,
where you have very recalcitrant groups on both ends of the
spectrum. It is not just that they are on the side of the very
hard core ideologues among Chinese authorities who take a dim
view of anything, religion or whatever, that they are not
controlling. On the side of the church, there are also those
who say, even if the Holy Father himself comes out and makes a
statement, they say he is misinformed.
So, you have these two extremes. Leave those aside. But in
the middle, I think, you have all of the gray area that we
constantly talk about, and I think that is the way to go. We
need more gray area. We need more people who are kind of trying
to find a way in the gloaming, in the fog, and to come
together.
You have heard this before, there are rights and there are
rites. R-I-G-H-T-S, which in the West we are very strong about,
and in China and in the East, R-I-T-E-S is much more important.
In other words, the way something is done is almost as
important as what is done.
When Senator Hagel was talking about building bridges, to
me, that is a coming together. You do not build a bridge by
throwing it over there and standing on this side and waiting
for everybody to cross over. That is not reconciliation or
bridging differences. It is something coming together in the
middle. So, that is what I mean. I think there are ways. We see
this.
I use this analogy a lot: In the West, there is a river,
and it is not running very smoothly, so you want to have it go
straight to its outlet, so you go in there and you dynamite out
the rocks, and it goes right straight through. But if you look
at a Chinese painting, the water is always going around, over,
and under, and around, and over, and under. It finds a way. It
gets there in the end, but it does not cause such damage in the
process. So maybe that is a little simplistic way of thinking
about it, but there is something there that I am trying to say.
The way we do it could achieve the same ends. It might take
longer, and in taking longer, if people are languishing in
prison or languishing and suffering, that is not good.
We do not want to compromise them in any way. But I think
marching out in the streets and demonstrating, things like
that--I worked for a number of years, as some of you know, at
the Holy See Mission to the United Nations. I will never forget
Monsignor Giovanni Calli, who was the head of the mission at
the time, saying, what goes on at the United Nations is a world
of diplomacy in which, behind the scenes, quietly, people can
find ways to come together to find their common interests. Once
it blows out in the public, nothing is going to be achieved
because neither side can back down publicly. So that is the way
of thinking of the school I come out of. There are ways to do
the same thing. It takes longer, maybe, and it might be more
difficult, and it is not always as satisfying as being able to
make a big statement.
Mr. Dorman. Good. Thank you.
Mr. Foarde. Susan, do you want to pick up the questioning?
Ms. Weld. Sure. I guess one aspect of my question has to do
with civil society and the reason the government sees the
organization of entities in civil society as so dangerous, when
now there is such a need, especially in the countryside where
the church is the strongest. So, that is one part of it. But
the other is this: the reasons the government feels that
religion is dangerous and backward. One reads a lot of things
that they put out saying it is anti-science, asking, how can
you have religion in a country that wants to develop?
Do you think there is movement there in the government for
changing this view of religion? Because you can prove that in
the West that science and religion are very happy partners in
development. So, that is part of my question.
The other is that in some of your writings you say the
Christian villages are stable. They have little crime and
everybody has a great, strong community feeling. It seems to me
the government now fears instability so much, that that would
be a model they should try to work with rather than fight. Is
there any chance that that might happen?
Mr. Madsen. I think that what Christians do, and should do,
is point to all the positive things that religion can bring.
People in China, researchers for instance, the Academy of
Social Sciences--have also pointed to that. Religion brings
good things, such as social stability. Social stability lowers
crime rates, et cetera. So, obviously it has positive social
functions.
In the government in China itself, as in any government,
there are different factions, different sides, hard-liners,
soft-liners: some would accentuate the positive, some would be
worried more about negative consequences. The negative
consequences are the possibilities of linking up and
communicating across wide areas that then could channel
discontent. Religion brings those things, too.
Also, of course, now I think globally, there is a more
global atmosphere of being aware of the downside of religion,
the fanaticism, and so forth. This problem has been
accentuated, of course, since September 11th. So, the
government also draws upon that sometimes.
I was in a meeting last year in Shanghai, and one person
there was from the Religious Affairs Bureau who in many ways
was very reasonable. But then at the end he talked about the
need to fight terrorists, he said, like bin Laden and the Dalai
Lama. I and my colleagues said, ``Wait a minute! Do you really
want to equate the Dalai Lama and bin Laden? '' He said, ``Yes,
yes, they are both terrorists. They both want to split China.
They are dangerous.'' So, that was the mentality that can get
generated in these times. Yet the same person was willing to
recognize various positive things that religious communities
can do. So, we are living in the stage of ambiguity right now.
In terms of science and religion, I think, in general,
there are old textbooks and old thinking in China from probably
the early part of the 20th century, that said that advanced
countries in the world to replace religion with science. This
was part of the ideology of the May 4th Movement. In fact, you
saw the same thing with the Kuomintang in Taiwan. To some
degree, more sophisticated people in China and elsewhere are
developing a more subtle understanding of this, but there is
still this kind of popular legitimation through science that
has a very strong foothold. But it does not map onto reality.
So, I think that the prejudice against religion will change as
the level of education begins to rise in China.
Sister Janet Carroll. Interestingly, we were recently
contacted by some scholars and academics in China asking if we
could supply them with copies of the Vatican documents which
had been translated into Chinese. Of course, they have been
translated into classical Chinese in greater China. The reason
they gave for their
interest in these documents is that they are interested in
doing commentaries on these documents which would ``help,''
exactly as they said, their government and people in authority
to revise their understanding of the role of religion in
society and the Church in the modern world. They were
interested in, as it were, the policies coming out of the
Second Vatican Council about the Church's social role, its
importance in that way, and not this old mentality that you
referred to, this sort of superstitious type of thing that you
can dismiss easily. I thought that was a very interesting
development, that also echoes the keen interest about the role
of religion in society among young scholars today in China.
In fact, the Chinese Government is sending many young
scholars--I know we even received one that the State Department
was facilitating a few years ago from People's University to
come and have experience and exposure in the States at the
request of the State Department to help him understand how
religion functions in our society. So they are very keen and
interested in that. Some years ago, we had a delegation from
Shanghai also at the time when Jiang Zemin was still mayor of
Shanghai, coming to try to understand that issue. In fact, we
met here at the law school. I do not recall if it was at
Catholic University, or where it was. Anyway, there is a keen
interest.
I think that those in China today that have that very old
ideological fixation of the non-compatibility of religion and
science, or religion and modernity, even, are few. However, it
does not take many, if they are in positions of influence, they
can certainly still have an impact. But I think the more
balanced leadership, the more rational contemporary leaders in
China today, are certainly more open in their view of the role
of religion in society. I mean, not to deny that they see a
very utilitarian role.
Mr. Foarde. Let me recognize Mark Milosch again for more
questions. Mark.
Mr. Milosch. It seems to me that one could say that the
Chinese Government permits quite a few Catholic civil society
organizations--for example, the parish itself, which, for most
Catholics in the world, is Catholic civil society. Of course,
there are also Catholic social service organizations in China.
And there are orders of sisters in China and there are
seminaries. But it seems that the point, for the Chinese
Government, is always to keep Catholic civil society
organizations local, rather than national, or even provincial.
Are there informal networks whereby Catholics try to link up
across diocesan and provincial boundaries? How do they do that
and how does the State try to frustrate that?
Mr. Madsen. Well, there are both formal and informal
networks, of course. There are national publications, like the
magazine published under the auspices, ultimately, of the so-
called Patriotic Association. The Patriotic Association tries
to monopolize the formal interconnections. It calls for
national bishops meetings, and so forth. So there is a formal
organization of the church. At the same time, there are a lot
of informal connections, although they are sometimes truncated,
made difficult, because of government supervision. So people
around China know what is going on in various ways, sometimes
through rumor, sometimes through word of mouth, sometimes
through passages of mimeographed materials.
And people travel. In the old days, it was very difficult
to travel from place to place in China, but now people travel
to different Catholic centers from around the country. For
instance, I was doing a little study project of a pilgrimage
site of Catholics in Sheshan near Shanghai, and people come
from all over China. They come from Xinjiang, they come from
Inner Mongolia. They come on long distance buses, especially in
the month of May. So, they know when this is happening. They
can organize themselves to come. Obviously when they come, it
is a chance for them to mingle and to learn things.
So there are networks that are difficult to see from the
outside because they are not formalized and they are not very
visible, but there is a lot of intercommunication that goes on,
maybe because some of it is not official. It is more difficult,
therefore, to separate, fact from rumor. So you get variations
in quality and quantity of information, which causes its own
difficulties and problems sometimes.
Mr. Milosch. If I could follow up right away. What about
Internet sites being used to create these networks? I hear
about the underground and official Catholic communities setting
up Internet sites--that these are always popping up and being
closed down, and popping up again.
Mr. Madsen. I do not know about underground Internet sites.
They are making a major effort to keep those under control.
There are above-ground Internet sites, for example in the
Shanghai Diocese, and this Beifang Jinde has a good Internet
site. Catholics, like many other groups in China, are
developing and starting to get used to using the Web.
Underground sites, I do not know of. If they do surface, the
government will shut them down, I am sure. Do you know, Sister
Janet?
Sister Janet Carroll. No. I would not know of any. I am not
sophisticated in that area, myself. But, as you mentioned, I
know the public ones. Two other points I would mention in terms
of national networking channels. Not only does Beifang Jinde
Social Center do the social program, but they also have a
national Catholic newspaper--Faith Fortnightly--which
circulates about 50,000 copies biweekly. You can subscribe to
it right here in the United States, and so forth. It really is
published there by the people. It carries world Church news,
local Church news, and has sections on spirituality,
devotionals, and a lot of local Church news. It goes out all
over the country.
There are also a couple of Catholic presses that transcend
their dioceses--like Guangqi Publishers in Shanghai, which
serves the whole country. Beijing has a press. I believe it is
called Wisdom, or something like that. Then Xi'an has a smaller
one, and they do a lot of publishing of books, mainly in the
area of theology, scripture, spirituality, and devotional
literature for the people.
Then, I do not know if this would fit in this category or
not, but there is a recent development of post-ordination
courses being organized for young clergy. They even welcome
foreign ``professors'' to give short courses within those
programs. Clergy from around the country go to the National
Seminary in Beijing for several months of study, while others
go to the Major Seminary at Shanghai and also Shijiazhuang.
This latter program receives professors from Fudan University
in Shanghai to help with the teaching, as well as having
visiting professors from abroad. Of course, there is also a mix
of other ``education''--history, politics, and social studies
required by the government as components of these programs.
Nonetheless, these programs are definitely helping to develop
the ministerial life of the young clergy. It is also a chance
for them to meet and form friendships and to mutually encourage
and support each other.
Finally, mentioning the Internet, I would say that we
should not just think of the old models of parish or maybe
diocese. Today young people in China, like everyone else,
network through the Internet. Everybody has an e-mail address
in China and cell phones are everywhere. Young people
especially are in touch with each other all the time. So there
is a lot of networking going on that transcends what we would
think of as traditional church networks. The parish structure
in China, except in the major cities such as cathedral
parishes, is not as clearly defined as we would think of it
here in the United States, but they may be organized as
dioceses, and the bishop is central to the leadership of those
groups in each province.
Mr. Foarde. More useful information and ideas. Thank you
both for those comments. Dick, I wanted to go back to something
that you said in your opening remarks. I was very taken with
your anecdote about your briefing for the Chinese officials
where you were talking about regulation of civil society in the
United States, and being told, in effect, ``No, we could never
do that here.'' I am wondering if this sort of directed,
corporatist approach that you were talking about toward which
they seem to be moving in China is prevalent anywhere else in
the world, in Europe, in Latin America, or Africa, for example,
or would this be something that is unique to China as it
develops?
Mr. Madsen. I think there are different models for how to
regulate and organize civil society. There is the Anglo-America
liberal model. There is a European model which you see coming
from the German tradition, or from France. To some degree, in
the early part of the 20th century, insofar as China got ideas
about organizing civil society, they came from such European
sources, often via Japan. To some degree, that more corporatist
approach may fit Chinese culture better and Japan might be a
model. Japan is not liberal and democratic in the sense that it
is here, but there is a lot of openness for civil society. In
Japan, if you know how that works, civil society groups have to
be registered and organized. It is much more controlled than it
would be here.
Mr. Foarde. So there is more structure.
Mr. Madsen. There is much more structure to it. But there
are still quite a lot of democratic freedoms. We rightly
consider Japan a democratic society. If China keeps on
evolving, it might evolve into that general model of
institution, perhaps, based on European civil law, not on
Anglo-American common law. So, that is one speculation. As it
is now, the problem with China is there is not any law. It
really is just a work in progress, so it is hard to know where
it is going to end up.
In the government, there are people who want to move toward
a more real rule of law and those who do not, and they are
struggling. It is hard to know what the outcome will be in the
short term. In the long term, I think, it has to develop a
legitimate rule of law or else it will come apart.
Mr. Foarde. Interesting. Useful. I guess I would ask both
of you, we have gone around a couple of times on different
aspects of it. But I would like your views more directly on the
specific question of why the Communist Party and the government
permit these sorts of social service organizations to come up
and operate, albeit unevenly at different times in different
places. What interest does a party that really wants to control
everything have in doing that?
Mr. Madsen. The Party is not trying because it does not
have the capacity to provide social services for people
throughout China any more. The old ``iron rice bowl,'' the old
state-run enterprises, that is all gone. There is an enormous
problem being created, with laid-off workers, people lacking
social services such as basic health care. So they are under
tremendous pressure to provide substitutes for what they
provided before. This is their dilemma. If they do not provide
these services, all sorts of terrible things can happen,
including social unrest. But not just social unrest. Basic
health care, for instance. Even in the most dim realization of
self interest, they have to provide things like inoculations
for people coming into cities like Shanghai, or else epidemics
such as SARS are going to get out of control. So they have to
make these services available, even though they do not have the
capacity to do so in a structured way. So they have to allow
various kinds of groups the leeway to do this. At the same
time, they are worried about the chaos that can come from
social fragmentation, so they are between a rock and a hard
place and they are trying to find their way through. Again, it
is difficult to know where it will end up because there are so
many contingencies there, that there is no clear path to the
future.
Sister Janet Carroll. I would just reinforce that idea, the
notion of China's absolutely sheer need. Again, I do not think
it is
entirely just utilitarian in that sense of the word. I think
the government is genuinely concerned to try to meet the
tremendous social needs. Having shredded the social safety net
that existed in the old structured socialism and the ``Big
Brother,'' or the ``danwei,'' the government has left people on
their own. We just saw in the New York Times in the past couple
of days several terribly moving articles about the plight of
migrant workers and the poor and struggling people in different
parts of the country. Migrant workers are contributing so much
to the economy of China, but at the same time placing these
tremendous burdens on social services. Just when they have
shredded the social safety net, these problems are multiplying
like crazy. I think I cited in the paper about the president of
the World Bank. Mr. Wolfensohn has just taken China on right at
this conference that was held in May in Shanghai--on the need
to address poverty, the need to reduce poverty, and that they
are facing this income gap. That is the issue that I want to
speak to, this tremendous gap that is growing up--it would have
been unheard of in the period of high Communist China when for
a time all boats were rising together even if they were rising
ever so slowly. Now we have this fabulous wealth alongside of
outright degradating poverty. Mr. Wolfensohn warned the Chinese
Government that this is grist for the mill of social
instability. As I said in my paper, a more serious challenge,
that lay in the lap of the government than to suggest that
religious groups are going to cause social instability.
So the Chinese people are desperately in need of the
assistance, as many governments in the world are, of all the
sectors in society. All should be able to contribute. I hope it
will be able to be done harmoniously. It is not always easily
done.
I remember from my time with the United Nations, when I
worked on NGO issues, the Non-Governmental Organizations
Committee, there were very few non-governmental organizations
anywhere in the world, in our experience, except mostly in the
West. But GONGOs, Government-Organized Non-Governmental
Organizations, were common all over the world, and I think this
will be the model in China, too. But I hope that the needs will
be able to be met before the situation deteriorates any
further.
Mr. Foarde. Thank you. Very useful. We have a few minutes
left. Dave, do you want to pick up a question?
Mr. Dorman. Sure.
Sister Janet, I want to thank you for bringing in a variety
of literature today. I picked up a Beifang Jinde brochure on
the way in. It is so beautifully designed, it just draws your
eye, so I have to admit to you that I have actually looked
through it while sitting here. I would like to ask you a few
questions about Beifang Jinde if I could. First, the brochure
says ``since 1998.'' So I think, as you have mentioned, we are
really not talking about history, we are talking about a
current event. The brochure also says ``the first Catholic
nonprofit, non-governmental social services organization.'' I
am just guessing that the group or person that is responsible
for setting up Beifang Jinde could be easily described as
devout, hardworking, and very savvy. I am wondering if you
could enlighten us to the work that was done to put this
organization together. I am also guessing that because the
brochure says ``the first,'' there is also a second and third
organization now? Could you also comment on the extent to which
the lessons learned from setting up Beifang Jinde were shared
with these organizations?
Sister Janet Carroll. Yes. I think ``the first'' has to do
with the fact that they are probably the first one that
registered as an NGO and are able to function as such. Of
course, this organization is like groups such as the Amity
Foundation on the Protestant side which have been in existence
for a long time.
Yes, like many things in China, a lot depends on the
personalities involved. The social centers I have spoken of
rely on the shoulders of gifted young priests like Father Jean-
Baptiste Zhang at Shijiazhuang and Father Steven Chen at Xi'an,
who are able to do these things. Both of them are movers and
shakers. It is not easy. They deal with a lot of difficulties
along the way, but they get up and over them. However, before
these centers were actually formally registered, the programs
were already quite well established. Credibility is very
important. For the center for which the newsletter is
available--that one I am sure is also registered, because they
receive funding from outside and they have a lot of
collaborative projects with groups like Caritas, operating out
of Hong Kong, and so on. And I believe the one at Shenyang, if
it has not already received it, it is seeking registration and
recognition as official. In fact, I think it is. We were there
in June, and I remember now seeing this large bronze placard
that they had ready to go up on the wall of the building
announcing this Catholic Social Service Center, which would
mean that they would have local approval. As I said, I would
not doubt that there are other places that also are moving in
this way. China is a big place.
In these three cases, I know the three priests who are
involved in the direction and they tend to be very gifted,
talented young men who, as I alluded to before, see the
opportunity and say, ``There is lots to be done, let us get in
and do what we can do within the confines of the situation, and
more will come later.'' All three of them happen to have had
opportunities for study abroad, and I think that helps a lot,
as it does for any group, to have chances to be exposed to
wider realities. Most recently, Father Joseph Zhang of Shenyang
led a team of sisters and laity to Thailand, where they
participated in an HIV/AIDS training workshop for several
weeks. Now they are doing that sort of work in that northeast
China area. Let me tell you that that brochure is even nicer
looking than this. This is just a Xeroxed copy of a glossy
folder that they have.
Mr. Dorman. Thank you.
Mr. Foarde. We are very short on time, so I think I would
give the last set of questions to Mark Milosch, if you have
questions. Mark, please.
Mr. Milosch. Yes, I do. Thank you. It is perhaps not such a
short question, but maybe you will be able to give it a short
answer. I am wondering if there are characteristic Catholic
attitudes that affect how Chinese Catholics come together, or
how they approach civil society, whether in formal associations
or informally in the Catholic underground? I am thinking of
sociologists who have written about Catholics as being
different from non-Catholics, about the idea that the Catholic
religion creates a kind of ``Catholic personality.'' Is that
good or bad for civil society? Do Chinese Catholics even have
this ``Catholic personality? '' Or are Chinese Catholics very
much like other Chinese people because they have been
socialized in an overwhelmingly non-Catholic society?
Mr. Madsen. Well, basically I think they are like other
Chinese people, although, because of the rural bias of the
church, they are more like rural Chinese people than modern
urban Chinese people, although that may be changing. In
general, the Catholic organization is, of course, hierarchical.
The Protestants are congregational, so it is a grassroots kind
of organization. The Catholics still look to the priest and
bishop, and things coming from the top down. The Church is
organized that way. Catholics do not grow quite as fast as the
Protestants, I think, because Protestants rely upon lay people,
lay preachers, and the Catholics still rely on the priest.
To some degree--and this is an impression--the Catholics in
China, somewhat the same as in other parts of the world, expect
funds to come more from the top down than raising them
themselves. You have more of that horizontal organization with
Protestants. A place like Shanghai has lots of services because
it has that real estate that I mentioned that has been
developed, and so the money comes from the top down. It is not
people putting money in the collection plate and organizing
themselves. Those are Catholic characteristics which I think
that you still see in China, although things are changing.
One thing that has paved the way for some of this change is
the way in which, when the church was suppressed during the
Maoist years, Catholics had to organize themselves locally
without priests, so there were lay leaders and local
organization. To some degree, that has been supplanted now
during this reform period by the more traditional forms of
organization. But there is this move toward local independence.
There is a little bit of protestantization, perhaps, going on,
although its intent is consistent with this other hierarchical
principle, which is also being changed as they get influence
from the Second Vatican Council. So, it is a dynamic mix.
Sister Janet Carroll. I would just add two things. One, our
colleague, a good friend of both Dick and me, Dr. Jean-Paul
Wiest, has said that the expulsion of the missionaries in the
1950s was sort of a ``happy fault'' for the Church in China,
because for the first time in its history it had to stand on
its own two feet and act autonomously within the confines of
being a local church, and assume leadership. In some ways, the
fact that the Vatican Council passed China by, somehow the Holy
Spirit was working there, to let the laity get involved, which,
of course, in the West we took as a great development in the
Catholic community after the Vatican Council. So, the Holy
Spirit found a way to do it in China without having the
Council's conclusions be promulgated there.
The other point I want to make is more to the point. I
think the character of the way Catholics can function in civil
society in the Catholic Church--and it is only starting to get
under way in China because they have to know more about it--is
we have, in Catholicism, a great body of social thought. I
think that is a great grounding for the activity which can
underpin our call to work for justice and peace. That message,
I think, the Catholic social teachings, would be very welcome
by the authorities in China if indeed it could inform the way
Catholics are able to engage in the civil society.
Mr. Milosch. Thank you.
Mr. Foarde. We have run out of time for this morning, but
it was a fascinating conversation and discussion. We very much
appreciate both of you coming from a great distance, and a
shorter but not inconsiderable distance, to Washington to share
your expertise with us.
So on behalf of Chairman Jim Leach and Co-Chairman Senator
Chuck Hagel and all the Members of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, thanks to our two panelists, and to all
who came and attended today.
I would remind our guests about the hearing on Hong Kong
next Thursday the 23rd, and then the presentation of the Annual
Report in a press conference over in the Longworth Building on
October 5.
For today, then, we will bring the gavel down on this one.
Thank you all very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m. the roundtable was concluded.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Richard Madsen
SEPTEMBER 17, 2004
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN CHINA
Although faced with severe challenges, the Catholic Church in China
is flourishing. It has at least 12 million members (a four fold
increase from the three million Catholics in 1949), many of whom
exhibit extraordinary amounts of devotion and commitment to their
faith. There has been a steady increase in construction of new Church
facilities and a steady stream of new candidates for the priesthood and
religious life. There are active interchanges between Chinese Catholic
leaders and leaders of the worldwide Church. A significant number of
newly ordained Chinese priests, seminarians, and sisters have been able
to study abroad. Chinese church leaders regularly receive visits from
priests, bishops, and even cardinals from abroad, and Chinese churches
receive economic help from sister churches around the world. The
Chinese Catholic Church is on an upward trajectory of growth in numbers
and in the size and quality of its institutions. By some measures, one
could argue that it is flourishing to a greater degree than the Church
in Europe and the United States.
At the same time, the Catholic Church in China faces severe
problems. The most troublesome is the split between ``underground'' and
``official'' factions. Catholics in the official Church carry out their
religious practices within venues officially registered with the
government and subject to government regulation and supervision.
Sometimes out of principle, sometimes out of necessity (because of a
lack of officially approved Church facilities), underground Catholics
practice their religion outside of the officially approved framework.
In many places, underground and official Catholics get along quite
well. Under some circumstances, however, they become bitterly at odds,
with underground Catholics accusing the leaders of the official Church
of having fatally compromised their faith by collaborating with a
Communist government and betraying their bonds of loyalty to the Holy
See.
Apart from these serious and widely publicized problems of
conflict, there are more subtle, and perhaps in the long run more
difficult to resolve problems. One is the lack of clergy. Although
there is a steady stream of new priests, it is not large enough to meet
the needs of a church that, because of inability to ordain significant
numbers of new priests during the repression of the Mao years, is top
heavy with old priests who are rapidly reaching the end of their lives.
Another set of problems stems from the difficulty of formulating
versions of the faith that would appeal to urban people. The great
majority of Catholics are rural and their beliefs and practices reflect
the values of a rural lifestyle. This form of faith is less
comprehensible and attractive to urban people. The Catholic seminary in
Shanghai, for example, has few students who actually come from
Shanghai--most come from small villages in the hinterlands. As China
becomes increasingly urbanized, it may become harder for the Catholic
Church to grow--unless of course it adapts its theology and
organization to a modernizing world, which may be difficult for a
leadership already stretched thin by the demands of ordinary pastoral
care.
THE CHINESE CATHOLIC CHURCH AS PART OF CIVIL SOCIETY
In both its strengths and weaknesses, the Catholic Church reflects
the overall development of civil society in China during the reform era
(i.e., 1979 to the present). By civil society, I simply mean the array
of social groups formed by voluntary association, which is made
possible by the opportunities for mobility that are the consequence of
a modern market economy. The marketization of the Chinese economy has
loosened the ties of dependency that bound peasants to their people's
communes and workers to their State owned enterprises. People now move
around looking for work. They form new groups for economic help and
social support. They need such groups because the government no longer
has the will nor the way to provide social security through its State
controlled institutions. Such voluntary associations form the
beginnings of a civil society, which is an almost automatic byproduct
of a market economy. But by itself such a civil society does not lead
to a stable, just, and peaceful society. Western political philosophies
offer various visions for how to make modern civil societies stable and
peaceful. These involve the construction of a rule of law that
guarantees citizens the right to form free associations while
regulating these associations so that they contribute to a common good.
But the Chinese government has not yet developed a stable rule of law
that would guarantee the right of association while regulating such
associations in a way that would seem legitimate to most of their
members.
Under these circumstances there has been a great flourishing of new
forms of
association. But many of these associations exist in a legal limbo.
They can be arbitrarily closed down. Because of this lack of security,
they have to adopt self-protective measures that may cause negative
consequences for society at large. Sometimes they have to conceal their
activities. Sometimes they cultivate particularistic relationships
(often lubricated with bribes) with powerful people who can protect
them. Sometimes they develop paranoid attitudes toward the government
and one another. Because of lack of oversight, sometimes their leaders
abuse money and power. The Catholic Church is not immune to these
problems that afflict Chinese civil society as a whole.
Much of Catholic activity exists in a legal limbo. The government
specifies that Church activities must take place under the auspices of
the Catholic Patriotic Association, which is supervised by the State
Agency for Religious Affairs. But only a few Catholic apparatchiks are
fully committed to this institutional framework. Most Catholics,
including most bishops and priests, who work within the officially
approved framework ignore much of the spirit if not the letter of its
regulations. For example, although they are not supposed to have direct
relationships with the Vatican, a large majority of bishops within the
``official'' church have received ``apostolic mandates'' from the Holy
See, that is, they have gotten Vatican approval to be bishops. This
would be possible on such a large scale only through informal
acquiescence from government officials responsible for regulating and
controlling religion. On the other hand, most underground Catholics
carry out their activities in a very visible manner, in full view of
government officials. This is also possible only because of informal
acquiescence from agents of the state.
Since such activities are not protected as rights under the law,
however, they can be suddenly suppressed. Thus in recent years we have
seen waves of arrests and church demolitions followed by periods of
relaxation--all in ways that from the point of view of people in the
grass roots must appear unpredictable and arbitrary. This in turn fuels
the anxiety and paranoia that lead to factionalism. But such
factionalism affects all areas of Chinese civil society, not just the
Catholic Church.
THE CHINESE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND INHIBITION OF CIVIL SOCIETY
Although the Catholic Church reflects many of the characteristics
of Chinese civil society in general, the Church has some particular
features deriving from its unique history, organization, and theology
that place it partially in opposition to the development of a modern
civil society.
As modern civil societies develop, they usually produce
associations of national and international scope that transcend the
interests of particular localities and help solve problems of national
importance. Thus, the American Catholic Bishops conference speaks out
on problems of national relevance and Catholic Charities distributes
aid to people across the world. At present it would be hard to imagine
the Chinese Catholic Church producing such organizations. Because the
Vatican has not established diplomatic relations with China, it is
unable to openly regulate China's Catholics. There is no Vatican nuncio
in Beijing to help make sure that Chinese bishops are following papal
directives. Communications between the Vatican and China's Catholics
have to be indirect and irregular. This gives local Chinese Catholics--
especially perhaps those in the underground--a great deal of practical
autonomy, more even than they would have in the United States or
Europe. This, in turn, leads to a great many local varieties of
Catholic practice. Nowhere in the world does the Catholic Church act as
a unified force, but in China it is even less unified than most places.
This, of course, fits nicely with a government agenda to block the
emergence of large scale organizations that could conceivably challenge
Communist Party hegemony.
The fragmentation of Catholic social organization affects not just
the standardization of teaching about faith and morals and the
mobilization of a Catholic voice on matters of national importance, but
the provision of social services. There are some well run Catholic
charitable associations in China, particularly Jinde in Shijiazhuang
(Hebei Province) and the various associations of the Shanghai diocese.
But some of these have ambitions to expand, it is unclear that they
will be able to realize these ambitions because they are deeply
embedded in their local social ecology. Unless the Sino-Vatican
relations were greatly improved, it would be difficult to imagine the
development of national charitable institutions like Catholic Charities
in the USA--or even organizations like the Three-self Protestant Amity
Foundation, which has a wide national reach.
Another important feature of the Chinese Catholic Church is its
embedding in traditional institutions of village and family. In the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Catholic missionaries made
great efforts to convert not individuals but whole extended families.
They attempted to build little ``christendoms,'' whole villages where
social, economic, and cultural institutions were intertwined with
Catholicism. This is indeed the pattern in those parts of China where
Catholic practice is strongest: whole lineages, whole villages, and
even whole counties are Catholic. The faith is thus identified with and
supported by the non-voluntary, traditional
institutions of family and community. This familism and localism pull
against the mobility and voluntary association that constitute modern
civil society. Catholic villages are said to be places with especially
strong moral solidarity, where crime is low and mutual cooperation is
high. But, if it stays confined to family and neighbors, the spirit of
love and solidarity does not really contribute to the building of a
civil society. In large cities like Shanghai, places filled with the
loose, relatively impersonal relationships that form the building
blocks of civil society, the Church seems to be losing ground.
Protestant spirituality indeed seems more conducive to such society,
which may be one reason why Protestant growth is outstripping Catholic
growth in China today.
In some respects, then, the Catholic Church in China does indeed
contribute to the constitution of a civil society. In some respects it
mirrors both the positive and the negative characteristics of Chinese
society in this time of transition. In other respects, however, it
stands apart from and even resists the formation of a mature civil
society--and is challenged to reform its theology and practice so as to
adapt to a modernizing China.
______
Prepared Statement of Janet Carroll, M.M.
SEPTEMBER 17. 2004
Senator Chuck Hagel, at a session of this Committee last June,
astutely noted that ``China's future is also important to America's
future. It is in our interest to work broadly and deeply with the
Chinese Government using all the bridges and opportunities available to
us to help shape and ensure a democratic future for China.'' [CECC
Hearing--June, 4, 2004]
I would like to key my remarks here this morning to this challenge
set before us by Senator Hagel--with the important caveat that I
believe we must also work ``broadly and deeply'' with the Chinese
people toward these noble ideals. The efforts in the field of social
services and charitable works of compassion and mercy that have been
very courageously and patiently initiated by religious believers
[including Catholics and Christians of all persuasions in China
today]--in the past decade and more, call upon us all to cross many
bridges and reach out in solidarity and support.
I have made available to this Committee through the Staff, a packet
of materials for anyone here who wishes to have evidence of this
development [albeit only a small sample] of Social Services programs
and projects which are slowly, but steadily contributing to the
emergence in China of a Civil Society--embryonic as it may appear at
present.
THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT FOR CATHOLICS IN CHINA: SERVING THE PEOPLE
In the past decade or so, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the demise of Communism as a credible ideology worldwide, the
Openness and Reform Policy pursued by China, has led to spectacular
economic growth and development. Some observers [including David Aikman
in his new book Jesus in Beijing; and the eminent China historian
Daniel Bays, at the Bartlett Lecture given at Yale University last
spring]--think that Christianity in China, at least Protestant
Christianity, may well be on the verge of entering its ``golden age.''
For the first time in their history, Chinese Christians had to find
their own self-sufficiency, employ their own initiatives, and choose
their own leadership.
However you choose to construe developments in the past quarter
century in China, from the perspective of the Churches--[1979-2004]--
signs of renewed opportunities for service to society and the
propagation of Christianity are certainly abundant today. However, a
maxim you should always bear in mind when thinking about China goes
something like this:
``Everything you hear about China is true . . . at some time and in
some place; but NOT true in another time or another place.''
To fully understand the status of the Catholic Church in China
within the State apparatus, to say nothing of the vicissitudes of the
way religious policies are implemented by the Beijing Regime [which has
recently reverted to stricter enforcement of rules and regulations for
religious organizations]- is well beyond the limitations of our time
here this morning. In the Q&A period I will be glad to respond to
specific questions you may have about these and other issues.
By way of addressing the subject of this Roundtable today, I would
like to offer some contextual perspectives on the engagement of Chinese
Catholics and Church-sponsored social ministries in recent years. In
nearly three astonishing decades since the opening of the Churches,
Christian believers in China have struggled to re-invigorate and extend
local communities of Faith, to restore and re-build not only churches,
but seminaries and convents, to train new generations of leadership,
and subsequently to establish centers for social and medical ministries
to the society;--all with only the barest of resources--but with vast
stores of enduring courage and commitment. As it continues this
journey--even greater challenges are before the Church to take its
witness out beyond the sanctuary and into the public square. Chinese
Christians are challenged to take up the immense task of giving
prophetic witness and service to the rapidly developing and radically
changing Society that is China today--an economic and political power
already playing a major role in the world community.
As cultural and social traditions evolve, Christianity is poised to
provide new ethical and moral foundations for the emergence of a modern
Civil Society and State. While there is cause for caution and concern
among friends of the Chinese people and the Church in China, at the
same time, there is are unparalleled opportunities for Christianity, to
once again offer valuable contributions to the Chinese people, by
sponsoring medical and social projects and educational programs (if not
yet formal academic institutions)--not on the scale that existed during
the modern missionary period [1850--1950];--but commensurate with the
material resources and human capabilities of the Chinese Local Church.
When Daniel Bays spoke at Yale last spring he addressed prospects
for Chinese Christians, albeit constrained by limited human rights and
religious freedoms, to make significant contributions to the up-
building of Civil Society in China. In another lecture entitled ``China
in Transition,'' by Roderick MacFarquhar [Professor of History and
Political Science at Harvard and one of the world's most respected
China scholars] this topic of civil society was also addressed, thought
interestingly, he never mentioned Religion as such. In an otherwise
very insightful and creative analysis of ``whither China'? at this
juncture in its quest for modernity, MacFarquhar presented a scenario
of the crisis China faces in the near term--as it struggles to
transition to what he called ``a new transnational Chinese
civilization''. His remarks pointed to important issues to bear in mind
in considering the prospects for Chinese Christians, and indeed all
religious believers in China today, to contribute to the emergence of a
viable Civil Society.
While MacFarquhar seemed somewhat pessimistic about developments in
China in the near term, Dan Bays projected a rather positive view of
the potential for Chinese Christians, in particular the new and more
educated entrepreneurs in urban settings--[whom Bays identified as `` a
significant sub-set of the emergent middle class'']--to play a
catalyzing role in this crucial transition. Looking from the
perspective of Catholics in China today, and reflecting on
Catholicism's call to ``prophetic servanthood'' on behalf of the common
good and well-being of the peoples, there are several possibilities
that present themselves which just might reconcile these contrasting
views.
A contemporary Jesuit China scholar, [Benoit Vermander SJ--Director
of the Ricci Institute in Taipei, Taiwan]--has elucidated the challenge
and opportunity for Christianity in China today--as presenting
Christianity as a living interlocutor with Chinese culture--a force
capable of contributing to the redefinition of Chinese Culture, that
both the leadership and the people require in order to re-interpret
their history--and ultimately rid themselves of the disappointments and
disillusionments of their past attempts to make the transition to
become a modern Nation State. [The MacFarquhar Lecture also dealt with
this issue of a revised understanding of their history by the Chinese
themselves]. Only then will they be enabled to assume roles of
influence and authority appropriate to a people with a civilization and
culture--rich with gifts and insights essential for the achievement of
prosperity, justice and peace for themselves and the global community.
New China--the Peoples Republic of China--already in the latter
half of its first century of existence--urgently needs a creative re-
invention of its traditional value system and moral categories; and to
employ new interpretive models by which to make sense of the past, find
common ground in the present and develop a sense of shared purpose and
meaning for the future. On a mutually acceptable basis of equality,
reciprocity and respect, Christianity can offer much to China in its
quest for a ``new spiritual civilization''--[a term now even used by
the Chinese regime to galvanize the masses under the rubric of the
United Front.]
This new spiritual civilization is perhaps another way of
describing the new transnational civilization,'' which MacFarquhar
noted was MAO TzeTung's visionary ideal from the early years of the
Communist revolution which the Chinese people tragically failed to
realize due to Mao's turn to brutal dictatorship.
After some 20 years of the Reform and Openness policies--initiated
by DENG following Mao's death in 1976--China still stands in need of a
second generation of transformation--ideally, one that will be
consistent with its culture, virtues and values. Among these harmony
and right relationships are central to the Chinese psyche and must bear
great weight in structuring a Civil Society in China.
Regrettably, many Chinese Christians, both Protestant and Catholic,
as well as other religious and quasi-religious movements (like Falun
Gong), are often sadly been in conflict with the political
authorities--who like the emperors of the Dynastic era--continue to
have an almost ``sacral sense'' of themselves as the final arbiters of
China's political and legal culture. While our Christian creeds and
confession stress harmony and peace, sometimes our actions tend too
much toward dissidence and confrontation--even if justified in
principle and validly grounded in human and natural rights. While
bearing in mind the Gospel admonition to ``render to Caesar the things
that are Caesar's; and to God the things that are God's''--in China we
also need to respect relationships and observe Rites--that is the
manner and the way things are done; these dynamics and principles count
every bit as much as the ``Rights,'' to which we in the West hold so
tenaciously. It takes great patience and perseverance to remain in
dialog--while ``seeking the common ground'' [to quote the well
respected Protestant sinologist Phillip Wickeri in his book by that
title.]
A NEW DIALOGUE BETWEEN RELIGION AND SOCIETY
Those seeking to partner with China in pursuit of social goals,
must be willing to listen and discern with sensitivity and respect; be
able to tolerate frustrations and the ambiguities of living with
constraints and limitations; and be people with a capacity to risk
difficulties and misunderstandings. Only in this manner, can we seize
and exploit the many opportunities that actually exist for religious
believers to give witness to their beliefs and share their ``good
news'' with the Chinese people, in a manner wholly appropriate and
relevant to the culture and social ethos of the times.
This next point may seem a digression, but I believe it is very
relevant to the subject of this discussion this morning. There are two
important issues to bear in mind in this dialog--both of words and
actions: one is the need mutual respect between sovereign states; and
the other is the moral weight attached to leading by example.
I find it lamentable that (under the present administration, the
United States, increasingly tends to be very selective in choosing when
to be domestically bound by international law in general, and human
rights in particular. In Chinese terms this is known as ``resisting
intrusion into internal affairs.'' Ironically, recent actions of the US
Government in this regard have undercut the credibility of this country
as the champion of internationally recognized human rights and
freedoms.
I refer specifically to the failure of the USA to become signatory
to several of the International Covenants and treaties on human rights
and freedoms, and more regrettably to withdraw from those previously
ascribed to. This seriously undermines confidence other weaker States
may accord to the Rule of Law; and signals to the world that powerful
leaders can withdraw from such obligations--as different leaders come
and go.
This is a penchant that Communist Party leaders in China have been
disposed for years--arbitrarily opting for rule by man, as opposed to
the ideal of Rule by Law. It is ironic that the USA is now perceived as
taking such a reprehensible stance in international affairs. The world
stands sorely in need of moral leadership based on example, not on
force. We cannot call others to adhere to international laws and
covenants which we ourselves selectively disregard.
THE NEED FOR A NEW SOCIAL ETHIC
Today, the literally tens of millions of religious believers in
China--including a growing number of young scholars, who have taken a
keen interest in Christianity as a life philosophy and as an ethical
and moral code, may succeed in re-imagining and re-creating a new Civil
Society in China that can appropriately take up its rightful role in
the global family of nations. These challenges toward which Christians
in China need to direct their energies and resources, also suggest to
those of us who are concerned about China's future and our own future
in the global community, possibilities of reaching out in solidarity,
supporting all those in China who are struggling to rise to the
occasion and seize the opportunity to minister to the social well-being
of their own people--especially the poor and marginalized.
We all need to get beyond the headlines and sound bytes of the
media and the overly simplistic approaches of some agencies in the
USA--with their own agendas for China. The lived reality for Chinese
people today is a far cry from what is reported or extrapolated from
given events or incidents in the Media. There are numerous ways to
partner with Christians in China. There are actually many areas of
service open to expatriates--both in the fields of education and social
and medical work Both human and financial resources are in demand for
supportive services in Church sponsored social and medical
ministries,--as well as directly with such programs in the public
domain. HIV/AIDs is a rampant and growing problem in China--one vastly
under acknowledged by the authorities. Slowly government health
ministries are starting to welcome training and assistance to prepare
and equip themselves to deal with this pending tragedy of already
crisis proportions.
RESPONSES FROM THE CHURCH
Regarding the government's response to initiatives from the
Catholic Church in the field of Social Service, I have included in the
packet of materials submitted, a brief memo--addressing some of the
concerns which may be on the minds of the committee members. [cf. Memo
of the Director, Xian CSSC]. In sum, it notes that as long as local
governmental policies, procedures, and requirements are carefully
complied with, activities and programs of civil service and for the
social welfare of the people are welcomed and appreciated by the
Chinese authorities.
In so far as there is coordination and/or cooperation with
international contacts in these fields, there is usually closer
supervision--especially regarding the role of foreign nationals in the
projects and regarding use of funds received. Not surprisingly--when
there are amenable relations between the authorities on both sides
(Church and government) trust is established and things work smoothly.
TWO AREAS AFFECTING THE INTEGRITY OF THE CHURCH-SPONSORED PROGRAMS:
1. Services provided must be offered on objective and unbiased
terms: [i.e. not as a cover for evangelization or other subjective
interests] and be without inappropriate requirements or expectations of
any reciprocity to the advantage of the service provider.
2. Social Service projects, especially medical services (hospitals
and clinics) must comply with standards established by local health
authorities: e.g. qualifications of professional staff, use of
appropriate procedures and medicines, and adherence to acceptable
standards of care, and so forth. Increasingly, especially in rural
areas, some small church-run clinics have been closed due to failure to
meet these standards.
[Interview with Dr. WU Gui Xian, Hebei/XianXian Catholic Diocese
MBA Cand. In Hospital Administration at Pace Univ./NYC]
Developments in the Not-for-Profit and Non-Governmental Social
Services Sector in China--as an integral part of the emergence of a
Civil Society--have come a long way in barely a quarter of a century.
This view is further validated if we acknowledge the absence of any
semblance of a Civic Society in either the Dynastic or the Republican
Eras, nor after the establishment of the Peoples' Republic in 1949.
Therefore, little if any foundation exists upon which a Civic Society
in China might be built--neither in China's past politico-social
structures nor in the socio-cultural traditions of the Chinese people.
Rather than decrying what is not yet, we might more generously assess
all that has been accomplished by our Chinese brothers and sisters in
initiating relevant works of social and civil service in their
communities.
CHALLENGES IN THE NEAR TERM
China's income disparity is worse than that of other Asian
countries like South Korea, Japan and India--this despite the fact that
under Mao (between 1950 and 1980) China had achieved one of the most
even distributions of wealth--with all boats rising together. For
several years running, China has maintain economic growth at about 9
percent per annum. This has brought a level of wealth to urbanites and
younger elites never dreamed of before, reflected in their choice
housing, style of clothing, and tastes in food; as well as in less
material ways such as education, entertainment and travel.
The dark side of China's new wealth really is a widening disparity
between rich and poor continuing unabated. Luxury gated communities are
surrounded by poorer shanty towns filled with illegal migrant workers
and displaced citizens scraping by on US$50 per month. Millions of
Chinese are left unemployed from their abandoned unprofitable state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). Rural poor continue to struggle to provide
for their families with little more than a sixth grade education.
Prostitution in cities has become one of the few ways that women with
little or no education can eke out a living.
By contrast, some 70 percent of China's peoples still live in rural
villages, where they are less touched by modern life and increasingly
dependent on wealth trickling down from the cities. The average income
inland is said to be only a third of that on the coast. This year the
threat of 4-5 percent inflation has prompted authorities to try to damp
down the economy, but only enough not to bring on a crash.
So eminent an expert in such matters as the President of the World
Bank--at a Conference on Poverty Reduction last in May in Shanghai,
warned China that the growing gap between the wealthy and progressive
coastal provinces and the still generally poor interior is grist for
widespread social instability--and threatens the undoing of all the
social and material progress of this past decade. It would be hard to
find a more dire and ominous threat to lay in the lap of China's
leadership!
There is a great irony in the fact that in the international market
place, many concerns are expressed about China's overheated economy.
Frequently, many US corporations and workers, especially those in
unions, express fears and frustration with the impact of China's
economic growth, not only on the global economy, but on the US domestic
economy. We ought not to miss the point however, that the fate of
hundreds of millions of ordinary working poor in China is also at
issue. As cited in an article in the NY Times many credit China's vast
numbers of migrant workers with that country's astonishing and
prolonged economic growth. As they increasingly flood into urban
regions, migrant workers add value to the economy. [NYT
9-12-04 Week in Review Pg. 5]. That is the good news. At the same time,
these millions of migrant workers also add a tremendous burden of
demands for social services upon the governmental sector--just when
such social safety nets as had
existed during the era of the centrally managed economy have been
shredded to pieces.
The difficulty facing China's leaders is to provide these millions
of migrant workers, and by extension their desperately poor families
and dependents, with affordable housing, access to schooling, health
care, legal protections and so forth. Obviously, social service
agencies and organizations have a major and crucial role to play in
helping to construct the social safety net required to meet these
demands. As in other developing countries--and even in our own
country--government turns to the voluntary and religious sector for
assistance. Not unexpectedly, as is our common experience, governmental
vis-a-vis non-governmental sector relationships are never as smooth and
unambiguous as the situation would seem to warrant.
In sum, China is undergoing unparalleled economic growth bringing
with it consequences that could lead to depression and disaster. The
values of a structured socialism have receded and the differences
between rich and poor, whether one speaks of individuals or of sectors
of society, have surged. Westerners generally are concerned with
individuals' rights, whereas traditionally, these have been limited in
China, where the perceived welfare of the group--family, village, or
society in general--has always had priority. Today, however, many
observers generally agree that people in general, and the single
individual, have never had more freedom in China. A person can be an
atheist or a believer. The thing he/she must not do is to participate
individually or within a group in activities that may in any way be
seen as a threat to the power of the state.
ROLE OF NON-PROFIT (NPO) AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL (NGO) ORGANIZATIONS
Long gone is the ``Iron Rice Bowl'' era (circa 1950-80), when ``Big
Brother'' took care of social welfare needs. China today is tending
toward what some term a ``small government, big community'' system.
Traditionally, Chinese normally cared for their family members and
those within their ``connections network'' (guanxi) One rarely helped
an acquaintance, let alone a total stranger. Charity and volunteerism
were unknown concepts up until the past decade.
The NPO/NGO sector, including equivalent social and civil programs
of the churches are increasingly necessary to bridging the socio-
economic gaps between haves and have-nots. China rapidly adopted the
Western capitalist model without acknowledging the important
underpinnings of capitalist society: those Judeo-Christian principles
which provided a moral compass and safety net for the weak and
disadvantaged. China's materialism--and we should be quick to
acknowledge, western and American capitalist and materialist
development, is increasingly based on a desire for profit in a moral
vacuum, where anything goes. By contrast, corporate social
responsibility (CSR) should rather play a key role in helping domestic
and multinational for-profit businesses invest in China's social
capital--and not just crassly exploit its vast means of production. In
this context, China desperately needs to continue to develop its non-
profit sector and find ways to encourage citizens to broaden the
horizons of their civic responsibilities.
For Christian and other religious believers in China today, the
current Chinese milieu may prove to be an opportune time to offer a re-
evaluation of Chinese society and to work toward the articulation of a
new social ethic and a new morality. While the Constitution of the PRC
is a finely worded document espousing many virtuous ideals, and while
the Party continually devises idealistic slogans to galvanize the
masses for the common good, China's movement toward a ``rule of law''
and a return to a more equitable distribution of material wealth system
has a long way to go. Religiously motivated organizations can make an
important contribution.
China's government however, remains particularly sensitive to
uncontrolled religious movements, although not without reason. In the
nation's history politico-religious movements have more than once
brought down a dynasty. Interestingly, many, if not most, Chinese
Christians have no quarrel with the idea of government supervision of
religion. What they object to is the abuse of this right of oversight.
Nonetheless, while repression or harsh mistreatment of unregistered
religious group leaders (Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, or Falun Gong)
continues to take place, longtime observers find the situation
improving. No longer ideologically anti-religious, many Chinese
authorities increasingly see the social benefits of religion. But due
to historical experiences, they are also sensitive, perhaps overly so,
to the dangers real, imagined or imputed of unregulated (even simply
unregistered) religious movements.
CONCLUSION
I'd like to conclude my statement with an challenging reflection by
Aldo Caliari, Coordinator of the Rethinking Bretton Woods Project at
the Center of Concern here in Washington DC:
``The human rights system envisioned in the mid twentieth
century placed on nation-states the ultimate responsibility for
the human rights of individuals in their jurisdiction. The
system rested on the assumption that states have the power,
resources and policy space to fulfill such a mission. Nowadays,
while it is true that nation-states continue to bear this
responsibility, it is important to recognize the changes in the
global political economy that have taken place in the years
since. These changes have significantly undermined the ability
of nation-states, especially those within the developing world,
to fulfill their human rights responsibilities.''
We ought not to ignore these realities, as we look to China to
develop a viable Civil Society in which the private, volunteer sector,
including those of religious motivation, will thrive. Difficult as it
is for us as Americans, we need large doses of humility and respect to
abide within the legal framework prescribed for the work of Christian
ministry and witness in China today--all the while working and praying
with the Christians in China for a more favorable time. Those of good
will and courageous and creative imagination will already find multiple
opportunities to serve. Together all of us can be empowered to work for
global justice in economic and social relations; for integrity and
harmony with all facets of Creation; and toward a world of Peace and
prosperity for God's people everywhere.
To return to Senator Hagel's admonition, cited at the opening of my
statement, ``It is in our interest to work broadly and deeply with the
Chinese Government (and the Chinese people) using all bridges and
opportunities available to us . . .'' I urge this committee to call
upon our government to ensure that its actions, both bi-laterally and
through its behavior in international finance and trade institutions,
respect and support the ability of China, and many other developing
countries, to fulfill their commitments under international human
rights law.
Again, in Caliari words:
``A significant forward move would be for the US to
incorporate as a key dimension of its foreign policy the notion
that international organizations and
industrial countries are co-responsible for human rights
violations in developing countries on whose domestic policy
choices they have had (either by action or omission) an
influence.''
David Lampton, President of the US-China Committee sums up my own
counsel best:
``Americans must balance the impulse to treat China as it
is--with the foresight to recognize China for what it may
become.''
National Interest [Fall 2003]
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