<DOC> [109th Congress House Hearings] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access] [DOCID: f:32439.wais] YUCCA MOUNTAIN: BROKEN MANAGEMENT, BROKEN QUALITY ASSURANCE, BROKEN PROJECT ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE AND AGENCY ORGANIZATION of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ APRIL 25, 2006 __________ Serial No. 109-206 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/ index.html http://www.house.gov/reform _______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 32-439 PDF WASHINGTON : 2007 ------------------------------------------------------------------ For sale by Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250. Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California JON C. PORTER, Nevada C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina Columbia CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania ------ VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio (Independent) ------ ------ David Marin, Staff Director Lawrence Halloran, Deputy Staff Director Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce and Agency Organization JON C. PORTER, Nevada, Chairman JOHN L. MICA, Florida DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois TOM DAVIS, Virginia MAJOR R. OWENS, New York DARRELL E. ISSA, California ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of KENNY MARCHANT, Texas Columbia PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland Ex Officio HENRY A. WAXMAN, California Ron Martinson, Staff Director Shannon Meade, Professional Staff Member Alex Cooper, Clerk Tania Shand, Minority Professional Staff Member C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on April 25, 2006................................... 1 Statement of: Wells, Jim, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Gregory Friedman, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Energy; Margaret Federline, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and Paul Golan, Acting Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy.... 9 Federline, Margaret...................................... 42 Friedman, Gregory........................................ 33 Golan, Paul.............................................. 52 Wells, Jim............................................... 9 Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Davis, Hon. Danny K., a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, prepared statement of................... 76 Federline, Margaret, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, prepared statement of.......................... 44 Friedman, Gregory, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Energy, prepared statement of.............................. 36 Golan, Paul, Acting Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy, prepared statement of............................................... 55 Porter, Hon. Jon C., a Representative in Congress from the State of Nevada, prepared statement of..................... 4 Wells, Jim, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of.... 11 YUCCA MOUNTAIN: BROKEN MANAGEMENT, BROKEN QUALITY ASSURANCE, BROKEN PROJECT ---------- TUESDAY, APRIL 25, 2006 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Federal Workforce and Agency Organization, Committee on Government Reform, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jon C. Porter (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Porter, Issa, and Norton. Also present: Representative Gibbons. Staff present: Ronald Martinson, staff director; Chad Bungard, deputy staff director/chief counsel; Shannon Meade, professional staff member; Alex Cooper, legislative assistant; Michelle Triestman, GAO detailee; Tania Shand, minority professional staff Member; and Teresa Coufal, minority assistant clerk. Mr. Porter. Good afternoon everyone. Welcome. I appreciate you all being here today. I would like to bring the meeting to order, this meeting of the Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce and Agency Organization. Today marks the third hearing the subcommittee has held with regard to its investigation of the Yucca Mountain Project. Today's hearing is about mismanagement and the problems that flow from it. Last year, when the USGS e-mails surfaced indicating quality assurance deficiencies, I requested the Government Accountability Office to conduct a followup study of the Department of Energy's quality assurance program. GAO recently completed the study and released its report entitled Quality Assurance at DOE's Planned Nuclear Waste Repository Needs Increased Management Attention. Today's hearing will examine these findings in more detail. The GAO study examined, No. 1, the history of the Project's quality assurance problems; No. 2, DOE's tracking of these problems and efforts to address them; and, No. 3, challenges facing DOE as it continues to address quality assurance issues within the Project. First, GAO found that DOE has had a long history of quality assurance problems at Yucca Mountain. In the late 1980's and 1990's, DOE had problems assuring the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that it had developed adequate plans and procedures related to quality assurance. More recently, as it prepares to submit a license application to the NRC, DOE has been relying on costly and time-consuming rework to resolve lingering quality assurance problems uncovered during audits and after- the-fact evaluations. The subcommittee's investigation sheds some light on these findings. Subcommittee investigators have interviewed current and former high-level quality assurance personnel. There is a consensus among those interviewed professionals that the type of audits conducted by the program today are ineffective at addressing quality assurance problems. Specifically, QA Management has shifted from conducting performance-based audits to compliance audits, which look at adherence to general procedures only. The ability to identify substantive issues and technical weaknesses makes performance-based audits more effective in correcting problems head on. This shift to compliance audits restrict's DOE's ability to identify and correct problems, which was a poor management decision. Second, GAO found that DOE cannot be certain its efforts to improve quality assurance have been effective because of ineffective management tools. For example, in 2004, DOE announced it was making a commitment to continuous quality assurance improvement and that its efforts would be tracked by performance indicators that would enable it to assess progress and direct management attention as needed. However, GAO found that the Project's performance indicators and other management tools were not effective for this purpose. Specifically, the management tools did not target existing areas of concern and did not track progress in addressing them. The tools also had weaknesses in detecting and highlighting significant problems for management attention. Finally, GAO found that DOE continues to face a number of quality assurance and other challenges. First, DOE is engaged in extensive efforts to restore confidence in scientific documents because of the quality assurance problems raised in the USGS e-mails. At the recommendation of the DOE Inspector General, the Department has about 14 million more project e-mails to review. Second, DOE faces quality assurance challenges in resolving design control problems associated with its requirements management process. The process for ensuring the high-level plans and regulatory requirements are incorporated in specific engineering details. In fact, problems with this process lead to the recent December 2005, work suspension of certain project work. And, third, DOE is challenged by management continuity. In just the last year, the Project lost its program director, licensing manager and quality assurance director in all key managerial positions--pardon me--all key managerial position. GAO findings in this report present real concerns that the Department is running an ineffective program that has not implemented quality as a top priority and DOE's management of this project is to blame. The importance of a rigorous quality assurance program is paramount to a project of this magnitude. All of the scientific data and engineering design submitted to support a license for Yucca Mountain should be credible, have to be credible, have to be reliable, have to be traceable, have to be transparent. In short, if quality assurance is not in place, the NRC could and should reject the license application on that ground alone. Moreover, already $9 billion has been spent. $9 billion has been spent on this project. Rather than appropriating more money and pushing legislation through to expedite the Project, these serious problems should be fixed. This is clearly a project that is consistently failing under the weight of its own mismanagement and ineptitude at correcting reoccurring quality assurance deficiencies. In fact, in recent weeks, Secretary Bodman himself conceded the Yucca Mountain Project has been poorly managed and labeled the Project--and this is his own word--``broken.'' Mr. Bodman is preceded by Energy Secretaries who did not provide the necessary quality assurance and oversight, including Secretary Richardson of the Clinton administration under whose watch two USGS scientists e-mailed accounts of fabricating quality assurance data to multiple recipients. Despite a clear record of mismanagement, however, it is important to recognize that the vast majority of Federal employees are reliable and hard-working individuals. It is unfortunate that management structure and the procedures at the Yucca Mountain Project have impaired their ability to perform. Therefore, I want to take a moment to recognize those Federal employees who have worked and continue to work very hard on this project. If this were NASA and this were a space shuttle, the space shuttle would not fly. We have a program that is broken, and the reason we are here today is to continue our investigation in looking at the Department of Energy and its management. [The prepared statement of Hon. Jon C. Porter follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Porter. I would like to thank, of course, our witnesses who are here today; and I would like to first really recognize my colleague to my immediate left, and that is Congressman Gibbons from Nevada. Welcome. Mr. Gibbons. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to thank you for your leadership on this issue and thank you for what this committee is doing in terms of highlighting the very sincere problems that all of us feel this issue has; and I want to also thank you for inviting me to participate with the committee today in hearing this issue. Before I allow for you to continue, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that my full and written statement can be entered into the record on this issue. But since the proposed Yucca Mountain Project has begun, and it was started over two decades ago, Nevadans have opposed this ill-advised project for many, many reasons. I only hope that someday Nevadans will have an opportunity to see and celebrate the demise of this disastrous proposal, and only then will Nevadans no longer need to worry about living next to the most dangerous substance on Earth. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, today is not that day. I do agree with many of the panel that we must find solutions to the escalating nuclear waste problem in this country. However, simply digging a hole in the Nevada desert and burying the waste is not that answer. One only needs to look at the recent history of the Yucca Mountain Project to get a sense of the DOE's motivations. Unfortunately, it is extremely disturbing to me to see that, since the birth of this project, that the Department of Energy has consistently failed to use sound science as their guide and has instead been blinded by its obsession to do anything to rubber stamp this project in order to rush it to completion. While this might be OK to the bureaucrats at DOE headquarters 2,500 miles away, it is completely inadequate to the people of Nevada and throughout this country who have to live with the reality of this substance, the deadliest substance known to man, contaminating perhaps our water supply, traveling through our communities and along our roads and perhaps endangering our communities. Last year, under Chairman Porter's leadership, this committee held a hearing which shed a very revealing light on the recent scandal plaguing this problem; and since that time, it seems clear that every month a new revelation about Yucca Mountain is revealed that continues to disturb but should not surprise Nevadans. First, the EPA comes out with an arbitrary and grossly inaccurate guideline to help them push this project forward. Then there are accounts that Yucca Mountain Project is falling apart from inside and will require millions of dollars to repair. Next, on April 4th, DOE sent its Yucca Mountain bill to Congress. Since Yucca fails the test of science and cannot satisfy traditional safety regulations for nuclear projects, the bill would unabashedly do an end run around those obstacles, constituting DOE's last-ditch attempt to salvage a repository that has failed nearly every test that it has been put through. And today, Mr. Chairman, you are holding a hearing on the Government Accountability's Office's assessment of the effectiveness of DOE's quality assurance program; and this report, may I say, is alarming, to say the least. It reinforces what many have been saying for years, that the Yucca Mountain Project is fatally flawed and should be stopped immediately, without delay. Chairman Porter, I applaud your ongoing efforts to try to investigate the alleged falsifications of scientific data on the Yucca Mountain Project through the House Government Reform Committee; and I look forward to hearing today from the witnesses who will try to explain the need to continue forward with this project despite the mounting evidence that points to the need to look for an alternative. I want to thank you again for the opportunity and inviting me to join you today, and I look forward to the opportunity as well to hear from our witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Porter. Thank you, Congressman. I will note for the record that Members will be coming and going today, and we have also received or will be receiving statements from other members of the Nevada delegation who are also invited to be on the dais today but because of schedules weren't able to be here but will be submitting their own documents. At this point, I would like to ask that the witnesses today recognize that there may be additional questions that will be addressed later from members of the committee, and I would like to ask that you all stand at this point, and we will do the customary swearing in. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Porter. Let the record reflect the witnesses answered in the affirmative. Please be seated. Thank you. Our first witness today will be Mr. Jim Wells, who is Director of Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office; followed by Gregory Friedman, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Energy; Margaret Federline--did I pronounce that correctly--Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and Mr. Paul Golan, Acting Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy. So, first, Mr. Wells, we appreciate your testimony. Keep it approximately 5 minutes. STATEMENTS OF JIM WELLS, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; GREGORY FRIEDMAN, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; MARGARET FEDERLINE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION; AND PAUL GOLAN, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY STATEMENT OF JIM WELLS Mr. Wells. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work concerning the quality assurance challenges facing DOE as it tries to obtain a license to construct a geological repository at the Yucca Mountain site. Our most recent March 2006, report, Quality Assurance Needs Attention, and in our earlier 2004 report, Persistent Quality Assurance Problems, continued the description of a troubled QA program. As a Nation, we are 25 years into a process to deal with geological burial of 50,000 metric tons and growing nuclear waste. Most in the room today are well aware of the twists and turns this program has taken over the years. Today, after continuing delays, DOE still must prepare a license request for approval from the NRC to begin construction. NRC requires that a quality program--quality assurance program must exist to ensure that the work and the technical information is supporting a license that is deemed accurate and defensible. DOE is not there yet. While we were doing our most recent audit, DOE announced the ``new path forward'' initiative, but it has not yet established a new date when they will be ready to ask for a license. I want to start and finish my statement today saying that resolving the QA problem we and others have found is essential to proceeding with construction. In 2004, we reported recurring QA problems could delay the licensing of the repository. 2006, 2 years later, we still don't have the request for a license. DOE tried to make changes to improve. In 2005, DOE reported that it had discovered a series of e-mail messages written in the late 1990's by USGS Geological Survey employees that appeared to imply that workers had falsified records for scientific work. Several of these messages appear to show disdain for the Project's quality assurance program and its requirements; and in December 2005 and again in February 2006, some project work has been stopped due to continuing QA problems. Our most recent report once again found problems. Over the years, NRC, the DOE IG and DOE's own management team were finding inadequate QA procedures, ineffective fixes to earlier problems, and continuing weaknesses in data, software, and modeling information. Mr. Chairman, of particular concern to us was DOE's reliance on costly and time-consuming rework to resolve lingering quality assurance concerns, as opposed to building quality assurance in at the beginning. Second, we found significant problems with the management tools, as you have mentioned in your opening statement, that DOE was using to target, to track, to report, and document successful fixes to past QA problems. I guess the best way to describe by findings was that, due to the numerous technical design flaws, what management tools DOE management was using to fix the problems was not adequately describing the problem or sufficiently drawing management's attention to the best solutions. In our report, we recommended that DOE needed to strengthen its management tools, and we offered suggestions as to ways to improve. DOE agreed with our recommendations. Third, DOE's aggressive new path forward faces substantial QA challenges going forward. They are not out of the woods yet. The e-mails suggesting the possible falsification of quality assurance records had resulted in extensive, again, rework efforts to restore confidence in scientific documents. DOE is conducting a review of 14 million additional e-mails to determine whether they raise additional QA problems. I suspect we will hear today about where the status of that is. DOE also has two stop-work orders in place as they continue to resolve new-found QA problems. As they announce new organizational changes, including bringing in new players to fix the problems, they will face potential for further confusion of their accountability as roles and responsibilities change. This will impose over an organization that is experiencing high managerial turnover and existing vacancies in various senior management positions. For example, 9 of the 17 key management positions at the Project level have turned over since 2001, and 3 different directors have served in Washington recently. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members, I would like to say that, clearly, DOE was assigned a task with a very complex and changing requirement to build something which has never been done before. Our GAO audit team continually met with and discussed the Project with some really smart DOE people, very talented people that are doing many things right. Our audits, however, we do have--this is where we find things that can be done better. We have made recommendations to DOE which they agree with. It is too early for us to conclude today whether its new path forward effort will resolve these tremendous challenges. I will end with what I started with: Resolving the QA problems we and others have found is essential to proceeding with this construction. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Porter. Thank you, Mr. Wells. Again, we appreciate your being here. [The prepared statement of Mr. Wells follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Porter. Mr. Friedman, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Energy, welcome. STATEMENT OF GREGORY FRIEDMAN Mr. Friedman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today at your request to testify on matters related to quality assurance procedures and general management at the U.S. Department of Energy's Yucca Mountain Project. My office has conducted a number of reviews involving Yucca Mountain Project over the last several years. In today's testimony, I would like to highlight three recent reviews relating to quality assurance and general project management. First, my office, in coordination with the Department of Interior Office of Inspector General and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, initiated a criminal investigation focusing on potential falsification of research data and quality assurance requirements pertaining to computer modeling of net water infiltration at the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. As part of the investigation, we conducted numerous interviews of current and former employees of the Department of Energy, Yucca Mountain Project contractors, and employees of the U.S. Geological Survey. We analyzed about 150,000 e-mails directly and also obtained and examined numerous documents that included various reports on internal and external reviews of the Yucca Mountain Project operations. The objective of the investigation was to identify the facts and circumstances surrounding a series of e-mails that discussed the potential fabrication of data and compromise of quality assurance requirements. The extensive factual record developed was provided to the U.S. Attorney's Office in December 2005 at the conclusion of our field work. Just last evening, on April 24th, the U.S. Attorney's Office notified the OIG they had declined to pursue criminal prosecution in this matter. Among the reasons given by the Department of Justice were that they could not show intent and the action did not rise to the level of criminality. My written testimony, Mr. Chairman, does not include this information because it was submitted prior to our being notified by the Department of Justice; and my verbal testimony will have to do in this regard. During the investigation, we observed internal control deficiencies that warrant the attention of Department of Energy program managers. A memorandum highlighting these issues has been issued to the Secretary of Energy. We understand the Department of Interior's Office of Inspector General was planning to issue a separate report to the Department of Interior Management regarding issues specific to the geological survey. With respect to the Department of Energy, we identified the following internal control deficiencies: First, a nearly 6-year delay in surfacing and appropriately dealing with the controversial e-mails, for which, frankly, we could find no satisfactory explanation; second, the compromise of scientific notebook requirements for an analysis and model report, an AMR report, on simulation of net infiltration for modern potential future climates; and, three, a failure to properly maintain critical control files relating to that same AMR in accordance with data management system requirements established by the project managers. Although criminal prosecution will not be pursued based on the Department of Justice's declaration, observers have pointed out that the authors of the e-mails demonstrated irresponsible and reckless behavior and their actions have had the effect of undermining public confidence in the quality of science associated with the Yucca Mountain Project. This incident has forced the Department of Energy to spend millions in actions to address the quality assurance issues raised in the e-mails. The second matter I would like to address is an IG report issued in November 2005. Nuclear Regulatory Commission procedures for granting a license for the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository require the Department publicly disclose on a Web site all documents, including e-mails, relative to the licensing process. In 2004, the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management took action to review approximately 10 million archived e-mails associated with Yucca Mountain for relevancy to the licensing process. Internal to the Yucca Mountain Project, an administrative procedure required that throughout the course of all project activities--and I stress all project activities--there be a conscious effort to identify and resolve any and all conditions adverse to quality. As a result of our inspection, we concluded that the Department's review of the archived e-mails had not been structured so as to ensure the quality assurance issues were identified and addressed. We were informed that, as a result of our report, Waste Management is developing a corrective action plan to expand its quality-assurance-related search effort to include a more comprehensive review of the approximately 10 million or more archived e-mails. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss an IG report issued in December 2005. We found the Department had paid approximately $4 million in incentive fees to Bechtel SAIC, Yucca Mountain's prime contractor, even though the firm did not meet contract performance expectations. We concluded that Waste Management had not established an adequate process to monitor and evaluate the contractor's work products and services. As a result of management weaknesses, the contractor was rewarded for projects and services integral to the Yucca Mountain project for services that did not meet the requirements of the contract, including matters related to ensuring project quality. As a result of our report, Waste Management agreed to establish a performance incentive plan with clearly defined standards and document its rationale for fee payments. The efforts to determine whether Yucca Mountain is a suitable site for disposal of the Nation's high-level nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel is a complex challenge. Of paramount concern is that this evaluation be objective and that it be based on sound and unbiased scientific analysis consistent with the highest possible quality assurance standards. Thus, it is vital the Department intensify its efforts in the quality assurance arena. We are committed to performing independent reviews to assist in this effort. In fact, in late 2005, at the request of the Acting Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Mr. Golan, we initiated a review of the completeness and effectiveness of the corrective action program to address quality assurance problems. This review is in process. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you might have. Mr. Porter. Thank you very much, Mr. Friedman. I appreciate all your efforts and your staff. [The prepared statement of Mr. Friedman follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Porter. Next, we have Margaret Federline, Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Welcome, Margaret. Thank you. STATEMENT OF MARGARET FEDERLINE Ms. Federline. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to appear before you today to share with you the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's perspective on the role of quality assurance in the Department of Energy's Yucca Mountain program. Since I will be presenting an abbreviated version of my testimony, I would ask that my entire written statement be made part of the hearing record. Thank you very much. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act assigns NRC the role of regulator for the proposed high-level waste repository. In addition to reviewing DOE's license application, the NRC observes and comments on DOE's quality assurance program as part of NRC's prelicensing activity. Implementation of an effective QA program during the prelicensing, licensing and operational periods will ensure that repository activities are consistent with safety requirements. The purpose of our observing DOE activities during the prelicense application phase is to verify that DOE clearly understands our requirements. We review the implementation and effectiveness of DOE's quality assurance program by performing independent reviews, observing audits and surveillances performed by DOE and its contractors and monitoring significant quality effecting activities. While no regulatory conclusions are made during our reviews, we do provide feedback to DOE for consideration. For example, we performed an independent review of important DOE model reports. Through independent technical work, NRC had identified that the information in these model reports was significant to a safety demonstration. During the review, NRC staff identified concerns with some aspects of the technical basis and information in the model reports. Also, NRC staff identified concerns with the effectiveness of some of DOE's corrective actions. NRC staff members also observe DOE audits of QA program implementation to determine their effectiveness in identifying issues that pertain to safety in their design for the proposed repository. Of the audits that we have observed, we have noted that the auditors are generally qualified, trained and independent of the areas being audited, and most audits were adequate in assessing the activities being audited. For example, NRC observers of a DOE audit of design engineering products related to the fuel handling and canister handling facilities determined that the audit was effective in assessing the adequacy, implementation and effectiveness of technical products and processes. On the other hand, NRC staff has identified other concerns during these observations. One such observation noted that NRC did not agree with the DOE auditors' conclusion that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories effectively implemented certain aspects related to control of measurement and test equipment and corrective action. As a result of our observations, DOE is performing additional reviews in this area. During the current year, NRC staff reviews have noted that DOE has made significant changes to its corrective action and trending process as a result of Yucca Mountain Project internal audit findings as well as the result of NRC comments. NRC staff will continue to observe DOE activities in areas of science as well as design work to ensure that DOE's QA program is appropriately applied in developing the safety case for licensing. Some current QA program implementation issues are of concern to us. These issues include those identified at the U.S. Geologic Survey, DOE's design controls and requirements flow-down and the calibration of test equipment at Lawrence Livermore Labs. These issues concern us because they raise questions about the systematic and effective implementation of DOE's QA program, which is an integral part of a high-quality license application. NRC staff will continue to review DOE's technical approaches, findings and conclusions regarding QA issues. We will closely observe DOE's corrective actions and will continue to bring any issues to DOE's attention. At the most recent quarterly management meeting, QA program implementation issues were discussed, and DOE presented its plans for resolving the issues. Our recent observations of Yucca Mountain Project activities have noted that DOE's plans for addressing current QA program issues with design control and requirements flow- down appear to be directed at the right problems and to be using good approaches for correcting the root causes. Recent Yucca Mountain Project staff additions have brought in management personnel with previous experience in implementing quality assurance programs for NRC-regulated activities. In March 2006, as we have heard, the Government Accountability Office issued its report on Yucca Mountain quality assurance. NRC staff had reviewed the GAO report and found that these conclusions are consistent with what we have observed, some of which I have discussed today. In conclusion, the NRC staff has noticed improvements in effectiveness of DOE's quality assurance program implementation. We will, however, continue to fulfill our responsibilities to ensure the adequate protection of public health and safety and the environment. Thank you very much. Mr. Porter. Thank you. Appreciate your testimony. [The prepared statement of Ms. Federline follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Porter. Next, Mr. Paul Golan, Acting Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. DOE. Welcome. STATEMENT OF PAUL GOLAN Mr. Golan. Thank you Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. My name is Paul Golan, and I am Acting Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management since May 2005. Previously, I served in the Department of Energy's environment cleanup program; and prior to that I had the privilege of serving in the U.S. Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program. In order for my testimony to be more productive today, I would like to provide the subcommittee my perspective of quality. When most people speak of QA, they envision an organization of auditors armed with checklists and pencil stubs counting beans and making sure all the boxes are checked and putting an ``inspected by'' label on the box with your product. That is not quality assurance. Rather, that is an audit or assessment. While a necessary component of a QA program, by all means not the most important aspect. When I speak of quality today, quality assurance, I am referring to an organizational culture, a culture that is a collection of the organization's standards, actions, behaviors, and ultimately its performance. People and organizations that set high standards act professionally, behave responsibly and perform in accordance with the requirements, embody good quality. These characteristics are critical to an organization's ability to function effectively in a regulated environment. Quality is an organizational trait earned by an organization's living up to its standards and is demonstrated by its performance. Over the years, the Yucca Mountain QA program has been reviewed by many of the organizations at the table today. The set of documents here is a compilation of the reports by these organizations, some of which go back to the 1980's. They addressed deficiencies in the Yucca Mountain QA program and found that, despite the development of corrective action plans, deficiencies have not been completely corrected and the same deficiencies tend to reoccur. Again, these findings were consistent with the findings of the latest review by the GAO in March 2006. In nearly all these reviews, the Department concurred with the findings and instituted corrective actions to address these deficiencies. I have read the reports and agree with the findings. The QA program and, more importantly, the culture of this organization needs to improve. In order for us to improve, there are two components of this program and this culture that I would like to focus on. The first is focus, and the second is accountability. With respect to the first component, we need to consider whether we are focusing on the symptoms or we are addressing the root cause. It is like taking an aspirin for a headache. If the headache keeps on coming back, then perhaps, maybe, the aspirin wasn't the right medicine. We need to focus on the true cause of the issue and ensure that the effectiveness of our corrective actions can be objectively measured through improvements in performance. The second aspect is accountability. Some call accountability follow through. Accountability is critical for any organization or any program to be successful. Employees are trained on the requirements and understand the requirements. Managers and leaders need to mentor their staff and make sure these requirements are met. Then if employees or managers are either unwilling or unable to meet those requirements, they need to be held accountable for their actions. On one level, that may call for additional training. In more egregious cases, it may also mean consequences ranging from counseling to letters of reprimand, from potentially being removed from having the privilege to work on this project depending on the severity of the situation. At the Yucca Mountain Project, it is important to recognize that the vast majority of the nearly 2,000 people who work on the Project--most of them citizens of Nevada--have high standards, behave professionally and perform good work, day in and day out. At the same time, though, we need to recognize that the actions of a few or the actions of the one can dramatically undermine the confidence and damage the reputation of hundreds of credible, honest and trustworthy people who have worked very long and hard on this project. Managers and leaders of this organization need to monitor their ongoing activities and address quality issues real-time. They need to know what is going on in their work spaces and correct issues on the spot. In order to be effective, managers and leaders need to be visible, they need to be engaged, and they need to actively listen. Managers and leaders need to communicate issues up the chain of command quickly and effectively as well as be responsible for developing solutions. Managers and leaders need to do this today, and they need to do it again tomorrow and the day after that until it becomes habit. Habits, good or bad, help define who we are as individuals and who we are as organizations. Habits over time become our culture. If I may take a couple of minutes to talk briefly on some of the work stoppages that my office has ordered, I would appreciate 2 more minutes. Mr. Porter. No problem. Mr. Golan. First, I would like to talk about the USGS work performed by the Department, which were discussed in our technical report issued in February 2006. Our independent technical evaluation noninfiltration estimates developed by the U.S. Geologic Survey were found to be consistent with the conclusions that were completed by scientists independent of this project under future predicted climate conditions. Nevertheless, our quality assurance requirements were not met; and, consequently, we are expending time and resources to replace that work. We have directed that Sandia National Laboratories redevelop computer codes that will generate new infiltration rate estimates in accordance with our QA requirements and then replace those infiltration rate estimates after the work has been independently reviewed. I take full accountability for that decision, sir. In other matters, more recently, we suspended the authority of our contractor to approve quality documents in the area of facility design because the flow-down of design requirement was not documented in accordance with our procedures. While our QA procedures did not require us to suspend work in this case, we nonetheless did to address any potential issues before moving forward with our new design to support the clean canistered approach to waste handling operations. In January of this year, we issued a stop-work order at the site when a cable being laid in the exploratory tunnel did not meet established code requirements. Workers at the site brought this to our attention, and we appreciate and applaud their actions. We have taken steps to address this issue. In April, we issued a stop-work order for work associated with the use of certain chemical standards because we found procedures used to procure those standards did not meet our specifications. We are taking steps to address this issue. Additionally, we are continuing our investigation on the calibration and use of humidity and temperature probes by one of our national laboratories. In all these cases, after we understand the facts, we will in a very deliberate way take actions necessary to ensure the quality of our work and hold managers and employees accountable for their actions as well as recognize those individuals who identified issues and took the right action. We are taking aggressive actions and measures to find quality assurance issues as well as take actions to address them. However, as everyone on the panel has pointed out today, these corrective actions in my mind amount to rework and a defect. While we will do what is necessary to ensure our work products meet our quality assurance requirements, I have a management goal where we do all our work right the first time, every time. Let me digress for a moment. I do not want to give the impression that a good QA program or good QA is defined by the absence of issues. We will find those situations that do not meet our requirements that will necessitate action. We believe, however, that with a good QA program we will find these situations early, within hours or days, and correct issues while they are small. Early detection and prompt action is our goal. Secretary Bodman a year ago asked this team to focus on working to make this project safer, simpler and more reliable and to improve the quality and culture of this organization as our No. 1 priority. We have worked diligently on this task, and the Department will seek to demonstrate good quality, good science, and good processes in our license application and across our entire organization through our performance. Thank you very much. Mr. Porter. Thank you for your testimony. [The prepared statement of Mr. Golan follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Porter. At this time, I would like to ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing record, and answers to written questions provided by the witnesses also be included in the record. Without objection, it is so ordered. I would also like to ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents and other materials referred to by Members and witnesses may be included in the hearing record and that all Members be permitted to revise and extend remarks. Without objection. Let the record reflect a quorum is now present. Thank you. I would like to now open it up for some questions for the panel. I would like to really begin myself and, since we are two Members--Congressmen--will be informal with questions. I would like to begin. Mr. Golan, I wear two hats, one as a Member of Congress from Nevada, one as chairman of this subcommittee. And whether--of course, my position is very clear on the Project, because I represent the State of Nevada and am very concerned about Yucca Mountain and its impact on our community and State. But let me put on my hat for one moment as chairman. It appears to me that no one is in charge of the Yucca Mountain Project. And I appreciate that you have been there about a year. But whether this is a design of a space shuttle or whether this is a design of an airplane, I personally would be afraid to fly it. And I know that a lot of DOE folks mean well and are working hard and a lot of great employees that mean well, but I am not sure any of them are responsible or taking full responsibility. And I am not sure whether you would let one of your children fly on an airplane that DOE is building right now, referring to Yucca Mountain. Time and time again, there has been questions of the safety and quality assurance. And, again, whether it is Wall Street or the private sector, with this much turnover in management, Wall Street would shut you down, the private sector or local government would shut you down, with 9 of 17 key management positions gone, 3 of the directors gone. Time and time again, testimony by experts that are saying that there are serious, serious safety problems--forget the word quality assurance. This is safety about men, women, and children around this country and in the State of Nevada. But my biggest concern, whether I was for or against the Project--and you know I am opposed to the Project--I would not trust my child to fly on your airplane. I would not trust my child's safety to be in your hands, because I don't believe anybody is in charge. My staff has done hours and hours of testimony with employees. I have spent time talking to employees, again, find hard-working individuals, but I have yet to find anyone that says that this project to date will be safe, other than management personnel. They are all very concerned. Employees are concerned. There's a morale problem. They are concerned about the turnover in management. They are concerned about the change in design of your airplane every other week. So I, too, share that concern. I know today is about some questions, but I will tell you that I am very, very troubled as a Member of this Congress. And I know other Members of Congress, all they want to do is find-- not all but many just want to find a place for the storage of nuclear waste. And out of sight out of mind. But for the folks living in Nevada, it is not out of sight, out of mind; and I am very concerned. Again, we have document after document after document stating that there is serious problems from management of the contract, with your subcontractors, there has been safety of employees because of different things through the years. I state that I question if anybody is in charge. Mr. Golan. Well, sir, I am in charge; and I take responsibility for this operation. Over the last year, I have spent a lot of time on various aspects of the Project, from the total systems performance assessment [TSPA], through the seismic analysis, through the design analysis of the facilities, all the way down to the layout of the facility at the site. Secretary Bodman asked--he gave us direction a year ago, very clear direction. He said, make it simpler and make it safer; and over the last year, we focused on that, sir. We talked about the redesign of the surface facilities. That is the first time we have done the redesign of the surface facilities since the site recommendation was basically made. And we took the approach with the clean canistered approach to make it safer, simpler and more reliable. Rather than handling bare spent fuel at the site, we are going to predominantly handle canister fuel. That is safer for the workers. That is safer for the State. That is simpler and more reliable. Second, we designated Sandia National Laboratory to coordinate all our scientific work. We are taking advantage of truly one of the gems of the national laboratory system in Sandia, and Sandia earned the right as our lead laboratory because of the good work they did at the waste isolation pilot plant. We want to establish a trust but verify culture. A couple of weeks back, we designated the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education [ORISE], as our independent review of our technical work. When we issued our technical report on the USGS infiltration work, we had that work independently verified, but we had to put together a team of individuals from the University of Arizona, Colorado School of Mines and the Department of Agriculture. Now we have access to nearly 100 universities to do the independent work. We have established our safety conscious work environment across the entire organization. Before, it was just set up in the Yucca Mountain Project office out in Las Vegas. I have the employee concerns manager and the director of quality assurance reporting to my office. We recently reorganized our staff to focus on line management accountability; and we have project offices, from chief scientist to chief engineer, regulatory authority, all assigned line management responsibilities, reporting to the director to clarify roles and responsibilities. These are just a few actions that we have taken to focus on making it safer, simpler, and more reliable. As I said, I have looked at aspects of this project from the infiltration down to the transport of the water as it leaves the waste package here. I think our science is sound, our engineering is sound and conservative, and the path forward that we intend to put this project on will make it safer, simpler and more reliable than it was before. Mr. Porter. Do you agree with the Secretary's comments that our Yucca Mountain Project is broken? Mr. Golan. I want to put that into context. The Yucca Mountain was supposed to start accepting waste in 1998. We are 8 years beyond that schedule. Clearly, there were things not going right for us not to meet that deadline. So I can understand the Secretary's frustration, and I can understand that classification of the Project as being broken. Mr. Porter. Thank you. Congressman Gibbons. Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Golan, I think you can agree with GAO's study, can you not, that there has been a serious quality control problem over years. Do you agree with that? Mr. Golan. I agree. I have read the reports by the general of the Government Accountability Office over the years; and I agree with the conclusions of their reports, sir. Mr. Gibbons. And, as you heard today, in their testimony it does tell of a long history of quality assurance problems. You heard their testimony as they sat here today. Mr. Golan. I did. But the reports also include, sir, the recognition over the years that the quality assurance program has been improving since the 1980's. Mr. Gibbons. I will buy that. You say you are making improvements; you are making steps forward. Let me ask you a question, because you just testified that you want to make it safer. The legislative bill that you are supporting, that you are pushing, that is coming before this Congress eliminates any applicability of our Nation's hazardous waste disposable laws, preempts State and local air quality regulations and usurps a State's traditional authority to administer the waters within its regions. How do you believe that makes it safer? Mr. Golan. Sir, if I may, in regards to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act provision, the requirements for shallow land disposal of hazardous waste compared to the disposal requirements of the spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste proposed for Yucca Mountain, Yucca Mountain has orders of magnitude, more safeguards and more protection than what you would find in a standard hazardous waste disposal cell. Mr. Gibbons. So you're saying that DOE's high-level waste management protection would preempt and actually be on an order of magnitude greater maybe than the State laws that have air and water quality assurances in them? Mr. Golan. Sir, I am talking about the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act provision---- Mr. Gibbons. I am talking about the bill that is before Congress today that your organization--your Department supports. Mr. Golan. I would like to go through the other two aspects of the bill that you mentioned, sir. Mr. Gibbons. I just want your statement. Do you believe that DOE, by supporting this piece of legislation, will make Yucca Mountain safer? Mr. Golan. If I might just add the air provision, sir---- Mr. Gibbons. It is a yes or no question. Mr. Golan. I would like just to go through the three provisions that you mentioned. Mr. Gibbons. You can go through the provisions. Just give me a yes or no answer to it. Mr. Golan. With regard to the air provision, we still are required to get air permits; and the environmental protection agency would be the issues of those air permits. Mr. Gibbons. But this legislation is going to take State standards out of it. Mr. Golan. It puts authority to issue air permits with the Environmental Protection Agency, sir. Mr. Gibbons. Yes, the government, Federal Government. Mr. Golan. Yes, sir. And, last, with regard to water, the only thing the Department is asking for is to be treated by like any other entity. Most of the water we are using is for worker safety. It is for dust suppression. It gets very dry and dusty. Most of the water is being used for dust suppression. Over the course of 5 years we intend to use the equivalent of 4 days worth of water that is used in Las Vegas, so over the course of 5 years we are just asking to be treated as any other person or any other entity asking for a State water permit. We would not be using the water that Las Vegas typically uses the aquifers for, and all we are asking for is to be treated equally under that provision. Mr. Gibbons. Well, that doesn't require a law change. Mr. Golan. We find it very difficult, sir, to get water permits issued for simple things such as dust suppression at the site. Mr. Gibbons. Is that because you don't have access or you don't have title to the water? Mr. Golan. It is because we have a difficult time getting permits from the State and to get access to the water, sir. Mr. Gibbons. There are courts to deal with that if the State doesn't give you a permit. But let me ask you a question, because you are the expert and you are the person sitting here talking to me about quality assurance. I am a scientist. I come out of the mining industry. Let me ask you a question. Do you feel that the quality assurance standards for the rock bolts that are in the mine that are applied today meet the quality assurance for a long-term assessment for those rock bolts that are in there? I mean---- Mr. Golan. Are we talking about the rocks bolts that are currently installed, sir? Mr. Gibbons. Yes. Mr. Golan. For the--when--if we get construction authorization from the NRC, our intent is to change the nature of the support structures inside the Yucca Mountain facility. Mr. Gibbons. Why do you need to do that? Mr. Golan. Because we have a provision that has--the waste has to be retrievable for a period of time from 50 to up to 300 years after emplacement. So we are going to change the nature of the ground support. Mr. Gibbons. In other words, the rock bolt quality assurance today doesn't meet those standards? Mr. Golan. Again, this is an exploratory tunnel, sir; and when we go into actual mining excavation and preparation for the tunnel for actual waste disposal, there will be a different set of standards and a different set of requirements that will be implemented. Mr. Gibbons. But the standards today don't meet what your expectations are, do they? Mr. Golan. We don't intend to dispose of the waste in the exploratory tunnels. Mr. Gibbons. You have a wonderful way of articulating a non-answer to my question. Mr. Golan. I just said we are going to use a different set of standards when we actually---- Mr. Gibbons. We will move on. You anticipate removing about 147,000 acres, withdrawing that land---- Mr. Golan. Yes, sir. Mr. Gibbons [continuing]. In the State of Nevada. Where is that land located today? Mr. Golan. It is located around the Yucca Mountain site; and I can provide a map for the record, sir. Mr. Gibbons. Would you please? Mr. Golan. Yes, sir. Mr. Gibbons. Is it within the Air Force training area? Mr. Golan. Part of the land is within Nellis Air Force Base, yes, sir. Mr. Gibbons. How much of it? Mr. Golan. About a quarter, sir. Mr. Gibbons. You anticipate restricting overflight and training from Nellis Air Force Base in that area. Mr. Golan. We anticipate there will be some flight restrictions that may be required during the waste in place and the waste handling operations. Mr. Gibbons. So about 30,000 acres is going to be removed from the Air Force training capability, a little more? Mr. Golan. About, a little more, somewhere around that, yes, sir. Mr. Gibbons. Somewhere around 37. Nellis is one of the principal pilot training areas that we have in this country, one of the few remaining where those of us who have trained there are able to get the skills and the ability to defend this country; and because of your now urgency of withdrawing 147,000 acres, taking part of that away from the Air Force, we are going to restrict those pilots from being able to get that training, to be able to protect this country, to be able to learn themselves how to better do their jobs. How do you justify national security concerns? Mr. Golan. Because, sir, this project has been approved by the President and both Houses of Congress. Mr. Gibbons. There is a lot of things we approved in this Congress, a lot of things that are signed by the President of United States and a lot of things that don't jeopardize the national security of this country. Your removal of that land, your removal of restricting that area, in my view, takes away a measurable part of the training area that these pilots train on; and, in addition to that, you are going to restrict them because of the railroad access, the highway accesses that you are going to have to build in there. So it is more than just that small fragment. You are going to set aside a large part of true training area that is the PhD for our men and women who fly these airplanes and defend this country because you want a larger and restricted area for this waste management area. You know, I am not opposed to nuclear energy. I am opposed to the poorly thought-out provision of Yucca Mountain. Mr. Golan. Sir, I am a member of the U.S. Armed Forces; and I appreciate your concern. But when the site recommendation was approved by Congress, it was always the intent to remove the 147,000 acres permanently as part---- Mr. Gibbons. Whose intent? I have been here for 10 years. Mr. Gulan. That was--in order for us to receive a construction authorization from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission require permanent land withdrawal. Mr. Gibbons. Congress hasn't said we are going to permanently withdraw 147,000---- Mr. Gulan. No, that's in front of Congress to decide, sir. Mr. Gibbons. Exactly. It's your decision to bring it before us today. We'll have another round, Mr. Chairman. I'm sorry to keep dominating the questions here. Mr. Porter. Thank you, Congressman. Question. Margaret, explain the process of the licensing application. Once it's provided to you, then your team investigates all the information of the provider? How does that work? Ms. Federline. Yes, sir. Once the license application is submitted to the NRC we have a 90-day acceptance period where we will conduct an acceptance review before we decide if it will be docketed. At that point all the information needs to be complete. Once the application is docketed, we will conduct a detailed rigorous independent review based on our staff's independent knowledge of Yucca Mountain. Once that is complete, we will develop a safety evaluation report and it will go to the licensing board for decision. Mr. Porter. How do you do that in 90 days? Ms. Federline. We have established a prelicensing-- Congress, in its wisdom, established a prelicensing consultation. And when I say consultation, I don't mean--it is a process by which we interact with DOE so that we can identify issues which would be essential to address to ensure a complete license application. We have referred to these as key technical issues, and we've identified over 290 of these issues which we believe would be important to address in order to have adequate information to conduct a licensing review. Mr. Porter. So in other words, you're periodically doing audits of your own and working with DOE and giving advice, although they don't have to follow it at this point. Will you give some direction as to some of the things they need to do prior to the application being submitted? Ms. Federline. We want to make sure that DOE understands our licensing requirement, so we feel it's very important for them in developing a license application to be clear as to what our licensing requirements require. And so the prelicensing period is for us to interact with DOE and to provide information and guidance similar to what we do with other-- licensing other nuclear facilities. Mr. Porter. So are we technically in the prelicensing stage at this point? Ms. Federline. Yes, we are. Mr. Porter. So the last 20 years technically has been prelicensing period? Ms. Federline. Yes, it has. Mr. Porter. So you have found close to 290 areas of concern; is that what you're saying? Ms. Federline. No. We identified a framework of issues which need to be addressed to thoroughly characterize or thoroughly make a safety case which answers the requirements in our regulations. Mr. Porter. So it's like questions that you have that they need to answer? Ms. Federline. Well, they're actually part of the demonstration of the safety case, pieces of the safety case that would need to be demonstrated to provide adequate information for us to conduct a safety review. Mr. Porter. So do they, then, give you preliminary prelicensing information that may be a test prior to the final application being submitted? Ms. Federline. No, they don't. We have interactions in which we identify the types of information that would be necessary, and we do provide guidance back to them if we feel that they don't understand our requirements. It's not--it would be--as a regulator, we could not make a predecision before the license application comes in. And so it's strictly intended to establish a framework which explains our regulations and what would be required. Mr. Porter. So throughout this process there has been communication between NRC and DOE which is normal in whether it be a nuclear reactor or Department of Energy, sort of following the guidelines that are consistent throughout the industry, correct? Ms. Federline. Yes. As part of design certification we do do precertification reviews where we do a similar type of thing, identify issues which need to be addressed as part of the design certification. Mr. Porter. Would the USNRC have a problem with Congress being able to see a draft license application from DOE regarding this project? Ms. Federline. We have not seen a draft license application. And when one became available to us when it was submitted, if DOE had not made it publically available, obviously we would make it publically available. Mr. Porter. Would you have a problem with Congress seeing one today if one were--or I guess let me ask this question a little differently. We have asked numerous times for a copy of a draft license application, and Department of Energy has consistently refused to provide it to the American public. Would you have a problem with us asking for a copy of that from the Department of Energy? Ms. Federline. Well, my sense is that at the time the license application is submitted it would contain the necessary and complete information. You know, we would not get involved between Congress and DOE in terms of what you require from DOE. Mr. Porter. So you wouldn't have a problem, then, with us requesting that information, it's between us and DOE? Ms. Federline. Yes. Mr. Porter. Thank you. Congressman. Mr. Gibbons. Let me followup with some of my questioning that I started before. And Director Federline, if the proposal that's before Congress today, the legislation which, if I may describe radically undercuts the traditional requirements by demonstrating nuclear safety by allowing unlimited changes in the repository with no right to a formal or informal oral hearing and only 18 months for environmental review, do you feel that is sufficient to give the American public confidence in the proposals as they move forward? Ms. Federline. I'm sorry, sir, but the Commission has not completed its review of the legislation; we have not completed development of comments. Mr. Gibbons. OK. Without having a formal opinion of the-- about the condition, what's your personal opinion of language that completely undercuts and removes the, as I said, removes the right to a formal or informal oral hearing and restricts it to 18 months for environmental review? Ms. Federline. With all due respect, sir, it would be inappropriate for me as a regulator to comment on standards that could be the subject of a licensing proceeding. Mr. Gibbons. Well, let me go back to Mr. Gulan. What's your opinion of having no right to a formal or informal oral hearing on changes to Yucca Mountain? Mr. Gulan. Well, first, sir, after we submit the license application the NRC, in accordance with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, is 3 years, with the possible exception they can request an additional 4th year before they make a decision on whether to grant the Department construction authorization. What we are asking for in the legislative package is, in the second phase of that--in other words, the licensing amendment to receive and possess--that the NRC basically have 12 months, with the possible extension of 6 months, to review that process, which I don't think is inconsistent with--because they'll have had 4 years to review the license before-- inconsistent with potentially how they would review an action in a nuclear reactor licensing arena. Mr. Gibbons. But in demonstrating nuclear safety there's a lot of people outside of DOE would have concerns, and you're now restricting or limiting to any formal or informal oral statements or position---- Mr. Gulan. I don't believe the proposed legislation restricts the interactions as you're talking through here, sir. Mr. Gibbons. Well, the way I read it for those unlimited changes that DOE wants to make to Yucca Mountain, and that means expanding from 70,000 to whatever number you plan to propose in the future, that you are going to restrict the informal and formal oral hearings. Mr. Gulan. Sir, that provision in the legislative proposal refers to the second step in the licensing process. When we submit our license application to the NRC, they'll have a period up to 4 years to review and to grant the Department the license---- Mr. Gibbons. But that's for the original 70,000 tons? Mr. Gulan. Yes, sir. Mr. Gibbons. And now I'm talking about the unlimited changes that you want to make. Why would it be good, why should we permit you to restrict informal or formal hearings and restrict it to 18 months, for example, if you wanted to double the size? Mr. Gulan. Sir, that provision, I'd just like to go back to, that's after receiving construction authorization, the 18- month provision would be a license to receive and possess. So the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would still have up to 4 years to review the license application and go through the hearing process, the formal hearing process in that 4-year period. Mr. Gibbons. Including the unlimited extensions and expansions that you want to put on Yucca Mountain after you get the original 70,000-ton determination? Mr. Gulan. Sir, again, the second part of the license application is the license amendment to receive and possess. And again, I don't have a copy of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in front of me here, and I'd be glad to take that question for the record, but the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is clear on the amount of time the Regulatory Commission has to review and issue a judgment on construction authorization. What the Nuclear Waste Policy Act didn't have when it was written or amended was a timeframe in which the NRC would then grant the second part of that license for receive and possess. Mr. Gibbons. One of the things that troubles me about the bill that your organization is proposing to Congress is the authority to limit the exercise of jurisdictional power by States, tribal governments, etc., over the transportation requirements through their communities, through their reservations, along their highways and byways. Why do you want to take away local government's authority to review transportation routes? Mr. Gulan. Sir, I'd like to offer a briefing to your office and to you on the full scope of the legislative package. I didn't come prepared to necessarily talk in detail on that today; however, I do want to point to the transportation aspect. The Department has been transporting nuclear materials and nuclear waste over the last 50 years and it has a very good safety record. Our intention, with the transportation provision in our legislative proposal, was to extend all the work, all the interactions that we currently do when we ship special nuclear materials, when we ship low level waste and when we ship transuranic waste. And it was meant to extend those types of provisions to how we transport waste to Yucca Mountain, sir. Mr. Gibbons. If those provisions, as you say, have resulted in such a historic safety record, why do you want to exclude local government from having a say in either the routes, which roads or which train lines or over what bridges or along what schools or along which communities that this material travels? Mr. Gulan. Sir, again, I'd offer again that we would come and provide you a briefing on the legislative package; but again, the intent of that provision was basically to extend the type of activities and the type of provisions that we have with the other nuclear materials that we ship and extend that over into the shipment of spent nuclear fuel---- Mr. Gibbons. Well, I understand the idea and the intent, but I don't understand the idea to exclude and cut out of the picture those people which are charged with overseeing the safety in some of these communities, including their first responders, which would have to respond if there was an incident or an accident, from you giving them or bringing them into the picture. That's what I don't understand. Mr. Gulan. Again, I would offer that our office could come and provide you a briefing on this and walk through that specific provision. Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Porter. Thank you. Mr. Friedman, thank you for your hard work for probably 8 or 9 months--I didn't add up the time, but I appreciate it very much. Mr. Friedman. Thank you. Mr. Porter. In the report that we received today you point out some key areas, and I appreciate you addressing them in your opening comments. But more specifically, you talked about the compromise of scientific notebook requirements. Now I'm not a scientist, but it's my understanding from your information that a scientific notebook is a standard protocol in the science community--I'm quoting from your statement--that document research approaches and outcomes, and in doing so they aid an individual other than the original author in reproducing and tracing the effort. And according to your report as of today, an area of concern is there was the lack of a scientific notebook--or at least that they weren't following the requirements; and you--if I read it properly, and correct me if I'm wrong, it's like this--it appears that this notebook requirement was stopped once they found problems. Is that what you're saying in this report? Mr. Friedman. Mr. Chairman, what we--on the particular-- first of all, you have, of course, correctly characterized the importance of lab notebooks. They're essential in the science field. It allows recording of information that's generated during current analyses and allows others to buildupon that. So you have characterized it correctly. What we found in the incident in question is the lab notebook had not been maintained from the outset, which violated good science principles, and this is a 6-year old problem. And it was compounded from our perspective by the fact that once it was determined that the lab notebook had never been maintained from the outset, the contractor and the USGS and the Department decided to compromise the requirement using an alternate document, which in our view was an unacceptable remedy to the problem. Mr. Porter. So how do you define the difference between intentional negligence and something that's criminal; how do you define the difference? Mr. Friedman. Well, there are questions of intent, Mr. Chairman, there are questions of materiality that are key, and those are the essence of the items that I would identify to you. Mr. Porter. It appears to me there was intentional behavior to not keep track of this science so no one would be able to check it in the future, and it appears to me that's intentional, is that what you're saying, that it's intentional? Mr. Friedman. I could not reach the conclusion that there was an intent to not participate in the lab notebook requirement for some nefarious reason as to the future ability to track the work. I can't reach that conclusion, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Porter. Also, you mention the 6-year delay in servicing is and dealing with the controversial e-mails, those are inconsistent with sound quality assurance protocols. You go on to say we could not find a satisfactory explanation as to why the e-mails had not been recognized as problematic years earlier. This would allow the Department to address the concerns raised by the contents of the e-mails in a timely manner. Despite this, the comments--and I'm paraphrasing and moving ahead on your comments because you know them better than I do, but despite this the comments and e-mails appears to have gone unchallenged. Additionally, internal quality assurance reviews over the years failed to identify the questionable e-mails. Again, can you explain to me a little bit more about what you're saying here? Mr. Friedman. Yes. Six years obviously has passed, Mr. Chairman, since the original offending e-mails were written. And in that 6-year period you referred earlier, or Mr. Gibbons did, to the turnover in personnel--maybe it was you, Mr. Chairman--people have minds, memories have faded, people have moved on, documentation is no longer available. And the point that we are trying to make is that if these offending e-mails had been identified contemporaneously or very close to the time that they were in fact written, minds would have been fresh, memories could have been fresh, the Department could have addressed the issues very promptly and saved a great deal of turmoil that has occurred as a result. So our point is that there was reason to believe--we had testimony to suggest that quality assurance people had in fact seen the e-mails, and yet for some reason the light bulb did not go on or they did not bring those to anybody's attention until a 6-year period had elapsed. Mr. Porter. The genesis of the project is that Yucca Mountain was chosen because the mountain may provide some natural barrier to prevent filtration--or infiltration of moisture into the storage which could then contaminate ground water. And the genesis of the science is that the mountain is safe, and that there is minimal, if any, infiltration of moisture. Again, in your report you mention that control files relating to the simulation of net infiltration from modern and potential future climates, AMR was not maintained in accordance with Data Management System's requirements, and that during the evaluation of AMR for the simulation of net infiltration from modern and potential future climates the team wasn't able to reproduce the model due to the absence of certain control files. Can you explain your findings under that No. 3? Mr. Friedman. I can, Mr. Chairman. In recent years there was an attempt made to reconstruct that model, to evaluate it further and to see whether it withstood the test of time. When they tried to recreate it, they found that there were certain control documents which they could not find in the master control file. And of course in a $9 billion project overall you would anticipate that would be absolutely essential. Ultimately the files were located in the residence of one of the participants--or at least part of the files were found there. Mr. Porter. Thank you. Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Chairman, I'm a bit taken aback by some of the answers we've gotten today because I expected a little more of being able to bridge between the problems of the quality assurance issues that have been described by either DOE or the GAO in their development of the program and the policy here at Yucca Mountain. But I'm more troubled by the fact that we are here in Congress and we are trying to bridge and overcome these quality assurance issues, and you know, it seems to me right now that we've kind of got the cart before the horse. You know, we've seen a lot of problems with the scientific analysis coming up, maybe they weren't intentionally changed or fraudulently put out there, and that did not give rise to a criminal action, but it does give rise to some serious concerns, concerns as a scientist myself, as a geologist, as a mining geologist, it gives rise of concern to me that perhaps those that were in charge of doing the science work and those who actually performed that science didn't have in their bag of work ethics the right motivation to be doing what they should have been doing on this project and simply took shortcuts. If that's the case, we've obviously got some serious problems here, or if they just simply said if they want more quality assurance I'll go write more quality assurance. Nonetheless, there's some real serious quality assurance problems here that haven't been answered adequately in my mind. There is also this question about the new piece of legislation which DOE is supporting before this Congress in an effort to overcome some problems that they can't meet today. And I think unfortunately I'm still of the opinion that this project that's fatally flawed, that no matter how much you move the goalpost to make it work, no matter how many times you change the standard to make something fit, no matter how many times you get a bigger hammer to fit a square peg in a round hole, it's still going to be a square peg in a round hole. And I think the bill that's before us is an unconstitutional usurpation of the States' sovereign prerogatives, whether it's in Nevada, but it sets a horrible precedence across this country because you're forcing communities, you're forcing States to give up traditional jurisdiction under the Constitution of areas that they normally had authority to regulate. It circumvents the scientific flaws that these people here have already said have existed and have a history of existing. It deprives the States, as I said, and localities nationwide for the role in waste transport. It exonerates the Department of Energy from traditional regulations for nuclear projects. I think what we are doing here is getting the bigger hammer out and we are trying to make everything fit. As a geologist, I can't accept it. First of all, to build Yucca Mountain in a safe place or build a project at Yucca Mountain that is supposed to be geologically stable should at first raise the flags automatically when it was a mountain. You know, it didn't get there, it didn't get to be a mountain by some placid tectonic activity. It's got serious geologic problems, and we don't have the vision to look down the road and say when those are going to reoccur. We are hoping that the blindness--with blinders on that we will somehow get past this, wash our hands of it and say out of sight, out of mind, we are done, and oh, by the way, let's make it bigger so we can take in everything. What's happening here today is that, because of the NIMBY syndrome--and I have to admit, it's in Nevada, we don't want it in our back yard, no other State wants it in their back yard, but we've failed to meet, I think, this country's expectations of how to deal with nuclear energy, and it will result in the end of nuclear energy in this country if the Department of Energy is allowed to complete Yucca Mountain. So my view, Mr. Chairman, is that the bill is fatally flawed, the project is fatally flawed, the concepts of how to deal with nuclear waste are fatally flawed. It has for 30 years had blinders on to just go forward with this, to make sure the deep geologic burial, according to the Nuclear Energy Institute, accommodates all of those power plants that want to close down or are closed down, but it doesn't meet the safety requirements that this country and this public expect. And I'm sad, saddened by the day that we sit here in here and talk about changing the standards, eliminating the oversight, giving unlimited jurisdiction to a department who's got sole responsibility for this type of occurrence. And it's worse than the chicken watching the fox--or the hen--excuse me, the fox watching the chicken house--I'll get that yet. And so, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for your leadership. I have no more questions about this. I haven't heard anything that allows me to get a better feeling for what's going on, but I do appreciate the fact that you've invited me here today, and I appreciate the fact that you have allowed me to participate in this hearing. With that, I want to thank all of our witnesses. I know you have tough jobs ahead of you, just as we have tough decisions to make, and I appreciate the fact that you have been here before us and responded to our questions. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Porter. Thank you, Congressman. I'd like to ask just a couple more questions. And Mr. Wells, again, thank you for being here. I did not want you to feel like we left you out of this debate---- Mr. Wells. No problem. Mr. Porter. But I know that you and your staff spent a lot of time and we greatly appreciate it, and on behalf of the American people we appreciate it. GAO has investigated quality assurance in Yucca Mountain for 20 something years. And the title of the 1988 report was Repository Work Should Not Proceed Until Quality Assurance Is Adequate. Now this is 1988. In light of the GAO's extensive work, why do you think DOE is still experiencing these same problems, since 1988, the same problems? Mr. Wells. You know, I think it goes back to--it was encouraging, everyone in the room probably picked up on Mr. Gulan's statement that their goal was to have early detection of these problems; and we have--since 1988 people have gone in and looked and found problems that seemed to--quality assurance problems that seemed to fester under the surface for a lot of years and under the radar screen, and all of a sudden they accumulate and they explode, and then the Department of Energy jumps to some type of fix, and it's rework and it's expensive. And you have to ask yourself why does that happen. And you know, consistently talking to the audit teams that have looked at the Yucca Mountain project and the quality assurance program, consistently we hear things with the culture, the importance of QA not being as high as the importance of meeting a schedule, or the ability to think that if it's wrong somebody else will find it and fix it later. And I think Mr. Gulan's commitment to change the culture is on the right track, to elevate the importance of quality assurance to keep these problems from festering so long. It shouldn't take 6 year e- mails to discover that they occurred; it shouldn't take the NRC to observe an audit and point out that the equipment they're using hasn't been calibrated in years. It's that culture that's unacceptable and it has to be changed. Mr. Porter. Thank you, Mr. Wells. And I find it truly amazing that we are talking about high level nuclear waste, and again, whether you're for or against Yucca Mountain, the fact that these questions of safety keeps coming up, it's nuclear waste, it's not about a bicycle plant someplace in Des Moines, we are talking about high level nuclear waste, a science that's untested, and continually questions of safety. And again, I appreciate your comments, Mr. Wells. Ms. Federline, another question for you, please. Is this turnover of management, 9 of 17 key positions and 3 directors in a short period of time, is that a concern for the NRC? Ms. Federline. Well, I think overall the NRC feels that the perspective of QA at DOE is very important; in other words, finding problems is not the problem; a good QA program will normally find problems. The issue with us is those problems need to be quickly fixed and they need to be prevented from recurrence. And those are two aspects that we want to emphasize to DOE. And they need to put in place an organizational structure which they feel will be effective in making those corrections and seeing that the problems don't reoccur. Mr. Porter. I see Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes has left. I'd like to just ask a couple of additional questions. Mr. Gulan, regarding the turnover of staff, 9 of 17, were any of those individuals asked to leave? Mr. Gulan. No. We did not renew a limited term SES appointment, but the people that you talk about left on their own volition. Mr. Porter. So there was no encouragement on the part of DOE for any of these individuals, it was just purely attrition and retirement? Mr. Gulan. Basically, sir. Mr. Porter. So then who has been held accountable for information that's been provided today? Has anyone been held accountable? Mr. Gulan. Yes, they have. And there are people who are no longer working on this project. Mr. Porter. You just moved them to another project, somewhere in the nuclear industry? Mr. Gulan. No. There's been folks in the contract or organization who are no longer part of this project, sir. Mr. Porter. And they're still working for the Federal Government? Mr. Gulan. I don't know, sir. They don't work on this project. Mr. Porter. OK. Is there a way that we can find out? Mr. Gulan. Sure. We'll take that question for the record. Mr. Porter. I appreciate that. Thank you. I guess in closing, Mr. Gulan, I'll ask you a question. Based on the findings of GAO and the Inspector General's office, in discussions today and in prior discussions, how can you say that we can assure the American public that Yucca Mountain is and will be safe? Mr. Gulan. Sir, that's our--the burden is on us to demonstrate to you and to the American public that we can operate Yucca Mountain safely. There is an established process through the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, through the licensing process that will be a very public process, the regulator being the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. So there is a formal process. But before we get to that formal process there is a process within the Department. Before we submit a license application it has to pass our standards. And one of the things that we didn't talk about today is the fact that we have not talked about a schedule of when the license application will be submitted. I mentioned earlier in my testimony, Secretary Bodman gave me clear instructions, make it simpler, make it safer, and improve the quality and culture of this organization. Those were his marching orders to me, sir, and we are following that. After we review everything from the model down through the design basis for the facilities, the safety analysis, the seismic analysis and develop our license application, it's our intent to conduct our internal reviews, our internal independent reviews to ensure that our standards have been met, to ensure that our quality standards have been met. And only after our standards have been met will we be in a position to submit our licensing application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for them to adjudicate the licensing process here. So there are standards that have to be met in this organization, and the bar is set high, before we send our application request in to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Mr. Porter. So once the application is submitted, is it the NRC's responsibility to determine if it's safe or is it DOE's? Mr. Gulan. It's the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's responsibility to adjudicate that process, it's not ours. Mr. Porter. So you don't accept responsibility if it's safe---- Mr. Gulan. No. I accept responsibility. It is my responsibility that we submit a high quality license application that our standards have been met. It's the NRC's job then to evaluate on whether or not they issue us a license to construct, and then subsequently a license to receive and possess; but it's our responsibility to meet our standards first. Mr. Porter. You know, I can remember growing up many, many years ago--and I'm not sure if this cartoon is still around, it was Family Circle. Steve, is it still in the paper, the Family Circle? Mr. Castor. Yes, it's in the Washington Post, sir. Mr. Porter. Thank you. I haven't had a chance to look at the cartoon pages as much as I'd like to, but there was this cartoon, the Family Circle, and these kids were around saying not me, not me, not me, not my fault, not my fault, not my fault. And my biggest concern--again, whether you're for or against Yucca Mountain--is that someday we are going to wake up and 2000 DOE employees are going to say it wasn't my job, NRC may wake up and say it wasn't our job, even though there was a major catastrophe or major accident, and everyone is going to go, not me. And I sense that time and time again, as I hear the facts that are presented, that so far your decisions have not been based upon sound science at the Department of Energy. The White House, multiple administrations, have based decisions on what they believe is sound science, this Congress is basing decisions that are based upon what they feel are sound science, and I have yet to hear the Department of Energy is using sound science. It appears to me that there is a rush--20 years, but there's a rush to appease the nuclear industry, there's a rush to appease certain Members of Congress and certain administrations, and there's a rush to get the job done. And Mr. Gulan, I would just hope that someday Department of Energy officials don't wake up and say not me, because I'm very, very concerned. Mr. Gulan. You won't hear those words from my mouth, sir. Mr. Porter. Again, I want to thank you all for being here. We will continue our investigation. We still have numerous documents to review. I appreciate Mr. Wells, Mr. Friedman, Ms. Federline and Mr. Gulan for being here today, and look forward to continued testimony in the future. We will be forwarding additional questions that we'd like to have answers for the record. So with that, we'll adjourn the meeting. Thank you all very much. [Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] [The prepared statement of Hon. Danny K. Davis follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] <all>