



Carlsbad, New Mexico August 19, 2000

Pipeline Rupture and Fire El Paso Natural Gas Company: Gas Transmission Line No. 1103







































Parties to the Investigation

- Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS)/Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA)
- El Paso Natural Gas Company



Investigation Team

- Rick Flint Report Writer / Investigator-in-Charge
- Cliff Zimmerman Investigator-in-Charge
- Ravi Chhatre
- Frank Zakar
- Chuck Koval
- Eric Sager
- Jim Gildea
- Joe Kris
- Robert Moore

Corrosion **Materials Laboratory Operations and Training Human Performance Survival Factors Survival Factors** Editor

Safety Issues

- Design and construction of the pipeline
- El Paso Natural Gas Company's program for internal corrosion control
- Federal Safety regulations
- Federal oversight of El Paso Natural Gas Company







Safety Issue #1

Design and construction of the pipeline







Mandrel pigs

Solid pigs













Plan View of Block Valve #6



Pipeline to rupture site and Pecos River Station

Concrete dike for drip storage tank

Pipeline from block Valve #6

Liquid storage leg



















Safety Issue # 2

El Paso Natural Gas Company's program for internal corrosion control



Line 1103 Failure

Severe internal corrosion



Photograph Showing Pitting Damage





Scanning Electron Microscope Photograph





Scanning Electron Microscope Photograph





- Electrolyte (water)
- Carbon Dioxide (CO₂)
- Hydrogen Sulfide (H_2S)
- Oxygen (O₂)
- Chloride (Cl⁻)
- Microorganisms



Gas Velocity

- Low gas velocity allows for liquids to separate from gas and collect in the pipeline
- Stagnant liquid pools could exist and facilitate corrosion



El Paso's Internal Corrosion Control Program



Controlling and Monitoring of the Quality of Gas In the Pipelines

- No reference of contaminants in procedures
- Some locations had gas quality monitoring



Running cleaning pigs to remove liquids



Blowing down drips



Revised Program

- El Paso had revised their internal corrosion control program
- The new corrosion control manual was issued less than six weeks before the Carlsbad accident, and El Paso had not fully implemented it



INDUSTRY STANDARDS

- The American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code for Gas Piping (B31.8)
- The American Gas Association Guide for Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems
- NACE International's (NACE) recommended practice RP0175-75 "Control of Internal Corrosion in Steel Pipelines and Piping Systems"







Safety Issue #3

Federal Safety Regulations



Federal Safety Regulations

The regulations for internal corrosion control for gas pipelines in effect at the time of the accident are in 49 CFR Part 192, "Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline: Minimum Federal Safety Standards," as follows:



192.475 Internal Corrosion Control:

- Corrosive gas may not be transported by pipeline, unless the corrosive effect of the gas on the pipeline has been investigated and steps have been taken to minimize internal corrosion.
- Whenever any pipe is removed from a pipeline, the internal surface must be inspected for evidence of corrosion.



If internal corrosion is found:

- The adjacent pipe must be investigated to determine the extent of internal corrosion,
- Replacement must be made
- Steps must be taken to minimize the internal corrosion.



192.477 Internal Corrosion Control:

- Monitoring: if corrosive gas is being transported, coupons or other suitable means must be used to determine the effectiveness of the steps taken to minimize internal corrosion.
- Each coupon or other means of monitoring internal corrosion must be checked two times each calendar year, but with intervals not exceeding 7 1/2 months.



These regulations do not specifically address:

- The importance of minimizing liquids and liquid accumulation in the pipeline, and removing liquids from the pipeline
- Maintaining drips
- Microbiologically influenced corrosion
- The way that water and contaminants in the pipeline can combine to contribute to the corrosion process
- The role of gas velocity in internal corrosion control







Safety Issue #4

Federal oversight of EPNG



OPS Inspections of EPNG

- 18 inspections from June 1990 to August 1998
- 8 inspections from July 1999 to September 2000 as a participant in the Office of Pipeline Safety's (OPS) "System Integrity Inspection Pilot Program"



OPS Inspections of EPNG (cont'd)

- Pre-Carlsbad Accident: inspections in the 10 years prior to the accident did not result in any enforcement actions related to internal corrosion control program
- Post-Carlsbad Accident: OPS found serious deficiencies in El Paso Natural Gas Company's internal corrosion control program





