## **CANICCOR RESEARCH**

P.O. Box 426829, San Francisco, California 94142-6829 Offices at 220 Golden Gate Avenue, 9th floor, San Francisco, CA 94102 Phone: (415) 885-5102 · FAX: (415) 885-5103 - e-mail: caniccor@mindspring.com

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Regulations Comments
Attn: No. 2004-4
Chief Counsel's Office
Office of Thrift Supervision
1700 G Street, NW
Washington, DC 20552



## Comments on Proposed Rule Making: Community Reinvestment Act Regulations

CANICCOR provides rankings of the social responsibility of financial corporations to institutional investors and serves as a consultant to these investors in dialogues with these corporations.

These comments were requested by the Access to Capital Working Group of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility as well as individual institutional investors. The opinions presented are those of CANICCOR.

CANICCOR objects to the changes in reporting and the definitions of small institutions in the proposed regulations and supports the maintenance of the current regulations defining small institutions and reporting from 1995.


If the proposed changes had been in effect in 2002, the reporting of loans to small businesses would have been reduced by 19%, of loans to small farms by 32% and of development and 3<sup>rd</sup> party loans by 8%, as shown on the left hand side of the figure on page 2. For CRA Performance Evaluations of the remaining individual depositories, such decreases in the reporting of loans to small business and especially to small farms could significantly change the industry levels used for comparison with the examined depository, resulting in an inaccurate Community Performance Evaluations by federal regulators as well as CANICCOR Rankings for all other depositories. Our major concern is the effect on the reporting of subsidiaries of bank holding companies with assets of greater than \$1 billion.

- I. CANICCOR objects for the following reasons to the change of CRA regulations to eliminate the reporting of CRA data for subsidiaries with assets of less than \$500 million of bank holding companies with assets of \$1 billion or greater:
- Between one-quarter and one-third of all bank holding companies with assets between \$1 billion and \$10 billion in 2002 held bank subsidiaries of assets of less than \$500 million. If the proposed regulations had been applied in 2002, these 64 holding companies with 195 smaller bank subsidiaries would have reported between 30% to 40% less in development lending, and loans to small businesses and small farms, as shown in the middle section of the figure.

# Percentages of Sectors Eliminated from the 2002 CRA Data if the Proposed Regulations had been in Effect.

### The Sectors are:

- All CRA reporters
- The 64 bank holding companies with assets of \$1 billion up to \$10 billion that had subsidiaries with assets of less than \$500 million, and
- All other depositories with asset of \$250 to \$500 million.



In fact for the \$1 billion to \$2 billion asset category of holding companies, their reporting of small farm loans would have dropped by more than half. The total declines incurred by the proposed regulations in reported lending by these holding companies of \$1 billion to \$10 billion are shown in the middle of the figure above. Holding companies of \$10 billion or greater would have been less effected with the exception of about four including Synovus Financial.

• The decrease in the number of assessment area census tracts of the holding companies by excluding small subsidiaries would decrease the amount of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act lending that would have been counted as within the assessment areas for CRA Performance Evaluations. For the 64 holding companies in 2002 with assets of \$1 billion up to \$10 billion and subsidiaries with assets of less than \$500 million, there would be a reduction by about one-quarter in the amount of purchase mortgages and home improvement loans counted as within the assessment areas of the holding company and thus included in the CRA performance evaluations.

#### As a result:

If any of these holding corporations with assets of \$1 billion or greater sought to merge or
acquire another institution, the Federal Reserve would not have had significant amounts of
CRA lending data for an adequate evaluation. This lack of data would have impaired the

CRA performance evaluations of these holding companies for mergers and acquisitions, and could lead to unexpected subsequent CRA performance results if the acquisition merges several inadequately evaluated depositories.

• Similarly, institutional investors with social screens would find difficulty in evaluating the social performances of these holding companies, thus hindering any investments in these corporations, placing of deposits, and/or the purchase of debt instruments and services.

## II. CANICCOR also objects to the exclusion of other depositories with assets of \$250 million to \$500 million:

- If the proposed regulations had been in effect in 2002, 631 depositories with assets in the range would not have reported, with the amount of loans reported to small business to declining by 13%, to small farms by 24% and for development and 3<sup>rd</sup> party lending by 5%, as shown on the right hand side the figure.
- Such decreases in loans to small business and especially to small farms would have significantly changed the industry levels for comparison to the remaining depositories for which detailed CRA performance examinations would be performed by all federal regulators.

### **Comments Regarding Regulatory Burden:**

If there be a need to reduce regulatory burden, CANICCOR proposes that the 1995 regulations be amended in a fashion similar to the following: Alter the current 1995 regulations to require reporting for only those institutions that have originated at least \$10 million in loans in one or more of the following categories: development & 3<sup>rd</sup> party loans, loans to small businesses or loans to small farms, the latter two types being exclusive of correspondent lines. This minimum reporting level would have had only a minor effect on the total reporting but would have reduced the number of reporters in 2002 by almost 300, i.e. 294, or by nearly a third of the reporters that would have been excluded under the proposed regulations.

CANICCOR supports the section: Assigned ratings (c): Effect of evidence of discriminatory, other illegal and abusive practices. CANICCOR urges that these requirements be broadened perhaps through Congressional legislation.

The CRA performance evaluations must reflect any violations of consumer protection laws as well as any patterns of lending based upon liquidation of the collateral (Section (c) ii). Regrettably, the current regulatory structure hampers the complete evaluation of non-bank affiliates and would require for implementation some legislative changes, perhaps similar to that suggested by the General Accounting Office on 24 February 2004 before the Senate Special Committee on Aging. Once APRs are reported under HMDA, the regulators should be able to focus on some of the more egregious cases.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> D. G Wood, Testimony before the Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate, 24 February 2004, "Federal and State Agencies Face Challenges in Combating Predatory Lending", GAO-04-412T, U. S. General Accounting Office.

CANICCOR supports the greater detail in the reporting of small business and small farm loans to be aggregated at the level of each census tract rather than the present level of census tract category as developed in 1995. However, if this finer level of collection is only possible under the proposed definition of "small institutions", then our preference is for not changing the present definition of small institutions now in force and leaving the level of aggregation unchanged.

The details supporting these statements are given in the appendix to these comments. Please contact me if there are any questions as to my methods of analysis. Thank you for this opportunity to comment on these proposed regulations

Sincerely yours,

John E. Lind, Ph.D. Executive Director

Cc: Steering Committee, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), Working Group on Access to Capital, \$110 billion in assets under management by members and affiliate members including:

Protestant Church Funds, assets under management of more than \$26 billion:

Patricia Zerega, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

Vidette Bullock Mixon, General Board of Pension and Health Benefits

The United Methodist Church

Mark A. Regier, Stewardship Investing Services Manager,

Mennonite Mutual Aid

William Somplatsky-Jarman, Presbyterian Church (USA)

Brian Grieves, Episcopal Church

Healthcare Systems, assets under management of \$4.4 billion:

Susan Vickers, Catholic Healthcare West

Catherine Rowan, Trinity Health

Investment Fund Managers, assets under management of \$13.9 billion:

Lauren Compere, Boston Common Asset Management

Julie Fox Gorte, Director, Social Research Department, Calvert Asset Management Co.

Steven Lydenberg, Chief Investment Officer, Domini Social Investments LLC

Joan Bavaria, President, Trillium Asset Management Corp

Kenneth Scott, Vice President, Portfolio Manager, Walden Asset Management

Religious Orders, assets under management of more than \$1.1 billion:

Rev. Joseph P. La Mar, Maryknoll Fathers and Brothers

Séamus P. Finn, Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate

Valorie Heinonen, Sisters of Mercy Region of Detroit Charitable Trust

Mercy Investment Program

Others: Paul M. Neuhauser, Professor Emeritus, School of Law, University of Iowa, ICCR Board

# Appendix OVERVIEW OF THE EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT REGULATIONS

The proposed Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) regulation changes include raising the minimum asset level of reporting depositories to \$500 million for all depositories. The present regulations require the reporting of all depositories of all asset sizes of holding companies with assets of \$1 billion or more and the reporting of other depositories of \$250 million or more. Thus the proposed regulations eliminate the reporting of all depositories with of \$250 million up to \$500 million in assets plus all depositories of less than \$250 million that are held by bank holding companies of \$1 billion or more.

The effects of the proposed Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) regulations can best be analyzed by applying them to the latest available CRA data, i.e. the 2002 data released in August 2003. According to the 2002 CRA data, 1892 depositories with assets of \$6,624 billion reported CRA data, based upon the reporting of loans to small businesses, loans to small farms and community development & 3<sup>rd</sup> party loans. Total small business and small farm loans are reported, but CANICCOR focuses upon the subsets of loans to small businesses and small farms, which are of concern to institutional investors with social concerns.

If the proposed regulations had been applied to the 2002 data collection, only 988 depositories would have reported or 53% of those that reported in 2002. Of those that would not have reported, 357 or 36% of those excluded would have been subsidiaries of bank holding companies with assets of \$1 billion or more and 631 would have been depositories with assets of less than \$500 million but not subsidiaries of large holding companies. Table I outlines the decrease in loan reporting that would have resulted.

Table			CRA Regulations be					
	ts are separa	ted into those	affecting holding tories with \$250	g companie:	s of \$1 billio	n or more a	nd then	
	Total Reported	Excluded un	der Proposed	Reported by Depositories with Assets of less than \$500 million				
	In 2002	Amount	Decline from 2002	Subsidi	aries of	Other De	ositories	
			2002	≥ \$1 billior	Co's of in Assets	Amount	Decline.	
	\$ billions	\$ billions	%	\$ billions	Decline	\$ billions	%	
Development & 3 <sup>rd</sup> Party Loans	23.926	1.824	7.6%	0.649	2.7%	1.175	4.9%	
Loans to Small Businesses	112.090	21.238	18.7%	7.210	6.2%	14.028	12.5%	
Loans to Small Farms	13.371	4.207	31.5%	1.051	7.9%	3.156	23.6%	
Depositories exclu	ided from rep	orting	988		357		631	
Note: Development farm loans do not.		y loans include	e corresponden	t line loans v	while small	business an	d small	

The proposed regulations would decrease the reporting of development and third-party lending by 7.6%, of loans to small businesses by 18.7% and of loans to small farms by 31.5%. As table I shows, these decreases are split roughly with one-third attributable to small subsidiaries of bank holding companies with assets of \$1 billion or more and two-thirds to other small depositories with assets between \$250 million up to \$500 million. The details of these computations are given below.

# Objection to the Elimination of Data on Small Subsidiaries of Holding Companies with Assets of \$1 billion or over.

Until smaller bank holding corporations consolidate their banking subsidiaries, the requirement that all subsidiaries of holding corporations of \$1 billion or more report CRA data should not be eliminated. CANICCOR recently received a request to evaluate the social rankings of Heartland Financial USA Inc of Dubuque, IA (HTLF). Heartland is a bank holding corporation with 6 depository subsidiaries and total assets of \$1.6 billion according to the 2002 CRA and HMDA data. Of these six subsidiaries only one, Dubuque Bank and Trust, held assets of greater than \$500 million.

Table II shows the amounts of lending that would not be reported under the proposed regulations if they had been in effect in 2002 for Heartland as well as a holding company ten times its size, Synovus.

V	vhich were	subsidiarie	s of Bank	with Asse Holding Co	mpanies w	ith Assets	of \$1 billio	n or more	
Reporter Assets	Number Report-	Assets of Reporters		Assets of Loans to Small		Loans to Small Farms		Community Dev. 3 <sup>rd</sup> Party Loans	
	ers	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%
\$ millions		millions	2002	Millions	2002	Millions	2002	millions	2002
			Heartlan	d Financia	I USA Inc	(HTLF)			
			R	SSD 9348	= 1206546				
All	6	1,640	100.0%	203	100.0%	72.0	100.0%	3.141	100.0%
< \$500	5	955	58.2%			37.6	52.2%	2.981	94.9%
**			Synov	us Financ	ial Corp (S	NV)			
			R	SSD 9348	= 1078846				•
All	38	17,934	100.0%	1,948	100.0%	86.8	100.0%	514.3	100.0%
< \$500	31	7,293	40.7%	1,122 de corresp	57.6%	63.2	72.8%	73.2	14.2%

For both of these corporations, the effect of excluding subsidiaries with assets of less than \$500 million would have been to decrease loans to small businesses and loans to small farms by between one-half to three-quarters. The effects on development and 3<sup>rd</sup> party loans would have been quite the opposite for these two corporations. Almost all (95%) of Heartland's development lending would have been eliminated, while only 14% of Synovus' lending would have been eliminated.

Needless to say, reporting for only subsidiaries of \$500 million or more would have completely distorted the social performances of both these holding corporations for both investors and, in the case of an acquisition, for the Federal Reserve. A major concern would also be that some of the smaller subsidiaries might not see any need to provide the bulk of the community and development lending that they now do with the present examination system.

In order to evaluate the effect of the exclusion of subsidiaries of less than \$500 million on a broad base of bank holding companies, the "regulatory high holder 1 identities" (RSSD 9348)

from bank call reports for year-end 2002 were added to the HMDA and CRA data for 2002 and the data were aggregated by this identity number. This aggregation does omit any savings institutions, which might have been acquired by a holding company. The asset sizes were those provided by the HMDA and CRA data.

As shown in Table III, the number of subsidiaries with assets of less than \$500 million of all bank holding companies with assets of \$1 billion or more in 2002 totaled only 357 depositories or 38% of the 988 depositories excluded by the new regulations. Of this total, 195 were subsidiaries of the holding companies of greatest concern, i.e. those with assets of \$1 billion to \$10 billion, because such large percentages of their lending were through these small subsidiaries. The other 162 small depositories were subsidiaries of holding companies with assets of \$10 billion and over, of which nearly a quarter of them (38) were subsidiaries of one corporation, Synovus Financial.

Table III. Nu of Bank Hold	mbers of Subs ling Companie	idiaries of Less s with Assets o	than \$500 mill	ion in Assets
Asset Size Holding Corp	Number Of Bank Holding	Num Sm	ber of Subsidia all Bank Categ in millions of	aries ory
\$ billions	Corps	< \$250 mil	250-< 500	Total < 500
1-<2	31	55	23	78
2 - < 10	33	112	. 5	117
≥ 10	28	121	41	162
Total	92	288	69	357

The results are shown in Table IV for the two groups of bank holding companies that would be most significantly affected by the exclusion of small bank subsidiaries. These two groups of holding companies were the 116 holding companies with assets of \$1 billion up to \$2 billion and the set of 109 holding corporations with assets from \$2 billion up to \$10 billion.

	of \$1 billion to \$10 billion from the 2002  Total for Bank Holding Corporation			Total for only the		
	All Those with			Subsidiaries of less than		
	Holding	Subsidia	aries		nillion in A	
	Corps	Less than \$5	00 million	\$	% of	% of
	\$ Millions		% Total	Millions	Group	Total
Bank Holding Comp	anies with	Assets from \$1	billion up	to \$2 billi	on	
116 Holding Companies of	f which 31 ha	ad Subsidiaries	of < \$500	million (i.e.	26.7%)	
Assets	\$156,416	\$42,012			32.7%	8.8%
Development and Third Party Loans	1,110	415	37.4%	159	38.3%	14.3%
Loans to Small Businesses	8,506	2,411	28.3%	980	40.6%	11.4%
Loans to Small Farms	1,080	509	47.2%	281	55.1%	26.0%
Bank Holding Compa	nies with A	ssets from \$2	2 billion u	p to \$10 h	illion	
109 Holding Companies o	f which 33 ha	ad Subsidiaries	of < \$500	million (i.e.:	30.3%)	
Assets	480,856	150,820	31.4%	39,310	26.1%	8.2%
Development and Third Party Loans	3,979	702	17.6%	206	29.3%	5.2%
Loans to Small Businesses	15,958	5,924	37.1%	2,015	34.0%	12.6%
Loans to Small Farms	2.557	1,381	54.0%	495	35.9%	19.4%

As Table IV shows, between one-quarter and one-third of all bank holding companies with assets between \$1 billion and \$10 billion held bank subsidiaries of assets of less than \$500 million. These holding companies with these smaller bank subsidiaries would have reported between 30% to 40% less in development lending, and loans to small businesses and small farms. In fact for the \$1 billion to \$2 billion asset category of holding companies, their reporting of small farm loans would have dropped by more than half.

Larger holding companies have tended to consolidate their subsidiaries and any smaller subsidiaries would not usually represent such a significant proportion of their lending. Thus there were only 4 bank holding companies with assets above \$10 billion where the subsidiaries with assets below \$500 million accounted for more than 10% of total assets. The classic example is Synovus Financial Corporation (SNV) with 38 subsidiaries and \$17.8 billion in assets, of which 31 had assets of less than \$500 million and represented 42% of total assets.

A similar analysis of savings institutions using the parent information from the year-end 2002 Thrift Financial Reports shows only 4 savings institutions with more than one depository subsidiary and total assets of \$10 billion or greater. For total assets between \$1 billion and \$10 billion, there were 6 institutions, all of which held a depository subsidiary of less than \$500 million, but none of these smaller depositories reported any development & third party lending nor any small business or small farm lending. Zero small business and small farm lending is not surprising since savings institutions have traditionally lent on real estate but not on business loans, but the lack of development and third party loans is disappointing. Suffice it to say, that the proposed regulations would have no effect on the reporting of subsidiaries of savings institutions with total assets of \$1 billion or greater.

Finally, CANICCOR is concerned by the loss of assessment area information. Analysis by CANICCOR is by metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or the portions of an MSA that are within and outside of the assessment areas. The federal regulators follow a similar procedure, focusing only on the assessment areas. Many small depositories do service only a portion of an MSA. Thus without assessment area information, these small lenders would be at a disadvantage to be compared to the performance of lenders throughout the MSA. Table V shows this loss for bank holding companies with assets of \$1 billion or more on the basis of the number of census tract that would not have been reported for their total assessment areas.

Table V. Loss of Assessment Are \$500 Million from Bank Ho	a Census Tracts  Iding Companie	s caused by Exes of \$1 billion of	cluding all or more from	Banks with n the 2002	assets of I	ess than	
	Total for Ba	Total for Bank Holding Corporation			Total for only the		
	All				Subsidiaries of less than		
	Holding					lion in Assets	
	Corps	Less than \$5	00 million		% of		
	No. Tracts		% Total	Tracts	Group	Total	
Bank Holding Co	mpanies with	Assets from \$1	billion up	to \$2 billi	on		
116 Holding Companie	s of which 31 ha	ad Subsidiaries	of < \$500	million (i.e.	26.7%)		
Assessment Area Tracts	76,946			59.2%	20.9%		
Bank Holding Con	panies with A	Assets from \$2	2 billion u	p to \$10 b	illion		
109 Holding Companie	es of which 33 h	ad Subsidiaries	of < \$500	million (i.e.	30.3%)		
Assessment Area Tracts	165,676				36.9%	11.9%	
Bank Holdin	g Companies v	vith Assets of	\$10 billion	or More			
63 Bank Holding Compai					e.46.0%)		
Assessment Area Tracts	484,158	285,428	60.0%	44,783	15.7%	9.2%	

Consolidating from Table V, the 64 bank holding companies with assets between \$1 billion up to \$10 billion with subsidiaries of less than \$500 million would have ceased reporting 44.4% of their assessment area tracts. For all 288 bank holding companies with assets of \$1 billion or greater, the reduction in the number of census tracts reported for assessment areas would have been 11.1% in 2002, while for only those with subsidiaries with assets of less than \$500 million, the reduction would have been 17.4%.

Particularly for the 64 bank holding companies with assets of \$1 billion up to \$10 million and subsidiaries with assets of less than \$500 million, the decrease of 44% in the reported assessment area tracts would significantly alter the analysis of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data. Table VI shows the shift in the amount of HMDA reported loans from assessment areas to non-assessment areas because of this loss of the reporting of assessment area census tracts for bank holding companies of \$1 billion or more in assets

Table VI. Effect o	f the Loss of A	Assessment Are	eas on HM	DA Analyşi	8	
Caused by Excluding all Banks w	ith assets of I	ess than \$500	Million from	n Bank Hold	ding Compa	anies
of \$1 t	oillion or more	from the 2002	CRA Data.		•	
Mortgage A	Affiliates and C	Correspondent	Lines Exclu	ided.		
	Total for Ba	ank Holding Co	rporation	Tota	al for only t	he
	All	Those	with		aries of les	
	Holding	Subsidia	aries	\$500 :	million in A	ssets
	Corps	Less than \$5	00 million	\$	% of	% of
	\$ Millions	\$ Millions	% Total		Group	Total
Bank Holding Com						
225 Holding Companies	of which 64 ha	ad Subsidiaries	of < \$500	million (i.e.	28.4%)	
Purchase Loans	20,023	6,525	32.5%	1,717	26.3%	8.6%
Home Improvement Loans	1,835	592	32.2%	152	25.7%	8.3%
Bank Holding C						
63 Holding Companies of	f which 29 ha	d Subsidiaries	of < \$500 n	nillion (i.e. 4	46.0%)	
Purchase Loans	143,640	46,645	32.4%	6,892	14.8%	4.8%
Home Improvement Loans	10,042	3,828	38.1%	474	12.4%	4.7%

For those 64 bank holding companies with assets of \$1 billion up to \$10 billion and subsidiaries of \$500 million or less, about a quarter of their purchase mortgage and home improvement loan originations, exclusive of any non-bank affiliate mortgage subsidiaries, would no longer be reported within their assessment areas. For the bank holding companies with assets of \$10 billion or more with small subsidiaries, the percentage drops to 12% to 15%.

CANICCOR argues against the change of CRA regulations regarding bank holding companies with assets of \$1 billion or greater for the following reasons:

• If any of these holding corporations with assets of \$1 billion or greater sought to merge or acquire another institution, the Federal Reserve would not have had significant amounts of CRA lending data for an adequate evaluation. This lack of data would have impaired the CRA performance evaluations of these holding companies for mergers and acquisitions, and could lead to unexpected subsequent CRA performance results if the acquisition merges several inadequately evaluated depositories.

- For CRA Performance Evaluations of the remaining individual depositories, such
  decreases in reporting of loans to small business and especially to small farms could
  significantly change the industry levels used for comparison to the examined depository,
  resulting in an inaccurate evaluations of the remaining institutions.
- The decrease in the number of assessment area census tracts of the holding companies by excluding small subsidiaries would decrease the amount of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act lending that would be counted as within the assessment areas for CRA Performance Evaluations. For the 64 holding companies with assets of \$1 billion up to \$10 billion and subsidiaries with assets of less than \$500 million, there would be a reduction by about one-quarter in the amount of purchase mortgages and home improvement loans counted as within the assessment areas of the holding company and thus excluded from the CRA performance evaluations.
- Institutional investors with social screens would find difficulty in evaluating the social
  performances of these holding companies, thus hindering any investments in these
  corporations, the placing of deposits, and/or the purchase of debt instruments and
  services.
- The burden of performance evaluations of these depositories with less than \$500 million
  in assets would have been relatively small, amounting to only 367 institutions in 2002 or
  about a third of the total depositories that would have been excluded under the
  proposed regulations. The cost burden to these large holding companies should also be
  small compared to total holding company assets.

# Objection to the Exclusion of other Small Institutions with Assets of \$250 million to less than \$500 million

CANICCOR does not object to some streamlining of performance evaluations for lenders with assets of under \$500 million but we do object to the loss of data.

As shown in Table I, if these small depositories, exclusive of the ones held by large bank holding companies, had not reported in 2002, the reporting of development and third-party lending would have decreased by 4.9%, of the loans to small businesses would have decrease by 12.5% and of the loans to small farms would have decreased by 23.6%. The decrease in census tract reporting would have eliminated from assessment areas about 10% of the total HMDA purchase mortgage and home improvement lending of 1892 CRA reporting depositories in 2002, although these percentages would be reduced for all HMDA reporters to 2.5% and 5.9%, respectively.

There were 238 bank holding companies with assets between \$500 million up to \$1 billion within this group. Table VII shows that of these 238 bank holding companies only 26 had with subsidiaries with assets between \$250 million up to \$500 million, which would not have reported in 2002, if the proposed regulations had been in place. While these subsidiaries of \$250 million up to \$500 million constituted 60% to 95% of the various loan types originated by these 26 bank holding companies, these loans amounts constituted only 5% to 8% of the total loans originated by these 238 bank holding companies. Although the exclusion of these subsidiaries would

significantly impair the performance evaluations of these 26 bank holding companies, there would be little effect beyond these evaluations because of their small proportion of the total lending.

Table VII. Effect of	the Loss of A	Assessment Ar	eas on HM	DA Analysis	 S	•		
Caused by Excluding all Banks wit						nies		
		illion from the 2						
Mortgage Af	filiates and C	orrespondent l	Lines Exclu	ded.				
	Total for B	ank Holding Co	rporation	Tota	al for only t	ne		
	All	Those v	vith	Subsidia	aries of les	s than		
	Holding Subsidiaries \$500 million in Assets							
	Corps	Less than \$5	00 million	\$	% of	% of		
	\$ Millions	\$ Millions	% Total	Millions	Group	Total		
Bank Holding Compa								
238 Holding Companies of which	26 had Subs	idiaries of ≥\$2	50 million to	o < \$500 m	illion (i.e. 1	5%)		
Assets	164,107	18,274	11.1%	12,493	68.4%	7.6%		
Development and Third Party Loans	1,159	70	5.8%	67	96.2%	5.8%		
Loans to Small Businesses	9,762	954	6.0%	722	75.7%	7.4%		
Loans to Small Farms	1,694	149	8.8%	128	86.1%	7.5%		
HMDA redu	ction from re	duction of asse	essment are	eas.				
Purchase Loans	5,994	698	11.6%	506	72.4%	8.4%		
Home Improvement Loans	542	49	9.0%	29	59.1%	5.4%		

This group of individual depositories and bank holding companies with assets of under \$1 billion, exclusive of subsidiaries of bank holding companies with assets \$1 billion or more has, in total, significant loan originations in most loan categories, although individually their originations may not be large. Thus CANICCOR is concerned that:

- Such decreases in reporting of loans to small business and especially to small farms
  would have significantly changed the industry levels for comparison to the remaining
  depositories for which detailed CRA performance examinations would be performed by
  all federal regulators.
- Institutional investors with social screens would find difficulty in evaluating the social
  performances of these small holding companies and other depositories, thus hindering
  any investments in these corporations, the placing of deposits, and/or the purchase of
  debt instruments and services.

## Comments on Regulatory Burden

Before making supplemental recommendations, a survey of the distribution of lending among the reporting depositories is warranted. To simplify this analysis, the database was queried for depositories, which reported a given minimum amount of lending as shown in the first column of Table VIII. This minimum lending could be in any one or more of the three loan categories shown in the table.

The smallest minimum loan reporting limit of \$5 million would on average mean that about 100 loans to small businesses or 83 loans to small farms were originated, because the average loan to a small businesses was about \$50,000 and the average loan to a small farm was \$60,000. These numbers of loans represent an estimate of the lower limit of a performance evaluation with some statistical validity. The loss of data is minimal, but the number of reporters is reduced by 92 or 15%. Thus there is a saving in reporter and regulatory costs.

wh	ible VIII. Ef f nich were n	or all Depo	sitories wit	h Assets o	f \$250 milli	on un to \$6	noillian 00	-	
Origina-	Report-	Asse	Assets of Reporters		o Small esses	Loans t	o Small ms	Commu	
Tions \$millions	Ers	\$ Billions	% 2002	\$ billions	% 2002	\$ billions	% 2002	\$ billions	%
>0 5.0	625 533	229.1 197.7	100.0% 86.3%	13.82	100.0%	3.139	100.0%	1.149	2002 100.0%
10.0	467	173.9	75.9%	13.61 <b>13.12</b>	98.4% <b>94.9%</b>	3.133 <b>3.107</b>	99.8% <b>99.0%</b>	1.098   <b>1.011</b>	95.6% <b>88.0%</b>
Note: Deve	305	115.6	50.4%	10.74	77.7%	2.733	87.0%	0.782	66 40/

Note: Development & third party loans include correspondent line loans while small business and small farm loans do not.

If the minimum reporting limit is raised to \$10 million, the statistical evaluations become better with an average of 200 loans to small business and 167 loans to small farms. The number of reporters is reduced by 158 or 25%. There is a loss of 5% of loans to small farms, but the only serious loss is the 12% loss of development lending and 3<sup>rd</sup> party loans. At a \$20 million reporting minimum, the loans to small businesses is significantly impaired by a loss of 22.3% of the dollar amount reported. CANICCOR would not recommend going above a reporting minimum of \$10 million.

Assuming that such a minimum reporting level would be useful, the next question is whether a minimum reporting level could also be applied to smaller subsidiaries of bank holding companies of \$1 billion or more. Table IX provides the necessary information.

	which were	subsidiarie	es of Bank	s with Asse Holding Co	mpanies w	กลก จอบบ ก vith Assets	nillion, of \$1 hillio	n or more	
Origina-	Report-	Report- Reporters		Loans to Small Businesses		Loans to Small Farms		Community Dev. 3 <sup>rd</sup> Party Loans	
Tions	Ers	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	S	%
\$millions		billions	2002	billions	2002	billions	2002	billions	2002
>0	334	71.45	100.0	7.210	100.0	1.051	100.0	0.649	100.0
5.0	252	59.95	83.9	7.002	97.1	1.008	95.9	0.631	94.4
10.0	198	48.25	67.5	6.607	91.6	0.914	86.9	0.549	84.6
20.0	104	30.48	42.7	5.410	75.0	0.715	68.1	0.391 siness and	60.4

Because of the present requirement that all subsidiaries of all sizes report for these holding companies, a minimum reporting level of \$10,000 for each subsidiary would have greater impact

than described in Table VIII above. The loans to small businesses would be reduced by 8.4%, while loans to small farms and development and third party lending would be reduced by 13.1% and 15.4%. While these decreases are high, these large bank holding companies will usually have larger subsidiaries reporting much higher volumes, so the net effect will be reduced.

Synovus Financial (RSSD 9348 = 1078846) was examined and a minimum reporting limit of \$10 million eliminated only one reporter out of 31 reporters in 2002 and this one reporter reported no loans in any of these categories. Thus there was no effect on Synovus's reporting. Similarly there was no effect in using the \$10 million minimum reporting for Heartland Financial (RSSD 9348 = 1206546). While this is not an exhaustive selection, these examples together with Table IX suggest that the negative effects of the \$10 million minimum reporting limit are minor.

CANICCOR maintains that the definition of small institutions should not be altered from the 1995 regulations. However, in order to reduce regulatory burden, the federal regulators could consider altering the regulations to require reporting for only those institutions that have originated at least \$10 million in loans of one or more of the following: development & 3<sup>rd</sup> party loans, loans to small businesses or loans to small farms, the latter two types being exclusive of correspondent lines. This minimum reporting level would have reduce the number of reporters in 2002 by almost 300 (294) or by nearly a third of the reporters that would have been excluded under the proposed regulations.

### Data Collection on Small Business and Small Farm Loans

CANICCOR supports the greater detail in the reporting of small business and small farm loans to be aggregated at the level of each census tract rather than the present level of census tract category as developed in 1995. However, if this finer level of collection is only possible under the proposed definition of "small institutions", then our preference is for not changing the present definition of small institutions and geographic level of data reporting now in force rather than obtaining this more detailed geographic level of the data with the loss of reporting depositories.

## Consumer Law Violations and Non-Assessment Area Coverage

CANICCOR supports the section: Assigned ratings (c): "Effect of evidence of discriminatory, other illegal and abusive practices", but would urge that these requirements be broadened.

This section includes in the CRA performance evaluations by the depository regulators the violations of consumer protections laws as well as any patterns of housing lending on the basis of asset value, where the borrowers cannot be expected to be able to make the payments required under the loan. While this section applies to any area of the examined depository, it only includes the assessment areas of affiliate whose loans were considered for CRA purposes by the depository.

These limits of the permissible evaluation are of concern because of the separation of regulatory authority. Adequate evaluation by the depository regulators is confounded by the fact that the

four depository regulators examine only the performances of the depository and contributing affiliates within the assessment areas while other agencies that can investigate and prosecute the violation of consumer laws and are not so limited geographically. These latter agencies are the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department of Justice (DOJ),

CANICCOR in its analysis of the social rankings of lenders, performs its analysis at the holding company level, since this is the level of equity investments of institutional investors. These rankings cover both the lending within assessment areas and also that outside of the assessment areas. CANICCOR would support the broadening of the Performance Evaluations of the federal regulators to cover the all of the lending of an institution and its non-depository affiliates both within the assessment areas and outside of them, independently of whether the loans of a nonblank affiliate are counted by the depository for CRA credit.

Such a performance evaluations pose difficulties in the present regulatory environment. For example, Washington Mutual's HMDA reported lending is from Washington Mutual Bank FA, which is supervised by the OTS. However, its subprime lender, Long Beach, reports to HUD and the corporation has one bank subsidiary, which is supervised by the FDIC. Countrywide is simpler with only one bank, which has a small assessment area and which is supervised by the OCC. Finally J.P. Morgan Chase has its mortgage corporation under a bank regulated by the Federal Reserve but may move it to an OTS supervised subsidiary. However, it has banks supervised by the OCC.

Perhaps the best solution is a legislative solution suggested by the U.S. General Accounting Office: "Our report recommends that Congress consider (1) making appropriate statutory changes that would grant the Board (of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) the authority to routinely monitor and, as necessary, examine the nonblank mortgage lending subsidiaries of financial and bank holding companies for compliance with federal consumer protection laws applicable to predatory lending practices and (2) giving the Board specific authority to initiate enforcement actions under those laws against these non-bank mortgage subsidiaries."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> D. G Wood, Testimony before the Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate, 24 February 2004, "Federal and State Agencies Face Challenges in Combating Predatory Lending", GAO-04-412T, U.S. General Accounting Office.