Press Room
 

FROM THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

October 16, 2002
PO-3538

TESTIMONY OF PAMELA OLSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY (TAX POLICY),
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BEFORE THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON TREASURY AND
GENERAL GOVERNMENT
ON CORPORATE INVERSION TRANSACTIONS

Mr. Chairman, Senator Campbell, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear today at this hearing relating to corporate inversion transactions.
 
Over the past year, several high-profile U.S. companies announced plans to reincorporate outside the United States.  The documents prepared for shareholder approval and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission cite substantial reductions in overall corporate taxes as a key reason for the transactions.  While these so-called corporate inversion transactions are not new, there has been a marked increase recently in the frequency, size, and profile of the transactions.
 
On February 28, 2002, the Treasury Department announced that it was studying the issues arising in connection with these corporate inversion transactions and the implications of these transactions for the U.S. tax system and the U.S. economy.  On May 17, 2002, the Treasury Department released its report on the tax policy implications of corporate inversion transactions.  (A copy of the Treasury report is attached.)  The Treasury report describes the mechanics of the transactions, the current tax treatment of the transactions, the current tax treatment of the companies post-inversion, the features of our tax laws that facilitate the transactions or that may be exploited through such transactions, and the features of our tax laws that drive companies to consider these transactions.
 
Inversion transactions implicate fundamental issues of tax policy.  The U.S. tax system can operate to provide a cost advantage to foreign-based multinational companies over U.S.-based multinational companies.  The Treasury report identifies two distinct classes of tax reduction that are available to foreign-based companies and that can be achieved through an inversion transaction.  First, an inversion transaction may be used by a U.S.-based company to achieve a reduction in the U.S. corporate-level tax on income from U.S. operations.  In addition, through an inversion transaction, a U.S.-based multinational group can substantially reduce or eliminate the U.S. corporate-level tax on income from its foreign operations.
 
An inversion is a transaction through which the corporate structure of a U.S.-based multinational group is altered so that a new foreign corporation, typically located in a low- or no-tax country, replaces the existing U.S. parent corporation as the parent of the corporate group.  In order to provide context for consideration of the policy issues that arise, the Treasury report includes a technical description of the forms of the inversion transaction and the potential tax treatment of the various elements of the transaction under current law.  The transactional forms through which the basic reincorporation outside the United States can be accomplished vary as a technical matter, but all involve little or no immediate operational change and all are transactions in which either the shareholders of the company or the company itself are subject to tax.  This reincorporation step may be accompanied by other restructuring steps designed to shift the ownership of the group's foreign operations outside the United States.  The restructuring steps involving movement of foreign subsidiaries are complex and varied, but, like the reincorporation itself, are transactions that are subject to tax.  When all the transactions are complete, the foreign operations of the company will be outside of the U.S. taxing jurisdiction and the corporate structure also may provide opportunities to reduce the U.S. tax on U.S. operations.
 
Market conditions have been a factor in the recent increase in inversion activity.  Although the reincorporation step triggers potential tax at the shareholder level or the corporate level, depending on the transactional form, that tax liability may be less significant because of current economic and market factors.  The company's shareholders may have little or no gain inherent in their stock and the company may have net operating losses that reduce any gain at the company level.  While these market conditions may facilitate the transactions, they are not what motivates a company to undertake an inversion.  U.S.-based companies and their shareholders are making the decision to reincorporate outside the United States largely because of the tax savings available.  It is that underlying motivation that we must address.
 
The ability to achieve a substantial reduction in taxes through a transaction that is complicated technically but virtually transparent operationally is a cause for concern as a policy matter.  As we formulate a response, however, we must not lose sight of the fact that an inversion is not the only route to accomplishing the same type of reduction in taxes.  A U.S.-based start-up venture that contemplates both U.S. and foreign operations may incorporate overseas at the outset.  An existing U.S. group may be the subject of a takeover, either friendly or hostile, by a foreign-based company.  In either case, the structure that results provides tax-savings opportunities similar to those provided by an inversion transaction.  A narrow policy response to the inversion phenomenon may inadvertently result in a tax code favoring the acquisition of U.S. operations by foreign corporations and the expansion of foreign controlled operations in the United States at the expense of domestically managed corporations.  In turn, other decisions affecting the location of new investment, choice of suppliers, and employment opportunities may be adversely affected.  While the openness of the U.S. economy has always made -- and will continue to make -- the United States one of the most attractive and hospitable locations for foreign investment in the world, our policies should provide a level playing field.  There is no merit in policies biased against domestic control and domestic management of U.S. operations.
 
The policy response to the recent corporate inversion activity should be broad enough to address the underlying differences in the U.S. tax treatment of U.S.-based companies and foreign-based companies, without regard to how foreign-based status is achieved.  Measures designed simply to halt inversion activity only address these transactions at the surface level and in the short run.  Measures that are targeted too narrowly would have the unintended effect of encouraging a shift to other forms of transactions and structures to the detriment of the U.S. economy in the long run.
 
An immediate response is needed to address the U.S. tax advantages that are available to foreign-based companies through the ability to reduce the U.S. corporate-level tax on income from U.S. operations.  Inappropriate shifting of income from the U.S. companies in the corporate group to the foreign parent or its foreign subsidiaries represents an erosion of the U.S. corporate tax base.  It provides a competitive advantage to companies that have undergone an inversion or otherwise operate in a foreign-based group.  It creates a corresponding disadvantage for their U.S. competitors that operate in a U.S.-based group.  Moreover, exploitation of inappropriate income-shifting opportunities erodes confidence in the fairness of the tax system.
 
The Treasury Department has made specific proposals relating to legislative and regulatory changes that are needed to address these transactions and the opportunities available through such transactions.  Both the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee have held hearings on this subject and members of both committees have crafted legislation in response to these transactions.  We are working closely with these committees to ensure the enactment of appropriate legislation.
 
We also must address the U.S. tax disadvantages for U.S.-based companies that do business abroad relative to their counterparts in our major trading partners.  The U.S. international tax rules can operate to impose a burden on U.S.-based companies with foreign operations that is disproportionate to the tax burden imposed by our trading partners on the foreign operations of their companies.  The U.S. rules for the taxation of foreign-source income are unique in their breadth of reach and degree of complexity.  Both the recent inversion activity and the increase in foreign acquisitions of U.S. multinationals are evidence that the competitive disadvantage caused by our international tax rules is a serious issue with significant consequences for U.S. businesses and the U.S. economy.  A comprehensive reexamination of the U.S. international tax rules and the economic assumptions underlying them is needed.  As we consider appropriate reformulation of these rules we should not underestimate the benefits to be gained from reducing the complexity of the current rules.  Our system of international tax rules should not disadvantage U.S.-based companies competing in the global marketplace.
 
As we consider these important issues, we must focus on the overarching goal of maintaining the attractiveness of the United States as the most desirable location in the world for incorporation, headquartering, foreign investment, business operations, and employment opportunities, to ensure an ever higher standard of living for all Americans.