

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE
GULF OF MEXICO REGION
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 25-FEB-2005 TIME: 1100 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Murphy Exploration &
Production Company - USA**

REPRESENTATIVE: **Lawrence P. Travis**

TELEPHONE: (504) 561-2225

3. LEASE: **G21778**

AREA: **MC** LATITUDE: **28.24085286**

BLOCK: **734** LONGITUDE: **-88.46815277**

4. PLATFORM:

RIG NAME **T.O. MARIANAS**

5. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE)

DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOC/POD)

6. TYPE: FIRE

EXPLOSION

BLOWOUT

COLLISION

INJURY NO. _____

FATALITY NO. _____

POLLUTION

OTHER _____

7. OPERATION: PRODUCTION

DRILLING

WORKOVER

COMPLETION

MOTOR VESSEL

PIPELINE SEGMENT NO. _____

OTHER _____

8. CAUSE: EQUIPMENT FAILURE

HUMAN ERROR

EXTERNAL DAMAGE

SLIP/TRIP/FALL

WEATHER RELATED

LEAK

UPSET H2O TREATING

OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID

OTHER _____

9. WATER DEPTH: **5785** FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **70** MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION:

SPEED: **23** M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:

SPEED: **6** M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: **6** FT.

16. OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE/
SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

Mr. Lawrence Travis

CITY: **Houston**

STATE: **TX**

TELEPHONE: **(713) 232-8204**

CONTRACTOR: **Transocean Offshore**

CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/
SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

Mr. Jason Braquet

CITY: **Houston**

STATE: **TX**

TELEPHONE: **(713) 232-8209**

17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

On February 24, 2005 at 2000 hours the derrick man transferred 170 bbls of MIDF synthetic base oil mud from pit # 2 to pit # 3 in order to clean pit # 2. The cleaning operation was incomplete when shift changeover occurred. The derrickman communicated to his relief that the dump valves were still open. The relieving derrickman felt the pits needed additional cleaning but after doing so he failed to close the dump valves. Around 0800 hours the following morning, February 25, 2005, the derrickman started transferring MIDF synthetic base oil mud from pit # 3 back to pit # 2 but he failed to remember he had not closed the dump valves the night before. After starting the transfer of synthetic base oil mud the derrickman was required to perform a second task. Then at approximately 0810 hours the mud engineer checked pit # 2 and found no fluid in the pit. The derrickman check the pits, and found no mud in either pit # 1 or pit # 2 where he immediately shut down operations and notified the supervisor.

Findings:

A Failure to follow Transocean NO SOBM SPILLS Plan (See attachment "B" page 1)

- (1) The operator failed to perform step two when the Permit to Work was not closed out when cleaning was complete and ensuring valve was closed.
- (2) Step three was not followed where two individual persons are required to verify that overboard/dump valves are closed prior to transferring SOBM into clean pit.
- (3) Step six was not followed when it called for monitoring and recording all pit volumes all the time. The pits were not checked until after the transfer was complete.
- (4) Step seven was not followed when it required having a second person involved in pit/volume monitoring (Assistant Driller/Derrickman).
- (5) The derrickman was performing a second task while SOBM was being transferred.

B Failure to follow Transocean TASK SPECIFIC THINK PROCEDURE Plan for TRANSFER OF FLUID FROM PIT TO PIT (See attachment "B" page 2).

- (1) Step three was not followed when there was a failure to double check line-up.
- (2) Step four was not followed when there was a failure to monitor pits during transfer of fluid.
- (3) Step five was not followed when all valves were not closed after initial transfer and pit cleaning.
- (4) Step six was not followed when all fluid was not accounted for.

C Failure to follow Transocean TASK SPECIFIC THINK PROCEDURE Plan for TRANSFER BASE OIL # 035. (See attachment "B" page 3).

- (1) Step three was not followed when there was a failure to double check line-up.
- (2) Step four was not followed when valves were not closed after intital transfer and clean up.
- (3) Step five was not followed when all valves were not closed on other pits.

D Failure to follow Transocean TASK SPECIFIC THINK PROCEDURE Plan for OPENING OVERBOARD MASTER DUMP VALVES (See attachment "B" page 4).

- (1) Step three was not followed when dumping fluid is finished, close all dump valves and lock with chain and padlock. Return key to toolpusher and inform driller that job is complete and set PVT's.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

- A - Failure to follow Transocean NO SOBM SPILLS Plan.
- B - Failure to follow Transocean TASK SPECIFIC THINK PROCEDURE Plan for TRANSFER OF FLUID FROM PIT TO PIT.
- C - Failure to follow Transocean TASK SPECIFIC THINK PROCEDURE Plan for TRANSFER OF BASE OIL #035
- D - Failure to follow Transocean TASK SPECIFIC THINK PROCEDURE Plan for OPENING OVERBOARD MASTER DUMP VALVES

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Synthetic Oil Based Mud spill.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$37,480

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

No Recommendations to MMS.

The New Orleans District concurs with Murphy Exploration & Production and Transocean's recommendations to prevent recurrence as stated below:

Transocean will insure that procedures pertaining to the transferring of SOBM are strictly enforced. Also, the Transocean Marinanas "Task Specific Think Procedure" regarding mud movement has now been modified to include the Murphy company representative and Mud engineer before any future mud transfer occurs.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

E-100 30 CFR.300(a) Lessee failed to prevent pollution
G-116 30 CFR.200 Lessee failed to follow Transocean's Task Specific Procedure.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

28-FEB-2005

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Steve Lucky / Randy Josey /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Troy Trosclair

APPROVED

DATE: 13-APR-2005

