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Military Intelligence 1861-63: Part II

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
            18 SEPT 95
                   
                 

   OFFICIAL USE ONLY  

                     
A study of the information that opposing commanders acted on substantially modifies historical evaluations of the Civil War.            
                     
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 1861-63
                     
Edwin C. Fishel
                     
PART II.   CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG 1
                     
     The few historians who have thought seriously about Civil War intelligence have generally concluded that it left much to be desired. They are near the truth, though not necessarily for the right reason. The belief held by some that intelligence in that war was more than ordinarily laden with error is an example of a wrong reason. Another is the assumption that it was seldom of much influence in battlefield decisions. The valid reason for deprecating Civil War intelligence is the limited scope of both the Northern and the Southern effort. Intelligence was not pursued on a scale that seems commensurate with the size and desperateness of the conflict. What was pursued was almost altogether military, and even the military sector was not fully covered: strategic intelligence was severely subordinated to the tactical.
                     
Family Affair                
                     
     The reason for the neglect of political and economic intelligence was simply the common ethos and ethnos of the civilian leaders of the North and South. Having known each other for much of their political lives, they had little motivation for investigating what the other side was fighting for and how far it would go. As they knew the enemy's geography and his language, they also knew the extent of his economic wherewithal.
                     
     This is not to say that opportunities for political intelligence combined with subversion were entirely ignored. The Confederates in particular engaged in such attempts, their effort being directed toward
                     
                             
     1 For Part I see Studies X 3, p. 81 ff.
                     
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Posted: May 08, 2007 08:09 AM
Last Updated: May 08, 2007 08:09 AM
Last Reviewed: May 08, 2007 08:09 AM