BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-T

Unit XII Case Study



Unit Objectives

Explain building security design issues to a building owner for consideration prior to a renovation or new construction.

Explain the identification process to arrive at the high risk asset-threat/hazard pairs of interest.

Justify the recommended mitigation measures, explaining the benefits in reducing the risk for the high risk situations of interest.



Cooperville Information / Business Center

Company

- Functions
- Infrastructure

Threats/Hazards

- Design Basis Threat
- Levels of Protection

Vulnerabilities

- Impact
- Mitigation

Report



Cooperville Information / Business Center (CI/BC)



Cooperville Information / Business Center

IT services and support and temporary office facilities

75+ employees

Two-story building in small corporate office park

Located in suburban area of major metropolitan city

"Neighbors" include:

- Offices
- Industry
- Road, Rail, Air traffic








FEMA 426, Figure 2-1: Example of Using GIS to Identify
Adjacent Hazards, p. 2-5
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY COOP T-t-T Unit XII-C-4

5-Mile Building Radius





Local Imagery



Local Imagery - CI/BC Cooperville Info / Bus Center






Site Imagery






HazMat Sites






Emergency Response





Functional Layout







Car Bomb Blast Effects






Truck Bomb Blast Effects - Highway







Truck Bomb Blast Effects – Loading Dock





Building Data

Infrastructure

Structural

- 2 Story Steel Frame with brick façade
- Annealed glass

Mechanical

- HVAC
- Gas
- Fire Suppression

Electrical


- Primary
- Back-up

IT


- Data Center
- Telecom

Physical Security






Mechanical Systems



HVAC Supply
Cooperville Info / Bus Center




Mechanical Systems



HVAC Return
Cooperville Info / Bus Center




Mechanical Systems



Chilled Water Distribution
Cooperville Info / Bus Center




Electrical Systems





Mechanical and Electrical Room



Mechanical and Electrical Room
Cooperville Info / Bus Center



Information Technology









Physical Security



Emergency Response

FEMA







Source: Mine Safety Appliances Company

Threats/Hazards

Threats include:

Terrorism

No direct threat to CI/BC

 Government, military, industry in the area

Intelligence Collection Crime

 High threat in metro area, lower in suburbs





Threats/Hazards

Threats (continued):

HazMat -- nearby facilities

- Fuel farm and pipeline
- Interstate highway
- Rail line

Natural Hazards

- Hurricanes Infrequent
- Tornadoes Almost every Spring
- Earthquakes Low intensity and low probability
- Flooding Not in 100 Yr Flood Plain
- Lightning Frequent







Computerized Elevation Looking Northwest





Computerized Elevation Looking Northeast





Design Basis Threat

Explosive Blast: Car Bomb 250 lb TNT equivalent. Truck Bomb 5,000 lb TNT equivalent (Murrah Federal Building class weapon)

Chemical: Large quantity gasoline spill and toxic plume from the adjacent tank farm, small quantity (tanker truck and rail car size) spills of HazMat materials (chlorine)

Biological: Anthrax delivered by mail or in packages, smallpox distributed by spray mechanism mounted on truck or aircraft in metropolitan area

Radiological: Small "dirty" bomb detonation within the 10-mile radius of the CI/BC building



DHS Interagency Security Committee Criteria

Level II Building – between 11-150 employees; 2,500 to 80,000 sq ft

- Perimeter Security
- Entry Security
- Interior Security
- Administrative Procedures
- Blast/Setback Standards



DoD Antiterrorism Standards

Level of Protection	Potential Structural Damage	Potential Door and Glazing Hazards	Potential Injury	
Low	Moderate damage – Building damage will not be economically repairable.	Glazing will fracture, potentially come out of the frame, but at a reduced velocity, does	Majority of personnel in damaged area suffer minor to	
	Progressive collapse will not occur. Space in and around damaged area will be unusable.	not present a significant injury hazard. (Very low hazard rating) Doors may fail, but they will rebound out of	moderate injuries with the potential for a few serious injuries, but fatalities are unlikely. Personnel in areas	
	their frames, presenting minimal hazards.	outside damaged areas will potentially experience minor to moderate injuries.		



FEMA 426, Adapted from Table 4-1: DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for New Buildings, p. 4-9, updated for *UFC 4-010-01*, 22 Jan 2007

DoD Antiterrorism Standards

Location	Building Category	Stand-off Distance or Separation Requirements			
Controlled Perimeter or Parking and Roadways without a Controlled Perimeter		Applicable Level of Protection	Conventional Construction Stand-off Distance	Minimum Stand-off Distance	Applicable Explosives Weight
	Primary Gathering Building	Low	45 m 148 ft	25 m 82 ft	Car Bomb



UFC 4-010-01 APPENDIX B DoD MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS FOR NEW AND EXISTING BUILDINGS

Standard 1	Stand-off Distances	
Standard 2	Unobstructed Space	
Standard 3	Drive-Up/Drop-Off Areas	
Standard 4	Access Roads	
Standard 5	Parking Beneath Buildings or on Rooftops	
Standard 6	Progressive Collapse Avoidance	
Standard 7	Structural Isolation	
Standard 8	Building Overhangs	
Standard 9	Exterior Masonry Walls	
Standard 10	Windows and Skylights	
Standard 11	Building Entrance Layout	
Standard 12	Exterior Doors	



Levels of Protection (continued)

UFC 4-010-01 APPENDIX B DoD MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS FOR NEW AND EXISTING BUILDINGS

Standard 13	Mail Rooms	
Standard 14	Roof Access	
Standard 15	Overhead Mounted Architectural Features	
Standard 16	Air Intakes	
Standard 17	Mail Room Ventilation	
Standard 18	Emergency Air Distribution Shutoff	
Standard 19	Utility Distribution and Installation	
Standard 20	Equipment Bracing	
Standard 21	Under Building Access	
Standard 22	Mass Notification	



Unit XII Case Study Activity

Finalization and Presentation of Group Results Purpose

- Groups finalize their assessments
- Decide on high priority risk concerns
- Determine appropriate mitigation measures
- Present findings to class

Requirements

Based on findings from previous activities, complete the worksheet table, including COOP requirements not yet met

Prepare to present conclusions and justify decisions to class in a 5- to 7-minute presentation



Vulnerability/Mitigation

Basis of Mitigation Measures

Recommendations ultimately require an understanding of benefit (capability) versus cost to implement

Blast Modeling

- Various scenarios run at Tier III level for comparison using Design Basis Threats
 - Truck bomb is worst case
 - Car bomb also analyzed for comparison
 - Some interesting and unexpected results
- More analysis required for final design



Vulnerability/Mitigation

Basis of Mitigation Measures

Plume Modeling (CBR or HazMat)

- Tier II / Tier III performed for selected Design Basis
 Threats external to building
- Additional Tier III analysis required inside building
 - Understand internal pressure changes during building operation
 - Understand how HVAC and other changes implemented in response plans affect building
 - Supports design of CBR measures



Vulnerability/Mitigation

Basis of Mitigation Measures

Cost Estimates are ROM (Rough Order of Magnitude)

- Assumes 10% Overhead and 10% Profit
- Assumes Area Cost Factor of 1.0 (DoD) or 100 (RS Means)
 - DoD Range: 0.84 (Huntsville AL) to 1.67 (Anchorage AK)
 - RS Means Range: 82.5 (Baton Rouge LA) to 131.9 (New York NY)
 - Adjusted for July 2006
- Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection equipment and construction costing information is still immature



Site / Vehicle Bomb

Maximize available stand-off

- Front side along sidewalk to prevent direct approach into building and ensure stand-off – 100 LF
- Due to straightaways on front and back of building, need K12 stopping power

■ Planters - \$22.3K

Plinth wall\$50.7K

Landscaping (boulders) - \$19.5K



Building Envelope / Vehicle Bomb

Harden windows (balanced envelope)

- Fragment Retention Film
 - Not costed -- could not meet performance required for upgraded stand-off
- Laminated glass -- 56 windows
 - ½" laminated interior pane with 0.060 PVB interlayer, air gap to 0.25 inches, and retention of exterior pane \$170.8K



Window Hardening


Original Glazing

- Large DBT 1,136 ft
- Small DBT 338 ft

Hardened Glazing

- Large DBT 422 / 579 ft
- Small DBT 29 / 150 ft

Between the two hardened glazing distances glass blows OUT of building





Building Envelope / Vehicle Bomb

Harden exterior -- Close in overhang

- Brick bonded to 4" Reinforced Concrete Wall, #3 rebar
 @12 inches each way \$64.2K
- Brick backed with truck bed liner \$34.6K
- Deduct window hardening if overhang enclosed (\$85.4K)



Infill Hardening

Overhang Infill – Brick Only

Large DBT – 1,210 ft


Small DBT – 88 ft

Hardened Overhang Infill w/ R/C Backup Wall

Large DBT – 422 ft

Small DBT - 32 ft





Infill Hardening

Overhang Infill – Brick Only

Large DBT – 1,210 ft

Small DBT – 88 ft

Hardened Overhang Infill w/ Spray-On Liner

Large DBT – 213 ft

Small DBT – 17 ft





Building Envelope / Vehicle Bomb

Harden walls (balanced envelope)

- Vermiculite in wall cavity \$23.5K
- Spray on truck bed liner \$43.4K



Wall Hardening

Cavity Wall - CMU Only

Large DBT – 1,022 ft

Small DBT - 230 ft

Hardened Cavity Walls w/ Vermiculite in gap

Large DBT – 371 ft

Small DBT - 31 ft





Wall Hardening

Cavity Wall – CMU Only


Large DBT – 1,022 ft

Small DBT – 230 ft

Hardened Cavity Walls w/ Spray-On Liner

Large DBT – 171 ft

Small DBT - 42 ft





Site / Vehicle Bomb

Protect site from truck bomb by establishing controlled perimeter

- Chain link fencing along main road K8 with two aircraft cables - \$50,500
- Vehicle pop-up barriers K8, 3 entrances \$181.7K
- Pre-screening away from building
 Facility (Pre-Engineering Building) \$35,000
 Manpower/year \$187.2K



Architectural / Vehicle Bomb

Strengthen overhead anchorage elements

Heaters - \$2.1K



Site / Armed Attack (Physical Security)

Controlled Perimeter

- Fencing on three sides of site not on main road -\$66.0K
- Upgrade Security Ops Center (security managers office) – digital CCTV, digital video recording (DVR), and cameras for complete building coverage -\$55.0K



Architectural / Mailroom

Separate front lobby from interior office space

- Harden wall between lobby and office space -\$22.9K
- Harden door between lobby and office space -\$4.4K
- Separate HVAC system \$4.4K
- Total \$31.7K

Separate Mailroom, hardened with separate HVAC - \$40.0K



Utilities / Mechanical Systems / Vehicle Bomb

Natural gas meters / pressure regulators

- Bollards, K12, 3 total \$2.3K
- Fencing (access control) \$0.20K

Utilities / Electrical Systems / Vehicle Bomb

Electrical transformers

■ Bollards, K12, 6 total – \$4.6K



Mechanical Systems / Fire Alarm Systems / General Vulnerability – Redundancy

Fire Alarm / Suppression

- Install annunciator panel \$3.5K
- Fire detection zones for CI/BC corporate space with dual detection in Data Center - \$81.0K
- Convert Data Center to clean agent to supplement water (check local code) - \$137.5K

Chilled Water

 Install backup piping to primary air handling units -\$26.0K



Electrical Systems / General Vulnerability – Redundancy

Increase size of generator fuel tank

- 2,000 to 3,000 gallons (30 hours at full output) -\$17.0K
- 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel \$8.7K
- Total \$25.7K
- Arrange multiple suppliers for daily deliveries under worst case conditions

Conduct full and extended load test of emergency generator and UPS system to confirm performance





Mechanical Systems-HVAC / CBR Attack


- Protect outside air intake \$21.0K (architecturally compatible)
- Emergency shut down switch \$10.0K
- Upgrade filters to MERV 11/13 (gasoline plume and radioactive particulates)
 - \$25.0K (filter assembly only) to
 - \$500.0K (upgraded air handling)



Fire Plumes - Smoke & CO








Carbon Monoxide

Mechanical Systems-HVAC / CBR Attack

- Evaluate carbon filters for chlorine type spills
 - \$130.0K
- Evaluate UVGI \$8.0K










CI/BC Chlorine Release Parameters

SITE DATA INFORMATION: Location: FAIRFAX. VIRGINIA Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.34 (sheltered double storied) Time: November 29, 2005 1111 hours EST (using computer's clock) CHEMICAL INFORMATION: Chemical Name: CHLORINE Molecular Weight: 70.91 g/mol ERPG-3: 20 ppm ERPG-2: 3 ppm ERPG-1: 1 ppm IDLH: 10 ppm Carcinogenic risk - see CAMEO Normal Boiling Point: -29.3° F Ambient Boiling Point: -29.7° F Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0% ATMOSPHERIC INFORMATION: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA) Wind: 7 mph from 180° true at 3 meters No Inversion Height Stability Class: D Air Temperature: 70° F Relative Humidity: 50% Ground Roughness: urban or forest Cloud Cover: 5 tenths COURSE STRENGTH INFURPHTION: Leak from hole in horizontal cylindrical tank Tank Dismotor: 6 feet Tank Length: 24.1 feet Tank contains liquid Tank Volume: 5100 gallons Internal Temperature: 70° F Chemical Mass in Tank: 30 tons Tank is 100% full Circular Opening Diameter: 6 inches Opening is 6 inches from tank bottom Release Duration: 2 minutes Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 57,700 pounds/min (averaged over a minute or more) Total Amount Released: 59,200 pounds



Chlorine Release Footprints





- Rapid release yields a large plume
- IDLH four miles long and over 1 mile wide


- Slow release reduces plume size
- IDLH less than 2 miles long and 0.5 miles wide


^{**} Emergency Response Planning Guide (1 hour exposure guidelines) 1 = mild symptoms, 2 = moderate symptoms, but without irreversible damage and not incapacitating



^{*} Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health – maximum concentration that allows 30 minutes exposure without serious or irreversible health risk

Chlorine Concentrations at CI/BC







- Rapid spike outdoors at CI/BC from 6 –12 minutes later
- Instantly fatal concentration levels for this short period
- Indoor concentrations remain low during plume passage
- Evacuees likely to become fatalities from 0.5 to 4 miles downwind during typical evacuation times (5-30 minutes) particularly absent clear/proper evacuation instructions
- Rapid spike outdoors at CI/BC begins at 6 minutes and continues for over an hour but at 100x lower levels
- Short exposures at 20-30 ppm (2xIDLH) for any lengthy period could cause serious or irreversible health problems
- Indoor concentrations remain below IDLH for > 1 hour and below ERPG 2 for > 0.5 hours



Chlorine Dose at CI/BC





Rapid Release (2 minutes)

- Dose spikes rapidly outdoors at CI/BC at 6 minutes
- Lethal dose at 6 minutes but no increase in dose after the plume passes (~12 minutes post release)
- Indoor concentrations increase at about 16 ppm 1000ppm-min/60 min. Health problems are likely in less than 30 minutes (IDLH - 10 ppm).

Slow Release (1 hour)

- Dose increases gradually outdoors at CI/BC beginning at 6 minutes and continues for over an hour but at a rate not much greater than the indoor rates for a rapid release (1 hour dose = 1500 ppm vs 1000 ppm (rapid release)
- Indoor dose remains very low throughout the full hour



IT Communications Systems / Utility Systems / Cyber Attack - Redundancy

Identify alternate telecom carrier circuits and availability



Emergency Operations & Response

Post shelter and evacuation procedures - \$900

Identify rally points (A, B, C) at sites away from building - \$900

Conference Room for shelter-in-place (130 people) [Sealing and Overpressurization] –\$177.4K

Personal protective evacuation hoods - \$180 / person - \$23.4K

