

*Information
Security
Oversight
Office*

1991

Authority

Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information." ISOO receives its policy and program direction from the President through the National Security Council. ISOO is an administrative component of the United States General Services Administration.

Mission

ISOO oversees the Government-wide information security (security classification) program and reports to the President annually on its status.

Functions

Develops and issues implementing directives and instructions for the information security program.

Maintains liaison with agency counterparts and conducts on-site inspections and special document reviews to monitor agency compliance with the information security program.

Develops and disseminates security education materials for Government and industry; monitors agencies' security education and training programs.

Receives and takes action on complaints, appeals and suggestions regarding the administration of the information security program.

Collects and analyzes relevant statistical data on each agency's information security program, and reports them annually, along with other information, to the President.

Conducts special studies on identified or potential problem areas in the information security program, and develops remedial approaches for program improvement.

Goals

To hold classification activity to the minimum necessary to protect the national security.

To ensure the safeguarding of national security information in an effective and efficient manner.

To promote declassification and public access to information as soon as national security considerations permit.



Information Security Oversight Office
750 17th Street, NW., Suite 530
Washington, DC 20006



March 16, 1992

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to submit the Information Security Oversight Office's (ISOO) 1991 Report to the President.

The Report features the findings of ISOO's classified document review of information classified during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. The results suggest that both the classification system under Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information," and the people who used the system performed most admirably in a crisis situation.

Last year ISOO forecast that Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm would likely result in far more classification actions during FY 1991 than in FY 1990. This Report reveals that the expansion in classification activity related to the Gulf Conflict was largely offset by reductions elsewhere. To ISOO, this unexpected result suggests that the classification system is already beginning to reflect the impact of the changing world order.

For some time ISOO has been coordinating an interagency review of the security classification system. While this review has examined specific issues, the dramatic changes taking place in the national security arena dictate that we broaden our focus significantly. ISOO and the major classifying agencies must commit themselves to this process.

Respectfully,



A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Steven Garfinkel".

Steven Garfinkel
Director

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500



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Summary of FY 1991 Program Activity

The FY 1991 Report to the President is the ninth to examine the information security program under E.O. 12356. The following data highlight ISOO's findings.

Classified Document Review

- ISOO examined 2,115 documents pertaining to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
- ISOO examined 8,418 other recently classified documents, unrelated to the Persian Gulf conflict.

Classification

- The number of original classification authorities decreased slightly to 6,474.
- Reported original classification decisions increased a modest 4% to 511,868.
- Reported derivative classification decisions increased 4.6% to 6,595,149.
- The total of all classification actions reported for FY 1991 increased 4.6% to 7,107,017.
- DOD accounted for 61% of all classification decisions; CIA 26%; Justice 9%; State 3%; and all other agencies 1%.

Declassification

- Under the systematic review program, agencies reviewed 15,698,607 pages of historically valuable records, 3% less than in FY 1990; and declassified 13,968,758 pages, 14% more than in FY 1990.
- Agencies received 3,172 new mandatory review requests.
- Under mandatory review, agencies declassified in full 66,203 pages; declassified in part 64,222 pages; and retained classification in full on 8,780 pages.
- Agencies received 243 new mandatory review appeals.
- On appeal, agencies declassified in whole or in part 25,044 additional pages.

Safeguarding


- Agencies conducted 21,613 self-inspections.
- Agencies reported 21,210 infractions, 6% less than in FY 1990.

Classified Document Review



**ISOO reviewed
over 10,000
classified
documents**

In FY 1991, ISOO reviewed a total of 10,533 classified documents. This is the largest number that ISOO has reviewed in any one year. Accounting for the increase was ISOO's effort to include in the sample a significant number of documents containing classified information from Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm (Desert Shield/Desert Storm). Here, ISOO first examines those documents in the sample that arose out of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Next, it examines the documents that do not pertain to the Gulf conflict. Both sections discuss the data in terms of the classification of each document (i.e., type of document, classification level, basis for classification, and assigned duration of classification); and the discrepancies in classification and markings. At the end of each part is a list of the agencies that participated in the review. Concerning classification and marking discrepancies, ISOO analysts work with a number of definitions to seek consistency in the recording of the data and in the interpretation of the results. These definitions appear below the first chart on discrepancies.




Desert Shield/Desert Storm Classified Information

Types of Documents

Of the 2,115 documents reviewed dealing with Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1,400 (66 %) were cablegrams; 239 (11 %) were memoranda or letters; and 476 (23 %) were other types of documents, predominantly planning documents, reports, or studies. This breakdown is understandable since the documents in the sample were generated either in the planning for or in the conduct of warfare. Cablegrams predominate in the sample because electronic transmission provides the means for disseminating information quickly and reliably to a large number of recipients.

TYPES OF DOCUMENTS




Classification Levels

By level of classification, 108 documents (5 %) were classified **Top Secret**; 1,750 (83 %) **Secret**; and 257 (12 %) **Confidential**. Of particular significance is the low incidence of documents in the sample classified **Top Secret**. This finding challenges a widely held assumption regarding the relationship between levels of classification and the intensity of international conflict; i.e., the higher the intensity of conflict, the greater the tendency to classify at a higher level. Since war is the most extreme form of international conflict, one might expect to find a high proportion of **Top Secret** documents in the Desert Shield/Desert Storm sample. The low rate of **Top Secret** classifications belies this assumption.

Relatively few
Top Secret
classifications
during Gulf
Conflict

CLASSIFICATION LEVELS



Classification Basis


ISOO Directive No. 1 does not require electronically transmitted information to indicate the basis for classification. Because of this, the absence of a "Classified by" line in cablegrams is not cited as a discrepancy. Of the 659 documents in the sample for which the classification basis was known, 183 (28%) were classified originally and 476 (72%) were derivative decisions. Of these derivative classifications, 87 documents (18%) were classified on the basis of a classification guide; 286 (60%) were based on multiple sources; and 103 (22%) were based on a single source. To promote uniformity, during the early stages of Operation Desert Shield the U.S. Central Command issued classification guidance. An expanded version of this guidance was issued early in 1991 by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Security Policy). The 87 documents in the sample classified on the basis of a guide cited this guidance as the source.



Timely issuance
of guidance
promoted better
classification

CLASSIFICATION BASIS

(Based on total of 659 documents for which the Classification Source was known)



Duration of Classification

Of the 2,115 documents reviewed, 2,042 (96%) were marked "Originating Agency's Determination Required," or "OADR" on the "Declassify on" line; 14 (1%) were marked with a date or event for declassification; and 59 (3%) did not indicate the duration of classification and are included among the discrepancies.

DURATION OF CLASSIFICATION




Discrepancies in Classification or Marking

The 164 discrepancies identified in the documents reviewed represent an error rate of 8%. This figure is obtained by dividing the number of discrepancies by the number of documents reviewed. It should be kept in mind, however, that some documents had more than one discrepancy. This error rate is very low considering that the documents in the sample had been generated under circumstances where time pressures and national security concerns created an environment conducive to overclassification or other errors. In fact, the low number of overclassifications challenges another widely held assumption: As tension mounts, the tendency to overclassify increases. Even though the documents in the sample were generated during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, there was only one instance of clear-cut overclassification in the sample. In this regard, ISOO is particularly pleased with the results of its reviews at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Both activities should take pride in their accomplishments in the classification process. ISOO did not identify a single instance of overclassification in the 1,461 documents reviewed at CENTCOM and SOCOM.

Error rate very low among Gulf Conflict documents

DISCREPANCIES



Holding line on levels helps preserve integrity of system

Definitions

Clear-cut overclassification—The information in the document does not meet the standards necessary for classification.

Questionable overclassification—While the question of meeting classification standards is arguable, classification does not appear to be necessary to protect our national security.

Partial overclassification—A portion(s) of the document appears to be unnecessarily classified, although the overall classification of the document is correct.

Overgrade—All or some of the information in the document appears to be classified at a higher level than justified.

Undergraded—All or some of the information in the document appears to be classified at a lower level than necessary.

Unauthorized Classifier—The document appears to have been classified by someone not authorized to do so.

Declassification—The document appears to have improper declassification instructions or no declassification instructions at all.

Duration—The duration of classification is marked "OADR" when a specific date or event for declassification appears feasible.

Original/Derivative—The document is marked and treated as an original classification action although the classified information appears to be derived from a guide or other source(s).

Marking—The document appears to have improper classification markings or lacks required markings, including instances in which the document fails to cite or cites improperly the classification source. This does not include marking errors more specifically included under another discrepancy category.

Portion Marking—The document appears to lack required portion markings.

Multiple Sources—The official file copy of the document cites "multiple sources" as the basis for classification, but does not list these sources.

PARTICIPANTS


Participants	No. of Documents
U.S. Central Command, JCS	376
U.S. Special Operations Command, JCS	1,085
Joint Communications & Support Element, JCS	304
56th Tactical Training Wing, AF	44
Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Group Two, Navy	22
DIA	234
State	50

Other Classified Information

Types of Documents

Of the 8,418 documents reviewed by ISOO in FY 1991 that did not deal with Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 3,805 (45 %) were cablegrams; 2,962 (35 %) were memoranda or letters; and 1,651 (20 %) were other types of documents, predominantly reports or studies.

TYPES OF DOCUMENTS




No instances of
clear-cut
overclassification

Classification Levels

By level of classification, 224 of the documents (3 %) were classified **Top Secret**; 3,351 (40 %) **Secret**; and 4,843 (57 %) **Confidential**. A positive finding is the low proportion of **Top Secret** documents in the sample. This restrained use of the highest classification level has important implications in terms of the costs borne by the Government to protect national security information. More stringent requirements apply to the management of **Top Secret** information than to **Secret** and **Confidential**. Holding the line on classification levels also helps preserve the integrity of the classification system.

CLASSIFICATION LEVELS




Classification Basis

As noted above, ISOO Directive No. 1 does not require electronically transmitted information to include a “Classified by” line. Of the 4,987 documents in the sample for which the classification basis was known, 894 (18%) were classified originally and 4,093 (82%) were derivative decisions. Of these derivative classifications, 2,518 documents (61%) were classified on the basis of a classification guide; 974 (24%) were based on multiple sources; and 601 (15%) were based on a single source. The high number of original classifications in the sample no doubt reflects the practice of some classifiers to apply original markings even when the information is derived from an existing source. Some classifiers erroneously equate original classification with fresh ideas, and thus view the use of derivative markings as degrading unique contributions.

CLASSIFICATION BASIS

(Based on total of 4,987 documents for which the Classification Source was known)




Duration of Classification

Of the 8,418 documents in the sample, 6,875 (82%) were marked “Originating Agency’s Determination Required,” or “OADR” on the “Declassify on” line; 962 (11%) were marked with a date or event for declassification; and 581 (7%) did not indicate the duration of classification, and are included among the discrepancies below. ISOO noted an additional 89 documents that were marked “OADR,” but should have cited a date or event for declassification. These are also cited as discrepancies.

Many “original” decisions are derived from classified sources


DURATION OF CLASSIFICATION



Discrepancies in Classification or Marking

The 2,736 discrepancies identified in these documents represent an error rate of 33%. This rate is much too high but lower than the 42% rate observed by ISOO for the combined document reviews it conducted in FY 1986 through FY 1989. Particularly disturbing are the

DISCREPANCIES



33% error rate still too high

errors involving clear-cut overclassification, absence of declassification instructions, failure to cite the classification source, and the failure to portion mark. Classifying information that does not meet the standards specified in the Order is an abuse of the system, and a disservice to those who strive to preserve its integrity. The absence of declassification instructions multiplies every time one of these documents is used as a source of classification in the derivative process, and creates an additional barrier when declassification and public access are warranted. Citing the classification source provides the means to trace a classification decision to its source. Omitting it eliminates this option. The absence of portion markings invites classification errors in the derivative process.

The agencies' performance in the implementation of their classification programs varies widely. A few agencies account for a disproportionate share of the discrepancies, while the classified product of others is relatively error free. Not surprisingly, agencies with the lowest rate of classification errors are those in which senior officials openly support the program and are committed to enforcing its requirements. The opposite is the case in agencies with high numbers of discrepancies in their classified product. For this reason, ISOO has renewed efforts to impress upon senior officials the critical role that their support and commitment play in achieving a quality classified product.

Agencies'
performance
varies widely

PARTICIPANTS

Participants	No. of Documents
AID	92
ARMY	544
Commerce	332
DEA	435
DIA	123
DOE	511
FBI	544
JCS	258
NASA	90
Navy	2,073
NRC	165
NSA	1,003
OMB	135
ONDCP	117
OSD	276
State	999
USIA	721



Classification

Original Classifiers

Original classification authorities, also called original classifiers, are those individuals designated in writing, either by the President or by selected agency heads, to classify information in the first instance. Under E.O. 12356, only original classifiers determine what information, if disclosed without authority, could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security.

For FY 1991, the number of original classifiers throughout the executive branch decreased by 18, to a total of 6,474. Other than the all-time low of 6,467 original classifiers reported in FY 1989, this is the smallest number ever reported by ISOO. Nevertheless, with the dramatic changes that have taken place in the world in the last few

ORIGINAL CLASSIFIERS FY 1991



Number of original classifiers decreases

Original Classification

years, ISOO anticipates that in the next few years agencies should be able to reduce far more significantly the number of original classification authorities. ISOO believes that limiting the number of original classifiers is one of the important means by which the classification system can regulate itself. ISOO will be monitoring this situation closely.

By classification level in FY 1991, there were modest decreases in the number of persons authorized to classify at the **Top Secret** and **Secret** levels. However, there was a 4% increase in the number of **Confidential** level authorities.


Several agencies merit congratulations for reducing their number of original classification authorities in FY 1991. Topping that list is DOE, which reported an outstanding 44% decrease. Others reporting more modest decreases include DOD, FEMA, Justice and OPIC. Within DOD, ISOO commends Navy for once again reducing its number of original classifiers significantly. Not far behind, Air Force also reported a second straight year of sizable reductions. Other DOD components reporting more modest reductions include Army, DISA (formerly DCA), JCS (formerly OJCS), and OSIA.

Original Classification

Original classification is an initial determination by an authorized classifier that information requires extraordinary protection, because unauthorized disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security. The process of original classification ordinarily includes both the determination of the need to protect the

Modest increase in original classification decisions

ORIGINAL ACTIVITY FY 1991




information and the placement of markings to identify the information as classified. By definition, original classification precedes all other aspects of the information security system, e.g., derivative classification, safeguarding, and declassification. Therefore, ISOO often refers to the number of original classification actions as the most important figure that it reports.

Because FY 1991 encompassed most of Operation Desert Shield and all of Operation Desert Storm, ISOO anticipated a significant increase in both original and derivative classification activity over FY 1990. While the numbers did go up, the increases were surprisingly small. For FY 1991, agencies reported a total of 511,868 original classification decisions. This figure represents a modest 4% increase of almost 21,000 original classification decisions from the number reported last year.

Even more surprising, the agency most involved in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, DOD, reported an 11% decrease in its original classification decisions. On analysis, however, this decrease is not as anomalous as it may first appear. As noted above, ISOO's own review of Desert Shield/Desert Storm documents revealed that, even at the command level, only a moderate percentage constituted original decisions. At the same time, improvements in DOD sampling and a better understanding within DOD classifying units of the difference between original and derivative classification have resulted in large-scale reductions in the number of reported original decisions by DOD beginning in FY 1989. The reduction for FY 1991 is very likely a continuation of this same trend. Without Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the reported decreases by DOD in original classification would have been much greater.

A review of original classification activity within DOD components bears out this conclusion. The United States Central Command, which had command responsibility for Desert Shield/Desert Storm, reported more than a five-fold increase in original classification decisions, from 4,901 in FY 1990, to 26,897 in FY 1991. Excluding this increase directly tied to Desert Shield/Desert Storm, reported DOD original classification activity declined by almost 34,000 decisions, or more than 30% from the number reported last year.

ORIGINAL ACTIVITY BY AGENCY FY 1991



DOD original classification decreases despite Gulf Conflict


For the third straight year, State, which treats all of its classification decisions as original, reported the highest number of original decisions. At 192,393, the total represents less than a 1% increase in original classification decisions over FY 1990. Therefore, whatever impact Desert Shield/Desert Storm may have had on increased classification activity at State was offset by other decreases.

Justice, which now accounts for the second largest number of original decisions, reported a 25% increase in FY 1991. Justice's classification activity remains concentrated around the FBI's counterintelligence responsibilities. The last of the big four classifying agencies, CIA, reported a 1% decrease in original decisions.

The remaining agencies that exercise original classification authority reported a 53% increase in original decisions. Their 11,587 decisions still comprised only 2% of the Government-wide total. Noteworthy for their reported reductions are Commerce, DOT, NASA, NRC, NSC, OSTP, OVP, and PFIAB.

"OADR" continues to be overused


ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION LEVELS FY 1991



By classification level, agencies again reported increases in the number of **Top Secret** and **Secret** original decisions, and a decrease in those at the **Confidential** level. The resulting proportions continue a trend, even more evident in derivative classification, to concentrate classification decisions at the **Secret** level.

As part of the original classification process, the classifier must determine a time frame for the protection of the information. This is commonly cited as the "duration" of classification. E.O. 12356 provides classifiers with two means of designating declassification

DURATION OF CLASSIFICATION FY 1991




Instructions for national security information. First, the information may be marked for declassification upon a specific date or event. For example, a classifier may determine that the information's sensitivity will lapse upon the completion of a particular project. That event would be noted on the face of the document, and when the project had been completed, the information would automatically be declassified. Only if a specific date or event cannot be determined at the time of classification does the classifier mark the document with the notation "Originating Agency's Determination Required" ("OADR"). "OADR" indicates that the information must be reviewed by the originating agency before any declassification action may be taken.

For FY 1991, the percentage of reported original classification decisions assigned a specific date or event for declassification (5%) continued to fall short of ISOO's approximation of the proportion of classification decisions that are susceptible to automatic declassification instructions at the time of original classification (10-18%). As ISOO has stated previously, this is an area in which improvement is necessary for the classification system to perform credibly. Changes to the classification system currently being developed include provisions that have been designed to help resolve this problem.

Derivative Classification

Derivative classification is the act of incorporating, paraphrasing, restating, or generating in new form classified source information. Information may be derivatively classified in two ways: (a) through the use of a source document, usually correspondence or publications

DERIVATIVE ACTIVITY FY 1991




Derivative actions increase modestly

generated by an original classification authority; or (b) through the use of a classification guide. A classification guide is a set of instructions issued by an original classification authority. It pertains to a particular subject and describes the elements of information about that subject that must be classified, and the level and duration of classification. Only executive branch or Government contractor employees with the appropriate security clearance, who are required by their work to restate classified source information, may classify derivatively.

For FY 1991, agencies reported 6,595,149 derivative classification actions. This number represents a 4.6% increase from that reported in FY 1990. Given Desert Shield/Desert Storm, this increase is also surprisingly small. Of the three agencies that account for almost 99% of derivative classification actions, DOD reported a 25% increase to 4.2 million; but CIA reported a 16% decrease to 1.8 million; and Justice/FBI, a 30% decrease to 0.5 million. All other agencies reported 84,546 derivative classification actions, an 8% reduction from the prior year. All the data suggest that, absent the Persian Gulf conflict, FY 1991 would have witnessed a considerable reduction in derivative activity.

Gulf Conflict accounts for increase in derivative activity


DERIVATIVE ACTIVITY BY AGENCY FY 1991



As in the past, the breakdown of derivative classification actions by classification level differs somewhat from the breakdown of original decisions: **Secret** and **Top Secret** decisions comprise higher percentages of the total. Several factors contribute to this result. With respect to the proportion of **Top Secret** actions, these result from a very few activities that produce a relatively large quantity of derivative documents from classification guidance. Generally, this **Top Secret** information is highly localized, so that the percentage of **Top Secret** actions within almost all collections of classified information is much smaller.

Significantly contributing to the higher proportion of **Secret** derivative decisions is the fact that State treats all of its classification decisions as original. Therefore, State's classification decisions have relatively little impact upon the total number of derivative decisions. State classifies a significantly higher percentage of its information at the **Confidential** level (almost 80%) than any of the other major classifying agencies. As a result, the percentage of derivative **Confidential** decisions (18%) is less than half the percentage of original **Confidential** decisions (39%) while the percentage of derivative **Secret** decisions (74%) is considerably higher than the percentage of original **Secret** decisions (57%).

DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION LEVELS FY 1991




Combined Classification

By adding original and derivative classification decisions, ISOO arrives at what it calls combined classification activity. Again in FY 1991, derivative actions outnumbered original actions by a ratio of almost 13:1. Therefore, derivative actions have a much greater effect on combined classification activity.

In FY 1991, agencies reported combined classification activity of 7,107,017 actions, a 4.6% increase over the number reported in FY 1990. This marks the first time that the total number of reported classification decisions in a year is a palindrome. Having no numerologists on its staff, ISOO is unprepared to analyze what this peculiarity forebodes, but is open to suggestion.

COMBINED ACTIVITY FY 1991




Increase in combined classification much lower than expected

While Desert Shield/Desert Storm did not increase total classification as much as ISOO anticipated, its impact upon the relative proportion of classification activity among the agencies was significant. While DOD accounted for slightly more than half of all classification decisions reported for FY 1990, for FY 1991 it was 61%. CIA accounted for 26%, Justice/FBI 9%, and State 3%. Again, the remaining agencies accounted for slightly more than 1% of the combined classification activity. These agencies run the gamut, however, in the degree of their involvement with classified information. They range from very large departments that possess very little classified information and generate almost none, to very small entities that exist almost exclusively in a classified environment.




Geopolitical changes beginning to affect classification activity

COMBINED ACTIVITY BY AGENCY FY 1991



One fact stands out from the data reported to ISOO about classification activity in FY 1991. It would appear that the dramatic events that have taken place throughout the world over the past few years, and the consequent easing of superpower tensions, are beginning to result in a significant downturn of classification activity. Were it not for the extraordinary situation of preparing for and waging war in FY 1991, classification activity would have decreased markedly.

COMBINED CLASSIFICATION LEVELS FY 1991



Declassification

Systematic Review

Started in 1972, “systematic review for declassification” is the program under which classified, permanently valuable (archival) records are reviewed for purposes of declassification after the records reach a specific age. Under E.O. 12356, NARA is the only agency required to conduct a systematic review of its classified holdings. NARA ordinarily reviews its classified holdings as they become 30 years old, except for certain intelligence or cryptologic file series, which are to be reviewed as they become 50 years old. While other agencies are not required to conduct a systematic review program, ISOO encourages them to do so. With the approval of the originator, agencies, including NARA, may conduct a systematic review of records that are less than 30 years old.

In FY 1991, the number of pages reviewed declined slightly, but because of an increase in the percentage of reviewed pages declassified, the actual number of pages declassified increased by 1.75 million. Agencies reviewed 15.7 million pages, over one-half million fewer (3%) than in FY 1990. However, of the pages reviewed, nearly 14 million (89%) were declassified, a significant increase from the 12.2 million pages (75% rate of declassification) reported in FY 1990.

As in the past, NARA and DOD account for the vast majority of pages both reviewed and declassified through the systematic review process. In FY 1991, NARA reviewed almost 8.6 million pages, a 19% increase from FY 1990. At a declassification rate of 97%, NARA declassified almost 8.3 million pages. ISOO commends NARA for its effort. It hopes to work with NARA to seek the resources and technology necessary to sustain and expand its systematic review program.

Voluntary systematic review activity remains critical to the program’s success. DOD accounted for the second highest volume of pages reviewed for FY 1991. While the number of pages DOD reviewed declined (17%), its declassification rate increased significantly, from 62% in FY 1990, to 85% in FY 1991. As a result, DOD declassified over 0.6 million pages more (13%) than it did the prior year. For the second straight year, Air Force accounted for most of DOD’s systematic review activity, reviewing and declassifying almost 2/3 of its total product. An equally positive situation is Navy’s contribution to systematic review in FY 1991. After years of a totally stagnant declassification program, in FY 1990, Navy



Nearly 14 million pages declassified by systematic review

commenced a modest systematic review effort. In FY 1991, Navy expanded this program significantly, which resulted in almost 1.7 million pages of declassified information. ISOO commends both Air Force and Navy for their efforts and urges their continuation.

Other agencies contributed to the systematic review product in FY 1991, but with a few exceptions, their contributions were disappointing. Those exceptions are NASA, OVP and USIA. Each reviewed and declassified a significant number of pages given the relatively small scope of their classification programs. ISOO urges all the other classifying agencies to contribute their fair share of effort to the systematic review program. The constant build-up of the classified universe demands it.

NARA, Air Force and Navy declassify the most pages

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW ACTIONS BY AGENCY FY 1991




Mandatory Review

Under Executive Order 12356, the mandatory review process allows agencies or citizens to require an agency to review specified national security information for purposes of seeking its declassification. Requests must be in writing and describe the information with sufficient detail to permit the agency to retrieve it with a reasonable amount of effort. Mandatory review remains popular with some researchers as a less contentious alternative to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. It is also used to seek the declassification of presidential papers or records, which are not subject to the FOIA.


The 3,166 cases processed under mandatory review during FY 1991 comprised 17,103 documents totaling 139,205 pages. The number of pages processed represents a 1 %

MANDATORY REVIEW PAGES PROCESSED FY 1990-1991



More resources needed to increase declassification activity

MANDATORY REVIEW ACTION TAKEN FY 1991



Almost 3,500 mandatory review cases and appeals processed


decrease from the prior year. Particularly noteworthy are the increase in the number of pages declassified in full and the decrease in the number of pages denied in full. The percentage of pages declassified in whole or in part (94%) is up 10% from the FY 1990 figure.

E.O. 12356 also provides that agencies or members of the public may appeal mandatory review denials to designated officials of the denying agencies. During FY 1991, agencies processed 223 appeals that comprised 5,629 documents totaling 26,672 pages. Of these, 94% of the pages were declassified in whole or in part. This impressive rate suggests that researchers can anticipate even greater returns in declassified information if they pursue an appeal.

MANDATORY REVIEW ACTIONS BY AGENCY FY 1991


Agency	Total Cases Acted On	% Granted in Full	% Granted in Part	% Denied in Full
DOD	723	59	23	18
NSC	684	46	52	2
State	516	44	48	8
NARA	442	33	62	5
CIA	421	22	66	12
Justice	75	48	44	8
All Others	305	68	29	3
Totals	3,166	46	46	8

MANDATORY REVIEW APPEALS: PAGES PROCESSED FY 1990-1991



MANDATORY REVIEW APPEALS DISPOSITION FY 1991

Total of 26,672 Pages Processed



Mandatory review yields 94% declassified in whole or part

Safeguarding




Lowest number
of agency self-
inspections
since 1983

Agency Self-Inspections

Executive Order 12356 requires that each executive branch agency that originates or handles classified information establish and maintain “an active oversight and security education program.” Agencies are required to report to ISOO the number of self-inspections that they undertake each year. They also report the number and types of infractions found during the year. Infractions are minor violations of the Order, the implementing ISOO Directive or agency regulations. Agency statistical reports do not include the more serious security violations that agencies must report to ISOO as they occur.

For FY 1991, agencies reported an 11% decrease in the number of self-inspections in comparison to those conducted in FY 1990. This significant decrease is attributed to DOD, which conducted 2,268 fewer self-inspections in FY 1991 than in FY 1990. DOD’s reduction in self-inspections can be related to a shift in priorities during the Persian Gulf conflict. Other agencies with significant decreases include DOE, NASA and State.

AGENCY SELF – INSPECTIONS FY 1991



In FY 1991, agencies detected a total of 21,210 infractions. Compared to FY 1990, this figure represents a 6% decrease. Although the overall number of inspections has decreased, the average number of infractions discovered per inspection has increased slightly from 0.93 in FY 1990, to 0.98 in FY 1991. Although these figures are encouraging, they are not at a level which indicates that an effective self-inspection program is in place at all agencies. ISOO reiterates its contention that agencies would identify a far greater number of infractions if self-inspections are augmented in quality and quantity. If agencies have not already incorporated periodic samplings of their classified product into their self-inspection programs, ISOO strongly encourages them to do so.

For FY 1991, agencies reported an increase in five categories of infractions as a result of conducting classified document reviews as part of their self-inspection program: 847 (22%) overclassification infractions; 296 (47%) underclassification infractions; 234 (6%) improper destruction infractions; 7,331 (13%) improper storage infractions; and 106 (23%) unauthorized reproduction infractions. Those agencies reporting significant increases in these infractions included AID and State (overclassification); State (underclassification); DOD and Treasury (improper destruction); AID, CIA, Justice, and USIA (improper storage); and DOD (unauthorized reproduction). ISOO commends these agencies for their efforts to conduct document reviews and incorporate them into their self-inspection programs.


Of the many benefits that can be derived from an effective self-inspection program, ISOO believes there are two that stand out. First, they enable the agency to measure its level of compliance with the Order's provisions; and second, they provide the basis for reviewing and revising the agency's security education and training program. With benefits such as these, each agency should strive to develop a self-inspection program that fully examines the requirements of information security and classification management.


INFRACTIONS


Infraction	Total FY 1990	Total FY 1991
Unauthorized Access	576	490
Mismarking	10,598	8,730
Unauthorized Transmission	3,225	2,648
Improper Storage	6,503	7,331
Unauthorized Reproduction	86	106
Overclassification	694	847
Underclassification	202	296
Classification w/o Authority	126	35
Improper Destruction	220	234
Other	426	493
Totals	22,656	21,210

Reported
infractions
increase in five
categories

Previews of *Coming Attractions*







Agency Acronyms or Abbreviations

ACDA	: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AID	: Agency for International Development
Air Force	: Department of the Air Force
Army	: Department of the Army
BIB	: Board for International Broadcasting
CEA	: Council of Economic Advisers
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
Commerce	: Department of Commerce
DARPA	: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DCAA	: Defense Contract Audit Agency
DIA	: Defense Intelligence Agency
DIS	: Defense Investigative Service
DISA	: Defense Information Systems Agency
DLA	: Defense Logistics Agency
DMMA	: Defense Mapping Agency
DNNA	: Defense Nuclear Agency
DOD	: Department of Defense
DOE	: Department of Energy
DOT	: Department of Transportation
ED	: Department of Education
EPA	: Environmental Protection Agency
EXIMBANK	: Export-Import Bank
FBI	: Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCA	: Farm Credit Administration
FCC	: Federal Communications Commission
FEMA	: Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMC	: Federal Maritime Commission
FRS	: Federal Reserve System
GSA	: General Services Administration
HHS	: Department of Health and Human Services
HUD	: Department of Housing and Urban Development
ICC	: Interstate Commerce Commission
Interior	: Department of the Interior
ISOO	: Information Security Oversight Office
ITC	: International Trade Commission
JCS	: Joint Chiefs of Staff

Agency Acronyms or Abbreviations



Justice	: Department of Justice
Labor	: Department of Labor
MMC	: Marine Mammal Commission
MSPB	: Merit Systems Protection Board
NARA	: National Archives and Records Administration
NASA	: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Navy	: Department of the Navy
NRC	: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSA	: National Security Agency
NSC	: National Security Council
NSF	: National Science Foundation
OA, EOP	: Office of Administration, Executive Office of the President
OIG, DOD	: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense
OMB	: Office of Management and Budget
ONDCP	: Office of National Drug Control Policy
OPIC	: Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OPM	: Office of Personnel Management
OSD	: Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSIA	: On-Site Inspection Agency
OSTP	: Office of Science and Technology Policy
OTS	: Office of Thrift Supervision
OVP	: Office of the Vice President
PC	: Peace Corps
PFIAB	: President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PIOB	: President's Intelligence Oversight Board
SBA	: Small Business Administration
SDIO	: Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
SEC	: Securities and Exchange Commission
SSS	: Selective Service System
State	: Department of State
Treasury	: Department of the Treasury
TVA	: Tennessee Valley Authority
USDA	: Department of Agriculture
USIA	: United States Information Agency
USPS	: United States Postal Service
USTR	: Office of the United States Trade Representative
VA	: Department of Veterans Affairs