

Bridging the Intelligence-Policy Divide

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“Intelligence failure” is a frequent topic of discussion in news media and academic journals. The focus usually is on a failure of the Intelligence Community to predict events abroad—a dramatic development like the overthrow of the Shah of Iran or a longer term trend like the collapse of Communism. Observers also criticize policymakers who fail to heed intelligence warnings, as in the Vietnam war or US involvement in Lebanon. But there is a third type of weakness that can reduce the effectiveness of intelligence and policy—the failure of communication between intelligence officers and policy officials.

In recent years, both intelligence officers and policy officials have taken important steps to improve understanding of each other and to bridge the cultural gap that can reduce effective communication between the two groups. With this in mind, the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence and Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy have sponsored an ongoing dialogue between current and former intelligence officers and policy officials in the hope that discussion of their experiences will provide valuable insights for current and future practitioners. This article summarizes the results of about 20 interviews and three seminars that include more than 60 intelligence officers and policy officials.

The “Tribal Tongues” Phenomenon

Observers of US national security decisionmaking have noted that a cultural barrier between policy and intelligence can defeat efficient use of intelligence. According to this view, intelligence officers tend to look at issues in abstract, scholarly terms, while policy officials are more pragmatic and activist in their outlook. Intelligence officers complain that policymakers ignore reality abroad; policy officials counter that intelligence officers are too detached

from the reality of Washington and do not have to take responsibility for their errors of judgment. Mark Lowenthal has dubbed this difference the “tribal tongues” phenomenon. In his view, intelligence and policy officials, like Britons and Americans in George Bernard Shaw’s famous quip, are “divided by a common tongue.”¹

Strategies for Improving Relations

Over the past decade, a number of intelligence officers and policy officials have overcome these divisions and created successful strategies for integrating intelligence into the policy process. The key element in all these strategies has been a recognition that intelligence and policy personnel have to function as members of a team, and that direct communication, feedback, and careful tailoring of support are essential.

Although officials participating in the dialogue differed as to whether intelligence or policy officers should take the lead in forging closer relationships, all agreed that the effective use of intelligence in policymaking is a shared responsibility. They also noted that, although intelligence officers have to “sell” their products to policymakers, it is the quality of intelligence support that makes for strong relationships. Many interviewees criticized the high volume of general intelligence publications and complained about overclassification.

Both intelligence and policy officials stressed the need for timely, actionable intelligence, tailored to the requirements of particular officials and events. They agreed that there is a continuing need to foster expertise and objectivity. And officials from both camps stressed the need for intelligence agencies to coordinate their efforts and reduce unnecessary competition and redundant products.

Thus far, the dialogue has identified a number of techniques that foster closer intelligence-policy ties. The following sections describe the elements of these techniques and provide anecdotes that illustrate how successful policy and intelligence officials have worked together.

Experiences of Policy Officials

Finding Out What Intelligence Can Do. Policy officials have benefited from planning their relationships with intelligence providers. For some first-time appointees, this required accepting a quick tutorial on how the key intelligence agencies work. Many policymakers also took steps to understand the various types of intelligence reporting and how best to use them. Knowing the potential and limits of espionage or technical sources and how intelligence collectors evaluate them has been invaluable to policymakers in trying to deal effectively with complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty:

- CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) has produced classified handbooks for policy officials detailing the support that it can offer.
- The Intelligence Community has tutorials available in the form of briefings, videos, and handbooks on collection sources and analytical methods.

Many policy officials have found that intelligence officers know details of the policy environment abroad that can help policy officials to refine ideas and package them to improve the chances of a policy success.² They can also be valuable sources of information that can be shared with foreign leaders in support of US policy:

- During the Cuban missile crisis, intelligence officers briefed key foreign leaders on the facts of Soviet missile deployment while policy officials sought support for the US response. Similar briefings for foreign officials became a cornerstone of US efforts to gain allied support for arms control proposals.
- Intelligence officers have worked closely with policy officials to develop information to support demarches to foreign countries on weapons proliferation and technology transfer issues.

Making Time For Intelligence. A number of the policymakers interviewed said that they found it useful to make themselves and their top staff aides available to intelligence and shared their schedules and agendas with intelligence counterparts:

- Some intelligence units have arranged to keep policymakers informed while they travel abroad via specialized cables timed to arrive at their various ports of call. In at least one instance, such specialized support alerted an Ambassador to the position of a foreign official hours before their meeting.
- With advance notice of meetings of the NSC Principals' or Deputies' Committees, intelligence officers have provided briefing papers, talking points, and tailored reporting to support policy discussions.

Encouraging Participation. A number of policymakers have brought intelligence officers directly onto their teams:

- Rotational assignments of intelligence officers to policy agencies have benefited both intelligence and policy organizations. One former NSC senior director had both CIA and DIA officers on his staff.
- Many policy officials invite intelligence officers to senior staff meetings. Others ask intelligence representatives to travel with them, to contribute "think pieces" for their private use, or to meet informally to discuss current developments.

Policy officials have used intelligence officers as soundingboards, relying on their discretion to protect policy ideas in the formulation stage:

- Before his death in the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut, Robert Ames, National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for the Near East, was a key member of the backstopping team on US policy toward Lebanon. Ames's contribution was unique because he was a manager of analysis who also had many years of operational experience.

- One NSC Staff senior director convened an informal weekly meeting of policy and intelligence officers to share information and brainstorm issues. No notes were kept, and no policy positions were taken.

Asking Questions. Policy officials have found it useful to lay out tasks and requirements to take advantage of the specialized resources available to their intelligence counterparts. In addition to assistance in obtaining information on short-fuse issues, intelligence—with appropriate guidance—can provide insights about over-the-horizon policy concerns:

- While they concentrated on short-range issues, policy officials often task intelligence to speculate on mid- and long-term issues that may become more important. One State Department analyst recognized the growing weakness of Philippine President Marcos some four years before his fall.
- One policy official thought of the Intelligence Community as a library. When she needed factual information on analytical insights urgently, she tasked her intelligence counterpart for a quick answer.

Many policy officials have made an effort to involve intelligence officers in conceptualizing issues and developing terms of reference for policy analyses:

- One DCI Intelligence Center has developed a strategic plan to anticipate policy objectives, identify collection and analysis requirements, and report to policymakers on foreign reactions to US initiatives.
- An intelligence organization that was not in the loop was asked to provide a “threat projection” to support a major weapon acquisition decision. The time period of the projection fell more than a decade short of the expected life cycle of the weapon. When criticized, the intelligence officers responded, “That is what we were tasked to do.”

Experience has shown that it is also important that policy officials ask questions that intelligence officers can answer:

- “What should I do?” takes the intelligence officer over the line from intelligence to policy. Rephrasing the question as an intelligence requirement

will often yield useful insights. “Whom do I have to convince in country X?” or “Under what circumstances would leader Y change his mind?” are examples.

- A policy official in charge of a traveling negotiating team asked for an analysis of the likely tactics of the other country. The analysis showed that the adversary was planning to exploit divisions in the US delegation, and the official reorganized his team members’ responsibilities to limit the damage.

Providing Feedback and Sharing Information. Along with specific tasking, the policy officials who made effective use of intelligence have let intelligence officers know whether they were satisfied or dissatisfied with the support they received. Intelligence officers are used to criticism and debate, and they will accept and profit from direct and frank feedback:

- One former policy official made it clear he wanted to see the working analysts’ rough drafts on tasking he posed and not the version varnished by layers of review and editing. The same policy official insisted on exchanges in his office with working analysts as well as their managers.
- Criticism of intelligence analysis in the early 1980s on the proposed Soviet-European gas pipeline permitted intelligence officers to sharpen their assessments and contribute to a shift in US policy from opposing the pipeline to limiting European dependence on Soviet gas.

Policy officials who wanted insightful analysis have also kept intelligence officers informed about important information that may affect their judgments as well as future issues or events:

- One intelligence staff used its knowledge of policymakers’ concerns to convene monthly roundtable meetings of analysts and collectors and to produce calendars of future events; the result was reporting better targeted to policy needs.
- Because they were privy to reports from the special envoy, State Department intelligence officers

were able to provide timely support on US policy toward Lebanon in the early 1980s. CIA analysts, however, were not aware of the special envoy's activities, and they could not bring their expertise and sources to bear to meet his needs.

Initiatives by Intelligence Officers

Learning About the Policy World. Whatever steps policy officials may have taken, experience has shown that a major burden of bridging the cultural divide rests with the intelligence officers. Some intelligence collection and analysis units have developed training programs on the policy process. But intelligence officers have been most effective when they had direct experience in the policy process; only then could they anticipate policymakers' needs and develop collection or analytical strategies to support them. Intelligence managers have assigned "fast-track" officers to tours in policy agencies and on negotiating and backstopping teams. Intelligence liaison officers assigned to policymaking agencies have also provided valuable insights:

- CIA liaison officers at policy agencies have met regularly to discuss strategies for supporting their customers. The DI has appointed an officer to be the focal point for liaison support.
- Joint participation in war games and policy simulations has sensitized policy officials and intelligence officers to each others' cultures and contribute to closer working relationships.

Identifying Key Customers. Intelligence agencies have long produced large amounts of reporting and analysis that are disseminated broadly throughout policy agencies. But because of resource limitations, intelligence organizations have found it increasingly necessary to concentrate their support efforts on those policymakers who have the greatest impact on decisions.

In many cases this means focusing on senior officials, but many participants in this project advised that an effective dialogue is required at all levels of the policy process. Several noted that the relationship between intelligence experts and desk-level officers in policy agencies is particularly important, because it is here that the options are formulated for decisions by senior officials.

Intelligence officers have to devote considerable effort to determine the most influential individuals among policy officials. Here, too, liaison officers have helped by identifying who carries the most weight. Successful intelligence officers also have studied writings and public statements of key policymakers, watched them on TV talk shows, and read press reports on both policy issues and Washington politics. Many have worked initially through senior staffs to gain insights into the decisionmaker's priorities and, over time, to gain direct access:

- One NIO used issues raised in a policymaker's speech on regional policy to organize a series of sessions with intelligence analysts and policy officials.
- One important side benefit of the State Department reorganization that is now under way is the empowerment of lower-ranking officers—country directors and desk officers in particular—with greater influence over policy formulation.

Intelligence officers have had to look for matches between analytic or collection strengths and the professional needs of policy officials. Thus, during initial contacts, effective intelligence officers have briefed policy officials with specificity on how intelligence can advance their policy agendas—what services are available on what issues in what formats:

- Initial briefings of new policy officials have included a substantive overview, a summary of available products, and directories and phone numbers of experts in the policy official's areas of responsibility.
- In a first briefing of a new Under Secretary, a senior intelligence officer warned, "Here is an area in which I am going to frustrate you. I will keep you informed of developments, but the outlook is pessimistic, and no one has devised an effective strategy."

Taking the Initiative. One universal recommendation of experienced hands on both sides of the divide is that intelligence officers must take the initiative to establish ties to policy counterparts. Often, the good offices of those with access are used. For example, senior intelligence leaders have set up luncheon meetings with key officials;³ liaison officers can help—indeed, almost any intelligence professional who has had experience working with the policy officer can facilitate access:

- Many appointees of new administrations served previously in government or have come from academic institutions. Some were well known to former intelligence officers. Others have been accessible through academic colleagues of intelligence specialists.
- Some intelligence organizations have set up informal conferences involving newly appointed policy officials and academic specialists, as well as intelligence officers. These events, especially the opportunity for wide-ranging, off-the-record discussions, have often facilitated continuing relationships.

With or without such assistance, many intelligence officers have taken steps to inform policy officials, especially new ones, of available expertise and services, and to educate them on the intelligence process. Such initiatives have often been tied to a major event, such as a visit by a foreign official or a trip by the policymaker. Intelligence officers have provided briefings for policy officials on the factors affecting the foreign visitor's views or the domestic politics of the countries on the travel itinerary:

- The CIA has long produced brief video profiles of foreign leaders. The objective, according to the head of the analytical office, is to make a policymaker's first meeting with a foreign official seem like the second.
- Other intelligence products highly valued by policymakers have included biographic and personality profiles on foreign leaders, maps and graphics, papers and charts that summarize complex data, and sensitive reports from intelligence sources.

The most effective intelligence officers realize that their information has to be delivered in a form that is useful for the policy official. Because policy officials are action oriented, the most effective intelligence has been presented in formats that are easy to use and at the lowest possible classification level. Generally, intelligence officers should favor oral presentations in conversations where policymakers can ask questions and challenge judgments:

- Intelligence advisers to senior arms control negotiators usually brief them each morning when abroad and visit them in Washington to hand-carry reports and analytical papers of particular interest.
- When briefing policy officials, intelligence officers often have been asked if their information can be used in a public statement or private demarche to a foreign country. Sometimes, intelligence officers have prepared a "sanitized" version of the information in advance.

Sustaining the Relationship. Recognizing that they are operating in a highly competitive "buyer's market," many intelligence officers have assumed most of the burden of sustaining effective ties. Here, responsiveness—tailormade support for the policy official's needs—usually induces reactions that nurture a lasting relationship. In keeping up their side of the relationship, the intelligence officers' access to all-source information provides a key comparative advantage for adding value to the policymaking process:

- Intelligence reporting and analysis has often put in perspective information that policy officials hear from their foreign counterparts.
- Articles in current intelligence publications like the *National Intelligence Daily* have been valuable to policymakers when they provide intelligence not available from the media, including details of foreign military deployments or political insights from agent reports.

Many intelligence officers ask policy officials to identify the media for exchange that suits them best—briefings, bull sessions, written reports—and the mixture of information, explanation, and prediction that provides the most benefit:

- A senior intelligence staff chief supplemented the formal intelligence assessments for his customers with short “private papers” that were not formally coordinated and were focused on current policy debates.
- A CIA operations officer gave the Assistant Secretary responsible for his region an envelope each week containing the 10 best field information reports.
- A newly appointed Deputy Secretary found that his weekly schedule included formal briefings by the heads of departmental intelligence units. One day, he asked his aide, “Who are those people in the back row?” “They’re the desk officers—the experts,” the aide replied. The Deputy Secretary cancelled the briefings and replaced them with weekly informal chats with the experts.

Regular and frequent exchanges have provided important benefits to the intelligence professional. The policy official, for example, has special knowledge of the alternatives under consideration by the US Government, on the terms of debate among US decisionmakers, and on the information transmitted privately by foreign counterparts. Moreover, exposure to the policymaker’s personal analysis of issues can sharpen the intelligence officers’ command of the subject:

- Many intelligence officers have developed close working relationships with policy officials by volunteering to participate in evening and weekend meetings, and to carry out supporting tasks, such as keeping the master text of a paper or advising on security matters.
- During the Gulf war, secure teleconferences among intelligence and policy officials were conducted frequently, providing both groups with up-to-date information and ready access to experts from each department and agency.

Stressing Actionable Intelligence. Policymakers are often uninterested in or hostile to the Intelligence Community’s predictions. Policymakers look to

intelligence primarily for facts. Many report a preference for “opportunity analysis” that helps them implement established policies or develop new ones by pointing to opportunities for using leverage to support US initiatives. Examples of opportunity analysis include:

- A memo prepared for a former President assessing the reasons for anti-US statements by a foreign leader and steps that could be taken to ameliorate his hostility.
- An assessment of public opinion in a key country and suggested themes for a US public diplomacy campaign.
- A cataloging of the strengths and weaknesses of a potential military adversary, together with suggestions on how to exploit the weaknesses.

In most relationships, timeliness has been all but synonymous with responsiveness in the policy official’s mind. For some accounts, secure fax machines have also met the standard of timeliness. Examples of timely intelligence support include:

- Quickly disseminated, lightly annotated reports affecting the dynamics of a negotiation.
- Customized support cables for traveling officials.
- Regularly updated data sets, graphics, and biographies.

“What If” and “Low Probability–High Impact” assessments and other forms of alternative analysis have also provided vehicles for adding value to the policymaking process.⁴ Under circumstances of high uncertainty and policy sensitivity, they help place the focus on the policymakers’ questions and concerns.

Some Special Issues

Multiple Voices and Information Overload. Policy officials are sometimes confounded by the multiplicity of intelligence officers and organizations that clamor for attention. And nearly all the policymakers

interviewed for this project complained about the deluge of intelligence reporting and analysis that they receive. They have been particularly critical of intelligence that is too general, that adds little to what is available from open sources, or that is hard to use because it is too highly classified.

The support that a policymaker requires, and the appropriate contact within the Intelligence Community, varies depending on the issue, specific information needs, or personal considerations. Departmental intelligence organizations such as the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Defense Department's Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence components of the military services are close to officials in their departments, can provide support quickly, and are sensitive to departmental concerns. National intelligence organizations such as the CIA have collection and analytical responsibilities that transcend the requirements of any single department. The CIA was created specifically to provide intelligence that was independent of the departments' policy agendas.

The National Intelligence Council, with its NIOs, is responsible for producing National Intelligence Estimates that draw on the analytical resources of the entire Intelligence Community. NIOs, who specialize in regions or functional issues, come about as close to "one-stop shopping" as can be found in the US intelligence establishment; they can provide a window into all the elements of the Intelligence Community. They represent the community at policy meetings, and they are conversant with the views of all intelligence agencies. Many develop close and effective working relationships with policy counterparts. DCI Centers for counterintelligence, counterterrorism, counternarcotics and nonproliferation also provide a single focal point for policy support on these issues.

Intelligence officers have to understand the full range of policy needs, to provide feedback to all concerned intelligence organizations, and to tap all the resources of the Intelligence Community. Senior intelligence managers are increasingly aware of the weaknesses of generalized intelligence products and the need to avoid unnecessary duplication and competition. With the prospect of shrinking intelligence resources, these issues require continuing attention.

Dealing with Congress. For Executive Branch officials, there are few experiences more exasperating than seeing a carefully crafted policy initiative undercut because of intelligence reporting that fosters opposition from the Congress. Yet the Congress is a legitimate intelligence consumer that has become increasingly active.

Our system of government makes struggles between the Congress and the Executive Branch inevitable, intense, and political. Despite its aspirations to objectivity and detachment, intelligence will inevitably be used in those struggles. The disruption has been minimal when policy officials have alerted intelligence to the political sensitivity of issues, and the intelligence officers have informed policy officials in advance of reporting or analysis that may be controversial.

The intelligence officer's commitment to objectivity and to "leveling the playing field" has run into roadblocks when it had to be balanced against the policy official's commitment to advancing the President's program. Intelligence officers have felt a professional obligation to offer the same basic intelligence judgments to all parties, but no similar obligation to report on US policy; indeed, they have generally been reluctant to comment on policy even if asked.⁵ When briefing Congressional staffs, for example, the CIA's Arms Control Intelligence Staff invited State Department representatives to field policy questions.

Intelligence Analysis and Covert Action. Some policymakers have been especially concerned about the objectivity of analysis on regions where the CIA is conducting a covert action, or where senior intelligence officers have expressed strong policy views.⁶ This is a concern for intelligence managers as well. With the ending of the Cold War, covert action is likely to diminish in scale; according to DCI R. James Woolsey, the portion of the CIA budget devoted to covert action has declined to 1 percent. But it remains incumbent on intelligence officials to ensure objective analysis regardless of the operational involvement of the Intelligence Community. Policy officials responsible for covert action have been best served when they were appropriately

agnostic, pressed intelligence analysts on the basis for their judgments, and sought out alternative views among informed (and appropriately cleared) critics.

A Final Caution

This report has documented a clear trend toward an increasingly close relationship between intelligence and policy. This is becoming the new orthodoxy, supplanting the traditional view that intelligence should be kept at arms length from policy and concerned principally with the objectivity of its assessments. The authors, and most of the intelligence and policy officials interviewed for this project, support the new trend. But there also is continuing validity in the traditional concerns.

Intelligence managers have to recognize that more effective policy support requires the building and maintaining of expertise. Intelligence officials know that professional knowledge and expertise are their principal assets in the policy process. In view of the new issues now facing the Clinton Administration, the Intelligence Community has to develop the expertise to provide support on topics that previously were low on the scale of priorities or not covered at all.

Similarly, intelligence managers have to continue to foster professional integrity, and they cannot hesitate to render judgments that conflict with policy assumptions. There is a delicate balance to be struck between the intelligence officer's obligations to provide warning of adverse policy consequences on the one hand and to assist policymakers in crafting strategies for promoting US interests under conditions of great risk and uncertainty on the other. This is particularly challenging when the DCI or other senior intelligence officials are deeply involved in policy deliberations and have their own views about policy matters.

The track record of intelligence is far from perfect. Failure to warn of such profound changes as the fall of the Shah of Iran and the 1973 Middle East war indicate a continuing need to strengthen collection and analysis. But these have also been situations from Vietnam to Lebanon in which the insights of intelligence analysis proved to be more correct than the views of officials who were immersed in policy arguments. This suggests a need for intelligence to follow a balanced approach, warning of dangers and helping to identify opportunities.

Policy officials also need to respect the professional objectivity of intelligence officers, and, while using their expertise to the fullest, must not try to make them into policy officials like themselves. To do so would undercut those very characteristics of intelligence officers that make a unique and valuable contribution to policy formation.

NOTES

1. "Tribal Tongues: Intelligence Consumers, Intelligence Producers," *Washington Quarterly*, winter 1992. Reprinted in the summer 1992 edition of *Studies in Intelligence*.
2. One former official, particularly successful in using intelligence, used an analogy dear to the hearts of Washington Redskins fans when he called intelligence officers his "analytical hogs."
3. In most administrations, DCIs have had regular meetings with the National Security Adviser and the Secretaries of State and Defense. Feedback from these meetings is an excellent source of information on the issues that these senior officials are focusing on and which officials in their organizations should receive intelligence support.
4. "What If" analysis seeks to determine the conditions that could change the analyst's judgment of the likely behavior of a foreign country; "Low Probability-High Impact" assessments deal with important contingencies that may be unlikely but which would have a major consequence for US policy.
5. This general observation may be less true at the most senior levels, where the distinction between intelligence and policy may be blurred.
6. Former Secretary of State George Shultz has noted in his memoirs that he became so concerned about DCI Casey's policy advocacy that he began to mistrust intelligence analysis in general.

One of time's arrows

The Intelligence Revolution and the Future

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The intelligence revolution is a distinctly 20th century phenomenon, one of the least well understood developments of our time. It began with the surfacing of some extraordinary fantasies into the political consciousness of modern Europe. As the century opened, French society shuddered its way through the scandal known as the Dreyfus affair, in which a French Army colonel of Jewish extraction was accused of spying against the state. The charges were trumped up, but before their fictionality could be revealed they set off a wave of anti-Semitism, heightened by manifestations of French national insecurity (see Bredin).

In Britain, a handful of patriotic and market-sensitive thriller writers seized on the alarms of the day to create both the genre of spy fiction and a panic about the clandestine activities of German spies ready and waiting to subvert the country from within whilst a German Army landed on Brighton Beach. The spy panic had no foundation in reality, but was taken very seriously by the authorities. In response, the British Government strengthened the defence of vulnerable installations in the country, tightened the official secrets laws, created a counterintelligence service (the forerunner of MI5) to uncover the alleged German spies, and constructed a foreign espionage agency (eventually to become MI6) to report on German plans and preparations (which were nonexistent) for invasion of Britain (see French, pp. 355–70). The arrival of a handful of British spies in Germany in the years before 1914, and their inevitable capture by the Prussian police, sparked in turn a German version of the British spy panic. In both cases societal anxiety about espionage and the emergence of fictional images of the dreaded spy preceded the reality.

In Russia, the secret police (the Okhrana) and the underground Bolshevik party played such an intricate game of subversion and surveillance that the identities of the two organizations soon became alarmingly blurred, with Okhrana agents engaged in assassination attempts and other forms of provocation, which were indistinguishable from the “real” activities of their opponents (see Andrew and Gordievsky). The drama of espionage even touched the Canadian psyche. When the Yukon gold rush erupted in 1896, the government took seriously the idea that the inflow of miners, speculators, adventurers, procurers, etc., masked an annexationist bid by the United States. Canada sent its spies south of the border to investigate the activities of a (non-existent) conspiracy known as the Order of the Midnight Sun.¹

From the beginning, the reality of espionage has been cloaked in fictionality. A public fascination with spying quickly found expression in a Manichean image of espionage both as a force threatening civilization and as a redemptive power whose individual master spies could alter the course of history and save the day. Spy fiction subscribed to this formula from the outset; as a cultural force it was soon joined by the cinema, which projected the myth of espionage from the printed page onto the silver screen.² Two of the greatest films of the inter-war period, the German film-maker Fritz Lang's *Spion* (1928) and Hollywood's version of the Mata Hari story (1932), starring Greta Garbo, helped sustain the emergent cult of intelligence by portraying a panic-stricken world endangered by spies, and saved in turn by secret agents. The glittering and insouciant Mata Hari presented a special kind of challenge, but Hollywood proved capable of redeeming the world even from the presence of Greta Garbo. Whose day was to be saved depended, of course, on whose day was threatened. The enemy could be the Jew, the foreigner, the not-quite gentleman, the corrupted, the bomb throwers, the women. Why the day needed to

be saved was very much a product of national insecurities that began to mount at the turn of the century. At their heart were fears about the pace of technological and societal change caused by the impact of the industrial revolution.³ In the wake of its manifold upheavals, traditional measures of the international balance of power were threatened and the domestic structures of government upset.

The industrial revolution began the intelligence revolution. The consequences included the rise of powerful, expansive, and intrusive intelligence “communities” whose coming both mirrored and helped create the national security state in which we all lived during the Cold War—and whose demise, complete with “peace dividends,” may have been prematurely announced.

With so much attention now being paid, at century’s end, to recapitulation and to uneasy prophecy about the future, it may be timely, as the contents of this special issue suggest, to consider the nature of the intelligence revolution from as many angles of inquiry as possible. In this essay, I hope to demonstrate the nature and implications of the establishment of intelligence agencies as a permanent fixture of the state. Other contributors endeavor to explicate the widespread impact of intelligence in diverse fields of history, politics, and culture. Above all, it is hoped that the contents of this special issue will go some way to suggesting the kind of force that intelligence services have become through their intervention in global politics, in domestic affairs, and through the ways in which representations of espionage have been shaped for consumption in the cultural marketplace. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the fantastic nature of the origins of modern intelligence services continues to imprint itself on our consciousness; Manichean images about the damning or redemptive missions of intelligence agencies continue to hold sway in public discourse. Yet the very idea of an intelligence revolution suggests that such static concepts are untenable. The intelligence revolution has unfolded at great speed, and continues to speed along, in an uncontrolled, irreversible, and possibly even unpredictable fashion. It is one of “time’s arrows,” to borrow from Stephen Jay Gould, bringing change to the political and intellectual history of the 20th century.

The linear progression of the intelligence revolution suggested by the Gould phrase is, however, far from smooth and straight. A graph of the revolution might suggest instead an historical roller coaster, the peaks marked by the impact of the three great conflicts of the century: World Wars I and II and the Cold War. In each of these conflicts, states looked to intelligence as a weapon of defence and as an aid to victory. Under the intense pressure of wartime, or quasi-war conditions, the power of intelligence services expanded; their size increased; they moved closer to the inner circle of bureaucracy; they grew more skilled in the performance of their task of threat assessment; and their societal status was affirmed by cultural productions of all kinds. War’s end brought demobilization, sometimes of a drastic order, and greater invisibility for intelligence services, but only until the next crisis erupted. In the post-Cold War era, we are perhaps in another period of between-crisis, making it all the more necessary to investigate the workings of the intelligence revolution as it has been, for its own sake, and in order to assess what might come next.

The intelligence revolution’s roller coaster ride blurs the structural components that have made for long-term changes. One of these components has been the growth, punctuated by great acceleration in wartime, of the scale of the intelligence enterprise. At the beginning of the 20th century, intelligence services were operated by only a handful of the major powers, were minuscule in size, existed on the peripheries of government bureaucracy, and possessed very little power. Despite what the first generation of spy fiction writers suggested, their sub rosa capabilities were minimal. The contrast with the situation today could hardly be more striking. Intelligence services are nowadays pervasive institutions of the state. They are no longer restricted to a handful of European great powers, but have been exported throughout international society. They have moved into or near the inner circles of decisionmaking. Their scale is, in the case of the major services, quite massive; their reach is global; their data collection capacities generally outstrip their ability to analyze events; and their budgets are staggering. As research centers, intelligence services can even overpower their academic and corporate competitors. The first working computer was developed at Bletchley Park

during World War II as part of the immensely successful British effort to master German codes. Today, there is probably no greater concentration of research and development activities in the field of computer technology than that undertaken by the National Security Agency (NSA), responsible for the monitoring of global, coded communications on behalf of the US Government (see Bamford). As the scale of the enterprise has increased, the clandestinity of "secret services" has increasingly become a polite fiction. Intelligence communities have access to knowledge and power on a scale unimagined by their precursors.

This change has been paralleled by a revolution in government attitudes toward the conduct of foreign and military decisionmaking. The days when princes and cabinets could make private decisions based on their own readings of the international situation, a practice that still lingered at the beginning of the 20th century, are now long gone. The modern condition of permanent national insecurity, the expansion of the international system, and the proliferation of weapons of destruction have forced governments to look increasingly to intelligence services to shape the flow of information about the outside world both for the purpose of long-term planning and for immediate warning. It was one marker of this change that in the late 1940s, in the midst of fears of Soviet expansionism, the newly established Central Intelligence Agency began to be described in official rhetoric as the "nation's first line of defence." This rhetoric has proved enduring; it was reaffirmed by President Bush in 1989 and by Bush's last Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates, in testimony to Congress in April 1992.

The very integration of intelligence assessments into government decisionmaking has introduced, in turn, complex problems in the relationships between intelligence agencies and government, not least to do with the politicization of intelligence to serve the preconceptions of regimes in power, and the employment of intelligence agencies as clandestine and unaccountable arms of executive action. The rise of covert operations, a form of intelligence activism, illustrates this problem in its most brutal form, besides being a phenomenon unimaginable at the onset of the century.

A third and vital component of the intelligence revolution involves massive changes in the application of technology and communications. One of the greatest obstacles to the performance of premodern intelligence services was the slow and unreliable means by which information flowed from the source to the government; this problem was compounded by the fact that intelligence services knew only one way to collect information, namely by relying on reports by secret agents—"humint" in the jargon of modern espionage. Between the days of the classical empires of the Mediterranean world and the 19th century, secret agents performed an unchanging role as the "eyes and ears" of the prince. Since 1900, a great transformation has occurred. Humint remains as one medium of intelligence collection, but its traditional importance has been usurped by new technologies—of signals intelligence (sigint) and machine surveillance (imagery). Signals intelligence is used to vacuum the ether, to search for and unlock the significant messages that flow through a global communications network. Imagery employs devices ranging from spy satellites to spy planes to spy cameras to keep a distant or close watch on activities perceived as posing threats to national security. Sigint and imagery consume big budgets and require great technological application to be utilized; in most cases expense and sophistication keep these instruments out of the hands of all but the largest and most globally oriented intelligence services. A First World/Third World divide thus opens up in the global spread of intelligence. Technology also tends to drive intelligence budgets, determine data flows, and distort priorities for watchfulness. The technological revolution has been so thorough going and so fast paced that it threatens to run beyond the control of intelligence services themselves.

In other ways, too, the technological revolution carries unprecedented dangers. The arrival of new means to collect and process information has helped instill a romantic vision of the perfectibility of intelligence. Sharpen the focus, turn the surveillance dials, and one will have the perfect image, and true intelligence assessment. But no intelligence channel carries all the messages needed by governments, and the result of overreliance on technological wizardry can be complacency, even blindness to threats.

Cases—from the shock of Hitler's Ardennes offensive in the winter of 1944 to the unanticipated fall of the Shah of Iran—attest to this problem.

The technological revolution in intelligence gathering has also bred a memorable dark vision, expressed most alarmingly in the literature of dystopia. George Orwell's novel of warning, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, is rarely thought of as a spy novel, and for good reason. But it contains a frightening picture of the surveillance state and its machinery. Espionage and counterintelligence are fundamental to the survival of the regime of Big Brother, and so powerful as to breed massive corruption and fatalistic compliance. Margaret Atwood's *The Handmaid's Tale* attempts a feminist revision of Orwell's dystopia, complete with an updated Thought Police, "The Eye," who travel the neighborhoods, their blacked-out vans painted with the corporate symbol of a luminescent eye.

The technology of sophisticated, even scarifying data collection has been complemented by a revolution in communications, which has replaced the letter carried by steamship with the phenomenon of simultaneity (see Der Derian). Events and their reportage are no longer separated by weeks or days, but can now occur at the same instance, an experience suddenly translated from the command post to everyone's living rooms by CNN's coverage of the Gulf war. Between supply and demand for intelligence there exists nothing but fiber-optic cable, the microchip, the computer circuit, all a part of the futuristic "cyberspace" of instantaneous communication. The implications of this communications revolution for intelligence, yet another acceleration in a whole series of leaps forward that began with the coming of the telegraph and the wireless radio, have scarcely begun to be appreciated.

The cumulative effect of such changes in the power of intelligence services, their bureaucratic positioning, and their data collection capabilities have enforced a massive paradigm shift in the practice of espionage. But what of societal attitudes toward intelligence, the view from outside looking in? Intelligence services rarely publicize their doings; clandestinity rules. Spy agencies are the last domain of secret diplomacy. Popular culture has instead

served as the medium by which the rise of intelligence services to power in the 20th century has been disseminated, understood, and legitimized. Spy fiction, spy films, investigative journalism, TV docudramas, memoirs by veterans of intelligence, popular histories, and, a latecomer, scholarly studies, have all served in varying degrees to shape our knowledge of the clandestine world. In this domain, the linear properties of the intelligence revolution do not appear; the metaphor of "time's arrow" seems less than relevant. Instead, one sees a cyclical phenomenon, in which cultural production alternates between two poles—embracing the world of espionage by celebrating its supposed ability to redeem a complex world in which ordinary, individual citizens are powerless; and then rejecting clandestinity as a dangerous field of corruption of power, morals, and individual rights.

Changes in the genre of spy fiction over the course of the 20th century perhaps exemplify this phenomenon as well as any. The cycles can be briefly sketched.⁴ The first generation of patriotic thriller writers, authors like William le Queux and John Buchan, painted a picture of a political world in which justice triumphed and civilization was saved from profound dangers, but only because of the interventions of heroic secret agents. Their fictions were often coded as camouflaged fact, or "faction," a device especially beloved by William le Queux. Then, in the interwar period, Somerset Maugham, Graham Greene, and Eric Ambler succeeded in politicizing the genre, overthrowing its romantic and heroic conventions, and substituting a bleaker vision of espionage as a metaphor for political and moral decay and as a powerless enterprise in a world of heavily armed social Darwinistic states. In the early 1950s, at the height of the Cold War, the cycle turned again, to bring forth Ian Fleming's James Bond, whose manly code sought to save the male gender and the West at one and the same time. But John le Carré and Len Deighton, and a host of imitators, were soon poised to renounce the Fleming mythology and reenergize the vision of espionage as corruptive and futile, with the spy as self-made victim.

The one constant factor in the popular culture portrayal of espionage, amidst the cyclical pattern, has been its emphasis on the individual and on the singular event. Its understanding of history as man-made and indeterminate has thus been at odds with the implications of the intelligence revolution as a series of transformations in power, bureaucratic politics, and technology. Such opposition can be healthy, insofar as it positions popular culture as a critique of intelligence. But the gap that exists between the revolutionary dynamics of the growth of intelligence and the cyclical portrayal of espionage in various modes of popular culture as a microcosm of societal anxieties and ills is large and unlikely to be bridged successfully in the near future. Bridgebuilding might be conceived as a prolonged function of increased openness in the conduct of intelligence, a more publicly acknowledged role for intelligence services in decisionmaking and public education (or propaganda), and an expansion of the serious study, within and without the academy, of intelligence services and their impact on domestic politics and international relations. The most delayed of all the intelligence revolutions has in fact been the scholarly one. The serious study of intelligence began only in the mid-1970s, and remains divided among a whole range of research projects (see Wark, 1993). As this scholarly study expands, the dominant concepts and clichés of popular culture's view of espionage are bound to be challenged. But it would be a reasonable wager to suppose that the public fascination with espionage as a realm of clandestinity, a realm in which selected individuals can escape powerlessness, ignorance, taboos against violence, and even the law, is unlikely to fade away.

To know how intelligence services have changed, and to know how they have been depicted in popular culture, provides little help with another perennial question asked of intelligence services. What about their performance? Are they worth the cost, and the nightmares? In particular, we might ask how well they repaid the investment during the Cold War, when the stakes were high and the bill enormous? From the historian's perspective, it is too early to say. The documents are not in, the passions scarcely cooled, the time for reflection not yet established. But one can turn the question upside down and wonder what the Cold War would have been like

without revolutionized intelligence services? In this spirit, Thomas Powers has recently provided one subtle accounting. In a review essay in the *New York Review of Books*, Powers used a wrestling metaphor to denote the role of the two great adversaries in the Cold War intelligence contest:

Intelligence services touch, watch and listen to each other at a thousand points. The intimate knowledge revealed by the wrestler's embrace freed both sides from the ignorance, rumor and the outbreaks of panicky fear that spark big wars no one wants. (Powers, p. 55)

Powers's persuasive answer begs, however, another question. How useful is it to think analogously about intelligence services, and just what are the best metaphors? This becomes an important issue, particularly when one considers the predictive function of intelligence. Is intelligence akin to the physical sciences—is it like meteorology? Is it at its best making behaviorist, structural, or evolutionary forecasts?⁵ Here the standard metaphor of intelligence—that of the jigsaw puzzle—belies the weakness of the predictive scope of espionage assessments. For puzzles have only one outcome, and the construction of the picture does not depend on an exercise of imagination and knowledge concerning the many possible faces of the finished product, but simply on mechanical skill.

We do not yet possess any thorough study of the discourse of intelligence, though the link between intelligence failures and such conceptual traps as mirror imaging and worst case analysis have been identified.⁶ One interesting avenue for exploration has been suggested by the concept of "chaos" as applied to natural science, and more recently to international politics.⁷ Intelligence services, chaos theory would suggest, live in an indeterminate and unpredictable world. Their record at prediction is bound, for that reason, to be spotty. Intelligence failures are also bound to be inevitable, and to occur with something like the same frequency as weather forecasting errors and firefighting miscues. To return to the Thomas Powers quote, it may not be a question of what intelligence services get right, but rather of what large-scale disastrous misunderstandings they might help to prevent.

Whether to avoid the worst of misunderstandings, or to engage in something more positively ambitious, intelligence undoubtedly has a future. It is a future secured on the basis of the forward-thrusting momentum of an ongoing intelligence revolution, and on an accumulative historical precedent that has cemented the identification of intelligence and national security, for better or for worse. The interesting questions are: what exactly will intelligence services do in the future? And what will we make of what they do?

What intelligence services will do will depend on the nature of changes that we can only glimpse, but which are already under way in the basic definitions of national security.⁸ The old concept is fated to be thoroughly undermined. As political sovereignty becomes increasingly a fiction, national security will have to be redefined. Senator David Boren, the chairperson of the powerful Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has already talked in print of the need for the US intelligence community to give thought to sharing secrets with the United Nations, and this is but one straw in the wind (see Boren, p. 57). National security will not in future mean simply the security of the nation-state; rather it will mean the security of a pluralized system of governance, across which "citizens" are likely to spread their loyalties and their appeals for safety and prosperity.

Equally, the concept of threats to whatever becomes the new national security will undergo change. The outbreak of war and violent civil disturbance will remain as dangers, but the relative sureties of intelligence targeting that were a feature of World War I, World War II, and the Cold War will be replaced by an explosion of new threats and challenges to understanding and control. Terrorism has already proved itself to be a difficult target for intelligence services, and will continue to remain so, by its very nature. Nuclear proliferation and the spread of deadly chemical and biological warfare techniques, as the experience of the Gulf war demonstrated, will be high on the agenda for present-day and future intelligence services. The drug trade is newly established as a national security problem, and intelligence services are already being required to deal with it. On the horizon are other threats. One concerns increased

competitiveness within a global economy, with unpredictable and wrenching shifts of economic power. The temptation will be great, whatever the implications might be for the classical liberal doctrine of the nightwatchman state, to utilize intelligence services as weapons of advantage in trade wars and as a means to stave off uncompetitiveness and at least delay loss of economic power. Intelligence services engaged in economic spying may in future create a kind of black-market flow of research and development leads, to compensate for lack of capability at home. Fears about ecological degradation may lead to a new role for intelligence services in monitoring environmental change, pollution, and conceivably the enforcement of international legislation. Population flows, whether of legal or illegal immigrants, will also be a national security concern in future, especially as they stem from political or environmental instability abroad. States and other organizations will require advance warning of such population flows in order to effect a balance between resources and demography, and to maintain a fragile civic tolerance. There are even more wonderful scenarios for future CIAs. When UFOs were in the collective mentality, governments in the United States and Canada turned to their intelligence services to assess the reports that piled up on alien spacecraft. Should project SETI (Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence) ever receive a signal from outer space, there will be yet another role for intelligence services, not in arming the lasers, but in trying to decode the messages.

It is legitimate to ask about this forecasting: why should any of these roles fall into the hands of intelligence services, rather than some other kind of organization? The answer is that intelligence services, historically, fill information vacuums, and will seek out future roles in order to maintain and justify their existence and place in the power structure. A more important answer perhaps arises from consideration of what intelligence services have already become, as a century-long intelligence revolution has worked its changes. They have become, in effect, large, government-directed think tanks, engaged in the business of research and development, armed to the teeth with information technology, and possessing a multiplicity of expensively earned talents. The

old cadre of spies is hardly even the thin end of the wedge. The intelligence officer might be a manager, a computer analyst, a linguist, an econometrician, and so forth. Few are spies, as the term is popularly understood; few would probably want to be. The film *Three Days of the Condor*—starring Robert Redford as a CIA analyst whose job it is to read spy novels in order to extract plots for a giant CIA data base, and who turns into a “real” intelligence agent in order to uncover a nefarious plot—may have been a last gasp attempt to merge the new reality with the old fantasy.

The obstacle to intelligence services providing information on such future threats as outlined above rests not in the arena of their capabilities, but rather in regard to their dedicated preservation of secrecy. Intelligence services love secrecy; in the organizational mentality it is what distinguishes them from other, more mundane bureaucracies, or from the university academic, for that matter. Secrecy also helps insulate intelligence services from criticism. But relinquishing clandestinity will be the price intelligence services will have to pay for an injection of new roles and new mandates in the future. This may be an easier process than it seems. When spy satellites are busy training their cameras and sensors on illicit fishing or whaling boats, when UN spy planes in distinctive blue and white overfly the latest zone of conflict or environmental disaster area, the question of preserving official “national” secrecy will be moot. CIA Director Robert Gates’s belief, aired in testimony to Congress on 1 April 1992, that the US intelligence community will in future continue to be “the nation’s first line of defense” already has a nostalgic and old-fashioned ring to it. The future, it is safe to say, will not be so like the past.

If the future for intelligence services is hard to read precisely, the same holds true to even a greater extent for the future of cultural responses to espionage. Cold War formulas for the depiction of spying are clearly dead. What will take place? Two guesses might be hazarded: the first is that old formulas will be replaced by nonformulaic treatments. The metaphor of spying as an escape from the homogenization and nondrama of quotidian reality has penetrated deep into the popular consciousness

and has already become the subject for treatment in a range of cultural production, including serious fiction, that is well outside the spy thriller genre. A second guess is that the old formulas will be replaced by new formulas, with female spies, counterterrorists, ecological warriors, and nonwestern settings well to the fore. Spies are overdue to appear and capture science fiction. As the historical tradition of modern espionage lengthens and is revealed, the material for historical novels and the romance will become increasingly tempting. It may even be hoped that the more we come to know about intelligence work in the past, the more seriously we will take the role of intelligence in the present and future. The fascination that sustains the cult of espionage will, I predict, remain, but will be altered and perhaps even attenuated by a loss of innocence about what intelligence has been, is, and might become.

NOTES

1. Little more is known. The incident is touched on in Wesley K. Wark, “Security Intelligence in Canada, 1864–1945: The History of a ‘National Insecurity State,’ ” in ed. Keith Neilson and B. J. C. McKercher, *Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History* (Westport, Connecticut: 1992).
2. For a capsule survey, see Alan R. Booth, “The Development of the Espionage Film,” in *Spy Fiction, Spy Films and Real Intelligence*, ed. Wesley K. Wark, (London: 1991), pp.136-60.
3. This phenomenon is explored by David Stafford in *The Silent Game: The Real World of Imaginary Spies* (Toronto: 1988).
4. These passages draw on an earlier piece: Wesley K. Wark, “Introduction: Fictions of History,” in *Spy Fiction, Spy Films and Real Intelligence* (London: 1991), pp.1-16.
5. I am indebted here to the very skillful and wide-ranging arguments of John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” *International Security*, 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93).

6. A valuable study of intelligence failure is Richard K. Betts's, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," *World Politics* XXXI (October 1978), pp. 61-90.
7. The "chaos" concepts in these two areas are examined in James Gleich, *Chaos: Making a New Science* (New York: 1987); and James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Continuity and Change*, (Princeton: 1989).
8. For another account of the future role of intelligence, see Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, *Strategic Intelligence for American National Security* (Princeton: 1989), ch. 7.

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