Detailed Information on the
National Nuclear Security Administration: Fissile Materials Disposition Program Assessment

The MOX project office will significantly increase the number of field assessments and surveillances of MOX project suppliers in FY09 due to concerns identified in FY08 with several equipment suppliers meeting appropriate quality assurance requirements.

This effort was transferred to DSW.

The Waste Solidification Building project will finalize its cost and schedule performance baseline and seek Departmental approval Acquisition Executive approval for Critical Decision 2, Approve Performance Baseline; and Critical Decision 3, Approval to Start Construction in the November/December 2008 time frame.

Developing a process to conduct internal biannual financial reviews to ensure any risks or obstacles to obligating or costing funds are promptly identified and mitigated.

The MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility Project will use the independently validated cost and schedule baseline to measure performance and maintain change control during construction.

This effort was transferred to DSW.

The MOX project controls system will complete certification by April 2008 to ensure accurate performance measurement reporting.

Measure: Cumulative percentage of the design, construction, and cold start-up activities completed for the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility.

Explanation:The percent completed is measured using a Departmentally-certified earned value management system that accurately measures progress of individual construction activities.

Measure: Cumulative amount of surplus U.S. highly enriched uranium (HEU) down-blended or shipped for down-blending.

Explanation:Annual results are compiled from material control and accounting data forms and reports that DOE sites are required to maintain under Special Nuclear Materials handling/shipping requirements.

Measure: Cumulative percentage of design, construction, and cold start-up activities completed for the Waste Solidification Building (WSB)

Explanation:Add explanation: The percent complete is measured using an earned value management system.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is responsible for disposing of surplus U.S. weapon-grade plutonium and surplus U.S. highly enriched uranium (HEU), as well as providing technical support for, and implementation of, efforts to obtain reciprocal disposition of surplus Russian weapons-grade plutonium. The U.S. has current commitments to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 151 metric tons of non-waste HEU. The Russian Federation has agreed to dispose of a related 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium.

Evidence: 1. DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Strategic Plan (Nov. 2004) 2. DOE Record of Decision for the Disposition of Surplus HEU (Aug. 1996) 3. DOE Record of Decision for Surplus Plutonium Disposition, Final Environmental Impact Statement (Jan. 2000, as amended) 4. U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (Sept. 2000) 5. FY 2007 budget submittal (Feb. 2006)

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: Excess weapon-grade plutonium in Russia is a clear and present danger to the security of the United States because of the possibility that it will be acquired by terrorists or rogue nations. Moreover, disposing of U.S. surplus fissile materials (both HEU and plutonium) helps the U.S. meet its Nonproliferation Treaty obligations, reduces storage costs, complies with existing provisions of the law, facilitates closure of DOE's former weapons complex sites, and maintains commitments to South Carolina for the removal of nuclear materials brought to the DOE Savannah River Site for disposition.

Evidence: 1. National Academy of Sciences Report: Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (1994) 2. DOE Record of Decision for the Disposition of Surplus HEU (Aug. 1996) 3. U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (Sept. 2000) 4. DOE Report to Congress, ""Disposition of Surplus Defense Plutonium at Savannah River Site (Feb. 2002)

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: No other U.S. Government program is aimed at disposing of surplus U.S. HEU and surplus U.S. and Russian weapon-grade plutonium. Previous U.S.-Russian efforts for arms reduction have been aimed primarily at the destruction of delivery systems. However, the U.S. plutonium disposition program has taken advantage of lessons-learned from a comparable Mixed [plutonium&uranium]-Oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facilities in Europe which have operated successfully for nearly three decades. In addition, the U.S. HEU disposition program is similar to a Russian program that downblends Russian HEU to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) and sells the product to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) for nuclear power plant fuel.

Evidence: 1. U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (Sept. 2000) 2. DOE Record of Decision for Surplus Plutonium Disposition, Final Environmental Impact Statement (Jan. 2000, as amended) 3. DOE Record of Decision for the Disposition of Surplus HEU (Aug. 1996)

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: Although the program approach is limited by the U.S.-R.F. Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, the current U.S. surplus plutonium disposition approach evolved after examining over 40 technical options as part of a National Security Council review and a FY 2002 report to Congress. Monthly performance measurement and reporting against defined cost and schedule milestones support sound program management. Technical and external risks that could adversely impact the projects have been identified and risk mitigation strategies are actively managed to ensure program success.

Evidence: 1. DOE Record of Decision for Surplus Plutonium Disposition, Final Environmental Impact Statement (Jan. 2000, as amended) 2. DOE Report to Congress, ""Disposition of Surplus Defense Plutonium at Savannah River Site"" (Feb. 2002) 3. Monthly reports from project contractors 4. Risk Management Plan for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Project, Rev 1 (Jan 2006)

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: Program resources are targeted to efforts and milestones that directly support program objectives and goals. Proper project management ensures the accomplishment of defined efforts. As part of the work authorization process, Annual Operating Plans identify the scope, schedule and funding of work elements as well as the project/task managers responsible for the work, project participants, and expected results. Management tools and systems, such as monthly earned value reporting, are used to monitor cost and schedule performance. Procedures for change control, quality assurance, and configuration management control ensure the required quality of the products delivered.

Evidence: 1. FY 2007 budget submittal (Feb. 2006) 2. Program's Annual Operating Plans (Oct. 2005) 3. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition Quality Assurance Program Documents Manual (Apr. 2006)

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: The program has three specific long-term measures to meaningfully assess progress towards achieving the program's purpose. They are: (1) complete the design, construction and cold start-up for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility by 2014, (2) complete the design, construction and cold start-up for the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility by 2016, and (3) dispose of 151 metric tons of non-waste U.S. HEU by 2030.

Evidence: 1. FY 2007 budget submittal including performance indicators and associated joint annual / long-term targets (Feb. 2006) 2. DOE JOULE performance measurement and reporting system (quarterly reports)

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: The targets and timeframes for the program's two main construction projects result from cost and schedule estimates that were reviewed by independent private-sector experts. The performance targets associated with these estimates are ambitious in that they are subject to technical and external risks that challenge the projects' timely completion within budget. Consistent with industry best-practices, program efforts include risk mitigation strategies to manage these risks.

Evidence: 1. The cost and schedule estimates used to generate the FY 2006 OMB and Congressional budget submission for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility and the Pit Dissassembly and Conversion Facility (Aug. 2005) 2. FY 2007 budget submittal and the associated 5-year Future Years Nuclear Security Program (Feb. 2006)

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: The program has a limited number of specific annual measures to meaningfully assess progress towards achieving the program's long-term goals. For FY2007, they are: (1) complete a cumulative 25% of the design, construction and cold-start-up activities for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility; (2) complete a cumulative 33% of the design, construction and cold-start-up activities for the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility; (3) dispose of a cumulative 103 metric tons of U.S. non-waste HEU.

Evidence: 1. FY 2007 budget submittal including performance indicators and associated joint annual / long-term targets (Feb. 2006) 2. DOE JOULE performance measurement and reporting system (quarterly reports)

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: Detailed cost and schedule estimates are generated following the DOE construction management process and these estimates are used to baseline its annual performance measures. The annual targets are ambitious in that project efforts address technical and external risks that are actively managed through risk mitigation strategies consistent with industry best practices. For the U.S. HEU Disposition program, annual measures are directly tied to HEU shipments and blend down schedules but also include some external risks. Results of HEU blend down and deliveries are reported and verified monthly, which aids in program management.

Evidence: 1. The cost and schedule estimates used to generate the FY 2006 OMB and Congressional budget submission for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility and the Pit Dissassembly and Conversion Facility (Aug. 2005) 2. FY 2007 budget submission and the associated 5-year Future Years Nuclear Security Program (Feb. 2006)

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: The MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) and the Pit Disassembly Conversion Facility (PDCF) have Project Execution Plans that define the project's objectives, description (scope, schedule, cost), roles and responsibilities of participants, technical considerations, management plans for risk and for integrated safety, project control systems and reporting systems. This and other contractual commitments ensure that the program partners are working toward the annual and long-term objectives and goals of the program.

Evidence: 1. Project Execution Plans for the MFFF (March 2006 Rev 4) and the PDCF (Mar. 2006 Rev1-CN-005) 2. DOE-United States Enrichment Corporation Memorandum of Agreement regarding HEU (Apr. 1998) 3. DOE-TVA Interagency Agreement regarding HEU (Apr. 2001) 4. Project's Annual Operating Plans (October 2005) 5. DOE primary contract for the MFFF (March 1999) 6. DOE primary contract for the PDCF (June 1999)

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: Major DOE construction projects must undergo External Independent Reviews (EIRs) during each major phase of the project's acquisition. These reviews are designed to evaluate a project's readiness to proceed, identify and manage project risks, and confirm the project's continuing mission need. Reviews are conducted by technical and management experts that are not affiliated with the program. Other reviews regularly assess the effectiveness of project management systems/data. The DOE Inspector General has conducted independent reviews of the PDCF and MFFF projects and the Government Accountability Office is currently assessing the maturity of technologies used in these projects and the risks for cost/schedule overruns.

Evidence: 1. External Independent Review of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility supporting Critical Decisions 2 and 3 in July 2006 for Approval of Performance Baseline and Approval for Start of Construction (Jun. 2006) 2. DOE Inspector General report, ""National Nuclear Security Administration's Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility"" (May 2005) 3. DOE Inspector General report, ""Status of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility"" (Dec. 2005)

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: The program's annual and long-term performance goals are directly tied to milestones supported in the program's five-year budget request. Annual DOE/NNSA budget resource allocation decisions are made within a framework of multi-year performance goals and targets. The five-year budget period of the NNSA budget request process also supports longer-term Total Project Cost estimates. The program's budget is presented in a complete and transparent manner that adheres to DOE guidance for content and format. The budget is later reviewed internally and externally by OMB for content and appropriate justification.

Evidence: 1. The cost and schedule estimates used to generate the FY 2007 OMB and Congressional budget submission for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility and the Pit Dissassembly and Conversion Facility (Aug. 2005) 2. FY 2007 budget submittal including the 5-year Future Years Nuclear Security Program (Feb. 2006) 3. NNSA PPBE (budget formulation) Guidance Documents located on the NNSA web-site.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: Although the program's strategic goals were largely established in 2002 with the agreed-upon U.S.-R.F. Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, the U.S. approach has required some adjustments. One such adjustment included management of chemical and radiological waste streams that were previously assumed to be processed through other DOE facilities. Downsizing of the DOE complex has prompted the U.S. MOX program to incorporate a dedicated waste facility into the project.

Evidence: 1. DOE Report to Congress, ""Disposition of Surplus Defense Plutonium at Savannah River Site"" (Feb. 2002) 2. DOE Record of Decision for Surplus Plutonium Disposition, Final Environmental Impact Statement (Jan. 2000, as amended) 3. FY 2004 budget submittal including a request for the Waste Solidification Building (Feb. 2003)

Has the agency/program conducted a recent, meaningful, credible analysis of alternatives that includes trade-offs between cost, schedule, risk, and performance goals, and used the results to guide the resulting activity?

Explanation: The current U.S. plutonium disposition approach was developed following an evaluation of 40 approaches as part of a National Security Council review and a FY 2002 report to Congress. As the project's acquisition moves from design to construction, a critical decision review by the Department's Secretarial Acquisition Executive for approval for start of construction is consideraing whether the current approach is still valid. Recent Congressional report language has also required an evaluation of alternatives for U.S. plutonium disposition. This is currently underway.

Evidence: 1. DOE Report to Congress, ""Disposition of Surplus Defense Plutonium at Savannah River Site"" (Feb. 2002) 2. FY 2007 House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill committee report guidance to re-define the U.S. plutonium disposition program and provide a cost and technical analysis of plutonium disposition alternatives (May 2006)

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: DOE financial systems are used to track fiscal obligations and costs. Contract reporting requirements for cost and schedule performance are also established. Major design contractors are required to use Earned Value Management Systems (EVMS) that comply with ANSI/EIA Standard 748, EVMS Criteria. Project control systems are independently examined to ensure accurate accounting and performance measurement procedures are in place, and comply with DOE and other internal requirements. These systems are used to analyze a project's actual performance against planned performance and to assist managers in prioritizing monthly funding allocations to improve performance by preventing any critical delays.

Evidence: 1. DOE financial system reports (monthly) 2. Project reports from contractors (monthly) 3. EVMS compliance report: ANSI/EIA - 748 compliance review on the MOX FFF Project (Dec. 2004) 4. Project Performance Reviews (quarterly/routinely) 5. DOE JOULE performance measurement and reporting system (quarterly)

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: The Federal Project Director (FPD) is responsible to the Acquisition Executive, who is accountable for all DOE capital acquisition programs. For Major System projects, the Acquisition Executive appoints the FPD and holds him/her accountable for all project performance. FPDs and their supervisors are required to maintain annual Performance Plans that contain elements related to their project management abilities. In addition, contractors are held accountable through performance measurement of milestones/deliverables. Invoices are examined to determine if the appropriate resources are being applied to the work scope. An additional process supports determination of fee earned.

Evidence: 1. Federal Project Directors' annual Performance Plan for Performance Management System Employees (Nov. 2005) 2. Statements of Work in the DOE primary contract for the MFFF (Mar. 1999) and the DOE primary contract for the PDCF (Jun. 1999) 3. Contract performance incentives, such as the MFFF contract proposal for the construction phase (Mar. 2006)

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: Since this program mostly does not use DOE laboratories for project execution, the obligation of funds is not carried out as quickly as many other DOE projects which exclusively use the labs. This is because DOE labs can readily obligate program funds using their existing contracts. The MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) and Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility PDCF) efforts can contractually obligate funds only after the mutual acceptance of a detailed statement of work. The MFFF project experienced delays are mostly due to external factors that prevented the full obligation of funds. However, the funds that were obligated are being spent for the intended purposes as controlled by Annual Operating Plans linked to Work Authorization Statements as well as the examinations of work performed and associated costs.

Evidence: 1. Project's Annual Operating Plans (Oct. 2005) 2. DOE primary contract for the MFFF (Mar. 1999) 3. DOE primary contract for the PDCF (Jun. 1999) 4. Work Authorization Statements (monthly) 5. Project reports from contractors (monthly)

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: The program follows all DOE and Federal requirements, policy and guidelines for competitive sourcing/contracting. Project procedures are in place for project execution that specify system and value engineering programs to ensure traceability of work to mission requirements and cost efficiency. Project architect/ engineer contractors are required to provide project performance reports based on earned value measurements that compare estimated and actual costs of work. This process enables ready measurement of progress.

Evidence: 1. Project Performance Reports (monthly) 2. Project Performance Reviews (quarterly/routinely) 3. PDCF Value Engineering Plan (Aug. 2001) 4. MFFF Project Execution Plan (Mar. 2006, Rev. 4) 5. MFFF Acquisition Strategy document (Mar. 2006, Rev. 1)

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: The program works closely with the State Department on the Russian plutonium disposition program. The State Department has the lead on related policy issues, while DOE has the program lead for technical implementation. State leads, and DOE participates in, the U.S. delegation for the associated G-8 Multilateral Plutonium Disposition Group. DOE and State also co-chair a working group to develop a monitoring and inspection regime consistent with the requirements and obligations of the 2000 Agreement. The overall program also collaborates with the Office of Managment and Budget (OMB) and the DOE offices of Defense Programs (DP) and Environmental Management (EM) on issues and activities related to the storage, transportation and disposition of U.S. surplus plutonium and HEU to reduce DOE's storage costs for these materials. The MFFF and PDCF projects also coordinate with the NRC and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, respectively. Finally, the HEU disposition program coordinates with the U.S. Enrichment Corp and the TVA to blend down HEU to LEU for fuel for nuclear power plants.

Evidence: 1. Project Execution Plan for MFFF (March 2006, Rev 4) and PDCF (Mar. 2006, Rev. 1-CN-005) 2. DOE-United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) Memorandum of Agreement regarding HEU (Apr. 1998) 3. DOE-TVA Interagency Agreement regarding HEU (Apr. 2001)

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: The program follows DOE's financial management policies and employs procedures and practices that meet all statutory requirements. Accounting services are provided by DOE and these systems are audited to meet compliance standards. The DOE Approved Funding Program and Work Authorization Statement systems control funding distribution to the field. The program maintains an internal change control process requiring signature authority for all work scope and funding changes. Finally, the MFFF project contractor is subject to routine financial audits by the Defense Contractor Audit Agency.

Evidence: 1. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Program Management Plan (May 1999, draft Mar. 2006) 2. Project's Annual Operating Plans (Oct. 2005) 3. Work Authorization Statements (monthly) 4. DOE financial information system reports (monthly) 5. Project reports from contractors (monthly) 6. Project Performance Reviews (quarterly/routinely)

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: The MFFF project has resolved or is resolving six concerns raised in a recent DOE Inspector General report. For instance, the project is on schedule to complete formal approval of its cost and schedule baseline by the Secretarial Acquisition Executive in July 2006. This baseline will support performance measurement and management oversight. In addition, the MFFF project contractor has undertaken a number of actions to address management and operational issues, including organizational realignments and enhancements such as a new Project Manager, establishing a Deputy Project Manager position, and creating of a stand-alone Project Controls organization whose manager will be a direct-report to the Project Manager.

Evidence: 1. DOE Inspector General report, "Status of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility" (Dec. 2005), and demonstrated follow-up efforts 2. Contract extension proposal from the MFFF performance contractor for construction, cold startup and operations preparation efforts. The summary section documents management improvements. (Mar. 2006)

Is the program managed by maintaining clearly defined deliverables, capability/performance characteristics, and appropriate, credible cost and schedule goals?

Explanation: Technical requirements and objectives are documented in Annual Operating Plans (AOPs), Project Execution Plans, and contract Statements of Work. AOPs contain statements of work and deliverables that provide input into project Work Authorization Statements. During design, individual deliverables are developed and later specified in contracts that are monitored against performance requirements including cost and schedules. All documentation resulting in the definition of mission and mission-supporting requirements are under change control and configuration management processes per a formal Quality Assurance program. Overall project cost and schedule performance is monitored via monthly reports and routine project/program reviews.

Evidence: 1. Statements of Work (SOWs) for the MFFF and PDCF contracts (Mar. 1999, Jun. 1999) 2. Project Execution Plan for MFFF (March 2006, Rev 4) and PDCF (Mar. 2006, Rev. 1-CN-005) 3. Project Annual Operating Plans (Oct. 2005) 4. The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition's Quality Assurance Program Description (Jul. 2003) 5. MFFF Integrated Project Schedule (Mar. 2006)

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: The program had previously been delayed due to an impasse over liability protections for U.S. work perfomed in Russia. Through 2005, the program has completed 13% of the MFFF's and 24% of the PDCF's design, construction and cold start-up efforts, and disposed of 82 of 151 metric tons (MT) non-waste HEU through downblend related processes. These three project efforts are on-track for their 2006 targets as well. In addition, the U.S. Plutonium disposition program also continues to achieve other key milestones. For instance in March 2006, the MFFF project contractor submitted of the required materials to support the project's request for Critical Decision 2 Approval of Performance Baseline and Critical Decision 3 Approval for Start of Construction.

Evidence: 1. DOE JOULE performance measurement and reporting system (quarterly reports) 2. Project cost and schedule reports (monthly) 3. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) construction authorization for the MFFF (Mar. 2005) 4. Insertion of four prototype MOX fuel lead test assemblies, fabricated in France, into one of the reactors at the Catawba Nuclear Station, after modifications to the reactor and an associated amendment to the NRC operating license (Jun. 2005)

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: The program is on schedule in FY 2006: to complete a cumulative 14% of the PDCF and 24% of the MFFF design, construction and cold start-up activities, and to downblend or shipment for downblending of a cumulative 93 metric tons of U.S. non-waste HEU. However, the MFFF has had difficulty meeting its annual performance goals in the past due to external factors, such as a liability agreement impasse with Russia and the requirement that the U.S. and Russian plutonium disposition programs proceed in rough parallel. As a result, the MFFF project has revised its estimated cost and schedule baseline, is seeking formal DOE approval of it by September 2006 after an External Independent Review, and is also working to begin construction by September 2006.

Evidence: 1. FY 2007 budget submission and associated 5-year FutureYears Nuclear Security Program (Feb. 2006) 2. DOE JOULE Report on status against annual milestones (quarterly)

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: The MFFF and PDCF are in the advanced design phase. The non-repetitive nature and often multi-year scope of project efforts do not lend themselves to demonstrating annually improved cost effectiveness. Regardless, potential cost efficiencies are achieved by value management systems required by DOE and federal guidelines to ensure the most economical methods are employed to meet facility design requirements. Earned value measurement of deliverables and associated costs are closely tracked and reported to ensure progress. Also, the PDCF project is employing a full-scale demonstration module to examine various aspects of operation, including efficiency, reliability and maintainability.

Evidence: 1. Cost Performance Index [Budgeted Cost for Work Performed, divided by Actual Cost of Work Performed] from the MFFF project's earned value management system (quarterly reports) 2. Completion of the second of three demonstrations of the PDCF project's Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System [ARIES] (Apr. 2002)

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: The U.S. HEU disposition program employs government and private-sector facilities in downblending HEU to LEU and selling the LEU to U.S. nuclear fuel fabricators to generate revenues. A part of this program, the U.S. Off-Specification HEU Blend Down Project, was thoroughly evaluated during the Secretary's Excellence in Acquisition award process and was awarded the top honor as DOE's best-managed project in 2003. In addition, the MFFF project has taken advantage of lesson-learned from comparable European facilities. Adjustments to a French design for more diverse U.S. plutonium input materials and to meet NRC requirements for a unique U.S. facility have proven challenging, especially in the post 9-11 enhanced security environment.

Evidence: 1. The Off-Specification HEU Blend Down Project received the Secretary of Energy's Excellence in Acquisition Award (May 2003) 2. Favorable finding of the External Independent Review of the MFFF Critical Decision 3B request for approval to procure certain long lead time equipment. (Mar. 2006)

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: The program has used independent technical experts to review the projects, identify deficiencies, and suggest corrective actions. External Independent Reviews (EIRs) are mandated by DOE for major system projects at Critical Decision (CD) points to approve a project's readiness to proceed. Successful completion of CD's and related EIRs demonstrates forward progress. The MFFF completed an initial CD-2A/3A for approval of site preparation activities in August 2005. Another EIR is currently being conducted in April 2006 to support the MFFF CD-2 to approve Performance Baseline and CD-3 to approve Start of Construction. Moreover, the Off-Specification HEU Blend Down Project was thoroughly reviewed during the Secretary's Excellence in Acquisition awards process and was awarded the top honor as DOE's best-managed project in 2003.

Evidence: 1. External Independent Review (EIR) for Critical Decision 2A/3A for approval of site preparation activities for the MOX facility (Aug. 2005) 2. March 2006 Internal review on MFFF to support preparation for Critical Decisions 2 and 3, for Approval of Performance Baseline and Approval for Start of Construction by September 2006. A full EIR is being performed as part of this CD-2/3 process. (Apr. 2006) 3. The Off-Specification HEU Blend Down Project received the Secretary of Energy's Excellence in Acquisition Award (May 2003)

Were program goals achieved within budgeted costs and established schedules?

Explanation: The U.S. HEU Disposition program has historically met its cost and schedule targets. A cumulative total of 93 metric tons of surplus U.S. HEU for FY 2006 will be downblended or shipped for downblending. However, progress on U.S. plutonium disposition has been delayed due to requirements for the U.S and Russian plutonium disposition programs to proceed in rough parallel and due to other programmatic adjustments. As a result, the MFFF and PDCF projects are revising estimated cost and schedule baselines to reflect these delays. DOE began site preparation efforts on MFFF and PDCF in September 2005 and is working to start MFFF construction by September 2006.

Evidence: 1. DOE JOULE performance measurement and reporting system (quartertly reports) 2. Project reports from contractors (monthly)