Unit IX-A Site and Layout Design Guidance



Unit Objectives

Identify site planning concerns that can create, reduce, or eliminate vulnerabilities and understand the concept of "Layers of Defense."

Recognize protective issues for suburban site planning.

Compare the pros and cons of barrier mitigation measures that increase stand-off or promote the need for hardening of buildings at risks.



Unit Objectives

Understand the following critical issues:

- Keeping up with growing demand for security design
- Understanding benefits that can be derived from appropriate security design

References

FEMA Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist, Chapter 1, page 1-46, FEMA 426

Site and Layout Design Guidance, Chapter 2, FEMA 426

FEMA 430, Primer for Incorporating Building Security Components in Architectural Design



Unit Objectives

Understand the following critical issues (continued):

- Adopting a creative process to face current design challenges
- Including aesthetic elements compatible with security and architecture characteristics of building and surrounding environment

References


FEMA Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist, Chapter 1, page 1-46, FEMA 426

Site and Layout Design Guidance, Chapter 2, FEMA 426


FEMA 430, Primer for Incorporating Building Security Components in Architectural Design



Layers of Defense



Layers of Defense



First Layer of Defense

Second Layer of Defense

High Security Building Third, Second, and First Layers of Defense



Layers of Defense

Layers of Defense	Survey Surroundings	Access Points	Layout / Site Considerations	Barriers / Bollards / Fencing	Gatehouses / Screening	Sidewalks and Curbs	Street Furniture	Yards and Plazas	Roadways	Parking	Signage	Security Lighting	Sensors / CCTV	Site Utilities
First Layer														
Second Layer														
Third Layer														



First Layer of Defense

Survey Surroundings / DataCollection

- 360 degrees all directions
- Use GIS and local authorities to understand your surroundings
 - Buildings
 - Infrastructure
 - Geographic/topographic elements
- Overhead and underground utilities





First Layer of Defense

Access Points

- Have commercial vehicle gates if possible
- Provide traffic calming
- Avoid high speed approaches
- Control angles of approach
- Prevent unauthorized access
- Avoid traffic queuing
- Have equal security capacity for exit








First Layer of Defense

Access Points

- Reject vehicles before final barrier
- Inspection area blast effects
 - Pressure
 - Fragments
- Reaction time to activate barriers






The following considerations can have an impact in the layout site design:


- Clustered versus dispersed facilities/functions
- Orientation
- Siting and view relationships



Layout/Site Considerations



Clustered facilities




Dispersed facilities




Layout/Site Considerations Orientation

- Significant impact on making building visible or hidden to aggressors
- Enhance surveillance opportunities of approaches and parking
- Minimize views into building
- Reduce blast effects






Layout/Site Considerations



Siting and View Relationships




Barriers/Bollards/Fencing





Barriers/Bollards/Fencing - Passive





Barriers/Bollards/Fencing - Passive




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



Barriers/Bollards/Fencing - Active



Barriers/Bollards/Fencing - Active







First/Second Layer of Defense Barriers, Bollards, and Fencing

Department of State periodically issues list of manufacturers and model numbers certified in meeting prescribed testing criteria (March 2003)

Rating	Vehicle Weight (lbs.)	Vehicle Speed (mph)	Distance Past Barrier (ft)
K4	15,000	30	<= 3.3
K8	15,000	40	<= 3.3
K12	15,000	50	<= 3.3

Check site utilities, water runoff, and other subterranean Conditions when installing bollards and barriers



First/Second Layer of Defense Barriers, Bollards, and Fencing

Department of Defense periodically issues list of manufacturers and model numbers certified in meeting prescribed testing criteria (August 2003)

Vehicle Weight (lbs.)	Vehicle Speed (mph)	Distance Past Barrier (ft)
15,000	30	<=3(L3)/20(L2)/50(L1)
15,000	40	<=3(L3)/20(L2)/50(L1)
15,000	50	<=3(L3)/20(L2)/50(L1)
10,000	50	0 to 50
10,000	15	50 to 100



Barriers, Bollards, and Fencing

- Fixed bollards
- Retractable bollards
- Planters




Fixed bollards





Barriers, Bollards, and Fencing

Retractable







Barriers, Bollards, and Fencing





Planters

- If well designed, planters can be an element of beautification
- Ensure barriers are properly anchored to stop vehicles and configured to reduce fragmentation



Barriers, Bollards, and Fencing

Avoid designing barriers that impair access by first responders:

- Intersection with driveways and gates
- Crossing of pedestrian paths and handicapped ramps
- Fire hydrants









Barriers, Bollards, and Fencing

Long expanses of bollards should be carefully designed and sited to avoid monotony







Bollard spacing should ensure no vehicles can get through

Pay attention to how bollards or fences turn the corner, intersect with driveways and gates, and cross pedestrian paths and handicapped ramps

Barriers, Bollards, and Fencing

Fencing

Delineates layer of defense

Demarcates stand-off required

Provides access control

Augments existing security

Channels vehicle/pedestrian traffic

Enhances electronic security





BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-28

Gatehouses/Screening

Access control with human intervention


- Hardened as determined by threat
- Protection from elements
- Located to minimize queuing





Sidewalks and Curbs

- Creating stand-off in lieu of hardening is usually less expensive
- High curbs can keep vehicles from departing roadway
- Do not remove curbside parking unless additional stand-off absolutely required








Sidewalks and Curbs

An alternate to visible barriers/bollards/fencing is collapsible sidewalks using low-strength concrete







Street Furniture

Streetscape can be used to increase security. Hardened elements that become security elements

- Parking meters
- Streetlights
- Benches
- Planters
- Trash receptacles







NCPC Streetscape Catalogue

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-32


Street Furniture

Place streetscape security components at least <u>24</u> inches from edge of curb

- Allow for opening car doors
- Allow for pedestrian movement from car to sidewalk










Street Furniture

- Treatment of security elements should be compatible with existing elements
- Perimeter barriers can go hand-in-hand with streetscape improvements and plantings
- Appropriate design can blend security into existing streetscape; serving as amenities for tenants and neighbors







BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-34

Buildings with front yards

Buildings with plazas







Building Yard



Narrow yard incorporating low stone wall and metal fence



- Generally small
- Usually provided for governmental & institutional buildings



Small yard with wide pavement that provide some useful stand-off

Building Yard



Low planting makes a moderate barrier





High stepped yard on sloping site make a strong barrier

Building Yard






Monumental yards make excellent barriers and elements of beautification



Plaza

- An expanded building yard
- Moved out from the controlled building access
- A developer provided public space
- A well designed plaza can provide visual interest at same time providing good stand-off





Roadways


- Minimize interruption or closure of street
- Ensure minimal conflict between pedestrian and traffic flow





Parking

- Restrict parking from the interior of a group of buildings and away from restricted area
- Locate parking within view of occupied buildings
- If possible, design the parking lot with one way circulation






Adapted from FEMA 452, Figure 2-4: Layers of Defense, p. 2-5

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-41

Parking





Parking

- Avoid parking too close to the building
- Design of good parking away from the building can avoid the need to harden the building
- Screening of vehicles and pedestrians at building may be necessary








Parking

- Restrict parking and access between buildings
- Consider one-way circulation in parking lots
- Locate parking within view of occupied buildings
- Restrict parking underneath buildings
- Well-lit, with security presence, emergency communications, and/or CCTV
- Apply progressive collapse hardening to columns when parking garage is in the building



Parking - Loading Docks

- Avoid trucks parking into or underneath of the buildings
- Keep dumpsters away from buildings
- Separate loading docks from building critical functions
- Design to prevent progressive collapse





Parking - Loading Docks

- Ensure separation from critical systems, functions, and utility service entrances
- Provide sufficient area for screening vehicles and packages





Signage

- Unless required, do not identify sensitive areas
- Minimize signs identifying critical utilities
- Warnings signs limiting access to control areas should be posted at all entrances
- Signpost may be hardened and included as part of the perimeter barrier
- The lighting of signage should enhance nighttime safety
- Warning signs should be posted in languages commonly spoken



First/Second Layer of Defense

Security Lighting

High-mast lighting at entry control points

Continuous lighting

- Glare projection
- Controlled lighting (avoid glare)
- Closed circuit television (CCTV)

Standby lighting

Movable lighting

Emergency lighting







First Layer of Defense

Sensors / CCTV

- When stand-off and hardening are not possible, security must rely upon sensors and CCTV
- Look for suspicious vehicles and people, especially those that seem to be profiling your building
- Monitor access to utilities serving the building
- Currently high tech monitoring systems need to be selected and placed by experts



Site Utilities





Site Utilities

- Concealed versus exposed
- Underground versus overhead
- Protect/secure versus accessible
- Surveillance if possible











Site Utilities

Control access to tanks of critical supplies on site

Place public address system/call boxes in parking lots and gathering areas to improve communications with security personnel







BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-52

Best Practices



Treatment of the security elements should be compatible existing elements

Perimeter barriers can be hand-inhand with streetscape improvements and street planting













Best Practices





Avoid introducing inappropriate security elements that will make tenants and neighbors feel more vulnerable and can detract from surrounding architecture and streetscape



Signage and way-finding should be carefully designed to increase security





Best Practices

Eliminate potential hiding places near facility, provide an unobstructed view around facility Eliminate parking beneath facilities

Minimize exterior signage or other indications of asset locations

as possible

Locate parking to obtain stand-off from facility

Locate trash bins as far from facility

> Illuminate building exteriors or sites where exposed assets are located

Minimize vehicle access points

Eliminate lines of approach perpendicular to the building

Secure access to power/heat plants, gas mains, water supplies, and electrical service

Locate facility

made vantage

away from natural or man-

points



Figure 2-16, Summary of Site Mitigation Measures, p. 2-53

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-55

Unit IX Case Study Activity

Site and Layout Design Guidance

Background

FEMA 426, Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist: screening tool for preliminary design vulnerability assessment

Requirements: Vulnerability Rating Approach
Assign sections of the checklist to qualified group members

Refer to Case Study and GIS portfolio, and answer worksheet questions

Review results to identify site and layout vulnerabilities and possible mitigation measures

