Detailed Information on the
Security Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa Assessment

In key post conflict countries in Africa, the militaries need to be successfully transformed and integrated into a holistic security sector reform effort so as to ensure conflict cannot return and UN peacekeepers can withdraw. Current status: The US is seeking to stand up headquarters, military pay and justice systems, and training institutions in three countries (Liberia, S. Sudan, DRC) with varying levels of programming activity. Soon a fourth country will begin in earnest: Somalia.

Explicitly link the budget request to accomplishment of performance goals as part of the 2006 performance plan and budget cycle.

Institute measures to hold federal managers and program partners accountable for achieving key program results.

Develop at least one efficiency goal for these programs.

Continue to evaluate and refine the performance measure for these programs to ensure that they provide useful information to inform management, budget and policy decisions.

Increase number of contract and program management officers in AF to ensure proper oversight.

Measure: U.S. trained African military units are available to support peace keeping/humanitarian missions.

Explanation:Target:By FY 2008 over 85% of African military units deployed in peace keeping/humanitarian response situations will have received specialized training and equipment from the United States. Actual Progress achieved toward goal:FY 2003: Approximately 55% of African military units deployed had been trained by the U.S.

Measure: African militaries are capable of sustained peace keeping and humanitarian operations.

Explanation:Target:By FY 2009 African countries which have received military assistance for five consecutive years since FY 2002 will have not participated in any extra-constitutional change of government. Actual Progress achieved toward goal:FY 2003: No U.S. trained African military units have attempted or supported an extra-constitutional change of government.

Measure: Training Cost for a Batallion. (New measure, added August 2007)

Explanation:

Measure: Train African military personnel.

Explanation:In 2004, train 2100 individuals.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: Sub-Saharan Africa security assistance programs are designed to promote peace and stability, develop indigenous African peacekeeping and humanitarian response capabilities, develop more professional African militaries, and develop relationships between US and African militaries.

Evidence: Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) for Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY 2001, FY 2002, FY 2003. FAA legislation, AF BPP, and State Performance Plan.

Does the program address a specific interest, problem or need?

Explanation: Security assistance programs are designed to promote peace and stability, develop indigenous African peacekeeping and humanitarian response capabilities, develop more professional African militaries, and develop relationships between US and African militaries. These programs are particularly needed in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is a region beset with conflict and instability. Ongoing or recent conflicts include Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia.

Evidence: Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) for Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY 2001, FY 2002, FY 2003. FAA legislation, AF BPP, and State Performance Plan.

Is the program designed to have a significant impact in addressing the interest, problem or need?

Explanation: Programs are designed to address specific deficiencies in the African militaries that, if successfully accomplished, will increase their capabilities and professionalization and enable them to perform peacekeeping and stabilizing functions in the continent. Funds are often used to provide financial support or support in kind to ensure viability of peacekeeping operations. Without this support, the peacekeeping mission would have to curtail operations, risking the collapse of the entire peace process.

Evidence: Reports and observations from the UN, NGOs, international agencies, EU partners, embassies, independent critiques, and official discussions.

Is the program designed to make a unique contribution in addressing the interest, problem or need (i.e., not needlessly redundant of any other Federal, state, local or private efforts)?

Explanation: Other donor countries are the only other major legitimate source of funding for security assistance. It does not appear that U.S. funding is duplicative of related U.S.G. or foreign donor efforts. These programs are well coordinated with related programs through U.S. interagency and multilateral meetings that include officials from the U.S., other donor countries, and representatives from the African military organizations receiving assistance.

Evidence: State cables reporting on coordination efforts.

Is the program optimally designed to address the interest, problem or need?

Explanation: The program definition for this exercise includes Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Foreign mIlitary Financing grants (FMF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). These programs are designed and implemented in very different ways and attempt to address different needs and areas within a country. There is no conclusive evidence that another approach, other than the current legislated programs, would yield greater results. In addition, AF Mission Performance Plans (MPP) and the AF BPP were dramatically improved in the 2004 cycle to better translate overarching conflict resolution/mitigation goal into objective strategies and tactics clearly linked to outcome based performance indicators. State plans to begin using performance based contracting for PKO funded programs in the upcoming fiscal year.

Evidence: CBJs, MPPs and BPPs.

Does the program have a limited number of specific, ambitious long-term performance goals that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: UPDATED FOR 2005: The long term goals and annual targets have been rewritten for these programs in the African Bureau Performance Plan for 2005. The goals and targets have been shared with other bureaus, departments and the embassies in the applicable countries. The revised goals focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program. Problems with performance goals that were noted in the 2004 PART review have been addressed.

Evidence: FY 2005 Africa Bureau Performance Plan.

Does the program have a limited number of annual performance goals that demonstrate progress toward achieving the long-term goals?

Explanation: The revised Bureau Performance Plan includes new annual measures designed to track the performance of U.S. trained military units in Peacekeeping activities and in their involvement in internal political activities. African militaries' involvement in internal political affairs is being tracked to ensure that military leaders understand the importance of civilian control and political non-interference.

Evidence: FY 2005 Africa Bureau Performance Plan.

Do all partners (grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, etc.) support program planning efforts by committing to the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: Program partners are required to report on performance, but this does not appear to be directly linked to the programs' annual and long-term goals. The Department should refine their reporting requirements for program partners in order to ensure that they are collecting data that allows them to directly evaluate programs' success related to performance goals.

Evidence: Weekly reports for USG contractors (ICI Helos, PAE Depot, PAE Sudan, AIRSCAN Surveillance Platform) as well as training/after-action reports. After action reports from U.S. military and from contractors for every ACRI/ACOTA exercise.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs that share similar goals and objectives?

Explanation: Programs are reviewed (at the account, country and regional levels) and coordinated at the embassy level, major military headquarters, and at the departmental levels. For example, State is working with Defense and other interagency staff to develop country blueprints under the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program to better coordinate all security assistance elements. At EUCOM and CENTCOM, security assistance programs for specific countries are integrated annually into the Theatre Security Cooperation Plan with activities and resources available from other -- primarily US military -- budget resources.

Evidence: ACOTA country blueprints. State cables that report on coordination efforts.

Are independent and quality evaluations of sufficient scope conducted on a regular basis or as needed to fill gaps in performance information to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness?

Explanation: Independent evaluations are not performed for all of these programs on a regular basis. However, the planning and budgeting elements in State and Defense regularly review country programs and both IMET and FMF programs are regularly assessed and evaluated by the country team and the interagency. A number of independent or semi-independent reviews have been carried out for a number of specific projects. The State Department's Inspector General (IG) conducted a general inspection of the entire AF Bureau in 2002, in which they assessed the purpose and performance of AF security assistance programs. In the coming year, the program managers will work with RM to identify resources to conduct independent evaluations of these programs. While there are not regularly scheduled independent reviews of all projects, there have been sufficient reviews on an "as needed" basis to merit a yes. However, in future years, the Department should demonstrate that 1.) they have a schedule for carrying out evaluations of all programs on a regular basis; 2.) these inspections are sufficiently independent (RM or the IG within State, or an outside entity); and 3.) that these inspections specifically evaluate performance as related to the programs' goals in MPP and BPP documents. In addition, the programs' performance goals would need to qualify for a "yes" in Sections II and IV, questions 1 and 2.

Evidence: Review of the ACRI program conducted by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. State cable providing conclusions from a review of a program to train a Guinean Battalion conducted by State and Defense elements and the International Red Cross.

Is the program budget aligned with the program goals in such a way that the impact of funding, policy, and legislative changes on performance is readily known?

Explanation: UPDATED FOR 2005: In general and for these specific programs, State Bureau Performance Plans and Mission Performance Plans do not tie resource decisions to annual performance targets.

Evidence: FY 2005 Africa Bureau Performance Plan

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: Steps have and will continue to be taken to address strategic deficiencies that existed in the past. For example, the transformation of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) program to ACOTA was undertaken to address flaws in the program. Through interagency and multilateral discussions, several planning deficiencies of peace support operations training have been addressed and corrected. AF has been able to take the lessons learned from ACRI and Operation Focus Relief (OFR) and build a stronger and more useful program. Information learned through this process has helped to inform other long term strategies for enhancing peace support operations in the region. More broadly, this year's BPP and MPP started to implement better strategic planning, linking its measures of effectiveness to program performance, so that program elements are now better aligned to help meet performance goals. Lastly, the AF Foreign Operations primer cable is attempting to address some of the shortfalls at posts and the program managers are receiving strategic planning training.

Evidence: CBJ for FY 2003 addresses transformation of ACRI program to ACOTA.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: Program managers receive regular reports on program implementation and performance, and this information is used to manage the programs. The Department should, however, work to improve the link between these reporting requirements and specific goals set out in program performance plans (such as the MPP). Information gathered should be included in an annual performance report (or within the MPPs and BPPs) in a way that compares the annual and long-term goals to the programs' actual performance.

Evidence: Weekly reports for USG contractors (ICI Helos, PAE Depot, PAE Sudan, AIRSCAN Surveillance Platform) as well as training/after-action reports. After action reports from U.S. military and from contractors for every ACRI/ACOTA exercise.

Are Federal managers and program partners (grantees, subgrantees, contractors, etc.) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: State acquisition contract officers are responsible for and held accountable for contract performance, etc. However, it does not appear that performance management contracts are used for program managers or that program managers are held accountable by some other means for achieving the key program results that are defined by agency performance plans. Both AF and PM are addressing deficiencies in the this area, however. For example, AF is in the process of hiring a full-time program manager.

Evidence: Contract evaluation criteria. Establishment of program manager position.

Are all funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?

Explanation: Both the Political Military (PM) and Africa (AF) Bureaus at the State Department track all obligations to ensure funds are obligated in a timely manner and for the intended purpose. Obligation of funds is mandated by legislation. Presently, PM has an office-based tracking system to track information on obligations and allotments. The program bureau is working with the Resource Management bureau and other agency staff to develop a better approach to their financial management requirements. AF is in the process of adding a Program Manager position to better ensure efficient obligation of funding.

Evidence: PM obligation reports and SF 133 reports provide evidence. FMF apportionment requests.

Does the program have incentives and procedures (e.g., competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: All new contracts require a rigorous competitive bidding process, and the State program managers are both extremely involved with this process and empowered to ensure that the appropriate decisions are made. There is an exception to the competitive bidding process in cases where there is an urgency override. Also, in some cases, existing contracts are extended without a competitive bidding process.

Evidence: Language in contracts and evaluation documents.

Does the agency estimate and budget for the full annual costs of operating the program (including all administrative costs and allocated overhead) so that program performance changes are identified with changes in funding levels?

Explanation: UPDATED FOR 2005: This question was deleted from the 2005 PART, so it did not seem appropriate to include it in the 2005 reassessment.

Evidence:  

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: UPDATED FOR 2005: The programs implemented by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) have procedures to ensure that payments are made properly for the intended purposes. Similar controls are in place on the State side through the contracting, certifying and disbursing process. PM has instituted a process by which all three accounts will be reviewed on a quarterly basis. This review will involve participants from all bureaus and agencies involved in the management of these programs to include AF, PM, RM, DSCA, and OSD. The program managers intend to work closely with State's Resource Management Bureau to further explore, evaluate and improve financial management practices.

Evidence: DSCA audit reports and financial planning documents. PM's Quarterly Management Reviews.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: AF is in the process of establishing a program manager. State as a whole has taken serious steps to improve their performance planning process and documents. Senior management in the most recent reviews has imposed the necessity for tighter expectations in the department to establish performance goals and indicators that would demonstrate progress toward both annual and long-term goals and associated costs.

Evidence: Position description for program manager. AF Foreign Operations primer to improve posts understanding of Foreign Operations budget.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term outcome goal(s)?

Explanation: UPDATED FOR 2005: The revised long term and annual goals show clear progress being achieved.

Evidence: FY 2005 Africa Bureau Performance Plan

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: UPDATED FOR 2005: The revised long term and annual goals show clear progress being achieved.

Evidence: FY 2005 Africa Bureau Performance Plan

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies and cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: Performance goals do not demonstrate achievement of efficiencies as measured in dollars over time (or some other quantifiable measure).

Evidence: FY 2005 Africa Bureau Performance Plan

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: None of the measures in the common measures program relate to this program.

Evidence:  

Do independent and quality evaluations of this program indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: Two particular reviews demonstrated that programs were thoroughly reviewed and achieving results.

Evidence: Review of the ACRI program conducted by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, The Fund for Peace. State cable providing conclusions from a review of a program to train a Guinean Battalion conducted by State and Defense elements and the International Red Cross.