ORS Information Line
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ORS Information Line
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Below you will find the most frequently asked questions, and their answers, received via the ORS Information Line. These Security FAQs will be updated periodically as the issues and information change.
Quick Question Scan (click on the question to read the answer)
- Why is it necessary to have a high level of security at the NIH? What is the real or perceived threat? Who determines what the threat level is and how we should respond?
- Will NIH campus life and activities return to normal, i.e. pre September 11? If not, what is the plan for meeting and sustaining the required increase in security?
- Will a fence be built around the NIH campus perimeter? If so, what type and when?
- Why are we restricting certain vehicles from coming on the NIH campus such as public transportation vehicles and even off-campus shuttle buses?
- Why are we restricting the number of vehicle entry points to the NIH campus? Why not open more entrances and exits to ease traffic flow?
- Why are some vehicles being inspected twice, once at the NIH campus perimeter and again before entering a garage?
- Why do some NIH campus buildings have security guards but others do not? Why is the level of security different for on-campus vs. off-campus buildings?
- Why is NIH generally restricting conference activities and special events to mission-related activities held during "normal business hours"?
- What is NIH doing to monitor mail and packages to minimize the threat of biohazardous or explosive material causing harm?
- How will the NIH communicate with staff in the event of an emergency?
- During an emergency, what can we do to expedite building evacuations?
- Are employees in danger of radioactive and biohazards on campus?
- Are these the substances they talk about when we hear about biological warfare?
- What kinds of coordination does the NIH have in place in the event of emergency?
- What is the NIH's emergency response capability for potential acts of chemical, biological, or radiological terrorism, such as explosions, fires, airborne releases, biohazardous exposures, etc.?
Why is it necessary to have a high level of security at the NIH? What is the real or perceived threat? Who determines what the threat level is and how we should respond?
Since September 11, there has been a focused effort to ensure that all Federal facilities are adequately secured from potential terrorist and criminal activity. NIH implemented heightened security procedures to comply with Department of Justice standards, General Services Administration guidelines, and Department directives to reduce the risk of potential harm to people and property in all of its facilities.
Being at the forefront of science, the NIH maintains a high national and international public profile. It operates research laboratories with select agents, pathogens, and radioactive materials. These characteristics coupled with its open campuses and a historic absence high profile security makes the NIH an "attractive target." Information gathered from intelligence agencies and activist groups confirm this perception.
A primary driver for escalating NIH Security is an IG report written prior to September 11 that characterized the "NIH's main campus in Bethesda [as] vulnerable to penetration, violence, and destruction." The report states "NIH needs to take immediate steps to ensure that its main campus laboratories are adequately secured." Thus, the NIH, in concert with direction from the Department and the Executive, is implementing a set of operational changes and physical improvements that will bolster its ability to guard against a range of risks. The IG's assessment is consistent with a series of security studies and an expert panel on security operations that NIH convened prior to September 11, 2001
Consistent with General Services Administration (GSA) and Department of Defense (DOD) procedures NIH is now is managed to respond to a set of assumed escalating levels of threats - four "Alert Levels." Even the lowest alert level calls for increased scrutiny and screening of visitors and their vehicles, various levels of restricted access to certain buildings or facilities, including posting of security guards at the entrances of high and medium risk buildings. All of the alert levels require a level of staffing and other resources higher than what was in place prior to September 11.
A detailed "Security Response Posture" matrix has been developed which describes the nature of the threat being responded to and the means of response at each alert level across a range of elements from employee vehicles to loading docks, and shuttle buses to building entry. The current response strategy relies heavily on using staff to provide security. Changes to the infrastructure will enable NIH to accomplish the same goals in a different and more effective way.
Security experts that the NIH consulted all concur that the single most effective way for the NIH to increase its ability to protect staff, visitors, and facilities is to manage access to its campuses. One of the challenges to is to provide a secure environment within the campus while maintaining the ability of staff to move freely across the campus and between buildings. A perimeter fence with multiple access points for employees, a restricted access point for visitors and patients, and a second restricted access point for construction and delivery vehicles is the most feasible and effective approach to manage campus access. NIH Police and security staff can focus attention on screening visitor and commercial vehicles and their occupants and NIH staff and authorized individuals will have convenient access and egress. The fence is planned to be secure enough to deter unauthorized entry by vehicles or people but will be esthetically pleasing and will blend into the park-like campus and the surrounding neighborhood.
Vehicle bombs like those used in the first World Trade center bombing and the bombing of the Murrah Building and Khobar Towers are the favored weapon of state sponsored terrorist and extremist groups. Since it not feasible to inspect each off -campus shuttle bus prior to coming on campus, there is the potential for someone to plant explosives on the bus while off-campus.
Maintaining campus access control is labor intensive and requires multiple shifts of multiple police or security guards as well as other logistics such as signage, traffic barriers, vehicle inspection stations, weather shelters, etc. Deploying more security staff to open more entrances would deplete staff monitoring building entrances, loading docks and conducting other day-to-day police activities. Even maintaining the current entry points has required the NIH Police to continuously work 12 hour shifts, six days a week.
The greatest potential for damage and loss of life is from a vehicle bomb in close proximity to a building, particularly in underground or adjacent garages. With no perimeter fence, it is conceivable for someone intent on doing harm, to walk onto campus and hide explosives and then plant them in a vehicle after it's been inspected at the campus perimeter.
The level and type of deployed security varies according to the potential risk of each building and location. NIH security planning, policy and operations are based on this premise and apply to all facilities. The NIH campus has a high public profile and there are many people in a concentrated area. More heavily visited public buildings on campus, such as the Clinical Center, have a greater potential risk than a smaller laboratory building occupied primarily by an IC. Off-campus facilities are less likely targets because they are scattered and are generally a mix of commercial and federal employees and hence do not necessarily need as much active deterrence as campus or high profile facilities. Also, because NIH does not have a complete free hand to control building security in leased, mixed use buildings, the current procedures and resources in some of these facilities may vary from the level of security intended.
As discussed in question number 5, NIH Police and security staff are stretched thin and working 12 hour shifts, 6 days a week to monitor campus and building access during normal business hours. We do not have the additional human or financial resources required to maintain adequate security levels needed if we were to extend activities to evenings or weekends.
NIH inspected and x-rayed packages and suspicious mail at the North Stonestreet main mail facility even prior to September; the scrutiny was increased after the anthrax incidents. Staff from the Division of Safety, the NIH Police, the Emergency Management Branch and Mail Services collaborated and developed response plans. Mail Services staff were given specific training on how to identify suspicious mail, what steps to take with mail, as well as health and safety training on how to deal with potential exposures to hazardous agents. All ICs were instructed to use the NIH main zip code which funnels all mail and packages to the main facility. IC Mail Clearing Houses were provided with some general guidelines and health and safety contact information.
Magnetometers were placed in the entrances of public buildings and visitors bags are inspected. Explosive "sniffer" technology is being purchased to use during vehicle inspections.
The NIH recognizes the need to have a coordinated communications strategy to ensure effective and efficient communication with NIH employees and staff in the event of an emergency. Ensuring timely and consistent information to an organization as large as the NIH is no small task. Currently the NIH is utilizing telephone systems, email, emergency radio systems and PDA devices to relay emergency information. Additional plans are underway to acquire and deploy a low power AM radio system that will broadcast emergency and traffic-related information to the NIH community. Finally, the NIH is upgrading to a campus-wide emergency and life safety two-way communication network that will allow emergency personnel to communicate directly with building occupants in the event of a crisis
At the NIH, each Institute, every building and even every floor has a designated official responsible for emergency evacuations. They are trained to react and coordinate safe evacuation of a building in the event of a fire, release of chemical, biological or radioactive materials and other crisis situations. The building evacuation program is included in the NIH Manual. It defines the scope and method for immediate, positive and orderly action to safeguard life and property during emergencies in all buildings occupied by NIH employees. Evacuation drills for each building are conducted twice a year, in the fall and spring. For more information about the building evacuation program, view the "NIH Occupant Evacuation Plan, detailed in the NIH Manual, Chapter 1430. You can find a copy of the plan at: http://www1.od.nih.gov/oma/manualchapters/management/1430/
While it is true that there are radioactive and biological materials in NIH facilities, it is important to remember that when they are present, radioactive levels in materials at the NIH are very low and are not considered dangerous. It is a misconception that the NIH harbors large amounts of radioactive material. To ensure the safety of employees and visitors, the ORS Radiation Safety Branch conducts monitoring of NIH facilities and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission conducts periodic assessments at the NIH. Many biological materials are also used in research conducted at the NIH. Some of these biological materials are infectious agents. However, all infectious agents used at the NIH are registered with and closely monitored by the ORS Occupational Safety and Health Branch. Laboratory-acquired infections at the NIH are very rare occurrences. If you do not work directly with infectious agents, the chance of coming into contact with them is extremely remote.
No. While some of the infectious agents at the NIH are considered potential agents of bioterror, we do not have the quantities or forms of the agents used to conduct biological warfare or bioterrorism present on the campus.
The NIH utilizes an "Incident Command System" to respond to emergencies of any kind. This system ensures that an NIH Fire and Police Department Command Officer is on the campus 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The Command Officer is empowered to direct emergency operations, evaluate the situation, and take immediate action to protect lives and property. Emergency response is incident-specific, tailored to the unique nature of each problem. With regard to ongoing emergency planning and coordination efforts, the ORS convenes a Security Group monthly to address issues including road closings, access to buildings, emergency evacuation procedures, providing updated security information to employees, etc. This group is comprised of a cross-section of key infrastructure personnel, including representation from the Clinical Center and other parties. Finally, the NIH Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) integrates all NIH resources to support NIH Emergency Services during the course of an emergency, and helps coordinate recovery activities in the aftermath of a disaster or crisis. The NIH COOP also works collaboratively with the DHHS Office of Emergency Preparedness in support of national needs.
The NIH has one of the most highly trained hazardous materials and emergency response teams at any government facility. The NIH has emergency response plans in place for each situation and coordinates response efforts with the various groups responsible for public and employee safety including: the NIH Police Department, NIH Fire Department, Occupational Medical Services, Occupational Safety and Health, Radiation Safety, Environmental Protection, as well as the Montgomery County Police, Fire and Rescue units. In response to the need for heightened security at government facilities, the NIH has increased the number of police officers and other security-related staffing and is strengthening its emergency response plans, including the Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP). The NIH Fire Department, in addition to a fully equipped hazardous materials response vehicle, also operates a decontamination trailer designed for large-scale events. The Department has the equipment and training to mitigate chemical, biological and radiological emergencies at the NIH and in the surrounding community. The Occupational Safety and Health Branch (OSHB) and the Environmental Protection Branch (EPB) have the equipment and expertise to sample and identify agents that pose a biological threat. OSHB and EPB also provide advice and guidance to first responders in the event of potential biological or chemical incidents. The Occupational Medical Service (OMS) has triage capacity to stabilize, treat, and refer casualties within the Clinical Center or to community hospitals. Consultation with appropriate Clinical Center and Institute-based medical specialists is also available. The Radiation Safety Branch (RSB) provides radiation safety training and has developed a program for responding to radiological incidents at the NIH and within the Baltimore/Washington metro area. In all cases, the NIH Fire Department provides first response for detection, triage, decontamination and evacuation in chemical, biological and radiological incidents.
The following websites provide additional information:
- Office of Research Services - security FAQ
http://www.nih.gov/od/ors/security/faq.htm
- NIH Emergency Management Branch/DPS
http://www.nih.gov/od/ors/dps/emb/preparedness.htm
- FirstGov.Gov Preparation for Emergencies and Disasters
http://www.firstgov.gov/Topics/Protect_Yourself.shtml
- Ready.Gov from the Department of Homeland Security
http://www.ready.gov
- Talking About Disaster - Providing Safety Information to the Public
http://www.fema.gov/rrr/talkdiz
- Biological Chemical Information
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Agent/agentlist.asp
- Terrorism - Preparing for the Unexpected
http://www.redcross.org
This page last updated on March 4, 2003