UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE GULF OF MEXICO REGION ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

 OCCURRED DATE: 07-MAR-2007 TIME: 1935 HOURS OPERATOR: Apache Corporation REPRESENTATIVE: Dan Orr TELEPHONE: (337) 354-8128 CONTRACTOR: ISLAND OPERATORS CO. INC. REPRESENTATIVE: Chris Fontenot TELEPHONE: (337) 233-9594 	STRUCTURAL DAMAGE CRANE OTHER LIFTING DEVICE DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS. INCIDENT >\$25K H2S/15MIN./20PPM REQUIRED MUSTER SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE OTHER			
3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:	6. OPERATION:			
 4. LEASE: G02754 AREA: HI BLOCK: A 376 5. PLATFORM: A RIG NAME: 	X PRODUCTION DRILLING WORKOVER COMPLETION HELICOPTER MOTOR VESSEL PIPELINE SEGMENT NO. OTHER			
6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE) X DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION	8. CAUSE:			
(DOCD/POD) 7. TYPE: HISTORIC INJURY REQUIRED EVACUATION LTA (1-3 days) LTA (>3 days) RW/JT (1-3 days) RW/JT (>3 days)	 EQUIPMENT FAILURE HUMAN ERROR EXTERNAL DAMAGE SLIP/TRIP/FALL WEATHER RELATED LEAK UPSET H20 TREATING OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID OTHER 			
Other Injury	9. WATER DEPTH: 328 FT.			
FATALITY POLLUTION X FIRE EXPLOSION	10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 85 MI.			
LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT UNDERGROUND	11. WIND DIRECTION: SPEED: M.P.H.			
SURFACE DEVERTER SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES	12. CURRENT DIRECTION: SPEED: M.P.H.			
COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <- \$25K	13. SEA STATE: FT.			

On March 7, 2007, during routine production operations at HI Block A-376 Platform A, the "C" compressor experienced a gas fire. The chain of events occurred as follows: All personnel were in the quarters building when they heard the compressor engine accelerate followed by a "boom" sound. Personnel went to the quarters door and observed flames rising from the compressor. An operator announced "FIRE" over the PA, hit the Emergency Shut Down (ESD) station, and sounded the fire alarm. The Operator then proceeded toward the compressor area and control station, where he was unable to start the fire pump. The gas fire was extinguished in ten minutes by using one (1) 150-pound dry chemical wheel unit and two (2) 30-pound dry chemical hand-held fire extinguishers, with no pollution or injuries.

As a result of numerous platform safety devices (level controllers, dumps, level safety highs) functioning satisfactorily, and a lack of fluid in the first stage suction scrubber, liquid carry over from process piping to the compressor could be ruled out.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Long term vibration resulted in shearing of the cylinder bolts holding the distance piece to the compressor frame, allowing gas to escape and enter the compressor engine air intake. During this time, gas was present in the atmosphere and an ignition source ignited the area. The result was a fire at the number two suction flange and the number four discharge flange.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

None.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

1) The diesel fire pump failed to start, although documentation indicated it had been tested the week prior to the fire.

 2) Most of the permanently installed dry chemical fire fighting system was red-tagged as "out of service" by the third party fire-fighting equipment service company.
 3) Some of the dry chemical fire fighting stations had the nitrogen bottles shut off and not ready to fight fires.

4) The Operators on the structure indicated they were not informed that the fire fighting equipment was disabled. A third party inspection report, however, had been completed and the report findings sent from the platform to the Apache office indicating that all fire equipment was back in service except for the upstairs main 2500 pound dry chemical unit. The report also indicated that the downstairs fire fighting equipment had been repaired and was in service.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

Burned beyond repair

Damage list for "C" Compressor 1) #2 throw-1st stage cylinder, piston and rod, packing glands, Distance piece (housing cylinder/frame), crosshead,compressor frame, con-rod journal, overhead coolers, #4 throw-1st stage cylinder, and the crank shaft. ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$250,000

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The Lake Jackson District recommends that a Safety Alert be sent to all Operators stating that:

* If any part of the fire fighting equipment is disabled, compromised, or "out of service", it shall be replaced, repaired, or have other types of fire fighting equipment available to replace the "out of service" components.
* Periodic inspection/maintenance of the compressor or other mechanical devices by qualified company personnel or servicing company personnel should assist in detecting component fatigue.

* The platform Operator or Person-In-Charge (PIC) should always verify and/or be informed that the required types and numbers of fire fighting equipemt are available, operable, and have been inspected and regularly serviced by servicing company personnel or qualified company personnel.

- 23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES
- 24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

P-130==Numerous fire fighting equipment on the platform was blocked out of service, and some had pending maintenance.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

09-MAR-2007

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Ralph Tate /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Stephen P. Martinez

APPROVED

DATE: 01-MAY-2007

FIRE/EXPLOSION ATTACHMENT

1.	SOURCE OF IGNIT		ne turbo charger, exhaust muffler, or possible flying abris causing a spark were possible sources
2.	TYPE OF FUEL:	x	GAS
			OIL
			DIESEL
			CONDENSATE
			HYDRAULIC
			OTHER
3.	FUEL SOURCE: 1	Fuel gas	s from the compressor's suction and discharge flange.
4.			TIONS TAKEN TO ISOLATE ION PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT ? YES

5.	TYPE	OF	FIREFIGHTING	EQUIPMENT	UTILIZED:	x	HANDHELD
						x	WHEELED UNIT
							FIXED CHEMICAL
							FIXED WATER
							NONE
							OTHER