



1993

INFORMATION  
SECURITY  
OVERSIGHT  
OFFICE



## **AUTHORITY**

Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information" and Executive Order 12829, "National Industrial Security Program." ISOO receives its policy and program direction from the President through the National Security Council. ISOO is an administrative component of the United States General Services Administration.

## **MISSION**

ISOO oversees the information security (security classification) programs in both Government and industry and reports to the President annually on their status.

## **FUNCTIONS**

Develops and issues implementing directives and instructions.

Maintains liaison with agency counterparts and conducts on-site inspections and special document reviews to monitor agency compliance.

Develops and disseminates security education materials for Government and industry; monitors security education and training programs.

Receives and takes action on complaints, appeals and suggestions.

Collects, analyzes relevant statistical data, and reports them annually, along with other information, to the President.

Serves as spokesperson to Congress, the media, special interest groups, professional organizations and the public.

Conducts special studies on identified or potential problem areas, and develops remedial approaches for program improvement.

## **GOALS**

To hold classification activity to the minimum necessary to protect the national security.

To ensure the safeguarding of national security information in both Government and industry in a cost effective and efficient manner.

To promote declassification and public access to information as soon as national security considerations permit.



Information Security Oversight Office  
750 17th Street NW., Suite 530  
Washington, DC 20006



March 2, 1994

Dear Mr. President

pleased to submit the Information Security Oversight Office's 1993 Report to the President

The submission of this Report occurs while we are in the final stages of shaping the first post-Cold War security classification system: a system intended to reduce significantly the amount of information that we classify in the first place, and to reduce dramatically through declassification the amount of older classified information that has built up over the decades. The input for creating this revised system largely took place during the time period covered by this Report. During this phase of the process, many hundreds of individuals, representing a vast spectrum of opinion, participated and contributed to the development of a new way of confronting the subject of Government secrecy.

The data that we report here continue to support the need for reform. Classification decisions have decreased in recent years. However, in sheer numbers alone, the reproduction and distribution of classified information add many more millions of classified pages to the classified universe each year. These additional pages far exceed the number that are declassified under the current system using available resources. With the likelihood of diminished personnel resources in the coming years, this trend will not change unless we adopt entirely new methods of classifying and declassifying information. At the same time, we cannot tolerate changes that undermine the national security. Seeking the right solutions within the context of these often competing circumstances has been and continues to be the goal of our efforts to restructure the security classification system.

Respectfully,

Steven Garfinke  
Director

The President  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

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# *Summary of FY 1993 Program Activity*

The FY 1993 Report to the President is the eleventh to examine the information security program under E.O. 12356. The following data highlight ISOO's findings.

## ***Classification***

- The number of original classification authorities decreased slightly to 5,661.
- Reported original classification decisions decreased significantly to 245,951.
- Reported derivative classification decisions increased 5% to 6,162,737.
- The total of all classification actions reported for FY 1993 increased 1% to 6,408,688.
- DOD accounted for 58% of all classification decisions; CIA 25%; Justice 13%; State 3% and all other agencies 1%.

## ***Declassification***

- Under the systematic review program, agencies reviewed 9,038,144 pages of historically valuable records, 16% fewer than in FY 1992; and declassified 6,588,456 pages, 30% fewer than in FY 1992.
- Agencies received 4,268 new mandatory review requests.
- Under mandatory review, agencies declassified in full 81,986 pages; declassified in part 146,796 pages; and retained classification in full on 18,121 pages.
- Agencies received 208 new mandatory review appeals.
- On appeal, agencies declassified in whole or in part 36,933 additional pages.

## ***Safeguarding***

- Agencies conducted 19,266 self-inspections.
- Agencies reported 18,765 infractions, 11% fewer than in FY 1992.

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## ***Table of Contents***

<b><i>i</i></b>	<b><i>Letter to the President</i></b>
<b><i>ii</i></b>	<b><i>Summary of FY 1993 Program Activity</i></b>
<b><i>1</i></b>	<b><i>Table of Contents</i></b>
<b><i>2</i></b>	<b><i>Revising the Security Classification System</i></b>
<b><i>6</i></b>	<b><i>Top Ten Reasons Why Progress is Being Made in Industrial Security</i></b>
<b><i>9</i></b>	<b><i>National Security Information: The Future of Declassification</i></b>
<b><i>16</i></b>	<b><i>Classification</i></b>
<b><i>24</i></b>	<b><i>Declassification</i></b>
<b><i>29</i></b>	<b><i>Safeguarding</i></b>

# Revising the Security Classification System

## ***The Text of Presidential Review Directive 29 of April 26, 1993***

April 26, 1993

### **PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE**

**SUBJECT:** National Security Information

**BACKGROUND** — With the end of the Cold War, we should re-evaluate our security classification and safeguarding systems, as articulated in E.O. 12356, to ensure that they are in line with the reality of the current, rather than the past, threat potential.

**OBJECTIVE** — The objective of this tasking is to review E.O. 12356 and other directives relating to protection of national security information with a view toward drafting a new executive order that reflects the need to classify and safeguard national security information in the post Cold War period.

**QUESTIONS** — The following sets forth the questions that should be addressed during this review. The resulting answers should serve as the basis for the drafting of the new proposed executive order which will be submitted upon completion of the review.

- ◆ In the post Cold War era, what types of information continue to require protection through classification in the interest of our national security?
- ◆ What steps can be taken to avoid excessive classification?
- ◆ What steps can be taken to declassify information as quickly as possible?
- ◆ What steps can be taken to declassify or otherwise dispose of the large amounts of classified information that currently exist in Government archives and other repositories?
- ◆ What steps can be taken to reduce the number of, and to provide adequate oversight and control over, special access programs?
- ◆ What steps can be taken to control unnecessary distribution and reproduction of classified information?
- ◆ What steps can be taken to enforce the “need-to-know” principle?
- ◆ What steps can be taken to increase individual accountability for the operation of the classification system?

**IMPLEMENTATION** — This review should be conducted under the chairmanship of the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) in coordination with the National Advisory Group for Security Countermeasures. Representatives of the agencies which comprise the NAG/SCM shall be included in the task force. It is further directed that this review be coordinated with the joint DCI-Secretary of Defense Security Commission.

The Chairman of the task force shall report to me through the NSC staff, Office of Intelligence Programs. The review should be completed no later than November 30, 1993, at which time a draft executive order superseding E.O. 12356 should be submitted for formal coordination.

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# *Prominent Points in the PRD Process*

*April 1993*

PRD 29 establishes a 25-member interagency task force to review the current classification system and prepare a draft replacement of E.O. 12356.



To build momentum and gain perspective, the task force begins by reviewing a vast amount of research compiled from a wide range of sources.



Individuals, including critics, from outside the Government are included in the initial stages of drafting an executive order on the classification system. More than a dozen people testify during two days of public hearings.



Over the following months, committees of the task force interview more than 100 persons, nearly half of whom are from outside the Government.



Members of the public and employees of the Government alike, submit over 100 documents to the task force that advocate everything from wholesale changes to maintaining the status quo.



As with the public hearings held earlier, divergent opinions on the classification system are again brought together as ISOO sponsors a Government-wide Declassification Conference.



A draft order with dozens of changes from the current system emerges.



On some issues, the chasm narrows between proponents of greater openness and proponents of greater security. Clearly gaps remain. All agree on the toughest questions that must ultimately be answered.

*November 1993*

*April 1993*

*November 1993*



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# *Resolving the Dirty Dozen*

The PRD process has identified twelve issues that evoke the greatest disagreement between those who are primarily advocates of greater public access to information and those who are primarily advocates of protecting national security information, hence the “dirty dozen.” The ultimate answers to the questions they present will determine the character of a new security classification system.

**AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION OF OLDER INFORMATION** — Should classified information of permanent historical value be automatically declassified without further review when it reaches a specific age?

- If so, at what age?
- If so, what categories?
- Categorical exceptions?
- Outside oversight?

**DURATION OF CLASSIFICATION AT THE TIME OF ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION** — At the time of original classification, should the information be marked for automatic declassification within a fixed number of years?

- If so, for how long?
- Categorical exceptions?
- Reclassification?
- Vary by classification level?
- If so, what categories?

**LEVELS OF CLASSIFICATION** — How many levels of classified information are necessary or advisable?

- Thresholds for each level?
- Distinguish by level of classification or level of safeguarding?
- Standardized safeguarding for all agencies?

**BALANCING TEST** — Should the deciding official apply a balancing test between the competing public interests in disclosure and protection?

- At the time of classification?
- At the time of declassification?
- Mandatory or discretionary?

**SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS** — Should the post-Cold War security classification system continue to authorize agency heads to establish special access programs?

- Standards?
- Limits?
- Outside oversight?



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**FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION**      What is the appropriate definition and scope of foreign government information?

- How expressed?
- Degree of deference in declassification?

**DESIGNATION OF CLASSIFIERS** — Should agencies be required to designate both original and derivative classifiers?

- Original classifiers?
- Derivative classifiers?
- Mandatory training?
- Certification?

**OVERSIGHT** — Should there be an independent oversight entity?

- Duties and functions?
- Role of internal oversight?
- Role of Inspectors General?

**CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL**      Should there be an independent classification appeals panel?

- Composition?
- Functions?

**POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL** –      Should there be an independent policy advisory council?


- Composition?
- Functions?

**PORTION MARKING** — Should portion marking, i.e., marking what portions of a document are classified, be mandatory for all classified documents?

- Exemptions?
- Authorized by whom?

**DECLASSIFICATION DATABASE** — Should there be established a Government-wide database of declassified information?

- Scope?
- Mandatory or permissive agency participation?
- Public access to declassified portions?



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# *Top Ten Reasons Why Progress Is Being Made in Industrial Security*

## ***NATIONAL PROGRAM—THE NEED TO RESHAPE IS RECOGNIZED***

In the mid-1980s, Government and industry began to explore the idea of revising contractor security procedures to improve ways to protect classified information held by contractors and achieve cost-savings. Key objectives of the joint effort have been to eliminate duplicative and inconsistent security policies and practices.

## ***CONSENSUS ON STRATEGY—WHERE THERE'S A WILL, THERE'S A WAY***

Consensus on the need for a national industrial security program culminated with the issuance of E.O. 12829. The Order calls for a single, integrated and cohesive system for safeguarding classified information held by industry. Such a program would likely result in lower costs and improved security.

## ***POLICY AND OPERATIONAL OVERSIGHT—A DISTINCTION WITH A DIFFERENCE***

The National Industrial Security Program (NISP) distinguishes between policy and operational oversight. It requires ISOO to exercise policy oversight on behalf of the NSC, and assigns operational oversight to the Secretary of Defense, who has final responsibility for issuing the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM). The Secretary is also responsible for inspecting cleared facilities; through arrangements with other agencies, the Secretary may conduct these inspections on their behalf. Efforts to develop uniform standards for the conduct of inspections and to agree on reciprocity have been somewhat slow, but progress is being made.

## ***INDUSTRY'S ROLE IN POLICYMAKING—PART OF THE TEAM***

Over the years, industry's contributions toward a national industrial security program have been many and varied. Industry has been a primary "mover-and-shaker" in this area, first in providing the initial impetus toward a national program, and later as a full partner in the endeavor. As a full partner, industry has helped shape the direction of the program by serving as co-chair with Government of the NISP Steering Committee. The National Industrial Security Program Policy Advisory Committee (NISPPAC) further institutionalizes the partnership of Government and industry in policy making. The NISPPAC, with representation from Government and non-Government officials, advises the ISOO Director on all matters concerning the program, including recommending changes in policy and proposing solutions to issues in dispute. The NISPPAC has already met twice to discuss these issues. Both meetings were open to the public.

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***SAFEGUARDING  
STANDARDS—UNIFORMITY  
AS A GOAL***

Issuance of the NISPOM (scheduled for June 1994), promises to provide industry for the first time with one universal security manual for classified information. The thrust toward uniformity is to eliminate competing agency standards.

***ACCOUNTING FOR  
COSTS—NO SUCH THING AS  
A FREE LUNCH***

The NISP requires an annual accounting of costs associated with its implementation. Presently, it is difficult to determine the actual costs of protecting classified information because they are integrated with costs not directly related to the protection of such information. Tracking down costs would help identify areas where savings can be achieved and administrative controls relaxed. Also, the development of a standard methodology for collecting and interpreting cost data would help ensure their validity and reliability.

***RISK—WE CAN'T AVOID IT,  
SO LET'S MANAGE IT***

The enormous changes in the post Cold War threat environment and shrinking budgets require Government to assess the cost/benefit of security requirements before imposing them on industry. The goal is to reduce risk to an acceptable level rather than, unrealistically, trying to totally eliminate it.

***RECIPROCAL ACCEPTANCE  
OF CLEARANCES—LONG  
OVERDUE***

Efforts continue to reach agreement on agencies' reciprocal acceptance of security clearances and uniform standards of administrative review. The new, more consistent investigative security standards for access to **Top Secret** and SCI information are the cornerstone for achieving further improvements in this area.

***CONSOLIDATED SECURITY  
TRAINING—A SURE BET***

For the first time, the trend is away from piecemeal security training and toward a consolidated program, including standardized briefings. Uniform requirements would eliminate redundancy, achieve cost savings, and contribute to the successful implementation of the overall program.

***KEEPING THE HORSE BEFORE  
THE CART—COORDINATION  
WITH OTHER SECURITY  
INITIATIVES***


Issuance of the NISPOM, originally scheduled for early January 1994, has been postponed until June. Two reasons for the extension stand out. One is that more time is needed to reach agreement on unresolved issues; the other is to ensure coordination with ongoing efforts to amend E.O. 12356 and the work of the Joint DCI/DOD Security Commission. Clearly, any substantive changes to the current classification system would impact directly on the Manual.

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# *One Reason Why Further Progress Could Be Halted*

***ADDED COMMITMENT TO  
"COMMON" GOALS RATHER  
THAN "AGENCY" INTERESTS  
NEEDED FOR FURTHER  
PROGRESS***

Significant progress has been made toward achieving the goals of E.O. 12829. Still, some important issues remain unresolved. Agreement on these issues remains elusive largely because they impact on individual agencies' interests. Ultimately, resolution of these issues and further progress toward a single, integrated program is likely to depend on greater agency commitment to set aside parochial interests, and a willingness to continue to work toward common goals.



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# *National Security Information: The Future of Declassification*

*(A Symposium Sponsored by ISOO and Hosted by the Department of the Air Force)*

On October 26-28, 1993, the Information Security Oversight Office sponsored an executive branch symposium on the declassification of national security information. The Department of the Air Force hosted the symposium at the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. The symposium included sessions on current and future declassification policy, ongoing programs and procedures, and the current and future application of technology to help resolve impediments to declassification. The goal of the symposium was to enhance declassification efforts throughout the executive branch.

The symposium afforded many opportunities for attendees to interact with the guest speakers and each other. Many of the presentations included a question and answer period, which generated lively and sometimes controversial discussion. There was a consensus among the attendees that this type of forum provides opportunity to explore common concerns and new solutions, both of which are vital to the future declassification process.

***Keynote Speaker:***

**R. Paul Richard**  
Deputy Staff Secretary  
to the President

***Other Speakers:***

**Steven Aftergood**  
Senior Research Analyst  
Federation of American Scientists

**Air Force Declassification Panel**

**Moderator:**  
**Lt Col Daniel J. Manix**

**Members:**

**Archie Difante**  
**Lt Col Don Dyrda**  
**Maj Dale E. Freeman**  
**Col Linda Smith**

**Thomas S. Blanton**  
Executive Director  
National Security Archive

**Col John A. Brown, USAF**  
Chief, Declassification Reference  
and Document Division  
Defense Prisoner of War and  
Missing in Action Affairs Office  
Office of the Secretary of Defense

**Joseph H. Chaddic**  
Director, Historical  
Documents Review Division  
Department of State

**Sherry L. Davis**  
Chief, Document Classification Unit  
Information Resources Division  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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**Paul R. Laplante**  
Chief, Policy Branch  
Office of Declassification  
Security Affairs  
Department of Energy

**Larry M. Lawrence**  
Group Leader  
Advanced Information Systems  
MITRE Corporation

**Frank M. Machak**  
Director  
Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy and  
Classification Review  
Department of State

**Ella W. Nargele**  
Declassification Officer  
Naval Historical Center  
Department of the Navy

**Thomas G. Paterson, Ph.D.**  
Professor, Department of History  
University of Connecticut

**Col Rodney Payne, USAF**  
Vice Commander of the  
Headquarters Air University  
Maxwell Air Force Base

**John F. Pereira**  
Chief, Historical Review Group  
Central Intelligence Agency

**Mary I. Ronan**  
Chief, Access Staff  
National Archives and Records Administration

**Jeanne Schauble**  
Director, Records Declassification Division  
National Archives and Records Administration

**James J. Smith**  
Declassification Services  
National Security Agency

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*The following quotes reflect some of the diverse opinions expressed by the speakers. They are intended as highlights, not comprehensive statements:*

## *On Openness in Government:*



**R. Paul Richard:** There should be a commitment to openness. We should both herald our triumphs and reveal our mistakes so that our children and future generations are not doomed to repeat them. We should avoid routine classification . . . and opt in favor of access.

**R. Paul Richard:** In the same spirit that we have examined our place in the world, so must we re-examine our role in the writing of that world's history. While ever vigilant for our security and foreign interests, we must keep in mind our greatest weapon: a knowledgeable citizenry that cares about and participates in its government.

**Rodney Payne:** In Air University's academic circle, we welcome your efforts [to declassify more information]. For those efforts have already provided millions of pages which have been declassified and made available for study in all our schools through the Air University Library and the Air Force Historical Research Agency. However, as an operator, I also understand that we cannot fight wars, if necessary, or win wars, if our techniques, tactics and procedures are compromised in trying to meet these demands for public openness.

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**Steven Aftergood:** . . . [G]overnment secrecy runs contrary to the way our political system is supposed to work. It tends to exclude the public and even, to some degree, their elected representatives, from some of the most important and consequential activities of government.

**Paul Laplante:** Openness is certainly a concept whose time has come to the RD [Restricted Data] world. . . . A lot of folks disagree on this openness initiative. . . . [T]his is going to happen; there's a lot of pressure out there for this to happen. Either we do it, or someone else is going to do it. And I guess it's better if we end up doing it — those . . . with experience, and with the knowledge to do it right and in a balanced way.

## *On the PRD Process:*



**Steven Aftergood:** The argument against a maximum classification lifetime of 20 years is that there is a lot of old material . . . that may still be sensitive today. . . . But that hypothetical damage needs to be weighed against the real, actual damage that unnecessary classification is doing today to our society in terms of massive public cynicism, and huge amounts of money and resources that are wasted. My impression is that the hypothetical damage is being given more emphasis than the real damage.


**Thomas Blanton:** . . . [T]he open process [used in developing a new executive order] won't mean anything if the results aren't there, if you don't come up with a system that pretty immediately disgorges millions of real documents and a system that prevents the creation of new millions of documents for long term.

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# *On the Use of Technology to Aid the Declassification Process:*



**Larry Lawrence:** [W]e are trying to help the process of reviewing the document properly and quickly.

**Frank Machak:** . . . [T]he most labor intensive and time-consuming aspect of the information access process is getting the final product to the requester. . . . [T]he actual cutting and pasting and copying activity associated with redaction is particularly difficult from a manager's prospective in view of continuing limitations in human resources. . . . It is becoming more apparent that the only approach to this activity can be through the application of technology.

**Thomas Paterson:** Create a clearinghouse in Washington that maintains computerized records of all documents declassified by any agency of the Government.

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# *On Declassification:*

**Steven Aftergood:** If you think that sometimes the critics of the classification system are too harsh or unfair or don't appreciate the responsibilities that you have to deal with, then I would say that the best way to shut those critics up is to release an avalanche of declassified files. Drown us in declassified documents! Then we will all be happy.

**Jeanne Schauble:** Vague [agency declassification] guidelines or lack of guidelines mean that we must withhold more material. And the more we must withhold, the slower the review process.


**Joseph Chaddick:** . . . [W]e looked at new ways of doing things. . . . We put together a small team of . . . foreign service specialists. In the four month period from June through the end of Fiscal Year [19]93, they were able to complete the 1963 central records of the Department. It was over a million pages.

**Paul Laplante:** A very important point in any program along these lines is to get the highest level of commitment. . . [T]he Secretary of the Energy, Hazel O'Leary, . . . identified declassification as one of the six reinventing government initiatives within the Department of Energy. . . .

**John Pereira:** . . . [W]e make the initial decisions. If other parts of the Agency disagree with us, then they have to be very specific about the damage to the national security. They have to be able to articulate what the specific damage would be, so mosaic is out. I've used mosaic for years in protecting information—this piece and that piece go together and you have a story. That's out, unless you can show the specific lead-in for that mosaic. . . . [W]e're, in effect, trying to change the mindset of CIA.

**Ella Nargele:** . . . [T]here is a conflict between the [military] services. . . . [E]very service has different [declassification] guidelines. . . . There must be some means of resolving these conflicts between the services and between the agencies, too. Unless there is some method of doing this, we will be . . . able to declassify less and less information in the joint operations environment that we face in the future.

**Air Force Declassification Panel:** . . . [W]e thought that if we declassify as soon as possible after the event, we could still protect what needs to be protected and get the rest out the door and save the Air Force valuable storage space. . . . [I]t allows us to protect ourselves against the critics . . . and finally lets us reclaim our own Air Force history from a security file.



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# *On Congressionally Mandated Declassification Projects:*

**James Smith:** NSA's goal was to be extremely sensitive to the relatives of the POWs/MIAs [when releasing information from the files]. We wanted to release the maximum amount of information with the least amount of sanitization. We didn't want to release the infamous blank piece of paper with a period or a black dot in the middle of it.

**John Pereira:** It's wise to get involved in the legislative process early. If you have a choice between mandatory and voluntary, voluntary is best.

**John Brown:** The goal that the [Secretary of Defense] gave us [in response to the POW/MIA mandate] was to put the maximum amount of substantive information out on the streets. In fact, we have done that. Whether or not that stands the test of time remains to be seen.

**Mary Ronan:** . . . I've seen the redactions. We're not talking about three words on a black page. We're talking about three words taken out of an entirely released page. So in that case . . . agencies are in fact following the spirit of the bill [JFK] and releasing an enormous amount of information.



**Air Force Declassification Panel:** In POW/MIA, we found out right away that many of these issues [problems associated with release of material] were legal issues, not declassification or classification issues.

**Sherry Davis:** One of the greatest impacts on our processing has been a reversal of a decision by the Attorney General on Communist Party-USA (CPUSA) matters. . . . It has . . . had a positive effect on our processing of the JFK files, which is one of the leading cases of the day. The JFK CORE files and related files consist of over a million pages, at least two-thirds of which have been reviewed. Perhaps a third of this project will be released within the next two months.



# Classification

## Original Classifiers

Original classification authorities, also called original classifiers, are those individuals designated in writing, either by the President or by selected agency heads, to classify information in the first instance. Under E.O. 12356, only original classifiers determine what information, if disclosed without authority, could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security.

For FY 1993, the number of original classifiers throughout the executive branch was 5,661, a decrease of 132 from the number reported last year. This figure represents the lowest number of original classifiers ever reported by ISOO. ISOO believes that efforts to downsize Government are largely responsible for the continued decreases in original classification authorities. There are disparities among agencies with comparable original classification authority. Therefore, ISOO believes that additional reductions can be achieved without having a negative impact on agency operations. For this reason, ISOO will continue to urge agencies to keep the number of original classifiers at the lowest level possible to enhance the credibility of the classification system as a whole.

### ORIGINAL CLASSIFIERS FY 1993




Fewer than 5,700 original classifiers—the lowest ever reported by ISOO

Another positive aspect of the decrease in the number of original classifiers is that all occurred at the **Top Secret** and **Secret** levels. ISOO believes that the benefits of reducing the number of original classifiers, especially at the higher levels, are significant. Limiting the number of original classifiers may result in fewer classification decisions. Because safeguards for documents classified **Top Secret** and **Secret** are more costly than those for **Confidential**, less original classifications at the higher levels should result in lower costs to the Government. In FY 1993, several agencies made special efforts to reduce the number of original classifiers and deserve special mention: ISOO applauds OMB and OVP for reporting decreases of 55% and 20%, respectively. DOD, DOE, Justice, NSC and USTR also reported considerable decreases.

**Original Classification**


Original classification is an initial determination by an authorized classifier that information requires extraordinary protection, because unauthorized disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security. The process of original classification ordinarily includes both the determination of the need to protect the information and the placement of markings to identify the information as classified. By definition, original classification precedes all other aspects of the information security system, e.g., derivative classification, safeguarding and declassification. Therefore, ISOO often refers to the number of original classification actions as the most important figure that it reports.

**ORIGINAL ACTIVITY FY 1993**



All decreed  
occurred  
Top Secret  
Secret lev

## ORIGINAL ACTIVITY BY AGENCY FY 1993




Fewer original  
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decisions than  
ever before

For FY 1993, agencies reported a total of 245,951 original classification decisions. This figure represents a decrease of 49% over the original classification decisions reported in FY 1992, and is the lowest number of original classification decisions ever reported by ISOO. The main explanation for this dramatic decrease concerns changes in reporting by State. Prior to FY 1993, State routinely reported all classification decisions as original decisions. Because experience has shown that by far most classification decisions are derivative rather than original, ISOO had questioned this practice on many occasions. Finally, during FY 1993, State modified its reporting system to distinguish between original and derivative decisions. ISOO applauds State's commitment to continue to improve its information security practices. Though dramatic, the changes in State's reporting do not account for the entire decrease in FY 1993 original classifications. Seventeen percent of the decrease is attributed to other agencies' efforts to curtail original classification. By classification level, **Top Secret** classification decisions decreased by 14%; **Secret** by 49%; and **Confidential** by 52%.

Four agencies, DOD, Justice, CIA, and State, continue to account for almost 97% of all original classification decisions. Of these agencies, DOD reported the highest number, with a total of 81,400 original classification decisions. Nevertheless, this number represents a significant decrease of 26% in original classifications at DOD. Even more impressive is the decrease of 40% in original decisions achieved by Justice. CIA also reported a 3% decrease in the number of their original classification decisions. For the agencies with smaller programs, the data collected show a 20% increase in the number of original classification decisions. While the increase is not a matter for serious concern, ISOO intends to monitor this trend closely.

## ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION LEVELS FY 1993



As part of the original classification process, the classifier must determine a time frame for the protection of the information. This is commonly called "duration" of classification. E.O. 12356 provides classifiers with two means of designating declassification instructions for national security information. First, the information may be marked for declassification upon a specific date or event. For example, a classifier may determine that the information's sensitivity will lapse upon the completion of a particular project. The event would be noted on the face of the document, and when the project had been completed, the information would automatically be declassified. Only if a specific date or event cannot be determined at the time of classification does the classifier mark the document with the notation "Originating Agency's Determination Required" ("OADR"). "OADR" indicates that the information must be reviewed by the originating agency before declassification action may be taken.

## DURATION OF CLASSIFICATION FY 1993




During FY 1993, only 3% of all original classification decisions were marked for declassification with a specific date or event, as compared to 5% of all original actions reported in FY 1992. Both of these proportions are too low. Changes to the classification system currently being considered, as directed by Presidential Review Directive (PRD) 29, include proposed solutions to the problem of indefinite duration of classification.

PRD seeks solutions to problems of indefinite classification.

## Derivative Classification

Derivative classification is the act of incorporating, paraphrasing, restating, or generating in new form classified source information. Information may be classified in two ways: (a) through the use of a source document, usually correspondence or publications generated by an original classification authority; or (b) through the use of a classification guide. A classification guide is a set of instructions issued by an original classification authority. It pertains to a particular subject and describes the elements of information about that subject that must be classified, and the level and duration of classification. Only executive branch or Government contractor employees with the appropriate security clearance, who are required by their work to restate classified source information, may classify derivatively.

### DERIVATIVE ACTIVITY FY 1993




Derivative actions up 5%

For FY 1993, the agencies reported 6,162,737 derivative classification actions.\* This number represents a 5% increase from that reported in FY 1992. The increase is attributable to increases in derivative activity at both DOD and Justice/FBI, and the reporting by State of derivative actions for the first time. During FY 1993, State generated 153,373 derivative classification actions, 2% of the total. Of the three remaining agencies that account for almost 97% of derivative classification actions, Justice/FBI reported a 26% increase to 0.8 million, DOD reported a 10% increase to 3.6 million, and CIA reported an 18% decrease to 1.5 million.

\* This number, to be consistent with reported actions in prior years, does not include a significant number of short lived images and related items that are continually being replaced.




## DERIVATIVE ACTIVITY BY AGENCY FY 1993



All other agencies reported 56,119 derivative classification actions, a 13% reduction from the prior year. ISOO commends the following agencies for reducing their number of derivative actions for FY 1993: AID (37%); CIA (18%); DOE (20%); EPA (100%); FCC (49%); FEMA (51%); FRS (100%); Interior (45%); ITC (29%); NSC (47%); OMB (54%); OVP (100%); PFIAB (74%); and PIOB (31%).

## DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION LEVELS FY 1993



As in the past, the breakdown of derivative classification actions by classification level differs somewhat from the breakdown of original decisions: **Secret** and **Top Secret** decisions continue to comprise higher percentages of the total. With respect to the proportion of **Top Secret** actions, this results from a very few activities that produce a relatively large quantity of derivative documents from classification guidance. Generally, this **Top Secret** information is highly localized, so that the percentage of **Top Secret** actions within almost all collections of classified information is much smaller.


State reported derivative actions for the first time

### Combined Classification


By adding original and derivative classification decisions, ISOO arrives at what it calls combined classification activity. In FY 1993, combined classification activity slightly increased by 59,156 (1%) to a total of 6,408,688 actions. The increase in combined classification results from the increase in derivative classification discussed above. For FY 1993, derivative actions outnumbered original actions by a ratio of 25:1. Consequently, they have a much greater impact on combined classification activity.

Combined classification up 1%


### COMBINED ACTIVITY FY 1993



### COMBINED ACTIVITY BY AGENCY FY 1993



### COMBINED CLASSIFICATION LEVELS FY 1993



Derivative decisions outnumber original 25

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# Declassification

## ***Systematic Review***

Started in 1972, “systematic review for declassification” is the program under which classified, permanently valuable (archival) records are reviewed for purposes of declassification after the records reach a specific age. Under E.O. 12356, NARA is the only agency required to conduct a systematic review of its classified holdings. NARA ordinarily reviews its classified holdings as they become 30 years old, except for certain intelligence or cryptologic file series, which are to be reviewed as they become 50 years old. While other agencies are not required to establish a systematic review program, ISOO encourages them to do so. With the approval of the originator, agencies, including NARA, may conduct a systematic review of records that are less than 30 years old.



Both the number of pages reviewed and declassified decreased in FY 1993. Agencies reviewed 9 million pages, almost 1.6 million (16%) fewer than in FY 1992, and declassified 6.6 million pages, almost 3 million pages fewer. Agencies declassified 73% of the pages reviewed in FY 1993, a declassification rate significantly lower than the 88% declassified in FY 1992.

Although the decrease in systematic review is due to the low figures reported by several agencies, NARA's figure critically impacted on the systematic review product. In FY 1993, NARA reviewed 3 million pages, a decrease of over one-half the amount reviewed in FY 1992. Because the success of the systematic review program primarily rests with NARA, ISOO maintains a special interest in those matters that affect NARA's declassification program. NARA's explanation for the decline in its systematic review product consists of three factors: (1) the lack of resources to staff its systematic review responsibilities sufficiently; (2) NARA's required diversion of ten staff positions to fulfill the Congressional mandate concerning the Kennedy assassination files; and (3) NARA's move into the new Archives facility in College Park, Maryland.

For the fourth straight year, Air Force accounted for most of DOD's systematic review activity. Of the 1,675,324 pages declassified by DOD, Air Force accounted for 56% of the total. Along with Air Force's performance, the efforts of State and CIA contributed significantly to the systematic review program for FY 1993. Both agencies significantly increased the number of pages reviewed and had declassification rates of 96% and 87%, respectively.

Pages  
reviewed and  
declassified  
continue to  
decrease

## SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ACTIONS BY AGENCY FY 1993



ISOO's annual reports have noted specific agency contributions to the systematic review effort; however, the agency-wide systematic review effort has been described, in past reports, as "modest" and "disappointing." The voluntary nature of the program, contributes to the non-participation by some agencies. ISOO continues to urge all agencies to contribute their fair share of effort to the systematic review program, even as the PRD process searches for more effective ways of dealing with the huge backlog of older classified records.


New approach necessary to deal with backlog of older records

### Mandatory Review


Under E.O. 12356, the mandatory review process allows agencies or citizens to require an agency to review specified national security information for purposes of seeking its declassification. Requests must be in writing and describe the information with sufficient detail to permit the agency to retrieve it with a reasonable amount of effort. Mandatory review remains popular with some researchers as a less contentious alternative to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. It is also used to seek the declassification of presidential papers or records, which are not subject to the FOIA.

Mandatory review remains popular with researchers

#### MANDATORY REVIEW PAGES PROCESSED FY 1992-1993



## MANDATORY REVIEW ACTION TAKEN FY 1993



Almost all requests result in declassification.

The 3,911 cases processed under mandatory review during FY 1993 comprised 36,157 documents totaling 246,903 pages. The number of pages processed represents a 6% increase from the prior year. The percentage of pages declassified in whole or in part (93%) remained at almost the same high level as last year's rate of 94%. Given the high proportion and number of pages declassified, mandatory review remains a highly successful mechanism for the declassification of information.


E.O. 12356 also provides that agencies or members of the public may appeal mandatory review denials to designated officials of the denying agencies. During FY 1993, agencies processed 242 appeals that comprised 12,104 documents totaling 38,094 pages. Of these, 97% of the pages were granted in whole or in part. This impressive rate suggests that researchers can anticipate even greater returns in declassified information if they pursue an appeal.

## MANDATORY REVIEW ACTIONS BY AGENCY FY 1993

Agency	Total Cases Acted On	% Granted In Full	% Granted in Part	% Denied in Part
DOD	1,031	60	27	13
NSC	924	49	49	2
CIA	603	30	55	15
NARA	550	38	50	12
State	444	53	43	4
DOE	69	7	93	0
All Others	290	75	19	6
<b>Totals</b>	<b>3,911</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>9</b>


Appeals result in significantly more declassified information

### MANDATORY REVIEW APPEALS: PAGES PROCESSED FY 1992-1993



### MANDATORY REVIEW APPEALS DISPOSITION FY 1993

Total of 38,094 Pages Processed






# Safeguarding

Executive Order 12356 requires that each executive branch agency that originates or handles classified information establish and maintain “an active oversight and security education program.” Self-inspections are an important part of an agency’s program and allows them to identify infractions (minor violations) of the executive order, the implementing ISOO Directive or agency regulations. Agencies are required to report to ISOO the number and results of these self-inspections each year.

For the third year in a row, agencies reported a decrease in the number of self-inspections. For FY 1993, agencies reported 1,967 fewer self-inspections, a 9% decrease in the number reported in FY 1992. This significant decrease is largely attributed to DOD, which conducted 1,800 fewer self-inspections in FY 1993 than in FY 1992. DOD’s reduction in self-inspections can be attributed to downsizing and reorganizations within the services. Other agencies with significant decreases include CIA, DOT, State and NRC. Those agencies reporting major increases, thus enhancing their oversight capability, include Commerce, DOE and Justice.

## AGENCY SELF – INSPECTIONS



Downsizing  
contributes  
fewer self-  
inspections

## INFRACTIONS

Infraction	Total FY 1992	Total FY 1993
Unauthorized Access	461	271
Mismarking	9,051	10,416
Unauthorized Transmission	2,473	1,465
Improper Storage	7,359	5,150
Unauthorized Reproduction	170	51
Overclassification	678	683
Under Classification	224	177
Classification w/o Authority	114	33
Improper Destruction	157	141
Other	384	378
<b>Totals</b>	<b>21,071</b>	<b>18,765</b>



In FY 1993, agencies detected a total of 18,765 infractions. Compared to FY 1992, this figure represents an 11% decrease. Although the overall number of inspections has decreased by a substantial margin, the average number of infractions discovered per inspection decreased slightly: from 0.99 in FY 1992, to 0.97 in FY 1993. This rate indicates that not all agencies have effective self-inspection programs. ISOO has consistently held that agencies would identify a far greater number of infractions if agencies conducted more quality self-inspections. If agencies have not already incorporated periodic samplings of their classified product into their self-inspection programs, ISOO strongly encourages them to do so. Although the overall number of infractions decreased, an increase in the mismarking category appears to indicate that more agencies are incorporating document reviews as part of their self-inspection programs. ISOO applauds this and hopes that this trend will continue.

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## *Agency Acronyms or Abbreviations*

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AID	Agency for International Development
Air Forc	Department of the Air Force
Army	Department of the Army
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
BIB	Board for International Broadcasting
CEA	Council of Economic Advisers
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
Commerce	Department of Commerce
DCAA	Defense Contract Audit Agency
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIS	Defense Investigative Service
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOT	Department of Transportation
ED	Department of Education
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EXIMBANK	Export-Import Bank of the United State
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCA	Farm Credit Administration
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMC	Federal Maritime Commission
FRS	Federal Reserve System
GSA	General Services Administration
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
HUD	Department of Housing and Urban Development
ICC	Interstate Commerce Commission
Interio	Department of the Interior
ISOO	Information Security Oversight Office
ITC	International Trade Commission
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
Justice	Department of Justice
Labor	Department of Labor
MMC	Marine Mammal Commission
MSPB	Merit Systems Protection Board
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Navv	Department of the Navy





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