Douglas MacEachin
served as CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence from 1993 to 1995 during his
thirty-two year career at CIA. Mr. MacEachin was an officer-in-residence at
Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, from 1995 to 1997,
subsequently becoming a senior at the Kennedy School.
Contents
On Christmas Eve 1979,
US intelligence began receiving reports that a massive Soviet military airlift
was under way in and around Afghanistan. Initially the bulk of the flights were
detected coming from the western USSR to air bases in the regions bordering
on Afghanistan, with a smaller proportion also going into the main cities in
Afghanistan. By the next morning, however, the number of flights into Afghanistan
had begun to surge, reaching some 250 to 300 within the next 72 hours. These
flights deployed what was believed to be five or six Soviet airborne battalions.
By the morning of
28 December, these Soviet military forces, along with additional troops who
had already been infiltrated into Afghanistan in the preceding weeks, had taken
control of the capital city of Kabul and other major cities and transportation
nodes. They eliminated the existing government, killed its leader and installed
a proxy regime that Moscow then used as a cover for sending in "requested
assistance" in the form of two ground force combat divisions with 25,000
troops. These troops were already entering Afghanistan when the "request"
was made.
US policy officials,
including President Jimmy Carter, almost unanimously expressed surprise over
the Soviet move--especially its size and scope. Explicit finger pointing
was kept to a relatively low profile, but many of them made it clear that they
considered the surprise to have been a consequence of an intelligence warning
failure. Some intelligence officials contested this, pointing out that the preparation
of the Soviet forces employed in the invasion had been described by the US Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in current
intelligence publications in the preceding months, and that an interagency intelligence
"Alert Memorandum" had been disseminated five days before the airlift
began. These arguments carried little sway. Earlier intelligence reports on
activities by the Soviet military units had not been accompanied by warnings
that this activity might indicate Moscow's intent to launch a major military
intervention. It was also evident that by the time the Alert Memorandum was
issued on 19 December the military intervention had already begun.
One indication that
this was seen as an intelligence failure was a National Security Council (NSC)
request--issued a few months after the Soviet invasion--for a study
of the implications of the Afghanistan experience; using that experience as
an indication of the intelligence capability to warn of Soviet military actions
elsewhere, including an attack on NATO. An even more explicit indication was
the inclusion of Afghanistan in the cases listed in a study that the Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) commissioned in 1983 "on the quality of intelligence
judgments preceding significant historical failures over the last twenty years
or so."1
This monograph seeks
to examine in detail--in an unclassified form that can be used in diverse
forums for study and assessment--what it was in the intelligence performance
that led to the "failure." The project was undertaken as a contribution
to continuing efforts to improve future performance by confronting the root
causes of past problems. It re-constructs, to the extent possible from declassified
documents, the intelligence chronology at the time--what information was
obtained from all sources, when it was obtained, how it was interpreted, and
how it was presented to US policy officials. The fundamental objective is to
illuminate how the intelligence came to be interpreted and described in a way
that made the invasion come as a surprise.
This reconstruction
of the intelligence picture as it was drawn at the time is then compared to
information now available from Soviet archives on the military preparations
actually undertaken--such as what units were chosen for the operations and
when they were told to begin their preparations. This segment of the study also
compares the US Intelligence Community's interpretations of potential Soviet
actions with at least the partial information now available on the deliberations
and debates that took place in Moscow's decision-making process.
As background for
all this, the monograph begins by briefly describing the evolution of the political-military
landscape in which Afghanistan existed at the time of the communist takeover
in Afghanistan in April 1978.
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In July 1973, Afghanistan's
former Prime Minister, Sadar Mohammed Daoud, seized control of the government
with the backing of Soviet-trained Afghan military officers and a Moscow-nurtured
Afghan Communist political faction. This proved to be a pivotal juncture in
Afghanistan's development as a Cold War battlefield. US officials viewed the
central role played by the pro-Moscow military and political factions as ominous
for the future.3
Daoud himself was
believed to be a nationalist, but during his earlier tenure as Prime Minister
from September 1953 to March 1963 he had established close ties to Moscow
by entering into a panoply of agreements for economic and military aid. His
turn toward the Soviet Union in his earlier tenure had been motivated not
by ideology but realpolitik, in the face of regional
alignments at the time--notably US cooperation with Pakistan and Iran,
his main regional contestants. Nonetheless, his policies resulted in significant
dependence on the USSR, and opened a number of avenues for Moscow to influence
Afghan military officers and segments of the Afghan educated class.
The military faction
that supported Daoud's seizure of power had been fostered by a mid-1955 agreement
with Moscow providing long-term, low-interest credit for Afghanistan to purchase
Soviet weapons and equipment. The agreement also involved deploying large
contingents of Soviet military advisors to Afghanistan and training Afghan
military officers in the Soviet Union. Escalating tensions with Pakistan,
at least partly Daoud's doing, forced his ouster as Prime Minister in 1963.
By 1973, a quarter to a third of the officers on active duty in the Afghan
Army had been trained in the USSR.4
The other group
that backed Daoud's takeover was one of two Afghan communist political factions
supported by Moscow. Each operated under the title People's Democratic Party
of Afghanistan (PDPA). Each espoused orthodox Marxist ideology, an allegiance
to Moscow, and a vague vision of a "social democratic" Afghanistan.
Their differences were mainly a matter of personalities, personal alliances,
the rival power aspirations of their leaders, and their strategies and tactics
in seeking political power.
The faction that
supported Daoud's coup was led by Babrak Karmal, whose approach was to appear
to cooperate with whatever contingent held national power, in hopes of eventually
appropriating power for himself. Noor Mohammed Taraki, a journalist, and his
strong second in command, Hafizullah Amin, headed the other faction. Their
approach tended more toward open opposition to the ruling establishment. The
Soviets saw Karmal's faction as adhering closer to their line and considered
the Taraki-Amin group radical to the point of being counterproductive. The
division between the two factions would play a major role in Soviet policies
toward Afghanistan and ultimately in Moscow's military intervention in December
1979.5
Each of these factions
had evolved separately as underground dissident cells during Daoud's previous
tenure as Prime Minister. They came together to form what would turn out to
be a relatively short-lived, unified Communist party in January 1965, after
the reigning Afghan monarch, Zahir Shah, had removed Daoud as Prime Minister
and issued a new constitution. This draft constitution established a parliamentary
system of government (albeit with some ambiguities in the allocation of authority
between the monarch and the parliament) and permitted the formation of political
parties. Elections for the newly created parliament were scheduled for September
1965.
Moscow had long
been urging its two client factions to put aside their differences and form
a unified party. The advantages for competing in the parliamentary elections
provided added incentive and, in January 1965, they joined to establish the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). As soon as the parliamentary
elections were over, however, the fissures quickly reopened. Largely because
of demographics, the only PDPA members to capture seats (four) in the new
parliament were of Karmal's faction. These results reinforced each faction's
commitment to take a separate path to political power. From inside the establishment,
Karmal began attacking "leftist adventurism," clearly aimed at the
opposition stance of Taraki. From outside, Taraki's supporters began referring
to Karmal's group within the government as "royal Communists."6
By spring 1967,
the two factions had split into what were, in effect, two parties. Each continued
to identify itself as the PDPA, and to operate under the same manifesto and
constitution. But each had its own Central Committee, and Karmal's "party"
operated as part of the government while Taraki's posed as the opposition.
Each faction became known under the name of its separate newspaper--Karmal's
as "Parcham" (Red Banner) and Taraki's as "Khalq" (Masses).7
Largely because
of incompetence and hubris, Karmal's strategy of appropriating power by conniving
from inside the constitutional monarchy did not produce the results he sought.
By the early 1970s, he was looking for another horse to ride to power. He
was not, however, ready to return to an alliance with the Khalq. Instead,
his Parcham faction began holding secret meetings with members of a growing
cadre of Soviet-trained military officers. Some of these military officers
had also begun to congregate around Daoud because they saw him as a strong
nationalist leader. It was this collaboration that boosted Daoud into power
in July 1973.
After Daoud's coup,
the Parcham faction formed what amounted to a coalition government with him.
Karmal and a few of his closest allies were brought into Daoud's inner circle,
in what a former member of his government described as "an accommodation
for the time being." A large number of ministerial positions--notably
in the Ministries of the Interior, Education, and Information and Culture--were
given to members of the Parcham faction. Meanwhile, the Khalq faction refused
to back Daoud, treating his takeover as a palace coup within a regime to which
Khalq was already in opposition, and regarding Parcham participation in the
Daoud government as a sellout.8
Parcham leaders
later would claim they had persuaded Daoud to take over the government, but
it was clear he was seeking to exploit them as much as they were using him.
For Daoud, the Communists and Soviet-trained military officers offered immediate
and expedient forces for taking power. Karmal saw his support for Daoud's
takeover as a way to reinsert himself into the political power chain, hoping
eventually to be the successor. A knowledgeable observer said Karmal sought
to make Daoud "the shoulder he could use to fire the gun which would
inaugurate the [next phase] of the revolution."9
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Moscow, not surprisingly,
hailed Daoud's takeover. His record in facilitating extensive Soviet influence,
and the fact that Soviet-supported political and military factions had backed
his move, were viewed in Moscow as promising signs for the future. A message
from the Soviet leadership a week after the takeover expressed confidence
that the "friendship and ... cooperation" between their governments
would "further successfully develop."
Offers of increased assistance followed, and during a visit to Moscow in June
1974, Daoud concluded an agreement for an additional $600 million in economic
assistance.The Soviets were investing in the expected future accession to
power of Karmal and his Parcham faction, which they considered more pliable
than the headstrong, confrontational Khalq.11
The implications
of Daoud's coup for expanding Soviet power in the region generated shared
concerns in Washington, Tehran and Islamabad. The leaders in Iran and Pakistan
made this clear to US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger when he visited their
capitals in November 1973. Their worst nightmare was of Soviet power creeping
closer to the Indian Ocean. Iran took the lead in a joint effort to use generous
economic and technical assistance to wean Daoud away from dependence on Moscow
and to persuade him to shed the Soviet-backed factions in his government.
In 1974, Iran gave $40 million in easy credit to the Daoud regime as an initial
step in what subsequently would develop into an economic aid package larger
than those offered by any other group including Moscow. Secretary Kissinger
visited Kabul in November 1974, and shortly thereafter dispatched a delegation
from the US Agency for International Development to Afghanistan with an offer
of economic and technical assistance.12
A significant impediment
to US political and economic initiatives, however, was the continuing conflict
between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the status of the ethnic Pashtuns
in Pakistan's border
regions.13 This ongoing antagonism
in the face of the US-Pakistan anticommunist alliance had impeded US aid to
Afghanistan during Daoud's earlier tenure as head of the government and contributed
to his turn to Moscow.14 Iran, in
the wake of a booming oil market, offered a potential new source of assistance.
But once again, Afghan antagonism toward Pakistan impeded an offer of aid.
Because of Tehran's status in US regional security arrangements, the Shah
found himself with little room for maneuver. He also had his own problems
with ethnic minority spillovers in Iran.
These issues were
escalating at the time of Daoud's coup. By early 1974, an armed revolt was
underway in Baluchistan, the southwestern region of Pakistan bordering on
Afghanistan and Iran. In northwest Pakistan, populated mainly by ethnic Afghan-Pashtuns,
insurrectionist sabotage was a common occurrence. The extent of the Daoud
regime's involvement in these insurrections has been a matter of some debate,
but he clearly was allowing Baluch resistance fighters to set up bases in
Afghanistan, and was providing sanctuary to Pashtun dissidents who were under
warrant of arrest in Pakistan.15
To retaliate against
Afghanistan's actions, Pakistan provided funds, material and weapons to Islamic
fundamentalist organizations and other anti-Daoud Afghan extremists conducting
raids and sabotage inside Afghanistan. A former member of Pakistan's government
at the time has insisted that these operations were not intended to overthrow
Daoud but to force him to negotiate.16
This could explain why Iran, at the same time it was offering economic aid
to Daoud and pressing him to resolve the conflict with Pakistan, was also
supplying US weapons and equipment to the insurgent groups in Afghanistan.
Some of this material went through Pakistani channels and some passed directly
to groups operating in western Afghanistan. Iran, because of its own sizable
Baluch community, had its own motives for seeing the armed revolt in Baluchistan
quelled, and provided Pakistan with US helicopters for use in this effort.
According to at least one source, these actions by Iran were carried out in
"loose collaboration" with the US. Egypt and Saudi Arabia also were
providing support to Afghan Islamic fundamentalist groups,17
some of which would have a lasting presence on the Afghan battleground.
A former deputy
foreign minister of Afghanistan has said that a message came through clearly
in diplomatic channels: demonstrable efforts to resolve the conflict with
Pakistan were necessary if Daoud hoped to sustain significant economic aid
from the US and its allies. Iran's Prime Minister, visiting Kabul in August
1974, proposed the opening of a dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani representatives,
as did Turkish officials. Kissinger pressed the issue in his visit in November.18
Daoud had his own
reasons for widening his international sources of support and suppressing
the power of Soviet-backed elements inside Afghanistan. One observer on the
scene has said that Daoud probably understood the motives and objectives of
the Parcham faction better than it understood his.19
So it is hard to assess how much the external pressures and enticements accounted
for his turning away from Moscow and the Soviet-backed factions inside Afghanistan,
but turn he did.
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As early as mid-1974,
when Daoud made his first official visit to Moscow after his coup, he had
already removed two communists from his cabinet and had begun to purge his
interior ministry, which controlled internal security forces. By the beginning
of 1975, he had reached agreement with Pakistani leader Zulfiqar Ali-Bhutto
to begin talks on resolving their conflicts.20
The opening of these talks was derailed for more than a year, however, by
the killing of a Bhutto friend and colleague by a terrorist bomb in Pakistan's
Pashtun tribal agency, which led Bhutto to retaliate against indigenous Pashtun
political officials. Nonetheless, Daoud's demonstrated willingness to work
on the problem appears to have registered. In April 1975, he visited Iran
and came away with a credit extension of $2 billion, of which $1.7 billion
was to be devoted to a rail system linking the Afghan cities of Herat, Kandahar,
and Kabul to Iranian lines extending to the Persian Gulf. (The subsequent
collapse of the oil market and the fall of the Shah would prevent much of
this from being realized.)21
Shortly after his
return from Iran, Daoud announced that Afghanistan would not tolerate "imported
ideology," clearly a swipe at the Moscow-backed communist factions in
his own government. A few months later, he removed three more communists from
ministerial positions, including the Minister of the Interior. By the end
of December 1975, there were no remaining Parcham communists in Daoud's cabinet
and he had drastically reduced the numbers in other government positions.
He then announced that he was putting forward a new constitution that would
establish a one-party state. He called for the dissolution of Parcham and
Khalq and said the communists should join his new party of National Revolution.22
Daoud proceeded
more cautiously in reducing the communist factions in the army. According
to one of his supporters, he was concerned over the potential implications
of a military backlash. Nonetheless, in October 1975, he dismissed 40 Soviet-trained
military officers and sent others to remote garrisons. He also began arranging
training for Afghan military officers in India and Egypt (whose armed forces
were also equipped with Soviet weapons), thereby enabling him to reduce the
number of officers subject to the political influence of training in the USSR.
Some military officers were sent to the US for schooling. Daoud also tried
to reduce the number of Soviet military advisors in Afghanistan.23
The following year
brought a budding rapprochement with Pakistan and a further expansion of relations
with Iran. After several months of rhetoric, Daoud and Bhutto held face-to-face
talks in Kabul from 7-10 June 1976 on resolving the Pashtun dispute. They
met again six weeks later in Pakistan. No final agreement was reached, but
the two sides agreed to keep negotiating. Raids by fundamentalist groups ceased,
goods moved relatively smoothly between the countries and, in March 1977,
air service between the two--suspended since early 1974--was restored.
A long-disputed treaty with Iran for construction of a mutually beneficial
dam on the river bordering the two countries was formally ratified by both
states and entered into force. 24
And Daoud's new, one-party constitution was enacted, outlawing the PDPA--;and
this applied to both of its factions.25
The Soviets decided
it was time to invite Daoud to Moscow for discussions, and a visit was set
for 12-15 April 1977. On the second day of the meetings, Soviet party leader
Leonid Brezhnev launched into a tirade about the large number of "experts"
from "NATO countries" involved in various projects in Afghanistan.
He asserted that they were "spies" and demanded they be sent out
of the country. Daoud stiffly retorted that Brezhnev's remarks were "unacceptable
...interference" in Afghanistan's internal affairs. The two reportedly
patched things up superficially on the spot, but Daoud canceled the remaining
private discussions he was scheduled to have with the Soviet leader and returned
to Kabul a day later. From the perspective of both Moscow and Kabul, this
was a demonstrable end of the affair.26
After the Moscow
face-off, Daoud stepped up his "outreach" program. He increased
the proportion of military officers sent for training in Egypt and India,
and began sending air force officers to train in Turkey. He also aggressively
associated himself with "moderate" non-aligned states such as Yugoslavia.
By early 1978, he had concluded economic aid agreements generating about $500
million each from Saudi Arabia and the United States. A visit to Kabul by
the Shah of Iran was set for June, and Daoud was scheduled to meet with President
Jimmy Carter in Washington in September.
Meanwhile, despite
Bhutto's overthrow in Pakistan by a military regime in 1977, talks between
Kabul and Islamabad were continuing, and there appeared to be a strong possibility
of settling their longstanding dispute. Although Moscow might plausibly have
encouraged such talks with the leftist Bhutto government as a wedge against
the US, a settlement with a rightist regime in Pakistan, one strongly supported
by Washington, held the prospect of a significant shift in regional alignments.
For Soviet leaders, enough clearly was enough.27
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By the time of the
Daoud-Brezhnev face-off, the Soviets already had begun aggressively pressing
the Parcham and Khalq factions to reunite into a single Communist party. Moscow
had enlisted the help of intermediaries from other Communist parties in the
region--the Iraqi and Indian parties, for example--as well as a leader
of the ethnic dissident group in Pakistan who was living in exile in Afghanistan.
These efforts were stymied for more than a year as each of the Afghan communist
factions maneuvered for dominance. But the combination of Daoud's moves and
Soviet pressure finally convinced the two factions to agree--at the beginning
of July 1977--to form a unified PDPA.
The fundamental
split between the factions did not end, however; it was merely papered over
for the time being. As in their earlier unified party, Taraki was given the
top position of party General Secretary, with Karmal in second place under
the title of First Secretary. Positions on the new party Central Committee
were divided equally between Parcham and Khalq.
The equal division
of positions did not extend to the military, where Khalq had established widespread
influence. The disaffection of military officers who had survived Daoud's
purging, and their perception that Parcham was linked to him, drew them to
the Khalq faction, which had launched a significant covert recruitment effort
in the military after Daoud had banned open recruiting. Leading this recruiting
was Amin, who now held--over virulent Parcham objection--the party
position in charge of the military. This made him the point man for planning
the overthrow of Daoud.28
Nine months after
patching together their reunified party, the communists seized control of
the government. The precipitating event was the assassination on 17 April
1978 of a top Parcham official, Mir Akbar Khyber. The PDPA accused the Daoud
regime of being behind it, and organized large-scale demonstrations in protest.
In response, police arrested Taraki, Karmal and five other top PDPA officials
in the night and early morning hours of 25-26 April, but they did not initially
arrest Amin. The police reportedly searched his residence and put him under
surveillance in a form of house arrest, but did not actually take him into
custody until sometime later on 26 April. In the meantime, he reportedly was
able to pass the coup plans and implementing orders to key party supporters
in the military.
By noon the next
day, 27 April, Afghan Army units had surrounded the presidential palace, the
ministry of defense and other key government buildings. Late in the afternoon,
helicopter gunships and jet fighters attacked government sites, pounding the
palace where Daoud had withdrawn. Imprisoned PDPA leaders were found and freed.
At 7 p.m., the two military officers leading the attacks announced on Radio
Afghanistan that the Daoud regime had been ousted and power taken by a "Revolutionary
Council of the Armed Forces," subsequently called the Revolutionary Military
Council. Sometime that night, Daoud was killed by troops assaulting the presidential
palace.29
A few days later,
decrees announced that the Revolutionary Military Council had been replaced
by a "Revolutionary Council" of a newly titled "Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan." Taraki was named Chairman of the Council (de
facto President of Afghanistan) and Prime Minister. Karmal was made Deputy
Chairman and Deputy Prime Minister, with Amin ranking third as Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The military officer who led the
army troops in the coup, Aslam Watanjar, nominally a Khalq sympathizer, was
also given the rank of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Communications.
The Ministry of Defense went to the officer who commanded the air force operations,
Abdul Qadir, an open Parcham supporter.30
From Washington's
perspective, the Soviets' obvious motivation to reverse the direction in which
Daoud had been taking Afghanistan, and to re-establish a more compliant client
regime led naturally to suspicions that Moscow had engineered the government
takeover. The fact that the USSR was the first state to formally recognize
the new government reinforced this view. US embassy officers also had reported
seeing Soviet advisors mingling with some of the Afghan military units carrying
out the operations.
US intelligence
assessments, however, said there was no evidence the Soviets had been involved
in launching the coup, although Moscow had moved quickly to exploit the situation
once it began. The assessments said that the more fervent Soviet ideologues
and military officials probably saw the developments as offering an opportunity
to create another allied Communist regime on the borders of the USSR.31
Evidence now available
from numerous and diverse sources indicates the Soviets had indeed been advised
of PDPA coup planning. The coup that took place, however, was not the one
they were expecting. Former PDPA and Soviet officials have all said that the
plans being coordinated with Moscow envisaged the coup taking place later,
around August. Often-contradictory accounts of the events that produced the
move in April--beginning with the assassination of Khyber--have attributed
them to diverse conspiracies and subplots. Some observers have described the
move as resulting from an ill-advised provocation by Daoud, who had been informed
of plotting among PDPA factions and sought to justify a preemptive strike.
This scenario has Amin simply exploiting an opportunity. Many other sources
have described the move as a scheme by Amin to eliminate his rivals--especially
those with influence in the military--and set the stage for taking power
for himself when the coup ultimately was launched. Some claim Amin planned
it--with the help of clandestine supporters in the intelligence service
and army--to preempt the plan being coordinated with Parcham and to position
himself to dictate the resulting power hierarchy. And at least one knowledgeable
scholar has argued that Amin was simply the beneficiary of actions taken by
the military, on its own initiative, in response to the sweeping arrests Daoud
ordered. 32
Whatever the case,
the Soviets clearly sought to make the best of the hand that had been dealt
them. Moscow quickly dispatched political advisors from the CPSU International
Department (the organization for coordinating relations with foreign Communist
parties) to mediate the struggle for power between the two PDPA factions and
coerce them into forming a viable regime. According to US intelligence reports,
the number of Soviet military advisors in Afghanistan was increased from 350
at the time of the coup to 500 by the end of May, many of them in the Ministry
of Defense in Kabul. US intelligence sources also disclosed that a delegation
from the Soviet General Staff Operations Directorate signed a new military
assistance protocol with the Taraki regime on 31 May.33
Soon the split between
the PDPA factions erupted again. In a power play reportedly assisted by the
defection of at least one or two Parchamites, Amin engineered a party vote
giving his Khalq faction the decisive role in setting state policy. By mid-July,
Karmal and six of the other top Parcham leaders had been "exiled"
to ambassadorial posts. Amin formally took over Karmal's position as the Deputy
Chairman of the ruling Revolutionary Council. Parcham supporter Abdul Qadir
remained as Defense Minister for the time being, but Amin saw to it that he
was isolated and under close watch. The fact that the Parcham leaders were
exiled rather than imprisoned--or worse--and that Qadir and other,
lower level Parcham members were allowed to retain their positions reportedly
was the result of Soviet intervention. 34
Amin would live to regret this benevolence.
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US intelligence
analysts interpreted the purge as having had Moscow's acquiescence. They pointed
out that shortly after Karmal's departure to ambassadorial exile in Prague
in July, the Soviets had signed another major agreement providing the Taraki
regime with $250 million of additional military assistance. The number of
Soviet military advisors was estimated to have increased to 700, double the
total prior to the coup. Many additional civilian advisors were also dispatched
to Kabul to help the regime consolidate its hold on power. Intelligence assessments
also concluded, however, that while the increased presence of the Soviets
had enhanced their ability to intervene militarily if it became necessary
to prop up their client regime, they would seek to avoid a situation requiring
them to send combat units to Afghanistan.35
Views among US policy
officials were divided. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, citing the absence
of information indicating Soviet complicity in the communist coup, held out
hope that even though the Afghan Government had now been seized by what he
described as "radical leftists in the army," Soviet influence could
be contained. He believed the best way to "maintain a measure of influence"
was to sustain the limited US economic assistance that had been underway before
the coup. He also reportedly supported arguments by the State Department's
Bureau of Middle East and South Asian Affairs that the US should avoid actions
that could push the new Afghan regime even closer to the USSR. President Carter's
National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, saw the coup as part of a
Soviet plan to acquire hegemony in the region. He is said to have favored
cutting off US relations with Afghanistan and mounting covert operations to
counter Soviet aspirations in the region. One former US Government official
has said that Brzezinski was not concerned that such a policy course might
provoke the Soviets because he believed they already were intent on taking
control of Afghanistan.36
The State Department's
approach for the most part prevailed. Washington officially recognized the
new Afghan Government, maintained normal diplomatic relations, and continued
modest economic aid at the pre-coup level. In July--about the same time
the Parcham leaders were departing for their exile posts and Moscow was bolstering
its advisory contingents--the United States named a new ambassador to
Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs. Dubs vigorously supported a "holding action,"
which was designed to avoid driving the Afghan regime closer to Moscow and,
hopefully, to encourage the regime eventually to lean in the opposite direction.
Also in July, Undersecretary of State David Newsom made an official visit
to Kabul to review the US economic aid program. He returned pessimistic about
the situation there, but nonetheless met with the Shah of Iran on the same
trip to reinforce US requests that Iran also try to work with the new Afghan
regime.37
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A month after Newsom
returned from Kabul, Afghan Defense Minister Qadir and two other senior military
officers associated with the Parcham faction were arrested on charges of plotting
to overthrow the new government. Their confessions were publicized a month
later. As is the case with most other events in Afghanistan during this time,
there are diverse accounts of what actually transpired, including the means
by which the confessions were obtained. The most commonly accepted version
is that Karmal, shortly before he left for Prague in July, conspired to have
Qadir and a group of Parcham supporters in the army seize control of the government.
The move was to be carried out on the Muslim holiday Eid, at the end of Ramadan,
which that year would have been 4 September. (This timing has led some scholars
to suggest that what Karmal and Qadir intended was to carry out the original
plan the PDPA had been coordinating with Moscow prior to Amin's April preemption.)
Qadir's plan was leaked to Amin--according to most accounts, by the Afghan
ambassador to India, who was secretly an Amin supporter. Amin then ordered
the arrests of the three senior Parcham military supporters.38
Amin used the plot
as grounds for purging the remaining Parcham members from the government,
imprisoning many and executing some. He also summoned the seven exiled Parcham
ambassadors back to Kabul, but they all--understandably--went into
hiding, taking with them substantial funds from their various embassies. US
intelligence reported that safe havens for the Parcham exiles had been arranged
by Moscow. Intelligence analysts also concluded that the purges had substantially
narrowed the regime's political base and diminished the reliability of the
army.39
With the elimination
of Qadir as Defense Minister, Amin sought to take the post himself, in effect
to take overt, official control over what already was his principal--albeit
eroding--power base. He was opposed by Watanjar, who believed that--as
an army officer and the primary field commander of the coup that brought the
PDPA to power--he was entitled to head the military. While nominally a
Khalq supporter, Watanjar's strongest loyalties were to himself and to the
military cells formed under the tutelage of Soviet military intelligence.
In a superficial compromise, Taraki took the Defense Minister title for himself,
but Amin, as the principal Deputy Prime Minister--with widespread, as
well as some covert support elements in the military--exercised primary
control. Watanjar was demoted from his Deputy Prime Minister status, and became
one of those whose enmity to Amin would play a key role in future events.40
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By this time, PDPA
efforts to impose a socialist revolution throughout the countryside were meeting
a violent backlash. Some scholars have pointed out that the regime's declared
objectives of reducing the inequities and repressive measures of Afghanistan's
tribal feudalism were justified. The regime's program of revolution called
for redistributing monopolized land holdings, relieving peasant indenture
status, reforming women's marriage rights, and outlawing old customs that
propped up the tribal leaders and Mullahs. But the measures were imposed dictatorially,
and the inevitable resistance of feudal landholders and tribal chiefs, moneylenders,
and mullahs was met with a repressive pattern of arrests and summary trials.
Many mullahs were among those arrested and many others were ejected from their
positions. Provincial administration in much of the countryside was placed
under the central control of the Communist Party.41
Armed opposition
erupted. In November 1978, US intelligence reported that fighting in the provinces
was escalating, and that insurgents appeared to have taken control of large
areas of north and east Afghanistan. The insurgents reportedly were receiving
arms and assistance from ethnic Pashtun guerrilla organizations operating
from Pakistan. Intelligence reports that the loyalty of the army was eroding
were borne out when the commander of the Afghan Army corps in Qandahar, in
southeast Afghanistan, was arrested for supporting the insurgents. Soviet
military advisors reportedly had been assigned to Afghan units directly engaged
in combating the insurgents. US intelligence analysts learned that one Soviet
military advisor concluded that a large Soviet military advisory presence
would be needed for several years.42
Early in December,
Taraki and Amin flew to Moscow on what US analysts interpreted as a mission
to gain increased assistance for combating the insurrection. On 5 December,
the two governments signed a 20-year treaty on "cooperation and friendship."
US intelligence assessments pointed out that it included no explicit mutual
defense commitment and contained a clause referring to Afghanistan's non-alignment.
But the treaty also included an article under which the two governments would
continue military cooperation and "consult with each other and take appropriate
measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity"
of the two states. As intelligence reporting pointed out, the Afghan government
could invoke this provision to request military assistance from the USSR.43
The 5 December treaty
marked the beginning of a turn in US policy. Former Secretary of State Vance
has since said that Washington saw the treaty "as a Soviet reaction to
the fact that Kabul's authority outside major cities had collapsed."
Former National Security Advisor Brzezinski is reported to have said in an
interview after leaving office that while the United States continued strict
adherence to President Carter's injunction against direct US assistance and
the use of US weapons to support the Afghan insurgency, the CIA did consult
with the Pakistan Government on its support to the opposition forces. At the
same time, however, apparently reflecting both US hopes of offering Amin alternatives
and Amin's efforts to assuage US concerns, Washington agreed to resume a small
program for training Afghan military officers in the US that had been cut
off after the April coup.44
In mid-January 1979,
a guerrilla force composed of Afghan refugees from Pakistan carried out a
raid on a provincial capital--Asadabad--near the northeastern border
of Afghanistan, and seized an army garrison there. The guerrillas were eventually
driven out, but were able to hold the garrison briefly because the Afghan
commander had already secretly defected to the insurrection. That same month,
US intelligence reported that a high-level Soviet military delegation had
arrived in Kabul to discuss further Soviet military aid. By this time, according
to US intelligence information, the number of military advisors had been raised
to as many as 1,000, with another 2,000 Soviet political and economic advisors
also in the country.45
On 14 February,
US Ambassador Dubs was abducted off the streets of Kabul by an extremist Afghan
anti-government cell. The kidnapers offered to swap him for the release of
a group of their leaders imprisoned by the Afghan regime. The regime refused
to deal with the abductors, despite demands from the US Embassy. Dubs was
killed a few hours later when Afghan police stormed the hotel room where the
terrorists were holding him. According to intelligence reports, Soviet advisors
were seen accompanying the Afghan forces that carried out the raid. To some
senior Washington officials, the Afghan leaders' refusal to accept responsibility
or apologize for the action reflected their anti-US, pro-Soviet bent. A week
later, the Carter Administration cut its already modest economic assistance
and canceled its plan to train a small number of Afghan military officers.46
The fact that the killing of the ambassador occurred one month after the Shah
of Iran was ousted in a seizure of power by an Islamic fundamentalist regime
may have influenced the US reaction.
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In mid-March, an
uprising in Herat--the main city in northwest Afghanistan--clearly
indicated the rebellion had reached a new level. The fighting in Herat lasted
well over a week, during much of the time cutting the city's links with the
rest of the country. Parts of the Afghan Army forces garrisoned in Herat defected
to the insurgency, and a significant portion of the other troops refused to
engage in the fighting. The uprising was finally suppressed after other Afghan
forces were brought in from Kabul. Intelligence reports suggested that Soviet
advisors had been singled out for attacks, with up to 20 having been killed
along with hundreds of Afghans.47
The Herat uprising
also set off a new round in the Afghan regime's internal power struggle. To
assuage charges of weak performance in the military leadership, Taraki finally
granted Watanjar his long-sought-after position as Minister of Defense.48
To placate Amin, Taraki conferred on him his own position of Prime Minister,
retaining for himself the mantle of President of the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan. Watanjar's move to take over the Defense Ministry was a demonstrable
exploitation of Amin's vulnerability in the aftermath of the failings of the
army. It intensified the personal animosity that would continue to be a critical
variable in the events playing out in Afghanistan.
For US intelligence
analysts, the Herat conflict brought Afghanistan to the front burner of intelligence
issues. By all reckoning, the Soviet client regime in Kabul was steadily losing
ground to the insurgency. There were signs of a growing perception among the
Afghan populace that Marxism--especially as represented by the Taraki-Amin
regime--was anti-Islam, and this was believed likely to continue to erode
the morale of the Afghan army. The intelligence question was whether Moscow
could accept the overthrow of the communist regime by a Muslim rebellion being
supported by the US ally Pakistan. How far was Moscow prepared to go to try
to prevent it? Would the USSR commit its own combat forces to do so?
Shortly after the
uprising in Herat, intelligence revealed unusual activity in two Soviet motorized
rifle divisions (MRDs)49 garrisoned
within about 10 kilometers of the Afghan border in what was known as the Turkestan
Military District of the USSR. One was the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division
at Kushka, near the main road in Afghanistan leading to Herat. Components
of this division were leaving their garrisons and moving toward the border
in convoys of tanks, trucks and personnel carriers, with various support elements.
The other active division, the 108th MRD located at Termez near
the main highway toward Kabul, was assembling convoys. Intelligence assessments
interpreted these activities as training exercises.50
Both of these were
divisions of a category normally maintained at very low manpower levels, from
about 10 percent to, at the very most, 30 percent of their prescribed combat
strength of 12,500 troops per division. The training observed was highly unusual
for these particular units, which in the past had been essentially dormant;
some analysts argued that it was virtually unprecedented. Both divisions clearly
had received an infusion of personnel from at least a short-term reservist
call-up, although it did not appear that they had been brought to full combat
strength. Thus some analysts argued (in internal debates) that while the observed
activity may have been only contingency preparations, it did seem to indicate
that the contingency was being taken very seriously.51
Other, smaller Soviet
units were also seen deployed near the Afghan border. High levels of activity
and vehicle movement were also detected at the garrisons of two Soviet airborne
regiments in this same Soviet military district bordering Afghanistan. All
together, at full strength, these forces being readied would have made up
an intervention force of some 30,000 combat troops.
Although these activities
bore the print of contingency preparations for a move into Afghanistan, CIA's
intelligence assessments concluded that:
The Soviets would be most
reluctant to introduce large numbers of ground forces into Afghanistan to
keep in power an Afghan government that had lost the support of virtually
all segments of the population. Not only would the Soviets find themselves
in an awkward morass in Afghanistan, but their actions could seriously damage
their relations with India, and--to a lesser degree--with Pakistan.
As a more likely option, the Soviets probably could seek to reestablish ties
with those members of the Afghan opposition [Parcham] with whom Moscow had
dealt profitably in the past.52
Less than a month
later, a delegation of Soviet "political generals" arrived in Kabul.
Intelligence analysts presumed that its purpose was to assess the political-military
situation and the capabilities and especially the loyalty of army components
around the country in the wake of the Herat uprising. Intelligence reporting
pointed out that the head of this delegation--General Yepishev, chief
of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Ministry of Defense--had
rarely traveled outside the Soviet-East European military alliance. When he
had done so in the past, it had been to bolster troubled communist regimes
with political and administrative advice and offers of military assistance.
US intelligence agencies learned that, upon his arrival in Kabul, General
Yepishev warned the Afghan leaders that Moscow's aid for combating the insurgency
was not open-ended, and that it was up to the Afghans to improve their own
effectiveness. Upon returning to Moscow a week later, Yepishev was said to
have reported to his superiors that the "poor ideological outlook"
(read "weak commitment to the Communist cause") among Afghan Army
officers was a major problem. The Soviets subsequently stepped up their political
indoctrination efforts both within the Afghan Army and in the population at
large.53
In May and June,
the level of insurgency continued to grow in eastern and northeastern Afghanistan,
and incidents began to occur in the vicinity of Kabul. The performance of
the Afghan Army continued to decline, and the effectiveness of the guerrilla
units continued to grow. By June 1979, according to estimates by the US Embassy,
the regime controlled--at most--only half the country.54
The Soviets responded
to the deteriorating situation by shipping more weapons to the Afghan Army
and Air Force, providing not only additional tanks, artillery and small arms,
but also fighter aircraft, helicopter gunships and transports. Soviet military
transport aircraft delivering aid operated regularly in and out of Bagram
air base just north of Kabul. At least 2,500 Soviet military advisors reportedly
were in Afghanistan by the end of June along with some 2,000 civilian advisers.
There were reports that additional military advisors were being assigned to
Afghan units engaging in combat, and that some Soviet military personnel were
piloting helicopters in ground strikes and operating tanks in combat.55
Continued erosion
of the Afghan regime's control, coupled with the increasing Soviet involvement,
led intelligence analysts again to review the factors that might lead to outright
Soviet military intervention. One possibility raised was that the Soviets
might resort to such a course if they became convinced that the ouster of
the Afghan regime by the insurgents could lead to an arc of militant Islamic
anticommunist states on the USSR's southern border that would threaten stability
in the Soviet Central Asian republics. Some analysts also pointed out that
the loss of Afghanistan, after a major Soviet commitment, would be seen as
a blow to the prestige and image so highly valued by the Soviet leadership.
On balance, however,
intelligence assessments at the time continued to portray the insertion of
Soviet combat forces as unlikely, although it was not ruled out. The main
factors seen as weighing against it were both military and political. Mountainous
terrain and limited--and vulnerable--ground transportation routes
in Afghanistan would compound the military difficulties inherent in confronting
guerrilla forces, according to intelligence assessments. Moscow also was seen
as loath to absorb the high political costs of quashing the prospects for
ratification of the SALT-II arms limitation treaty. Moreover, invading Afghanistan
would be certain to provoke a backlash in other Muslim countries. In line
with this judgment, a senior Soviet political counselor in Kabul, Vasily Safronchuk,
told the US chargé on 24 June that the USSR had no intention of sending
combat troops to Afghanistan. He pointed to the harm such a move would do
to the SALT-II Treaty, and to the USSR's political position worldwide.56
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As the situation
in Afghanistan worsened during the summer of 1979, US intelligence received
numerous indications that the Soviets were seeking alternatives to the Taraki-Amin
regime. Soviet officials made no effort to hide their displeasure with their
inability to coerce the regime into pulling back from the extreme social and
economic measures that were inflaming tribal and Islamic groups. In conversations
with US Embassy officials and other members of the international diplomatic
corps in Kabul, Safronchuk made it clear that Moscow was looking for a way
to replace Taraki and Amin--especially Amin. According to various accounts,
Safronchuk said the Soviets were frustrated by their inability to persuade
the Afghan regime to create a coalition that might win stronger support by
bringing representatives of diverse political constituencies into the government.
Other Soviet officials took the same line.
In mid-July, the
East German ambassador in Kabul told US diplomats that the Soviets' desire
to replace the Afghan regime was such that they were willing to use force
if necessary. Other sources said Moscow was planning a takeover by military
officers opposed to Amin. There were several reports that exiled members of
the Parcham faction in East Europe were claiming that the Soviets had promised
to return them to power. Intelligence analysts viewed the "military takeover"
option as the more likely, believing that Moscow would have no reason to expect
the base of support for a Karmal government to be any broader than that of
the Taraki-Amin faction.57
The same stories
appeared in the press. A New York Times article on
2 August said the Soviets were seeking an alternative to the Taraki-Amin regime,
and apparently were focusing on the military as a source for a government
takeover. The Times article said Amin was considered
a "zealous revolutionary" who was the real power in Afghanistan
and who continued to push his inflammatory reform policies despite Soviet
urging to proceed more cautiously. The high visibility being given to this
Soviet outlook led the US Embassy in Kabul to posit in July that Moscow was
engaged in a calculated effort to soften reaction to the growing Soviet military
presence and to mitigate reaction if a regime turnover ultimately was achieved.
Another purpose not mentioned in this Embassy report may have been to step
up pressures on Taraki and Amin to moderate their revolutionary policies.
Whatever the reason
for the high noise level, Taraki and Amin clearly got the word that the Soviets
were out to replace them. In late July, US intelligence analysts described
a shakeup in the Afghan cabinet as a move by Taraki and Amin to preempt a
feared Soviet-sponsored takeover by alienated military officers. Amin reclaimed
the post of Defense Minister, a move that intelligence analysts described
as probably designed to improve his vantage point for spotting and heading
off any coup from within the military. This interpretation also appeared in
the Western press. According to intelligence analysts, Watanjar was "reported
to have figured in the plan" for installing a new government, and was
sent back to the Interior Ministry, deepening his antagonism toward Amin.59
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Meanwhile, at the
beginning of July, the Soviets crossed a new threshold with their first known
movement of a combat unit into Afghanistan: a battalion of airborne troops
deployed at the Bagram air base near Kabul. Bagram already had essentially
become the main Soviet operational base in Afghanistan, with Soviet military
air transports shuttling in and out with supplies of weapons and military
equipment. Intelligence analysts concluded that the combat troops were sent
to Bagram to provide security for the air transport units, and that there
was no intent to commit them to combat operations elsewhere in Afghanistan.60
Insurgent attacks
grew steadily throughout July, and the Afghanistan territory under government
control continued to shrink. Mutinies were spreading throughout the Army,
and insurgent raids were capturing Army munitions. Roads were being cut and
Afghan Army units were increasingly dependent on supply by air, including
transport helicopters. The regime still owned the cities, but the insurgents
owned the countryside. The press quoted US officials who said the civil war
in Afghanistan had reduced the government's control to about 25 percent of
the country. And, as already demonstrated in Herat, even the control of major
cities depended on the regime's ability to deploy defense and rescue missions
from the central power center of Kabul. Afghan Army units, with the benefit
of Soviet-supplied weapons, could still make such movements through the countryside,
but could not hold significant tracts of territory outside the main cities.
This deterioration
was continuing despite the increased involvement of Soviet personnel in guiding
Afghan combat operations and logistics. The role of the Soviets reportedly
was expanding from advice to active participation in a wide variety of operations
with regimental and battalion sized units. New intelligence information reinforced
earlier reports that Soviet helicopter pilots with Afghan copilots (or vice
versa) were flying the strikes on insurgent positions. There were additional
reports of Soviets operating tanks in combat missions.61
Increasing Soviet
military involvement in Afghanistan and widespread resistance to the Soviet-supported
regime--combined with Moscow's rebuffs when Washington warned about jeopardizing
US-Soviet relations-- prompted an initial Presidential authorization (officially
called a "finding") for covert support to the Afghan insurgency.
The covert aid helped with propaganda activities in support of the insurgents'
cause, and provided medical assistance and other non-military supplies. The
aid was channeled through "third countries," mainly Pakistan. National
Security Advisor Brzezinski also proposed to the President that the US make
a more public expression of "sympathy" for the Afghan "independence"
forces. He also raised with the President, in a 23 July discussion, the prospect
that the Soviets might try to unseat the current government, whose tactics
were proving counterproductive to Moscow's aims. The President directed that
something be done to put a public spotlight on the issue.62
One apparent result
of this was a speech by Brzezinski on 2 August that The
New York Times reported in an article headlined "US Indirectly
Pressing Russians to Halt Afghanistan Intervention." Brzezinski's speech--describing
US "prudence" with regard to Iran and declaring that others were
expected to "abstain from intervention and from efforts to impose alien
doctrines on a deeply religious and nationally conscious people"--did
not explicitly mention the Soviet Union or Afghanistan. The article said,
however, that a "US official" had made clear "privately"
that the speech was specifically directed at the threat of Soviet intervention
in Afghanistan, where the pro-Soviet government was near collapse in the face
of widespread Islamic opposition and tribal rebellion. The article also described
"Western intelligence reports" of "several hundred ... armed
Soviet advisors around an airfield [Bagram] north of Kabul," and said
that "Mr. Brzezinski's statement was evidently intended as a warning
against deeper [Soviet] involvement."63
Three days later,
on 5 August, a mutiny erupted in an Afghan garrison at Bala Hissar, on the
outskirts of Kabul. A group of officers seized control of the garrison command
center, put together a formation of tanks and armored troop carriers, and
set off for the presidential palace in Kabul. The move was crushed within
a matter of hours by vastly superior loyalist Afghan Army forces employing
tanks and helicopter gunships.
The US Embassy described
this event as among the most serious challenges yet encountered by the Afghan
government. Although the regime showed it still had the strength to defend
its fortress cities, the mutiny bared one of the regime's fundamental weaknesses:
the deteriorating loyalty of regular army units. In the Embassy's view, this
foreshadowed growing problems for the Afghan regime and its Soviet mentors.
Western press accounts described the mutiny as the most serious clash since
the ouster of Daoud sixteen months earlier. The press also reported that,
although the regime had fairly quickly put down the revolt, the US Government
was sufficiently concerned over the situation in Kabul that it began reducing
the number of personnel at its Embassy there.64
Within the US Intelligence
Community, an internal memorandum submitted to the National Intelligence Officer
for Warning 65 offered the view that
the latest mutiny increased the prospect for direct Soviet military intervention.
It pointed out that earlier intelligence assessments had already concluded
that the Afghan regime had been driven into a fortress defense posture. The
Afghan Army constituted the wall of this fortress, and the Bala Hissar mutiny
showed that there were significant cracks in the wall. The Soviets were now
faced with the possibility that the army to which they were providing assistance
might come apart. The memo said this was forcing the Soviets to examine options
and costs for taking over the major burden of the counterinsurgency by deploying
their own forces rather than accepting the consequences of an insurgency takeover
in Kabul.
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This view was reinforced
when, on 17 August, a top-level Soviet military delegation of 13 generals
and six colonels arrived in Kabul. Unlike the group of officers sent to Kabul
in April after the Herat uprising, this delegation was not made up of "political
generals" concerned with "ideological outlook." It was headed
by the Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff and Commander of the Soviet
Ground Forces General I. G. Pavlovsky, and was composed of officers responsible
for planning and directing military operations. The fact that this delegation
was dispatched less than two weeks after the Bala Hissar uprising led intelligence
assessments to report that its mission was probably to conduct a close-up
examination of the military situation and operational conditions in the aftermath
of the rebellion. And the rank and composition of the delegation also led
intelligence analysts to suggest Moscow was contemplating a major decision
on the level and form of field-level military support it was willing to give
to the Taraki regime.66 (Some analysts
could not help attaching significance to the fact that Pavlovsky had led Soviet
Army units into Czechoslovakia in August of 1968.)
At about the time
of the Bala Hissar mutiny, US intelligence analysts had concluded that the
Soviets had essentially given up on their efforts to replace Taraki and Amin.
Having been unsuccessful in their attempts to create an Afghan coalition that
would offer anything better, the Soviets appeared to have decided to focus
on the aid and advisors needed to help the existing regime survive. If the
Soviets were to make such an investment, however, they presumably needed some
assurance that the Afghan Army could muster the cohesion and commitment to
take the offensive against the insurgency. And in view of the uncertainty
about this, some analysts presumed that part of the Pavlovsky delegation's
mission was to evaluate the operational feasibility of committing Soviet military
forces to the task of crushing the insurrection.67
Nonetheless, a week
after the delegation had arrived in Kabul, CIA reported that the majority
of its analysts "continue to feel that the deteriorating situation does
not presage an escalation of Soviet military involvement in the form of a
direct combat role."68
US Embassy assessments
from Kabul in early September expressed similar views. It reported that one
"possible" purpose of the Pavlovsky mission was to lay the groundwork
for Soviet military intervention, in the event Moscow decided that it was
necessary. An Embassy cable concluded that "at some point the hemorrhaging
of Khalq military manpower [through death, desertion and defection] will require
the USSR to make a decision whether to commit its own combat units."
The cable pointed out that "there were not enough Afghan tank crews to
man the large number of tanks being delivered by the USSR," and that
at some point the Taraki-Amin regime might feel compelled to ask for assistance
from Soviet troops.69
The Embassy also
reported that many diplomats in Kabul did not rule out the possibility that
Moscow might feel compelled to send in troops to save the revolution. These
officials believed that, in such an event, the initial involvement would be
limited--perhaps to a special airborne force to protect Soviet housing
installations--but that, once there, the troop commitment probably would
expand. Others diplomats believed the Soviets would withhold combat support
in the belief they could "do business with almost any successor regime."
The Embassy's own view was that "The time has not yet arrived for a Khalq
plea for help--nor is there yet any solid evidence that the USSR is poising
itself for armed intervention. Undoubtedly, the USSR has...been making its
contingency plans and preparations."70
A somewhat more
somber and less equivocal account appeared in The New
York Times on 6 September. Citing "diplomatic sources," it
said the Soviets' inability to find a political solution was moving them toward
direct military intervention. The article described the growing number of
Soviet military personnel already in the country, their "takeover"
of Bagram air base, the heavy traffic of military transport aircraft there,
and the reports of Soviet advisors participating in combat operations. The
Soviets were said to recognize that military intervention would have severe
implications for relations with the US, India, Iran and other Islamic countries.
Nevertheless, the article quoted one "foreign expert" as saying
that "If you accept the premise that the Russians cannot let Afghanistan
go, and if you also realize that the Afghan institutions can no longer hope
to contain the insurrections, the only possible conclusion is that the Soviets
come in forcefully."71
Meanwhile, in the
last week of August, US intelligence agencies were again seeing activity in
some of the same Soviet combat forces opposite the northern border of Afghanistan
that had been active in March. The 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division at
Kushka had again moved components out of garrison. Some of its subordinate
units--including a battalion of tanks, an antiaircraft artillery battalion,
a mortar battery, and groups of trucks--had been moved to a nearby rail
yard. Intelligence assessments said the movements appeared to be connected
to a field training exercise, again with some apparent reservist participation.72
Components of the
105th Guards Airborne Division also were again detected in what appeared to
be preparations for air movement. (Unlike the motorized rifle divisions, airborne
divisions based in the USSR were maintained at or near full manning levels.)
The airborne unit activities seemed to involve training in specific techniques
for loading equipment on a new and more advanced military transport aircraft
(the IL-76) than the model (AN-12) normally used by this airborne division.
This prompted the first intelligence assessment suggesting that the Soviets
might be preparing to commit airborne troops to Afghanistan. The assessment
said the likely purpose of such an operation would be to defend Kabul in the
event of a sudden, drastic deterioration that threatened to overwhelm the
Afghan capital (for example, an operation along the lines postulated by some
diplomatic representatives in Kabul).73
The majority view
in the US Intelligence Community continued to rate the chances of a major
movement of Soviet forces into Afghanistan as unlikely, but some analysts
pressed for a more active examination of alternatives for direct military
action. They pointed to the number of Soviet military advisors, their increased
involvement in combat and logistic support operations, the Pavlovsky delegation
and the activities seen in Soviet units bordering Afghanistan as signs that
Moscow had not yet set a limit on its commitment.74
An Alert Memorandum
on 14 September from Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner to
the President and other senior US officials, reflecting this concern, warned
that "The Soviet leaders may be on the threshold of a decision to commit
their own forces to prevent the collapse of the regime and to protect their
sizable stakes in Afghanistan." This memorandum also said, however, that
Moscow was sensitive to the potentially open-ended military and political
costs that could result from such a venture. Therefore, if the Soviets ultimately
did increase their military role they were likely to do so only incrementally--raising
the number of military advisors, expanding involvement in combat operations,
and possibly bringing in small units to provide security in key cities. The
Alert Memorandum nonetheless acknowledged that, even if the commitment initially
was limited to incremental steps, the Soviets would risk amplifying their
stake in the ultimate outcome, making it harder to resist further increasing
their military commitment if their initial steps did not produce the results
they sought.75
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The same day this
Alert Memorandum was sent to US policy officials, a new leadership crisis
occurred in Kabul. On the evening of 14 September (mid-day in Washington)
Kabul radio announced the dismissal of four top government officials--Minister
of the Interior Watanjar, Minister of Communications Ghulabzoy, Minister of
Tribal Affairs Mazdoorjar, and Chief of Intelligence (the AGCA, which included
the secret police) Sarwari. The radio announcement said the dismissals had
been at Amin's recommendation and with Taraki's approval. The US Embassy in
Kabul reported that shortly before the dismissals had been announced, troops
and armored vehicles had surrounded the presidential palace and begun to occupy
key positions in the capital. (These military components were from the 4th Afghan Army Armored Corps, which had carried out similar functions
in the coup against Daoud a year and a half earlier.) Gunfire had been heard
in the palace area.76
Two days later,
on 16 September, Kabul radio announced that an "extraordinary meeting"
of the PDPA Central Committee had been held and that Taraki had "requested
that he be relieved of his party and government leadership positions due to
health reasons and physical incapacity." The announcement said that Amin
had been appointed to replace Taraki as the new party general secretary. The
top government body, the "Revolutionary Council," had also met that
day, according to the radio broadcast, also "approving" Taraki's
"request" to be relieved of the Presidency and appointing Amin as
his successor.77
In the following
days, US intelligence again detected heightened activity in Soviet combat
forces across the border from Afghanistan. A regiment of the 105th
Guards Airborne Division had once more been moved into convoy formation, apparently
being readied for deployment. Armored troop carriers and field artillery normally
kept in covered storage were again positioned for loading aboard transport
aircraft. Partial mobilization also appeared to be taking place in a ground
force motorized rifle division--the 58th located at Kizyl Arvat, west
of Kushka--that was not one of those seen engaging in such activity in
March. This raised to three the number of such divisions in this region seen
mobilizing in recent months. Two airborne divisions located farther from the
Afghan border--the 104th in the Transcaucasus and the 98th in Odessa--also
appeared to be preparing to deploy. The activity in all these forces would
continue until the beginning of October, at which time all would return to
their garrisons.78
On 19 September,
the State Department included in its press briefing a statement that the US
had detected "increased activity" in Soviet military units near
the Afghan border. The statement said that while the purpose of this activity
could not be confirmed, the US "wanted to reiterate [its] opposition
to any intervention in Afghan internal affairs."79
On the same day, National Security Advisor Brzezinski informed the President
that he believed a Soviet invasion was becoming more probable. A day later,
officials from various US agencies met to examine plans for dealing with this
potential development, and Brzezinski asked the DCI to prepare an intelligence
appraisal "of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan to date, so that we can
differentiate between creeping involvement and direct invasion."80
Meanwhile, information
from diverse sources was providing a basic outline of the events that had
brought about the sudden leadership change in the Afghan regime.81
A few days before the shootout at the presidential palace, Taraki--returning
from a conference in Havana--had stopped off for discussions in Moscow.
Upon Taraki's return to Kabul, Amin demanded that four officials whom he accused
of plotting his ouster be summarily dismissed. (He reportedly had been tipped
off by conspirators of his own.) Taraki sternly rebuffed this demand, but
Amin defiantly dismissed the four officials. Taraki reacted by summoning Amin
to a meeting at the presidential palace on 14 September. (There would be later
reports that the Soviet ambassador played a role in arranging this meeting
and persuading Amin to attend.) When Amin entered the palace and began to
mount the stairs to Taraki's suite, one or more of the palace security guards--reportedly
acting under instructions from one of the dismissed plotters--tried to
shoot him. Amin survived because of the effort of the chief of the palace
security force, a secret Amin supporter who was killed in the shooting (and
later extolled as a hero). Amin escaped, and immediately launched his military
move to take power.
Uncertainty surrounded
the question of a Soviet role. US intelligence analysts tentatively concluded
that Amin's action "may have been a preemptive move to forestall a Soviet
plot to have Taraki remove him." The various conflicting reports received
through diplomatic and other channels included allegations that Taraki had
discussed the plan during his stopover in Moscow, and that an Amin sympathizer
who was in Taraki's travel delegation got wind of it and warned Amin. These
stories varied as to whether the scheme originated with the Afghan plotters
and was supported by the Soviets, or was pushed on Taraki by Moscow. The US
Embassy in Kabul, for its part, was skeptical that the plot had been discussed
in Moscow.
Taraki's whereabouts
in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of his ouster were initially
unknown. Stories circulated that he had been injured, if not killed, in the
shooting at the presidential palace on 14 September. The Embassy subsequently
learned that he was alive but being held prisoner at the presidential palace.
In the ensuing weeks there would be reports that three of the plotters had
escaped (Defense Minister Watanjar, intelligence chief Sawari, and Minister
of Tribal Affairs Ghulabzoy) and were hiding at the Soviet mission compound
in Kabul, although the US embassy again expressed skepticism about the validity
of such stories. (The fourth plotter, Minister of Communications Mazdoorjar,
was known to have been captured and placed under house arrest.)82
As murky as the
picture was, there was one point on which reports were virtually unanimous,
and that was that Moscow was not happy with the outcome. Western news media
pointed out that Amin had been a principal obstacle to Soviet efforts to find
a political solution to the turmoil in Afghanistan. The Intelligence Community
concluded that the Soviets probably believed Amin's coup had narrowed the
regime's base of support and made the counterinsurgency task even more difficult.
An Interagency Intelligence Memorandum disseminated on 28 September, prepared
in response to Brzezinski's request a week earlier, said that "Moscow
probably views the situation as even more unstable...[and] may fear that this
coup might fragment the Afghan Army and lead to a breakdown of control in
Kabul." It said that "The threat raised by the Muslim insurgency
to the survival of the Marxist government in Afghanistan appears to be more
serious now than at any time since the government assumed power in April 1978."83
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The 28 September
1979 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum also provided an in-depth examination
of where Moscow's military involvement in Afghanistan was likely to lead in
the longer term. It noted that the estimated number of Soviet military advisors
in Afghanistan had grown from 350 at the time of the communist coup to some
750-1,000 by the beginning of 1979, and to 2,500 at the time of Amin's takeover.
It also pointed out that advisors were attached to every command level in
the Afghan Army, including at least some regimental and battalion level units
engaged in combat.84
The Interagency
Intelligence Assessment described the Soviet military as having two very distinct
options in Afghanistan: to serve in a support capacity, assisting in a military
campaign carried out primarily by the Afghan Army, or to mount a large-scale
intervention in which Soviet forces would take over most of the combat operations.
Potential actions in the first category were described as including:
1) Increased equipment and advisors,
with advisors allowed to participate more extensively in combat and combat air
support and in ferrying men and material within Afghanistan; 2) Limited intervention
of combat and combat service support units, including attack helicopter units
and logistic support and maintenance components to enhance Afghan "combat
reach and effectiveness;" 3) Limited intervention with Soviet combat units
to provide security for Kabul and key cities and critical points, and perhaps
to operate selectively in combat operations alongside Afghan Army units to stiffen
their resolve.85
To do anything beyond
securing Kabul and a few other key cities or critical points, the interagency
assessment gave the Soviets only the second category of military options--committing
massive numbers of ground forces in a potentially open-ended operation.
As a practical matter,
the three courses of action postulated under the first category were not alternatives,
but gradations of escalating military involvement, and the choice was how
far to go and how fast. All of these moves were designed to help the Afghan
Army defeat the insurgent forces, and all of them relied on the Afghan Army
taking the main role in nationwide military operations. Thus the linchpin
of Moscow's willingness and ability to undertake one or more of these steps
was, according to intelligence analysts, its assessment of the loyalty and
cohesion of the Afghan Army.86
Analysts also believed
that, even for limited combat support options, the Soviets would need to move
cautiously lest they alienate rather than bolster the Afghan forces they still
were counting on to play the major combat role. For this reason, even if the
Soviets decided to introduce limited combat forces, they were expected to
do so incrementally, beginning with a few battalions and working up to an
airborne division or two at the most. The 105th Guards Airborne Division--seen
in preparatory activities during previous upheavals in Afghanistan, and with
a full-strength troop complement of 7,900--was judged to be the most likely
force to be brought in.87
One postulated exception
that might cause the Soviets to move more rapidly would be a backlash to the
Amin coup that provoked severe fighting in the capital. In such a situation,
according to the intelligence assessment, the Soviets probably were prepared
to deploy one or more airborne divisions to Kabul and vicinity to protect
Soviets already there as well as to maintain a pro-Soviet regime. (Again,
the preparations of the 105th Guards Airborne Division would certainly have
supported such a view.) The intelligence community analysis said that such
a deployment would not be intended for use in fighting the Muslim insurgency
but acknowledged that, once there, Soviet units could get drawn into the fighting.88
If the Afghan Army
came apart, according to this analysis, Moscow would confront the prospect
that preserving the current Afghan regime would mean taking the lead role
in combating the insurgency--what the assessment described as "massive"
Soviet military intervention. Soviet ground force units moving into Afghanistan
would meet armed opposition not only from the insurgents but from defecting
Afghan Army forces.
The Interagency
Intelligence Memorandum described such an undertaking by the Soviets as a
"multidivisional operation" requiring more than the four ground
force divisions and one airborne division (the 105th ) based in
the Turkestan Military District. It noted that some additional divisions could
be drawn from the nearby Central Asian Military District opposite the Xinjiang
Province of China, but said the Soviets probably would be reluctant to weaken
their position there. "An operation of this magnitude would therefore
require the re-deployment of forces--and their supporting elements--from
western and central [USSR] military districts, in addition to those near the
Soviet-Afghan border," according to the assessment.89
The memorandum said
Moscow had seemed prepared before the Amin coup to offer some combat help
well short of the major intervention that the assessment defined as a "multidivision
ground force operation." Given the uncertainty immediately following
the coup, any such moves probably had been deferred, according to the memorandum,
until the Soviets were satisfied that Amin would consolidate his position.
But as soon as Moscow felt assured he had done so, according to intelligence
analysts, the Soviet leaders' desire to avoid facing an all-or-nothing choice
would cause them to begin increasing their combat support, up to what the
memorandum characterized as a "sprinkling" of Soviet combat units.
If, in fact, the
Afghan Army did come apart, and Moscow confronted a situation where only large-scale
intervention by Soviet troops would save the regime, the intelligence analysis
concluded that Soviet leaders were more likely to abandon the Khalq regime
than to be willing to incur the costs of invasion. Their first choice obviously
would be to find some viable leftist alternative to Amin, but if no such faction
appeared, according to the analysis, "the Soviets would promote installation
of a moderate regime willing to deal with them." Intelligence analysts
acknowledged that abandoning a communist regime Moscow had so demonstrably
sponsored would be seen by many Soviet leaders as damaging to the USSR. The
Soviets could deflect this to some extent by standing behind their policy
and blaming the Afghan communists for not following Moscow's guidance.
By comparison, according
to the intelligence analysis, the price of an invasion would include:
"the grave and open-ended
task of holding down an Afghan insurgency in rugged terrain. The Soviets would
also have to consider the likely prospect that they would be contending with
an increasingly hostile and anti-Soviet population. The USSR would then have
to consider the likelihood of an adverse reaction in the West, as well as
further complications with Iran, India, and Pakistan. Moscow would also have
to weigh the negative effects elsewhere in the Muslim world of a massive Soviet
military presence in Afghanistan. ... A conspicuous use of Soviet military
force against an Asian population would also provide the Chinese considerable
political capital."
On balance, the
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum concluded (with no dissents) that Moscow
would not believe that saving the current Khalq regime or even another communist
regime was worth this price. The final sentence of the memorandum listed examples
of situations in which there would be a "substantially greater"
chance that Moscow would be willing "to pay the price of large-scale
and long-term military intervention." Examples included "the prospect
of the advent of an anti-Soviet regime," "foreign military intervention"
and "prolonged political chaos."90
In light of the events that ultimately occurred, it should be noted that the
condition of "prolonged political chaos" could accompany most scenarios
for intervention.
The interagency
assessment did not address the activities that had been observed in the airborne
division or in three of the four motorized rifle divisions in the Turkestan
Military District. Nor did it mention the alerting of airborne divisions in
the central and western USSR during times of crisis in Afghanistan. The only
comment offered on the status and activities of the Soviet forces was the
conclusion that "We have not seen indications that the Soviets are at
the moment preparing ground forces for large-scale military intervention in
Afghanistan." By "large scale" the memorandum presumably was
referring to the "muliti-division" force described above.
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On 10 October, Kabul
radio announced that Taraki had died the previous day of a "serious illness,"
and that his remains had immediately been buried. In Washington it was generally
believed he had in fact been fatally wounded during the palace shootout and
probably had died well before the official announcement.91
Less than a week
later, an entire infantry division of the Afghan Army garrisoned at Rishkor,
about nine miles southwest of Kabul, mutinied and launched an attack toward
Kabul. Several days of intense combat ensued before the mutiny finally was
put down. In addressing the critical importance of the Afghan Army's loyalty
in determining Soviet actions, the intelligence appraisal disseminated at
the end of September had pointed out that "with four major mutinies in
the past seven months, its continued allegiance is suspect."92
The "frequency ratio" was now up to five in eight.
According to intelligence
received at the time, the mutiny seemed especially alarming to the Soviets
and "a number of major steps were taken shortly thereafter."93
Once again, as had been the case in every crisis in Afghanistan since the
Herat uprising in March, the Soviet 105th Guards Airborne Division
at Fergana--the military unit the recent Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
had described as most likely to be deployed to Kabul if Moscow urgently sought
to beef-up security there--was seen getting ready to move.
Heightened activity
also was detected again in the same three divisions: the 5th Motorized
Rifle Division at Kushka; the 108th at Termez; and the 58th
that Kizyl Arvat that had been periodically engaging in field deployments
and unusual training and mobilization rehearsals in the preceeding months.94
Intelligence reporting
described the alerting of the airborne division at Fergana as probably linked
to the latest Afghan mutiny and Moscow's concern for its personnel in Kabul.
The activity of the three other Soviet ground force divisions was said to
be "possibly" related to the events in Afghanistan, although--as
a retrospective intelligence evaluation put it--"this linkage was
not made strongly."95
The progressive
weakness of the Afghan Army was becoming increasingly apparent at the same
time insurgent attacks were growing in size and frequency. The insurgents
had begun to focus particularly on cutting supply lines to cities and military
bases. The Afghan regime was forced to provide armored convoys for movements
along major roads linking Kabul and the other major cities, and to increase
its reliance on aerial supply of its major army garrisons. US government analysts
were publicly quoted as saying that, while the Afghan Army controlled Kabul
and a handful of major cities, insurgents operated with impunity in about
half of the country.96
Offensive operations
by the Afghan Army succeeded only when Soviet military personnel were heavily
involved both in combat and combat support at all echelons down to the front-line
units. A Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment disseminated in late
October said that "without Soviet support the [Afghan] Army would have
collapsed a long time ago." DIA said the Soviets were "the backbone
of Afghanistan's logistics system...they maintain all technical equipment
and provide massive quantities of supplies and other equipment."97
Reports continued
to circulate in diplomatic and intelligence channels as well as the news media
that Moscow was dissatisfied with Amin. Soviet officials were making it known
on the diplomatic circuit that, while the USSR would continue to provide weapons,
equipment and advisors to the existing regime, Moscow was trying to come up
with an alternative leader--most likely one not associated with the present
Afghan government. Intelligence sources reported that Amin was aware of this--Moscow
had, after all, tried to get rid of him in September--and was making gestures,
albeit not very convincing ones, to moderate some of the policies the Soviets
considered counterproductive. These minimal gestures were undermined by the
murders and disappearances attributed to Amin's efforts to eliminate his known
or suspected rivals and thus prevent Moscow from assembling an alternative
regime.98
By late November,
it had become clear to intelligence analysts that the Soviet 105th
Airborne Division, put on alert at the time of the latest mutiny in mid-October,
had remained at heightened readiness. Also, the Soviet motorized rifle divisions
in the area were again engaging in activity that, although below a level indicating
imminent deployment, suggested efforts to raise their overall readiness. This
mainly was field training at the battalion and regimental level, apparently
including activated reservists. By the last week of November, at least two
of these divisions--the 5th at Kushka and the 108th
at Termez--appeared to be mobilizing at least to a limited degree.99
The predominant
intelligence view attributed these activities--particularly the readying
of airborne units--to Moscow's concern for the safety of Soviet personnel
in Kabul. By this time, however, the crisis ignited in Iran by the seizure
of the US Embassy there was adding a new element of ambiguity to the analysts'
interpretations of Soviet military activities in the region. This was especially
so for the ground force motorized rifle divisions. Some intelligence reporting
postulated that the apparent effort to improve their readiness was a manifestation
of Moscow's unease over possible US reactions to the Iranian crisis.100
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On 29 November,
senior Soviet Deputy Interior Minister Viktor Paputin, who carried the rank
of general in the Soviet internal security forces, arrived in Kabul. Over
the next few days he met with his counterparts in the Afghan internal security
forces and with Amin. These meetings were reported by the Kabul radio station,
but did not draw particular attention at the time.101
Also on 29 November
and continuing for the next few days, Soviet military transport aircraft were
detected flying into Kabul. Some of them remained parked at the Kabul airport,
but reports from observers in Kabul indicated that a portion of the aircraft
had apparently discharged whatever cargo or personnel they were carrying and
quickly departed. The type of aircraft seen at Kabul, and other evidence,
indicated that they probably had come from the western USSR, either flying
directly or staging through Soviet bases north of Afghanistan.
The purpose of the
flights was unclear. Whatever they brought had been expeditiously removed
from the airport, and there were unconfirmed reports that some special Soviet
troop units had been moved into the city.102
US intelligence officers in Kabul described an apparent infiltration of special
Soviet troops into the city, and numerous reports from the field also indicated
some covert operations seemed to be afoot. An on-the-spot assessment by the
senior US intelligence officer in the field concluded that some Soviet military
operation was being readied.
On 8 December, the
intelligence community reported that a second Soviet airborne battalion had
been brought to the airfield at Bagram, site of the main operating base for
Moscow's military assistance mission. (As noted above, at least one airborne
battalion had been based at Bagram for some months.)
The
National Intelligence Daily ( NID ) and DIA's
Defense Intelligence Notes ( DIN
) both stated that deployment of this additional airborne battalion to Bagram
probably was intended to upgrade defenses at the air base in the face of the
increasing insurgent threat. The battalion could also provide added security
if Moscow was forced to evacuate its personnel from the country. This interpretation
was consistent with the earlier assessments of the most likely purpose of
any additional military units Moscow might insert into Afghanistan. The
DIN added that the heightened preparations suggested "the threat
is perceived in Moscow as greater than our reporting indicates...[and] demonstrates
Moscow's resolve in pursuing its interests in Afghanistan despite obvious
pitfalls and at a time when the Kremlin may consider the US to be preoccupied
with events in Tehran."103
Two days later,
intelligence revealed the arrival of what appeared to be a motorized rifle
battalion, equipped with the usual complement of armored vehicles for transportation
and for combat operations, as well as with field artillery and antiaircraft
artillery. This represented a new level of Soviet military presence. The new
unit clearly had been airlifted into Afghanistan during the preceding day
or so.
The
NID noted that the deployment could be "indicative of a decision
by the Soviets to increase their forces substantially." DIA estimated
that, in addition to security for Soviet operations at Bagram, the newly deployed
combat units could be used for quick-reaction, limited-combat security missions
elsewhere in Afghanistan, and to help evacuate Soviet personnel if the situation
should require. DIA added, however, that
"...it is also possible,
although much more speculative, that the airborne and motorized rifle elements
now at Bagram are merely the first increment of a much larger combat force
that may be deployed to Afghanistan during the coming year. ...It is not certain
that Moscow has embarked on such a plan...but it is clear that the Soviets
have made a qualitative increase in their military presence and capabilities...."104
On 11 December,
the National Intelligence Officer for Warning convened a group of senior analysts
to address the question of whether the deployment of the motorized rifle battalion
to Bagram signaled that the Soviets had "crossed a line" in their
intentions to engage in military combat operations in Afghanistan. The clear
majority of those participating in this meeting supported the view that already
had been given in the daily intelligence: that the additional forces had been
introduced to provide increased security, especially in the event of a potential
need to evacuate Soviet personnel in a rapidly deteriorating situation. Their
judgment was, therefore, that although the deployment significantly expanded
the security forces, it did not yet foreshadow intentions to escalate Soviet
engagement in the Afghan conflict itself. A small minority of the participants
dissented, pointing out that the battalion included a full complement of anti-aircraft
artillery. These analysts argued that it was difficult to conceive of any
aircraft posing such a threat to Soviet troops in Afghanistan as to warrant
including anti-aircraft weapons, with one exception--the Afghan Air Force.
They believed this suggested that Mosocw might be contemplating an operation
of sufficient magnitude to risk a reaction by at least parts of the Afghan
military.105
In the next few
days, the US Embassy in Kabul reported that observers there had seen what
were believed to be soldiers of a Soviet combat battalion being stationed
discreetly around the Afghan capital. This information seemed to confirm what
some analysts believed was the most likely explanation for the mysterious
Soviet military air transport flights into Kabul at the end of November. Their
presumption was that these troops probably were from the "Spetznaz,"
Soviet military units roughly comparable to US Special Forces.106
By 15 December,
intelligence disclosed that the Soviet 5th Guards and 108th
motorized rifle divisions--the ones most frequently seen in heightened
training and mobilization activity--had been brought to what appeared
to be full strength, and that the 108th was leaving its garrison.
A buildup of transport and combat helicopters had been detected at Kokaty
air base in the south of the USSR's Turkestan Military District, and other
military transport aircraft were being marshaled at air bases in this area.
A substantial buildup of tactical combat aircraft--fighters, fighter-bombers
and light bombers--also was seen at Soviet airfields in the region, including
at some airfields that normally did not serve as bases for such aircraft.107
That afternoon,
a Saturday, a number of US intelligence community officials and analysts (including
the author) were notified by telephone that the DCI, following discussions
that day at the White House, had directed that a meeting be convened the following
Monday (17 December) to prepare an alert memorandum on the implications of
the increasing Soviet presence in Afghanistan. National Security Advisor Brzezinski
already had sent a memorandum to the DCI earlier in the week informing him
that the President-- after reading intelligence reporting that a second
Soviet airborne battalion had arrived at Bagram--wanted to publicize the
information. In the memo, Brzezinski asked the DCI to provide by 14 December
(Friday) text "sanitized" in a way that would permit it to be used
publicly (i.e., in a way that would protect the sources of the information).108
By the time the DCI received Brzezinski's memo, however, the motorized rifle
battalion already had arrived at Bagram. This discovery presumably figured
in the discussions between Brzezinski and the DCI on 15 December, followed
by the DCI's call for an alert memorandum laying out the implications.
Also on 15 December,
the Secretary of State's special advisor on Soviet affairs, Marshal Schulman,
called in the chargé from the Soviet Embassy (Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin
had departed for the USSR a week earlier) and asked that Moscow provide an
explanation for the sudden increase of its military presence in Afghanistan.
A cable was also sent that day to the US Embassy in Moscow instructing the
ambassador to put the same question directly to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.109
On Monday morning,
17 December, the Afghan situation was taken up at a meeting of senior national
security officials initially called to address the Iran hostage crisis. (Participants
included Vice President Walter Mondale, National Security Advisor Brzezinski,
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the DCI.) DCI Turner reported
that the recent movement of new units to Afghanistan--including a third
airborne battalion added to the Soviet forces at Bagram--raised the number
of Soviet military personnel there from 3,500 to an estimated 5,300. He also
pointed out that two Soviet military command posts had been created just north
of the Afghan border, that two more divisions in the vicinity appeared to
be on the move, and that a buildup of air assets was underway. According to
the record of the meeting, the DCI said:
CIA does not see this as
a crash buildup but rather as a steady, planned buildup, perhaps related to
Soviet perceptions of a deterioration of the Afghan military forces and the
need to beef them up at some point. ... We believe that the Soviets have made
a political decision to keep a pro-Soviet regime in power and to use military
force to that end if necessary. They either give this a higher priority than
SALT [the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty being debated at that time in the
US Congress] or they may believe it is irrelevant to SALT.110
It was decided at
the national security meeting that the US would explore with Pakistan and
the United Kingdom the possibility of providing additional funds, weapons
and communications to the Afghan rebels "to make it as expensive as possible
for the Soviets to continue their efforts." The US also would increase
worldwide propaganda relating to the Soviet activities, recommending to its
European allies that they encourage more media attention to the Afghan situation
and step up efforts "to cast the Soviets as opposing Muslim religious
and nationalist expression." The participants in the meeting also concluded,
however, that for now the US would continue to keep its diplomatic demarches
to the Soviets in private channels "for the record," in the belief
that "there was no benefit in going public at this time."111
By the time this
meeting adjourned, the State Department had received a cable from US Ambassador
Watson in Moscow reporting that "The Soviets did not respond to our request
for an explanation of their deployments into Afghanistan. Their total presentation
was essentially a rebuff." According to the ambassador, the Soviet deputy
foreign minister had described as "inventions" the activities the
US questioned, and asserted that affairs between the "sovereign states"
of Afghanistan and the USSR were "solely their own business."112
Also on 17 December
an event occurred in Kabul which, in the light of later developments, may
have been of greater significance than was recognized at the time. An assassination
attempt on Amin took place at his presidential palace residence. Once again
he survived, although there were reports that he suffered a slight leg wound.
His nephew, who was head of the intelligence service and Amin's top security
aide, was seriously wounded and taken to the USSR for treatment. Two days
later, Amin moved his residence to a former royal palace complex about seven
miles southeast of the center of Kabul, and took his security detachment with
him.113
Meanwhile, completion
of the Alert Memorandum DCI Turner had ordered was being delayed by disagreement
among analysts over the implications of the Soviet buildup north of the Afghan
border. All agreed that the Soviets were preparing to engage directly in combat
operations and that this would, by itself, represent a distinct escalation
of their commitment. The disagreement was mainly over the magnitude and purpose
of the military operations Moscow was preparing and how soon they would occur.
A sizable majority of analysts from all the intelligence agencies argued that
Moscow intended a graduated "augmentation" to shore up the deteriorating
Afghan military; this had been the basis for the view the DCI presented at
the 17 December White House meeting. A few analysts contended, however, that
the steps being taken indicated that Moscow was about to launch a major military
intervention that would include the full-scale deployment into Afghanistan
of the two ground force divisions being readied north of the border along
with one or more airborne divisions. This would involve some 30,000 or more
troops and would amount to a full-fledged military intervention to seize control
of the situation in the country. And these analysts argued that signs showed
this move to be imminent.114
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The alert memorandum
finally was shaken loose on 19 December when intelligence revealed large stocks
of gasoline and other fuels pre-positioned in mobile containers near the key
road crossings from the USSR into Afghanistan. A train was also unloading
bridging equipment near one of the crossings. The 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division had left Kushka and was heading toward
the border. Confirmation came that preparations were under way to move additional
airborne units from three air bases in the western USSR. The buildup of tactical
aircraft was continuing at airfields in the border region. There also was
evidence that troops from a Soviet unit already in Afghanistan (suspected
to be from the motorized rifle battalion recently brought to Bagram) were
securing a key intersection (the Salang Pass) on the main road from the USSR
to Kabul.115
This information
enabled analysts to reach a consensus that a move of additional forces probably
was imminent, but they continued to disagree over the size and significance
of the military force likely to be involved. As a result, the wording of the
Alert Memorandum issued on 19 December was somewhat cautious on this point.
It said, "The pace of Soviet deployments in recent weeks does not suggest
that the Soviets are responding to what they perceive as a time urgent contingency,
but rather that they are reacting to the continuing deterioration of the security
situation in Afghanistan." The buildup near the border, according to
the memorandum, suggested that "further augmentation [of the Soviet forces
in Afghanistan] is likely soon, and...preparations for a much more substantial
reinforcement may also be under way." Introducing the "augmentation"
forces (described in the NID a day later as a "multidivisional
force") would, according to the Alert Memorandum, enable the Soviets
to "hold other key points, engage insurgents in selected provinces, or
free Afghan Army units for operations elsewhere." It also said, however,
that "To conduct extensive anti-insurgent operations on a countrywide
scale would require mobilization of much larger numbers of regular ground
forces drawn from other military districts in a potentially open-ended operation."116
On 21 December,
the administration began publicizing extensive details of the expanded Soviet
military presence in Afghanistan and the buildup of Soviet forces north of
the Afghan border. According to press reports, "Carter Administration
officials" said they were providing this information "in line with
a recent decision to publicize Moscow's military role in the Afghan war"
(presumably referring to the recommendations of the 17 December White House
meeting). They described the movement of three battalions of Soviet armored
and airborne troops to an air base near Kabul within the previous two weeks,
resulting in the addition of some 1,500 combat soldiers to the Soviet forces
already in country. The press also was told that two Soviet motorized rifle
divisions and an airborne division, totaling more than 30,000 troops, had
been put on alert near the border. One State Department official "who
asked not to be identified" said that "several times in recent days"
the US had voiced its concern to Moscow over the buildup of forces in and
near Afghanistan.117
These same press
accounts also reflected divided views among intelligence analysts and Administration
officials over the implications of the buildup. Some officials were described
as believing the Soviets were preparing for a full-scale invasion. One "White
House national security aide," was reported to have said that the Soviet
preparations around Afghanistan "show all the marks of a major military
intervention," pointing out that the same signs had been seen before
the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Some intelligence analysts reportedly
had cited the creation of a special Soviet operational headquarters near the
border as a signal that Soviet forces were about to go in.
"However, other
officials said that they doubted that Moscow would begin a major invasion
and that the buildup was part of a more gradual process of military intervention
in the guerrilla war," according to the press reports. Many "intelligence
aides" were also said to be unsure about Moscow's motives, and some were
cited as saying there was "no clear sign of the purpose of Soviet forces
in or near Afghanistan." Some Administration officials reportedly believed
the force being mobilized probably was not large enough to undertake full-scale
counterinsurgency operations and expected that, if it were in fact sent to
Afghanistan, it probably would be used to secure certain key points while
the 50,000-man Afghan Army carried out the direct combat. Officially, however,
the State Department spokesman who provided the basic information in a press
briefing declined any comment, and in a separate venue Secretary of State
Vance responded to a question by saying that any comment would be only speculation
on his part.
On 22 December,
the same day these accounts began appearing in the press, National Security
Agency Director Vice Admiral Bobby Ray Inman telephoned Brzezinski and Defense
Secretary Brown to inform them, according to one account, that there was "no
doubt" the Soviets would begin a major military intervention in Afghanistan
within the next 72 hours. He called again on 24 December to report that the
move would begin within the next fifteen hours.118
His information certainly proved to be correct.
Late in the evening
of 24 December Washington time, US intelligence began reporting a massive
airlift by Soviet military transport aircraft. The majority of flights were
from the western USSR to air bases in the Soviet Military District of Turkestan,
but a sizable portion also were landing at Kabul and Bagram airfields in Afghanistan.
The following morning the DCI issued another Alert Memorandum, warning that
the Soviets had completed preparations for a major move into Afghanistan and
that the move probably had already begun. The same day, the National Security
Agency issued a report saying a major Soviet move into Afghanistan was possibly
imminent.119
By the time these
alerts were dispatched to policy officials on December 25, waves of military
aircraft were surging into Afghanistan, most from the Turkestan Military District.
It quickly became apparent that the aircraft detected the night before flying
into airfields in the Soviet border region near Afghanistan were using those
airfields as staging bases. It also was clear that units being airlifted included
not only those from the 105th Airborne Division at nearby Fergana, but also
the 103rd Airborne Division headquartered at Vitebsk, in the Belorussian Military
District in the Western USSR. Some flights also were coming from bases in
the Moscow Military District, and analysts assumed they were carrying special
forces units. In addition to landing at the two main air bases of Bagram and
Kabul, some flights were detected going into Shindand and Qandahar, in the
western and southern parts of Afghanistan.120
Reporting on these
events in the daily intelligence publications of both CIA and DIA continued
to reflect the perception of an incremental augmentation of forces already
in the country. At the end of the day on 25 December, analysts still described
the primary mission of these forces as one of providing security to Soviet
personnel in the Kabul area and other centers. At that point the number of
troops estimated to have been brought in was about 800. A
NID article on 26 December pointed to the large field petroleum depots
set up near the border at Termz and Kushka as suggesting the Soviets intended
to use these sites as staging areas for introducing additional units. The
daily current intelligence reporting on 26 and 27 December said that, if the
newly deployed forces were to be used in combat operations, it was likely
to be on a small scale intended to assist the Afghan regime in maintaining
its "dwindling authority." This was the same picture US officials
gave to the media.121
The airlift continued
at a high level until the evening of 27 December, when it began to tail off.
Between 24 and 27 December 1979 there were 250 to 300 flights. The forces
brought in were initially estimated to be about five to six battalions, amounting
to 2,000 to 2,500 troops.122
The perception of
an operation merely to prop up the existing Amin regime was definitively squashed
on 27 December (late in the evening Kabul time) when Soviet troops carried
out an assault on Amin's new residence that resulted in his death. In a broadcast
purporting to be on Kabul radio, Babrak Karmal--whose sudden reappearance
was itself revealing--announced that Amin had been ousted by the "People's
Democratic Party and the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan." Karmal said he was heading the new government even then
being formed. Intelligence fairly quickly determined that the broadcast was
transmitted on the Kabul radio frequency from across the border in the USSR.
In one of their small slip-ups, the Soviets were slow in seizing the real
Kabul radio transmission facility, and thus it was still on the air when it
suddenly was overpowered by the broadcast from the USSR.123
There still are
differing versions, even from Soviet and Afghan participants, of exactly how
Amin was killed--whether his Soviet attackers shot him, or he shot himself
as they burst into his palace. There were no doubts even at the time, however,
that it was a Soviet operation to install the new regime of their choice.
Soviet special forces ("Spetznaz") troops attacking Amin's presidential
palace were outfitted in Afghan Army uniforms and appeared to have been selected
by ethnic origin to assist their disguise, but it did not sell. Too many eyewitnesses
observed Soviet combat units simultaneously seizing or cordoning off several
other key political and military facilities, including the ministries of defense,
interior, and even the Kabul radio station. Some of the Soviet units included
armored combat vehicles, and in some cases they engaged in firefights with
the few Afghan units that put up nominal resistance. Some analysts quickly
concluded that they now understood the purpose of the airlift of quasi-covert
troops into Kabul in the first week of December.124
By 28 December,
intelligence confirmed that the two Soviet motorized rifle divisions near
the border were moving into Afghanistan. The 108th Division from Termez was
moving along the road that went through the now-secured Salang pass to Bagram
and Kabul. The other, the 5th Guards from Kushka, crossed over further west
and headed down a road that circled through Herat toward the major southwest
Afghan city of Qandahar. At this point, intelligence analysts also raised
their estimate of the forces airlifted in during the preceding four days to
about 5,000. The airlift, together with the movement of the two motorized
rifle divisions meant that there now were some 30,000 troops in or entering
Afghanistan. The Carter administration immediately publicized this information.1
At about the time
these divisions were crossing the border, the new Kabul regime announced in
a broadcast that Moscow had accepted its request for military assistance.
The broadcast also announced the formation of the new government, whose members
would include at least two of the plotters (Watanjar and Sarwari) who had
been in hiding--reportedly with Soviet assistance--since their failed
attempt to remove Amin in September.126
There no longer
was any doubt in Washington about what had begun on Christmas Eve. The Soviets
had airlifted major combat forces into Afghanistan, using them to seize control
of the capital and major cities and transportation nodes. They eliminated
the existing government, installed a proxy regime and used it to provide cover
for sending in the additional combat divisions. At a National Security Council
meeting President Carter chaired that day, "All knew," according
to Brzezinski, "that a major watershed had been reached."127
There was a new combat zone on the Cold War battleground.
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Soviet records released
in recent years show that the military operation carried out in December 1979
began to be shaped at least nine months earlier, as part of Moscow's reaction
to the mutiny of the Afghan Army troops in Herat. At an extended Politburo
meeting beginning on 17 March, held specifically to examine responses to the
situation in Afghanistan, senior Politburo member and acting chairman Kirilenko
(Brezhnev was not present for this session) referred in his opening comments
to "proposals which have been completed and are now in front of you."128
The subsequent discussions clearly indicate that use of Soviet combat forces
in Afghanistan was on this list.
After various Politburo
members referred to the possible use of combat units, Defense Minister Ustinov
described military contingency measures then being prepared. He said one option
called for getting the 105th Airborne Division
and a motorized rifle regiment ready to move into Kabul on a day's notice.
Two ground force divisions would be moved to the border area. Once there,
they would be prepared, if necessary, to go into Afghanistan within three
days. Ustinov said the military was preparing an alternative plan in which
the ground force divisions would be immediately moved into Afghanistan. The
two divisions he named--the 5th Motor
Artillery Division--which US intelligence listed as the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle at Kushka, and the 68th motorized division known by US intelligence analysts as the
108th Motorized Rifle Division at Termez--were
the same two divisions US intelligence detected a few days later as they began
training and selective reservist call-ups that continued sporadically until
the units entered Afghanistan in December.129
In a session of
the same extended Politburo deliberations, Ustinov said two days later that
a third ground force division also was being prepared "in the Central
Asian Military District." A third division was, in fact, mobilized at
the time of the invasion and it moved into Afghanistan about a month later.
This division (known by US analysts as the 201st Motorized Rifle Division)
was garrisoned at Dushambe, in Tajikistan, a Soviet republic that made up
part of the Central Asian Military District.130
The commitment of
combat forces into Afghanistan was treated as an open question during the
first day of this extended Politburo meeting.131
Early in that session Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko asserted that, in considering
assistance to the Kabul regime:
We must proceed from the fundamental
proposition that...under no conditions can we lose Afghanistan. For 60 years
now we have lived with Afghanistan in peace and friendship. And if we lose
Afghanistan now and it turns against the Soviet Union, this will result in
a sharp setback to our foreign policy.132
KGB Chairman Yuri
Andropov, discussing the need to develop a public justification for inserting
military forces, said this should be done "bearing in mind that we will
be branded as an aggressor, but that in spite of that we cannot lose Afghanistan."
And later in the meeting, Premier Aleksei Kosygin interjected that "All
of us agree--we must not lose Afghanistan." Although he clearly showed
reservations about the merits of committing Soviet troops, Kosygin explicitly
acknowledged that it remained an option "as a last resort." The
discussions addressed tactics such as conveying to Taraki the need for the
Afghan regime to "request" Soviet forces in order to provide nominal
public justification for any military move Moscow might make. Ustinov pointed
out that if Soviet combat troops were committed, they should not be mixed
with the Afghan forces.133
Major concerns also
were raised by several participants over the prospect that strong support
for the insurgency among Muslim fundamentalists could cause a Soviet intervention
force "to wage war in significant part" against the Afghan population.
The reliability of the Afghan Army also was questioned. Gromyko, despite his
belligerent injunction on "not losing Afghanistan," emphasized that
"it is one thing to apply extreme measures" in collaboration with
the Afghan Army, but "it is an entirely different matter if the Army
does not support the lawful government... If the Army is against the government,
and as a result against our forces, then the matter will be complicated indeed."134
At the end of this
first session, a Politburo decision on whether actually to undertake direct
military involvement was put on hold until a clearer picture developed--for
example, on the real status of the Afghan armed forces. As Kirilenko phrased
it: "Who will we be fighting if we send [our troops] in there?"
In effect, "What are we getting ourselves into?" Nevertheless, the
Defense Ministry was authorized to proceed with the contingency preparations
Ustinov proposed, including explicit authorization to move the two divisions
to the border.
The Politburo agreed
that, in the meantime, they would go ahead with most of the other assistance
measures that had been proposed and even accelerate some. These included shipping
armaments (except for systems that might provide the Afghan leaders a wedge
for requesting Soviet crews), economic assistance and material supplies. There
also was agreement to begin diplomatic moves aimed at governments--such
as Pakistan and China--believed to be providing aid to the insurgents.135
The record of the
Politburo's second session, on 18 March, reads--almost--as though
it had been held by a completely different set of actors with no connection
to what had been said the previous day. Andropov, who on the day before insisted
that despite the cost of being labeled an aggressor, "Under no circumstances
can we lose Afghanistan," now declared that because Afghanistan did not
conform to Lenin's definition of a revolutionary situation, suppressing the
insurgency with the aid of Soviet bayonets was an inadmissible risk. Gromyko,
who had twice avowed the "can't lose" imperative, now said he "completely
support[ed] Comrade Andropov's proposal to rule out...deployment of our troops
into Afghanistan." According to Gromyko, the answer to the previous day's
question "Against whom will [our army] fight?" was "against
the Afghan people," and this would mean that "All we have done in
recent years with such effort in terms of détente, arms reductions
and much more--would be thrown back."136
The cost of sending in troops was now judged to be too high a price to pay
for saving Afghanistan, which had been described a day earlier as something
that "could not be lost."
For the remainder
of this session, each of the main participants dutifully agreed with this
conviction. Someone who had no familiarity with the details of the previous
day's discussions could plausibly interpret the record of the second day as
indicating that military intervention had never been considered. Kirilenko,
however, committed a couple of breaches of this line. He commented that:
Yesterday...we were inclined
toward the conclusion that we ought, perhaps, to deploy some measure of military
detachments. Today...the discussion here has quite correctly taken a somewhat
different course, namely we are all adhering to the position that there is
no basis whatever for the deployment of forces.
Andropov quickly
asserted that "Yesterday...the Afghans were not talking about the deployment
of troops." (The record of the previous day's meeting shows the Afghans
were talking about it, and the Soviets certainly were talking about it, including
the question of whether they should pressure Taraki to ask for Soviet forces.)
Andropov said "The people do not support the government of Taraki,"
and declared that the Afghan leader needed to be told "in no case will
we go forward with a deployment of troops into Afghanistan." Kirilenko
then corrected his characterization of the previous day's discussions, saying
that "Yesterday we were unanimous as to the rendering of military aid,
but we carefully discussed the matter, considered various options, and searched
for different ways, other than the deployment of troops."137
Brezhnev gave what
appears to be a more accurate summation of the Soviet position a day later
(19 March), when he surfaced at the Politburo meeting to approve officially
the proposals coming from the earlier sessions. Brezhnev said:
The question was raised as
to the immediate participation of our troops in the conflict that has
arisen in Afghanistan. In my view, the Politburo has correctly determined
that the time is not right for us to become entangled in that war.
(Emphasis added.)138
Clearly, between
the first two Politburo sessions, discussions took place off line, probably
informed by additional assessments and information and reflecting Brezhnev's
outlook. The leadership as a group agreed not to commit military forces, at
least for the time being. Nonetheless, steps were taken to ensure that forces
would be prepared in case this decision changed, as indicated by Ustinov's
statement near the end of the session:
We are forming two divisions
in the Turkestan Military District [the two he had described in the earlier
session] and one division in the Central Asian Military District. We have
three regiments [about 3,500 to 4,000 troops, depending on the type of regiment]
that could arrive in literally three hours. But I am saying this, of course,
only to emphasize our state of readiness. Like the rest of my Comrades, I
do not support the idea of deploying our troops to Afghanistan. I would request
permission [to] conduct tactical exercises on the border with Afghanistan
and to form regiments and divisions [presumably by calling up some reservists.]139
Declassified US
intelligence from this period clearly verifies that this proposal was carried
out.
A large number of
publicly released Soviet documents covering the ensuing months show the Soviets
rebuffing Afghan regime requests for Soviet troops. Many documents making
a similar point also have been disclosed in treatises on the Afghan invasion
by former Soviet military officers. Evidence from other sources also indicates
that the Afghans did make such requests and that Moscow was for some time
unwilling to involve combat units. It is also true, however, that the principal
defense that former Soviet officials have offered for the military intervention
is that it was ultimately a response to Afghan pleas for assistance in fighting
an insurgency that was receiving outside help. It is thus understandable that
more documents seem to have been released on this aspect of Soviet decision
making on Afghanistan than any other.140
The earliest known
Soviet document mentioning a specific deployment of a combat unit to Afghanistan
jibes with the first one that US intelligence detected: the airborne battalion
discovered at Bagram in July 1979. A report dated 28 June 1979 from the Politburo's
special commission on Afghanistan (composed of Foreign Minister Gromyko, KGB
Chairman Andropov, Defense Minister Ustinov, and head of the Central Committee
International Department Boris Ponomarev) recommended deployment of an airborne
battalion to protect Soviet air units at Bagram. It said the troops were to
be disguised as being involved in aircraft maintenance and service. Approval
for this deployment was given at a Politburo meeting the next day.141
Also recommended
in this same document was the dispatch of a special KGB detachment to Kabul,
disguised as embassy service personnel, "for defense of the Soviet Embassy."
And last but not least, the document proposed that "a special detachment
of the GRU of the General Staff" (a military intelligence
Spetznaz unit) be sent to Bagram at the beginning of August "after
preparations [not further specified] have been completed." This GRU detachment
was to deal with any "sharp aggravation of the situation for the security
and defense of particularly important government installations." Stealth
and disguises notwithstanding, and allowing for the difficulties in deriving
precise head counts and organizational origins, the presence of these special
detachments did not go long undetected.142
What is perhaps more revealing is the glimpse of an early step in what would
be an ongoing process of infiltrating small--usually battalion-size--combat
units and special force detachments into Afghanistan. In the end, these units
provided what in military science terms would be called a bridgehead.
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A number of documents
support the view of intelligence analysts at the time that Moscow was chagrined
over the botched effort in September to get rid of Amin that backfired into
Taraki's ouster. These documents also show that Soviet leaders were, at a
minimum, uneasy over the potential repercussions of Amin's takeover. The records
offer little help in sorting out various subsequent versions of the shootout,
but one document does seem to confirm the Soviet ambassador's role in setting
up the meeting at which it occurred. On 13 September, the Politburo instructed
him to arrange a meeting, but the way the message was worded does not provide
any basis for assuming he would have known an assassination was in the works.
Most of the evidence today points to one or more of Amin's rivals in the Afghan
regime being responsible for the ambush, but the Soviet intelligence services
in Kabul almost certainly were aware of it.143
The second paragraph of the 13 September Politburo instruction reflects Moscow's
involvement:
Guide yourself by the fact
that we cannot take it upon ourselves to arrest Amin with our own battalion
force, since this would be a direct interference in the internal affairs of
Afghanistan and would have far reaching consequences.
That the Politburo
felt it necessary to issue such directions is itself instructive, even more
so because this part of the message also was sent to the three top Soviet
security officials then in Afghanistan: Army General Pavlovsky, who was there
to assess the Afghan military; Lt. Gen. Gorelov, chief of the military advisory
mission, and Kabul KGB Rezident Boris Ivanov. It
appears very much to have been a warning to officers who knew that a political
showdown was under way between the two Afghan leaders and that Moscow was
seeking Amin's removal, and who therefore needed to be advised not to do anything
rash.
Moscow almost certainly
was counting on Taraki and/or his cohorts to oust Amin by themselves. Soviet
leaders' subsequent disappointment that Taraki was unable to do so is seen
in their after-the-fact descriptions, which consistently blame his "indecisiveness,"
"hesitation," and "inability to take swift and effective measures"
as the reason Amin was able to take power.144
Soviet documents
indicate that in the aftermath of the botched effort to remove Amin, Moscow's
initial reaction was to hold its ground and not make things worse, while seeking
a new "solution." A report to the Politburo on 15 September pointed
out that Amin had taken control of "all the levers of power." Instructions
sent to Soviet missions in Afghanistan said it was "expedient, considering
the real state of affairs as it now exists, not to refuse to deal with H.
Amin and the leadership he represents." An East German transcript of
a meeting between Honecker and Brezhnev on 4 October shows the Soviet leader
complaining that "We are not pleased by all of Amin's methods and actions."
Brezhnev pointed out that Amin's basic platform--"development of
the Revolution [i.e., staying on the Communist course] and furthering cooperation
with the Soviet Union"--meant Moscow would continue to support "Afghanistan"
(he did not say continue to support Amin).
Before long, charges
would appear that Amin was not hewing to the "revolution" and "furthering
cooperation with the Soviet Union." A report from the Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev
commission on 29 October, after listing Amin's repressive actions and counterproductive
domestic policies, cited putative evidence of his contacts with the US. "Taking
account of this and starting from the necessity of doing everything possible
not to allow the victory of counterrevolution in Afghanistan or the reorientation
of H. Amin toward the west," the report recommended continuing to work
with him in a way that does not "give him grounds to believe that we
[Soviets] do not trust him or do not wish to work with him." These sustained
contacts would provide an opportunity "to expose his true intentions,"
according to the report, and "upon the availability of facts bearing
witness to a turn by H. Amin in an anti-Soviet direction, introduce supplemental
proposals about measures from our side."145
In other words,
once the justification was assembled, the commission would be back with a
proposal to replace him. The replacement plan probably was already being put
together. According to information now available, at the time this report
was submitted Karmal had already been brought to Moscow. Various sources at
the time reported that three of the anti-Amin plotters in the September clash
had taken refuge in the Soviet mission in Kabul, and were presumed to have
been smuggled from there to Moscow sometime in late October.146
On 4 December, Andropov
and Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Ogarkov signed a recommendation
that the Politburo send a 500-troop contingent to Afghanistan "in a uniform
that does not reveal its belonging to the Armed Forces of the USSR" to
defend Amin's residence. The recommendation said Amin had been "insistently"
requesting this. It said the troops would be "in a detachment of the
GRU of the General Staff" [Spetnaz], which had
been "prepared for these goals," and whose deployment had been envisaged
in the Politburo protocol of 29 June (the same protocol that authorized deploying
the first airborne battalion to Bagram). It proposed airlifting the GRU unit
to Kabul "in the first half of December of this year." The Politburo
formally approved the recommendation on 6 December 1979.147
The real mission
of this detachment, however, is revealed in a personal memorandum from Andropov
to Brezhnev in early December, about the same time the Politburo was approving
his recommendation to move the unit to Kabul. The memo asserted that Amin's
"mass repressions" were destroying the Afghan government and armed
forces, and said evidence confirmed his turn toward the west. It said this
created the danger of simultaneously "losing the gains of the April [1978
Communist] revolution," and creating a "threat to our positions
in Afghanistan" through a "shift to the West."
The Andropov memorandum
reported that "We have been contacted by a group of Afghan Communists
living abroad" (referring specifically to Karmal and Sawari--by then
living in the USSR among the plotters who had holed up in the Soviet mission
after the September attempt to oust Amin). They have a plan "for opposing
Amin and creating a new party and state organs," and they have requested
assistance, including military forces, Andropov told Brezhnev, concluding:
"We have two battalions in Kabul that could render such assistance,"
and which appear to be "entirely sufficient for a successful operation.
But, as a precautionary measure against unforeseen complications, it would
be wise to have a military group close to the border." 148
Unless one wishes
to believe that Andropov was simultaneously backing proposals both to protect
and to remove Amin, it seems clear that the recommendation sent to the Politburo
on 4 December was intended as cover for inserting troops that were to carry
out the coup. The plan had cover on both ends. According to the recommendation,
sending the detachment was in response to Amin's request; had been "agreed
upon with the Afghan side;" and was approved by the Soviet Politburo.
Based on the furtive arrivals at Kabul airport during the first days of December,
there is a good chance the recommendation also was intended to provide post
facto official endorsement of a move already under way, if not already completed.
Andropov's comment about already having "two battalions stationed in
Kabul" makes this even more plausible. The uncertainty arises mainly
from evidence, both at the time and since then, showing that infiltrating
special troop units was done off and on over an extended time. Exactly when
and which troops were inserted remains murky.
It seems clear,
however, that by the first week of December, at the latest, the basic plan
was on. Amin was to be taken out, a new Afghan regime installed and, if necessary,
ground forces moved across the border. Having failed in their previous attempt
to remove Amin because of what they euphemistically termed "indecisiveness"
on the part of Taraki, the Soviets were determined to make this one work.
But their task this
time was much more demanding. Previously, the lead person in their replacement
regime was already in Kabul, along with key players such as Watanjar and Sawari,
who had influence in the military and security forces. This time, however,
they had no shadow regime in Kabul; Amin controlled the Afghan Army and security
forces, and they would have to insert their proxy regime from the outside.
They would also need to import the firepower to take out the existing regime
and the muscle to neutralize the unpredictable Afghan Army and security forces.
In hindsight, it
seems likely the attempted assassination of Amin on 17 December was to have
launched this plan. The gunman, reportedly a Muslim extremist, was killed
immediately, preventing him from being interrogated. Various accounts since
then have attributed the assassination attempt to a Soviet plot. Obviously
this is not the sort of thing normally borne out in preserved archives, and
some of the stories have more recently been discounted. A strong indication
that it is true, however, came relatively recently in a description by a former
Soviet general who was at the time assigned to the Soviet Army headquarters
at Termez, north of the Afghan border. He has said that when Deputy Chief
of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev arrived at the Termez headquarters
on 14 December to take command of the Afghanistan operations, he commented
that Amin had been "removed." A few days later, Akhromeyev is reported
to have said that it turned out that the action against Amin had not been
carried out.149
If the assassination
had succeeded on this date [17 December], it would have provided better cover
for the operation (although this fairly could be said to be damning with faint
praise). The Soviet troop units already inserted into the Afghan capital area
could have rapidly cordoned off key government centers to "protect them"
from similar attacks by insurgent fanatics. They could have safeguarded the
return of Karmal and protected him as he formed a new leadership and requested
additional Soviet military assistance.
Whether this would
have enabled the Soviets to avoid some of the reactions that followed--reactions
with monumental long-term consequences--is a matter of speculation. Once
Amin had escaped the 17 December attack and moved to the fortified residence
out of town, the Soviets apparently decided that time and physical circumstances
left little recourse other than the blatant assault they carried out. What
seems most baffling in all this is the extent to which Amin appears to have
been blind to the fact that it was the Soviets who were the greatest threat
to his life. He continued to ask for "security" from Soviet troops,
which in the end made it easier for them to remove him.
150
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The officially released
Soviet materials contain almost nothing dealing specifically with the decision
to send in ground forces at the end of December. The nugget that has drawn
the most attention in recent years is a simple handwritten note, dated 12
December 1979, under the title of "Resolution of the CC CPSU Concerning
the Situation in `A.'" The complete text reads as follows:
1. Ratify evaluations and measures
set forth by Andropov, Yu.V., Ustinov, D.F., and Gromyko, A.A. Authorize them
to introduce amendments of non-essential character in the course of execution
of these measures.
Questions concerning the decisions
of the CC should be expeditiously introduced to the Politburo.
The execution of all these
measures should be entrusted to Comrades Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko.
2. Entrust Comrades Andropov,
Ustinov to keep the Politburo informed on the status of the execution of the
outlined measures.
151
The document has signatures of
nine Politburo members written diagonally across the text, all under the 12
December date. Additional signatures with the later dates of 25 and 26 December
appear lower down. Various accounts have been given as to how this note came
into being and the sequence in which some of the signatures were added. The
accounts all agree, however, on the essential point that it was drafted by Chernenko
with guidance from Andropov, Gromyko and Ustinov, who signed it immediately
and then obtained Brezhnev's signature. Brezhnev, described by some witnesses
as in a doddering condition at the time, reportedly scrawled his signature after
being fed distorted descriptions by Andropov and his colleagues of the situation
in Afghanistan. The main differences in accounts of this have to do with when
the other Politburo members signed the note--some saying when Brezhnev signed
it and others saying later.152
More recent testimony
gives a somewhat different perspective. A former Soviet officer on the Soviet
General Staff at the time has said that Andropov and Ustinov got Brezhnev's
verbal approval for the intervention plan at a meeting with him on 8 December.
Former Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin says essentially the same. He was unable
to put a date on the meeting where this occurred, but has confirmed it was
in early December, which certainly seems supported by the Andropov memo laying
out the scheme for using Soviet troops to back the Parcham takeover. Dobrynin
claims that Gromyko was also present. According to Dobrynin, it was Brezhnev
who ordered that the proposals be presented to the larger Politburo.153
All of this merely
reinforces the impression that the 12 December meeting and the handwritten
note were pro forma exercises to put the stamp of
an official "collective decision" on a process already set in motion.
By the time this note was drafted and signed, the US intelligence community
already had discovered at Bagram the motorized rifle battalion that later
secured the Salang pass for Soviet ground forces moving into the Kabul area.
The first of two additional airborne battalions had been brought in, and an
unknown number of special forces had been infiltrated into Kabul. Andropov
already had informed Brezhnev of the scheme to provide forces to back the
creation of a new government by the Parcham faction.
Because of the paucity
of official documents from the period leading up to the military intervention,
most of what is understood today about Soviet decision-making regarding this
operation is drawn from accounts by political or military participants. Many
have given interviews, and written or contributed to articles and books on
the subject. Details of the accounts make fascinating reading, but few are
without a point of view. Nonetheless, even after allowing for a certain level
of exculpatory purpose, the evidence clearly is persuasive that the planning
and decision-making were done mainly in compartment by the small group of
Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko. Each one's defenders point to the influence
of one of the others, and in this contest Ustinov seems to have the fewest
defenders. 154
The military intervention
carried out in the last week of December 1979 was essentially the plan Ustinov
outlined in March, plus the covert operation to install a new regime. Declassified
intelligence shows that preparation of the forces to carry out this original
plan continued steadily if modestly throughout the summer and fall, and intensified
sharply when the September attempt to remove Amin backfired. The airborne
division based near the border was raised to a sustained higher level of readiness,
and airborne units in the west were moved to an area from which they could
deploy more quickly. All of which indicates that the military option in Afghanistan
was not as completely off the table as has been generally alleged.
The military preparations
recorded by US intelligence make a good case that Soviet officials behind
the intervention were getting their operation ready even before they had gone
through the formal political decision process. Some former Soviet military
sources have said it was not until 10 December that Ustinov ordered a full
call-up of reservists to bring the two ground force divisions to full readiness.
This squares with what intelligence saw, but both divisions had been at least
partially mobilizing since the last week of November. Declassified US intelligence
confirms that two combat battalions, including one motorized rifle battalion,
already had moved into Bagram by 10 December, and an unknown number of special
forces troops already were in Kabul.
The Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov
team apparently presumed they would be able to get the somewhat-enfeebled
Brezhnev to agree, and with that the others would be obliged to sign on. The
12 December meeting appears to have been presented with a near fait accompli.
Many advance units already had been inserted into Afghanistan, the ground
divisions that were to deploy were poised to come to full readiness in a few
days, and the party Chairman, Defense Minister, Foreign Minister and KGB Chairman
all agreed that it should be done. 155
On 14 December,
two days after the handwritten note was signed, Marshal Akhromeyev arrived
at Termez to take command of the operation. The next day, intelligence saw
the now fully mobilized division based there leave its garrison and head toward
the border. Three days after that, on 18 December, a team from Akhromeyev's
headquarters arrived at Bagram air base. (Preparing this air base as the site
of the advance operational command post was probably a key factor in inserting
the additional combat units the preceding week.) It was the next day that
intelligence detected a second division in the Turkestan Military District
leaving its garrison, and discovered the mobile fuel containers near the border
crossing points.
And it was on that
day, 19 December 1979, that the DCI sent an Alert Memorandum stating that
"the buildup...near the Soviet-Afghan border suggests that further augmentation
there is likely soon and that preparations for a much more substantial reinforcement
may be underway."
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The military intervention
the Soviets carried out in the last week of December 1979--particularly
its timing and scope--came as a surprise to the US intelligence community
at large and to US policy officials in general. This was acknowledged in the
intelligence community's own retrospective assessment, produced in response
to a request from the National Security Council after members of the NSC staff
expressed concern over the extent to which the Soviet move had been unexpected.
There were, at most, only a few exceptions to the consensus that Soviet introduction
of military forces would continue to be in small increments to augment security
for Soviet personnel and to help the Kabul regime maintain its authority.
This view continued to prevail even after the beginning of the Soviet airlift
on Christmas Eve. It was not until 28 December--after learning of Amin's
removal and the crossing of the border by the two divisions--that daily
intelligence reporting acknowledged that a large-scale military intervention
was under way.156
This was
not because of an absence of intelligence information on Soviet preparations
for the move. It was that the operation being prepared was contrary to what
intelligence analysts had expected Moscow would be
willing to do. All the major military units that made up the invasion force
had been seen during the preceding months increasing their readiness. The
two Soviet ground force divisions closest to the Afghan border began increasing
readiness in March, and were detected doing so again in the summer and fall.
In the second half of October, both these divisions again were observed in
unusual levels of activity. By this time, at least one other ground force
division in the area had also been observed in similar, although less frequent,
activity. At the beginning of November, the ground force units returned to
what appeared to be a normal posture, but in the last week of the month the
two divisions closest to the border began partial mobilization. For most of
this time, the Soviet airborne division in the same area had been kept at
higher-than-normal readiness.
If all this was
not enough to suggest that the introduction of around three divisions (with
a total of about 30,000 to 35,000 troops) was at least an option that the
Soviets might be preparing, there were additional signs. Two additional combat
battalions and some special forces units were inserted into Afghanistan in
the first week of December, and another airborne battalion a few days later.
Sending in a small number of advance units to take control of the capital
and other key centers was an operational scenario already observed in the
1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
At the time these
activities were being observed, the plight of the Soviet-sponsored regime
in Kabul was becoming increasingly precarious--and the prospect that it
would survive without major military support from the USSR was becoming increasingly
questionable. Thus the readiness of Soviet forces for a major military intervention
was increasing at the same time the potential motivation for such an act was
increasing. And all this information on Soviet force preparations and the
deteriorating internal situation in Afghanistan was fully reported in daily
intelligence publications.
None of this would
have been sufficient to warrant a judgment that military intervention was
inevitable. Taken on its own merits, however, and unfiltered by theories about
how Soviet leaders rated their options, the evidence certainly should have
warranted serious concern that there was at least a real prospect the Soviets
might do what they had prepared themselves to do.
Analysts had concluded
early on, however, that military action along the lines indicated by Soviet
force preparations was unlikely. One key intelligence assessment, in fact,
specifically identified it as an operation Moscow would not
be willing to undertake. The declassified Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
of 28 September 1979 said that any insertion of Soviet combat forces was doubtful.
If Moscow did intervene with combat units, the Intelligence Community judgment
was that they would do so on one or the other end of a spectrum. At one end--the
most likely would be a limited operation by a few battalions up to an airborne
division or so, carried out incrementally to strengthen security and perhaps
conduct a few carefully circumscribed operations. "Anything beyond that,"
according to the Intelligence Community assessment, would require--at
the other end of the spectrum--a multidivision force well beyond the four
divisions in the military district bordering Afghanistan.
Any operation in-between
these poles, involving two or three ground divisions and one or two airborne
divisions, thus fell into the very realm intelligence assessments had practically
ruled out. As a consequence, the preparations that were seen were not evaluated
in terms of what might be intended, but rather in terms of how they fit with
what was expected. And they did not fit with what was expected.
This is certainly
not because the analysis or judgments about Soviet attitudes was somehow far
off the mark. On the contrary, the documents now available from Soviet archives
show that the political costs that US intelligence analysts saw as exerting
a deterrent effect on Soviet moves were in fact the same arguments raised
by several top Soviet officials in opposing or at least questioning military
involvement. There has been ample, credible testimony from former Soviet officers
that most of the professional military planners were against intervention
as well. Their calculation of the military imbroglio was much the same as
that of the analysts in Washington, and Soviet military planners shared the
US intelligence analysts' view that if the military had to intervene, it must
do so with a multidivision force. One of the dark humor jokes circulating
around CIA in the months after the invasion was that the analysts got it right,
and it was the Soviets who got it wrong. (The actual wording was somewhat
more colorful.)
Those who study
the history of intelligence performance will recognize this as illustrating
probably the most recurrent trap for analysts. As many studies have noted,
the trap is not unique to intelligence analysis.157
One part of it might be called the "model cage." Once having constructed
an intellectual model of how the variables are likely to play out, each new
piece of information is weighed in accordance with the components of that
model. Evidence that does not fit is far more likely to be explained away
than used to question the model's validity. In this case, the actions taken
(military preparations) were not used to interpret intentions so much as the
conclusions about intentions were used to interpret the actions.
This also illustrates
the commonly noted failing of presenting analysis with more conviction about
what other actors will decide than is held by those actors themselves. Whatever
the limitations of the released records from Soviet meetings, one thing they
demonstrate clearly is that the "decision" to deploy combat forces
was a work in progress from its conception in March to its execution at Christmas.
At the same time,
it would be unfair not to acknowledge the pressures on intelligence either
to express more certainty--justified by evidence--or to engage in
safe hedging. Clearly, at a time when détente was being challenged
and the SALT II treaty appeared to be in a life-threatening status with the
Senate, allegations that Moscow was about to engage in yet another Third World
aggression barely two years after what was regarded as its proxy intervention
in Ethiopia was not something most US policy officials wanted to see casually
aired. As the minutes of the 17 December White House meeting show, even at
that late date, and with the amount of evidence available, policy officials
agreed "there was no benefit to going public at this time." In hindsight,
that was probably right, but mainly because at that stage they would have
been trying to stop a train that had left the station.
Speculation on what,
if any, policy action might have resulted from a more forceful intelligence
presentation, and what the effects might have been, is left to the counterfactuals.
There were some in the Intelligence Community who thought at the time that
the last good chance for such a presentation--the missed opportunity--came
with the discovery on 10 December that a motorized rifle battalion had been
moved to Bagram. By that time, an additional airborne battalion had also been
discovered in Bagram, two divisions near the border were mobilizing and some
special troops had been slipped into Kabul. Given the extent to which the
military intervention plan was hidden from much of the Soviet Politburo, it
is possible that publicity might have caused some trouble in Moscow for those
hatching the plot. This is at best uncertain, because there were events taking
place globally--for example, the agreement in Europe to deploy a new generation
of intermediate range US missiles--that might well have persuaded the
Soviets that détente was already in recession.
Perhaps it might
have been possible to put Amin more on alert, and to offer additional arguments
for the professional Soviet military planners and Politburo members who opposed
intervention. It is worth pointing out in this regard that the strident public
denials from Moscow on 23 December, reacting to the Carter administration's
release of the intelligence picture the day before, probably were not so naively
composed as to expect they would be believed by anyone in Washington. And
the denials came with full certainty that within 24 to 48 hours it would be
open knowledge worldwide that they were lies. About the most Moscow could
have been hoping to achieve from them was to preserve a little tactical surprise
on the operational scene.
However slim the
chances that a forceful public offensive by Washington around 11 December
could have had an impact, by the time the 17 December intelligence community
meeting convened to draft what would become the second Alert Memorandum on
Afghanistan, the die probably was already cast. Intelligence analysts can
point to the fact that they did inform the policy officials that the Soviets
had completed preparations for a military move and that some move--albeit
not the one that took place--was imminent. By 19 December, when the Alert
Memorandum finally was delivered, the Soviet invasion was--as one NSC
staff officer put it later--"a spectator sport." The US could
make a lot of noise from the stands, but could not have much impact on the
playing field. That would have to wait until the next round of the Great Game.
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Shortly before this
monograph was scheduled to be printed, additional information became available
on Soviet actions leading up to the military intervention in Afghanistan.
The information was from Vasili Mitrokhin, a former KGB officer and archivist
who, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, brought out to the West an enormous
body of documents, many of which have since been used in publications by British
scholars. On the subject of Afghanistan, Mitrokhin does not provide any copies
of the actual documents, but instead describes the information he obtained
from them (and in some cases provides quotations) in a paper he wrote clandestinely
in the mid-1980s in the hope--now realized--that he would someday
be able to release it to the public.158
Mitrokhin's descriptions are not only completely consistent with the description
of events outlined in this mongraph, he in fact provides substantial reinforcement
to many of the monograph's judgments, most notably on the extent of Moscow's
scheming to get rid of Amin.
For example, as
is described in the text, at the time of the September 1979 confrontation
that led to Amin's takeover and the death of Taraki, there was and has continued
to be a wide spectrum of views on how much Moscow was behind the specific,
ill-fated attempt to oust Amin. Mitrokhin's information would seem to put
this to rest. He describes a 1 September 1979 KGB report to the Soviet Politburo
presenting "the need to remove Amin."159
Mitrokhin says this KGB report was used to prepare talking points for Brezhnev's
meeting with Taraki on 10 September, when the Afghan leader stopped in Moscow
enroute to Kabul from Havana. Mitrokhin's accounts also describe the intimate
involvement of Soviet officials in the meetings that took place in Taraki's
residence in Kabul over the next few days, leading up to the attempt on Amin's
life on 14 September. Mitrokhin's descriptions of these meetings suggest that
by the time the shooting took place, the Soviets had already perceived that
Amin had been tipped off and was taking pre-emptive measures, and that the
challenge to the Soviet officials in Kabul at that point was to prevent the
kind of confrontation that would lead to the very result they most feared--a
takeover by Amin. After this actually occurred, the KGB portrayed it as a
coup by Amin.
Mitrokhin also confirms
the earlier stories that the three Afghan plotters who escaped Amin's attempts
to arrest them had taken refuge in the Soviet Embassy, and were smuggled out
to the USSR a few days later. According to Mitrokhin the three were then sequestered
temporarily in Bulgaria.
Almost immediately
after Taraki's death was announced, according to Mitrokhin, Andropov--with
Brezhnev's authorization-- instructed the KGB to contact Babrak Karmal
in Czechoslovakia and begin planning the next attempt at replacing Amin. KGB
officers then held some meetings with Karmal in Prague, and by the beginning
of November he was brought to Moscow, along with the three plotters who had
been sequestered in Bulgaria. They and a few additional Amin opponents, who
had been exiled or had chosen to depart Afghanistan, formed a group that the
KGB documents called "the Center." This group worked with the KGB,
in Mitrokhin's words, "to develop a political platform and concrete plans
to remove H. Amin from power ...under the influence of the recommendations
of the CPSU Central Committee which were conveyed to the Afghan friends."
Mitrokhin includes what is apparently a quoted passage from an unidentified
document from this time:
"...the healthy forces
of the PDPA intend to come to power by overthrowing the regime. A military
committee to plan the military and political operation to eliminate H. Amin
has been set up... [A] former member of the Central Committee of the PDPA...[will
be sent] to Afghanistan to maintain contact between the underground and the
Center. Later,...Gulyzabzoi [one of the September plotters] will be sent to
organize on the spot the anti-Amin movement. All of the other members of the
Center led by Comrade Babrak will shortly be moved closer to the Afghan border
so that they can work more effectively and clandestinely. The Center already
has general outlines of the military plan which includes a rapid military
operation in the capital with the physical elimination of H. Amin..."160
The plans called
for the number two position in the new Karmal regime to be given to Sarwari,
the former head of the Afghan intelligence forces under Taraki and one of
the plotters in the September attempt to oust Amin. According to another document
cited by Mitrokhin, the Karmal "Center" was moved to the border
area on 12 December.
Mitrokhin also describes
information--from documents pertaining to the insertion of various Soviet
troop units into Afghanistan prior to the invasion--that is fully consistent
with the judgments made by some analysts at the time, described in the body
of this paper, regarding the infiltration of special forces into Kabul for
what would, in effect, be the "hit squad." He says that these forces
were infiltrated for the specific purpose of preparing and ultimately carrying
out what was labeled "Operation Agat," the elimination of Amin.
While these troops were from diverse Soviet components, Mitrokhin describes
the specific task of eliminating Amin as having been assigned to the "8th
Department of Directorate S of the F[irst] C[hief] D[irectorate]" of
the KGB, the department responsible for "special operations."161
Two of the detailed taskings Mitrokhin describes as part of the preparation
process include "study [of] the communication lines of Amin's new residence,"
(for which two specialists were sent in on 7 December) and monitoring the
Kubul radio broadcasts--from Dushambe, across the border in the USSR--to
give your opinion of its possible use in the measures known to you."
(This was assigned to the KGB Residency, clearly to check out its use for
the broadcasts announcing that Karmal was coming to the rescue.)
What is equally
noteworthy about the descriptions of the material given by Mitrokhin is that
he offers no additional details about the attempted assassination of Amin
on 17 December, and, in fact, offers fewer details than were in open sources
at the time. Mitrokin's only reference to that date is a statement that on
17 December Soviet guards were deployed around Amin's residence. Given the
way that this assassination attempt played out, it is not surprising that
the official KGB reporting records might have been a bit sparse.
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At the time this monograph
was written--late in 2001--virtually all the intelligence products specifically
dealing with Afghanistan that were disseminated to policy officials in the 29-month
period from the Afghan Communist Party coup to the Soviet invasion were still
classified. A key intelligence source that has been declassified, however, is
the retrospective study produced in response to the NSC request shortly after
the Soviet invasion occurred. This study, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan:
Implications for Warning (Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, October 1980),
provides an extensive, chronological description of the intelligence information
obtained between April 1978 and the invasion in December 1979. (Originally classified
Top Secret, its text fills some 70 double-column pages of single-spaced, relatively
small type.) It describes what was known of developments in Afghanistan, the
nature and degree of Soviet involvement, and the activities and movements seen
in Soviet military forces in the regions near Afghanistan. Equally important,
the study also describes how this information was interpreted and presented
in the intelligence reports and assessments provided to policy officials in
various products including current intelligence publications, special alert
memoranda and periodic assessments of a more comprehensive nature. In some cases
passages from these products are quoted.
Another significant
declassified intelligence document--so far the only comprehensive assessment
produced prior to the invasion that has been formally released--is an Interagency
Intelligence Memorandum entitled Soviet Options in Afghanistan, disseminated
on 28 September 1979. It was the last comprehensive assessment produced prior
to the invasion, and provides an informative overview of what was known at that
point, how it was interpreted, and the specific picture that was given to senior
policy officials.
Additional declassified
sources for the intelligence picture at the time include contemporary documents
produced by US policy agencies. Some of these refer to--and in some cases
give fairly extensive descriptions of--information and intelligence assessments
the policy agencies received at the time. They include, for example, embassy
reporting cables, cables from Washington providing information and guidance
to US embassies, and records of policy meetings--including at the White
House--at which the intelligence was discussed, sometimes including summaries
of briefings given by DCIs and other intelligence representatives.
The memoirs of former
DCI Robert Gates describe the content of some of the Intelligence Community's
alert memoranda on Afghanistan and the specific dates on which they were disseminated.
Other former officials who were in office at the time--Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example--also
have described what they believe they heard from intelligence as the events
were unfolding.
Descriptions of what
was known at the time also include accounts appearing in the news media. This
monograph includes them in some detail partly to try to define the "value
added" of intelligence from secret sources--what more did the Intelligence
Community know than "everybody" could know. Press accounts also provide
additional versions of intelligence obtained by the US administration and intentionally
released by it to the media to give it public exposure.
Finally, it must be
noted that the author has drawn on his own involvement in the process at the
time as a source for the descriptions of the flow of information and intelligence
reporting. In April 1979, in the immediate aftermath of an anti-regime uprising
in the Afghan city of Herat (and, as is now known, at the very time the Soviets
were taking their first contingency steps for military intervention) I was detailed
to the "Strategic Warning Staff" at the Pentagon. From then until
the end of that year, developments in Afghanistan and the potential for Soviet
military intervention constituted the main, virtually exclusive focus of day
to day work. I participated in the intelligence community meetings described
in the monograph at which the evidence and implications were debated, and that
participation is the source for the descriptions of the debates. (Dissemination
of memoranda from the Warning Staff, however, was at that time limited to Intelligence
Community addressees.) My background has helped add some details to the descriptions
of the information provided in the sources that are cited and, in turn, the
sources have been used to validate my descriptions. This study is not,
however, about "my role," but about the process as a whole. It is
not designed to identify who was right and who was wrong, but rather the factors
that led to the unintended outcome, in the hope of helping develop analytic
practices specifically targeted at countering those factors.
As for Soviet planning
and decisions, documents now available from the Soviet archives include minutes
of Soviet Politburo meetings on Afghanistan, memoranda on various communications
and discussions between various Soviet officials, and records of decisions and
instructions for implementing those decisions. While some of these archival
materials must be examined with the caveat that they were, even at the time,
written "for the record," they nonetheless include substantial details
as to specific Soviet military plans and the actual physical contingency measures
Soviet forces undertook. These can be compared to the activities observed through
US intelligence sources, as described in the declassified retrospective study
done in 1980.
Of particular value
is the insight these Soviet archival materials provide into the process by which
the Soviets made decisions leading to their military intervention. This, by
itself, offers valuable lessons for intelligence analysts on the hazards of
reaching overly strong conclusions about the "intentions" of political
actors who are themselves far from certain about their intentions. This hazard,
as the monograph demonstrates, was at the heart of the problem with intelligence
performance on the Afghanistan intervention, and most studies show it to be
at the heart of most intelligence failures.
Most of the Soviet
materials drawn on for this study are on deposit at the National Security Archive,
Gelman Library, Suite 701, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC. They were assembled
in a single compendium used at an "oral history" conference on the
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan hosted by the Nobel Institute near Oslo,
Norway, in 1995. This same compendium contains most of the documents dealing
with Afghanistan that have been declassified by US policy agencies, described
above.
Some former Soviet
officials who held positions in the chain of decisions and actions leading up
to the invasion, including former military officers, also have given public
descriptions of the process by which it was organized and carried out. Again,
while taking into account exculpatory motives, many of these can be usefully
examined alongside what was shown in US intelligence at the time.
As for the Afghan
historical background, ever since that country rose to the top rank of Cold
War battle sites, many accounts of how it got there have been written--from
diverse perspectives--by individuals who were intimately involved with developments
there. These include, for example, a deputy foreign minister and long-serving
functionary of the Afghan Government overthrown by the communist coup of 1978.
Another is a former Pakistani government official who took refuge in Afghanistan
after Prime Minister Bhutto's ouster by a military regime in 1977. He became
personally close to Afghan Communist Party leaders, and was there both for the
communist coup of 1978 and the Soviet invasion of 1979. Other accounts include
those by former US journalists whose later careers turned to such diverse institutions
as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and to the analytic component
of CIA. Yet another account is given by a former CIA officer who served in the
US embassy in Kabul in the years leading up to the communist coup.
While these varied
perspectives produce many differences in the descriptions of the evolving situation,
what is most important and most impressive is the extent to which, despite their
different political casts, these authors give relatively common accounts of
the main lines of developments.
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Source List
Books
Andrew, Christopher
and Gordievsky, Oleg, KGB: The Inside Story (New York, Harper Perennial,
1990).
Anwar, Raja, The
Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First Hand Account (London, Verso, 1988).
Arnold, Anthony, The
Fateful Pebble: Afghanistan's Role in the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Novato,
CA, Presidio Press, 1993).
Bradsher, Henry, Afghanistan
and the Soviet Union, 2nd ed. (Durham, SC, Duke University Press,
1985).
Brzezinski, Zbigniew,
Power and Principle: Memoirs of a National Security Advisor (New York,
Farar, Strauss and Giroux, 1983).
Cooley, John K., Unholy
Wars: Afghanistan, America, and International Terrorism (London, Pluto Press,
1999).
Cordovez, Diego and
Harrison, Selig, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1995).
Dobrynin, Anatoly,
In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents
(New York, Times Books/Random House, 1995).
Garthoff, Raymond,
Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to
Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 1994).
Gates, Robert, From
the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won
the Cold War (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996).
Ghaus, Abdul Samad,
The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider's Account (Washington, DC, Pergamon-Brassey,
1988).
Kissinger, Henry,
Years of Upheaval (Boston, Little and Brown, 1982).
Mangus, Ralph H.,
and Naby, Eden, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid, (Boulder, Colorado,
Westview Press, 1998).
Vance, Cyrus, Hard
Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York, Simon and
Schuster, 1983).
Articles
Cogan, Charles, "Partners
in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979," World Affairs Journal,
Summer 1993, pp. 73-82.
Kuzichin, Vladimir,
"Coups and Killings in Kabul," Time Magazine, 22 November 1992,
pp. 33-34.
Wested, Odd Arne,
"Concerning the situation in `A': New Evidence on the Soviet Intervention
in Afghanistan," Cold War International History Project Bulletin No.
8-9, pp. 128-132.
Documents
Declassified Interagency
Intelligence Memorandum, Soviet Options in Afghanistan, 28 September
1979, National Security Archive.
Declassified Interagency
Intelligence Memorandum, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Implications
for Warning, October 1980, National Security Archive. [Note: this document
reviews and describes the intelligence reporting on Afghanistan during the year
preceding the Soviet invasion.]
Compendium, The Intervention
in Afghanistan and the Fall of Détente, compiled for the Nobel Symposium,
1995, on deposit at the National Security Archive. [Contains hundreds of declassified
materials relating to Afghanistan from various U.S. government agencies as well
as from Soviet archives.]
Documents from Soviet
Archives, dated July 1978 through December 1979, Cold War History Project
Bulletin No. 8-9, pp. 133-162.
[Note: Volumes of
press and media articles were combed for this project, and all citations are
listed in the footnotes to the text.]
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Footnotes
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