


Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

R e p o r t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t

1991





DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
 1625 K STREET, N.W. SUITE 400
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006-1604

JIM COURTER CHAIRMAN

July 1, 1991

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 ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
 JAMES SMITH II, P.E.
 ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

The President
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, we are pleased to submit a report containing both a review of the Defense Secretary's April 12 list and our recommendations for the closure or realignment of U.S. military installations.

In preparing this report, the Commission reviewed thousands of pages of oral testimony and written documentation. All of our work was subject to public scrutiny. We held 28 hearings across the United States, visited 47 military installations and met face-to-face with hundreds of representatives in surrounding communities. Among the many people who presented expert testimony were members of Congress and officials representing the Pentagon, the General Accounting Office and the Environmental Protection Agency.

Ultimately, this report reflects the independent judgment of the Commission's seven members. Not one of our decisions was easy. Each of the installations recommended for closure enjoys a proud history of service to the United States. Moreover, we recognize that base closure creates economic hardship that only time and initiative can overcome. Nevertheless, budget constraints, coupled with changing national security requirements, compel the United States to reduce its military overhead costs. I am convinced that our recommendations will strengthen this country's ability to meet its international responsibilities.

Respectfully yours,

Jim Courter
 Chairman

William L. Ball, III
 Commissioner

Robert D. Stuart, Jr.
 Commissioner

James E. Smith II, P.E.
 Commissioner

Arthur Levitt, Jr.
 Commissioner

Howard H. Callaway
 Commissioner

Gen. Duane H. Cassidy, USAF (Ret.)
 Commissioner

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission


Report to the President

1991

This is the second printing of this report.

FRONTISPIECE

1991 BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS



CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

1. Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point), Washington
 2. Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho
 3. Beale Air Force Base, California
 4. Mather Air Force Base, California
 5. Sacramento Army Depot, California
 6. Naval Station Treasure Island (Hunters Point Annex), California
 7. Naval Air Station Moffett Field, California
 8. Castle Air Force Base, California
 9. Fort Ord, California
 10. Naval Station Long Beach, California
 11. Naval Air Facility Midway Island, Midway
 12. Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, California
 13. March Air Force Base, California
 14. Williams Air Force Base, Arizona
 15. Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado
 16. Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas
 17. Carswell Air Force Base, Texas
 18. Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas
 19. Naval Air Station Chase Field, Texas
 20. Fort Polk, Louisiana
 21. England Air Force Base, Louisiana
 22. Fort Chaffee, Arkansas
 23. Eaker Air Force Base, Arkansas
 24. Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, Missouri
 25. ASC/Troop Support Command, Missouri
 26. Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois
 27. Wurtsmith Air Force Base, Michigan
 28. Grissom Air Force Base, Indiana
 29. Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana
 30. Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, Ohio
 31. Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania
 32. Philadelphia Naval Station, Pennsylvania
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Pennsylvania
 33. Loring Air Force Base, Maine
 34. Fort Devens, Massachusetts
 35. Construction Battalion Center Davisville, Rhode Island
 36. Fort Dix, New Jersey
 37. Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, South Carolina
 38. MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
- NOT PICTURED ON MAP**
- 17 Realignments and 7 Closures of Naval Research, Development, Testing & Engineering, Engineering & Fleet Support Activities
 - Realignment of Combat Materiel Research Lab and Medical Lab 21
 - Realignment of the Army Corps of Engineers


Executive Summary

On November 5, 1990, President George Bush signed Public Law **101-510**, Title **XXIX** (the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of **1990**), establishing the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to ensure a timely, independent, and fair process for closing and realigning U.S. military installations.

This statute required the Secretary of Defense to submit a list of proposed military base closures and realignments to the Commission by **April 15, 1991**. In accordance with the statute, these recommendations were to be based upon a force-structure plan submitted to Congress with the Department of Defense (DoD) budget request for fiscal year (**FY**) **1992** and eight selection criteria developed by DoD with public comment. Anticipated levels of defense funding in the **FY 1992-97** period and a reassessment of the probable threats to the United States drove the force-structure plan. The present Administration viewed the changing world order as an opportunity to implement measured defense reductions. However, Congress **has** seized upon the reduced threat to **our** national security and mandated a sharp decline in defense funding. The graph **on** the next page showing DoD's budget authority depicts **this** dramatic decline in funding since the **mid-1980s**.

The Commission's purpose was to ensure that the proposals submitted by DoD did not deviate substantially **from** the force-structure plan and the eight selection criteria. Where it identified such deviations, the Commission was authorized to add or delete bases. The Commission's founding legislation calls for **this process** to be repeated in **1993** and **1995**.

The end of the Cold War, evidenced by the fall of the Berlin Wall in **1989** and the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in **1991**, fundamentally altered the military threat **posed** by the Soviet **Union** and its allies. These events had dramatic impacts **on U.S.** military requirements. In addition, the growing **U.S.** budget deficit provided an impetus to cut U.S. **military** spending. Therefore, DoD is planning



to decrease the **U.S.** military by approximately **25** percent over the next five years.

Clearly, fewer forces **require** fewer bases. By eliminating unnecessary facilities, limited dollars can **go** to vital military needs. Balancing the base structure with the new force-structure plan will make DoD more efficient, streamline the defense infrastructure, and enhance national security.

This Commission differs from previous base-closure efforts; its purpose was to make independent recommendations to the Resident based **on** its review of the Secretary of Defense's April **1991** proposal to close **43** bases and realign **29**. The **1988** DoD Commission, **on** the other hand, developed its **own** list of proposed closures, which it presented to the Secretary of Defense and Congress.

The **U.S.** General Accounting Office (GAO) was involved closely in the process. It acquired data from DoD and prepared a review of DoD's proposals, which was forwarded to Congress and the Commission **on May 16, 1991**. It also assisted the Commission in its own review of data by detailing staffers to the Commission and providing assistance from field staff.

The **1991** Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's recommendations emerged from a uniquely open process, in which testimony and viewpoints were heard from community and congressional leaders. **This** process insulated the Commission from partisan politics. All meetings were **open** to the public. Transcripts of hearings and data received by the Commission were available for public review. Furthermore, every major site proposed for closure was visited by at least one commissioner. These **visits** enabled the

commissioners to gain a firsthand look at the installations. Commissioners also heard from members of the public about the effect that closure would have on local communities.

The Commission also received public testimony in Washington, D.C., from members of Congress, DoD officials, and other expert witnesses. Public hearings, providing community leaders an opportunity to comment, were held at 14 other locations across the country.

The Commission recognizes that some communities depend greatly on these installations. It notes, however, in the long term, and with effort and initiative, communities can overcome the hardships caused by base closures. In fact, history has shown many post-closure economies are stronger and more stable.

According to a survey by DoD's Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA), between 1961 and 1990 approximately 158,000 new jobs had been created to replace nearly 93,000 jobs lost as a result of base closures. The OEA has also been working with 21 communities located near bases recommended for closure by the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission and has provided \$1.6 million in grants to help develop reuse plans.

Since the Commission wanted to devote its entire effort to considering the bases under study for closure or realignment, an after-action report will be prepared and forwarded to the President and Congress. The report will offer the Commission's guidance for improving the base-closing process.

Based on the Commission's review and analysis and deliberations process, it is recommending to the President that 34 bases be closed and 48 bases be realigned. These actions will result in FY 1992-97 net savings of \$2.3 billion after one-time costs of \$4.1 billion. The savings from these actions will total \$1.5 billion annually. The following list summarizes closure and realignment actions of the 1991 Commission.

RECOMMENDED FOR CLOSURE

Department of the Army

Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN
Fort Devens, MA
Fort Ord, CA
Sacramento Army Depot, CA
Henry Diamond Lab Woodbridge Research Facility, VA

Department of the Navy

Construction Battalion Center, Davisville, RI
Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station
Treasure Island, CA
Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA
Naval Air Station Chase Field, TX
Naval Air Station Moffett Field, CA
Naval Station Long Beach, CA
Naval Station Philadelphia, PA
Naval Station Puget Sound, Sand Point, WA
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA
7 RDT & E Engineering and Fleet Support
Activities

Department of the Air Force

Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX
Carswell Air Force Base, TX
Castle Air Force Base, CA
Eaker Air Force Base, AR
England Air Force Base, LA
Grissom Air Force Base, IN
Loring Air Force Base, ME
Lowry Air Force Base, CO
Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, SC
Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, MO
Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, OH
Williams Air Force Base, AZ
Wurtsmith Air Force Base, MI

***RECOMMENDED
FOR REALIGNMENT***

Department of the Army

Army Corps of Engineers
Aviation Systems Command/Troop Support
Command, St. Louis, MO
Fort Chaffee, AR
Fort Dix, NJ
Fort Polk, LA
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA
Rock Island Arsenal, IL
10 RDT&E Laboratories
7 Medical Laboratories

Department of the Navy

Midway Island Naval Air Facility
17 RDT&E Engineering and Fleet Support
Activities

***Department of the
Air Force***

Beale Air Force Base, CA
Goodfellow Air Force Base, TX
MacDill Air Force Base, FL
March Air Force Base, CA
Mather Air Force Base, CA
Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID

***RECOMMENDED
TO STAY OPEN***

Department of the Army

Fort McClellan, AL

Department of the Navy

Naval Training Center Orlando, FL
Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA

***Department of the
Air Force***

Moody Air Force Base, GA

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Editors Note:
In this second printing,
we have incorporated
the errata **into** the text.

Chapter 1

History of Base Closures

In the early **1960s**, then-Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara closed many bases to reduce military overhead. Secretary McNamara created within DoD the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) to ease the economic impacts of closures **on** affected communities and to allow the reuse of former bases. **In** the early **1970s**, and in response to the end of the Vietnam War, hundreds of military facilities across the country closed.

In the **1960s** and again in the **1970s**, accusations were widespread that base closures were being used by the executive branch to punish uncooperative legislators. **This** sentiment prompted Congress in **1977** to pass Section **2687** of Title **10**, United States Code, which required DoD to notify Congress if an installation became a closure candidate, and it also applied the National Environmental Policy Act to base-closure recommendations. These stipulations, combined with Congress' reluctance to close military bases, effectively prevented DoD from closing any **major** military installation.

The **1980s** saw a rapid military expansion as a result of a dramatic increase in defense spending. **In 1985**, Senator **Barry** Goldwater recognized the need for DoD to rid itself of excess base capacity. He asked Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to submit an "illustrative" list of military bases for closure. A hearing was held to discuss the **22** bases on Secretary Weinberger's list, but **no** further action was taken.

1988 COMMISSION

By 1988, while the structure of the U.S. **armed** forces had changed, the base structure remained unaltered. Therefore, **on** May 3, **1988**, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci chartered the Defense Secretary's Commission **on** Base Realignment and Closure, ordering it to conduct an independent study of the domestic military base structure and to recommend installations for realignment and closure. **In** October **1988**, Congress passed and Resident Reagan signed Public **Law 100-526**, the Defense

Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act.

The **1988** Commission, chaired by former Senator Abraham Ribicoff and former Congressman Jack Edwards, recommended that 86 bases be closed fully and 59 others be closed partially or realigned. These changes would, according to Commission estimates, generate an annual **savings** of \$693.6 million.

1990 DoD PROPOSALS

In an effort to reshape and reduce the military infrastructure, Secretary of Defense Cheney in January **1990** proposed closing 36 bases in the United States. The congressional response was reminiscent of the base-closing rounds of the **1960s** and **1970s**. Congressional critics claimed that the list unfairly targeted districts represented by Democrats. Others charged that Congress again was institutionally incapable of making decisions that were good for the country but painful for some congressional districts.

The list **was** not acted upon by Congress, but the groundwork was laid for a second base-closing commission.

1991 BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of **1990** (see Appendix **A**) **intends, as the law says,** "to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United **States.**"

The process **was** built around the following **Standards.**

- The force-structure plan submitted to **Congress** with the DoD budget request for Fiscal Year **1992** (see Appendix **B**)

- Eight selection criteria finalized by DoD after public comment (see Appendix C)

Of the eight criteria, the first four concerned military value and were to receive preference.

- Current and future mission requirements
- Availability and condition of land, facilities, and air space
- Contingency and mobilization requirements
- Cost and manpower implications

The remaining criteria were

- **Return on investment**
- **Local economic impact**
- **Impact on community infrastructure**
- **Environmental impact**

The Commission received DoDs proposed list of closures and realignments after the following process: First, the **Army, Navy, and Air Force** analyzed their own base structures, comparing them against the force-structure plan and the selection criteria. The services then submitted their proposals to Secretary Cheney, who **on April 12, 1991,** sent **DoDs** recommendations to the Commission. The Commission was required to send its recommendations to the President by July **1, 1991.**

The statutory test to be applied by the Commission in justifying modifications to **DoDs** recommended list involves "substantial deviation" from the force-structure plan and selection criteria. **The** Commission could recommend changes for those bases where a substantial deviation was established.

Approval by the President and Congress

The law requires the President to approve or disapprove the Commission's recommendations by July 15, 1991. An approved report will be sent to Congress. If the President rejects the report, it will be returned to the Commission for revision. The Commission must submit to the President by August 15 a revised report. The President then has 15 days to approve or disapprove the revised report. The President must send an approved report to Congress by September 1, 1991. If he does not approve the report, the closure process for 1991 comes to an end with no action.

Once the Commission's recommendations are approved by the President, Congress has 45 legislative days, or until it adjourns for the session, to consider them. Changes to the approved recommendations are not allowed. Unless Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving the Commission's proposals, the Secretary must begin to close or realign those installations listed in the report within two years and complete the action within six years.

Differences Between the 1988 and 1991 Commissions

Both Commissions were set up to overcome the political paralysis that had prevented the closure of bases during the previous decade. The recommendations of the 1988 Commission were driven largely by the need to size a bloated base infrastructure to a reduced threat and force structure. The 1991 Commission was driven by further reductions in DoD budgets and dramatic changes in Eastern Europe.

Structurally, the differences between these two Commissions are significant. The 1988 Commission was chartered by and reported to the Secretary of Defense. Congress codified the authority of that Commission when it passed Public Law 100-526. The 1991 Commission, on the other hand, was

established by law from the outset. Its members were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

Other differences between these two Commissions resulted primarily from the lessons learned in the congressional debate that followed the 1988 base closure and realignment recommendations.

After publication of the 1988 list, affected members of Congress leveled three major charges against the Commission process. First, they contended the process had been secretive. In fact, hearings had been closed and information on the ranking of facilities and transcripts of Commission meetings were hard to obtain. Second, Congress noted many of the affected facilities had not been visited by commissioners. Such visits, believed the legislators, might have helped the commissioners verify information included in the staff reports. Finally, they complained that faulty data had been used to reach the final closure recommendations. Congress believed the General Accounting office (GAO) or another independent organization should have reviewed the information and data for accuracy.

Commission members and legislators also said that the panel's mandate to recover the cost within six years was too restrictive and had prevented the closing of several obsolete installations.

Congress, through Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510, established the 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to redress these issues. The process is open, commissioners have visited all major affected bases, and GAO has been an integral part of the process.

Composition of the 1991 Commission

The commissioners were chosen for their distinguished legislative, business, military, and diplomatic backgrounds. Six were appointed by President Bush - four in

consultation with **House** and Senate majority leaders and two with the advice of House and Senate minority leaders. The other appointments were made independently by the President.

The staff was drawn from backgrounds encompassing government, law, journalism, academia, and the military. Some were hired directly by the Commission, while others were detailed from DoD, **GAO**, the Federal

Emergency Management Agency, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Under the **Commission's** founding legislation, **no** more than one-third of the **staff** could be detailed from DoD. Divisional directors (including the **staff** director) were civilians hired directly by the Commission. The Commission also hired independent consultants from the Logistics Management Institute, who helped design and then participated in the review and analysis of the services' recommendations.

Chapter 2

Department of Defense Procedures to Develop Recommended List

On April 12, 1991, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney presented to Congress and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission a list of military installations proposed for realignment or closure. The list recommended 43 base closures and 29 realignments and was the product of an extensive DoD review of military bases.

DoD began its review of bases on December 10, 1990, by establishing policy guidance for all services to follow. A DoD steering committee developed the final eight base-evaluation criteria and issued several implementing memoranda. Within this general framework, each service was allowed the flexibility to design an analysis plan around its unique missions and structure.

Four additional memoranda were issued to clarify the DoD review process.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

In November 1990, the Secretary of the Army established the Total Army Basing Study and tasked this study group to recommend potential closures and realignments.

The Army divided its installations into seven main categories and analyzed each category quantitatively using five existing measures of merit, which were then defined in terms of DoD's selection criteria 1-4 (military value) and criterion 7 (community infrastructure). Each measure was weighted to reflect the Army's view of its importance. The measures of merit and attributes were used to determine the military value of the installations. These rankings served as a point of departure from which the analysts applied their military judgments to recommend closures and realignments.

The Army applied the return-on-investment and impact criteria to bases that ranked low in military value.

Senior **Army** staff reviewed the Army's final proposals and recommended the list for approval. The Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff approved **this** list.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

The **Secretary** of the Navy established a six-member Base Structure Committee in December **1990** to determine the Navy's closure and realignment candidates.

The Base Structure **Committee** grouped all of its installations into categories and determined which categories contained excess capacity; there, it searched for closure and realignment options.

The Base Structure Committee used information as the VCNO (Vice Chief of Naval Operations) study. It was later called the OpNav Study because it was initiated in February **1990** by the **Office** of the Chief of Naval Operations.

The Base Structure Committee had intended to **use** the study prepared by the OpNav group, but the committee members were not **satisfied** with the total utility of the data or weights **used** in the OpNav Study. The Base Structure Committee used the **data from** the OpNav Study **as a starting** point and began a series of hearings, in which senior Navy officials briefed the committee **on** their respective activities.

The **committee** members combined their professional military judgment **with** the **data** gleaned **from** these interviews and existing data from the OpNav Study to arrive at their **base-closure** recommendations. As a result, these judgments sometimes differed **from** the assessments one might make using the raw empirical **data**.

The Navy **assigned** color codes to bases in the categories with excess capacity. The color

codes were assigned to a base by assuming that it could be closed and assessing what impact its closure would have **on** the Navy's mission. Like the Army, the Navy considered community support (criterion 7) in its analysis of the military value of bases.

Once the **Base** Structure Committee had selected bases for possible closure or realignment, it evaluated criteria **5, 6,** and **8** for these proposals.

The Base Structure Committee presented its nominations to the Secretary of the **Navy**, who recommended to the Secretary of Defense naval **installations** for closure or realignment.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

The Secretary of the **Air** Force appointed a Base Closure Executive Group of five general officers and five senior-executive-service officials.

The Air Force collected data by distributing standard questionnaires - general, environmental, and air space - to each Air Force base. The executive group **sorted** the Air Force bases into five categories and **ten** subcategories, and examined **each** to identify excess capacity.

Unlike the Army and Navy, the **Air** Force analyzed all bases according to all eight selection criteria. The executive group developed up to 83 subelements **per category** to provide specific **data** points.

The **Air Force** prepared color ratings for the subelements and used these ratings to **rank** and group bases. The Secretary of the Air Force selected bases for closure from the options developed by the executive group.

Chapter 3

The Role of the General Accounting Office

The General Accounting Office did not become involved in the 1988 process until after that Commission published its report. Then Congress called upon GAO to examine the Commission's methodology, findings, and recommendations.

GAOs recommendations addressed ways to ensure data accuracy, which cost factors and economic impacts should be considered, how to develop specific criteria, and how to measure employment impacts.

To ensure GAO's role during the 1991 Commission's analysis, Congress gave GAO a clear role in the 1991 process.

Under Section 2903 (d)(5) of Title XXIX, Public Law 101-510, Congress called on the Comptroller General to do two things: assist the Commission in its review of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations and transmit an independent report to Congress and the Commission containing GAO's analysis of DoD's proposals and processes.

ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMISSION

At least one GAO professional served on each of the Commission's Army, Navy, and Air Force review-and-analysis teams. These individuals were fully integrated into all review-and-analysis efforts.

GAO also helped the Commission's researchers verify the data used by the services. GAO field personnel visited some 39 bases to gather firsthand information and verify data selected by the Commission.

THE GAO REPORT

GAO released its report, titled *Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed Closures and Realignment*, on May 16, 1991. The Assistant Comptroller General testified before the Commission on May 17. GAO's findings paralleled much of the Commission staff's work up to that time,

but provided detail — especially on costs and savings.

GAO found that the Army and Air Force could document their use of the force-structure plan and the military-value criteria. While there were differences in the way the services developed military-value rankings, these differences were insignificant. Therefore, GAO concluded in its report, the recommendations by the Army and Air Force were “adequately supported.”

However, GAO concluded that the Navy did not offer enough documentation to prove whether or not its process followed the force structure and the selection criteria, preventing GAO from evaluating specific Navy recommendations. GAO analyzed the Navy’s ship-berthing capacity to decide how many naval stations the Navy needs to support its fleet. If only the recommended bases are closed, concluded GAO, the Navy would still have significant excess shipberthing capacity.

GAO did not evaluate the Navy’s methodology for air stations, shipyards, or labs.

GAO conducted a “sensitivity check” on DoD’s estimation of the number of years it would take to recover closing costs. This entailed projecting 50 percent and 100 percent increases in one-time costs. While the payback periods for many of DoD’s recommendations changed little, there were some closure or realignment proposals where a 50 percent increase in one-time costs would increase the number of years for payback from 4 to 100 years.

GAO also discovered inconsistencies in service costs, savings estimates, and payback calculations. Despite DoD guidance to the contrary, the Army, Navy, and Air Force used budget data for other than 1991 dollars as their baselines. The results of these inconsistencies were overstatements of estimated annual savings and a shortening of the payback period for several closures.

Chapter 4

The Work of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

The Commission was empowered to ensure that the DoD recommendations did not deviate substantially from Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510. The law also required the Commission to conduct its proceedings in public and open its records and deliberations to public scrutiny.

Four concurrent activities provided the Commission with information. First, the Commission held 15 hearings in Washington, D.C., to receive information from DoD, legislators, and other experts. Second, the Commission encouraged public comments by holding 14 regional and site hearings, where it received testimony on bases being considered for closure or realignment. Third, the commissioners visited the major facilities proposed for closure. Finally, the Commission's research staff reviewed the services' processes and data to help commissioners arrive at their recommendations and to ensure that they had adhered to the statutory standards.

The inputs from communities potentially affected by base closures were tremendous. Community and elected leaders were tireless advocates for their military installations. In the two-and-a-half months the Commission conducted its business, it received more than 143,000 letters and more than 100 phone calls a day. This level of input uncovered for commissioners every possible argument that could be proffered on behalf of potentially impacted bases.

The Commission set up review-and-analysis teams – Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special – to evaluate the services' processes. The Commission's teams focused on the process each service used to adhere to legislative requirements.

The Army team's review paralleled the Army's process. The team determined whether the Army considered all bases and whether its categorization of bases and use of attributes were sound. The Commission did this by comparing the major activities on Army bases with the "measures of merit" and attributes developed by the Army to ensure that all eight criteria were addressed. The Commission then

looked at the Army's proposals in terms of the capacity needed to house its forces in **1995** as envisioned by the force-structure plan.

The Navy presented a special challenge to the Commission. Its selection process was more subjective and less documented than that of either the **Army** or the Air Force. To determine whether the Navy complied with the law, the Commission's **staff** held a series of meetings with members of the Navy's Base Structure Committee and other high-ranking naval officers - including the heads of naval aviation, surface warfare and personnel, and training. These individuals responded to questions and supplied information to the Commission. The Commission studied these data to determine whether the Navy's compliance with selection criteria and the force-structure plan was adequate.

The Navy provided additional explanation for its decisions. The **Commission**, with **GAO's** help, obtained and analyzed several hundred items of data from some **29** naval installations across the country. Moreover, the Commission examined the Navy's berthing capacity in detail.

The Commission's Air Force team first checked to see that the **Air Force** had studied

its facilities by identifying all Air Force bases and checking updated manpower documents. Second, the team examined the categories and subcategories used by the **Air Force** to compare bases. Third, the team checked the **Air Force's** analysis of capacity within categories and for individual facilities. The team also reviewed decisions to exclude certain categories from further consideration due to a lack of excess capacity. Then, the team checked the Air Force application of the eight criteria to the remaining bases. In this step, the team first examined the individual bases that were excluded as "militarily or geographically unique or mission essential." Finally, the team considered the application of the eight selection criteria to the remaining **72** bases.

These activities provided the Commission with the **information** it needed to arrive at its recommendations in accordance with the standards mandated in the law. The commissioners used it to develop a "menu of options" - potential additions and substitutions to the **DoD** proposals (see Appendix **H**). The Commission's final recommendations are presented in Chapter **5**.

Chapter 5

Closure and Realignment Recommendations of the Commission

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has completed its review and analysis of the Department of Defense recommendations for base closures and realignments, as transmitted to the Commission on April 12, 1991, by the Secretary of Defense. **This** chapter contains the recommendations made by this Commission.

In recommending to the services where to move their units, missions, or forces, the Commission recognizes that the military must retain some flexibility. The force-structure plan itself is not a rigid document because it reflects a world that is changing rapidly.

Aside from recommendations on the status of particular bases, the Commission also made two general recommendations.

First, the Commission observed, it is DoD policy to operate military hospitals primarily to support active-duty military personnel. Congress established the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) to care for the medical needs of non-active-duty beneficiaries. Closures of military hospitals normally follow closures of bases with active-duty populations served by those hospitals, with CHAMPUS covering the beneficiaries in that area. **In** addition, assignments of active-duty health-care specialists are tied directly to support of active-duty forces. The Commission recommends that DoD confer with Congress regarding these policies and report to the Commission in time for the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission to consider the issue of hospital closures.

Second, with the closure of bases bearing the names of American heroes such as President Benjamin Harrison; General Ira C. Eaker; astronaut Virgil "Gus" Grissom; and World War I pilot, Eddie Rickenbacker, the Commission urges the President to find some other means to honor the contributions of these great Americans.

Detailed information on each of the Commission's base-closure-and-realignment decisions is presented below, including the

rationale for each recommendation. Substantial deviations from the application of the force-structure plan and the final criteria have been identified where applicable.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Category: Corps of Engineers
Mission: Military and Civil Works
Cost to Close: \$266 million
Savings: 1992-97: \$238 million;
Annual: \$112 million
Payback: 2 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Consider reorganization of the **U.S. Army** Corps of Engineers under legislation separate from that which established the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (Public Law 101-510). The Corps of Engineers conducted a reorganization study and submitted it as a part of the Department of the Army's recommendation to DoD. The Secretary of Defense removed the **Corps** of Engineers from his submission to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The communities argued that the study had not been properly reviewed by congressional committees charged with oversight of the Corps of Engineers. They also argued that reducing the number of divisions from ten to six had no rational foundation and that the boundaries that describe these new divisions and districts were not determined in a consistent manner. The communities stated that the great distances between these new divisions and district headquarters and their

respective field offices would create inefficiencies.

Finally, the communities argued that the proposed realignment would have a significant impact on the local economies and regions.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the Corps of Engineers reorganization plan is based on a business-like approach. It combines like functions at the division level where area coverage can be provided, thus relieving the districts of some of their administrative functions. The number of divisions selected was based on four options. Each option considered command-and-control factors and balanced the workload. The boundaries for the new divisions were based on watershed locations and optimizing customer support. The selection of division headquarters was based solely on the ranking of existing headquarters. The number of districts and their headquarters were based primarily on their military ranking and their civil works rankings. In some cases, selections did not follow the rankings to account for needed geographic dispersion and unique capabilities.

The Commission found that the unemployment impacts would increase by no more than two percentage points in any one area; however, these rates are independent of any other action that may be occurring in the respective areas. The implementation costs may be overstated because it is not known exactly how many personnel will elect to retire or quit as opposed to relocating.

The Commission also found that **6,600** authorized positions would be transferred and an additional **2,600** authorized positions would be eliminated. This represents approximately 22 percent of the **Corps of Engineers** total work force and 47 percent of the work force available for reorganization.

These transfers and eliminations occur at the district and division levels. Four division

and fourteen district headquarters are eliminated to reduce the span of control and increase operational efficiencies. However, project and construction offices in support of the districts are not affected by the reorganization.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission recommends the realignment of the Army Corps of Engineers. We find that the Secretary deviated substantially from criterion 1 (current and future mission requirements) and criterion 4 (cost and manpower implications). Such realignment will be accomplished primarily through the elimination of a number of Corps of Engineers division and district management headquarters located in the United States. The realignment will not be initiated until July 1, 1992, and will conform to the 1991 Corps of *Engineers Reorganization Study* unless legislation is enacted by Congress providing an alternative realignment by July 1, 1992, in which event the Secretary will initiate the realignment as determined by the legislation.

Aviation Systems Command and Troop Support Command, St. Louis, Missouri

*Category: Industrial-Commodity Oriented
Installations*

Mission: Logistics Support

Costs to Realign: \$6.4 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$33.5 million;

Annual: \$22.5 million

Payback: Immediate

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Merge Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) and Troop Support Command (TROSCOM) in St. Louis, Missouri, as part of

the Defense Management Report Decision to consolidate the inventory control point.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

There were no formal expressions from the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the consolidation of inventory control points and resultant elimination of an inventory control point were rational approaches to management efficiencies. The cost efficiencies of merging AVSCOM and TROSCOM support the DoD proposal.

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Commission finds that the Department did not deviate substantially from the force plan criteria. The Commission recommends the merger of AVSCOM with TROSCOM as proposed. Also, the Commission recommends that we evaluate the relocation of those activities from leased to government owned facilities and provide appropriate recommendations in the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

Category: Initial Entry Training/Branch
School

Mission: Army Soldier Support Center;
Defense Finance and Accounting Service

Cost to Close: \$206 million

Savings: 1992-97: -\$123.8 million;

Annual: \$36.9 million

Payback: 4 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Fort Benjamin Harrison and realign the Soldier Support Center from Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, to Fort Jackson, South Carolina, to initiate the Soldier Support Warfighting Center. Relocate U.S. Army Recruiting Command from Fort Sheridan to Fort Rnox rather than Fort Benjamin Harrison. This part of the proposal is a revision to the 1988 Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure recommendations. Retain Building 1 for the continued use by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) and retain part of Fort Benjamin Harrison for the Army reserves.

Fort Benjamin Harrison was rated lowest in its category. It has limited expansion capability, high operating costs, and high real-mperty-maintenance costs.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that the Army Soldier Support Warfighting Center would be more suitable at Fort Benjamin Harrison. Moving the two branch schools from Fort Jackson to Fort Benjamin Harrison would be easier than sending six schools from Fort Benjamin Harrison to Fort Jackson. The community also claimed that closing Fort Benjamin Harrison would cause significant job loss. Fort Benjamin Harrison has been a major source of employment for the handicapped and minorities and serves thousands of retirees. The community also argued that Building 1 is currently underused, thus DoD should relocate

functions currently in leased space to Building 1.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that Fort Jackson is a more economical location for the Army Soldier Support Warfighting Center than Fort Benjamin Harrison. It found that the missions at Fort Benjamin Harrison do not require extensive facilities and thus can be easily realigned at minimal costs.

The Commission found that Building 1 is underused. Building 1 is the current home of the branch of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service that is responsible for the Department of the Army finances. The Commission is aware of an ongoing Defense Management Review initiative to consolidate and streamline DoD's Finance and Accounting Services. DoD should look closely at using adequate excess government-owned facilities when evaluating its overall facility requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission recommends to the President the closure of Fort Benjamin Harrison; the realignment of the Soldier Support Center to Fort Jackson, South Carolina; and the retention of the Department of Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Indianapolis Center. We also recommend the revision of the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure 1988 recommendation relocating the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) from Fort Sheridan to Fort Knox rather than Fort Benjamin Harrison. The Commission also recommends an adjustment in the DoD recommendation. We find that the Secretary deviated substantially from criterion 2, the availability and condition of land and facilities at both the existing and potential receiving locations. Because of this, the Commission recommends to the President the closure of Building 1.

The Commission further recommends that **DoD** submit its consolidation plan of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

Category: Major Training Areas

Mission: Major Maneuver and Training

Cost to Close: Fort Chaffee/Fort Polk

\$303 million

Savings: 1992-97: -\$34.2 million;

Annual: \$22.9 million

Payback: 5 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Fort Chaffee, retaining the facilities and training area to support the Reserve Component. Station the current Active Component tenant, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), permanently at Fort Polk, Louisiana (outlined in **DoD's** recommendation for Fort Polk).

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that economic impacts will extend further **than** **DoD** stated.

Additionally, the community claimed that Fort Chaffee provides a more challenging, versatile training environment **than** Fort Polk and **that** Fort Polk was never considered as a candidate for the JRTC. The local citizens also argued that **DoD** overstated costs for facilities to support the **JRTC**. For example, a hospital and housing **are** available in the community and need not be constructed. Finally, the community argued that World War II facilities **can** be rehabilitated to meet the needs of JRTC at a cost of \$79 million rather than the **DoD** estimate of \$224 million.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that both Forts Chaffee and **Polk** were evaluated as potential

sites for the JRTC. The selection of Fort Polk as the site for the **JRTC** is the result of an Army stationing study that evaluated alternative locations.

The Commission also found that unemployment will increase by four percentage points. The counties of Sebastian, Crawford, and Franklin, which are immediately adjacent to Fort Chaffee, will incur 90 percent of the increase. The Commission also finds there are **no** permanent facilities at Fort Chaffee and the Army would incur substantial military construction costs **in** preparing Fort Chaffee to be the permanent home of the JRTC.

The Commission found that Fort Chaffee currently has **an** Active Component garrison and that the garrison will continue to exist at Fort Chaffee after **JRTC** is moved to Fort **Polk** and Fort Chaffee reverts to primarily supporting Reserve Component training. This has been **confirmed** with **DoD**.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds **DoD's** recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the selection criteria. The Commission, therefore, recommends **that** Fort Chaffee be returned to its semiactive status with an Active Component garrison to be used in support of Reserve Component training and **that** a permanent Joint Readiness Training Center be established at Fort Polk, Louisiana.

Fort Devens, Massachusetts

Category: Command and Control
Mission: 10th Special Forces Group
Cost to Close: \$160.2 million
Savings: 1992-97: \$30.8 million;
Annual: \$55.2 million
Payback: 0 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Fort Devens, retaining only those facilities to support Reserve Component training. Create a small Reserve enclave on Fort Devens's main post and retain approximately 3,000 acres for use as a regional training center. Retain the Headquarters, Information Systems Command (ISC) and supporting elements at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and relocate selected ISC elements from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to Fort Ritchie, Maryland, or another location in the National Capital Region (a change to the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendations). Relocate the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) from Fort Devens to Fort Carson, Colorado.

The Army will soon need fewer command-and-control installations. Fort Devens ranked ninth out of eleven installations in its category and is not critical to either the midterm management of the Army's build down or the long-term strategic requirements of the Army's command-and-control installation structure.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that the DoD recommendation violates the law because it changes the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission's recommendation, which never was enacted. It also claimed that the Army would be better served by having the Headquarters, ISC, located nearer to a "center of high technology." The community argued that closing Fort Devens will remove the active

Army presence in New England. The community also claimed that the training ranges were adequate to support the 10th SFG. Finally, the community argued that the proposed closure will have a significant impact on the local economy and that the Army overstated the expected land value of the properties to be sold.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that all installations in this category were treated fairly. It also found that the change to the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission's recommendation to leave the ISC at Fort Huachuca, Fort Monmouth, and the National Capital Region does not violate the law. Additionally, a 1989 GAO report revised the 1988 Commission's findings regarding recurring savings from \$21 million to \$8.1 million and the payback periods from 0 years to a range of 43 to 200 years. The Commission also found that because the Headquarters, ISC, had not left Fort Huachuca, the mission may best be continued there, avoiding construction costs of approximately \$74 million at Fort Devens.

The Commission found that the training area at Fort Devens could not adequately support the 10th SFG training. It has insufficient maneuver space, a small drop zone, limits on demolition training, and limits on weapon firing. The proximity to a civilian airport also affects high-altitude, low-opening operations. Army presence will remain in New England for Reserve Component support, recruiting, and other activities.

The Commission also found that the Army will retain 4,600, not 3,000 acres for Reserve Component training. This has been confirmed with the Department of the Army. The Commission found that Fort Devens has newly constructed facilities and that DoD should make maximum use of these facilities in future stationing decisions. The Commission estimates civilian unemployment would increase by two percentage points. The Commission did not include any proposed land

sale in its calculations and found that this did not change the Army's decision.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that DoD's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. The Commission, therefore, recommends the closure of Fort Devens and the retention of **4,600** acres and those facilities essential to support Reserve Component Training requirements; and realignment of the **10th** SFG to Fort Carson. Instead of moving Headquarters, ISC, and supporting elements to Fort Devens from Forts Huachuca, Monmouth, and Belvoir and leased space in the National Capital Region as recommended by the **1988** Base Realignment and Closure Commission, retain Headquarters, ISC, at Fort Huachuca and support elements at Fort Monmouth, and relocate selected ISC elements from Fort Belvoir to Fort Ritchie or another location in the National Capital Region.

Fort Dix, New Jersey

Category: Fighting (Major Training Areas)

Mission: Reserve Component Training

Cost to Close: \$30.2 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$60.5 million;

Annual: \$25.3 million

Payback: 0years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Fort Dix, relocating active organizations that do not directly support the Reserve Component (except those that cannot be relocated elsewhere). Retain **only** those facilities and training areas necessary to **support** Reserve Component training. This proposal changes the **1988** Base Realignment and Closure Commission's recommendation to maintain Fort Dix in a semiactive status. It is driven by a desire to reduce base operations and real-property-maintenance costs by eliminating excess facilities and relocating

tenants that do not support the Reserve Component.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that the land value included in **DoD's** recommendation (**\$82.6** million) was overstated. The community also argued that Fort Dix could be used for many alternative purposes, including the **U.S.** Army Reserve Command headquarters, a Reserve Center of Excellence for training, or the site of other DoD activities that are now in leased space in the Washington, D.C., area.

The community asserted that the unemployment impact would be large and that the word "close" in DoD's recommendation was not clear. The community was concerned that the word "closure" would preclude Fort Dix from being available as a potential receiver of other Reserve Component training missions or as a potential receiver of other DoD activities. The community further argued that Fort Dix, while ranking second in its category based on military-value calculations, was selected for closure because of potential savings.

The community asserted that Fort Dix was not given full credit for its quality-of-life attributes, such as family housing.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that DoD did not treat all installations in **this** category equally. Four other lower-ranked bases were deferred from further consideration because of uncertainty in the Reserve Component force structure and because the results of a study addressing the Reserve Component training strategies and management of major training areas were not **known**.

The Commission found that, while the land value may have been overstated, it had **no** impact on the final decision.

Moving certain active missions off Fort Dix to better align its role as a Reserve Component training center is reasonable, but the Army should not declare facilities excess without determining what role **Fort Dix** will play in the future Reserve Component force structure.

The Commission further encourages DoD to study the benefits of the collocation of **Fort Dix** and McGuire Air Force Base for mobilization.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds DoD's recommendation deviates substantially from the force-structure plan by not allowing for the uncertainties in the future reorganization of Reserve Component division forces. The recommendation also deviates substantially from selection criterion 1.

The Commission recommends that Fort Dix be realigned to support the Reserve Component force structure through retention of an Active Component garrison and essential facilities (which include essential portions of Walson **Army** Hospital and housing facilities), ranges, and training areas to support Reserve and Active Component training. The Commission also recommends that the Defense Medical Facilities Office (DMFO) determine the medical facilities requirement to support the **Fort Dix and McGuire Air Force Base** areas and ensure implementation of the most effective solution.

Fort McClellan, Alabama

Category: Initial Entry Training/Branch School

Mission: Army Military Police School; Army Chemical School; and Defense Polygraph Institute

Cost to Close: N/A

Savings: 1992-97: NIA

Payback: NIA

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Fort McClellan and realign chemical and military police schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, to create the Maneuver Support Warfighting Center. Move the Defense Polygraph School from Fort McClellan to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to be collocated with the Intelligence School.

Retain the Pelham Range for use by the Alabama National Guard. Retain the Special Operations Test Site and a reserve enclave. Put the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility (CDTF) in caretaker status.

Fort McClellan was recommended for closure because it is the home of the smallest **Army** training center and most of its missions and facility requirements can be met elsewhere.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The local community contended that DoD did not accurately assess the military value of live-agent training at Fort McClellan. The decision to place the CDTF in caretaker status was not predicated upon military value, but rather on budgetary constraints. The loss of use of the CDTF could be detrimental to the services' chemical readiness and national security. The CDTF is the only **known** live-agent training facility in the free world.

Local officials claimed that environmental impediments and resulting costs will prevent the CDTF from being replicated at another installation.

Finally, closure of Fort McClellan could result in a CHAMPUS cost of **\$278** million by the year 2007.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission questioned maintaining the **CDTF** in caretaker status because it could contribute little if any to chemical defense preparedness. The CDTF could not be reactivated quickly. Moreover, the Army would have to obtain environmental permits for reactivation if the facility is shut down for more than one year, and start-up costs could range from **\$4** million to **\$7** million. Furthermore, depending upon the environmental and regulatory standards, the permitting process is currently estimated to require three to five years.

The Commission basically agreed with experts in the chemical field that the CDTF has high military value. The Commission also agreed that if a new CDTF cannot be built at the receiving base, then relocating the chemical school should not be implemented.

The Commission has not received any indication that another CDTF can be duplicated at any other installation. Duplicating the CDTF would require compliance with stringent environmental laws.

The Commission recognized the value of live-agent training in chemical defense.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission found a substantial deviation from criterion 1 (the current and future mission requirements and the impact of operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force) and criterion 2 (the availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated air space) at both the existing and potential receiving locations. Thus, the Commission recommends that Fort McClellan remain open.

Fort Ord, California

Category: Fighting (Maneuver)
Mission: 7th Infantry Division
Cost to Close: \$150.8 million
Savings: 1992-97: -\$38.8 million;
Annwl: \$70.4 million
Payback: 2 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Fort Ord and relocate the 7th Infantry Division (Light) from Fort Ord to Fort Lewis, Washington.

The Army currently can house 13 divisions in the United States, but in 1995 will have 12 divisions. **Fort Ord** ranks relatively low in its category. Moving the 7th Infantry Division from **Fort Ord** to **Fort Lewis** reduces excess capacity, maintains flexibility, and capitalizes on the operational deployability and security attributes at Fort Lewis.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community asserted that Fort Ord was penalized in the Army's ranking for being small, but that it is perfectly suited to train a light division. The community argued that the

Army could build (or enhance) an airfield at Fort Ord for approximately \$60 million–\$120 million. The community stated that closing Fort Ord would increase unemployment by 25 percent. The community also argued that the land value included in DoD's recommendation was overstated. Finally, the community asserted that adequate family housing existed at Fort Ord for all of the soldiers assigned to the installation.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that all installations in this category were treated fairly. It also found that moving the 7th Infantry Division from Fort Ord to Fort Lewis optimizes the use of Fort Lewis. The Commission also found that there will be an excess capacity of two installations in the category at the end of 1995. The Commission finds that the community assertion for deployability has some merit; however, stationing the division at Fort Lewis does enable the division to use nearby McChord Air Force Base for its deployment. Currently, the 7th Infantry Division uses a civilian airport or travels 150 miles to Travis Air Force Base. The Commission found that building an airfield at Fort Ord (or enhancing the existing airfield) will cost approximately \$97 million; however, environmental concerns may prevent the construction.

The Commission agreed that the land value was overstated, but the issue was not a factor in the Army's recommendation. The Commission found that family housing is limited and expensive. There are currently 1,365 families inadequately housed at Fort Ord. The Commission also found that training for the division, while readily available, is split among three different installations – Fort Ord proper, Fort Hunter-Liggett, and Camp Roberts.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds DoD's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the selection criteria. The Commission, therefore, recommends the

closure of Fort Ord, California, and the movement of the 7th Infantry Division from Fort Ord to Fort Lewis, Washington. This recommendation does not impact on the status of Fort Hunter-Liggett. Fort Hunter-Liggett therefore remains open and is still recognized as a valuable asset to the Army and DoD.

Fort Polk, Louisiana

Category: Fighting (Maneuver)

Mission: 5th Infantry Division (5 MX)

*Cost to Close: Fort Polk/Fort Chaffee
\$303 million*

Savings: 1992-97: –\$34.2 million;

Annual: \$22.9 million

Payback: 5 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) to Fort Hood, Texas, from Fort Polk, Louisiana; move the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) from Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, to Fort Polk; realign the 199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Fort Polk.

This realignment allows the Army to station the JRTC at the installation best suited to its requirements (Fort Polk) and to house two divisions at its finest fighting installation (Fort Hood). Realignment of the 199th SMB from Fort Lewis to Fort Polk to serve as the opposing force for units training at the JRTC enhances the JRTC capabilities and opens space at Fort Lewis for the 7th Infantry Division (Light).

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that the DoD recommendation would create excess capacity at Fort Polk. It also stated that unemployment would increase six to eight percentage points as a result of the combination of the Fort Polk recommendation and the Air Force's proposal to close England Air Force Base.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that excess capacity will exist at Fort Polk after completion of the recommended realignment. However, it also found that the Army will likely use this excess capacity to house forces that may return from overseas or to station other Army or DoD activities. Additionally, the Commission finds that Fort Polk does not have enough training facilities or maneuver acreage to support both a division and the JRTC at Fort Polk. The Commission estimates that the unemployment impact will be severe.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the DoD's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the selection criteria. The Commission, therefore, recommends the realignment of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from Fort Polk to Fort Hood, the JRTC from Fort Chaffee to Fort Polk, and the 199th SMB from Fort Lewis to Fort Polk.

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania

Category: Industrial Depot

Mission: Depot Maintenance

Costs to Realign: \$36.4 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$27.0 million;

Annual: \$17.7 million

Payback: Immediate

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Realign the Headquarters, Depot Systems Command, including the Systems Integration Management Activity (SIMA), from Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania, to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, and merge it with the Armaments, Munitions and Chemical Command to form the Industrial Operations Command. Realign the Materiel Readiness Support Activity from Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, Kentucky, and the Logistics

Control Activity from the Presidio of San Francisco, California, to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. The latter proposal is a revision to the recommendations of the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission, which relocated the Materiel Readiness Support Activity to Letterkenny Army Depot.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that the Depot Systems Command need not be relocated in order to form the Industrial Operations Command. The new command could operate effectively in a split configuration. Additionally, the community believed that the SIMA was a separate entity that supported a variety of customers. Relocating that activity would result in an unwarranted up-front cost and an additional operational cost to support the entire customer base. The community was also concerned that the realignments would degrade the mission because experienced personnel would not move.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the depots were treated equally. The formation of the Industrial Operations Command and resultant reduction of the number of subordinate commands were rational approaches to management efficiencies.

The Commission did consider alternative ways to form the Industrial Operations Command and to realign each of the activities designated for relocation. The Commission determined that the formation of the Industrial Operations Command in a single location was operationally more effective. The realignments of Depot Systems Command, the Materiel Readiness Support Activity, and the Logistics Control Agency were also determined to be economical. The relocation of SIMA was operationally expedient in the long term and beneficial to the economy at the receiving location (Rock Island Arsenal), which is losing a large number of employees because of other base realignment and closure actions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds the DoD recommendations did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends that DoD realign Depot Systems Command with the Systems Integration Management Activity to Rock Island and form the Industrial Operations Command. Additionally, it recommends that the Materiel Readiness Support Activity and the Logistics Control Agency be realigned at Redstone Arsenal as proposed. This proposal is a revision to the recommendations of the 1988 Base Closure Commission, which directed the Materiel Readiness Support Activity to relocate from Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot to Letterkenny.

Realign Army Laboratories (Lab 21 Study), Adelphi and Aberdeen, Maryland

Category: Industrial-Commodity Oriented Installations

Mission: Research, Development and Testing

Cost to Realign: \$281.8 million

Savings: 1992-97: -\$106.0 million;

Annual: \$44.7 million

Payback: 4 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Establish the Combat Materiel Research Laboratory (CMRL) at Adelphi, Maryland. The Army Materiel Technology Laboratory (AMTL), now in Watertown, Massachusetts, should not be split among Detroit Arsenal, Michigan; Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey; and Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Instead, realign the AMTL to Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), Maryland. Collocate the Structures Element at NASA-Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia. This proposal is a revision to the

recommendations of the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the Base Closure and Realignment Commission should wait for the recommendations on laboratory realignments from the Advisory Commission on Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and Development Laboratories. The latter Commission is an advisory group established by law to provide recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how to effectively reorganize the research and development structure. The community also argued portions of the realignment were not cost-effective and would adversely impact readiness.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the industrial-commodity oriented installations were treated equally. The Commission found that the DoD studies and Defense Management Report Decision regarding laboratory realignments were credible and rational. The Army reviewed ten scenarios for the realignment of the laboratories and this proposal was cost-effective. The realignment of the Army Materiel Technology Laboratory functions to a single site was determined to have operational and cost advantages over the triple-site option recommended by the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds DoD's recommendations did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the criteria. The Commission recommends the closure of Harry Diamond Laboratory in Woodbridge, Virginia, and realignment of the laboratories to establish the Combat Materiel Technology

Laboratory at Adelphi and APG. The following specific realignments are included

- Move the Army Research Institute MANPRINT function from Alexandria, Virginia, to APG.
- Move the 6.1 and 6.2 materiel elements from the Belvoir Research and Development Center, Virginia, to APG.
- Move the AMTL (less Structures Element) from Watertown, Massachusetts, to APG (change to the recommendations of the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission).
- Move the AMTL Structures Element to the Army Aviation Aerostructures Directorate collocated at NASA-Langley Research Center and expand the mission at that site to form an Army Structures Directorate (change to the recommendations of the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission).
- Move the Directed Energy and Sensors Basic and Applied Research Element of the Center for Night Vision and Electro-Optics from Fort Belvoir to Adelphi.
- Move the Electronic Technology Device Laboratory from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Adelphi.
- Move the Battlefield Environment Effects Element of the Atmospheric Science Laboratory from White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, to Adelphi.
- Collocate the Ground Vehicle Propulsion Basic and Applied Research Activity from Warren, Michigan, with the Army Aviation Propulsion Directorate at the NASA-Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio.

They will form the Army Propulsion Directorate.

- Move the Harry Diamond Laboratories Woodbridge Research Facility Element to CMRL in Adelphi and close/dispose of the Woodbridge, Virginia, facility.
- Move the Fuze Development and Production Mission (armament-related) from Harry Diamond Laboratories in Adelphi to Picatinny Arsenal.
- Move the Fuze Development and Production Mission (missile-related) from Harry Diamond Laboratories in Adelphi to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

The Secretary of Defense must defer implementation until January 1, 1992, in order to consider the recommendations and findings of the Advisory Commission on Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and Development Laboratories and consult with the appropriate congressional committees thereon.

Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois

***Category: Industrial-Commodity Oriented
Installations***

Mission: Production

Cost to Realign: \$65.2 million

Savings: 1992-97: -\$18.2 million;

Annual: \$38.8 million

Payback: 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign the Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command from Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, as part of the Defense Management Review's inventory control point consolidations.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that the Army miscategorized Rock Island Arsenal as a production installation. The community also noted that Rock Island Arsenal had excess administrative space and consolidation could occur at Rock Island instead of Redstone Arsenal. The community also noted that the workforce at Rock Island had a higher skill-level base and private-sector pay rates were lower.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the industrial-commodity oriented installations were treated equally. The Commission found the consolidation of inventory control points would yield cost efficiencies that support the DoD realignment proposal.

The Commission found categorization of **Rock** Island Arsenal was debatable but did not affect the proposed realignment. Rock Island Arsenal does have excess capacity, but it is inefficient to consolidate the inventory control point at Rock Island. Redstone Arsenal has a slightly higher skill-level base and lower government pay rate.

The Commission did consider alternatives such as splitting the inventory control point or separating the inventory control point from its parent command. However, it determined the DoD realignment to be more operationally sound and cost-effective.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds DoD's recommendation did **not** deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. The Commission recommends that the Army realign the Armaments, Munitions, and Chemical Command as proposed and form a single inventory control point at Redstone Arsenal.

Sacramento Army Depot, California

Category: Industrial Depot
Mission: Logistics Support
Cost to Close: \$84.9 million
Savings: 1992-97: \$33.4 million;
Annual: \$55.8 million
Payback: Immediate

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Sacramento Army Depot. Transfer the ground communications electronic maintenance workload from Sacramento Army Depot, California, to Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania; Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; Red River Army Depot, Texas; Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania; and Corpus Christi Army Depot, Texas. Retain **50** acres for Reserve Component use.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community agreed with the closure of Sacramento Army Depot but disagreed with the transfer of all workload outside the Sacramento area. The community argued about the personnel disruption following closure and said that the DoD proposal did not contain a sufficient degree of DoD-wide interservice consolidation. It proposed an alternative plan that consolidated all ground communications electronics in two centers: Tobyhanna Army Depot on the East Coast and Sacramento **Air** Logistics Center at McClellan Air Force Base, Sacramento, California, on the West **Coast**.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that all industrial depots were treated equally. There was excess maintenance capacity for ground communications electronics, and Sacramento

Army Depot ranked the lowest of the installations with communications electronics maintenance capability.

DoD did consider the alternative proposal of consolidation of the ground communications electronics at Tobyhanna Army Depot and McClellan Air Force Base. The Commission found that the DoD decision not to use McClellan Air Force Base was due to the high man-hour rates that resulted in higher costs for depot-level maintenance work.

The Commission found that both the DoD proposal and the community counterproposal were rational approaches to the distribution of the ground communications electronics maintenance workload after closure of the Sacramento Army Depot. The Commission also developed modifications of the community plan. The DoD approach provided the larger savings, and the Commission's modification of the community proposal required fewer people to relocate.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that DoD deviated substantially from criterion 5. Therefore the Commission recommends the closure of Sacramento Army Depot and the realignment of its workload by competition to ensure the most cost-effective distribution of work. The Secretary of Defense will develop statements of work and a plan to conduct a public-public competition. This competition will determine how best to distribute the workload currently performed at Sacramento Army Depot, among those depots in the DoD plan (Tobyhanna Army Depot, Anniston Army Depot, Corpus Christi Army Depot, Red River Army Depot, Letterkenny Army Depot) and the Sacramento Air Logistics Center at McClellan Air Force Base. The implementation plan will include the logical groups of items to be competed, a time-phased schedule, and source selection criteria. The competition will begin as soon as possible. The Communications Systems Test Activity from Sacramento Army Depot will be realigned to Fort Lewis, Washington. As much as 50 acres of Sacramento Army Depot may be retained for Reserve Component use. The

residual supply mission at Sacramento Army Depot will be transferred to the Defense Depot West at Sharpe Depot or Tracy Depot.

Tri-Service Project Reliance Study, Various Locations

***Category: Commodity-Oriented Installation
Mission: Research, Development and Testing
Costs to Realign: \$24.3 million
Savings: 1992-97: \$71.0 million;
Annual: \$6.9 million
Payback: Less than 1 year***

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Execute the Tri-Service Project Reliance medical research study by reducing the number of Army medical research labs from nine to **six**.

Disestablish the Letterman Army Institute of Research (**LAIR**) Presidio of San Francisco, California (change to the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendation); disestablish the **U.S.** Army Institute of Dental Research, Washington, D.C.; and disestablish the **U.S.** Army Biomedical Research Development Laboratory, Fort Detrick, Maryland. Consolidate the Army's trauma-research and medical-materiel-development with existing Army medical research, development, test and evaluation facilities. The proposal **also** recommends the collocation of seven Tri-Service medical research programs at existing Army, Navy, and Air Force medical laboratories as follows: the Army blood research with the Navy; the Army combat dentistry with the Navy; Army directed energy (laser and microwave) bioeffects with the Air Force; elements of the Army and Navy biodynamics with the Air Force; Navy and Army toxicology (environmental quality and occupational health) with the Air Force; and Navy infectious disease research and Air Force

environmental medicine (heat physiology) with the Army.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The various communities argued that the Commission should wait to recommend laboratory realignments until the Federal Advisory Commission on the Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and Development Laboratories has finished its study. The latter Commission is an advisory group established by law to recommend to the Secretary of Defense how to reorganize the research and development structure.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the disestablishment of LAIR and realignment of its residual functions offers more operational and cost advantages than the option recommended by the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

The Commission determined that its jurisdiction did include authority to recommend realignment and closure of laboratories without the input of the Federal Advisory Commission.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds DoD's recommendations did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. The Commission recommends the disestablishment of the LAIR and realignment, as explained under "Department of Defense Recommendations," of the associated medical functions to the locations specified below. Specific actions and realignments are as follows:

Disestablish LAIR as part of the closure of the Presidio of San Francisco. Cancel the design and construction of the replacement laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Realign LAIR's research programs in the following manner (change to recommendations of the

1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission):

- Move trauma research to the U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
- Collocate blood research with the Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI), Bethesda, Maryland.
- Collocate laser bioeffects research with the Armstrong Laboratory, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas.

Disestablish the U.S. Army Biomedical Research Development Laboratory at Fort Detrick and transfer medical materiel research to the U.S. Army Medical Materiel and Development Activity at Fort Detrick. Collocate environmental and occupational toxicology research with the Armstrong Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.

Disestablish the U.S. Army Institute of Dental Research, Washington, D.C., and collocate combat dentistry research with the Naval Dental Research Institute at Great Lakes Naval Base, Illinois.

Move microwave bioeffects research from Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), Washington, D.C., and collocate it with the Armstrong Laboratory, Brooks Air Force Base.

Collocate infectious disease research at NMRI with WRAIR.

Move biodynamics research from the U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory, Fort Rucker, Alabama, and collocate it with the Armstrong Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.

Move heat physiology research from the United States Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine (USAFSAM) [now called Armstrong Laboratory at Brooks Air Force Base] and collocate it with the U.S. Army Research

Institute of Environmental Medicine, Natick, Massachusetts.

Davisville buildings could continue to be used. The community also was concerned about the loss of jobs in an economically depressed area.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Construction Battalion Center Davisville, Rhode Island

Category: Construction Battalion Center
Mission: Mobilization and Logistics Support to Reserve Seabees
Cost to Close: \$36.6 million
Savings: 1992-97: -\$12.8 million;
Annual: \$5.5 million
Payback: 10 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Davisville and relocate three sets of equipment and tools for Reserve Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (RNMCB) and other pre-positioned war reserve material stock to the other Construction Battalion Centers at Gulfport, Mississippi, and Port Hueneme, California.

The projected reduction of RNMCBs and the ability of the other construction battalion centers to provide required mobilization support enable reduction in the Naval Construction Force support infrastructure. The personnel support facilities at Davisville are deteriorated and the facility will no longer be designated as a site for mobilizing Reserve personnel.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community stated that Davisville had historically been critical for support of the Seabees and that the support is still needed, particularly for storage space and equipment repair. The community questioned the need to build new warehouse space when existing

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that many of the facilities at Davisville are deteriorated and unusable. The ability of the other two construction battalion centers to support the major Naval Construction Force effort during Desert Shield/Storm demonstrated the ability of these bases to provide required support without Davisville.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on Construction Battalion Center Davisville did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Construction Battalion Center Davisville.

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, California

Category: Naval Station
Mission: Support Tenant Activities
Cost to Close: 0
Savings: 1992-97: \$325,000;
Annual: \$319,000
Payback: Less than 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Hunters Point Annex. Outlease the entire property, with provisions for continued occupancy of space by the Supervisor of Ship building, Conversion, and Repair; Planning, Engineering, Repair, and Alterations

Detachment; and a contractor-operated test facility. This is a change to the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendation.

Hunters Point Annex has low military value because of significant encroachment that will result from congressionally mandated outleasing to the city of San Francisco. The infrastructure at the base is deficient. Moreover, this closure will have little impact on the economy or environment of the San Francisco area. Implementation costs will be minimal.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community is anxious to gain use of the land that Hunters Point occupies and thus did not argue against closure.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that few tenants use the facilities and that the piers are not in use. Closure removes 15,900 feet of excess berthing capacity. The outlease obligation renders the large Dry Dock 4 unusable for emergent repairs.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the DoD proposal did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends closing the Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island. Outlease the entire property, with provisions for continued occupancy of space by the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair; Planning, Engineering, Repair, and Alterations Detachment; and a contractor-operated test facility. This is a change to the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendation.

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, California

Category: Marine Corps Air Station

Mission: Support Marine Corps Aviation

Cost to Close: \$590.4 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$56.8 million;

Annual: \$0.4 million

Payback: 100 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Tustin, retaining family housing and related personnel facilities to support MCAS El Toro, California. Combine Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 16 with MAG 39 from Camp Pendleton and transfer the combined MAG, along with the Tustin's headquarters components and related units, to a new air station to be built at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California.

Before relocation, MAG 16 and MAG 39 at MCAS Camp Pendleton, California, will be combined. Projected requirements necessitate restructuring aviation support to complement combined-arms training. Only MCAS Yuma, Arizona, which has a unique mission, ranked lower than Tustin in military value. The air station and its air space are being encroached. The aging facilities have many deficiencies. Moving helicopter support to Twentynine Palms integrates it more closely with training for Camp Pendleton ground forces. Helicopter facilities at Camp Pendleton are located too far from training areas at Twentynine Palms to permit MAG-39 to play an integral role in ground-force training.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community supports closure of MCAS Tustin so the property can be commercially developed, thereby increasing the community tax base. The community also supports eliminating helicopter noise pollution. There is a minor economic impact of 0.1 percent to 0.3percent.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that there was not a significant force-structure reduction dictating the closure of an MCAS; however, MCAS Tustin has only a slight excess capacity. There is significant community encroachment and there are increasing limitations on air space used by low-flying helicopters. The same factors that limit the base's military value provide MCAS Tustin with an unusually high redevelopment value.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation on MCAS Tustin deviated substantially from criterion 2 (availability and condition of land and facilities at receiving locations) and criterion 4 (cost implications).

Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of MCAS Tustin and the retention of the family housing and related personnel support facilities in support of MCAS El Toro. It further recommends MAG 16 be composited with MAG 39 and relocated to Marine Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms or Camp Pendleton or both and with MAG 39 continued tenancy at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton.

Further, the Secretary of Defense shall propose for consideration in the Fiscal Year 1992 or 1993 Defense Authorization Bill a fair-market exchange of land and facilities at construction of military facilities at Twentynine Palms or Camp Pendleton. If a fair exchange is not authorized in Fiscal Year 1992 or 1993, then the Secretary of Defense should proceed with the relocation to

Twentynine Palms or Camp Pendleton or both, utilizing the Defense Base Closure Account.

Naval Air Facility Midway Island

Category: Naval Air Station/Other - Unique

Mission: Logistic Support

Cost to Close: \$7.2 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$33.8 million;

Annual: \$6.9 million

Payback: Less than 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Realign Naval Air Facility Midway Island. Eliminate the mission. Retain caretaker presence to support intermittent joint special operations.

Naval Air Facility Midway Island was a likely candidate for realignment because the site-specific mission requirements are reducing and the degradations to joint operations are acceptable.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Naval Air Facility Midway Island's civilian population comprises 230 contract personnel. The community expressed no concerns with regard to the realignment.

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation did not deviate from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends realigning Naval Air Facility Midway Island. Eliminate the mission and operate under a caretaker status.

Naval Air Station Chase Field, Beeville, Texas

Category: Naval Air Station
Mission: Naval Aviation Training
Cost to Close: \$47.7 million
Savings: 1992-97: -\$7.5 million;
Annwl: \$24.7 million
Payback: Less than 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Air Station Chase Field, retain the capability to be operated as an outlying field (OLF), and retain the air operations personnel necessary to operate it. Disestablish air training squadrons and all other tenants. Expand air training squadrons at Naval Air Station Kingsville, Texas, and Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi, to handle any increased student output. Improve Kingsville runways for safety and efficiency with additional flight operations.

Projected reductions of carrier and air wing force structure reduce the annual strike pilot training rate (PTR) requirement, creating an excess of approximately one base. Chase Field graded lower in military value because of infrastructure deficiencies identified as facility construction required for the introduction of the T-45 trainer. Chase Field was determined to more readily function as an OLF than Naval Air Station Kingsville and Naval Air Station Meridian. Finally, realignment of Chase Field is more easily reversible should force structure increase to the point where base reconstitution may become required.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community principally argued that the Navy plan was excessively wasteful, inflicted economic and environmental damage, ignored real savings, and was predicated on false information, doubtful data, and improbable projections. The community asserted that Naval Air Station Chase Field was the most productive strike training base, suggesting that Naval Air Station Meridian

was the most logical choice for closure due to its lower productivity and greater savings achieved by consolidation of training in South Texas. The community also made issue of superior air space and zoning ordinances that insured long-term freedom from both land and air space encroachment.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that DoD's closure recommendation was consistent with projected force-structure reductions with the exception that the requirement for an outlying field is not fully supported by projected PTR requirements. The surge requirement for 600 PTR was revised to 450 by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

The Commission assessed that issues of relative productivity, airfield design, air space, encroachment, and weather were not significant enough to be a basis for a closure recommendation. The relevant issues were determined to be relative cost and military value.

The Commission found that DoD underestimated the costs to relocate the T-45 from Naval Air Station Kingsville to Naval Air Station Chase Field.

Naval Air Station Kingsville was considered too expensive to relocate. Naval Air Station Meridian and Naval Air Station Chase Field became the potential candidates for closure. Geographical diversity and cost were predominant factors in retaining Naval Air Station Meridian.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission agrees with the DoD recommendation to close Naval Air Station Chase Field. However, the Commission finds that, in recommending the retention of an OLF, the DoD substantially deviated from the force-structure plan. Projected reductions of carrier and air wing force structure reduce Navy-wide pilot training rate requirements to

a level that does not require retention of the Chase Field as an OLF.

The Commission also found that the DoD substantially deviated from criterion **6** in that realignment to retain an OLF imposes significantly greater adverse economic impact **on** the local community than closure of the entire air station.

The Commission therefore recommends the complete closure of Naval Air Station Chase Field, including the OLF.

Naval Air Station Moffett Field, California

***Category: Naval Air Station/Maritime Patrol
Aircraft***

Mission: Maritime Patrol Aircraft Support

Cost to Close: \$112 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$104.8 million;

Annual: \$72.4 million

Payback: Less than 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Moffett Field, decommission three active-duty maritime patrol squadrons, and redistribute the remaining squadrons among Naval Air Stations Jacksonville, Florida; Barbers Point, Hawaii; and Brunswick, Maine. Consolidate the P-3 Fleet Replacement Squadron operations at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida.

Moffett Field ranked low among all naval air stations and lowest among the four bases in the maritime patrol aircraft subcategory. The base **suffers from** severe ground and air space encroachment. There is **no** potential for increased **aircraft** operations. Moffett Field is located **in** a high-cost area. Finally, a force-structure reduction of **25** percent **results** in an excess of one base in this subcategory.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that the benefits afforded by Moffett Field are essential to the San Francisco Bay Area economy and to the nation. The long-term coexistence between businesses and the naval air station is profitable to the federal government. If the naval air station were to close, the base should remain federally operated and maintained so that defense contractors can continue to use the air facilities. While Moffett Field may **no** longer meet national military needs, it remains a crucial part of the **high-technology** and aerospace industries.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that DoD's closure recommendations were consistent with projected force-structure reductions. They were also consistent with the aircraft-relocation plan proposed by DoD and with recent military construction that supports them. Under that plan, the maritime patrol force will move **from** its traditional **50-50** split between fleets to a new deployment strategy with **40** percent of the force in the Pacific Fleet and **60** percent in the Atlantic Fleet. The Commission found that ground and air space encroachment at Naval Air Station Moffett Field and quality of life problems for Navy personnel in the **San** Francisco Bay Area are **significant**.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendations **on** Naval Air Station Moffett Field did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends closing Naval Air Station Moffett Field; transferring assigned P-3 aircraft to Naval **Air** Stations Jacksonville, Brunswick, and Barbers **Point**; and consolidating P-3 Fleet Replacement Squadron operations at Naval Air Station Jacksonville. Additionally, the

Commission suggests that the base remain in federal custody in support of non-DoD agencies and industry. The Secretary should consult with NASA on possible use.

Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Washington

Category: Carrier Airwing Support

Mission: A-6 Attack and EA-6B Electronic Warfare Aircraft

Cost to Close: N/A

Savings: N/A

Payback: N/A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Whidbey Island and the supporting Naval Hospital Oak Harbor. Transfer aviation activities to Naval Air Station Lemoore, California. Retain the ranges in Navy custody.

Force-structure reductions in aircraft carriers and carrier airwings and the imminent departure of the A-6 Intruder medium-attack aircraft from the Navy's inventory argued for the closure of Whidbey Island. Lemoore, where the Navy wants to consolidate all West Coast attack squadrons, has available capacity. Whidbey's single-runway configuration limits operational flexibility and future growth. Whidbey's outlying field is encroached.

The economic consequences will be the most severe of any proposed closure, a 58.3 percent loss in jobs.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that the economic impact would be devastating - almost 84 percent unemployment after closure. The community argued that the base's mission is not diminishing since the A-6E is being rewinged.

Whidbey actually has two runways, optimized for variable winds, and the base offers flexible training with its outlying field.

Moreover, the EA-6B will be unable to perform its electronic warfare mission at Lemoore, which lacks the ranges. The air space at Lemoore is too limited for receipt of all Whidbey's aircraft. Further, DoD underestimated the construction costs a move to Lemoore would entail.

Finally, the closure of Whidbey Island would leave a demographic void with regard to the Naval Reserves.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the A-6 force structure reduces at a rate no greater than that associated with projected carrier-air-wing force-structure reductions. While the A-6 aircraft is reaching the end of its operating service life, major aircraft modifications are being incorporated that extend its wing life until 2005, when a replacement aircraft should become available.

Naval Air Station Whidbey Island operates from two runways with only one being operational at a time. This affects operational flexibility and growth in that it limits the ability to conduct field carrier landing practice. The functional wing commander conducts this training through use of the Outlying Field Coupeville. While this optimizes training and enhances the single runway operations, noted in the DoD recommendation, it exacerbates the encroachment at the outlying field. The encroachment issue at Outlying Field Coupeville is significant. The A-6 and EA-6B aircraft are two of the loudest aircraft in the Navy inventory. The local community has not passed any zoning ordinances that preclude development near the airfield. The community has organized an aggressive campaign focusing on abating the noise. The Commission found that the noise and encroachment issues are moderate relative to other Navy bases. Expansion of the base is

possible. With the exception of Naval Air Station Lemoore, all carrier support naval air stations rate worse than Naval Air Station Whidbey Island with respect to encroachment on air installation compatible use zone management. This issue can be resolved without closing the base.

The Spectrum Aviation Division of the Federal Aviation Administration documented projected impacts to operating and training the EA-6B aircraft in California. The interference to national air space system will degrade air safety and efficiency.

The Commission found that while excess capacity exists at training ranges in California and Nevada, no coordination was conducted with DoD, other federal agencies, and local governments toward facilitating the 100 percent growth in tactical aircraft in the Central California operating areas. The need to perform this coordination was recommended in the Navy analysis, *An Analysis of Naval Airspace Utilization and Requirements (Project Blue Air Update)*, of November 2, 1987. The report documented the traffic-flow problems through choke-point corridors between the California and Nevada operating areas. The congestion imposes severe limits on the number of aircraft that can be handled as well as significant traffic-flow management problems for the Federal Aviation Administration.

The Commission found excess capacity at Naval Air Station Lemoore, the relocating base for the Whidbey Island aviation tenants. However, not enough capacity exists to preclude DoD's estimate of more than \$300 million in military construction to accommodate the aircraft from Whidbey Island. Based on varying accounts of the construction requirements by Navy organizations, the Commission found the estimate could well grow. The Commission found the return on investment to be high.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that DoD deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and

from criteria 1 and 3 by not accurately focusing on the current and future mission requirements of the carrier medium-attack mission; it also inaccurately assessed the availability of land, facilities, and air space at the current location and the full impacts on facilities and air space at Naval Air Station Lemoore. Therefore, the Commission recommends that Naval Air Station Whidbey Island and the supporting Naval Hospital Oak Harbor remain open.

Naval Station Long Beach, California

Category: Naval Station

*Mission: Support Homeported Ships
and Shipyard*

Cost to Close: \$118.6 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$201.8 million;

Annual: \$85.2 million

Payback: Less than 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Station Long Beach and the supporting Naval Hospital Long Beach. Transfer ship support functions and a parcel of land to the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. Reassign ships to other Pacific Fleet homeports.

The Navy has considerable excess pier capacity on the West Coast and will be able to accommodate its 1997 force structure at the more essential ports of San Diego and Everett. Long Beach rated low in military value because its facilities are deficient and require military construction, the location is expensive, and, unlike San Diego, it lacks capacity to homeport all Southern California ships. Finally, the closure would produce significant savings.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that the Navy's Base Structure Committee overturned an

earlier recommendation by the OpNav working group not to close **Long Beach**. The community claimed the Base Structure Committee was intent **on** protecting new strategic homeports, **specifically** Naval Station Everett, Washington, currently under construction. The community maintained that a **draft GAO** report **on** strategic homeports, **now** released, advocated deleting Everett and keeping Long Beach **open**. The community claimed that the Navy overstated excess berthing capacity.

The community also asserted that the station supports a large regional reserve presence, **has** excellent access to **open** sea and Southern California training areas, can homeport a nuclear-powered carrier, and provides critical support for the shipyard.

The community stated that the economic impact of closure would be high, claiming that Navy ships constitute **97** percent of local private repair work. Finally, the community believed the Navy underestimated the military construction required at receiving locations, thus understating the actual payback period.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the OpNav group recommendation was not **definitive**, the Navy did in fact evaluate its homeports, and the **GAO** report did not compare the homeports against other naval stations as the community alleged. Halting construction at Everett would remove **too** little of the Navy's excess berthing capacity.

The declining force structure enables **San Diego** and Everett to provide all the **West Coast** naval station **berthing** required in **1997**. The declining number of Naval Reserve ships enables the Navy to relinquish the support provided by **Long Beach**.

The Commission found that closing **Long Beach** would eliminate more than two-thirds of the Navy's excess berthing capacity **on** the **West Coast**. However, the Navy will have to continue to use **San Diego** piers classified as

inadequate until funds become available to meet its stated requirement to replace them.

While most piers are classified as substandard, only **\$17** million would be required to make them adequate. Currently, Long Beach piers do not serve a nuclear carrier. Upgrading one of its pier's to homeport a nuclear carrier would cost **\$75** million.

The Commission found that the potential savings from closure are high. The Navy should expand the **San Diego** homeport area to include private repair facilities now in the Long Beach area in order to ameliorate local job loss, which is projected to be only two-tenths of one percentage point.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the DoD recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the **final** selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Naval Station Long Beach and the supporting Naval Hospital **Long Beach**. Ship support functions and a parcel of land will be transferred **to** the naval shipyard. Ships assigned to the naval station will be reassigned to other Pacific Fleet homeports. Alternative use of the hospital facilities should **be** explored with the Department of Veterans Affairs, Public Health **Service**, state and local governments and the community.

Naval Station Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Category: Naval Station

***Mission: Support Shipyard and Assigned
Ships***

Cost to Close: \$53.5 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$55.9 million;

Annual: \$40.4 million

Payback: Less than 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Naval Station Philadelphia. Reassign ships to other Atlantic Fleet homeports, close the naval base, and move the Naval Damage Control Training Center to the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois. Transfer remaining tenants to other bases or retain them in leased space. Retain the regional brig.

Naval Station Philadelphia **was** graded low in military value because of significant facility deficiencies that would require construction to correct, its high-cost location, and the elimination of the requirement to support the naval shipyard, which DoD is also recommending for closure.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The Philadelphia community believes the naval shipyard should remain open, and therefore the naval **station** must **also** remain **open** to support it. **The** community further believes that the Navy failed to consider costs at receiving bases, the high cost of environmental cleanup after closure, and the ability of assigned Naval Reserve ships to tap the large local Reserve pool.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The naval station **has no** piers. Assigned ships are berthed at the shipyard, which the station supports. Closing the shipyard will

remove the station's primary mission. Assigned ships must steam a relatively long distance to reach the open ocean, which can lengthen Reserve drill weekends and affect retention. Closure will account for a relatively small fraction of the overall local job loss resulting from closing the entire naval complex. Closure will produce significant savings.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that DoD's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Naval Station Philadelphia.

Ships assigned to the Naval Station will be reassigned to other Atlantic Fleet homeports. The office of Commander, Naval Base Philadelphia will close. The Naval Damage **Control** Training Center, a major tenant, will move to the Naval Training Center at Great Lakes, Illinois. Other tenants will transfer to other bases or remain in leased space. The regional brig will remain.

Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point), Washington

Category: Naval Station

Mission: Support Staff and Tenant Activities

Cost to Close: \$28.4 million

Savings: 1992-97: -\$22.9 million;

Annual: \$1.6 million

Payback: 100 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point). Relocate most functions and activities to Everett, Washington. Retain the **regional** brig and a small surrounding parcel of land. Dispose of the rest of the property. This

changes the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission's recommendation to partially close this base.

Sand Point received a low grade for military value because previous functions and missions had been reduced, culminating in the loss of almost one-half of the property. Commander, Naval Base Seattle, the Navy's Pacific Northwest regional coordinator, will move to Submarine Base Bangor, consistent with his concurrent responsibilities as Commander Submarine Group Nine. Commanding Officer, Naval Station Puget Sound, will move to Naval Station Everett when construction there is completed. Since most existing Sand Point billets will remain in the area and since new billets will be added at Everett, economic impacts will be slight.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community did not argue against the closure of Sand Point. The local government plans to use the land for park expansion and has proposed additional community uses. The main community concerns were expeditious cleanup of the site and the incompatibility of the remaining Navy brig with planned park use.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

Naval Station Sand Point **has no** mission, its facilities are poor, and it cannot contribute **significantly** to meeting surge requirements. The major tenants are relocating. The current small overhead explains the long payback period.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that DoD's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the **force-structure** plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends **the** closure of Puget Sound Naval Station (Sand Point). A majority of the functions will be relocated to Everett, **Washington**. The regional brig and a small surrounding parcel of land may **be** retained by

the Secretary after study. The Navy will dispose of the remainder of the property. This is a change to the 1988 Base Closure Commission recommendation to partially close the installation.

Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida

Category: Training

**Mission: Recruit Training; Service School
Command; Nuclear Power Schools**

Cost to Close: N/A

Savings: N/A

Payback: N/A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Training Center (NTC) Orlando and the supporting Naval Hospital Orlando. The recruit training will be absorbed by NTC Great Lakes, Illinois, and NTC San Diego, California. The nuclear training function and all "A" schools will be relocated.

Force-structure reductions decrease requirements for basic recruit and follow-on training. **As** a result, slightly over **two** Recruit Training Commands (RTCs) **can** accommodate future requirements, leaving an excess capacity of approximately one RTC. Major savings can **only** be realized by closure of a complete NTC.

NTC Orlando was graded lowest in military value for the following key reasons: **First**, the Navy wants **to retain** the NTC in **San** Diego because of its collocation with major fleet concentrations. **Second**, significant capital is invested in complex, sophisticated, and expensive training devices, systems, and buildings at NTC Great **Lakes**. **Third**, NTC Great Lakes has expansion and surge capability; NTC Orlando does **not**. **And finally**, Naval Hospital Orlando was identified for closure as a "follower" because of its reduced support to the active-duty population in the area.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed that the Navy improperly rated NTC Orlando lowest in expansion capability. The community also argued that one of the reasons for excluding NTC Great Lakes from consideration for closure was the estimated cost to relocate its extensive training devices but that the training devices are not recruit related.

The community argued that the major reason for not proposing the closure of San Diego was its collocation with the fleet, which is not recruit related. Also, the Navy omitted the infrastructure costs at Great Lakes to accommodate the Orlando move. The community also noted that extensive pharmacy costs had been omitted from the hospital COBRA (Cost of Base Realignment Actions) computations. And finally, the community claimed that failure to consider Orlando's mobilization capacity adversely affected its overall ranking.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that DoD based its closure recommendation of NTC Orlando on the basis of excess capacity in the recruit training assets. The Commission found that although NTC Orlando has excess capacity in recruit training, this excess does not carry over to the other training schools. The Commission also found that DoD based its closure recommendation of Orlando on an overall low military rating and that this rating was significantly influenced by a low rating for criterion 3. Further, the Commission found that NTC Orlando had more surge capacity than NTC San Diego which received a high rating for criterion 3. The Commission also found that Orlando has much more land than NTC San Diego, on which to develop additional facilities in the event of mobilization requirements.

The Commission found that the Navy's analysis was very sensitive to one-time costs due to the sizable military construction (MILCON) required to relocate the Orlando schools to NTC Great Lakes. The original COBRA submitted by the Navy yielded a

12-year payback and a \$57.1 million annual savings. An updated COBRA submitted by the Navy indicates a 20-year payback and a \$35.5 million annual savings after six years. The Commission's COBRA run on NTC Orlando yielded a cost to close of \$423.2 million and a payback period of 100 years.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that with regard to the DoD recommendation to close NTC Orlando, the Secretary deviated substantially from criteria 3 and 5 by not considering the significant surge capacity as required for mobilization and by overestimating return on investment. Therefore, the Commission recommends that the Naval Training Center and the Naval Hospital Orlando remain open.

Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Pennsylvania

Category: Naval Shipyard

Mission: Repair, Maintenance, and Overhaul of Navy Ships

Cost to Close: \$102 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$38.1 million;

Annual: \$36 million

Payback: 2 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Philadelphia Naval Shipyard and preserve for emergent requirements. Retain the propeller facility (shops and foundry), Naval Inactive Ships Maintenance Facility, and Naval Ship System Engineering Station in active status on shipyard property.

Changes in the force structure will reduce shiprepair requirements and terminate the carrier service life extension program (CV-SLEP). Closure of a naval shipyard is necessary to balance the Navy's industrial infrastructure with this reduced workload. Maintaining the shipyard in mothball status will allow its use for unplanned requirements

or its reconstitution if future needs are greater than now anticipated.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community stated that Philadelphia provides the skilled workforce and facilities that the Navy will need to repair its large conventional ships in the **future**. It believes that the shipyard is particularly well suited to repair Aegis-equipped ships because of specialized public and private industrial facilities in the area. The community also claimed that Philadelphia is the most cost-effective and **efficient** public shipyard, with the lowest man-day rate and highest productive ratio. This, along with its facilities for repairing large ships, justifies keeping the facility open during the 1990s, even at a reduced workload level, until the conventional ship workload increases.

The community pointed to the recent congressional decision to require the aircraft carrier John **F. Kennedy** to undergo a CV-**SLEP** in Philadelphia, **as** a reason not to consider the shipyard for closure - the planned schedule **runs** too close to the end of the required closure milestone date.

The impact **on** the city of Philadelphia would be severe, particularly when added to proposed closures of other Philadelphia-area bases. The **community** believes that this is too large **an** impact for any single region to **bear**. If Philadelphia Naval Shipyard is closed and mothballed, the community stated that it would vigorously pursue legislative relief to force reversion or outleasing of shipyard property to the city.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the overall public shipyard workload is falling **significantly** because of force reductions and budget limitations. The **projected** workload in nuclear shipyards during the 1990s was found to limit the potential for closing any nuclear shipyard until **the** late 1990s.

The largest portion of Philadelphia's recent workload has been CV-SLEP, which the Navy desires to terminate. However, Congress has passed legislation that requires a CV- **SLEP** at Philadelphia. The Commission found that this CV-SLEP should be completed in mid-1996, about a year before the required closure date.

Workload is available that could be diverted from public **and** private East Coast shipyards to Philadelphia to bring its activity up to levels that justify keeping it open. However, this would limit the Navy's ability to meet its target of putting **30** percent of its repair work in private yards. It may increase costs at public shipyards, such **as** Norfolk, which would lose workload. The Commission found that retaining Philadelphia active at a low employment level, such as the 1,200-person option considered by the Navy, would increase the cost for work **performed** at Philadelphia over the cost for the same work performed at a public shipyard with **a** traditional staffing level.

The Commission found that the combination of carrier-capable drydocks at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, **Newport News Shipbuilding**, and the mothballed drydocks at Philadelphia provide capacity for unplanned requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS

"he Commission **finds** that the Secretary's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure and preservation of Philadelphia Naval Shipyard for emergent requirements. The propeller facility, Naval Inactive Ships Maintenance Facility, and Naval Ship System Engineering Station will remain in active status **on** shipyard property.

Navy Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Engineering, and Fleet Support Activities

***Category: Research, Development, Testing,
and Evaluation***

Mission: Research and Engineering Facilities

Cost to Consolidate: \$513 million

Savings: 1992-97: -\$119 million;

Annual: \$107 million

***Payback: 2-10 years (varies by warfare
center)***

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close 10 and realign 16 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), Engineering and Fleet Support Facilities as part of a facility consolidation plan. Create four centers: Naval Air Warfare Center; Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, Naval Surface Warfare Center; and Naval Undersea Warfare Center.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The communities argued that implementing the consolidation plan would disrupt the RDT&E, engineering, and fleet-support functions these activities perform. Much of this disruption, they claimed, would result from the loss of key scientists and engineers who would be unwilling to relocate.

Communities expressed concern that the Navy underestimated the costs of the consolidation, that it failed to evaluate all alternatives, and that the new warfare centers would not emphasize research and development sufficiently. The communities requested the Commission to wait for the completion of the DoD Advisory Commission on Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and Development Laboratories study before making any recommendations.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the DoD did not adequately examine the availability of alternative facilities for the location of the East Coast In-Service Engineering Directorate, which the DoD proposed to be located in Portsmouth, Virginia. Existing facilities may be available in Charleston, South Carolina, elsewhere in the Norfolk metropolitan area, or at other locations. Additionally, the Committee found that development in the Portsmouth area could affect the Navy's ability to conduct tests on radars and communications equipment. While the Commission found inaccuracies in the DoD cost and savings estimates, these errors were insignificant.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that, with one exception, the Secretary's proposal for closure and realignment of RDT&E, Engineering, and Fleet Support Activities did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and the selection criteria.

In its recommended establishment of Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center's East Coast In-Service Engineering Directorate in Portsmouth, the Commission finds that the Secretary deviated substantially from criteria 2 and 4 by not examining fully all available alternatives for location of the Directorate.

The Commission recommends the following closures and realignments.

Closures

Integrated Combat Systems Test Facility,
San Diego, CA

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering
Center, San Diego, CA

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center,
Vallejo, CA

Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity,
Yorktown, VA

Trident Command and Control Systems
Maintenance Activity, Newport, RI

Naval Space Systems Activity,
Los Angeles, CA

Naval Sea Combat Systems Engineering
Station, Norfolk, VA

Naval Ocean Systems Center Detachment,
Kaneohe, HI

Fleet Combat Direction Systems Support
Activity, San Diego, CA

Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility,
Albuquerque, NM

Additionally, the Commission recommends to the President that the Secretary defer implementation of this consolidation plan until January 1, 1992, in order to give the Secretary time to consider the findings and recommendations of the DoD Advisory Commission on Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and Development Laboratories and to consult with the appropriate committees of Congress.

Realignments

David Taylor Research Center Detachment,
Annapolis, MD

Naval Air Development Center,
Warminster, PA

Naval Air Engineering Center, Lakehurst, NJ

Naval Air Propulsion Center, Trenton, NJ

Naval Avionics Center, Indianapolis, IN

Naval Coastal Systems Center,
Panama City, FL

Naval Ordnance Station, Indian Head, MD

Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville, KY

Naval Surface Weapons Center Detachment,
White Oak, MD

Naval Underwater Systems Center
Detachment, New London, CT

Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station,
Keyport, WA

Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, CA

Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane, IN

Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, CA

The Commission also believes there is a clear role for the Advisory Commission to advise the Secretary of how best to implement this consolidation plan so as to minimize the impact of the turbulence it could create, including the loss of key personnel. Clearly, the challenge of undertaking such a comprehensive reorganization will require the careful development and execution of personnel management plans to minimize the disruption of critical research and development activities in the Navy laboratory system.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Beale Air Force Base, California

*Category: Flying/Strategic
Mission: Strategic Reconnaissance
and Air Refueling, U-2, TR-1, and KC-135*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Undergraduate Navigator Training and the 323rd Flying Training Wing from Mather Air Force Base, California, to Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, instead of realigning to Beale Air Force Base as recommended by the 1988 Commission on Base Realignment and Closure.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The economic impact will harm an already depressed area.

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on realignment of Beale Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. The economic impact will not be severe. Therefore, the Commission recommends as part of the closure of Mather Air Force Base, the realignment of these activities to Randolph Air Force Base.

Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas

*Category: Flying/Tactical
Mission: Tactical Reconnaissance, RF-4
Cost to Close: \$39.8 million
Savings: 1992-97: \$128 million;
Annual: \$36.3 million
Payback: 2 years*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Bergstrom and retire the assigned RF-4 aircraft. The 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing will be inactivated. Maintain the existing Air Force Reserve units in an enclosed area if the base is converted to a civil airport. Relocate the 12th Air Force Headquarters, 12th Tactical Intelligence Squadron, and 602nd Tactical Air Control Center Squadron to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. The 41st Electronic Combat Squadron will remain in place at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base rather than move to Bergstrom Air Force Base as recommended by the 1988 Commission. Finally, move the 712th Air Support Operations Center Squadron to Fort Hood, Texas.

Bergstrom ranked relatively low in the flying/tactical category based on its long-term military value compared with other bases in the category. The base suffers from ground and regional air space encroachment. The regional air space is increasingly stressed by growth in air traffic. There are insufficient suitable air-to-ground or electronic combat ranges nearby for flight training. Finally, the capacity of on-base family housing is below

average compared with that at other bases in the category.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed that Bergstrom simply needs a new mission. It declared that the base is strategically located to support Fort Hood, Texas, with close air support operations and airlift for operational or exercise deployments. The community also was concerned that the closure recommendation was based upon the impression that the base would definitely be converted to a commercial airport. The community minimized the severity of ground and air space encroachment.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that DoD's closure recommendation was not tied to the conversion of the airfield to a civil airport. However, there is an option to maintain the Air Force Reserve unit if the airfield is converted to commercial use. The lack of adequate ranges and increasing encroachment limit the base's overall military value. Other tactical units such as the 149th Tactical Fighter Group at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, can adequately support Fort Hood. Finally, Fort Hood uses its own Grey Army Airfield for airlift operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on Bergstrom Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends that Bergstrom Air Force Base close and that the assigned RF-4 aircraft retire. The 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing will be inactivated. The Regional Corrosion Control Facility will remain if it continues to be economical for the Air Force to operate it there. The Air Force Reserve units shall remain in a cantonment area if the base is converted to a civilian airport. If no decision on a civilian airport is reached by June 1993, the Reserve units will be redistributed. If the Reserve units stay but the airport is not an

economically viable entity by the end of 1996, these units would also be redistributed. The 12th Air Force Headquarters 12th TAC Intelligence Squadron and the 602nd Tactical Air Control Center Squadron will relocate to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. The 712th Air Support Operations Center Squadron will relocate to Fort Hood, Texas. The 41st Electronic Combat Squadron will remain in place at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base.

Carswell Air Force Base, Texas

Category: Flying/Strategic
Mission: Strategic Bombardment and Air Refueling, B-52 and KC-135
Cost to Close: \$45.6 million
Savings: 1992-97: \$156 million;
Annual: \$45.5 million
Payback: 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Carswell Air Force Base and transfer the assigned B-52H aircraft to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The assigned KC-135 aircraft will be transferred to the Air Reserve Component, and the 7th Bombardment Wing will be inactivated. The 436th Strategic Training Squadron will be relocated to Dyess AFB, Texas. Maintain the existing Air Force Reserve units in a cantonment area.

Carswell AFB ranked low based on its long-term military value compared with other bases in its category. The base is poorly located for wartime bomber or tanker employment. The base has the worst ground and regional air space encroachment in its category. The regional air space will continue to be stressed by aggressive aviation growth in the area.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed that many subelement scores were incorrect and that the "corrected" scores would change the overall rating for the base. The community minimized the impact and severity of air space encroachment, citing excellent procedures and equipment used to control aircraft in the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport area. Similarly, it declared that the existing ground encroachment in both the clear and accident zones will decrease. The community was also concerned about the disposition of the base hospital. The hospital serves the active-duty military members and their dependents as well as many retirees. The community was also concerned about the economic impact on a region already hard hit by other cuts in the defense industry.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found very few errors in the subelement scores, and the full Air Force process was validated by the GAO. Carswell AFB is in an area of continued aviation growth and strong pressure on regional air space. Additionally, there is commercial and residential encroachment in the protected zones off either end of the runway. The poor location for wartime employment and ground and air space encroachment limit the base's future military value.

Much of the on-base housing is unusable because it is under renovation and the contractor has defaulted. The Air Force projects this housing to be unusable for the extended future.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation on Carswell Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Carswell AFB and the transfer of the assigned B-52 aircraft to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The assigned KC-135 aircraft should transfer to the Air Reserve Component.

The 436th Strategic Training Squadron will relocate to Dyess AFB. The existing Air Force Reserve units will remain in a cantonment area.

Castle Air Force Base, California

Category: Flying/Strategic

Mission: Strategic Bombardment,

*Air Refueling, and Combat Crew Training
School; B-52 and KC-135*

Cost to Close: \$99.2 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$63.0 million;

Annual: \$52.7 million

Payback: 2 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Castle Air Force Base and transfer the assigned B-52G conventional aircraft to K.I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan. Transfer the assigned KC-135 aircraft to other Active or Reserve Component units. Transfer the B-52 and KC-135 Combat Crew Training mission to Fairchild AFB, Washington. The 93rd Bombardment Wing will be inactivated.

Castle AFB ranked relatively low based on its long-term military value compared with other bases in the category. The base is in a relatively poor location for wartime bomber employment. Its ranking also suffered because of its relatively poor location for wartime and peacetime air-refueling operations. The base endures local ground and regional air space encroachment. The regional air space is being increasingly stressed by growth in air traffic. Finally, the condition of the facilities at Castle AFB is below the average of other bases in the same category.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed that Castle AFB was incorrectly categorized as a flying/strategic base when, in its opinion, the primary mission of the base is initial training of B-52

and KC-135 aircrews. It declared Castle AFB has unique attributes to perform this training mission, including its many aircrew-training devices, access to numerous airfields, and transient student quarters. Finally, it believes that moving the training mission would be short-sighted because the longevity of the B-52 is in question.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the base was properly categorized along with other flying/strategic bases. It is in a poor location for wartime bomber and tanker employment. Regional air space and local ground encroachment also degrade its overall military value. The DoD force-structure plan includes the B-52 aircraft until past the turn of the century.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation on Castle Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends closing Castle AFB and transferring the assigned B-52 aircraft to K.I. Sawyer AFB. Transfer the assigned KC-135 aircraft to other Active or Reserve Component units. Transfer the B-52 and KC-135 Combat Crew Training missions to Fairchild AFB, Washington.

Eaker Air Force Base, Arkansas

Category: Flying/Strategic
Mission: Strategic Bombardment and Air Refueling, B-52 and KC-135
Cost to Close: \$18.5 million
Savings: 1992-97: \$221.0 million;
Annual: \$52.9 million
Payback: Less than 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Eaker Air Force Base and transfer the assigned KC-135 aircraft to other Active or

Reserve Component units. Retire the assigned B-52G Air Launched Cruise Missile aircraft. The 97th Bombardment Wing will be inactivated.

Eaker AFB ranked relatively low in the flying/strategic category based on its long-term military value compared with other bases in the category. The base is in a relatively poor location to support wartime bomber employment. Its ranking also suffered because of the limited opportunity for peacetime use of tanker assets and access to bombing ranges. The base experiences some current restrictions on access to bombing ranges and expects future restrictions as well. Finally, the capacity of the facilities is below the average of other bases in the same category.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed that Eaker AFB is close to many air-refueling tracks and removing assigned KC-135s will exacerbate a regional peacetime air-refueling tanker shortfall. It also stated that Eaker AFB has better weather than many northern strategic bases. The community was especially concerned with the economic impact of the closure.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that, although Eaker AFB is close to many designated air refueling tracks, it is still relatively distant from an area of high air-refueling requirements. Eaker AFB is in a relatively poor location for wartime bomber and tanker employment. The cost to close Eaker AFB is low, and the payback is achieved in less than one year. The economic impact on the community from the closing of Eaker AFB will be among the most significant in the Air Force.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendations on Eaker Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria.

Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Eaker AFB. The assigned B-52 aircraft will be retired, and the assigned KC-135 aircraft will be transferred to other Active or Reserve Component units.

England Air Force Base, Louisiana

Category: Flying/Tactical
Mission: Tactical Fighters, A-10
Cost to Close: \$40.3 million
Savings: 1992-97: \$176 million;
Annual: \$47.2 million
Payback: 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close England Air Force Base (AFB) and retire or redistribute all aircraft among remaining Active and Reserve Component units. Inactivate the 23rd Tactical Fighter Wing. Realign one A/OA-10 squadron to Eglin AFB, Florida, and one to McChord AFB, Washington.

England AFB ranked relatively low in the flying/tactical category. The long-term military value of England AFB is limited by available airspace for training and by weather, for which England AFB ranked lowest in its category. The Air Force acknowledged the advantage of England AFB's proximity to Fort Polk, but stated that other bases could support the Army. Also, the cost to close is low while the savings are high.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that England AFB's mix of weather was good for training. It stated that the local air space, low-altitude military operating areas, and availability of higher altitude air space were not adequately considered. It questioned whether the Air Force could meet the Army's needs at Fort Polk if England AFB was closed. The community also stated that DoD understated the combined

economic impact of England AFB's closure and Fort Polk's realignment.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the air space and weather can impact the military value of the base. With its surrounding air space England AFB can meet current mission requirements but will not be able to support future missions. Concerns that the current mission degraded the base rankings were unfounded. Air Force proposals to provide support to the Army were reasonable and formally endorsed by the Army. Finally, the combined economic impact of the two adjustments was substantially higher than for a single base.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on England Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of England AFB and the redistribution of one squadron to Eglin AFB, one squadron to McChord AFB, and the retirement of other remaining assigned aircraft, including the 23rd Tactical Fighter Wing.

Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas

Category: Training
Mission: Technical Training

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

As part of the closure of Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois, realign the fuels training to Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas, and realign the technical training fire course to Goodfellow Air Force Base unless a satisfactory and cost-effective contract can be arranged. The 1988 Commission on Base Realignment and Closure

recommended that both of these courses be realigned to Goodfellow AFB.

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on realignment of Goodfellow Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the realignment of the fuels training from Goodfellow AFB to Sheppard AFB and the realignment of the technical training fire course to Goodfellow AFB unless a satisfactory and cost-effective contract can be arranged.

Grissom Air Force Base, Indiana

Category: Flying/Strategic
Mission: Strategic Air Refueling, KC-135
Cost to Close: \$24.9 million
Savings: 1992-97: \$157 million;
Annual: \$48.3 million
Payback: 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Grissom Air Force Base and transfer the assigned KC-135 aircraft to the Air Reserve Component. The EC-135 aircraft will be retired and the 305th Air Refueling Wing will be inactivated. Grissom AFB ranked below average in the flying/strategic category based on its long-term overall military value compared with other bases in the category. The base's location provides limited opportunity for peacetime use of tankers and access to bombing ranges. Finally, Grissom AFB costs the fourth least to close in the category and the savings generated after closure are substantial.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed that Grissom AFB has no air space restrictions and that

expansion capability is unlimited around the base. The community also highlighted that, because of its distance to the coast, the base's survivability is enhanced due to its mid-western location. Also, the existing ramp can accommodate additional aircraft and the quality of life at Grissom AFB is better than at several bases not recommended for closure.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the base was properly graded. The base has no flying restrictions and can expand. However, the distance to air-refueling receivers and primary ranges diminishes the base's military value. Grissom AFB is the fourth lowest cost to close in the category and offers a significant annual savings. Closing the base will have a negative economic impact on the local community. Finally, the condition of facilities at Grissom AFB graded lower than the category average.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation on Grissom Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Grissom AFB, the retirement of assigned EC-135 aircraft, the inactivation of the 305th Air Refueling Wing, and the transfer of KC-135 aircraft to the Air Reserve Component.

Loring Air Force Base, Maine

Category: Flying/Strategic

*Mission: Conventional Bombardment and Air
Refueling, B-52 and KC-135*

Cost to Close: \$46.6 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$182 million;

Annual: \$61.8 million

Payback: 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Loring Air Force Base and transfer the assigned B-52 aircraft to K.I. Sawyer AFB and disperse KC-135 aircraft to Active and Reserve Component units.

Loring AFB ranked relatively low in the flying/strategic category based on its long-term military value compared with other bases in the category. The base's location provides limited opportunity for peacetime use of tankers and access to bombing ranges. The condition of base facilities is below the average of other bases in the category. The cost to close Loring AFB is low and the savings are among the highest of the bases in this subcategory.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed that Loring AFB is the closest base to conventional and strategic targets east of the United States. It also pointed out that Loring AFB has two fully operational runways. Further, it stated that the base is near air-refueling routes, base facilities are adequate to meet current mission requirements, not enough credit was given for improvements to facilities, distance to bombing ranges is not a significant factor, and the Air Force did not adequately consider the economic impact.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that, although Loring AFB is the closest base to potential targets east of the United States, the

advantage is relative when the total mission is considered. Loring AFB is rated lower in military value because of the limited opportunity for peacetime use of tankers and access to bombing ranges. The condition of the facilities is below the command's average and the cost of required upgrades to meet the current and future missions is high. Loring AFB has only one fully operational runway and one prelaunch survivability runway. The annual savings will be one of the highest of the bases closed in the flying/strategic category. The economic impact on the Loring AFB community will be severe.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation on Loring Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Loring AFB, the transfer of the assigned B-52 aircraft to K.I. Sawyer AFB, and the dispersal of the KC-135 aircraft to Active and Air Reserve Component units.

Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado

Category: Training

Mission: Technical Training Center

Cost to Close: \$222.5 million

Savings: 1992-97: -\$44.5 million;

Annual: \$42.2 million

Payback: 5 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Lowry Air Force Base and redistribute all technical training to the remaining technical training centers. The 1001st Space Systems Squadron Defense Finance and Accounting Service and Air Force Reserve Personnel Center remain at Lowry. The Lowry Technical Training Center will be inactivated.

Lowry's long-term military value was low compared with other bases in its category. Its ranking suffered because base facilities ranked below the category average and the lack of a runway limits its ability to accept additional missions. Additionally, it is the second-least-expensive base to close in this category.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that Lowry was penalized too severely for the lack of a runway and that the DoD criteria placed too much emphasis on runway operations. The community also noted that the base has a favorable cost-per-student-trained ratio when compared with the other technical training centers. It also argued that the closure of Lowry would reduce too much infrastructure in light of the Fiscal Year 1988 decision to close Chanute Air Force Base. The elimination of two large training centers does not allow enough infrastructure to handle a quick surge in training that might be required.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that all training bases were treated fairly and Lowry did rank low in its category. The lack of a runway was considered correctly since it does limit future mission capabilities. However, the lack of a runway did not penalize Lowry when evaluated for supporting the current mission. Three training bases lacking active runway operations were all downgraded equally with regard to future mission capabilities. Lowry's base facilities rated lower than the category average. The Commission found that the cost of training per student is a function of the type of training conducted at Lowry and not a function of the physical properties of Lowry Air Force Base. Concerning the remaining technical training capacity, the closure of Chanute and Lowry removes 33 percent of the training infrastructure. The Air Force's projected accessions are 50 percent of what they were in the 1980s when there were six training centers. Therefore, the one-third reduction in facilities allows for surge capability if and when it is required. The Department of Defense should look closely at

using the excess facilities created by this closure when evaluating the Department's overall facility requirements such as the consolidation of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on Lowry Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Lowry Air Force Base and that all technical training be redistributed to the remaining technical training centers or relocated to other locations. The 1001st Space Systems Squadron, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and the Air Force Reserve Personnel Center remain open, in cantonment areas as proposed by the Secretary of Defense.

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

Category: Flying/Tactical

Mission: Tactical Fighter Training and Joint Headquarters, F-16

Cost to Realign: \$31.0 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$53 million;

Annual: \$20.4 million

Payback: 2 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Realign and partially close MacDill Air Force Base. The aircraft realign to Luke AFB, Arizona; the Joint Communications Support Element moves to Charleston AFB, South Carolina; the airfield closes; and the remainder of MacDill AFB becomes an administrative base.

The long-term military value of MacDill AFB is limited by pressure on air space, training areas, and low-level routes. MacDill AFB is not located near Army units that would offer joint-training opportunities. MacDill

AFB also has ground encroachment. Drawdown in the force structure results in the need for one less F-16 training wing. DoD did not recommend full closure because of the high cost to relocate two large joint headquarters.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that the reduction in the base's hospital staff associated with the population drawdown will reduce support to a large retired population and increase CHAMPUS costs. While it acknowledged air space congestion, the community argued that air space problems and accident potential in the Phoenix area are significantly worse. Loss of the airfield was also presented as degrading the ability of the joint headquarters to fulfill their missions. In particular, the community argued that a classified mission at MacDill AFB required a dedicated airfield. The community also expressed the concern that realignment was the first step toward closure.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that MacDill AFB was located in an area with increasing pressure on air space and therefore restricted training capabilities. The increased CHAMPUS costs associated with base closures were factored into the Air Force analysis. The CHAMPUS program was developed to address medical needs of all nonactive duty beneficiaries since DoD policy precludes manning a hospital solely to meet the needs of a retired population. In this case the increased cost was due to the large number of retirees.

The Commission examined the broad comparisons between Phoenix and Tampa raised by the community. Detailed review revealed that resulting force structure was below historic highs and that air traffic procedures were workable. The Commission also noted that Luke AFB has exceptional training air space to the south, which is connected to Luke AFB by established routing.

Arguments that the missions DoD plans to retain (both unclassified and classified) at MacDill AFB require a military airfield were

found wanting. The Commission also noted the high cost of total closure and the low cost and reasonable savings of realignment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendations on MacDill Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan or the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the realignment and partial closure of MacDill AFB; the realignment of the aircraft to Luke AFB, Arizona; the movement of the Communications Support Element to Charleston AFB, South Carolina; and the closure of the airfield. The remainder of MacDill AFB becomes an administrative base.

March Air Force Base, California

*Category: Flying/Strategic
Mission: Air Refueling, KC-10*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign 45 Air Force Audit Agency manpower authorizations from Norton Air Force Base, California, to the National Capital Region instead of March Air Force Base as recommended by the 1988 Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. The remaining 139 manpower authorizations will be transferred to March Air Force Base as directed by the 1988 Commission.

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on realignment of these limited manpower authorizations did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the realignment of the 45 Air Force Audit Agency manpower authorizations from Norton AFB to

the National Capital Region and the transfer of 139 manpower authorizations from Norton AFB to March AFB.

Mather Air Force Base, California

Category: Flying Training
Mission: Navigator Training, T-43 and T-37

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Realign the 940th Air Refueling Group from Mather Air Force Base to McClellan Air Force Base. Leave the 323rd Flying Training Wing Hospital open as an annex to McClellan Air Force Base instead of leaving the 940th Air Refueling Group at Mather Air Force Base and closing the 323rd Flying Training Wing Hospital, as recommended by the 1988 Commission on Base Realignment and Closure.

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendations did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the realignment of the 940th Air Refueling Group from Mather Air Force Base to McClellan Air Force Base and the retention of the 323rd Flying Training Wing Hospital as an annex to McClellan Air Force Base.

Moody Air Force Base, Georgia

Category: Flying/Tactical
Mission: Tactical Fighters, F-16
Cost to Close: N/A
Savings: N/A
Payback: N/A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Moody Air Force Base and redistribute all aircraft to modernize other Active and Reserve Component units. The 347th Tactical Fighter Wing will be inactivated.

Moody AFB's long-term military value compared unfavorably with other bases in its category. Its ranking suffered because of weather and its location in a region where special-use air space is being stressed increasingly by growth in air traffic. Additionally, it is the least costly base in its category to close.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that Moody AFB was incorrectly downgraded for air space and that the weather does not downgrade the base's ability to meet its mission. The community also noted that the base was recently identified as the best in the Air Force and has growth potential for a composite wing, potential that was not considered by the Air Force. It also

argued that the closure of Moody AFB was an example of the Air Force's failure to consider support to the Army.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that Moody AFB's minor training limitations are successfully managed and the wing can meet its training needs. While an increase in commercial aviation is evident, the routing around Moody AFB's air space and repeated examples of the Federal Aviation Administration providing additional air space to Moody AFB argue against training capability decreasing in the future. Sorties have been lost to weather, but the Air Force has successfully overcome this problem in the past and should be able to do so in the future. The closure of Moody AFB provides only small savings, and that justifies leaving open what has been recognized as one of the best bases in the Air Force for installation excellence.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that DoD substantially deviated from selection criteria 1, 2, and 3 in recommending the closure of Moody Air Force Base. Specifically, DoD did not adequately consider the military value of Moody AFB in its assessment of the extent of the impact of weather and air space problems. Therefore, the Commission recommends Moody AFB remain open.

Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho

*Category: Flying/Tactical
Mission: Tactical Fighter and Electronic
Warfare, F-111 and EF-111*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Realign the remaining F-4G aircraft to the Idaho and Nevada Air National Guard; inactivate the 35th Tactical Training Wing;

maintain the 41st Electronic Combat Squadron at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona; realign the EF-111 aircraft assigned from Mountain Home Air Force Base to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. Establish a composite wing at Mountain Home AFB.

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Realign the remaining F-4G aircraft to the Idaho and Nevada Air National Guard; inactivate the 35th Tactical Training Wing; maintain the 41st Electronic Combat Squadron at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona; realign the EF-111 aircraft assigned from Mountain Home AFB to Cannon AFB, New Mexico. Establish a composite wing at Mountain Home AFB.

Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, South Carolina

*Category: Flying/Tactical
Mission: Tactical Fighters, A-10
Cost to Close: \$54.4 million
Savings: 1992-97: \$76.0 million;
Annual: \$30.2 million
Payback: 2 years*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Myrtle Beach Air Force Base and redistribute all aircraft to modernize other Active and Reserve Component units. Inactivate the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing. The DoD recommendation also states that there be one active squadron each at Shaw AFB and Pope AFB.

Myrtle Beach AFB's long-term military value was low compared with other bases in its category. Its ranking suffered because of

weather, ground encroachment, and its location in a region where special use air space is being stressed increasingly by growth in air traffic. Additionally, the cost to close is low while the savings are high.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued that Myrtle Beach AFB was incorrectly downgraded for ground encroachment and that the weather does not downgrade the base's ability to meet its mission. The community also noted that the base was recently identified as one of the best in the Air Force and has the potential to house a composite wing, which was not considered by the Air Force. It also argued that the closure of Myrtle Beach AFB was an example of the Air Force's failure to consider providing close-air support to the Army.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that all flying/tactical bases were treated fairly and Myrtle Beach AFB did rank low in its category. It does have training limitations and projections indicate increasing pressure on air space. Weather and air space do degrade Myrtle Beach AFB's military value and justify its low ranking. The base has low closure cost and favorable savings.

Regarding support to the Army, the Commission found that Shaw AFB, North Carolina, provides the needed support to Army units in the area.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on Myrtle Beach Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Myrtle Beach AFB and the redistribution of all assigned aircraft to other Active and Reserve Component units, and that one active A/OA-10 squadron be realigned to Shaw AFB and Pope AFB.

Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, Missouri

Category: Air Reserve Component Base
Mission: Tactical Fighters, A-10
Cost to Close: \$47.6 million
Savings: 1992-97: -\$4 million;
Annual: \$12.9 million
Payback: 5 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station and transfer the 442nd Tactical Fighter Wing to Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. The 36th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron and the 77th and 78th Aerial Port Squadrons will transfer to Peterson AFB, Colorado.

Since the joint-use plan with the Kansas City Department of Aviation, which was envisioned 12 years ago, has not materialized, the Air Force Reserve has borne a substantial portion of the operating costs of this airfield. The economically viable airport that the Air Force anticipated and the expected reduction in costs have not materialized. Therefore, relocating the Reserve activities to an Active Air Force base would achieve significant cost savings. Consideration was given to the recruiting needs of these units to ensure that the realignment meets military requirements and is cost-effective. The long-term effect on training is minimal since Whiteman AFB has similar access to training ranges, low-level routes, and Army exercise areas.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community stated that the units would not be able to use current training ranges and could not support Fort Riley and Fort Sill. It also stated that the move would adversely affect recruitment, retention, and training because of the reduced population available for recruitment. In addition, it stated that the cost

to move was understated because the missile wing would not move as soon as anticipated.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the Air Force and community's cost estimates for relocating to Whiteman AFB were incorrect. There will be some additional rehabilitation costs for temporary facilities, but the relocation costs would not be as much as envisioned for new construction. The Air Force's payback period would be seven years, not five years. The recruitment area and the travel distance required is within the Air Force guidance. The move will enable the unit to use additional training ranges and support Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Fort Riley, Kansas, and Fort Sill, Oklahoma, will get their support from Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan or the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, the transfer of the 442nd Tactical Fighter Wing to Whiteman AFB, and the transfer of the 36th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron and the 77th and 78th Aerial Port Squadrons to Peterson AFB.

Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, Ohio

Category: Air Reserve Component Base
Mission: Tactical Fighters and Air Refueling, A-7, and KC-135
Cost to Close: \$106.1 million
Savings: 1992-97: -\$16 million;
Annual: \$22.7 million
Payback: 5 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Rickenbacker Air Guard Base and transfer the 160th Air Refueling Group and

the 907th Tactical Airlift Group to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. The 4950th Test Wing will consolidate with the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base, California.

Since the Air Reserve Component units located at Rickenbacker Air Guard Base are the predominant users of the airfield, the support costs for these activities are high and the relocation of the units could bring about significant savings. Transferring the units to Wright-Patterson AFB keeps the Air National Guard units in Ohio and reduces the costs to move since the 4950th would vacate usable facilities. Also, moving the Guard and Reserve units to Dayton would increase the overall recruiting area population. In addition, collocation with Active forces will improve operations.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community questioned the costing methodology and claimed that the costs to move the Air Reserve Component units were understated. It also said that the eight criteria were not consistently applied. In addition, it claimed that moving three more flying units to Dayton would cause air space congestion. It also claimed that because Dayton's population is one-half the size of the population of Columbus, recruiting will be hurt.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the community's cost estimate was for building all new facilities at Wright-Patterson AFB. The community did not recognize that the Air Force was going to use vacated facilities. Small additional increases in air traffic will be manageable. Using the Air Force's recruiting guidelines, locating the units in Dayton does not degrade the recruiting base. The Air Force modified its selection criteria for Air Reserve Component bases first by determining if there was a significant cost savings and then by applying the eight criteria. An underlying concern was the moving of Air National Guard

units across state lines. This did not adversely affect the selection process.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation on Rickenbacker Air Guard Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, the transfer of the 160th Air Refueling Group and the 907th Tactical Airlift Group to Wright-Patterson AFB, and the consolidation of the 4950th Test Wing from Wright-Patterson AFB with the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB.

Williams Air Force Base, Arizona

Category: Flying/Training
Mission: Flying/Training, T-37 and T-38
Cost to Close: \$26.7 million
Savings: 1992-97: \$222 million;
Annual: \$54.1 million
Payback: 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Williams Air Force Base and retire or redistribute all aircraft. Inactivate the 82nd Flying/Training Wing. Move the Aircrew Training Research Facility to Orlando, Florida.

Williams AFB ranked low in the flying/training category and lowest for air space encroachment - a problem that is expected to worsen. The condition of its facilities also ranked lowest. Williams AFB's closure will have the least severe impact on its local community of any of the bases in its category.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued principally that the Air Force did not give Williams AFB enough credit for its excellent weather and

incorrectly rated its facilities. The community believed that DoD placed too much emphasis on air space without recognizing adjustments made in the region to alleviate encroachment problems. In addition, the community claimed the closure and movement of the Aircrew Training Research Facility will be too costly.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that all flying/training bases were treated fairly and Williams AFB ranked lowest in its category. It has the most severe air space problems - a situation that is projected only to worsen. Projected air traffic growth of 65 percent by 2005, civilian traffic cutting into instrument training, and the potential of a new regional airport are a few of the problems.

The Air Force did consider a recent agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration to improve the utility of one of Williams AFB's Military Operating Areas. However, this adjustment fails to address the more pressing problem of minimum air space. Williams AFB has the minimum air space per sortie considered safe and the least of any flying/training base.

Williams AFB did rate highest in the category for weather. However, even with added emphasis, this rating could not overcome deficiencies in other areas.

Finally, Orlando, in addition to being the least expensive alternative for the relocation of the lab, also provides synergism by collocating Air Force and Navy elements working in the same area.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Williams Air Force Base, the transfer of the Aircrew Training Research Facility to Orlando, Florida, and the

deactivation of the 82nd Flying/Training Wing.

Wurtsmith Air Force Base, Michigan

Category: Flying/Strategic
Mission: Strategic Bombardment and Air Refueling, B-52 and KC-135
Cost to Close: \$29.1 million
Savings: 1992-97: \$256 million;
Annual: \$63.3 million
Payback: 1 year

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Close Wurtsmith Air Force Base and transfer the assigned KC-135 aircraft to the Air Reserve Component. The B-52G Air Launched Cruise Missile aircraft will be retired, and the 379th Bombardment Wing will be inactivated.

Wurtsmith AFB ranked below average in the flying/strategic category based on its long-term overall military value compared with other bases in the category. The low ranking results from the base's distance to primary low-altitude training routes and peacetime air-refueling training requirements. Finally, Wurtsmith AFB costs the third least to close in the category and the savings generated after closure are high.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed that Wurtsmith AFB has no air space restrictions and that all

operational requirements for the assigned aircraft can be met without interference. The community also stated that closing Wurtsmith AFB would have a significant negative economic impact on northern Michigan. It directly challenged individual ratings of the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group. In addition, it argued for keeping Wurtsmith AFB open and closing K.I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found that the base was properly graded. The base has no flying restrictions and can perform all operations required to sustain the mission. However, the distance to scored training routes is significant and lowers the efficiency of the missions at Wurtsmith AFB. Also, tankers must travel a significant distance to air-refueling receivers. Wurtsmith AFB costs the third least to close in the category and offers the highest annual savings of any Air Force base closure. Closing the base will have a severe economic impact on the local community. Finally, K.I. Sawyer AFB graded higher overall in military value than Wurtsmith AFB.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on Wurtsmith Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Wurtsmith AFB, the transfer of KC-135 aircraft to the Air Reserve Component, and the retirement of the assigned B-52G aircraft and the inactivation of the 379th Bombardment Wing.

Chapter 6

Communities and Base Reuse

Communities will have a wide range of experiences in developing reuse proposals. Even as the Commission conducted its review, a few communities were already developing plans for reusing base facilities. While short-term economic impacts from base closures are unavoidable, communities can take steps to mitigate these impacts and use the former base to stimulate new economic growth.

Full economic recovery from base closure is dependent upon timely disposition of the facilities and land vacated by the services. The Secretary of Defense should do everything in his power to ensure a timely transfer of these valuable assets to the local communities.

MOBILIZING FOR REUSE

Reusing former military base property offers communities the best opportunities to rebuild their economies. The buildings and facilities can fill residential, commercial, and industrial needs and thus can replace jobs and lost income. Airfields are especially marketable because of the national shortage of available hangar space. Several communities that lost bases as a result of the 1988 Base Closure Commission have taken advantage of this opportunity for a quick economic turnaround.

Attracting permanent tenants for the property, once disposal occurs, is an integral part of a community's strategy for economic recovery.

Successes can result from two things: early creation of an organization to plan and implement a suitable base reuse strategy, and aggressive marketing of base assets and available facilities.

DoD's Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) surveyed reuse of closed military installations between 1961 and 1990 and concluded that 158,000 new jobs had been created to replace 93,000 jobs lost as a result of base closures.

Communities can take six steps in preparing a strategy for reusing a closed installation:

- Form a reuse committee
- Work with federal and state representatives
- Maintain close relations with DoD
- Be active in the planning process
- Use federal and state programs
- Hire experts to fill any gaps in their professional staffs.

Each community will have unique opportunities and constraints. The successful implementation of any base-reuse strategy hinges upon harnessing the energy and creativity present in a community.

ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE

DoD created the Economic Adjustment Program for this purpose in May 1961. Since 1970, DoD has rendered adjustment assistance through the President's Economic Adjustment Committee (EAC), which is composed of 18 federal departments and agencies and chaired by the Secretary of Defense.

EAC works with representatives of local, state and federal agencies to develop strategies and coordinate action plans that will generate new job opportunities and to alleviate the social and economic impacts resulting from DoD program changes. To assist communities, the Secretary of Defense can make grants to qualified local government entities for development of community-adjustment plans.

The transition period (often three to five years) in securing new civilian uses can be difficult for many communities. But the

experience of communities affected by earlier base closures clearly indicates communities can adjust successfully.

More recently, OEA has been working with 21 communities that are near bases recommended for closure by the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. OEA has provided \$1.6 million in grants to the affected communities to help develop reuse plans and is working through the EAC to help these communities implement their reuse plans.

Environmental Restoration at Closing Bases

DoD is obligated under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act to restore contaminated sites on military bases.

Within the capabilities of technology and the availability of funds, DoD is committed to restoring closing bases to safe condition. The Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990 can be used to fund this environmental restoration.

DoD also has several initiatives under way to expedite the environmental restoration process and thereby speed local economic recovery.

- DoD has convened a task force to report on ways to improve interagency coordination of environmental-response actions; streamline and consolidate practices and policies; and improve environmental restoration at closing bases.
- DoD has established a model program that will test ways of expediting cleanup and accelerating the contracting process. The program will also probe alternatives that will help

avoid disputes, provide concurrent regulatory review, and offer options for local reuse while cleanup is in progress.

- DoD is reemphasizing ongoing efforts, including expanded use of interagency agreements that detail restorations at National Priority List sites and memorandums of agreement between DoD and states for resolving technical disputes at National Priority List sites.

Homeowners Assistance Program

The Homeowners Assistance Program, in operation since 1966, assists DoD military and civilian employees who are forced to move as a result of a base closure.

The government helps eligible employees who cannot sell their homes within a reasonable amount of time by either buying their homes for 75 percent of the preclosure-announcement value or reimbursing them for most of the lost equity should the homeowners sell the house for less than the value before the closure was announced. The program also provides relief for displaced employees facing foreclosure.

The program is initially funded with appropriated funds; however, proceeds from

the sale or rental of government-purchased houses replenish the fund.

Civilian Employee Assistance

The DoD Priority Placement Program is another program that was originally established to help DoD civilian employees adjust to the base closures of the 1960s.

A state-of-the-art automated referral is currently in operation. In the years since its inception, the referral system has helped more than 98,000 employees find new assignments. This cost-effective system supports the Priority Placement Program.

The Displaced Employee Program provides for priority placement referral of separated employees to other federal agencies. In addition, DoD and the Office of Personnel Management have initiated a project to link data systems. Upon completion, the linked systems will support a significantly expanded Defense Referral System.

The communities that will lose bases as a result of the 1991 closure and realignment process face an uncertain future. Local leaders, with the assistance of federal and state agencies, can steer a path from economic dislocation to economic growth.

Appendix A

Public Law 101-510,
Title XXIX,
Nov. 5, 1990

Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Act of 1990

104 STAT. 1808

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

**TITLE XXIX—DEFENSE BASE CLOSURES AND
REALIGNMENTS**

Defense Base
Closure and
Realignment Act
of 1990.
10 USC 2687
note.

10 USC 2687
note.

President.

Public
information.

PART A—DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SEC. 2901. SHORT TITLE AND PURPOSE

(a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This part may be cited as the “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990”.

(b) **PURPOSE.**—The purpose of this part is to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.

SEC. 2902. THE COMMISSION

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—There is established an independent commission to be known as the “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission”.

(b) **DUTIES.**—The Commission shall carry out the duties specified for it in this part.

(c) **APPOINTMENT.**—(1)(A) The Commission shall be composed of eight members appointed by the President, by and with the advise and consent of the Senate.

(B) The President shall transmit to the Senate the nominations for appointment to the Commission—

(i) by no later than January 3, 1991, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 102nd Congress;

(ii) by no later than January 25, 1993, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 103rd Congress; and

(iii) by no later than January 3, 1995, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 104th Congress.

(2) In selecting individuals for nominations for appointments to the Commission, the President should consult with—

(A) the Speaker of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of two members;

(B) the majority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of two members;

(C) the minority leader of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of one member; and

(D) the minority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of one member.

(3) At the time the President nominates individuals for appointment to the Commission for each session of Congress referred to in paragraph (1)(B), the President shall designate one such individual who shall serve as Chairman of the Commission.

(d) **TERMS.**—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each member of the Commission shall serve until the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which the member was appointed to the Commission.

(2) The Chairman of the Commission shall serve until the confirmation of a successor.

(e) **MEETINGS.**—(1) The Commission shall meet only during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995.

(2)(A) Each meeting of the Commission, other than meetings in which classified information is to be discussed, shall be open to the public.

(B) All the proceedings, information, and deliberations of the Commission shall be open, upon request, to the following:

(i) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability, and Support of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority party member.

(ii) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority party member.

(iii) The Chairmen and ranking minority party members of the Subcommittees on Military Construction of the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittees designated by such Chairmen or ranking minority party members.

(f) VACANCIES.—A vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment, but the individual appointed to fill the vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term for which the individual's predecessor was appointed.

(g) PAY AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.—(1)(A) Each member, other than the Chairman, shall be paid at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which the member is engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Commission.

(B) The Chairman shall be paid for each day referred to in subparagraph (A) at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) Members shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with sections 5702 and 5703 of title 5, United States Code.

(h) DIRECTOR OF STAFF.—(1) The Commission shall, without regard to section 5311(b) of title 5, United States Code, appoint a Director who has not served on active duty in the Armed Forces or as a civilian employee of the Department of Defense during the one-year period preceding the date of such appointment.

(2) The Director shall be paid at the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

(i) STAFF.—(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Director, with the approval of the Commission, may appoint and fix the pay of additional personnel.

(2) The Director may make such appointments without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and any personnel so appointed may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that an individual so appointed may not receive pay in excess of the annual rate of basic pay payable for GS-18 of the General Schedule.

(3) Not more than one-third of the personnel employed by or detailed to the Commission may be on detail from the Department of Defense.

(4) Upon request of the Director, the head of any Federal department or agency may detail any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Commission to assist the Commission in carrying out its duties under this part.

(5) The Comptroller General of the United States shall provide assistance, including the detailing of employees, to the Commission in accordance with an agreement entered into with the Commission.

(j) **OTHER AUTHORITY.**—(1) The Commission may procure by contract, to the extent funds are available, the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants pursuant to section 3109 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) The Commission may lease space and acquire personal property to the extent funds are available.

(k) **FUNDING.**—(1) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission such funds as are necessary to carry out its duties under this part. Such funds shall remain available until expended.

(2) If no funds are appropriated to the Commission by the end of the second session of the 101st Congress, the Secretary of Defense may transfer, for fiscal year 1991, to the Commission funds from the Department of Defense Base Closure Account established by section 207 of Public Law 100-526. Such funds shall remain available until expended.

(l) **TERMINATION.**—The Commission shall terminate on December 31, 1995.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2903. PROCEDURE FOR MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

(a) **FORCE-STRUCTURE PLAN.**—(1) As part of the budget justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the budget for the Department of Defense for each of the fiscal years 1992, 1994, and 1996, the Secretary shall include a force-structure plan for the Armed Forces based on an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the six-year period beginning with the fiscal year for which the budget request is made and of the anticipated levels of funding that will be available for national defense purposes during such period.

(2) Such plan shall include, without any reference (directly or indirectly) to military installations inside the United States that may be closed or realigned under such plan—

(A) a description of the assessment referred to in paragraph (1);

(B) a description (i) of the anticipated force structure during and at the end of each such period for each military department (with specifications of the number and type of units in the active and reserve forces of each such department), and (ii) of the units that will need to be forward based (with a justification thereof) during and at the end of each such period; and

(C) a description of the anticipated implementation of such force-structure plan.

(3) The Secretary shall also transmit a copy of each such force-structure plan to the Commission.

(b) **SELECTION CRITERIA.**—(1) The Secretary shall, by no later than December 31, 1990, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the criteria proposed to be used by the Department of Defense in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part. The Secretary shall provide an

Federal
Register,
publication.

opportunity for public comment on the proposed criteria for a period of at least 30 days and shall include notice of that opportunity in the publication required under the preceding sentence.

(2)(A) The Secretary shall, by no later than February 15, 1991, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the final criteria to be used in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part. Except as provided in subparagraph (B), such criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, along with the force-structure plan referred to in subsection (a), in making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before March 15, 1991.

Federal Register, publication.

(B) The Secretary may amend such criteria, but such amendments may not become effective until they have been published in the Federal Register, opened to public comment for at least 30 days, and then transmitted to the congressional defense committees in final form by no later than February 15 of the year concerned. Such amended criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, along with the force-structure plan referred to in subsection (a), in making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before March 15 of the year concerned.

(c) DOD RECOMMENDATIONS.—(1) The Secretary may, by no later than April 15, 1991, April 15, 1993, and April 15, 1995, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees and to the Commission a list of the military installations inside the United States that the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment on the basis of the force-structure plan and the final criteria referred to in subsection (b)(2) that are applicable to the year concerned.

Federal Register, publication.

(2) The Secretary shall include, with the list of recommendations published and transmitted pursuant to paragraph (1), a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendation for each installation, including a justification for each recommendation.

(3) In considering military installations for closure or realignment, the Secretary shall consider all military installations inside the United States equally without regard to whether the installation has been previously considered or proposed for closure or realignment by the Department.

(4) The Secretary shall make available to the Commission and the Comptroller General of the United States all information used by the Department in making its recommendations to the Commission for closures and realignments.

(d) REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION.—(1) After receiving the recommendations from the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c) for any year, the Commission shall conduct public hearings on the recommendations.

Public information.

(2)(A) The Commission shall, by no later than July 1 of each year in which the Secretary transmits recommendations to it pursuant to subsection (c), transmit to the President a report containing the Commission's findings and conclusions based on a review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary, together with the Commission's recommendations for closures and realignments of military installations inside the United States.

Reports.

(B) In making its recommendations, the Commission may make changes in any of the recommendations made by the Secretary if the Commission determines that the Secretary deviated substantially

from the force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in subsection (c)(1) in making recommendations.

(3) The Commission shall explain and justify in its report submitted to the President pursuant to paragraph (2) any recommendation made by the Commission that is different from the recommendations made by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c). The Commission shall transmit a copy of such report to the congressional defense committees on the same date on which it transmits its recommendations to the President under paragraph (2).

(4) After July 1 of each year in which the Commission transmits recommendations to the President under this subsection, the Commission shall promptly provide, upon request, to any Member of Congress information used by the Commission in making its recommendations.

Reports.

(5) The Comptroller General of the United States shall—

(A) assist the Commission, to the extent requested, in the Commission's review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c); and

(B) by no later than May 15 of each year in which the Secretary makes such recommendations, transmit to the Congress and to the Commission a report containing a detailed analysis of the Secretary's recommendations and selection process.

Reports.

(e) **REVIEW BY THE PRESIDENT.**—(1) The President shall, by no later than July 15 of each year in which the Commission makes recommendations under subsection (d), transmit to the Commission and to the Congress a report containing the President's approval or disapproval of the Commission's recommendations.

(2) If the President approves all the recommendations of the Commission, the President shall transmit a copy of such recommendations to the Congress, together with a certification of such approval.

(3) If the President disapproves the recommendations of the Commission, in whole or in part, the President shall transmit to the Commission and the Congress the reasons for that disapproval. The Commission shall then transmit to the President, by no later than August 15 of the year concerned, a revised list of recommendations for the closure and realignment of military installations.

(4) If the President approves all of the revised recommendations of the Commission transmitted to the President under paragraph (3), the President shall transmit a copy of such revised recommendations to the Congress, together with a certification of such approval.

(5) If the President does not transmit to the Congress an approval and certification described in paragraph (2) or (4) by September 1 of any year in which the Commission has transmitted recommendations to the President under this part, the process by which military installations may be selected for closure or realignment under this part with respect to that year shall be terminated.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2904. CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Subject to subsection (b), the Secretary shall—

(1) close all military installations recommended for closure by the Commission in each report transmitted to the Congress by the President pursuant to section 2903(e);

(2) realign all military installations recommended for realignment by such Commission in each such report;

(3) initiate all such closures and realignments no later than two years after the date on which the President transmits a report to the Congress pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or realignments; and

(4) complete all such closures and realignments no later than the end of the six-year period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or realignments.

(b) CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL.—(1) The Secretary may not carry out any closure or realignment recommended by the Commission in a report transmitted from the President pursuant to section 2903(e) if a joint resolution is enacted, in accordance with the provisions of section 2908, disapproving such recommendations of the Commission before the earlier of—

(A) the end of the 45-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits such report; or

(B) the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which such report is transmitted.

(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection and subsections (a) and (c) of section 2908, the days on which either House of Congress is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain shall be excluded in the computation of a period.

SEC. 2905. IMPLEMENTATION

10 USC 2687
note.

(a) IN GENERAL.—(1) In closing or realigning any military installation under this part, the Secretary may—

(A) take such actions as may be necessary to close or realign any military installation, including the acquisition of such land, the construction of such replacement facilities, the performance of such activities, and the conduct of such advance planning and design as may be required to transfer functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for use in planning and design, minor construction, or operation and maintenance;

(B) provide—

(i) economic adjustment assistance to any community located near a military installation being closed or realigned, and

(ii) community planning assistance to any community located near a military installation to which functions will be transferred as a result of the closure or realignment of a military installation,

if the Secretary of Defense determines that the financial resources available to the community (by grant or otherwise) for such purposes are inadequate, and may use for such purposes funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for economic adjustment assistance or community planning assistance;

(C) carry out activities for the purposes of environmental restoration and mitigation at any such installation, and may use for such purposes funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for environmental restoration and mitigation;

Community
action programs.

Environmental
protection.

(D) provide outplacement assistance to civilian employees employed by the Department of Defense at military installations being closed or realigned, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for outplacement assistance to employees; and

(E) reimburse other Federal agencies for actions performed at the request of the Secretary with respect to any such closure or realignment, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense and available for such purpose.

Environmental
protection.

(2) In carrying out any closure or realignment under this part, the Secretary shall ensure that environmental restoration of any property made excess to the needs of the Department of Defense as a result of such closure or realignment be carried out as soon as possible with funds available for such purpose.

(b) MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY.—(1) The Administrator of General Services shall delegate to the Secretary of Defense, with respect to excess and surplus real property and facilities located at a military installation closed or realigned under this part—

(A) the authority of the Administrator to utilize excess property under section 202 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483);

(B) the authority of the Administrator to dispose of surplus property under section 203 of that Act (40 U.S.C. 484);

(C) the authority of the Administrator to grant approvals and make determinations under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)); and

(D) the authority of the Administrator to determine the availability of excess or surplus real property for wildlife conservation purposes in accordance with the Act of May 19, 1948 (16 U.S.C. 667b).

(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (C), the Secretary of Defense shall exercise the authority delegated to the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1) in accordance with—

(i) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing the utilization of excess property and the disposal of surplus property under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949; and

(ii) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing the conveyance and disposal of property under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)).

(B) The Secretary, after consulting with the Administrator of General Services, may issue regulations that are necessary to carry out the delegation of authority required by paragraph (1).

(C) The authority required to be delegated by paragraph (1) to the Secretary by the Administrator of General Services shall not include the authority to prescribe general policies and methods for utilizing excess property and disposing of surplus property.

(D) The Secretary of Defense may transfer real property or facilities located at a military installation to be closed or realigned under this part, with or without reimbursement, to a military department or other entity (including a nonappropriated fund instrumentality) within the Department of Defense or the Coast Guard.

(E) Before any action may be taken with respect to the disposal of any surplus real property or facility located at any military installa-

tion to be closed or realigned under this part, the Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Governor of the State and the heads of the local governments concerned for the purpose of considering any plan for the use of such property by the local community concerned.

(c) **APPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969.**—(1) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) shall not apply to the actions of the President, the Commission, and, except as provided in paragraph (2), the Department of Defense in carrying out this part.

(2)(A) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 shall apply to actions of the Department of Defense under this part (i) during the process of property disposal, and (ii) during the process of relocating functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation after the receiving installation has been selected but before the functions are relocated.

(B) In applying the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the processes referred to in subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the military departments concerned shall not have to consider—

(i) the need for closing or realigning the military installation which has been recommended for closure or realignment by the Commission;

(ii) the need for transferring functions to any military installation which has been selected as the receiving installation; or

(iii) military installations alternative to those recommended or selected.

(3) A civil action for judicial review, with respect to any requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the extent such Act is applicable under paragraph (2), of any act or failure to act by the Department of Defense during the closing, realigning, or relocating of functions referred to in clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (2)(A), may not be brought more than 60 days after the date of such act or failure to act.

(d) **WAIVER.**—The Secretary of Defense may close or realign military installations under this part without regard to—

(1) any provision of law restricting the use of funds for closing or realigning military installations included in any appropriations or authorization Act; and

(2) sections 2662 and 2687 of title 10, United States Code.

SEC. 2906. ACCOUNT

10 USC 2687
note.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—(1) There is hereby established on the books of the Treasury an account to be known as the “Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990” which shall be administered by the Secretary as a single account.

(2) There shall be deposited into the Account—

(A) funds authorized for and appropriated to the Account;

(B) any funds that the Secretary may, subject to approval in an appropriation Act, transfer to the Account from funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for any purpose, except that such funds may be transferred only after the date on which the Secretary transmits written notice of, and justification for, such transfer to the congressional defense committees; and

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(C) proceeds received from the transfer or disposal of any property at a military installation closed or realigned under this part.

(b) **USE OF FUNDS.**—(1) The Secretary may use the funds in the Account only for the purposes described in section 2905(a).

(2) When a decision is made to use funds in the Account to carry out a construction project under section 2905(a) and the cost of the project will exceed the maximum amount authorized by law for a minor military construction project, the Secretary shall notify in writing the congressional defense committees of the nature of, and justification for, the project and the amount of expenditures for such project. Any such construction project may be carried out without regard to section 2802(a) of title 10, United States Code.

(c) **REPORTS.**—(1) No later than 60 days after the end of each fiscal year in which the Secretary carries out activities under this part, the Secretary shall transmit a report to the congressional defense committees of the amount and nature of the deposits into, and the expenditures from, the Account during such fiscal year and of the amount and nature of other expenditures made pursuant to section 2905(a) during such fiscal year.

(2) Unobligated funds which remain in the Account after the termination of the Commission shall be held in the Account until transferred by law after the congressional defense committees receive the report transmitted under paragraph (3).

(3) No later than 60 days after the termination of the Commission, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense committees a report containing an accounting of—

- (A) all the funds deposited into and expended from the Account or otherwise expended under this part; and
- (B) any amount remaining in the Account.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2907. REPORTS

As part of the budget request for fiscal year 1993 and for each fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense committees of Congress—

(1) a schedule of the closure and realignment actions to be carried out under this part in the fiscal year for which the request is made and an estimate of the total expenditures required and cost savings to be achieved by each such closure and realignment and of the time period in which these savings are to be achieved in each case, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such actions; and

(2) a description of the military installations, including those under construction and those planned for construction, to which functions are to be transferred as a result of such closures and realignments, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such transfers.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2908. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF COMMISSION REPORT

(a) **TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION.**—For purposes of section 2904(b), the term “joint resolution” means only a joint resolution which is introduced within the 10-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under section 2903(e), and—

- (1) which does not have a preamble;

(2) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That Congress disapproves the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission as submitted by the President on _____", the blank space being filled in with the appropriate date; and

(3) the title of which is as follows: "Joint resolution disapproving the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission."

(b) REFERRAL.—A resolution described in subsection (a) that is introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. A resolution described in subsection (a) introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(c) DISCHARGE.—If the committee to which a resolution described in subsection (a) is referred has not reported such resolution (or an identical resolution) by the end of the 20-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under section 2903(e), such committee shall be, at the end of such period, discharged from further consideration of such resolution, and such resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.

(d) CONSIDERATION.—(1) On or after the third day after the date on which the committee to which such a resolution is referred has reported, or has been discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of, such a resolution, it is in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution (but only on the day after the calendar day on which such Member announces to the House concerned the Member's intention to do so). All points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion is highly privileged in the House of Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the respective House shall immediately proceed to consideration of the joint resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business, and the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of.

(2) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 2 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. An amendment to the resolution is not in order. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. A motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.

(3) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in subsection (a) and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.

(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as

the case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate.

(e) **CONSIDERATION BY OTHER HOUSE.**—(1) If, before the passage by one House of a resolution of that House described in subsection (a), that House receives from the other House a resolution described in subsection (a), then the following procedures shall apply:

(A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee and may not be considered in the House receiving it except in the case of final passage as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii).

(B) With respect to a resolution described in subsection (a) of the House receiving the resolution—

(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no resolution had been received from the other House; but

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the other House.

(2) Upon disposition of the resolution received from the other House, it shall no longer be in order to consider the resolution that originated in the receiving House.

(f) **RULES OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE.**—This section is enacted by Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a resolution described in subsection (a), and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2909. RESTRICTION ON OTHER BASE CLOSURE AUTHORITY

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Except as provided in subsection (c), during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 1995, this part shall be the exclusive authority for selecting for closure or realignment, or for carrying out any closure or realignment of, a military installation inside the United States.

(b) **RESTRICTION.**—Except as provided in subsection (c), none of the funds available to the Department of Defense may be used, other than under this part, during the period specified in subsection (a)—

(1) to identify, through any transmittal to the Congress or through any other public announcement or notification, any military installation inside the United States as an installation to be closed or realigned or as an installation under consideration for closure or realignment; or

(2) to carry out any closure or realignment of a military installation inside the United States.

(c) **EXCEPTION.**—Nothing in this part affects the authority of the Secretary to carry out—

(1) closures and realignments under title II of Public Law 100-526; and

(2) closures and realignments to which section 2687 of title 10, United States Code, is not applicable, including closures and

realignments carried out for reasons of national security or a military emergency referred to in subsection (c) of such section.

SEC. 2910. DEFINITIONS

10 USC 2687
note.

As used in this part:

(1) The term "Account" means the Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990 established by section 2906(a)(1).

(2) The term "congressional defense committees" means the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.

(3) The term "Commission" means the Commission established by section 2902.

(4) The term "military installation" means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility.

(5) The term "realignment" includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, or skill imbalances.

(6) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Defense.

(7) The term "United States" means the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

SEC. 2911. CLARIFYING AMENDMENT

Section 2687(e)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by inserting "homeport facility for any ship," after "center,"; and

(2) by striking out "under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department" and inserting in lieu thereof "under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility,".

Part B—Other Provisions Relating to Defense Base Closures and Realignments

SEC. 2921. CLOSURE OF FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

10 USC 2687
note.

(a) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the termination of military operations by the United States at military installations outside the United States should be accomplished at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense at the earliest opportunity;

(2) in providing for such termination, the Secretary of Defense should take steps to ensure that the United States receives, through direct payment or otherwise, consideration equal to the fair market value of the improvements made by the United States at facilities that will be released to host countries;

(3) the Secretary of Defense, acting through the military component commands or the sub-unified commands to the combatant commands, should be the lead official in negotiations relating to determining and receiving such consideration; and

(4) the determination of the fair market value of such improvements released to host countries in whole or in part by

the United States should be handled on a facility-by-facility basis.

(b) **RESIDUAL VALUE.**—(1) For each installation outside the United States at which military operations were being carried out by the United States on October 1, 1990, the Secretary of Defense shall transmit, by no later than June 1, 1991, an estimate of the fair market value, as of January 1, 1991, of the improvements made by the United States at facilities at each such installation.

(2) For purposes of this section:

(A) The term “fair market value of the improvements” means the value of improvements determined by the Secretary on the basis of their highest use.

(B) The term “improvements” includes new construction of facilities and all additions, improvements, modifications, or renovations made to existing facilities or to real property, without regard to whether they were carried out with appropriated or nonappropriated funds.

(c) **ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL ACCOUNT.**—(1) There is established on the books of the Treasury a special account to be known as the “Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account”. Any amounts paid to the United States, pursuant to any treaty, status of forces agreement, or other international agreement to which the United States is a party, for the residual value of real property or improvements to real property used by civilian or military personnel of the Department of Defense shall be deposited into such account.

(2) Money deposited in the Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account shall be available to the Secretary of Defense for payment, as provided in appropriation Acts, of costs incurred by the Department of Defense in connection with facility maintenance and repair and environmental restoration at military installations in the United States. Funds in the Account shall remain available until expended.

SEC. 2922. MODIFICATION OF THE CONTENT OF BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ALTERNATIVE UTILIZATION OF MILITARY FACILITIES

(a) **USES OF FACILITIES.**—Section 2819(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100-456; 102 Stat. 2119; 10 U.S.C. 2391 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2), by striking out “minimum security facilities for nonviolent prisoners” and inserting in lieu thereof “Federal confinement or correctional facilities including shock incarceration facilities”;

(2) by striking out “and” at the end of paragraph (3);

(3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and

(4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (4):

“(4) identify those facilities, or parts of facilities, that could be effectively utilized or renovated to meet the needs of States and local jurisdictions for confinement or correctional facilities; and”.

(b) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to the first report required to be submitted under section 2819 the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, after September 30, 1990.

10 USC 2391
note.

SEC. 2923. FUNDING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS SCHEDULED FOR CLOSURE INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense Base Closure Account for fiscal year 1991, in addition to any other funds authorized to be appropriated to that account for that fiscal year, the sum of \$100,000,000. Amounts appropriated to that account pursuant to the preceding sentence shall be available only for activities for the purpose of environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned under title II of Public Law 100-526, as authorized under section 204(a)(3) of that title.

(b) **EXCLUSIVE SOURCE OF FUNDING.**—(1) Section 207 of Public Law 100-526 is amended by adding at the end the following:

10 USC 2687
note.

“(b) **BASE CLOSURE ACCOUNT TO BE EXCLUSIVE SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROJECTS.**—No funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may be used for purposes described in section 204(a)(3) except funds that have been authorized for and appropriated to the Account. The prohibition in the preceding sentence expires upon the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this title.”.

(2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) does not apply with respect to the availability of funds appropriated before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) **TASK FORCE REPORT.**—(1) Not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report containing the findings and recommendations of the task force established under paragraph (2) concerning—

10 USC 2687
note.

(A) ways to improve interagency coordination, within existing laws, regulations, and administrative policies, of environmental response actions at military installations (or portions of installations) that are being closed, or are scheduled to be closed, pursuant to title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526); and

(B) ways to consolidate and streamline, within existing laws and regulations, the practices, policies, and administrative procedures of relevant Federal and State agencies with respect to such environmental response actions so as to enable those actions to be carried out more expeditiously.

(2) There is hereby established an environmental response task force to make the findings and recommendations, and to prepare the report, required by paragraph (1). The task force shall consist of the following (or their designees):

(A) The Secretary of Defense, who shall be chairman of the task force.

(B) The Attorney General.

(C) The Administrator of the General Services Administration.

(D) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

(E) The Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army.

(F) A representative of a State environmental protection agency, appointed by the head of the National Governors Association.

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(G) A representative of a State attorney general's office, appointed by the head of the National Association of Attorney Generals.

(H) A representative of a public-interest environmental organization, appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2924. COMMUNITY PREFERENCE CONSIDERATION IN CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

In any process of selecting any military installation inside the United States for closure or realignment, the Secretary of Defense shall take such steps as are necessary to assure that special consideration and emphasis is given to any official statement from a unit of general local government adjacent to or within a military installation requesting the closure or realignment of such installation.

SEC. 2925. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

(a) **NORTON AIR FORCE BASE.**—(1) Consistent with the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, the Secretary of the Air Force may not relocate, until after September 30, 1995, any of the functions that were being carried out at the ballistics missile office at Norton Air Force Base, California, on the date on which the Secretary of Defense transmitted a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives as described in section 202(a)(1) of Public Law 100-526.

(2) This subsection shall take effect as of the date on which the report referred to in subsection (a) was transmitted to such Committees.

(b) **GENERAL DIRECTIVE.**—Consistent with the requirements of section 201 of Public Law 100-526, the Secretary of Defense shall direct each of the Secretaries of the military departments to take all actions necessary to carry out the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure and to take no action that is inconsistent with such recommendations.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2926. CONTRACTS FOR CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION ACTIVITIES

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT OF MODEL PROGRAM.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall establish a model program to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the base closure environmental restoration program.

(b) **ADMINISTRATOR OF PROGRAM.**—The Secretary shall designate the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment as the Administrator of the model program referred to in subsection (a). The Deputy Assistant Secretary shall report to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.

(c) **APPLICABILITY.**—This section shall apply to environmental restoration activities at installations selected by the Secretary pursuant to the provisions of subsection (d)(1).

(d) **PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.**—In carrying out the model program, the Secretary of Defense shall:

(1) Designate for the model program two installations under his jurisdiction that have been designated for closure pursuant to the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526) and for which

Reports.

preliminary assessments, site inspections, and Environmental Impact Statements required by law or regulation have been completed. The Secretary shall designate only those installations which have satisfied the requirements of section 204 of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526).

(2) Compile a prequalification list of prospective contractors for solicitation and negotiation in accordance with the procedures set forth in title IX of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Public Law 92-582; 40 U.S.C. 541 et seq., as amended). Such contractors shall satisfy all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. In addition, the contractor selected for one of the two installations under this program shall indemnify the Federal Government against all liabilities, claims, penalties, costs, and damages caused by (A) the contractor's breach of any term or provision of the contract; and (B) any negligent or willful act or omission of the contractor, its employees, or its subcontractors in the performance of the contract.

(3) Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, solicit proposals from qualified contractors for response action (as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601)) at the installations designated under paragraph (1). Such solicitations and proposals shall include the following:

(A) Proposals to perform response action. Such proposals shall include provisions for receiving the necessary authorizations or approvals of the response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies.

(B) To the maximum extent possible, provisions offered by single prime contractors to perform all phases of the response action, using performance specifications supplied by the Secretary of Defense and including any safeguards the Secretary deems essential to avoid conflict of interest.

(4) Evaluate bids on the basis of price and other evaluation criteria.

(5) Subject to the availability of authorized and appropriated funds to the Department of Defense, make contract awards for response action within 120 days after the solicitation of proposals pursuant to paragraph (3) for the response action, or within 120 days after receipt of the necessary authorizations or approvals of the response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies, whichever is later.

(e) APPLICATION OF SECTION 120 OF CERCLA.—Activities of the model program shall be carried out subject to, and in a manner consistent with, section 120 (relating to Federal facilities) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620).

(f) EXPEDITED AGREEMENTS.—The Secretary shall, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, assure compliance with all applicable Federal statutes and regulations and, in addition, take all reasonable and appropriate measures to expedite all necessary administrative decisions, agreements, and concurrences.

(g) REPORT.—The Secretary of Defense shall include a description of the progress made during the preceding fiscal year in implementing and accomplishing the goals of this section within the annual

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report to Congress required by section 2706 of title 10, United States Code.

(h) **APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING LAW.**—Nothing in this section affects or modifies, in any way, the obligations or liability of any person under other Federal or State law, including common law, with respect to the disposal or release of hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601).

Appendix B

Force Structure Summary*

BACKGROUND

Public Law 101-510 required the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress and to the Commission a force structure plan for fiscal years (FY) 1992 through 1997. The Secretary submitted the plan to Congress on March 19, 1991, and to the Commission on March 23, 1991.

The force-structure plan incorporates an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the FY92-97 period and takes account of the anticipated levels of funding for this period. The plan comprises three sections:

- The military threat assessment,
- The need for overseas basing, and
- The force structure, including the implementation plan.

The force-structure plan is classified **SECRET**. What follows is an unclassified summary of the plan.

MILITARY THREAT ASSESSMENT

For 40 years, the Soviet Union and its surrogates posed the principal threat to U.S. interests and objectives. However, America's security agenda is being rewritten because of the collapse of East European communism, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, ongoing changes within the Soviet Union, the reshaping of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and a reduction in Soviet conventional military power. This redefinition of our threat perception has been accelerated by the emergence and intensification of both new and historical regional quarrels; one of which has already

*This appendix is taken verbatim from *Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report*, April 1991.

brought the United States into armed conflict in the Persian Gulf. Threats to U.S. interests range from the enmity of nations like North Korea and Cuba, to pressures from friend and foe alike to reduce U.S. presence around the world. In addition, our efforts to promote regional stability and to enhance the spread of democracy will continue to be challenged by insurgencies and terrorism.

THREATS

Even with the promise of a greatly reduced Soviet force posture in Eastern Europe, certain crucial constants endure in our long-term assessment of Soviet military capability and global threats.

- **The Nuclear Threat.** The most enduring concern for U.S. leadership is that the Soviet Union remains the one country in the world capable of destroying the United States with a single, devastating attack. However, the rationale for such an attack is difficult to construe. Nevertheless, until and unless the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal is vastly modified, the cornerstone of U.S. military strategy must continue to be a modern, credible, flexible, and survivable nuclear deterrent force.
- **The Conventional Threat.** Even though Soviet military power is reducing and changing in form and purpose, the Soviet state still will have millions of well armed men in uniform and will remain the strongest military force on the Eurasian landmass. As leader of the Free World, the United States must maintain, in conjunction with our allies, the conventional capability to counterbalance the might of the Soviet Union's huge conventional forces.

Across the Atlantic

Looking eastward from our Atlantic shore, the focus of U.S. security concern has shifted

from Western Europe to the defense of both Europe and the Persian Gulf. With respect to Europe, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet retrenchment within its borders, German unification, and the prospect of economic integration embody the success of collective defense, as well as the imperatives for new approaches to collective security. Although the prospect of a concerted military threat to Western Europe from the east has faded dramatically, continuing political and economic instability in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union presents new concerns. Consequently, we and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners are conducting a thorough review of alliance strategy. The broad outlines of a new force posture are already emerging and include highly mobile units, some of which will be restructured into multinational formations. The number of active units will be scaled back, and increasing reliance will be placed on mobilization and reconstitution.

Looking across the Mediterranean to the Middle East and Persian Gulf, regional threats to U.S. vital interests and enduring obligations will place continuing demands on our Armed Forces. Escort operations in the Persian Gulf, conducted for over two years, established the precedent of U.S. military intervention to protect the free flow of oil. Then, just as the Soviets and the Iran-Iraq war receded as threats to regional stability, Iraq emerged from eight years of war with a fanatic zeal, a large arsenal, a shattered economy, overwhelming foreign debts, and a trumped-up quarrel with Kuwait. Even though Iraq has been ejected from Kuwait by the United Nations-sponsored and U.S.-led international coalition, the region still faces an uncertain future. We will maintain our commitment and expect to significantly reduce, but not entirely eliminate, our forces in this region.

- Immediate security concerns for many nations in Southwest Asia will be lessened because of the resounding defeat of the Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm. Over the longer term, however, a number of problems including the prospect of Iraqi rearmament, the Arab-Israeli

peace process, and subsequent reconfiguration of regional security arrangement, and relationships will complicate defense planning and shape strategic choices for all parties in the region.

- While Iraq will require perhaps a decade to rebuild its military capabilities to prehostilities levels, Baghdad will likely remain a disruptive political force in the region. The calculus of regional security will shift as Western coalition forces draw down and political leaders are challenged to construct a more stable and predictable regional environment. The prospect of regional instability will likely remain the chief cause of concern among most political and military decision makers for at least the next two or three years.

Across the Pacific

The divided Korean peninsula stands in stark contrast to the dissipating Cold War in Europe. However, the U.S. security burden is being eased by the continuing surge of democracy, economic growth, and military capacity in South Korea. Our reassessment of regional security concerns concluded that the United States could undertake a prudent phased series of steps to reduce its force presence in Korea modestly – as well as Japan and elsewhere in the Pacific – and could initiate a gradual transition toward a partnership in which Republic of Korea armed forces assume the leading role. Should deterrence fail, however, in-place and reinforcing U.S. forces would still be required. For the region as a whole, a modest level of U.S. military presence – principally maritime – will be essential to preserve stability, encourage democracy, and deter aggression.

The Rest of the World

This broad characterization is not intended to either diminish or denigrate the importance

of U.S. interests, friends, and allies in regions beyond Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific. Rather, the nature and urgency of threats beyond those especially compelling locales are such that the threats can be dealt with by a judicious mix of active forces adequate to protect the most vital U.S. interests and by units with specialized capabilities and mobility for crises at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. The more important point is that many regional disputes are becoming increasingly lethal with the proliferation of advancing technological weapons.

THE NEED FOR OVERSEAS BASING

In August 1990, the President, while speaking of our changing defense strategy, said: "Our new strategy must provide the framework to guide our deliberate reductions to no more forces than we need to guard our enduring interests--the forces to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises, to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should this be needed . . . and to . . . maintain an effective deterrent." This strategy necessitates maintaining a balance between Continental United States (CONUS) basing and overseas basing. To provide the foundation for any national military strategy, the military must maintain facilities in CONUS for active and reserve forces for such purposes as strategic offense, tactical warning and assessment of an attack on the United States, training, research and development, mobilization, maintenance and supply, homeporting, counterdrug operations, contingency planning, and day-to-day management of the various components of the military.

Balancing the need for CONUS facilities is the continuing need for robust, though reduced, forward presence. Overseas basing remains important to the execution of peacetime forward presence and to regional contingency operations during crises. Foreign bases enhance deterrence, contribute to

regional stability, and facilitate rapid response by U.S. forces in meeting threats.

In both Europe and Asia, a continuing forward-deployed presence will be maintained in sufficient strength to deter aggression and fulfill mutual security treaty obligations. However, the rapidly changing security environment has dictated changes to the overseas deployments of American forces.

Europe

These changes will be most noticeable in Europe where a dramatic reduction in U.S. forward-based forces will occur. The United States will continue to maintain an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces, modernized where necessary, to serve as the keystone to deterrence. The continuing U.S. presence there signifies our commitment to deter aggression and is vital to regional stability in an uncertain era of shifting military balances and political relationships. Similarly, our ability to reinforce Europe in a crisis and maintain the necessary and scaled-back but ready reception and basing facilities there becomes increasingly important as our forward presence is reduced.

Middle East and Persian Gulf

In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, the United States and its allies will be best served by a continued, modest military presence within the region. We have an enduring commitment to this region requiring us to restore and preserve regional stability. It has become increasingly clear that the traditional terms of American presence in the Gulf region have been forever transformed, and future events in this region will shape the nature of U.S. presence.

Asia

In Asia, where potential regional aggressors have long presented a more likely

threat to stability than has superpower competition, some reductions will occur. A 10 to 12 percent reduction by the end of 1992 in the 135,000 personnel currently forward-deployed in Asia is already underway. The U.S. presence at bases in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines has historically been accepted and generally welcomed as a significant contribution to regional stability. Even if the U.S. basing structure in the region experiences changes in the years to come, continuing U.S. presence and access to the region will remain important to preserve strategic interests and regional stability.

THE FORCE STRUCTURE

Reflecting the reduced chance of global conflicts, the President's FY 1992-1993 budget [and its accompanying Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)] includes reductions in the U.S. force structure that continues a prudently phased plan for reaching the force targets established for the new strategy and threat projections. By the end of 1995, U.S. forces will approximate those targets and be well below FY 1990 levels. The FY 1995 force will also be substantially restructured so as to support the new strategy most effectively and efficiently.

Strategic forces are programmed to be scaled back in accordance with expectations regarding arms reductions agreements and to enable the Department of Defense to maintain credible strategic deterrence at the least cost. Retirement of the MINUTEMEN II force will begin in 1992. Retirements of submarines with the POSEIDON missile will be accelerated. During the 1990s, the current mix of 34 POSEIDON and TRIDENT submarines will be reduced to a force of 18 TRIDENT submarines. Air Force strategic bombers will decrease from 268 in 1990 to 181 in 1995.

Conventional forces will be restructured to include significant airlift and sealift capabilities, substantial and highly effective maritime and amphibious forces, a sophisticated array of combat aircraft, special

operations forces, Marine Corps divisions, and heavy and light Army divisions.

Compared to 1990 force levels, by the end of FY 1995 the Army will have 6 fewer active

divisions; the Navy will have 94 fewer battle force ships, 1 less aircraft carrier and 2 fewer carrier air wings; and the Air Force will have 10 fewer tactical fighter wings.

Appendix C

Selection Criteria

MILITARY VALUE

(given priority consideration)

1. Current and future mission requirements and the impact of operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.

RETURN ON INVESTMENT

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

IMPACTS

6. The economic impact on local communities.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructures to support forces, missions, and personnel.
8. The environmental impact.

Appendix D

Department of Defense's Closure and Realignment Recommen- dations

RECOMMENDED CLOSURES

Department of the Army

Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN
Fort Chaffee, AR
Fort Devens, MA
Fort Dix, NJ
Fort McClellan, AL
Fort Ord, CA
Harry Diamond Lab Woodbridge
Research Facility, VA
Sacramento Army Depot, CA

Department of the Navy

Chase Field Naval Air Station, TX
Davisville Construction Battalion
Center, RI
Hunters Point Annex, CA
Long Beach Naval Station, CA
Moffett Field Naval Air Station, CA
Orlando Naval Training Center, FL
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA
Philadelphia Naval Station, PA
10 RDT&E, Engineering and Fleet
Support Activities
Sand Point (Puget Sound) Naval
Station, WA
Tustin Marine Corps Air Station, CA
Whidbey Island Naval Air Station, WA

Department of the Air Force

Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX
Carswell Air Force Base, TX
Castle Air Force Base, CA
Eaker Air Force Base, AR
England Air Force Base, LA
Grissom Air Force Base, IN
Loring Air Force Base, ME
Lowry Air Force Base, CO
Moody Air Force Base, GA
Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, SC
Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, MO

Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, OH
Williams Air Force Base, AZ
Wurtsmith Air Force Base, MI

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA
Rock Island Arsenal, IL
White Sands Missile Range, NM

***RECOMMENDED
REALIGNMENTS***

Department of the Army

Army Research Institute, Alexandria, VA
Aviation Systems Command/Troop
Support Command, St. Louis, MO
Fort Belvoir, VA
Fort Detrick, MD
Fort Monmouth, NJ
Fort Polk, LA
Harry Diamond Laboratories, MD

Department of the Navy

Midway Island Naval Air Facility,
Midway
16 RDT&E Engineering and Fleet
Support Activities

***Department of the
Air Force***

MacDill Air Force Base, FL

Appendix E

Commissioners' Biographies

Jim Courter, chairman, represented the 12th district of New Jersey in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1978 until 1990. While in Congress, he chaired the House Military Reform Caucus and served on the following subcommittees of the House Armed Services Committee: Military Installations and Facilities, Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, and Research and Development. In 1983 he wrote and shepherded through Congress a law that created the Office of Defense Test and Evaluation, an ombudsman and advisory office that ensures weapons are properly field-tested before they are mass-produced. Mr. Courter is today senior partner of the law firm he founded, Courter, Kobert, Laufer, Purcell and Cohen, in Hackettstown, New Jersey.

William L. Ball III has been Secretary of the Navy, assistant to the President for legislative affairs, and administrative assistant to Senator John Tower. He has served on the Senate Armed Services Committee staff and in the U.S. Navy. Today, Mr. Ball is president of the National Soft Drink Association in Washington, D.C.

Howard H. (Bo) Callaway was a Member of Congress from Georgia prior to serving as Secretary of the Army. He was the manager of President Gerald Ford's 1976 campaign, and he is now chairman of GOPAC in Washington, D.C. He is also the chief executive officer and principal owner of the Crested Butte Mountain Resort. He served in the U.S. Army in Korea.

General Duane H. Cassidy, U.S. Air Force (Retired) was commander-in-chief of the U.S. Transportation Command and of the Military Airlift Command. He served in the Air Force for more than 30 years. During this time, he served in Vietnam, commanded the Military Airlift Command's 21st Air Force, and was deputy chief of staff for manpower and personnel. General Cassidy is now vice president for logistics technology at CSX Corporation in Richmond, Virginia.

Arthur Levitt, Jr., is chairman of the board at Levitt Media Company. He founded the American Business Conference, was a director of the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, chairman of the 1980 White House Small Business Conference, and chairman and chief executive officer of the American Stock Exchange. Mr. Levitt served in the U.S. Air Force and is on the board of the Rockefeller Foundation.

James C. Smith II, P.E., was a member of the Secretary of Defense's 1988 Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. For many years he was a staff member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. Dr. Smith is an engineer by

training and served in the U.S. Army, time that included two tours in Vietnam. Today, he is a vice president of Brown & Root U.S.A., Inc., an engineering and construction company located in Houston, Texas.

Robert D. Stuart, Jr., was U.S. ambassador to Norway from 1984 to 1989, after serving as president, chief executive officer, and then chairman of the board of The Quaker Oats Company. Ambassador Stuart is president of the Council of American Ambassadors, vice chairman of the Illinois Commission on the Future of Public Service, and president of North Star Investments. He served in the U.S. Army in Europe during World War II.

Appendix F

Commission Staff

Matthew P. Behrmann, *Director of Staff*
Paul J. Hirsch, *Director of Review and Analysis*
Benton L. Borden, *Deputy Director of Review
and Analysis*
Cary Walker, *Director of Communications
and Public Affairs*
Caroline Cimon, *Director of Administration*
Robert J. Moore, *General Counsel*
Col. Wayne Purser, USAF, *Senior Military
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³Consultant from Logistics Management Institute.

⁴Detailee from Federal Emergency Management Agency.

⁵Detailee from Environmental Protection Agency.

Appendix G

Hearings

WASHINGTON, D.C. HEARINGS

15 April 1991

*Presentation of Department of Defense
Recommendations*

1100 Longworth House Office Building

26 April 1991

*Presentation of Force Structure Plan and
Department of Defense Methodology*

1100 Longworth House Office Building

10 May 1991

*Presentation on Land Value, Environment, and
Economic Impact*

1100 Longworth House Office Building

17 May 1991

*Presentation of GAO Report on the Department
of Defense Analyses Supporting Proposed
Closures and Realignments*

1100 Longworth House Office Building

21-22 May 1991

*Congressional Testimony on Military Facility
Closures and Realignments*

215 Dirksen Senate House Office Building

5 June 1991

Testimony on the Army Corps of Engineers

2167 Rayburn House Office Building

6-7 June 1991

Commission Deliberations

Office of Thrift Supervision

Washington, D.C.

13-14 June 1991

Commission Deliberations

General Services Administration Building

Washington, D.C.

27, 28, 30 June 1991

Commission Deliberations

2167 Rayburn House Office Building

1100 Longworth House Office Building

REGIONAL HEARINGS

6-7 May 1991

San Francisco Regional Hearing
California Palace of the Legion of Honor

8 May 1991

Los Angeles Regional Hearing
California Museum of Science and History,
Kinsey Auditorium

13 May 1991

Denver Regional Hearing
Denver Auditorium

14 May 1991

Fort Worth, Texas, Regional Hearing
Will Rogers Memorial Center

23 May 1991

Jacksonville, Florida, Regional Hearing
Prime F. Osborn Convention Center

24 May 1991

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Regional Hearing
Philadelphia Civic Center

28 May 1991

Boston, Massachusetts, Regional Hearing
State House, Gardner Auditorium

30 May 1991

Indianapolis Regional Hearing
Indianapolis Convention Center

17 June 1991

Regional Hearing, Marine Corps Recruit Depot
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego

17 June 1991

Regional Hearing, Washington, D.C.
334 Cannon House Office Building

18 June 1991

Regional Hearing – Goodfellow Air Force Base
San Angelo Civic Auditorium

20 June 1991

Regional Hearing – Plattsburgh Air Force
Base
Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York

21 June 1991

Regional Hearing – Naval Air Station
Meridian
Temple Theatre, Meridian, Mississippi

21 June 1991

Regional Hearing – Naval Air Station
Kingsville
Kingsville Naval Air Station, TX

Appendix H

Military Installations Visited

ARMY

Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN
Fort Chaffee, AR
Fort Devens, MA
Fort Dix, NJ
Fort McClellan, AL
Fort Ord, CA
Rock Island Arsenal, IL
Sacramento Army Depot, CA
Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA

NAVY

Hunters Point Annex, CA
Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA
Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, CA
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, CA
Naval Air Development Center,
Warminster, PA
Naval Air Station Chase Field, TX
Naval Air Station Kingsville, TX
Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA
Naval Air Station Meridian, MS
Naval Air Station Moffett Field, CA
Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA
Naval Electronic Systems
Engineering Center, Charleston, SC
Naval Station Long Beach, CA
Naval Station Philadelphia, PA
Naval Station Sand Point, WA
Naval Station Staten Island, NY
Naval Underwater Systems Center,
New London, CT
Naval Training Center Orlando, FL
Naval Training Center San Diego, CA
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA

AIR FORCE

Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX
Carswell Air Force Base, TX
Castle Air Force Base, CA
Eaker Air Force Base, AR
England Air Force Base, LA
Goodfellow Air Force Base, TX
Grissom Air Force Base, IN
Loring Air Force Base, ME
Lowry Air Force Base, CO
MacDill Air Force Base, FL

Moody Air Force Base, GA
Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, SC
Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY
Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, MO

Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, OH
Sacramento Air Logistics Center, CA
Williams Air Force Base, AZ
Wurtsmith Air Force Base, MI

Appendix I

Menu of Options

Base	Category	Study for
ARMY Army Corps of Engineers* Fort Richardson, AK Fort Drum, NY Fort McCoy, WI* Fort Pickett, VA* Fort A.P. Hill, VA* Fort Indiantown Gap, PA* Fort Buchanan, PR* Fort Hamilton, NY* Fort Totten, NY*	Fighting/Maneuver Fighting/Maneuver Major Training Major Training Major Training Major Training Major Training Command and Control Command and Control	Close/Realign Close Close To Reserves To Reserves To Reserves To Reserves To Reserves Close/Realign Close/Realign
NAVY Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA* NAVSTA Treasure Island, CA* NAVSTA Staten Island, NY* NAVSTA Pascagoula, MS NAVSTA Mobile, AL NAVSTA Everett, WA NAVSTA Ingleside, TX Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, San Diego, CA Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, FL U.S. Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA Naval Aviation Depot, Norfolk, VA Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, FL NAS Meridian, MS* NAS Kingsville, TX* NAS Agana, Guam	Shipyard Naval Station Homeport Homeport Homeport Homeport Homeport Homeport Industrial/Depot Industrial/Depot Industrial/Depot Industrial/Depot Industrial/Depot Naval Air Station Naval Air Station Naval Air Station	Close Close/Realign Close Close Close Close Close Close Realign Realign Realign Realign Realign Close Close Close

* Indicates Commission continued to consider base for closure or realignment after June 7.

Base	Category	Study for
NAVY (Continued) Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL Naval Training Center San Diego, CA* Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, CA*	Training Center Training Center Training Center	Close/Realign Close/Realign Close/Realign
AIR FORCE Goodfellow, TX* Plattsburgh, NY* Griffiss, NY Homestead, FL Mountain Home, ID MacDill, FL*	Training Flying/Strategic Flying/Strategic Flying/Tactical Flying/Tactical Flying/Tactical	Close Close Close Close Close Close

* Indicates Commission continued to consider base for closure or realignment after June 7.



Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

BASE CLOSURE

AND

REALIGNMENT

REPORT

March 1993

Preface

This information has been assembled to support the 1993 Department of Defense recommendations for base closures and realignments inside the United States.

The Secretary of Defense transmitted his recommended closures and realignments to the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and to the Congress in March 1993. The recommendations were also published in the Federal Register.

Chapter Four of this report contains the statutory recommendations, justifications and process summaries the Secretary of Defense transmitted to the Commission, the Congress, and the Federal Register pursuant to Public Law 101-510, as amended.

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Executive Summary

Introduction

This report describes the Department of Defense recommendations for base closures and realignments to the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (the Commission). The recommendations were submitted by the Secretary of Defense to the Commission in March of 1993, as authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Public Law 101-510, as amended). The recommendations were also transmitted to the Congress and filed with the Federal Register, as required by the Act.

The list of military installations inside the United States for closure or realignment is based on the force structure plan and the final criteria, as required by the Act. The list includes 31 major bases recommended for closure, 12 major bases recommended for realignment, and 122 smaller base or activity reductions.

These recommendations support the national goals of maintaining military effectiveness while drawing down the force, reducing the deficit, and reinvesting in America.

The Department of Defense overall base closure policy is an important part of this effort. The policy has five compelling characteristics:

- o It saves money that would otherwise go to unnecessary overhead.
- o It supports military effectiveness by reducing the competition for ever scarcer resources.
- o It is fair and objective.
- o It hits bases overseas harder than those at home.
- o It supports the investment necessary to foster economic growth.

As the Department implements the policy, DoD will recognize its special obligation to the people -- military and civilian -- who won the cold war. DoD will meet that obligation.

Saving Taxpayer Dollars and Maintaining Military Effectiveness

Closing military bases worldwide saves taxpayer dollars; permits DoD to invest properly in the forces and bases it keeps in order to ensure their continued effectiveness; and frees up valuable defense assets (people, facilities and real estate) for productive private sector reuse.

The defense budget will decline by more than 40 percent in real terms from 1985 to 1997, and military personnel in the United States will be reduced by 30 percent. Base closures have lagged behind this overall drawdown. No bases were closed until two years ago, following decisions made in the 1988 and 1991 rounds of base closures. Under those two rounds, domestic base structure was reduced by only nine percent, measured by plant replacement value.

Plant replacement value is what it would cost to replace all the buildings, pavements, and utilities at a base. DoD measures its progress in terms of plant replacement value because it is a better measure of magnitude than simply counting large bases and small bases equally.

Failure to close bases in line with reductions in budgets and personnel constitutes a double hit: Resources are drained into bases not needed, and, therefore, resources are not available to buy the things DoD does need.

The Planned 1993 Round of Closures Will Save \$3.1 Billion Per Year

The following table shows the costs and savings associated with the 1993 closures and realignments:

Net costs in FY 1994 through 1996	\$1.7 billion
<u>Net savings in FY 1997 through 1999</u>	<u>\$5.7 billion</u>
Net savings during implementation	\$4.0 billion
Annual savings thereafter (\$FY99)	\$3.1 billion

The 1993 program, coupled with the previously approved 1988 and 1991 closures, will reduce the domestic base structure by about 15 percent (measured by replacement value). All three rounds of closures together, when complete in 1999, will produce \$5.6 billion in annual recurring savings, measured in FY 1999 dollars.

Being Objective and Fair

Congress has given the Executive Branch extraordinary authority to close domestic bases, provided the Executive Branch follows the established rules strictly and keeps faith with the Congress.

This means using an objective, fair analytical process for closing bases that will withstand scrutiny by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, the General Accounting Office, Congress and the public. The process which has worked well so far, is described in Chapter One of this report.

The Military Departments and Defense Agencies made their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on February 22, 1993. The Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense reviewed the recommendations and underlying analyses to ensure that the law and DoD policies were followed.

The Military Department and Defense Agency recommendations were founded on the final selection criteria and a 6-year force structure plan. Chapter Two of this report describes the criteria and Chapter Three contains the unclassified version of the force structure plan.

The Secretary's recommendations are consistent with a six-year force structure plan. The plan DoD has used is the Bush Administration's "base force." The legal deadline for recommendations precluded DoD from making changes based on future force reductions not yet decided.

The "base force" has twelve active Army divisions; DoD will have room to station all of them. It has twelve carriers; DoD will have room to berth all of them. It has 1,098 active Air Force fighters; DoD will have room to beddown all of them.

Unless the force structure is increased above the "base force," DoD has all the bases it needs.

The Department is confident, therefore, that future changes will decrease force structure, and will require more, not fewer, base closures than those recommended at this time. The Secretary of Defense did not recommend any base for closure that would conceivably be kept open under a revised force structure plan. The Secretary's list of military installations inside the United States recommended for closure or realignment, a summary of the selection process that resulted in each recommendation, and a justification for each recommendation is in Chapter Four of this report.

While the recommendations stand on their own merits, it is important to note two additional points. First, with respect to maintenance depots, there was not sufficient time for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to review all potential interservicing possibilities. The Secretary suggested that the Commission examine those possibilities. Second, some installations host non-defense government activities, and it was not possible to evaluate fully the net impact of the recommendations on those activities. The Secretary suggested that the Commission devote some attention to those potential impacts.

Considering Regional Impacts Carefully

The Secretary of Defense carefully considered the regional economic impacts of these necessary, yet tough, closure decisions. In looking at the regional impacts, the Secretary considered the cumulative economic impact of previously approved closures as well as the ones recommended in this report. The Secretary was concerned not only about the impacts at bases on DoD's 1993 closure list, but also about the effects at bases closed by earlier rounds.

Reducing Overseas Bases Even More

DoD is reducing its military forces and its overseas base structure much more than in the U.S.

DoD has, to date, announced it will end or reduce its operations overseas at sites accounting for 28 percent of replacement value.

DoD's plan is to reduce the replacement value of the overseas base structure by 35-40% as we complete our reduction in personnel stationed overseas to about 200,000.

DoD base spending overseas will also decline dramatically, both because of troop reductions and because Japan and Korea are paying an increasing share of the costs of stationing U.S. forces there.

While DoD will continue to reduce its forward deployed forces, those forces have played a fundamental role in regions vital to the national interest. Permanently stationing and periodically deploying forces overseas have been key to averting crises and preventing war. They show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, provide crisis response capability, and promote U.S. influence and access throughout the world.

Supporting the Reinvestment Necessary to Restore Economic Growth

Closing domestic bases and reducing DoD's weapons and equipment purchases are critical elements of a balanced defense drawdown -- one which will preserve a fully capable, albeit smaller, military.

Nationally, the drawdown in defense spending does not pose any extraordinary problems for the economy. The economic impact of the planned drawdown is actually smaller than the impacts after the Korean and Vietnam wars. However, the impacts are substantial in regions where the local economy depends heavily on defense spending.

Closing domestic military bases is difficult, especially for the communities affected. A close working relationship between the bases and local communities is essential to helping the closure process proceed smoothly. Early development of a viable reuse plan speeds the process immensely and benefits everyone--economic recovery is expedited and DoD savings are realized sooner. The Department is committed to the close cooperation needed to make this happen. Chapter Five of this report describes the base closure implementation process and the Department's programs to ease the impact.

In particular, DoD can help support economic growth by promoting productive private sector reuse of base facilities and real estate no longer needed by defense.

History shows that most local communities economically recover from base closures and actually end up better off, with more jobs and a more diverse economic base -- but in the past the recovery has been too slow and too costly.

DoD is developing a new reuse and reinvestment strategy with initiatives that will: close bases more quickly, thereby making them available for reuse more quickly; promote reuse opportunities, in concert with local community efforts; and, refocus DoD internally to consider, for the first time, the trade-offs between DoD needs and local community needs. The law gives the Secretary of Defense considerable authority to decide whether the land is sold or given away, and to whom it should go.

DoD's Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) spearheads the President's Economic Adjustment Committee which focuses Federal assistance programs on adversely affected communities. OEA also gives planning assistance grants to affected communities. In addition, DoD funds (\$80 million in FY 1993) will help the Economic Development Administration to assist communities.

DoD wants to ensure, wherever possible, that environmental cleanup is not a barrier to economic recovery. DoD has spent and will continue to spend significant defense resources on environmental restoration, but will need help from Congress and the Environmental Protection Agency to streamline the process.

Lastly, DoD will work to create, in coordination with other Cabinet agencies, a new community economic redevelopment fund to help communities most affected by base closures. The fund will be used as a catalyst to spur new economic growth, especially where recovery would be difficult. Funding will be provided by setting aside a portion of the net savings from base closures.

Conclusion

Because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense must get smaller. Closing military bases is essential to balancing the drawdown of forces and budgets with infrastructure and overhead costs.

DoD is downsizing in the way many major corporations are. Just as they are eliminating overhead and closing unneeded plants, so we are inactivating forces, eliminating overhead and closing military bases worldwide. By downsizing this way, DoD makes resources available to allow us to do the right thing in Defense: maintain the quality of our people in uniform and maintain the technological edge of their weapons.

Chapter 1

The Base Closure Process

Public Law 101-510

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510, as amended) established new procedures for closing or realigning military installations inside the United States. The Act was amended by both the 1992 and 1993 National Defense Authorization Acts. The amended Act is at Appendix A.

The Act established an independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The Commission is charged with reviewing the base closure and realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995.

The Act specifies procedures which the Congress, the President, the Department of Defense (DoD), the General Accounting Office, the General Services Administration, and the Commission must follow, in order for bases to be closed or realigned inside the United States. The Act defines "United States" to be the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. The Act also establishes certain thresholds for applicability of the Act to closures and realignments, which are those established in Section 2687, Title 10, United States Code (see Appendix B).

1993 DoD Base Closure Actions

Public Law 101-510 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress and the Commission a force structure plan for fiscal years 1994 through 1999. The Act requires that the Secretary's recommendations for closure or realignment be based on this force structure plan. The unclassified version of the plan is in Chapter 2. The complete force structure plan, which was provided to the Commission and to the Congress, is classified SECRET.

Public Law 101-510 also requires the Secretary of Defense to develop criteria to be used in selecting bases for closure and realignment. In developing the criteria, the Secretary was required to publish proposed criteria in the Federal Register and solicit public comments. Chapter 3 describes the steps taken by DoD in developing the final criteria. The final criteria were subject to Congressional review between February 15, 1991, and March 15, 1991. The criteria became final on March 15, 1991.

On December 15, 1992, the Department of Defense published in the Federal Register a notice that DoD would use the final criteria approved in 1991 for the 1993 base closure process.

Under the law, the Secretary of Defense, no later than March 15, 1993, can publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees and the Commission a list of military installations inside the United States that the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment on the basis of the force structure plan and the final criteria. This report describes the recommendations the Secretary made and transmitted to the Commission, the congressional defense committees, and the Federal Register on March 12, 1993. The list of military installations, the selection processes, and the recommendations and justifications are in Chapter 4. The Secretary's transmittal letter to the Commission is in Appendix C.

The selection process was not only based upon the force structure plan and the final criteria, but also upon policy guidance issued by the Department of Defense to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies regarding the 1993 base closure and realignment analysis process. These guidance memoranda are at Appendix D.

The 1993 Commission

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission is established by law to review the Secretary of Defense's base closure and realignment recommendations. The members of the Commission are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the United States Senate.

The Commission is required to conduct public hearings on the recommendations. The 1993 Commission must report to the President by July 1, 1993, on its findings, conclusions and recommendations for closures and realignments inside the United States.

The Commission may make changes in any of the Secretary's recommendations if the Commission determines that the Secretary deviated substantially from the force structure plan and the final criteria in making recommendations. The Commission is

required to explain and justify in its report to the President any recommendation that is different from the recommendations made by the Secretary. The Commission is further required to base any change on the force structure plan and the criteria, and to publish proposed changes and to hold public hearings on those changes.

The Role of the General Accounting Office

Public Law 101-510 requires the General Accounting Office (GAO) to monitor the activities, as they occur, of the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies and the Department of Defense in selecting bases for closure or realignment under the Act.

The GAO is required to provide the Commission and the Congress with a detailed analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations and selection process. The GAO report, due by April 15, 1993, is also intended to describe how the DoD selection process was conducted and whether it met the requirements of the Act. In addition, the GAO is required to assist the Commission, if requested, with its review and analysis of the Secretary's recommendations.

The Role of the President

The President has an important role in establishing the Commission. The President nominates the eight commissioners and designates the Chairman of the Commission.

Public Law 101-510 specifies that the President is to receive the Commission's recommended closures and realignments by July 1, 1993. The President then approves or disapproves the Commission's recommendations by July 15, 1993. If the President approves all the Commission's recommendations, he reports his approval to the Congress.

If the President disapproves the Commission's recommendations, in whole or in part, he informs the Commission and the Congress of the reasons for that disapproval. Should the President disapprove the Commission's recommendations, the Commission has until August 15, 1993, to revise their recommendations and resubmit them to the President.

The President then approves or disapproves the Commission's revised recommendations by September 1, 1993. If the President approves all the revised recommendations, he reports his approval to the Congress.

Should the President not approve the revised recommendations by September 1, 1993, the 1993 procedures for selecting bases to be closed or realigned under the Act would be terminated.

The Role of the Congress

The Congress of the United States plays a number of important roles regarding defense base closures and realignments. First, Congress passed and amended Public Law 101-510, which established the exclusive procedures for selecting and carrying out domestic base closures and realignments (other than minor actions under section 2687; see Appendix B). In establishing these procedures, the Congress' purpose was to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.

Second, Congress asked the President in Public Law 101-510 to consult with the Congressional leadership on his nominations of individuals to serve on the Commission. In addition, the United States Senate is required to confirm those nominations.

Third, Congress maintains oversight over the base closure procedures through:

- o Authority to disapprove by law the Secretary's final criteria,
- o Receipt of the Secretary of Defense's force structure plan,
- o Receipt of the Secretary's recommended closures and realignments, and other information submitted to the Commission,
- o Receipt of the General Accounting Office's report, and
- o The requirement that the Commission's proceedings, information, and deliberations be open, on request, to designated Members of Congress.

Fourth, Congress has provided itself an opportunity to accept or reject the Commission's recommendations in their entirety by enactment of a law under expedited legislative procedures. Congressional disapproval of the Commission's recommendations must be accomplished through a joint resolution of disapproval. The Congress established a 45-day period for its review, as computed under the law. The period begins on the date the President transmits his approval of the Commission's recommendations.

Finally, Congress must provide funds necessary to implement approved base closures and realignments.

Implementing Base Closures and Realignments

Chapter 5 contains a description of the public laws, regulations, and programs under which the Department of Defense implements approved base closures or realignments inside the United States.

Applicability of the National Environmental Policy Act

In establishing the new base closure and realignment procedures in Public Law 101-510, the Congress waived certain procedural elements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). This streamlined the environmental impact analysis process associated with closure and realignment decisions, while preserving all responsibilities for cleanup and compliance with other applicable laws and regulations.

Specifically, Public Law 101-510 waived the procedures of NEPA as it would have applied to the actions of DoD and the Commission in recommending bases for closure and realignment, and to the actions of the President in approving or disapproving the Commission's recommendations (see Appendix A).

DoD, in carrying out its responsibilities under Public Law 101-510, included environmental impact as one of the final criteria for selecting bases for closure or realignment (see Chapter 3). Consequently, while environmental impact analyses will not be accomplished under the provisions of NEPA for DoD's recommendations, the impact on the environment is a consideration in DoD's analysis. DoD wants to ensure, wherever possible, that environmental cleanup is not a barrier to economic recovery.

NEPA will apply to DoD's actions in disposing of property and relocating functions to receiving bases (see Chapter 5).

Overseas Basing

Chapter 2 contains a section on the need for overseas basing. However, as the United States reduces its overseas forces, ending or reducing operations at overseas sites has become an important part of Defense planning and budgeting.

The base closure and realignment procedures established by Public Law 101-510 for domestic bases do not apply to overseas bases.

The Secretary of Defense has the authority to end or reduce the operations of U.S. forces overseas. The Department of Defense carries out these actions in consultation with our allies and in accordance with the terms of international treaties or host nation agreements.

The Department of Defense has established an ongoing process to announce reductions or cessations of operations overseas. To date, DoD has announced it will end or reduce its operations overseas at sites accounting for 28 percent of plant replacement value. As the U.S. continues to drawdown its overseas forces over the next several years, additional overseas closures are anticipated which would bring the total drawdown of overseas sites to 35-40 percent of the overseas base structure.

Basing overseas is often different than basing in the United States. In the United States, the areas which make up a base (operations and maintenance areas, training areas, offices, barracks, family housing areas, recreation areas, shopping areas, etc.) are usually contiguous. Overseas, each area is often distinct, separate and intermingled with local towns, farms and industrial areas. These distinct sites are often grouped administratively into combinations which if contiguous would resemble U.S. bases.

DoD's Worldwide Base Structure

Appendix E provides a summary of DoD's worldwide base structure and a summary of domestic and overseas base reductions since 1988.

Chapter 2

Force Structure Plan

Background

Public Law 101-510 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress and to the Commission a force structure plan for fiscal years 1994 through 1999. The Secretary submitted the plan to Congress and to the Commission on March 12, 1993.

The force structure plan which follows incorporates an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the fiscal year 1994 through 1999 period, and takes into account the anticipated levels of funding for this period. The plan comprises three sections:

- o The military threat assessment,
- o The need for overseas basing, and
- o The force structure, including the implementation plan.

The force structure plan is classified SECRET. What follows is the UNCLASSIFIED version of the plan.

Section I: Military Threat Assessment

The vital interests of the United States will be threatened by regional crises between historic antagonists, such as North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, and the Middle East/Persian Gulf states. Also, the collapse of political order as a result of ethnic enmities in areas such as Somalia and the former Yugoslavia will prompt international efforts to contain violence, halt the loss of life and the destruction of property, and re-establish civil society. The future world military situation will be characterized by regional actors with modern destructive weaponry, including chemical and biological weapons, modern ballistic missiles, and, in some cases, nuclear weapons. The acceleration of regional strife caused by frustrated ethnic and nationalistic aspirations will increase the pressure on the United States to contribute military forces to international peacekeeping/enforcement and humanitarian relief efforts.

The United States faces three types of conflict in the coming years: deliberate attacks on U.S. allies or vital interests; the escalation of regional conflicts that eventually threaten U.S. allies or vital interests; and conflicts that do not directly threaten vital interests, but whose costs in lives of innocents demand an international response in which the United States will play a leading role.

Across the Atlantic

The Balkans and parts of the former Soviet Union will be a source of major crises in the coming years, as political-ethnic-religious antagonism weaken fragile post-Cold War institutions. These countries may resort to arms to protect narrow political-ethnic interests or maximize their power vis-a-vis their rivals. The presence of vast stores of conventional weapons and ammunition greatly increases the potential for these local conflicts to spread. Meanwhile, European NATO allies will continue to grapple with shaping an evolving regional security framework capable of crisis management and conflict prevention, as well as responding to out-of-area contingencies. These countries will develop closer relations with the central East European countries of Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary, but they will be reluctant to admit the republics of the former Soviet Union into a formal collective defense arrangement. Attempts by these former Soviet republics to transform into democratic states with market economies and stable national boundaries may prove too difficult or too costly and could result in a reassertion of authoritarianism, economic collapse, and civil war. Unsettled civil-military relations, unstable relations between Russia and Ukraine, and retention of significant numbers of nuclear weapons even after the implementation of START II, the continuation of other strategic programs, and relatively indiscriminate arms sales will remain troubling aspects of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

In the Middle East, competition for political influence and natural resources (i.e., water and oil), along with weak economies, Islamic fundamentalism, and demographic pressures will contribute to deteriorating living standards and encourage social unrest. The requirement for the United States to maintain a major role in Persian Gulf security arrangements will not diminish for the foreseeable future.

The major threat of military aggression or subversion in the Persian Gulf region may well emanate from Iran. Iran will find its principal leverage in subversion and propaganda, and in threats and military posturing below the threshold that would precipitate U.S. intervention.

Iraq will continue to be a major concern for the region and the world. By the turn of the century, Iraq could pose a renewed regional threat depending on what sanctions remain in place and what success Iraq has in circumventing them. Iraq continues to constitute a residual threat to some Gulf states, particularly Kuwait. Its military capabilities to threaten other Gulf Arab states will grow. These states will nevertheless continue to depend largely on the U.S. deterrent to forestall a renewed Iraqi drive for regional dominance.

A prolonged stalemate in the Middle East peace process may lead to further violence and threats to U.S. allies and interests, perhaps accelerating the popularity of anti-Western and Islamic radical movements.

Across the Pacific

The security environment in most of Asia risks becoming unstable as nations reorient their defense policies to adapt to the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet empire, the breakup of the former Soviet Union, and the lessons of the Persian Gulf War. Political and economic pressures upon Communist or authoritarian regimes may lead to greater instability and violence. Virtually every nation will base its strategic calculations on the premise of a declining U.S. military presence. The lesser nations of Asia will become increasingly concerned about security in areas characterized by national rivalries.

Our most active regional security concern in Asia remains the military threat posed by North Korea to our treaty ally, the Republic of Korea. Our concerns are intensified by North Korea's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems.

China's military modernization efforts of the last two decades will produce a smaller but more capable military with modern combat aircraft, including the Su-27/FLANKER. China will also have aerial refueling and airborne warning and control aircraft before the end of the decade. The Chinese Navy will have significantly improved air defense missile capabilities, antiship missiles, long-range cruise missiles (120 km range), and a new submarine-launched cruise missile. By the end of the decade China also will have improved its strategic nuclear forces.

Japan's major security concerns will focus primarily on the potential emergence of a reunified Korea armed with nuclear weapons, on the expanding Chinese naval threat, and on the possibility of a nationalistic Russia.

In South Asia, the principal threat to U.S. security will remain the potential of renewed conflict between India and Pakistan. While the conventional capabilities of both countries probably will be eroded by severe budget pressures, internal security obligations, and the loss of Superpower benefactors, India and Pakistan will still have nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

The Rest of the World

This broad characterization covers regions not addressed above and is not intended to either diminish or denigrate the importance of U.S. interests, friends, and allies in areas beyond Europe and the Pacific.

In Latin America, democratic foundations remain unstable and the democratization process will remain vulnerable to a wide variety of influences and factors that could easily derail it. Virtually every country in the region will be victimized by drug-associated violence and crime. Over the next few years, the capabilities of almost all of the militaries in the region will remain static or decline despite planned or ongoing measures to upgrade or modernize existing inventories or restructure. A single exception may be Chile, which may see some force structure improvements through the mid-1990s.

In Africa, chronic instability, insurgency, and civil war will continue throughout the continent. Two major kinds of security issues will dominate U.S. relations with the region: noncombatant evacuation and conflict resolution. Operations most likely to draw the U.S. military into the continent include disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, international peacekeeping, and logistic support for allied military operations. Further, conflict resolution efforts will test the growing reputation of the United States for negotiation and mediation.

Direct threats to U.S. allies or vital interests that would require a significant military response in the near future are those posed by North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. More numerous, however, are those regional conflicts that would quickly escalate to threaten vital U.S. interests in Southeastern Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. These conflicts would not require military responses on the order of DESERT STORM, but they would pose unique demands on the ability of U.S. Armed Forces to maintain stability and provide the environment for political solutions. Finally, there will be a large number of contingencies in which the sheer magnitude of human suffering and moral outrage demands a U.S. response, probably in concert with the United Nations. The current number of international crises is unlikely to diminish before the end of this decade, as many regions of the world continue to suffer the ravages of failed economic programs and nationalistic violence.

Section II: Justification for Overseas Basing

As we reduce forward-presence forces globally, we nevertheless will continue to emphasize the fundamental roles of forward-presence forces essential to deterring aggression, fostering alliance relationships, bolstering regional stability, and protecting U.S. interests abroad. Forward-presence activities such as forward basing, rotational and periodic deployments, exercises and port visits, military-to-military contacts, security assistance, combatting terrorism, combatting narcotrafficking, and protecting American citizens in crisis areas will remain central to our stability and U.S. influence will be promoted through emerging forward-presence operations. These include roles for the military in the war on drugs and in providing humanitarian assistance.

Over the past 45 years, the day-to-day presence of U.S. forces in regions vital to U.S. national interest has been key to averting crises and preventing war. Our forces throughout the world show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide crisis-response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access. Although the numbers of U.S. forces stationed overseas will be reduced, the credibility of our capability and intent to respond to crisis will continue to depend on judicious forward presence. Forward presence is also vital to the maintenance of the system of collective defense by which the United States works with its friends and allies to protect our security interests, while reducing the burdens of defense spending and unnecessary arms competition.

Atlantic Forces

U.S. interests in the Atlantic Regions, including Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Africa and Southwest Asia, require continuing commitment. There will be forces, forward stationed and rotational, with the capability for rapid reinforcement from within the Atlantic region and from the United States and the means to support deployment of larger forces when needed.

The end of the Cold War has significantly reduced the requirement to station U.S. forces in Europe. Yet, the security of the United States remains linked to that of Europe, and our continued support of the Atlantic Alliance is crucial. Our stake in long-term European security and stability, as well as enduring economic, cultural, and geopolitical interests require a continued commitment of U.S. military strength.

Our forward presence forces in Europe must be sized, designed, and postured to preserve an active and influential role in the Atlantic Alliance and in the future security framework on the continent. The remaining force of 1 Army Corps with 2 divisions and 3(+) Air Force Fighter Wing Equivalents (FWE) is a direct response to the

uncertainty and instability that remains in this region. In addition, maritime forces committed to Europe will be one Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and one Amphibious Ready Group (ARG/MEU(SOC)). These forward-deployed forces provide an explicit commitment to the security and stability of Europe, and pre-positioned equipment provides an infrastructure for CONUS-based forces should the need arise in Europe or elsewhere.

The U.S. response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was built on the foundation of previous U.S. presence in the region. Air, ground, and maritime deployments, coupled with pre-position, combined exercises, security assistance, and infrastructure, as well as European and regional enroute strategic airlift infrastructure, enhanced the crisis-response force buildup. Future presence in Southwest Asia will be defined by ongoing bilateral negotiations with the governments of the Gulf Cooperative Council. Our commitment will be reinforced by pre-positioned equipment, access agreements, bilateral planning, periodic deployments and exercises, visits by senior officials and security assistance.

Pacific Forces

U.S. interests in the Pacific, including Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, require a continuing commitment. Because the forces of potential adversaries in the Pacific are different than the Atlantic, and due to the maritime character of the area, U.S. military forces in this vast region of major importance differ from those in the Atlantic arena. As Asia continues its economic and political development, U.S. forward presence will continue to serve as a stabilizing influence and a restraint to potential regional aggression and rearmament.

Forward presence forces will be principally maritime, with half of the projected carrier and amphibious force oriented toward this area including one CVBG, ARG, and Marine Expeditionary Force forward-based in this region. The improving military capability of South Korea has enabled our Army forces to be trimmed to less than a division. One Air Force FWE in South Korea and 1(+) FWE in Japan are to be forward-based in this region. In addition, presence in both Alaska and Hawaii will be maintained.

Elsewhere in the World

In the less-predictable yet increasingly important other regions of the globe, the United States seeks to preserve its access to foreign markets and resources, mediate the traumas of economic and social strife, deter regional aggressors, and promote the regional stability necessary for progress and prosperity. From Latin America to sub-

Saharan Africa to the far-flung islands of the world's oceans, American military men and women contribute daily to the unsung tasks of nation-building, security assistance, and quiet diplomacy that protect and extend our political goodwill and access to foreign markets. Such access becomes increasingly critical in an era of reduced forward presence, when forces deploying from the United States are more than ever dependent on enroute and host-nation support to ensure timely response to distant crises. In the future, maintaining forward presence through combined planning and exercises, pre-positioning and service agreements, and combined warfighting doctrine and interoperability could spell the difference between success or failure in defending vital regional interests.

Contingency Forces

The U.S strategy for the come-as-you-are arena of spontaneous, often unpredictable crises requires fully trained, highly ready forces that are rapidly deliverable and initially self-sufficient. Therefore, such forces must be drawn primarily from the active force structure and tailored into highly effective joint task forces that capitalize on the unique capabilities of each Service and the special operations forces. In this regard, the CINC must have the opportunity to select from a broad spectrum of capabilities such as: airborne, air assault, light infantry, and rapidly deliverable heavy forces from the Army; the entire range of fighter, fighter-bomber, and long range conventional bomber forces provided by the Air Force; carrier-based naval air power, the striking capability of surface combatants, and the covert capabilities of attack submarines from the Navy; the amphibious combat power of the Marine Corps, particularly when access ashore is contested, which includes on-station MEU(SOC) and Maritime Pre-positioning Ships; and the unique capabilities of the special operations forces. Additionally, certain reserve units must be maintained at high readiness to assist and augment responding active units. Reserve forces perform much of the lift and other vital missions from the outset of any contingency operation. In regions where no U.S. forward presence exists, these contingency forces are the tip of the spear, first into action, and followed as required by heavier forces and long-term sustainment.

Section III: The Force Structure and Implementation Plan

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 95</u>	<u>FY 97</u>
ARMY DIVISIONS			
Active	14	12	12
Reserve(Cadre)	10(0)	6(2)	6(2)
MARINE CORPS DIVISIONS			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	13	12	12
TRAINING CARRIER	1	1	1
CARRIER AIR WINGS			
Active	12	11	11
Reserve	2	2	2
BATTLE FORCE SHIPS	466	427	425
AIR FORCE FIGHTERS			
Active	1,248	1,098	1,098
Reserve	816	810	810
AIR FORCE BOMBERS	242	176	184

DoD Personnel
(End Strength in thousands)

	<u>FY 92</u>	<u>FY 95</u>	<u>FY 97</u>
ACTIVE DUTY			
Army	610	538	522
Navy	542	490	489
Marine Corps	185	170	159
Air Force	<u>470</u>	<u>409</u>	<u>400</u>
TOTAL	1,807	1,607	1,570
RESERVES	1,114	911	907
CIVILIANS	1,006	904	884

Chapter 3

Final Criteria

Introduction

Public Law 101-510 required the Secretary of Defense to develop the final criteria to be used in selecting bases for closure and realignment. The final criteria are listed below. Before developing the final criteria, the Secretary was required to publish the proposed criteria in the Federal Register and solicit public comments.

Proposed Criteria

The Department of Defense (DoD) published the proposed criteria and requested public comments in the November 30, 1990, issue of the Federal Register (55 FR 49679).

The proposed criteria closely mirrored the criteria established for the 1988 Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (See Appendix F for a history of base closures).

The 1988 criteria were developed jointly by the Department of Defense and the Congress, and were incorporated, by reference, into Public Law 100-526 (the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act).

The proposed DoD selection criteria differed in two ways from the 1988 criteria. The 1988 Base Closure Commission stated that in their analysis of the DoD base structure, they gave priority to military value. DoD agreed and changed the proposed criteria accordingly. The 1988 Commission also recommended that "payback" not be limited to six years. DoD agreed and changed the proposed criteria accordingly.

Final Criteria

DoD received 169 public comments in response to the proposed criteria and request for comments. DoD published the final criteria in the February 15, 1991, issue of the Federal Register (56 FR 6374). This Federal Register notice contained an analysis of public comments received and a description of the changes DoD made to the proposed criteria before finalizing them. The final criteria follow.

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.
8. The environmental impact.

1993 Criteria

On December 15, 1992, DoD published a notice in the Federal Register (57 FR 59334) that DoD would not change the final criteria approved in 1991, and would use the same criteria for the 1993 base closure process.

Chapter 4

Recommendations

Introduction

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, permits the Secretary of Defense to publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the Congressional Defense Committees and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission a list of military installations inside the United States that the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment on the basis of a six-year force structure plan and final (selection) criteria.

The Secretary is required by the law to include with the list of recommendations published and transmitted: (1) a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendation for each installation, and (2) the justification for each recommendation.

The law further specifies that the list of recommendations, selection process summaries and justifications be published and transmitted no later than March 15, 1993. The following report satisfies the legal requirements above. The Secretary of Defense's transmittal letter to the Commission is in Appendix C.

The 1993 Department of Defense Selection Process

The Department of Defense began the 1993 base realignment and closure process in May of 1992. The Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum of May 5, 1992, issued detailed policy, procedures, authorities and responsibilities for the 1993 process.

The Deputy Secretary: gave the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies the responsibility for submitting base closure and realignment recommendations; required that the recommendations follow the law, and DoD policies and procedures; and required that the recommendations be based on the six-year force structure plan and final criteria.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics was given the responsibility to oversee the 1993 process, and the authority to issue additional instructions.

The Assistant Secretary issued a series of DoD policy memoranda and established a steering committee of principals from the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, the Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense staff to oversee the process.

The Deputy Secretary's May 1992 memorandum provided the Military Departments and Defense Agencies with an interim force structure plan and selection criteria so they could begin their data collection and analyses. The Deputy Secretary issued the final selection criteria on December 10, 1992 and the final force structure plan on January 19, 1993.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Directors of the Defense Agencies submitted their base closure and realignment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics organized the Office of the Secretary of Defense review of the recommendations and provided a copy of the reports received from the Departments and Agencies to the Joint Staff for their review.

The Joint Staff reviewed the recommendations from a warfighting perspective to ensure they would not harm the military capabilities of the armed services. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the recommendations without objection.

Key staff elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense reviewed the recommendations, from their perspective, to ensure they would not harm essential training and support capabilities.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics reviewed the recommendations to ensure: all eight selection criteria were considered; the recommendations were consistent with the force structure plan; the prescribed DoD policies and procedures were followed; and the analyses were objective and rigorous.

After careful review of the submissions, and after careful review of comments received from other offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics provided his conclusions and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Included in the decision package for the Secretary was an analysis of the cumulative economic impact of the recommendations, factoring in the economic impact of previously approved 1988 and 1991 closures and realignments.

The Secretary approved the recommendations of the Military Departments and Defense Agencies, with the modifications recommended by the Assistant Secretary.

While the recommendations stand on their own merits, it is important to note two additional points. First, with respect to maintenance depots, there was not sufficient time for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to review all potential interservicing possibilities. The Secretary suggested that the Commission should examine those possibilities. Second, some installations host non-defense government activities, and it was also not possible to evaluate fully the net impact of the recommendations on those activities. The Secretary suggested that the Commission devote some attention to those potential impacts.

The list of military installations inside the United States approved by the Secretary of Defense for closure or realignment follows. Summaries of the Military Department and Defense Agency selection processes, recommendations and justifications follow the list.

The 1991 Commission, in making recommendations to the President, raised four areas of special interest regarding: MCAS Tustin, CA; depot workload competition; hospitals; and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. The Department's response to these Commission recommendations is in Appendix G.

Lastly, at Appendix H, are the preliminary military and civilian personnel impacts by State for the 1993 base closure and realignment recommendations.

**1993 List of Military Installations
Inside the United States for Closure or Realignment**

Part I: Major Base Closures

Army

**Fort McClellan, Alabama
Vint Hill Farms, Virginia**

Navy

**Naval Station Mobile, Alabama
Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California
Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California
Naval Air Station Alameda, California
Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, California
Naval Hospital Oakland, California
Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, California
Naval Supply Center Oakland, California
Naval Training Center San Diego, California
Naval Air Station Cecil Field, Florida
Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, Florida
Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida
Naval Air Station Barbers Point, Hawaii
Naval Air Station Glenview, Illinois
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, St. Inigoes, Maryland
Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi
Naval Air Station South Weymouth, Massachusetts
Naval Station Staten Island, New York
Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Charleston Naval Shipyard, South Carolina
Naval Station Charleston, South Carolina
Naval Air Station Dallas, Texas
Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, Virginia**

Air Force

Homestead Air Force Base, Florida
K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan
Newark Air Force Base, Ohio
O'Hare International Airport Air Force Reserve Station, Chicago, Illinois

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Electronics Supply Center, Dayton, Ohio
Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Part II: Major Base Realignment

Army

Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania
Tooele Army Depot, Utah
Fort Belvoir, Virginia

Navy

Naval Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut
Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren) White Oak Detachment, White Oak,
Maryland
1st Marine Corps District, Garden City, New York
Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, Rhode Island
Naval Air Station Memphis, Tennessee

Air Force

March Air Force Base, California
McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey
Griffiss Air Force Base, New York

**Part III: Smaller Base or Activity Closures, Realignments,
Disestablishments or Relocations**

Army

None

Navy

Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port Hueneme, California
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Western Engineering Field
Division, San Bruno, California
Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations (Surface) Pacific,
San Francisco, California
Public Works Center San Francisco, California
Naval Electronic Security Sys. Engineering Ctr., Washington, D.C.
Naval Hospital Orlando, Florida
Naval Supply Center Pensacola, Florida
Naval Surface Warfare Center - Carderock, Annapolis Detachment,
Annapolis, Maryland
Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Annapolis, Maryland
Sea Automated Data Systems Activity, Indian Head, Maryland
Naval Air Facility Detroit, Michigan
Naval Air Facility, Midway Island
Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement,
Portsmouth, New Hampshire
Naval Air Warfare Center - Aircraft Division, Trenton, New Jersey
DoD Family Housing Office, Niagara Falls, New York
Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations (Surface) Atlantic (HQ),
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, Charleston, South Carolina
Naval Hospital Charleston, South Carolina
Naval Supply Center Charleston, South Carolina
Naval Surface Warfare Center - Port Hueneme, Virginia Beach Detachment,
Virginia Beach, Virginia
Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Driver, Virginia
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Norfolk Detachment, Norfolk, Virginia
Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations (Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia
Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations (CV), Bremerton, Washington

Navy National Capital Region (NCR) Activities

Security Group Command, Security Group Station, and Security Group Detachment,
Potomac, Washington, DC
Bureau of Navy Personnel, Arlington, Virginia (including the Office of Military
Manpower Management, Arlington, Virginia)
Naval Air Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Alexandria, Virginia
Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia
Naval Supply Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia (including Defense Printing
Office, Alexandria, Virginia and Food Systems Office, Arlington, Virginia)
Naval Recruiting Command, Arlington, Virginia
Tactical Support Office, Arlington, Virginia

Navy/Marine Reserve Activities

Naval Reserve Centers at:

Gadsden, Alabama
Montgomery, Alabama
Fayetteville, Arkansas
Fort Smith, Arkansas
Pacific Grove, California
Macon, Georgia
Terre Haute, Indiana
Hutchinson, Kansas
Monroe, Louisiana
New Bedford, Massachusetts
Pittsfield, Massachusetts
Joplin, Missouri
St. Joseph, Missouri
Great Falls, Montana
Missoula, Montana
Atlantic City, New Jersey
Perth Amboy, New Jersey
Jamestown, New York
Poughkeepsie, New York
Altoona, Pennsylvania
Kingsport, Tennessee
Memphis, Tennessee
Ogden, Utah
Staunton, Virginia
Parkersburg, West Virginia

Naval Reserve Facilities at:

Alexandria, Louisiana
Midland, Texas

Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers at:

Fort Wayne, Indiana
Billings, Montana
Abilene, Texas

Readiness Command Regions at:

Olathe, Kansas (Region 18)
Scotia, New York (Region 2)
Ravenna, Ohio (Region 5)

Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Distribution Depot Oakland, California
Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola, Florida
Defense Contract Management District Northcentral, Chicago, Illinois
Defense Logistics Service Center, Battle Creek, Michigan
Defense Contract Management District Midatlantic, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania
Defense Logistics Agency Clothing Factory, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, South Carolina
Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, Utah
Defense Contract Management District West, El Segundo, California
Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service, Battle Creek, Michigan
Defense Industrial Supply Center, Pennsylvania

DoD Data Center Consolidation

Army Data Processing Centers

None

Navy Data Processing Centers

Facilities Systems Office, Port Hueneme, California
Fleet Industrial Support Center, San Diego, California
Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, California
Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, Point Mugu, California
Naval Command Control & Ocean Surveillance Center, San Diego, California
Navy Regional Data Automation Center, San Francisco, California
Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station, San Diego, California
Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station, Washington, DC
Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida
Naval Air Station, Mayport, Florida
Naval Computer and Telecommunication Station Pensacola, Florida
Trident Refit Facility, Kings Bay, Georgia
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area Master Station, EASTPAC
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
Naval Supply Center, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
Enlisted Personnel Management Center, New Orleans, Louisiana
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station, New Orleans, Louisiana
Naval Air Station, Brunswick, Maine
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland
Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Naval Supply Center, Charleston, South Carolina
Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area Master Station, Atlantic,
Norfolk, Virginia
Navy Data Automation Facility, Corpus Christi, Texas
Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington, Virginia
Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, Virginia
Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, Washington
Naval Supply Center, Puget Sound, Washington
Trident Refit Facility, Bangor, Washington

Marine Corps Data Processing Centers

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California
Regional Automated Services Center, Camp Pendleton, California
Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina
Regional Automated Services Center, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina

Air Force Data Processing Centers

Regional Processing Center, McClellan AFB, California
Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph AFB, Texas
Computer Service Center, San Antonio, Texas
7th Communications Group, Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia

Defense Logistics Agency Data Processing Centers

Information Processing Center, Battle Creek, Michigan
Information Processing Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Information Processing Center, Ogden, Utah
Information Processing Center, Richmond, Virginia.

Defense Information Systems Agency Data Processing Centers

Defense Information Technology Service Organization, Indianapolis Information
Processing Center, Indiana
Defense Information Technology Service Organization, Kansas City Information
Processing Center, Missouri
Defense Information Technology Service Organization, Columbus
Annex (Dayton), Ohio

Part IV: Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 Recommendations

Army

Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois (AMCCOM remains at Rock Island,
Illinois instead of moving to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama)

Presidio of San Francisco, California (6th Army relocates to NASA Ames, California
vice Ft Carson, Colorado)

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania (Systems Integration Management Activity-
East remains at Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania vice Rock Island,
Illinois)

Navy

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA (Substitute NAS Miramar for Marine Corps Air Station 29 Palms as one receiver of Marine Corps Air Station Tustin's assets)

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island, California (Retain no facilities, dispose vice outlease all property)

Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility, Albuquerque, New Mexico (retain as a tenant of the Air Force)

Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center., San Diego, CA (Consolidate with Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center, Vallejo, CA, into available Air Force space vice new construction)

Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity, Yorktown, VA (Realign to Panama City, FL vice Dam Neck, VA)

Air Force

Castle Air Force Base, California (B-52 Combat Crew Training redirected from Fairchild AFB to Barksdale AFB and KC-135 Combat Crew Training from Fairchild AFB to Altus AFB).

Mather Air Force Base, California (940th Air Refueling Group redirected from McClellan AFB to Beale AFB).

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida (Airfield does not close. 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES) is reassigned from Homestead AFB and operates the airfield. Joint Communications Support Element stays at MacDill vice relocating to Charleston AFB).

Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois (Metals Technology and Aircraft Structural Maintenance training courses from Chanute to Sheppard AFB redirected to NAS Memphis).

Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, Ohio (Retain 121st Air Refueling Wing and the 160th Air Refueling Group in a cantonment area at Rickenbacker instead of Wright-Patterson AFB. Rickenbacker AGB does not close.)

**Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas (704th Fighter Squadron and 924th Fighter Group
redirected from Bergstrom AFB to Carswell AFB cantonment area).**

**Carswell Air Force Base, Texas (Fabrication function of the 436th Training Squadron
redirected from Dyess AFB to Luke AFB, maintenance training function
redirected from Dyess AFB to Hill AFB).**

Department of the Army

Summary of Selection Process

Introduction

The Army is reducing its force structure and tailoring its base structure in light of changes in the world situation and the reduction in resources devoted to national defense. By 1997, the Army will have 12 active divisions, 2 fewer than 1992. The end strength of the Army will decline by 14.4 percent, with the majority of that decline overseas, assuming the decline continues.

The Selection Process

The Army's base closure selection process was a structured three phase assessment. Phase I entailed grouping installations in like categories and analyzing them for military value, and identifying candidates to be studied by the Total Army Basing Study (TABS) group. In Phase II, the Army used analytical tools to identify and develop alternatives which result in the approved Department of the Army recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Phase III provides support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

The first step in Phase I included a review of legislative and Departmental guidance to ensure that it was properly reflected in the Army's process. The study group then developed five measures to use in assessing the military value of Army installations. The Army determined that mission essentiality, mission suitability, operational efficiency, quality of life and expandability would provide the appropriate linkage to the DoD criteria. To add merit to these measures, weights were assigned to reflect the relative importance of each measure in order to assess the installations.

The Army then developed eleven categories of installations and grouped the installations by like missions, capabilities, and characteristics to facilitate the assessment of military value. Installations that are closing or inactivating as a result of 1988 and 1991 Commissions' recommendations were not included. Attributes were developed to support the measures of merit and weights assigned for each attribute to reflect their relative importance within the associated measure of merit.

To standardize data collection, specific guidance was provided to the major commands that defined the procedures, formats, measures, attributes, and weights to be used for assessing each installation's military value. Qualitative assessments of each installation's military value were also prepared. These assessments provided a starting point for evaluating the Army's base structure--they did not produce a decision on which bases should be closed or realigned.

The next part of the analysis identified study candidates. The DoD Force Structure, Army basing strategy, MACOM reshaping proposals, military value assessments, approved Defense Management Review Decisions, and other studies were used to formulate a set of possible candidates. The list of study candidates was approved by the Under Secretary of the Army and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

Next, the study candidates were examined to identify specific alternatives. Each alternative was developed, analyzed, refined, and documented based on feasibility, affordability, socioeconomic impacts, and environmental impacts. The Army analyzed each alternative using the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model, the DoD Office of Economic Adjustment impact model, and internal feasibility and affordability evaluations. Each alternative was presented to the Army's Program Budget Committee, the Select Committee comprised of the most senior military and civilian officials from the Army staff and Secretariat, and the Acting Secretary of the Army for review and approval of the recommendations.

The Acting Secretary of the Army, with the advice of the Chief of Staff of the Army, nominated bases to the Secretary of Defense for closure or realignment based on the DoD Force Structure Plan and the final criteria established under Public Law 101-510, as amended.

Department of the Army

Recommendations and Justifications

Fort George B. McClellan, Alabama

Recommendation: Close Fort McClellan. Relocate the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Transfer accountability for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities, through licensing, to the Army National Guard. Retain an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves. Retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan.

Justification: Fort McClellan has the least amount of facilities and smallest population of any of the Army's individual entry training/branch school installations and was accordingly ranked ninth in a category of thirteen installations. Three of the thirteen installations tied for the thirteenth position and were later removed from further consideration as a result of a specific capability needed to support mission requirements. The tenth installation in this category was not considered for closure because it controls airspace, airfields, and aviation facilities which represent unique assets to the Army.

Collocation of the chemical, military police, and engineer schools provides substantial advantages for operational linkages among the three branches. These linkages enable the Army to focus on the doctrinal and force development of three key maneuver support elements. Synergistic advantages of training and professional development programs are: coordination, employment, and removal of obstacles; conduct of river crossing operations; internal security/nation assistance operations; operations in rear areas or along main supply routes; and counter drug operations. The missions of the three branches will be more effectively integrated.

Each school develops doctrine, training, leadership, organization and material products which are technical in nature and proponent specific. The only place to achieve integration is at the combined arms level. Using the opportunity to collocate these schools will assure synergistic solutions for current, emerging, and future challenges.

This recommendation is a change to the recommendation made to the 1991 Commission that was disapproved. The 1991 Commission rejected this recommendation because they found the Army substantially deviated from criterion 1 and criterion 2. Their rationale questioned the Army's decision to maintain the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility (CDTF) in caretaker status because it could contribute little, if any, to chemical defense preparedness and the CDTF could not be reactivated quickly.

The Army's proposal to close Fort McClellan differs in two respects. First, the DODPI will relocate to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, instead of Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and second, the Army will retain the capability to continue live-agent training. Subsequent to the 1991 Commission's decision, the Army conducted an in-depth study of the value of live-agent training. The study affirmed its military value. The Army's nuclear, biological and chemical readiness training is interwoven throughout all training and included at all levels of command. Operations in a potentially hostile chemical environment are an integral part of individual and collective skills training, and routinely practiced during unit field training exercises. By maintaining the capability for chemical live-agent training at Fort McClellan, the Army will continue to provide realistic chemical preparedness training. A robust chemical/biological defense is a vital part of a three-pronged effort, including arms control and conventional/nuclear deterrence. The Army is the only service that conducts live-agent training; and it will continue this training. The Air Force has indicated its desire to collocate its disaster preparedness technical training with the Army's Chemical School at Fort Leonard Wood; the Army supports this initiative.

The Army provides live-agent training not only for Army personnel (approximately 4000 students per year), but also for other Services, the State Department, and even foreign countries (approximately 600 students per year). This training usually involves two days at the CDTF while other training is conducted at other facilities of the Chemical School. The CDTF will remain part of the Chemical School, even though it is being operated at another location. Although it is feasible to replicate this facility at Fort Leonard Wood, maintaining the existing facility affords the same capability without any additional construction.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this closure are approximately \$111 million. Annual steady state savings are about \$31 million, with a return on investment in three years.

Impacts: The closure of Fort McClellan will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 20 percent of the employment base in the Anniston Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no significant environmental impact resulting from this closure. Pelham Range, the site of most of the contamination, will be retained. Environmental restoration will continue until complete. There are no known obstacles in the ability of the receiving community's infrastructure to support this recommendation.

Vint Hill Farms, Virginia

Recommendation: Close Vint Hill Farms. Relocate the maintenance and repair function of the Intelligence Material Management Center (IMMC) to Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA. Transfer the remaining elements of IMMC, the Signal Warfare Directorate, and the program executive officer (PEO) for Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) to Fort Monmouth, NJ.

Justification: Vint Hill Farms ranked low in military value within its category. With the departure of the military intelligence battalion and its consolidation at Fort Gordon, GA, Vint Hill Farms is underutilized. It was determined that Vint Hill Farms could be closed and its functions performed elsewhere. Closure of this installation supports the Army's basing strategy to consolidate similar functions and close small installations when feasible to do so. Moving its activities to Fort Monmouth enhances the synergistic effect of research and development for communication electronics and intelligence electronics warfare. Collocation at Fort Monmouth also facilitates the interaction between the Program Managers and Program Executive Officers that currently reside at Fort Monmouth, thereby creating greater military value in this category.

Consolidating research and development will achieve greater efficiencies in the areas of mission, mission overhead, and base operations. This allows the Army to reduce costs, giving the flexibility to put scarce resources into the research and development arena that significantly contributes to overall readiness.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this closure are approximately \$72 million. Annual steady state savings are about \$19 million, with a return on investment in three years.

Impacts: The closure of Vint Hill Farms will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 13 percent of the employment base in the Fauquier County Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no

economic recovery. There are no known environmental impediments from this closure. Environmental restoration will continue until complete. There are no known obstacles in the ability of the receiving community's infrastructure to support this recommendation.

Fort Monmouth, New Jersey

Recommendation: Realign Fort Monmouth. Relocate the headquarters of U.S. Army Communications Electronic Command (CECOM) from leased space outside Fort Monmouth to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois and transfer the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Fort Monmouth. Dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods sub posts, as well as main post, Fort Monmouth.

Justification: Fort Monmouth ranks fourth out of twelve installations in military value. It is a small installation with elements located off base in costly leased space. Relocating the CECOM Headquarters, an administrative and logistical headquarters, from leased facilities located outside the main post of Fort Monmouth, New Jersey to permanent facilities at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois allows the Army to terminate a lease of \$15 million per year with additional savings of over \$8 million per year in locality pay differential for the civilian workforce. At the same time it better utilizes the excess space identified at Rock Island. Separating the headquarters and administrative function from the research and development aspect of CECOM will not have an operational impact.

Rock Island Arsenal has the infrastructure to support and house the headquarters element of CECOM. Currently, Rock Island has administrative space to accommodate approximately 1,000 additional personnel and permanent building space that can be renovated to accommodate even more personnel. The computer system center on the arsenal is one of the Army's largest and can accommodate the needs of the headquarters.

The Rock Island community infrastructure can accommodate the new residents without the need to construct new schools, new water and sewer facilities or other public facilities. There is abundant housing at reasonable costs and excellent access to higher education, both at the graduate and undergraduate level.

Fort Jackson trains about one half of the basic trainees and is the largest recruit training center. It is also the home of the Soldier Support Center, which is relocating from Fort Benjamin Harrison. The report to the 1991 Commission describing the

proposed closure of Fort Benjamin Harrison stated that the Army planned to collocate the Chaplain School with this Center eventually. The transfer of the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson benefits not only the Chaplain School's students, but also the large population of basic trainees who are beginning a new career in the Army, many of whom are separated from their families for the first time. The Chaplain School and its staff of chaplains will facilitate the trainees' transition to the Army life.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this realignment are approximately \$93 million. Annual steady state savings are about \$20 million, with a return on investment in three years.

Impacts: The realignment of Fort Monmouth will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 3 percent of the employment base in the Monmouth County Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. This potential job loss is partially offset by the proposed movement of personnel to Fort Monmouth from Vint Hill Farms. There are no known environmental impediments from this realignment. Environmental restoration will continue until complete. There are no known obstacles in the ability of the receiving community's infrastructure to support this recommendation.

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Realign Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) by reducing it to a depot activity and placing it under the command and control of Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA. Relocate the maintenance functions and associated workload to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector. Retain the conventional ammunition storage mission and the regional Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) mission. Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Letterkenny as follows. Instead of sending Systems Integration Management Activity East (SIMA-E) to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, as recommended by the 1991 Commission, retain this activity in place. Retain the SIMA-E and the Information Processing Center at Letterkenny until the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) completes its review of activities relocated under Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) 918. The activities of the depot not associated with the remaining mission will be inactivated, transferred or otherwise eliminated. Missile maintenance workload will not consolidate at Letterkenny, as originally planned. However, Depot Systems Command will relocate to Rock Island Arsenal, where it will consolidate under the Industrial Operations Command there, as approved by the 1991 Commission.

Justification: The decision to realign LEAD was driven by the results of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff triennial review of roles and missions in the Department of Defense. As part of this review, the Chairman chartered the Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study. The study identified a significant amount of excess depot capacity and duplication among the Services.

The Army has concluded that the projected ground systems and equipment depot maintenance workload for fiscal year 1999 is not sufficient to maintain all of the ground systems and equipment depots.

In drawing the conclusion to downsize LEAD, the Army considered the following factors: relative military value of the depots; the future heavy force mix; reduced budget; workforce skills; excess capacity; ability of the depots to accommodate new workload levels; the proximity of the depots to the heavy forces in the U.S.; and the resulting savings.

SIMA-E performs computer systems design and data management functions for a variety of activities. This organization is transferring to the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) in 1993. Retention keeps this activity focused regionally upon the customer. SIMA-West is located in St. Louis and supports functions in the western portion of the U.S. DISA advised the Army that there were no advantages or savings from a relocation to Rock Island Arsenal, IL. Less than 25% of the work performed by SIMA-E is associated with the Industrial Operations Command at Rock Island Arsenal.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this realignment are approximately \$106 million. Annual steady state savings are about \$30 million, with an immediate return on investment.

Impacts: The realignment of Letterkenny Army Depot will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 7 percent of the employment base in the Franklin County Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There are no significant environmental impediments from this realignment. Environmental restoration will continue until complete. There are no known obstacles in the ability of the receiving community's infrastructure to support this recommendation.

Tooele Army Depot, Utah

Recommendation: Realign Tooele Army Depot (TEAD) by reducing it to a depot activity and placing it under the command and control of Red River Army Depot, TX. Retain conventional ammunition storage and the chemical demilitarization mission. The depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector. The activities of the depot not associated with the remaining mission will be inactivated, transferred or eliminated, as appropriate.

Justification: The decision to realign TEAD was driven by the results of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff triennial review of roles and missions in the Department of Defense. As part of this review, the Chairman chartered the Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study. The study identified a significant amount of excess depot capacity and duplication among the Services.

The Army has concluded that the projected ground systems and equipment depot maintenance workload for fiscal year 1999 is not sufficient to maintain all of the ground systems and equipment depots.

In drawing the conclusion to downsize TEAD, the Army considered the following factors: relative military value of the depots; the future heavy force mix; reduced budget; workforce skills; excess capacity; ability of the depots to accommodate new workload levels; the proximity of the depots to the heavy forces in the U.S.; and the resulting savings.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this realignment are approximately \$74 million. Annual steady state savings are about \$51 million, with an immediate return on investment.

Impacts: The realignment of Tooele Army Depot will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 28 percent of the employment base in the Tooele County Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There are no significant environmental impediments from this realignment. Environmental restoration will continue until complete. There are no known obstacles in the ability of the receiving community's infrastructure to support this recommendation.

Fort Belvoir, Virginia

Recommendation: Realign Fort Belvoir as follows: disestablish the Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center (BRDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Relocate the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification, and Fuel/Lubricant Business Areas to the Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC), Detroit Arsenal, Michigan. Transfer command and control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observables Business Areas to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of the Communication and Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC), Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Justification: In July 1992, the Secretary of the Army requested that the Army Science Board appoint a panel of members and consultants to conduct a review of the Army Materiel Command Research, Development and Engineering Center (RDEC) business plans. Specifically, the Secretary requested the panel determine which RDEC capabilities the Army can afford. The panel based its findings on an objective assessment of the missions, functions, business areas, core capabilities, customer needs and major fields of technical endeavor of each RDEC measured against at least the following criteria to determine which RDEC capabilities are essential and affordable:

- relevance to the Army customer;
- availability from other sources;
- R&D quality;
- in-house cost and efficiency.

The study identified technical areas to be emphasized, deemphasized or eliminated. Areas identified for elimination are tunnel detection, materials, marine craft, topographic equipment, support equipment and construction equipment. The Army Science Board panel recommended the closure of the Belvoir RDEC and dispersal of the business areas that were not recommended for elimination.

The relocation of the Supply, Bridging, Counter Mobility, Water Purification, and Fuel/Lubricant business areas to TARDEC is consistent with the conclusions of the Army Science Board Study. There is a synergy between these functions and the mission of building military vehicles. For example, the Bridging area requires heavy vehicles such as tanks and heavy mobile logistics to move across demountable bridges and light spans. Supply, Fuel/ Lubricants and Counter Mobility also complement the mission of TARDEC. The relocation of the Fuel/Lubricant business area as part the DoD Project Reliance has commenced.

The transfer of operational control of the Physical Security, Battlefield Deception, Electric Power, Remote Mine Detection/Neutralization, Environmental Controls and Low Cost/Low Observables Business Areas from the Belvoir RDEC to the Night Vision Electro-Optics Directorate (NVEOD) of the Communication and Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC), also located in the same general area of Fort Belvoir supports the study recommendations, while avoiding any additional costs.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this action are approximately \$11 million. Annual steady state savings are about \$13 million, with an immediate return on investment.

Impacts: The realignment of Fort Belvoir will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is less than 1 percent of the employment base in the Washington, DC-Maryland-Virginia Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There are no known obstacles in the ability of the receiving community's infrastructure to support this recommendation.

Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Rock Island Arsenal, IL, as follows. Instead of sending the materiel management functions of U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, as recommended by the 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions under Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) with the functions remaining in place at Rock Island Arsenal, IL.

Justification: Under the Commission's recommendation in 1991, the materiel management functions for AMCCOM's armament and chemical functions were to be transferred to Redstone Arsenal for merger with U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM). The merger would have created a new commodity command to be called the Missile, Armament and Chemical Command (MACCOM). This merger allowed one national inventory control point (NICP) to be eliminated.

In December 1992, the Commander of Army Materiel Command (AMC) directed that the command's Core Competency Advocates (Logistics Power Projection, Acquisition Excellence, Technology Generation) review the creation of MACCOM to see if there was a more cost effective option to realign Redstone Arsenal. These competency advocates recommended that the AMCCOM's materiel management

functions should remain in place as a subset of the NICP at TACOM. A closer alignment exists between the armaments and chassis functions than between armaments and missiles, making the reorganization under TACOM more beneficial and cost effective for the Army:

- AMCCOM performs approximately \$50 million and 500 work years for Tank Automotive Command's research and development effort compared to only \$9 million and 90 workyears for Missile Command.

- AMCCOM receives \$29 million from TACOM versus \$0.1 million from MICOM for sustainment.

- AMCCOM and TACOM jointly produce all tanks, howitzers, and infantry vehicles. AMCCOM and MICOM do not jointly produce any weapon systems.

- AMCCOM and TACOM use common contractors and universities.

- AMCCOM and TACOM jointly field, manage, and sustain common weapon systems.

- AMCCOM and TACOM share common business practices.

- Guns have their fire control sensors and computers in the vehicle and require extensive joint integration, as AMCCOM and TACOM do now. Missiles have their sensors and fire control in the missile and are easier to mount on a vehicle, as MICOM and TACOM do now.

The Army believes that the armament/chemical materiel management functions can be fully executed from Rock Island Arsenal without relocating. There is precedence for geographic dispersion of NICP functions. The U.S. Communications-Electronic Command NICP is currently performed at three separate sites.

Retention of this activity at Rock Island Arsenal, as a subordinate element of the TACOM NICP, avoids the expense of building new facilities at and relocating over 1,000 employees to Redstone Arsenal.

Return on Investment: Implementing this recommendation will avoid approximately \$44 million while incurring no costs. Annual steady state savings of about \$1 million are anticipated from efficiencies gained from additional reductions in personnel.

Impacts: There are no environmental or community infrastructure impediments from this recommendation.

Presidio of San Francisco, California

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1988 Commission regarding the Presidio of San Francisco, as follows: relocate Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army from Presidio San Francisco to NASA Ames, CA, instead of Ft Carson, CO, as originally approved by the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure in 1988.

Justification: The 1988 Base Closure Commission recommended closing the Presidio of San Francisco. As a result of this closure, the Army identified Fort Carson, Colorado, as the receiver of the 6th Army Headquarters. Since then, the 1991 Base Closure Commission recommended several closures and realignments in California that did not have the capacity to receive functions or personnel in the 1988 process. During the Army's capacity analysis they identified available space at NASA Ames (formerly NAS Moffett) which could accept the 6th Army Headquarters. As part of their analysis, the Army determined that the military value of retaining this headquarters within California is significantly enhanced as it provides the best available location necessary to exercise command and control of all the reserve units within its area of responsibility. These reasons are as follows:

- (a) Seventy-five percent of the reserve units within Sixth Army's area of responsibility are located on the West Coast;
- (b) The principle ports of debarkation for the West Coast are Seattle, Oakland, and Long Beach;
- (c) The West Coast is prime territory for military assistance to civil authorities. It is the area with the highest probability of natural disaster and is an area where substantial drug enforcement missions are taking place;
- (d) Timeliness/location is the critical element that may separate success from failure.

Additionally, recent experiences with Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm, natural disasters, and civil disturbances have pointed out the need to keep the headquarters on the West Coast.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this relocation are approximately \$9 million. This relocation will avoid the expenditure of \$36 million at Fort Carson.

Impacts: There is no significant environmental impact resulting from this relocation. Environmental restoration will continue until complete. There are no known obstacles in the ability of the receiving community's infrastructure to support this recommendation.

Department of the Navy

Summary of Selection Process

Introduction

By 1997, the Navy will have 12 aircraft carriers and 11 active carrier air wings -- one fewer aircraft carrier and one fewer carrier air wing than 1992. Navy battle force ships will decline from 466 to 425, a 9 percent reduction. The Navy will also have 53,000 fewer active duty personnel, a 10 percent reduction. The Marine Corps will undergo a 14 percent reduction in active duty personnel. These factors, which will continue to decline through 1999, require a reduction in the Navy and Marine Corps base structure.

The Navy's basing structure is focused primarily on homeporting active and reserve ships, and carrier air wings. The Marine Corps basing structure is focused primarily on support of the Marine Expeditionary Forces. The base structure also provides the requisite training, logistics, depot maintenance, housing and related support. Forward deployment operations, supported by a few overseas bases, and the domestic base structure allow Navy and Marine Corps forces to respond to the full spectrum of international conflict.

The Selection Process

The Secretary of the Navy established a Base Structure Evaluation Committee, responsible for preparing recommendations for closure or realignment of Naval installations. The Committee was tasked to develop categories of installations; determine whether excess capacity exists, and develop methodologies to reduce it. The Committee was responsible for evaluating return on investment, economic and community impacts, and for developing recommendations for closure or realignment to the Secretary of the Navy.

The Committee was supported by the Base Structure Analysis Team which developed data calls, recommended analytical methodologies and maintained the Base Structure Data Base. The Analysis Team developed the Navy's Internal Control Plan which specified organizational and documentation controls for managing the process. A key element of the Internal Control Plan was the involvement of the Naval Audit Service. The Audit Service served as a technical advisor to the Committee, validating

the procedures used to build the database and auditing data to determine the method of collection, its accuracy, and the level of compliance throughout the chain of command. The Internal Control Plan also established the procedures necessary to create an audit trail to document the Navy process. One of the most significant controls was the requirement to keep minutes of each deliberative meeting of the Committee.

In accordance with PL 101-510, as amended, the Navy employed a "bottom to top" data certification policy. That meant that the individual initially generating the data in response to a data call, executed the initial statutory certification and, thereafter, the data was recertified at each succeeding level of the chain of command before the data was provided to the Committee for inclusion in the database. The Navy's Audit Service and its General Counsel ensured compliance.

The Committee determined that installations fell into three categories: (1) providing support to military personnel (personnel); (2) providing weapon systems and material support (materials); and (3) providing shore support to Navy and Marine Corps operational forces (forces). Within these three categories, activities were grouped into a variety of subcategories. Several of these subcategories were divided into further sub-elements for purposes of analysis. Within these subcategories are the individual Navy or Marine Corps installations reviewed by the Committee.

At least two data calls were sent to each installation; one for data relating to capacity and the other for data relating to military value. These data calls were prepared by the Analysis Team with the assistance of technical experts in the various disciplines and approved by the Committee. The responses to the data calls, having been properly certified, were entered into the database and formed the sole basis for the Committee's recommendations.

The next step was to determine whether there was excess capacity in any given subcategory, and if so, to what extent. If there was no meaningful excess capacity in a subcategory, no installation in that subcategory was considered further for closure or realignment. If, on the other hand, a subcategory had sufficient excess capacity, the Committee evaluated the military value of each installation in the subcategory.

The capacity analysis used the certified data call responses to develop throughputs as the basic indicator of capacity. For example, the key indicator for training centers was the average number of students on board. Similarly, for operational air stations, the basic throughput indicator was the number of squadrons that could be hosted in terms of apron space, hangers and runways. A comparison was made between the maximum available throughput and that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. When the available throughput exceeded the force structure

requirement, the Committee determined there was excess capacity. In subcategories in which there was either no or minimal excess capacity, the Committee determined that further analysis for military value was not warranted.

Whenever the capacity analysis indicated the presence of more than minimal excess capacity within a particular subcategory, each installation in that subcategory was subjected to a military value analysis. The Committee categorized the four DoD military value criteria as readiness, facilities, mobilization capability, and cost and manpower implications. For each of the four major categories of military value, the Committee assigned a weight so that the sum of the weights equalled 100, and these weights were applied to the military value analyses for each installation in the subcategories within that category.

The Analysis Team prepared a series of questions or statements which the Committee placed in one of three scoring bands depending on their level of importance. Each question or statement was then given a numerical scoring range, by the Committee, depending on the band in which it was placed (i.e., Band 1: 6-10 points; Band 2: 3-7 points; Band 3: 1-4 points). The Committee reviewed the responses from each installation within that subcategory. If the response contained data which affirmatively answered the subject matter, that installation received the weighted point total for that question. The total point score for each installation was determined by simple addition of the weighted-average points received.

The next step was to develop closure and realignment scenarios with the use of a computer model. The goal of the model was to find that set of installations in a subcategory which achieved the maximum reduction of excess capacity and, to the maximum extent practicable, resulted in an average military value equal to or greater than all installations currently in that subcategory.

Not all scenarios were limited to installations in a single subcategory. For instance, in the case of naval bases, berthing of ships was the prime throughput indicia for analysis. Since the Naval Air Station, Alameda, is the homeport for two aircraft carriers, it was also considered in the configuration analysis of the "naval bases" subcategory along with installations such as Naval Base, Norfolk.

Rules for the computer model were developed so that the model would not run unconstrained. For example, left to run without guidance, the model might identify a set of bases which eliminated excess capacity but which bore little resemblance to operational realities. Therefore, the model was given some rules, which, in the case of naval bases for example, included the rule that ships were to be split between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets in the ratios reflected in the Fiscal Year 1994-1995

President's Budget Submission. In every case where rules were imposed, the Committee reviewed them stringently to ensure that only the minimum number of rules needed to operate the model were prescribed so the results would not be artificially skewed.

The computer model resulted in finding that mix of installations which resulted in the maximum reduction of excess capacity without regard to the installation's military value. If that mix resulted in an average military value which was less than that for the current list of installations, the computer was asked to search for an alternative mix which raised the average military value with the minimum decrease in the reduction of excess capacity.

The computer models were the starting point for the application of military judgment in the analysis of potential closure or realignment scenarios. For example, in the configuration analysis for naval bases, the model satisfied its requirement to reduce capacity by identifying as excess the capacity at both of the Naval Station and the Submarine Base at Pearl Harbor. The Committee determined that, as a matter of naval presence in the Pacific theater, it was more important for military value to retain the forward capability in the Pacific than to achieve an absolute maximum reduction in excess capacity.

Sometimes the configuration analysis was not helpful. In the case of the two Marine Corps training bases, the two logistics bases, and the two recruit depots there is insufficient capacity in any one of those facilities to handle the requirements flowing from the DoD Force Structure Plan should the other be closed. In those instances, the Committee determined that further analysis was unwarranted.

Finally, the Committee evaluated the potential costs and savings, economic impact, community infrastructure and environmental impact on closure and realignment candidates (and any potential receiving locations) before making its nominations to the Acting Secretary of the Navy.

The Chief of Naval Operations, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of the Navy, with the advice of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, nominated bases to the Secretary of Defense for closure or realignment based on the force structure plan and the final criteria established under Public Law 101-510, as amended.

Department of the Navy

Recommendations and Justifications

Naval Station Mobile, Alabama

Recommendation: Close Naval Station, Mobile and relocate assigned ships to Naval Stations Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Ingleside, Texas, along with dedicated personnel, equipment and appropriate other support.

Justification: The berths at Naval Station, Mobile are excess to the capacity required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support the projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations were configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations as part of the solution. The ships based at Naval Station Mobile can be relocated to other naval bases which have a higher military value. This realignment, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$4.4 million. Annual recurring savings are \$15.8 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$182.8 million.

Impacts: The closure of this naval station will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential loss (both direct and indirect) is 0.6 percent of the employment base in the Mobile Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There is no significant environmental impact resulting from this closure. Generation of hazardous wastes and pollutants will be eliminated. Environmental cleanup will be continued until complete.

Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California

Recommendation: Close the Mare Island Naval Shipyard (NSY). Relocate the Combat Systems Technical Schools Command activity to Dam Neck, Virginia. Relocate one submarine to the Naval Submarine Base, Bangor, Washington. Family housing located at Mare Island NSY will be retained as necessary to support Naval Weapons Station Concord.

Justification: The capacity of the Mare Island NSY is excess to that required to support the reduced number of ships reflected in the DoD Force Structure Plan. An analysis of naval shipyard capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining shipyards. Mare Island has the lowest military value of those shipyards supporting the Pacific Fleet, and its workload can be readily absorbed by the remaining yards which possess higher military value. The closure of Mare Island NSY, in combination with the Charleston NSY, allows the elimination of a greater amount of excess capacity while maintaining the overall value of the remaining shipyards at a higher military value level than that of the current configuration of shipyards. Other options either reduced capacity below that required to support the approved force levels, eliminated specific capabilities needed to support mission requirements or resulted in a lower military value for this group of activities.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this closure are \$279.9 million. Annual recurring savings are \$148.9 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$1,112 million.

Impacts: The closure of Mare Island NSY will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 11.7 percent of the employment base of the Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), assuming no economic recovery. Additionally, other 1993 closure and realignment recommendations have a total impact of 4.9 percent on the adjacent Oakland MSA. There is no significant community infrastructure impact on receiving locations as a result of this closure. Generation of hazardous wastes and pollutants will be eliminated at Mare Island NSY. Emissions from several hundred controlled air emission sources will be eliminated, providing air emission "credits". This closure will eliminate the need to operate the industrial waste water treatment plant and for annual maintenance dredging.

Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California

Recommendation: Close Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) El Toro, California. Relocate its aircraft along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station (NAS), Miramar, California and MCAS Camp Pendleton, California.

Justification: Naval and Marine air wings are projected to be reduced consistent with fleet requirements in the DoD Force Structure Plan, creating an excess in air station capacity. MCAS El Toro is recommended for closure since, of the jet bases supporting the Pacific Fleet, it has the lowest military value, has no expansion possibilities, is the subject of serious encroachment and land use problems, and has many of its training evolutions conducted over private property. The redistribution of aviation assets allows the relocation of Marine Corps fixed wing and helicopter assets to the NAS Miramar, in a manner which both eliminates excess capacity and avoids the construction of a new aviation facility at Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, California. In an associated action the squadrons and related activities at NAS Miramar will move to NAS Lemoore in order to make room for the relocation of the MCAS El Toro squadrons. This closure results in a new configuration of Naval and Marine Corps air stations having an increased average military value when compared to the current mix of air stations in the Pacific Fleet. Finally the Department of the Navy will dispose of the land and facilities at MCAS El Toro and any proceeds will be used to defray base closure expenses.

Return On Investment: This recommendation was considered as part of a package that included Pacific operational air stations. The COBRA data below applies to the operational air stations on the West Coast and in Hawaii, as follows: NAS Barbers Point, MCAS Kaneohe Bay, MCAS El Toro and NAS Miramar. The total estimated one-time costs for the recommendations are \$898.5 million. Annual recurring savings are \$173.9 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$1,374.2 million. In addition, this package avoids approximately \$600 million in military construction at MCAS 29 Palms which is required to implement the 1991 Base Closure Commission's recommendation to close MCAS Tustin.

Impacts: The closure of this MCAS will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect is 0.9 percent of the employment base of the Anaheim-Santa Ana Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no significant community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. This closure will eliminate the generation of hazardous waste and pollutants and will remove special air space restrictions (such as military operating areas), and reduce noise levels and air emissions. Environmental cleanup efforts will continue until completed.

Naval Air Station Alameda, California

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station (NAS), Alameda, California and relocate its aircraft along with the dedicated personnel, equipment and support to NASA Ames/Moffett Field, California and NAS North Island. In addition, those ships currently berthed at NAS Alameda will be relocated to the Fleet concentrations at San Diego and Bangor/Puget Sound/Everett. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Navy Regional Data Automation Center, San Francisco realigns to NAS North Island; Ship Intermediate Maintenance Department disestablishes; the Naval Air Reserve Center and the Marine Corps Reserve Center relocate to leased space at NASA/Ames.

Justification: The projected carrier air wing reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan require a significant decrease in air station and naval station capacity. NAS Alameda is recommended for closure as it has the lowest military value of those air stations supporting the Pacific Fleet. Given the number of aircraft "bedded down" at the air station, it has greatest amount of excess capacity. Also, given the need to eliminate excess ship berthing, its capacity is not required to meet force levels, since no more than five carrier berths are required on the West Coast; three at the fleet concentration in San Diego and two at Bangor/Puget Sound/Everett. Both the limited aircraft (primarily reserve) and ship assets at NAS Alameda can be readily absorbed at bases with a higher military value. This closure results in increase average military value of both the remaining air stations and naval stations in the Pacific Fleet.

Return On Investment: The total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$193.7 million. Annual recurring savings are \$41.7 million with a return on investment in four years. The net present value of the costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$197.1 million.

Impacts: The closure of NAS Alameda will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss both direct and indirect is 2.9 percent of the employment base in the Oakland, California Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) assuming no economic recovery. Other 1993 closure and realignment recommendations bring the total impact on Oakland, California MSA to 4.9 percent. There is no significant community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There will be no significant environmental impacts resulting from this action. Hazardous waste generation and pollutants will be eliminated. This closure will remove special air space restrictions (such as military operating areas), and reduce noise levels and air emissions. The indoor and outdoor hazardous waste storage facilities at NAS Alameda will be closed in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. Annual maintenance dredging and the dredging of the turning basin and entrance channel will be eliminated. Environmental cleanup efforts will continue until complete.

Naval Aviation Depot, Alameda, California

Recommendation: Close Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Alameda and relocate repair capability as necessary to other depot maintenance activities. This relocation may include personnel, equipment and support. The depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector.

Justification: Naval Aviation Depot, Alameda is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected reductions require an almost 50 percent reduction in capacity in the Navy aviation depots. In determining the mix of aviation depots which would achieve the maximum reduction in excess capacity, the Navy determined that there must be at least one aviation depot at a fleet concentration on each coast. The work performed at Naval Aviation Depot, Alameda can be performed at other aviation maintenance activities, including the private sector. The closure of NADEP Alameda will reduce excess capacity in this category and maintain or increase the average military value of the remaining depots.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$126.8 million. Annual recurring savings are \$78.3 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$538.9 million.

Impacts: The closure of NADEP Alameda will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential loss (both direct and indirect) is 0.8 percent of the employment base of the Oakland, California, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), assuming no economic recovery. Other 1993 closure and realignment recommendations bring the total impact on this MSA, assuming no economic recovery, to 4.9 percent. There is no significant community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There will be no significant environmental impacts occasioned by this closure. Generation of hazardous wastes and pollutants will be eliminated, as will air emissions, which will result in air emission "credits".

Naval Hospital, Oakland, California

Recommendation: Close the Naval Hospital, Oakland and relocate certain military and civilian personnel to other Naval hospitals, and certain military personnel to the Naval Air Stations at Lemoore and Whidbey Island. The Deployable Medical Unit, Northwest Region, will relocate to Naval Hospital, Bremerton, Washington.

Justification: Naval Hospitals are situated and their size determined for location near operating forces whose personnel will require medical support in numbers significant enough to mandate a medical facility as large as a hospital. Given the extensive use of CHAMPUS, any Naval Hospital closure must be predicated upon the elimination of the operating forces which created a demand for the presence of a Naval Hospital in the first instance. In the San Francisco Bay area, the Naval Air Station, Alameda, Naval Shipyard, Mare Island and the supporting Public Works Center and Supply Center are being recommended for closure. Given the elimination of these operating force activities, closure of the Naval Hospital, Oakland is indicated as the military personnel previously supported are no longer in the area.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$57.5 million. Annual recurring savings are \$41.5 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$286.4 million.

Impacts: The closure of Naval Hospital, Oakland will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.4 percent of the employment base in the Oakland, California, Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. The closure of the Naval Hospital will have a positive impact on the environment as a source of pollution will be eliminated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until completed.

Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, California

Recommendation: Close Naval Station, Treasure Island and relocate personnel, as appropriate to the Naval Station, San Diego, California; Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia; Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois and various Naval Reserve sites in California. Major tenants are impacted as follows: Naval Reserve Center San Francisco relocates to the Naval/Marine Corps Reserve Center, Alameda, California and REDCOM 20 relocates to the Naval Reserve Center, San Bruno, California. Naval Technical Training Center relocates to Fleet Training Center San Diego, Naval Amphibious School, Little Creek and Naval Training Center Great Lakes.

Justification: The DoD Force Structure Plan supports a decrease in naval station capacity. Naval Station, Treasure Island has a relatively low military value and its capacity is not required to support Navy requirements. The naval bases to which its activities will be relocated have higher military value to the Navy than does this naval station. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while

maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support the projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. This closure, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Pacific Fleet, reduces excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Pacific Fleet bases.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$33.7 million. Annual recurring savings are \$43.1 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty-year period is a savings of \$330.7 million.

Impacts: The closure of this naval station will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential loss (both direct and indirect) is 0.2 percent of the employment base in the San Francisco, CA, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), assuming no economic recovery. Other 1993 closure and realignment recommendations bring the total impact on this MSA, assuming no economic recovery, to 1.1 percent. There is no significant community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There will be no significant environmental impacts occasioned by this closure, which also will permit the closure or alternative use of the recently improved 2.0 MGD wastewater treatment plant and will eliminate various air emissions, thus providing potential air emission "credits".

Naval Supply Center, Oakland, California

Recommendation: Close the Naval Supply Center (NSC) Oakland, including the Naval Supply Depot, Point Molate, and relocate two supply ships to the Naval Supply Center, San Diego. The Office of the Military Sealift Command, Pacific Division, relocates to leased space in the Oakland area.

Justification: NSC Oakland's capacity is excess to the requirements of the DoD Force Structure Plan. The principal customers of NSC Oakland; Naval Aviation Depot, Alameda; Naval Hospital, Oakland; Mare Island Naval Shipyard and Naval Station Treasure Island have also been recommended for closure. The workload of NSC Oakland will move with its customers to other locations.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$119.4 million. Annual recurring savings are \$45.4 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$259.9 million.

Impacts: The closure of NSC Oakland will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.5 percent of the employment base in the Oakland Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), assuming no economic recovery. Other 1993 closure and realignment recommendations bring the total impact on the Oakland MSA to 4.9 percent. The closure of NSC Oakland will have a positive impact on the environment as a source of potential hazardous wastes and pollutants will be eliminated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until completed.

Naval Training Center, San Diego, California

Recommendation: Close the Naval Training Center (NTC), San Diego and relocate certain personnel, equipment and support to NTC Great Lakes, and other locations, consistent with training requirements. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Recruit Training Command relocates to NTC, Great Lakes; Branch Medical Clinic relocates to Submarine Base, San Diego; Naval Recruiting District relocates to Naval Air Station North Island; Service School Command (Electronic Warfare) relocates to Naval Training Center, Great Lakes; Service School Command (Surface) relocates to NTC Great Lakes; the remainder of the Service School Command relocates to NTC Great Lakes, Naval Air Station Pensacola, and Fleet Training Center, San Diego.

Justification: Projected manpower reductions contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan require a substantial decrease in naval force structure capacity. As a result of projected manpower levels, the Navy has two to three times the capacity required, as measured by a variety of indicators, to perform the recruit training function. The closure of NTC San Diego removes unneeded excess capacity and results in the realignment of training to a training center with a higher military value. The resulting consolidation at NTC Great Lakes not only results in the highest possible military value but also is the most economical alignment for the processing of personnel into the Navy. In addition, NTC San Diego has equipment and facilities which are more readily relocatable to another naval training center.

Return On Investment: The Naval Training Center recommendations were considered as a package and, as a result, the COBRA data set out below represents the costs and savings associated with the closure of both NTC San Diego and NTC

Orlando. Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$327.9 million. Annual recurring savings are \$69.0 million with a return on investment in two years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$323.9 million.

Impacts: The closure of NTC San Diego will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 0.7 percent of the employment base of the San Diego, California Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) assuming no economic recovery. However, because of other closures or realignments into this MSA, there will be a net 1.2 percent increase in employment. There is no significant community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There will be no significant environmental impacts resulting from this action. Hazardous waste and pollutants will be eliminated, as will air emissions, which will generate air emission "credits".

Naval Air Station Cecil Field, Jacksonville, Florida

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station, Cecil Field and relocate its aircraft along with dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia, and Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Marine Corps Security Force Company relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Department relocates to MCAS Cherry Point; Air Maintenance Training Group Detachment, Fleet Aviation Support Office Training Group Atlantic, and Sea Operations Detachment relocate to MCAS Cherry Point and NAS Oceana.

Justification: Carrier air wings will be reduced consistent with fleet requirements in the DoD Force Structure Plan, creating an excess in air station capacity. Reducing this excess capacity is complicated by the requirement to "bed down" different mixes of aircraft at various air stations. In making these choices, the outlook for environmental and land use issues was significantly important. In making the determination for reductions at air stations supporting the Atlantic Fleet, NAS Cecil Field was selected for closure because it represented the greatest amount of excess capacity which could be eliminated with assets most readily redistributed to receiving air stations. The preponderance of aircraft to be redistributed from NAS Cecil Field were F/A-18s which were relocated to two MCAS on the East Coast, Beaufort and Cherry Point. These air stations both had a higher military value than NAS Cecil Field, alleviated concerns with regard to future environmental and land use problems and dovetail with the recent determination for joint military operations of Navy and Marine Corps

aircraft from carrier decks. Some NAS Cecil Field assets are relocating to NAS Oceana, an air station with a lower military value, because NAS Oceana is the only F-14 air station supporting the Atlantic Fleet and had to be retained to support military operations of these aircraft. Its excess capacity was merely utilized to absorb the remaining aircraft from NAS Cecil Field.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$312.3 million. Annual recurring savings for both are \$56.7 million, with a return on investment in six years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$200.9 million.

Impacts: The closure of NAS Cecil Field will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 3.0 percent of the employment base of the Jacksonville Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Relocations to MCAS Cherry Point will require increased classroom space in the local schools. Remediation of this impact is included in the cost analysis. There are no significant environmental impacts resulting from this action. Hazardous waste and pollutant generation will be eliminated. Similarly, this closure will remove special use air space restrictions (such as military operating areas) and reduce noise levels and air emissions. Environmental cleanup will continue until completed.

Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida

Recommendation: Close the Naval Training Center (NTC), Orlando, and relocate certain personnel, equipment and support to NTC Great Lakes and other locations, consistent with DoD training requirements. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Recruit Training Command relocates to NTC Great Lakes; the Nuclear Power School and the Nuclear "A" School relocate to the Submarine School at the Naval Submarine Base (NSB), New London; Personnel Support Detachment relocates to NTC Great Lakes; Service School Command relocates to Great Lakes; Naval Dental Clinic relocates to Great Lakes; Naval Education and Training Program Management Support Activity disestablishes.

Justification: The 1991 Commission rejected the recommendation to close NTC Orlando due to prohibitive closure costs. This recommendation encompasses the additional closure of NTC San Diego and proposes significantly reduced closure costs by taking advantage of facilities made available by the recommended realignment of NSB New London. Projected manpower reductions contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan require a substantial decrease in naval force structure. As a result of

projected manpower levels the Navy has two to three times the capacity required, as measured by a variety of indicators, to perform the recruit training function. The closure of the NTC Orlando removes excess capacity and relocates training to a naval training center with a higher military value and results in an efficient collocation of the Submarine School, the Nuclear Power School and the Nuclear "A" School at the NSB, New London. The resulting consolidation at the NTC Great Lakes not only results in the highest possible military value for this group of military activities but also is the most economical alignment for the processing of personnel into the Navy. In addition, NTC Orlando has equipment and facilities which are more readily relocatable to another naval training center.

Return On Investment: The Naval Training Centers were considered as a package and, as a result, the COBRA data set out below represents costs and savings associated with the closure of both NTC Orlando and NTC San Diego. Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$327.9 million. Annual recurring savings are \$69.0 million with a return on investment in two years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$323.9 million.

Impacts: The closure of NTC Orlando will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 2.1 percent of the employment base of the Orlando, Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no significant community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There will be no significant environmental impacts resulting from this closure. Hazardous waste and pollutant generation will be eliminated, as will the generation wastewater on the average of 1.13 million gallons per day.

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, Florida

Recommendation: Close Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola (NADEP), and relocate repair capability as necessary to other depot maintenance activities. This relocation may include personnel, equipment and support. The Depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector. The dynamic component and rotor blade repair facility will remain in place.

Justification: Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected reductions require an almost 50 percent reduction in capacity in the Navy aviation depots. In determining the mix of aviation depots which would achieve the maximum reduction in excess capacity the Navy determined that there must be at least one aviation depot at a fleet concentration on each coast. The work performed at

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola can be performed at other aviation maintenance activities, including the private sector. The closure of NADEP Alameda will reduce excess capacity in this category and maintain or increase the average military value of the remaining depots.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$165.4 million. Annual recurring savings are \$51.1 million with a return on investment in two years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$341.2 million.

Impacts: The closure of this NADEP Pensacola will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential loss (both direct and indirect) is 6.1 percent of the employment base of the Pensacola, Florida Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. However, because of other closures and realignments into this area, there will be a net 4.3 percent increase in employment. There is no significant community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There will be no significant environmental impacts occasioned by this closure. The NADEP depot is located on the property of Naval Air Station Pensacola, which is on EPA's National Priorities List. The closure of this depot will require that all hazardous industrial materials and waste be removed. Generation of hazardous wastes and pollutants will be eliminated, as will air emissions, which will result in air emission "credits".

Naval Air Station Barbers Point, Hawaii

Recommendation: Close the Naval Air Station (NAS) Barbers Point and relocate its aircraft along with their dedicated personnel and equipment support to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii and NAS Whidbey Island, Washington. Retain the family housing as needed for multi-service use.

Justification: The NAS Barbers Point is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required to support the reduced force levels contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan. The analysis of required capacity supports only one naval air station in Hawaii. NAS Barbers Point has a lower military value than MCAS Kaneohe Bay and its assets can be readily redistributed to other existing air stations. By maintaining operations at the MCAS, Kaneohe Bay, we retained the additional capacity that air station provides in supporting ground forces. With the uncertainties posed in overseas basing MCAS Kaneohe Bay provides the flexibility to support future military operations for both Navy and Marine Corps and is of greater military value.

In an associated move the F-18 and CH-46 squadrons at MCAS Kaneohe Bay will move to NAS Miramar to facilitate the relocation of the NAS Barbers Point squadrons. Finally the Department of the Navy will dispose of the land and facilities at NAS Barbers Point and any proceeds will be used to defray base closure expenses.

Return On Investment: This recommendation was considered as part of a package that included Pacific operational air stations. The COBRA data below applies to the operational air stations on the West Coast and in Hawaii, as follows: NAS Barbers Point, MCAS Kaneohe Bay, MCAS El Toro and NAS Miramar. The total estimated one-time costs for the recommendations are \$898.5 million. Annual recurring savings are \$173.9 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of the costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$1374.2 million. In addition this package avoids approximately \$600 million in military construction at MCAS 29 Palms which is required to implement the 1991 Base Closure Commission's recommendation to close MCAS Tustin.

Impacts: The closure of NAS Barbers Point will have an impact on the local economy. The proposed potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 1.9 percent of the employment base of the Honolulu, Hawaii, Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no significant community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There will be no significant environmental impacts resulting from this action. Hazardous waste generation and pollutants will be eliminated. This closure will remove special use air space restrictions (such as military operating areas) as well as elevated noise levels and air emissions. Ongoing environmental clean-up efforts will continue until completed.

Naval Air Station, Glenview, Illinois

Recommendation: Close the Naval Air Station (NAS), Glenview and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to Navy Reserve, National Guard and other activities. Family housing located at NAS Glenview will be retained to meet existing and new requirements of the nearby Naval Training Center (NTC), Great Lakes. The Recruiting District, Chicago will be relocated to NTC Great Lakes. The Marine Corps Reserve Center activities will relocate as appropriate to Dam Neck, Virginia, Green Bay, Wisconsin, Stewart Army National Guard Facility, New Windsor, New York and NAS, Atlanta, Georgia.

Justification: Naval air forces are being reduced consistent with the fleet reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected force levels for both active and reserve aviation elements leave the Department with significant excess capacity in the reserve

air station category. Closure of NAS Glenview eliminates excess capacity at a base with a very low military value whose assets can be redistributed into more economical and efficient operations. This closure, combined with three others in this category, results in maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining reserve air stations. In arriving at the recommendation to close NAS Glenview, a specific analysis was conducted to ensure that there was demographic support for purposes of force recruiting in the areas to which the reserve aircraft are being relocated.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$14.1 million. Annual recurring savings are \$31 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$313.4 million.

Impacts: The closure of NAS Glenview will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 0.1 percent of the employment base of the Chicago Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no significant community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There will be no significant environmental impacts resulting from this action. Generation of hazardous wastes and pollutants will be eliminated. In addition, this closure will remove special use air space restrictions such as military operations areas and military training areas, and reduce noise levels and air emissions.

Naval Electronic Centers

Recommendation: Close Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center (NESEC) St. Inigoes, Maryland, disestablish NESEC Charleston, South Carolina and Naval Electronics Security Systems Engineering Center (NESSEC), Washington, DC. Consolidate the Centers into an East Coast NESEC at Portsmouth, Virginia. The ATC/ACLS facility at St. Inigoes and the Aegis Radio Room Laboratory will remain in place and will be transferred to Naval Air Systems Command.

Justification: This recommendation was rejected by the 1991 DoD Base Closure and Realignment Commission. In doing so, the Commission stated that DoD had failed to explore other alternative sites and had failed to address asserted problems at Portsmouth with testing of radars and communication equipment. Several new factors contributed to the renewal of this recommendation.

The DoD Force Structure Plan shows a significant further decrease in force structure from that in 1991, giving rise to additional excess capacity. The facilities at

St. Inigoes, Maryland, once NESEC St. Inigoes relocates to Portsmouth, would be available to support the major relocation to the Patuxent River complex of the Naval Air Systems Command and several of its subordinate organizations. This move results in both substantial organizational efficiencies and economics and is a significant element of the Navy's compliance with the DoD policy to move activities out of leased space in the NCR into DoD owned facilities. The Portsmouth consolidation includes NESSEC Washington, DC resulting in an additional relocation from leased space in the NCR into DoD owned facilities. The Portsmouth consolidation also achieves a major reduction in excess capacity for these activities and with this consolidation in Portsmouth, the Navy Management Support Office can be consolidated at this Center. Without the Portsmouth consolidation, the benefits resulting from the synergy of consolidating the three centers would not be realized, and the reduction in excess capacity would be adversely impacted.

The Portsmouth consolidation utilizes, as the magnet site for this consolidation, the installation with the highest military value of all activities in the cluster. A review of the certified data call responses indicates that one of the reasons for this military value rating is NESEC Portsmouth's current capability to perform a broad range of testing functions on a wide variety of communications and radar systems, including the Submarine Broadcast System, Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar, Tactical Secure Voice, and the AN/SLQ-32(V) 1/2/3/4/5. At its Fleet Engineering Support Center is a completely integrated shipboard communications system that contains a sample of every communications receiver, transmitter, data link and ancillary terminal hardware in the LF through UHF frequency range. The radar systems testing capability is enhanced by the AN/SSQ-74(V) Radar and Communications Signal Simulator with its associated antenna farm. These capabilities, particularly when joined with those of the other activities in this consolidation, gives the Navy a most formidable technical center which, because of the consolidation, will be able to function more economically and efficiently than these activities could if separate.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$147.3 million. Annual recurring savings are \$32.3 million with a return on investment in three years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$123.8 million.

Impacts: The closure, disestablishment and relocation, as appropriate, of these Naval technical centers will have impacts on the local economies. The projected potential employment losses (both direct and indirect) are 1.6 percent of the employment base of the Charleston, SC Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) assuming no economic recovery; 11.9 percent of the employment base of St. Mary's County, Maryland, except that, because of other relocations into this county, there will only be a net 1.8 percent

decrease in employment; 0.03 percent of the employment base of the Washington, DC, MSA, assuming no economic recovery; and 0.2 percent of the employment base of the Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, Virginia, MSA assuming no economic recovery. The consolidation at NESSEC, Portsmouth will have a positive impact on the environment as a source of pollution will be eliminated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until completed.

Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station (NAS) Meridian. Relocate advanced strike training to Naval Air Station Kingsville, Texas. Relocate intermediate strike training and Naval Technical Training Center to NAS Pensacola, Florida.

Justification: Projected reductions contained in the Department of Defense Force Structure Plan require a substantial decrease in training air station capacity. When considering air space and facilities of all types of support aviation training, there is about twice the capacity required to perform the mission. The training conducted at the Naval Air Station, Meridian can be consolidated with similar training at the Naval Air Station, Kingsville and the Naval Air Station, Pensacola. This results in an economy and efficiency of operations which enhances the military value of the training and places training aircraft in proximity to over-water air space and potential berthing sites for carriers being used in training evolutions. Currently, for example, pilots training in Meridian fly to the Naval Air Station, Pensacola in order to do carrier landing training. The closure of Meridian and the accompanying closure of the Naval Air Station, Memphis, result in centralized aviation training functions at bases with a higher average military value than that possessed by the training air stations before closure. Both the Naval Air Station, Kingsville and the Naval Air Station, Pensacola have higher military value than the Naval Air Station, Meridian. The consolidation of the Naval Technical Training Center with its parent command, the Chief of Naval Education and Training, will provide for improvement in the management and efficiency of the training establishment and enhance its military value to the Navy.

Return On Investment: The total estimated one-time costs for both NAS Meridian and NAS Memphis recommendations are \$274.1 million. Annual recurring savings for both actions are \$82.2 million with a return on investment in two years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is \$481.1 million.

Impacts: The closure of NAS Meridian will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 12.8 percent of the local employment base in Lauderdale County, assuming no economic recovery.

There is no significant environmental impact at NAS Meridian as a result of this closure. Environmental cleanup will continue until complete. Relocation of advanced strike training to NAS Kingsville will result in additional noise impacts in the direction of the city of Kingsville. This may require adoption of noise abatement procedures until the ultimate transition of the TA-4 aircraft to the new T-45 which will significantly reduce noise impacts. Noise impacts will also be increased by relocation of intermediate strike training to NAS Pensacola and will require prudent management of aircraft operations to mitigate this impact on the local community.

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, Massachusetts

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station (NAS), South Weymouth and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Stations Brunswick, Maine, New Orleans, Louisiana, and Naval Station Mayport, Florida. The Marine Corps Reserve Center activities will relocate to Dam Neck, Virginia, Johnstown, Pennsylvania, Camp Pendleton, California, and NAS Willow Grove, Pennsylvania.

Justification: Naval air forces are being reduced consistent with fleet reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected force levels for both active and reserve aviation elements leave the Department with significant excess capacity in the reserve air station category. The greater operational utility of active air stations and the decision to rely on reserve aviation elements in support of active operating forces place a higher military value on locating reserve aviation elements on active operating air bases to the extent possible. Closure of NAS South Weymouth allows the relocation of reserve P-3's to the major P-3 active operating base at NAS Brunswick, ME and distributes other assets to the active operating base at Mayport, FL and to a reserve air station with a higher military value. In arriving at the recommendation to close NAS South Weymouth, a specific analysis was conducted to ensure that there was demographic support for purposes of force recruiting in the areas to which the reserve aircraft are being relocated.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$23.0 million. Annual recurring savings are \$25.9 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$252.1 million.

Impacts: The closure of NAS South Weymouth will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 0.1 percent of the employment base of the Boston-Lawrence-Salem-Lowell, Massachusetts,

Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no significant community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There will be no significant environmental impacts resulting from this action. Generation of hazardous wastes and pollutants will be eliminated. In addition, this closure will remove special use air space restrictions (such as military operations areas and military training routes), and reduce noise levels and air emissions.

Naval Station, Staten Island, New York

Recommendation: Close Naval Station Staten Island. Relocate its ships along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Stations, Norfolk, Virginia and Mayport, Florida. Disposition of minor tenants is as follows: Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity, New York relocates to Earle, New Jersey and Norfolk, Virginia; Recruiting District, New York disestablishes; Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP), Brooklyn Detachment disestablishes.

Justification: The berthing capacity of Naval Station Staten Island is excess to the capacity required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with the goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. The ships currently berthed at Naval Station Staten Island can be relocated to bases with higher military value. This closure, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time savings for this closure exceed one-time costs by \$1.7 million. Annual recurring savings are \$58.5 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$660.9 million.

Impacts: The closure of Naval Station Staten Island will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.1 percent of the local employment base in the New York Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no significant community infrastructure impact at either closing or receiving locations. This closure will eliminate the

generation of hazardous wastes and the requirement to eliminate the hazardous material conforming storage facility. Ongoing environmental cleanup will continue as part of the closure process. There are no significant environmental impacts at either Naval Station Mayport or Naval Station Norfolk.

Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close the Aviation Supply Office (ASO), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and relocate necessary personnel, equipment and support to the Ship Parts Control Center (SPCC), Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania.

Justification: The reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan equate to a significant workload reduction for the Navy's inventory control points. Since there is excess capacity in this category the Navy decided to consolidate their two inventory control points at one location. A companion consideration was the relocation of the Naval Supply Systems Command from its present location in leased space in the National Capital Region, to a location at which it could be collocated with major subordinate organizations. This major consolidation of a headquarters with its operational components can be accomplished at SPCC, Mechanicsburg with a minimum of construction and rehabilitation. The end result is a significantly more efficient and economical organization.

Return On Investment: This realignment was considered as part of a larger group of moves and the COBRA data set out below include the following realignments from the National Capital Region and Philadelphia to SPCC Mechanicsburg: Naval Supply Systems Command, Aviation Supply Office, Defense Printing Systems Management Office and Food Service Systems Office. Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$88.9 million. Annual recurring savings are \$20.5 million with a return on investment in one year. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$102.8 million.

Impacts: The closure of this inventory control point will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 0.2 percent of the employment base of the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no significant community infrastructure impact at the receiving installation. The closure of ASO Philadelphia will have a positive impact on the environment since a source of potential hazardous wastes and pollutants will be eliminated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until complete.

Naval Shipyard, Charleston, South Carolina

Recommendation: Close the Naval Shipyard (NSY) Charleston.

Justification: NSY Charleston's capacity is excess to that required to support the number of ships in the DoD Force Structure Plan. An analysis of naval shipyard capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining shipyards. The closure of NSY Charleston, when combined with the recommended closure of NSY Mare Island, California, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity, and its workload can readily be absorbed by the remaining yards. The elimination of another shipyard performing nuclear work would reduce this capability below the minimum capacity required to support this critical area. The closure of NSY Charleston, in combination with Mare Island NSY, allows the elimination of a greater amount of excess capacity while maintaining the overall value of the remaining shipyards at a higher military value level than that of the current configuration of shipyards. Other options either reduced capacity below that required to support the approved force levels, eliminated specific capabilities needed to support mission requirements or resulted in a lower military value for this group of activities.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this closure are \$246.7 million. Annual recurring savings are \$66.2 million with a return on investment in one year. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty-year period is a savings of \$385.3 million.

Impacts: The closure of NSY Charleston will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 5.2 percent of the local employment base in the Charleston Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), assuming no economic recovery. Other 1993 closure and realignment recommendations bring the total impact on the Charleston MSA to 15 percent. There is no significant community infrastructure impact at any receiving location resulting from this closure. Generation of hazardous wastes and pollutants will be eliminated. Currently, programmed environmental projects will be completed as part of the closure actions, which will also eliminate the need to operate the hazardous waste facilities and to do annual dredging.

Naval Station Charleston, South Carolina

Recommendation: Close Naval Station (NS), Charleston and relocate assigned ships to Naval Stations, Norfolk, Virginia; Mayport, Florida; Pascagoula, Mississippi; Ingleside, Texas and Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Georgia. Appropriate personnel, equipment and support, to include the drydock, will be relocated with the ships. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations (PERA) relocates to Portsmouth, Virginia; the Naval Investigative Service Regional Office disestablishes; Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity, Charleston disestablishes, and the Naval Reserve Center and REDCOM 7 relocate to leased space in the Charleston area; Fleet and Mine Warfare Training Center relocates to Naval Station Ingleside, Fleet Training Center Mayport, and Fleet Training Center Norfolk; Submarine Training Facility Charleston disestablishes. Family housing located within the Charleston Navy complex will be retained as necessary to support the nearby Naval Weapons Station Charleston.

Justification: The piers and maintenance activity at NS Charleston are excess to the capacity required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations as part of the solution. The berths at the NS Charleston are excess to Navy requirements. The relocation of the 21 ships currently based at NS Charleston will allow the closure of this naval base and eliminate almost half of the excess berthing capacity in bases supporting the Atlantic Fleet. This closure, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet Bases.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$185.0 million. Annual recurring savings are \$92.6 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$748.1 million.

Impacts: The closure of this naval station will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential loss (both direct and indirect) is 7.0 percent of the employment base in the Charleston Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), assuming no economic recovery. Other 1993 closure and realignment recommendations bring the total impact

on this MSA, assuming no economic recovery, to 15 percent. There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There is no significant environmental impact resulting from this closure. Environmental cleanup will be continued until complete.

Naval Air Station, Dallas, Texas

Recommendation: Close the Naval Air Station (NAS), Dallas and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, Texas. The following Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers relocate to Carswell Air Force Base: Naval Reserve Center, Dallas, Marine Corp Reserve Center, Dallas, Marine Corps Reserve Center (Wing) Dallas, and REDCOM 11.

Justification: Naval air forces are being reduced consistent with the fleet reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected force levels reflected for both active and reserve aviation elements leave the Navy with significant excess capacity in the reserve air station category. Closure of Naval Air Station, Dallas and reconstitution at Carswell Air Force Base provides the reserves with a significantly superior air base. The resulting air station, with Air Force reserve squadrons now as tenants, will remove the operational difficulties currently experienced at the Naval Air Station, Dallas, including flight conflicts with the civilian airport. This closure, combined with three others in this category, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity in reserve air stations while increasing the average military value of the remaining bases in this category.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$24.0 million. Annual recurring savings are \$5.2 million with a return on investment in five years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$30.8 million.

Impacts: The closure of NAS Dallas will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 0.5 percent of the employment base of the Dallas, Texas Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no known community infrastructure impact at the receiving installation. There will be no significant environmental impacts as a result of this action. Generation of hazardous waste and pollutants will be eliminated. The hazardous waste storage facility operated by NAS Dallas will have to be closed in accordance with the requirements of the Part B permit. In addition, this closure will remove special use air space restrictions (such as military operating areas), and reduce noise levels and air emissions.

Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, Virginia

Recommendation: Close Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), Norfolk and relocate repair capability as necessary to other depot maintenance activities. This relocation may include personnel, equipment and support. The Depot workload will move to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector.

Justification: Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected reductions require an almost 50 percent reduction in capacity in the Navy aviation depots. In determining the mix of aviation depots which would achieve the maximum reduction in excess capacity, the Navy determined that there must be at least one aviation depot at a fleet concentration on each coast. The work performed at NADEP, Norfolk can be performed at other aviation maintenance activities, including the private sector. While the military value of the Naval Aviation Depot, Norfolk was not substantially less than that of the Naval Aviation Depots at Cherry Point and Jacksonville, those NADEPs possess unique features and capabilities which required their retention. The closure of NADEP Norfolk will reduce excess capacity in this category and maintain or increase the average military value of the remaining depots.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$172.5 million. Annual recurring savings are \$108.2 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$748.5 million.

Impacts: The closure of the NADEP Norfolk will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential loss (both direct and indirect) is 1.9 percent of the employment base of the Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, Virginia Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) assuming no economic recovery. However, because of other closures and realignments into this area, there will be a net 0.7 percent increase in employment. There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There are no significant environmental impacts occasioned by this closure. Generation of hazardous wastes and pollutants will be eliminated, as will air emissions, which will result in air emission "credits".

Naval Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut

Recommendation: Realign Naval Submarine Base (NSB), New London by terminating its mission to homeport ships. Relocate berthed ships, their personnel, associated equipment and other support to the Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Georgia

and the Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia. This relocation is to include a floating drydock. Piers, waterfront facilities, and related property shall be retained by the Navy at New London, Connecticut. The Nuclear Submarine Support Facility, a major tenant, relocates to Kings Bay, Georgia and Norfolk, Virginia; and another major tenant, the Nuclear Power Training Unit, disestablishes.

Justification: Naval Submarine Base, New London's capacity is excess to that required to support the number of ships reflected in the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support the projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. With a reduction in ships, the Navy requires one submarine base per Fleet. In view of the capacity at the Submarine Base, Kings Bay and the Naval Station, Norfolk, the submarines based at New London can be relocated to activities with a higher military value. The education and training missions being performed at the Submarine Base, New London will continue to be performed there and the Navy will retain piers, waterfront facilities and related property. This realignment, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this realignment are \$260 million. Annual recurring savings are \$74.6 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$502.7 million.

Impacts: The realignment of Naval Submarine Base, New London will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) in the New London, CT-Norwich, CT-Rhode Island Metropolitan Statistical Area is 7.4 percent of the employment base, assuming no economic recovery. Potential community infrastructure impact was identified at Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Georgia, relating primarily to schools and roads. Costs of remediating these impacts were included in the return on investment calculations. This closure will result in a reduction in the generation of hazardous wastes, which, because Naval Submarine Base, New London is on the National Priorities List, will have a positive impact on the on-going efforts to clean up the site. There will be no other significant environmental impacts from this closure.

Naval Surface Warfare Center Detachment White Oak, Maryland

Recommendation: Disestablish the White Oak Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) (Dahlgren), located at White Oak, Maryland. Relocate its functions, personnel, equipment and support to NSWC-Dahlgren, Virginia. The property and facilities at White Oak will be retained for use by the Navy so that it may, among other things, relocate the Naval Sea Systems (NAVSEA) Command from leased space in Arlington, Virginia.

Justification: This technical center is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. As the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$74 million. Annual recurring savings are \$22.3 million with a return on investment in two years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$103.3 million. This includes the relocation of NAVSEA.

Impacts: The closure of NSWC-Dahlgren, will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect is 1.0 percent of the employment base in this Metropolitan Area, assuming no economic recovery. The closure of NSWC-Dahlgren will have a positive impact on the environment as a source of pollution will be eliminated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until completed.

1st Marine Corps District Garden City, New York

Recommendation: Close the 1st Marine District, Garden City, New York and relocate necessary personnel, equipment and support to the Defense Distribution Region East, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania. The Defense Contract Management Area Office, a present tenant in the facility occupied by this activity as its host, will remain in place and assume responsibility for this facility. The Marine Corps Reserve Center, Garden City will relocate to Fort Hamilton, New York.

Justification: The reductions in force structure require a reduction of capacity in administrative activities. Consolidation of this activity into a joint services organization will enhance its ability to discharge its mission most effectively and economically.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$6.3 million. Annual recurring savings are \$1 million with a return on investment in six years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$2.8 million.

Impacts: The closure and relocation of this activity will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 0.01 percent of the employment base of the Nassau-Suffolk, Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There are no environmental impacts occasioned by this closure and realignment. Any necessary environmental clean-ups will continue until completed.

Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, Rhode Island

Recommendation: Realign the Naval Education and Training Center (NETC) Newport and terminate the Center's mission to berth ships. Relocate the ships to Naval Station Mayport, Florida and Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia. Piers, waterfront facilities and related property shall be retained by NETC Newport. The Education and Training Center will remain to satisfy its education and training mission.

Justification: The piers and maintenance activity associated with NETC Newport are excess to the capacity required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the

overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support the projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. NETC Newport currently berths five ships which can be absorbed at other homeports with a higher military value. This realignment, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this realignment are \$23.5 million. Annual recurring savings are \$4.3 million with a return on investment in two years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$20.3 million.

Impacts: The realignment of NETC Newport will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 3.0 percent of the local employment base in Newport County, assuming no economic recovery. There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving location. Realignment of NETC Newport will eliminate sources of pollution and remove operational and future developmental constraints such as explosive safety arcs and electromagnetic radiation hazard areas. There are no significant environmental impacts at either Naval Station Mayport or Naval Station Norfolk.

Naval Air Station Memphis, Tennessee

Recommendation: Realign Naval Air Station (NAS) Memphis by terminating the flying mission and relocating its reserve squadrons to Carswell AFB, Texas. Relocate the Naval Air Technical Training Center to NAS Pensacola, Florida. The Bureau of Naval Personnel, currently in Washington DC, will be relocated to NAS Memphis as part of a separate recommendation.

Justification: Naval aviator requirements are decreasing as a result of carrier air wing and fleet reductions consistent with the DoD Force Structure Plan. The NAS Memphis capacity is excess to that required to train the number of student aviators required to meet fleet needs. The Navy analyzed its training air stations with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent consistent with the decreasing throughput of students. Any remaining mix of air stations needed, at a minimum, to maintain the overall military value of the remaining bases, while allowing continuance

of key mission requirements and maximized efficiency. These factors included availability of training airspace, outlying fields and access to overwater training. The inland location of NAS Memphis and lack of training airspace make it a primary candidate for closure. Its realignment combined with the recommended closure of NAS Meridian, Mississippi, reduces excess capacity while allowing consolidation of naval air training around the two air stations with the highest military value. The resulting configuration increases the average military value of the remaining training air stations and maximizes efficiency through restructuring around the two hubs, thus increasing the effectiveness of aviation training. Relocation of the Naval Air Technical Training Center fills excess capacity created by the closure of the Naval Aviation Depot and the Naval Supply Center at NAS Pensacola.

Return On Investment: The total estimated one-time costs for both the NAS Meridian and NAS Memphis recommendations are \$274.1 million. Annual recurring savings for both actions are \$82.2 million with a return on investment in two years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$481.1 million.

Impacts: The realignment of NAS Memphis will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 3.1 percent of the local employment base in the Memphis Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), assuming no economic recovery. It should be noted, however, that because of other 1993 realignment actions into this MSA, the net decrease is 2.2 percent. Realignment of NAS Memphis will reduce noise impacts and hazardous wastes generation. It will also remove special use airspace restrictions. This realignment has no significant environmental or community impacts at either NAS Pensacola or Carswell AFB.

**Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL)
Port Hueneme, California**

Recommendation: Close this technical center and realign necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at the Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, California.

Justification: This technical center is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity

increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy. The Department of the Navy will dispose of this property and any proceeds will be used to defray base closure expenses.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$27.0 million. Annual recurring savings are \$7.4 million with a return on investment in two years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$37.2 million.

Impacts: The closure of this activity will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect is 0.04 percent of the employment base in this Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. This closure will have a positive impact on the environment as a source of pollution will be eliminated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until completed.

**Naval Facilities Engineering Command
Western Engineering Field Division
San Bruno, California**

Recommendation: Realign the Western Engineering Field Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), San Bruno, California. Retain in place necessary personnel, equipment and support as a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Engineering Field Activity under the management of the Southwestern Field Division, NAVFAC, San Diego, California.

Justification: The reduction in the force structure in the DoD Force Structure Plan and the closure of major naval activities in the San Francisco Bay area requires the realignment of this activity. The activity's capacity to handle NAVFAC's considerable responsibilities in dealing with environmental matters arising out of the 1993 round of base closures will remain in the same geographic area. The activity presently has such capacity. Retaining it for this purpose is a more economical and efficient alternative than relocating it to San Diego and then handling on-site problems on a travel status.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$0.8 million. Annual recurring savings are \$1.3 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$8.0 million.

Impacts: The realignment of this naval activity will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 0.01 percent of the employment base of the San Francisco, California Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There are no significant environmental impacts occasioned by this realignment. Any necessary environmental clean-ups will continue until completed.

Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alteration Centers (PERA)

Recommendation: Disestablish the following four technical centers and relocate necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, San Diego, California, Portsmouth, Virginia and Newport News, Virginia:

(PERA)-(CV), Bremerton, Washington,
(PERA)-(Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia,
(PERA)-(Surface) Pacific, San Francisco, California,
(PERA)-(Surface) (HQ), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Justification: These technical centers are recommended for disestablishment because their capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

Return On Investment: Estimated one-time costs of disestablishing PERA (CV) are \$6.3 million. Annual recurring savings are \$0.7 million with a return on investment in 12 years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of 0.7 million. Combined one-time costs for disestablishing the other three PERAs (Surface) are \$8.8 million. Annual recurring savings are \$2.3 million with a return on investment in four years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$13.7 million.

Impacts: Disestablishing the PERAs will have an impact on the local economies in each locality. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, for each locality is as follows:

- 0.4 percent in the Puget Sound, WA, MSA
- 0.01 percent in the Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News MSA
- 0.09 percent in the Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA, MSA
- 0.02 percent in the Philadelphia, PA-New Jersey, MSA

Disestablishing these centers will have a positive impact on the environment as a source of pollution will be eliminated.

Public Works Center, San Francisco, California

Recommendation: Disestablish the Public Works Center (PWC) San Francisco.

Justification: PWC San Francisco's capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan and, due to other Navy closures and realignments, its principal customer base has been eliminated.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$37.5 million. Annual savings are \$27.1 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$180.2 million.

Impacts: Disestablishment of PWC San Francisco will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.3 percent of the employment base in the Oakland Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), assuming no economic recovery. Other 1993 closure and realignment recommendations bring the total impact on the Oakland MSA to 4.9 percent. The disestablishment of PWC will have a positive impact on the environment as a source of pollution will be eliminated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until completed.

Naval Hospital, Orlando, Florida

Recommendation: Close the Naval Hospital, Orlando and relocate certain military and civilian personnel to other Naval Hospitals.

Justification: Naval Hospitals are situated and their size determined for location near operating forces whose personnel will require medical support in numbers significant enough to mandate a medical facility as large as a hospital. Given the extensive use of CHAMPUS, any Naval Hospital closure must be predicated upon the elimination of the forces which created a demand for the presence of a Naval Hospital in the first instance. The Naval Training Center, Orlando which was supported by the Naval Hospital, Orlando is being recommended for closure. Accordingly, the operating force support previously provided by the Naval Hospital, Orlando is no longer required and closure follows the decision to close the Naval Training Center.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$51.3 million. Annual recurring savings are \$8.1 million with a return on investment in six years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$21.9 million.

Impacts: The closure of Naval Hospital, Orlando will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.4 percent of the employment base in the Orlando, Florida Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. The closure of the Naval Hospital will have a positive impact on the environment as a source of pollution will be eliminated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until completed.

Naval Supply Center, Pensacola, Florida

Recommendation: Disestablish the Naval Supply Center (NSC) Pensacola.

Justification: NSC Pensacola's capacity is excess to the requirements of the DoD Force Structure Plan. The principal customer of NSC Pensacola, the Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola is also recommended for closure. The workload of NSC Pensacola will move with its customer's workload to receiving bases.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$7.9 million. Annual recurring savings are \$6.7 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$62.8 million.

Impacts: The disestablishment of NSC Pensacola will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.3 percent of the employment base in the Pensacola Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), assuming no economic recovery. Other 1993 closure and realignment recommendations bring the total impact on the Pensacola MSA to a net gain of 4.3 percent. The disestablishment of NSC Pensacola will have a positive impact on the environment as a source of potential hazardous wastes and pollutants will be eliminated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until completed.

Naval Surface Warfare Center Detachment Annapolis, Maryland

Recommendation: Disestablish the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)-Carderock, Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland, and relocate the necessary functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)-Carderock, Philadelphia Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and NSWC-Carderock, Bethesda, Maryland.

Justification: This technical center is recommended for disestablishment because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$24.8 million. Annual recurring savings are \$7.8 million with a return on investment in three years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$30.8 million.

Impacts: The disestablishment of NSWC-Carderock, Annapolis Detachment will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect is 0.05 percent of the employment base in this Metropolitan Statistical

Area, assuming no economic recovery. The disestablishment of NSWC-Carderock will have a positive impact on the environment as a source of pollution will be eliminated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until completed.

Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Annapolis, Maryland

Recommendation: Disestablish the Navy Radio Transmission Facility (NRTF), Annapolis. The Navy shall retain the real property on which this facility resides.

Justification: This action is recommended to eliminate redundancy in geographic coverage in Naval telecommunications. Projected reductions contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan support a decrease in telecommunications capacity. South-Atlantic VLF communications coverage is duplicated by the NRTF Annapolis and NCTS Puerto Rico, and the Mid-Atlantic VLF by NRTF Annapolis and NRTF Cutler, Maine. Since both the Puerto Rico and the Maine facilities also are the sole coverage for another geographic area, and since NRTF Annapolis is not, it could be disestablished without eliminating coverage. The property on which this activity has been sited will be retained by the Navy to support educational requirements at the Naval Academy.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$0.5 million. Annual recurring savings are \$0.1 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$6.4 million.

Impacts: There will be no net change in employment as a result of this action. The current staffing is scheduled for elimination as a result of planned force structure changes. There is no significant impact on the environment resulting from this closure.

Sea Automated Data Systems Activity (SEAADSA) Indian Head, Maryland

Recommendation: Disestablish the Sea Automated Data Systems Activity (SEAADSA) and relocate necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Indian Head, Maryland.

Justification: This technical center is recommended for disestablishment because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the

period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budget workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$0.1 million. Annual recurring savings are \$0.5 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$3.4 million.

Impacts: Disestablishing of SEAADSA will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect is less than 0.01 percent of the employment base in this Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Disestablishing of SEAADSA will have a positive impact on the environment as a source of pollution will be eliminated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until completed.

Naval Air Facility, Detroit, Michigan

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Facility (NAF), Detroit and relocate its aircraft and associated personnel, equipment and support to the Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida and Carswell Air Force Base, Fort Worth, TX. The Mt. Clemons, Michigan Marine Corps Reserve Center will relocate to the Marine Corps Reserve Center, Twin Cities, Minnesota.

Justification: Naval air forces are being reduced consistent with fleet reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan. Projected force levels reflected for both active and reserve aviation elements leave the Department with significant excess capacity in the reserve air station category. Given the greater operational activity of active air stations, the decision to rely on reserve aviation elements in support of active operating forces places a high military value on locating reserve aviation elements on active operating air bases to the extent possible. Closure of NAF Detroit will eliminate excess capacity at the reserve air base with the lowest military value and allow relocation of most of its assets to the major P-3 active force base at NAS Jacksonville.

In arriving at the recommendation to close NAF Detroit, a specific analysis was conducted to ensure that there was demographic support for purposes of force recruiting in the areas to which the reserve aircraft are being relocated.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$4.9 million. Annual recurring savings are \$10.3 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$103.2 million.

Impacts: The closure of NAF Detroit will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 0.05 percent of the employment base of the Detroit, Michigan Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no significant community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There will be no significant environmental impacts resulting from this action. The closure will eliminate the generation of hazardous wastes and pollutants.

Naval Air Facility, Midway Island

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Facility (NAF), Midway Island.

Justification: The 1991 Commission Report, pages 5-19, recommended the elimination of the mission at NAF Midway Island and its continued operation under a caretaker status. Based on the DoD Force Structure Plan, its capacity is excess to that needed to support forces in its geographic area. There is no operational need for this air facility to remain in the inventory even in a caretaker status. Therefore, the Navy recommends that NAF Midway be closed and appropriate disposal action taken.

Return On Investment: The one-time cost of this closure is \$2.1 million. The annual recurring savings is \$6.6 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$66.1 million.

Impacts: Because of the light economic activity at this geographic area, there will be no significant impact on the local economy resulting from this recommendation. Closure of this facility will perpetuate the restrictions incident to the designation by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of Midway Atoll as an Overlay National Wildlife Refuge. All environmental clean-up efforts will continue until complete.

**Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning
and Procurement (SUBMEPP), Portsmouth, New Hampshire**

Recommendation: Disestablish the Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning and Procurement (SUBMEPP), New Hampshire and relocate the necessary functions, personnel, equipment, and support at Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine.

Justification: This technical center is recommended for disestablishment because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budget workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$5.9 million. Annual recurring savings are \$2.6 million with a return on investment in one year. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$18.5 million.

Impacts: The closure of SUBMEPP will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect is less than 0.01 percent of the employment base in this MSA assuming no economic recovery. The disestablishment of SUBMEPP will have a positive impact on the environment as a source of pollution will be eliminated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until completed.

**Naval Air Warfare Center - Aircraft Division
Trenton, New Jersey**

Recommendation: Close the Aircraft Division of the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) Trenton, New Jersey and relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Arnold Engineering Development Center, Tullahoma, Tennessee, and the Naval Air Warfare Center, Patuxent River, Maryland.

Justification: This technical center is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. As the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy. The closure of the Trenton Detachment completes a realignment of NAWCS approved by the 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, with continuing reductions in forces being supported and in resource levels. Further consolidations are required so that we may have the most efficient and economic operation.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$50.1 million. Annual recurring savings are \$17.8 million with a return on investment in two years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$94.8 million.

Impacts: The closure of this naval technical center will impact the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 0.6 percent of the employment base of the Trenton, New Jersey Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. The closure of this center will have a positive impact on the environment, as a source of pollution will be eliminated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until completed.

**DOD Family Housing and
Family Housing Office
Niagara Falls, New York**

Recommendation: Close the DoD Family Housing Office and the 111 housing units it administers.

Justification: The force reductions in the DOD Force Structure Plan require reduction of support activities as well. This activity administers housing units which are old and substandard and expensive to maintain. These housing units are occupied by military personnel performing recruiting duties in the local area. The number of recruiting personnel will be drawing down, and those that remain will be able to find adequate housing on the local economy.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for the recommendation are \$0.1 million. Annual recurring savings are \$1.5 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$15.5 million.

Impacts: This closure will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 0.04 percent of the employment base of the Niagara Falls Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no significant community infrastructure impact resulting from this closure. There are no significant environmental impacts occasioned by this closure. Any necessary environmental clean-ups will continue until completed.

Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Close the Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia and relocate certain personnel, equipment and support to the new Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters, Patuxent River, Maryland.

Justification: Projected reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan results in a decrease in required technical center capacity. Budget levels and the number of operating forces being supported by technical centers continue to decline. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and consolidate wherever possible so that the remaining

technical centers will have the greater military value to the DoD. Closure of the Technical Services Facility eliminates excess capacity and allows the consolidation of necessary functions at the new headquarters concentration for the Naval Air Systems Command producing economies and efficiencies in the management of assigned functions. This consolidation will also incorporate the Depot Operation Center and the Aviation Maintenance Office currently at Patuxent River.

Return On Investment: This recommendation was considered as part of a package to support the new Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters and the COBRA data below applies to the following realignments at Naval Air Warfare Center - AD, Patuxent River, Maryland: Naval Air Systems Command, Naval Aviation Depot Operations Center, Naval Aviation Maintenance Office, and Naval Air Technical Services Facility. The total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$198.0 million. Annual recurring savings are \$41.6 million with a return on investment in three years. The net present value of the costs and savings is a savings of \$169.4 million.

Impacts: The closure of this naval technical center will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) is 0.02 percent of the employment base of the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no significant community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. There will be no significant environmental impacts resulting from this action. Any necessary environmental clean-up efforts will be continued until completed.

Naval Hospital, Charleston, South Carolina

Recommendation: Close the Naval Hospital, Charleston and relocate certain military and civilian personnel to other Naval Hospitals.

Justification: Naval Hospitals are situated and their size determined for location near operating forces whose personnel will require medical support in numbers significant enough to mandate a medical facility as large as a hospital. Given the extensive use of CHAMPUS, any Naval Hospital closure must be predicated upon the elimination of the operating forces which created a demand for the presence of a Naval Hospital in the first instance. As a result of the closure of the Charleston Naval Station, the Charleston Naval Shipyard and the supporting Supply Center and Public Works Center, the active duty personnel previously supported by the Naval Hospital, Charleston, are no longer in the area to be supported. Closure of the Naval Hospital follows the closure of these activities supporting these operating forces.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$36.7 million. Annual recurring savings are \$18.5 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$131 million.

Impacts: The closure of Naval Hospital, Charleston will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 1.1 percent of the employment base in the Charleston Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. The closure of the Naval Hospital will have a positive impact on environmental mitigation, and restoration will continue until completed.

Naval Supply Center, Charleston, South Carolina

Recommendation: Disestablish the Naval Supply Center (NSC) Charleston.

Justification: NSC Charleston's capacity is excess to the requirements of the DoD Force Structure Plan. The principal customers of NSC Charleston, the Charleston Naval Shipyard and the Naval Station Charleston, have been recommended for closure. The workload of NSC Charleston will move with its customer's workload to receiving bases.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$13.6 million. Annual recurring savings are \$16.0 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$122.6 million.

Impacts: The disestablishment of NSC Charleston will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.4 percent of the employment base in the Charleston Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), assuming no economic recovery. Other 1993 closure and realignment recommendations bring the total impact on the Charleston MSA to 15 percent. The disestablishment of NSC Charleston will have a positive impact on the environment as hazardous wastes and pollutants will no longer be generated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until completed.

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Detachment Virginia Beach, Virginia

Recommendation: Disestablish the Virginia-Beach Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme and relocate its functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Fleet Combat Training Center, Dam Neck, Virginia.

Justification: This technical center is recommended for disestablishment because its capacity is excess to that required by the DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. As the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$2.0 million. Annual recurring savings are \$7.0 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$47.8 million.

Impacts: The disestablishment of the Detachment will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.03 percent of the employment base in this Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. The disestablishment of the Detachment will have a positive impact on the environment as a source of pollution will be eliminated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until completed.

Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Driver, Virginia

Recommendation: Close the Navy Radio Transmission Facility (NRTF), Driver.

Justification: This closure is recommended to eliminate redundancy in geographic coverage in Naval telecommunications. Projected reductions contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan support a decrease in telecommunications capacity. Mid-Atlantic

HF communications coverage is duplicated by the NRTF Driver and NRTF Saddle Branch, Florida.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$0.5 million. Annual recurring savings are \$2.1 million with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$20.1 million.

Impacts: The closure of this transmission facility will have no impact on the local economy since current staffing is scheduled for elimination as a result of planned force structure changes. The closure of NRTF Driver will have a positive impact on the environment since the source of potential hazardous wastes and pollutants will be eliminated.

Naval Undersea Warfare Center Detachment Norfolk, Virginia

Recommendation: Disestablish the Norfolk Detachment of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, Rhode Island, and relocate its functions, personnel, equipment and support to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC), Newport, Rhode Island.

Justification: This technical center is recommended for closure because its capacity is excess to that required by the approved DoD Force Structure Plan. There is excess capacity in this category based on a comparison of budgeted workload during the period 1986-1995 and the FY 1995 budgeted workload. A review of the Navy budget displays a clear decline in the period 1995-1999. Thus, as the work declines, the excess capacity increases thereby requiring a reduction in facilities and personnel. The technical centers throughout the Department of the Navy currently have significant excess capacity as these technical centers were established and sized to support significantly higher naval force levels and require resource levels greatly in excess of those projected if all resources are to be fully employed. Given this excess capacity and the imbalance with force and resource levels, it is imperative to realign and compress wherever possible so that the remaining technical centers will have the greater military value to the Department of the Navy.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time costs for this recommendation are \$18.2 million. Annual recurring savings are \$6.1 million with a return on investment in four years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$38.4 million.

Impacts: The closure of NUWC, Norfolk Detachment, will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.4 percent of the employment base in this Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. The closure of NUWC, Norfolk Detachment, will have a positive impact on the environment as a source of pollution will be eliminated. Environmental mitigation and restoration will continue until completed.

National Capital Region (NCR) Activities

Recommendation: Realign Navy National Capital Region activities and relocate them as follows:

Naval Air Systems Command to
Naval Air Station
Patuxent River, Maryland

Naval Supply Systems Command,
(including Food Service System Office, and
Defense Printing Management Systems Office) to
Ship Parts Control Center
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania

Bureau of Naval Personnel
(including Office of Military Manpower Management) to
Naval Air Station
Memphis, Tennessee

Naval Recruiting Command to
Naval Training Center
Great Lakes, Illinois

Naval Security Group Command,
(including Security Group Station, and
Security Group Detachment, Potomac) to
National Security Agency
Ft. Meade, Maryland

Tactical Support Office to
Commander-in-Chief
Atlantic Fleet
Norfolk, Virginia

Relocate the following National Capital Region activities from leased space to Government-owned space in one of these locations: Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland:

Naval Sea Systems Command
Naval Facilities Engineering Command
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
Office of the General Counsel
Office of the Judge Advocate General
Navy Field Support Activity
Office of the Secretary of the Navy
 * Legislative Affairs
 * Program Appraisal
 * Comptroller
 * Inspector General
 * Information
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Civilian Manpower Management
International Programs Office
Combined Civilian Personnel Office
Navy Regional Contracting Center
Naval Criminal Investigative Service
Naval Audit Service
Strategic Systems Programs Office
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations & Logistics), U.S.
 Marine Corps
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower & Reserve Affairs), U.S.
 Marine Corps
Marine Corps Systems Command (Clarendon Office)

Justification: Current DoD policy is to consider relocating outside the NCR all activities whose mission does not require them to be in the NCR. Both NAVAIR and NAVSUP could be relocated to sites outside the NCR where they could be collocated with major subordinate activities. Additionally, Naval Sea Logistics Center, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, also will consolidate, in place, at SPCC Mechanicsburg, thereby promoting logistics resource efficiencies. Further, BUPERS and the office responsible for the military boards, as well as the Naval Manpower Analysis Center, Chesapeake, Virginia, with a large percentage of enlisted personnel and junior officers, could achieve a material increase in the quality of life of their personnel by relocating

to Memphis, Tennessee, a city, which being an airline hub, also offers easy ingress and egress. The Recruiting Command is being collocated with the Navy's recruit training center at Great Lakes, Illinois. The Security Group command and activities are being collocated at Fort Meade, Maryland, with the National Security Agency, the principal agency with whom they deal on a daily basis. Finally, the Tactical Support Activity is being collocated in Norfolk, Virginia, with one of its major customers, CINCLANTFLT.

All of the remaining NCR activities will be moved from their present facilities in leased commercial space to vacant Government-owned space in one of five locations: the Navy Annex; the Navy Yard; Nebraska Avenue; Quantico, Virginia; and White Oak, Maryland. These actions will terminate DON's reliance on use of leased space in the NCR.

Return On Investment: The total estimated one-time costs for the realignments of Naval Air Systems Command, Naval Aviation Depot Operations Center, Naval Training Systems Center, Naval Aviation Maintenance Office, and Naval Air Technical Services Facility to NAWC-AD, Patuxent River, Maryland are \$198.0 million. Annual recurring savings are \$41.6 million, with a return on investment in three years. Net present value of the costs and savings is \$169.4 million.

Total estimated one-time costs for the realignments of the Naval Supply Systems Command, the Aviation Supply Office, Defense Printing Systems Management Office, and Food Service Systems Office to the Ship Parts Control Center, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, are \$88.9 million. Annual recurring savings are \$20.5 million, with a return on investment in one year. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$102.8 million.

Total estimated one-time costs for the realignments of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the Office of Military Manpower Management, and the Naval Manpower Analysis Center to the Naval Air Station, Memphis, Tennessee, are \$59.2 million. Annual recurring savings are \$20.2 million, with a return on investment in four years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$118.2 million.

Total estimated one-time costs for the realignment of the Naval Recruiting Command to NTC Great Lakes are \$6.8 million. Annual recurring savings are \$1.4 million, with a return on investment in seven years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$5.5 million.

Total estimated one-time costs for the realignment of the Naval Security Group Command to Fort Meade, Maryland, are \$6.6 million. Annual recurring savings are \$9.7 million, with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$93.0 million.

Total estimated one-time costs for the realignment of the Tactical Support Activity from its facilities both in the Washington Navy Yard and Silver Spring, Maryland, to Norfolk, Virginia; the realignment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center - Dahlgren, White Oak Detachment, to Dahlgren, Virginia; and the realignment of the Naval Sea Systems Command from leased space in Arlington, Virginia, to White Oak, are \$74.6 million. Annual recurring savings are \$22.3 million, with a return on investment in two years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$103.3 million.

The costs incurred and savings accrued from the movement of activities out of leased space into Government-owned space were included in the return on investment calculations shown above.

Impacts: The closure and realignments discussed in this recommendation will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss (both direct and indirect) for these combined actions is 0.8 percent of the employment base of the Washington, DC-Maryland-Virginia Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. The impact would be hardest felt in the Northern Virginia portion of that area. There is no significant impact at any receiving location. There are no significant environmental impacts resulting from these closures and realignments. Any necessary environmental remediation will continue until completed.

Stand-Alone Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers

Recommendation: Close the following reserve centers:

Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers at:

Fort Wayne, Indiana
Billings, Montana
Abilene, Texas

Naval Reserve Centers at:

**Gadsden, Alabama
Montgomery, Alabama
Fayetteville, Arkansas
Fort Smith, Arkansas
Pacific Grove, California
Macon, Georgia
Terre Haute, Indiana
Hutchinson, Kansas
Monroe, Louisiana
New Bedford, Massachusetts
Pittsfield, Massachusetts
Joplin, Missouri
St. Joseph, Missouri
Great Falls, Montana
Missoula, Montana
Atlantic City, New Jersey
Perth Amboy, New Jersey
Jamestown, New York
Poughkeepsie, New York
Altoona, Pennsylvania
Kingsport, Tennessee
Memphis, Tennessee
Ogden, Utah
Staunton, Virginia
Parkersburg, West Virginia**

Naval Reserve Facility at:

**Alexandria, Louisiana
Midland, Texas**

Readiness Command Districts at:

**Olathe, Kansas (REDCOM 18)
Scotia, New York (REDCOM 2)
Ravenna, Ohio (REDCOM 5)**

Justification: The DOD Force Structure Plan requires the reduction of reserve assets as it does active duty assets. These Reserve Centers are being closed because their capacity is excess to the projected Navy/Marine Corps requirements. In arriving at the recommendation to close the Reserve Centers, specific analysis was conducted to ensure that there was either an alternate location available to accommodate the affected reserve population (e.g., realign with an existing reserve center), or demographic support for purposes of force recruiting in the areas to which units were being relocated. This specific analysis, conducted through the COBRA model, supports these closures.

Return On Investment: The total estimated one-time costs for the closure of these 33 Reserve Centers are \$6.9 million. Annual recurring savings are \$17.2 million. Twenty-seven of the recommendations obtain an immediate return on investment. The remaining recommendations obtain return on investment within a range of 4 to 10 years. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty-year period is a savings of \$160.9 million.

Impacts: Because of the small size of these Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Centers, their closure will have a negligible impact on the various local economies. There is no known community infrastructure impact at any receiving installation. Likewise, these closures will have no significant environmental impacts.

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island San Francisco, California

Recommendation: Permit the Navy to dispose of this facility in any lawful manner, including outleasing.

Justification: The 1991 Commission Report, at pages 5-18, recommended closing the Hunters Point Annex and outleasing the entire property, with provisions for continued occupancy of space for Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair; Planning, Engineering, Repair, and Alterations Detachment; and a Contractor-Operated test facility.

Force level reductions consistent with the DoD Force Structure Plan remove any long-term need to retain all of this facility for emergent requirements. The recommended closure of the major naval installations in this geographic area terminates any requirement for these facilities. The limitation of disposal authority to outleasing unnecessarily restricts the Navy's ability to dispose of this property in a timely and lawful manner.

Impacts: There are no significant economic impacts occasioned by this recommendation since the Navy is only seeking approval of having access to additional disposal authorities, the decision to dispose of this facility already having been made in 1991 Commission recommendations. Likewise, there are no environmental impacts in addition to those raised previously. All environmental clean-up efforts will continue until complete.

Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility, Albuquerque, New Mexico

Recommendation: Permit a small detachment of the Weapons Division to remain after the closure of the Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility (NWEF) in order to provide liaison with the Sandia Laboratory of the Department of Energy.

Justification: This recommendation was originally intended as an exception to the 1991 recommendation to close NWEF Albuquerque, but was not included in the specific DoD recommendations. The Navy has a continuing need for a detachment to provide liaison with the Sandia Laboratory and other agencies involved in nuclear programs in that geographic area. The detachment would remain as a tenant of Kirtland Air Force Base.

Impacts: There are no significant economic or environmental impacts resulting from this recommendation, since the Navy is only leaving a small detachment in place.

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Centers

Recommendation: Change the receiving location of the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center (NESEC) San Diego, California and the NESEC Vallejo, California to be Air Force Plant #19 in San Diego vice new construction at Point Loma, San Diego, California.

Justification: This is a change from the 1991 Commission action which called for closure of NESEC San Diego and relocation to Point Loma to form Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC). Air Force Plant #19 was operated by a contractor as an Air Force Government-Owned-Contractor-Owned and NESEC San Diego subleased space. Now the contractor has left and Air Force offered to transfer Plant 19 without reimbursement. Rehabilitation can be accomplished within the estimates of the BRAC 91 recommendations for both relocating NESECs and avoiding the serious environmental concerns attendant to new construction at Point Loma.

Return on Investment: The one-time cost of this recommendation is \$0.9 million. The annual recurring savings are \$0.7 million, with an immediate return on investment. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$5.9 million.

Impacts: There is no additional impact on the local community beyond that identified in BRAC 91.

Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity Yorktown, Virginia

Recommendation: Relocate the Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity (now the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Port Hueneme, Yorktown Detachment) to the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida.

Justification: In the 1991 Commission Report, the Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity (NMWEA), Yorktown, Virginia, was recommended for closure and realignment to facilities under the control of the Chief of Naval Education and Training at Dam Neck, Virginia. The realignment has been accomplished through organizational changes and NMWEA is now the Yorktown Detachment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Port Hueneme. However, after BRAC 91, the needs of the educational and training community were such that the Dam Neck space is no longer available. Therefore, as part of BRAC 93 process, alternative receiving sites were explored. Because of the advisability of consolidating activities performing similar functions, and since the Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida, has significant responsibilities in mine warfare R&D, COBRA data was requested. Because of the advantages of collocating this mine warfare engineering activity with another facility having substantial responsibilities in the same fields, and because it is less expensive than the BRAC 91 relocation to Dam Neck, Virginia, the Navy recommends that the receiving site for this activity be revised to Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida, in lieu of Dam Neck, Virginia.

Return On Investment: Total estimated one-time savings exceed one-time costs for the recommendation by \$5.7 million. Annual recurring savings are \$1.1 million, with a return on investment in one year. The net present value of costs and savings over a twenty year period is a savings of \$13.5 million.

Impacts: This recommendation will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment losses (both direct and indirect) is 0.07 percent of the Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There are no significant environmental impacts occasioned by this recommendation. All environmental clean-ups will continue until complete.

Department of the Air Force

Summary of Selection Process

Department of the Air Force Selection Process

The Air Force 1993 selection process is essentially the same as was used in 1991. The Secretary of the Air Force appointed a Base Closure Executive Group of seven general officers and six comparable (Senior Executive Service) career civilians. Areas of expertise included environment; facilities and construction; finance; law; logistics; programs; operations; personnel and training; reserve components; and research, development and acquisition. The group met regularly from November 1992 to March 1993. Additionally, an Air Staff Base Closure Working Group was formed to provide staff support and detailed expertise to the Executive Group. General officers from the Plans and Programs offices of the Major Commands (MAJCOM) met on several occasions with the Executive Group. They provided mission specific expertise and greater base-level detail where necessary. Also, potential cross-service utilization was identified by a special interservice working group.

The Executive Group developed a base closure Internal Control Plan which was approved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics) and the DoD Inspector General. This plan provides structure and guidance for all participants in the base closure process, including procedures for data gathering and certification.

The Executive Group reviewed all Active and Air Reserve Component (ARC) installations in the United States which met or exceeded the Section 2687, Title 10 U.S.C. threshold of 300 direct-hire civilians authorized to be employed. A comprehensive and detailed questionnaire was developed to gather data. The questionnaire was sent to each applicable base and the data was validated by each base, Major Command and the Air Staff. All data were evaluated and certified in accordance with the Internal Control Plan. As an additional control measure, the Air Force Audit Agency was tasked to review the Air Force process for consistency with the law and DoD policy and to ensure that the data collection and validation process was adequate.

A capacity analysis was also performed, including actual on-site surveys at 48 bases which evaluated the capability of a base to accommodate additional force structure and other activities (excess capacity) beyond what was programmed to be stationed at the base.

The Executive Group frequently challenged data based on their own substantial knowledge and experience. Additionally, more detailed, or corrected data were provided where appropriate. All data used in the preparation and submission of information and recommendations concerning the closure or realignment of military installations were certified as to accuracy and completeness by appropriate officials at the base, MAJCOM, and Headquarters level. In addition, the Executive Group and the acting Secretary of the Air Force certified that all information used to support the recommendations was accurate and complete to the best of their knowledge and belief. The results of the excess capacity analysis were used in conjunction with the approved DoD Force Structure Plan in determining base structure requirements. Also, the capacity analysis was used to identify cost effective opportunities to beddown activities and aircraft dislocated from bases recommended for closure or realignment.

The Secretary of the Air Force determined that further study was not needed for bases the Executive Group deemed mission essential or geographically key. The Executive Group then placed all the remaining bases in four categories based on the installation's predominant use. Capacity was analyzed by category based on a study of current base capacity and the future requirements imposed by the DoD Force Structure Plan. Some categories or subcategories were found to have no excess capacity and the Secretary of the Air Force determined that further study of these bases was not warranted. Categories or subcategories having some excess capacity but unreasonable cost to relocate or replicate essential continuing functions were also eliminated from further study.

All Active Component bases in the remaining categories were individually examined on the basis of the eight selection criteria established by the Secretary of Defense, and over 160 Air Force unique subelements which were developed by the Air Force to provide specific data points for each criterion.

The Air Reserve Component (ARC) category, comprised of Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve (AFRES) bases, warrants further explanation. First, these bases do not readily compete against each other as ARC units enjoy a special relationship with their respective states and local communities. In fact, relocating Guard units across state boundaries is not a practical alternative. We must also give careful consideration of the recruiting needs of these units. Second, the DoD Force Structure Plan does not reduce the ARC force structure, so there is no apparent excess base structure and this category could have been excluded from further consideration. However, realignment of ARC units onto active installations or onto other ARC installations could prove cost effective. Therefore, the ARC category was examined for cost effective realignments to other bases.

Information, base groupings, and options resulting from the Executive Group analyses were presented to the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff, in person, by the Executive Group on a number of occasions. Based on the DoD force structure plan and the final criteria, with consideration given to excess capacity, efficiencies in base utilization and evolving concepts of basing the force, the acting Secretary of the Air Force, with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff, and in consultation with the Base Closure Executive Group, selected the bases recommended for closure and realignment.

Department of the Air Force

Recommendations and Justifications

Homestead Air Force Base, Florida

Recommendation: Homestead AFB, Florida, is recommended for closure. The 31st Fighter Wing will inactivate. All F-16s from the 31st Fighter Wing will remain temporarily assigned to Moody AFB, Georgia, and Shaw AFB, South Carolina. The Inter-American Air Forces Academy will move to Lackland AFB, Texas. The Air Force Water Survival School will be temporarily located at Tyndall AFB, Florida. Future disposition of the Water Survival School is dependent upon efforts to consolidate its functions with the US Navy. The 301st Rescue Squadron, Air Force Reserve (AFRES) will move to Patrick AFB, Florida. The 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES) will move to MacDill AFB, Florida and convert to KC-135Rs. The NORAD alert activity will move to an alternate location. The 726th Air Control Squadron will relocate to Shaw AFB. The Naval Security Group will consolidate with other US Navy units. All DoD activities and facilities including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and base exchange facilities will close. All essential cleanup and restoration activities associated with Hurricane Andrew will continue until completed. If Homestead AFB resumes operations as a civilian airport, the NORAD alert facility may be rebuilt in a cantonment area.

Justification: There were several factors which resulted in the closure recommendation. First, the Air Force has one more small aircraft base than is required to support the fighter aircraft in the DoD Force Structure Plan. When the data were evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria, Homestead AFB ranked low relative to the other bases in the small aircraft subcategory. While Homestead AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, one stood out: the excessive cost to rebuild Homestead, while other small aircraft bases required little or no new investment. The cost to close Homestead AFB is low, especially when measured against the high cost of reconstruction, and the long-term savings are substantial.

All small aircraft bases were considered equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DOD) guidance. Bases were evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Data were collected and the criteria and subelements of

the criteria applied by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a group of seven general officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to close Homestead AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

Return on Investment: The cost to close is estimated to be \$75.1 million; the annual savings after closure are \$75.4 million; the return on investment years based on the net present value computations is 0 years. All dollar amounts are in constant FY 94 dollars.

Impacts: The Air Force will dispose of all property at Homestead AFB except a small parcel that may be needed for a NORAD alert facility. The closure of Homestead AFB will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 1.0 percent of the employment base in the Miami-Hialeah Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. The impact on the city of Homestead, Florida will be much more severe. Homestead AFB is in an air quality non-attainment area for ozone, and has significant soil contamination from fuels, lead, and pesticides. Homestead AFB is on the National Priorities List. Closure of Homestead AFB will result in generally positive environmental effects. Environmental restoration of Homestead AFB will continue until complete. The impact on the community infrastructure at receiving bases is not significant.

K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan

Recommendation: K.I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan, is recommended for closure. The 410th Wing will inactivate. B-52H aircraft will transfer to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The Air Force will retire its B-52G aircraft instead of implementing the previous Base Closure Commission recommendation to transfer those aircraft from Castle AFB, California, to K.I. Sawyer AFB.

Justification: There are several factors which resulted in the above recommendation. The Air Force has four more large aircraft bases than are needed to support the number of bombers, tankers, and airlift assets in the DoD Force Structure Plan. The Air Force must maintain Minuteman III basing flexibility due to uncertainty with respect to START II. This requires the retention of the ballistic missile fields at Malmstrom AFB, Grand Forks AFB, Minot AFB, and F.E. Warren AFB. It is more economical to retain a bomber/missile base that must remain open for missiles than to maintain a bomber-only base. Therefore, based on the facts that K.I. Sawyer AFB

does not support ballistic missile operations, that when all eight DoD criteria are applied K.I. Sawyer AFB ranks low, and that there is excess large aircraft base capacity, K.I. Sawyer AFB is recommended for closure.

All large aircraft bases were considered equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Extensive data gathered to support the evaluation of each base under each criterion was reviewed by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a group of seven general officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to close K.I. Sawyer AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

Return on Investment: The cost to close is estimated to be \$143.7 million; the annual savings after closure are \$62.4 million; the return on investment years based on the net present value computations is 1 year. All dollar amounts are in constant FY 94 dollars.

Impacts: The closure of K.I. Sawyer AFB will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 14 percent of the employment base in the Marquette County Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Closure of K.I. Sawyer will result in generally positive environmental effects. There is no significant environmental impact resulting from this closure. Environmental restoration of K.I. Sawyer AFB will continue until complete. The impact on the community infrastructure at receiving bases is not significant.

Newark Air Force Base, Ohio

Recommendation: Newark AFB, Ohio, is recommended for closure. The Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center (AGMC) depot will be closed; some workload will move to other depot maintenance activities including the private sector. We anticipate that most will be privatized in place.

Justification: Due to significant reductions in force structure, the Air Force has an excess depot maintenance capacity of at least 8.7 million Direct Product Actual Hours (DPAH). When all eight criteria are applied to the bases in the depot subcategory, Newark AFB ranked low in comparison to the other five depot bases. The long-term military value of the base is low because it does not have an airfield and it is not a

traditional Air Force base in any respect. Instead, it is a stand-alone, highly technical, industrial plant that is operated predominantly by a civilian work force. As a result, it is conducive to conversion to the private sector. The closure of Newark AFB will reduce the Air Force excess depot capacity by 1.7 million DPAH and is consistent with OSD guidance to reduce excess capacity, economize depot management, and increase competition and privatization in DoD.

All six Air Force depots were considered for closure equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance. Each base hosting an Air Force depot was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases, depots, and missions. Extensive data, gathered to support the evaluation of these bases under each criterion, was reviewed by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group). The Executive Group is a group of seven general officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF). SECAF made the decision to close Newark AFB with the advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

Return on Investment: The cost to close is estimated to be \$31.3 million; the annual savings after closure are \$3.8 million; the return on investment years based on the net present value computations is 8 years. All dollar amounts are in constant FY 94 dollars.

Impacts: The closure of Newark AFB will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 4.6 percent of the employment base in the Licking County Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Newark AFB is in an air quality non-attainment area for ozone. Closure of Newark AFB will result in generally positive environmental effects. Environmental restoration of Newark AFB will continue until complete. The impact on the community infrastructure at receiving bases is not significant.

**Community Preference Consideration in Closure and
Realignment of Military Installations
Section 2924. Public Law 101-510**

O'Hare International Airport, Air Force Reserve Station, Illinois

Community Proposal: The City of Chicago has exercised its right under Section 2924 of P.L. 101-510 to propose that the O'Hare Air Reserve Station (ARS) be closed and the flying units moved to a new facility to be constructed at Rockford, Illinois. This provision of law mandates the Department give special consideration to the proposal. The City desires to acquire the property for aviation-related commercial use.

Recommendation: Close O'Hare ARS as proposed by the City of Chicago and relocate the assigned Air Reserve Component (ARC) units to the Greater Rockford Airport, or another location acceptable to the Secretary of the Air Force, provided the City can demonstrate that it has the financing in place to cover the full cost of replacing facilities, moving, and environmental cleanup, without any cost whatsoever to the federal government and that the closure/realignment must begin by July 1995 and be completed by July 1997. Chicago would also have to fund the full cost of relocating the Army Reserve activity, or leave it in place. If these conditions are not met, the units should remain at O'Hare International Airport.

Justification: O'Hare Reserve Station is in the Northwest corner of O'Hare International Airport, enjoying immediate access to two runways. Two ARC units are based there: the 928th Airlift Group (Air Force Reserve), with C-130s; and the 126th Air Refueling Wing (Air National Guard), with KC-135s. An Army Reserve Center is located adjacent to the base. In addition, a large Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) activity currently occupies a government owned, recently renovated office building on the base; however, DLA is recommending disestablishment of this activity to other locations as part of the 1993 base closure process.

In a 1991 land exchange agreement, intended to resolve all real property issues between the Air Force and the City of Chicago at O'Hare International Airport, the City specifically agreed that it would seek no more land from the O'Hare ARS. The Air Force has advised the City that the ARC units are adequately housed at O'Hare, and there is no basis for moving them. There are no savings from moving; only costs. To justify this realignment under the DoD Base Closure Selection Criteria, all costs of closure/realignment would have to be funded entirely outside the federal government. (For example, no DoD or FAA funds). The relocation site would have to meet all

operating requirements, such as runway length and freedom from noise-related operating limitations, and be close enough to Chicago that the units would not suffer major loss of personnel. The day-to-day operating costs at the relocation site would have to compare favorably with those at O'Hare International Airport.

The City proposes that the ARC units move to Greater Rockford Airport, 55 miles northwest of O'Hare International Airport. Virtually no facilities for the units exist at Rockford, so an entirely new base would have to be constructed. The airfield is constrained on two sides by the Rock River and flood plain. At least one runway will have to be extended for KC-135 operations. There appear to be noise and other environmental problems to resolve before a final determination of siting feasibility can be made.

Return on Investment: The COBRA model estimates that the cost to close is \$361 million. This estimate is based on the City of Chicago consultant's estimate of construction costs at Rockford, and normal COBRA estimating factors for other costs. There are no apparent savings to offset this cost.

The proceeds from disposal of the real property, which might offset some of the cost, are difficult to estimate. If the airport property were sold at fair market value, the estimated proceeds would be about \$33 million. The buildings may or may not be of use to a buyer. While some are new and all are usable for their current military use, their value to a commercial or civil aviation user are questionable. Demolition and disposal are estimated by the City's consultant to cost \$25 million, which would be an offset to the land value. However, most of the O'Hare ARS qualifies as aviation-related property, which the City could obtain in a no-cost public benefit transfer under the Surplus Property Act of 1944, 50 U.S.C. App. 1622. The building, to be vacated by DLA is severable from the Reserve Base and does not appear to be aviation property. The net cost to close and realign is estimated to be in a range from \$328 million to \$361 million. Since there are no savings in operational or other costs, the payback period is infinity.

The Air Force analysis of the proposal assuming Chicago or some other non-Federal source pays the full cost is as follows. The facilities at O'Hare ARS are adequate, with many new or recently renovated buildings. The recruiting base, the Chicago metropolitan area, is outstanding. There are no serious constraints on mission accomplishment, other than some air traffic control delays due to the dense commercial traffic. However, alert or other time-sensitive missions are not flown from O'Hare

ARS. Since the base is adequate for its purpose, no savings would accrue from closing it. The aircraft remain in the force structure plan and the units are not planned for inactivation. In the case of the ANG, the governor's consent would be required to disband. Thus, closure of the base requires that both units be realigned.

The military value of an ARC base at Rockford, fully built up with all the necessary facilities, still does not exceed that of O'Hare. For retention of the mostly part-time ARC personnel it is not as good, due to the distance from the homes of currently assigned personnel. Some personnel losses and retraining must be anticipated, effecting unit readiness and adding to the cost. It is not clear that the Rockford area alone can provide a steady stream of volunteers large enough to man two large ARC units. Recruiting from Chicago will still be required, but will be much harder due to the distance differential between O'Hare and Rockford.

Although the City of Chicago had previously stated that they did not expect the Air Force to fund relocation and facility replacement costs, the City has been unable to guarantee that it will pay the full cost of moving. However, in its most recent correspondence, the City has made the following commitment, "At this time, we wish to commit that all costs associated with our plan will be at no cost to the Department of Defense and that the City of Chicago, together with the host airport, will provide suitable replacement facilities on either a square foot for square foot basis or with more cost efficient functionally equivalent facilities. This commitment of full cost coverage is contingent upon securing necessary financing, which we continue to pursue, and the approval of our governing council body."

Acceptance of this proposal must be based on benefits to the City of Chicago. The proposed move would make some considerable space available for airport related activities at this intensively used air carrier airport. Therefore, if the City of Chicago could demonstrate: that it has financing in place to cover the full cost of replacing facilities, moving and environmental cleanup, without any cost whatsoever to the federal government; that the closure/realignment could begin by July 1995, as required by Section 2904(a)(3) of the Defense Base Closure and realignment Act of 1990, and that the relocation could be completed by July 1997; the Air Force would not object to the proposal. The City would also have to fund the full cost of relocating the Army Reserve activity, or leave it in place. If these conditions are not met, the units should remain at O'Hare International Airport.

March Air Force Base, California

Recommendation: March AFB, California, is recommended for realignment. The 22nd Air Refueling Wing will inactivate. The KC-10 (Active and Associate Reserve) aircraft will be relocated to Travis AFB, California. The Southwest Air Defense Sector will remain at March in a cantonment area pending the outcome of a NORAD sector consolidation study. If the sector remains it will be transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG). The 445th Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve (AFRES), 452nd Air Refueling Wing (AFRES), 163rd Reconnaissance Group (ANG) (becomes an Air Refueling Group), the Air Force Audit Agency, and the Media Center (from Norton AFB, California) will remain and the base will convert to a reserve base. Additionally, the Army Corps of Engineers Unit, the US Customs Aviation Operation Center West, and the Drug Enforcement Agency aviation unit will remain.

Justification: There are several factors which resulted in the above recommendation. First, the Air Force has four more large aircraft bases than needed to support the number of bombers, tankers, and airlift assets in the DoD Force Structure Plan. Also, when all eight DoD criteria were applied to the large aircraft bases, March AFB ranked low. The Air Force plans to establish a large air mobility base (KC-10, C-5 and C-141 aircraft) on the west coast. When bases in the region (Beale AFB, California; Fairchild AFB, Washington; March AFB, California; McChord AFB, Washington; Malmstrom AFB, Montana; Travis AFB, California) were analyzed for this mission, Travis AFB ranked highest. March AFB currently requires a large active duty component to support a relatively small active duty force structure. The conversion of March AFB to a reserve base achieves substantial savings and the benefit of a large recruiting population for the Air Force Reserve is retained.

All large aircraft bases were considered equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Extensive data, gathered to support the evaluation of each base under each criterion was reviewed by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a group of seven general officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to realign March AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

Return on Investment: The cost to realign is estimated to be \$134.8 million; the annual savings after realignment are \$46.9 million; the return on investment years based on the net present value computations is 2 years. All dollar amounts are in constant FY 94 dollars.

Impacts: The Air Force will dispose of all property not required within the revised boundaries of the reserve base and welcome joint use of the airfield with civil aviation or conversion to a civilian airport. The realignment of March AFB will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 1.6 percent of the employment base in the Riverside County Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. The realignment of March AFB will result in generally positive environmental effects. March AFB is in an air quality non-attainment area for ozone, carbon-monoxide, nitric-oxide, and particulates. Threatened and endangered species and critical habitat are present on-base. March AFB is on the National Priorities List. Environmental restoration of March AFB will continue until complete. The impact on the community infrastructure at receiving bases is not significant.

McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey

Recommendation: McGuire AFB, New Jersey, is recommended for realignment. The 438th Airlift Wing will inactivate. Most of the C-141s will transfer to Plattsburgh AFB, New York. Fourteen C-141s will remain and transfer to the Air Force Reserve. The 514th Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve (AFRES), the 170th Air Refueling Group Air National Guard (ANG), and the 108th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) will remain and the base will convert to a Reserve base. The 913th Airlift Group (AFRES) will relocate from Willow Grove Naval Air Station, Pennsylvania, to McGuire AFB. The Air Force Reserve will operate the base.

Justification: There are several factors which result in the above recommendation. First of all, the Air Force has four more large aircraft bases than are needed to support the number of bombers, tankers, and airlift assets in the DoD Force Structure Plan. When all eight DoD criteria were applied, McGuire AFB ranked low when compared to the other bases in its category. Also, when McGuire AFB was compared specifically with other airlift bases, it still ranked low.

The Air Force plans to establish a large mobility base in the Northeast to support the new Major Regional Contingency (MRC) strategy. McGuire AFB was evaluated specifically as the location for this wing. Along with other bases that met the geographical criteria and were available for this mission are Griffiss AFB, New

York and Plattsburgh AFB, New York. Plattsburgh AFB ranked best in capability to support the air mobility wing due to its geographical location, attributes, and base loading capacity. Principal mobility attributes include aircraft parking space (for 70-80 tanker/airlift aircraft), fuel hydrants and fuel supply/storage capacity, along with present and future encroachment and airspace considerations.

When Plattsburgh AFB was compared directly with McGuire AFB, Plattsburgh AFB rated better in all of the mobility attributes. An air mobility wing at Plattsburgh AFB will eliminate many of the problems associated with operating at McGuire AFB, in the midst of the New York/New Jersey air traffic congestion. Basing the additional aircraft of an air mobility wing at McGuire AFB will add to that congestion. Plattsburgh AFB, on the other hand, has ample airspace for present and future training by an air mobility wing. Also, the FAA has long expressed a desire for civil use of McGuire AFB, which will ease the congestion at other airfields and terminal facilities in the New York and Philadelphia metropolitan areas. For these reasons, McGuire AFB was recommended for realignment and conversion to an Air Force Reserve Base.

The Air Reserve Component (ARC) forces at McGuire AFB represent a significant portion of the air refueling and airlift forces stationed there and they are well located for recruiting. By keeping the airfield open for military use, the parking and fuel handling capacity at McGuire AFB remains available in future contingencies. The existing programmed Military Construction funds for the ANG KC-135 conversion will be used to establish the ARC cantonment at McGuire AFB.

The Air Force encourages conversion of the airfield to a civil airport. The ARC units will remain as tenants if McGuire AFB becomes a civil airfield. Civil operation will enhance the value of the base to the community and encourage reuse of the facilities not needed by the reserve units, and create jobs. It will also reduce the cost to the Air Force of operating its units at McGuire AFB.

All large aircraft bases were considered equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Extensive data, gathered to support the evaluation of each base under each criterion was reviewed by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a group of seven general officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to realign McGuire AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

Return on Investment: The cost to realign is estimated to be \$197.5 million; the annual savings after realignment are \$47.5 million; the return on investment years based on the net present value computations is 4 years. All dollar amounts are in constant FY 94 dollars.

Impacts: The Air Force will dispose of all property outside the reduced base boundary and consider joint use of the airfield with civil aviation or conversion to a civil airport. The realignment of McGuire AFB will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 3.5 percent of the employment base in the Burlington County Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is moderate impact on community housing and the medical community at the new receiving base; however, this impact will be mitigated by Air Force constructed housing and an expansion of the base medical capabilities. McGuire AFB is in an air quality non-attainment area for ozone and is on the National Priorities List. The realignment of McGuire AFB will result in generally positive environmental effects. Environmental restoration of McGuire AFB will continue until complete.

Griffiss Air Force Base, New York

Recommendation: Griffiss AFB, New York, is recommended for realignment. The 416th Bomb Wing will inactivate. The B-52H aircraft will transfer to Minot AFB, North Dakota, and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The KC-135 aircraft from Griffiss AFB will transfer to Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. The 485th Engineering Installation Group at Griffiss AFB will relocate to Hill AFB, Utah.

The Northeast Air Defense Sector will remain at Griffiss in a cantonment area pending the outcome of a NORAD sector consolidation study. If the sector remains it will be transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG). Rome Laboratory will remain at Griffiss AFB in its existing facilities as a stand-alone Air Force laboratory. A minimum essential airfield will be maintained and operated by a contractor on an "as needed, on call" basis. The ANG will maintain and operate necessary facilities to support mobility/contingency/training of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division located at Fort Drum, New York, and operate them when needed. Only the stand-alone laboratory and the ANG mission will remain.

Justification: The Air Force has four more large aircraft bases than needed to support the number of bombers, tankers, and airlift assets in the DoD Force Structure Plan. When all eight DoD criteria are applied, Griffiss AFB ranked low compared to the other large aircraft bases. Based on this analysis, the application of all eight DoD selection criteria, and excess capacity which results from reduced force structure, Griffiss AFB is recommended for realignment.

The Air Force plans to establish a large air mobility base in the Northeast to support the new Major Regional Contingency (MRC) strategy. Griffiss AFB was evaluated specifically as the location for this wing, along with other bases that met the geographical criteria and were available for this mission: McGuire AFB, New Jersey and Plattsburgh AFB, New York. Plattsburgh AFB ranked best in capability to support the air mobility wing due to its geographical location, attributes and base loading capacity. Principal mobility attributes include aircraft parking space (for 70-80 tanker/airlift aircraft), fuel hydrants and fuel supply/storage capacity, along with present and future encroachment and airspace considerations.

The Rome Laboratory has a large civilian work force and is located in adequate facilities that can be separated from the rest of Griffiss AFB. It does not need to be closed or realigned as a result of the reductions in the rest of the base.

All large aircraft bases were considered equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DoD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Extensive data, gathered to support the evaluation of each base under each criterion was reviewed by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a group of seven general officers and six Senior Executive Service career civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The decision to realign Griffiss AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the Executive Group.

Return on Investment: The cost to realign is estimated to be \$120.8 million; the annual savings after realignment are \$39.2 million; the return on investment years based on the net present value computations is 3 years. All dollar amounts are in constant FY 94 dollars.

Impacts: The Air Force will actively pursue conversion to a civil airport, and will dispose of all property not required at Griffiss AFB. The realignment of Griffiss AFB will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 7.6 percent of the employment base in the Utica-Rome

Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. There is no significant environmental impact resulting from this closure. Generation of hazardous wastes and pollutants will be eliminated. Griffiss AFB is on the National Priorities List. Environmental restoration of Griffiss AFB will continue until complete. The impact on the community infrastructure at receiving bases is not significant.

Changes To 1988 Base Closure Commission Recommendations

Bases identified by the 1988 Base Closure Commission as receiving bases were evaluated by mission category along with all other bases in the United States. As part of this review, the 1988 Commission's realignment recommendations were evaluated against recent force structure reductions, as well as, opportunities to operate more efficiently and effectively. The Air Force recommended changes result from analysis of changing world order, other base closures, the threat and force structure plan, and budgetary reality. The Air Force continues to implement the closure of the five bases recommended by the 1988 Commission.

Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois

Recommendation: As part of the closure of Chanute AFB, Illinois, the Air Force recommends consolidating its 16 Metals Technology, Non-Destructive Inspection, and Aircraft Structural Maintenance training courses with the Navy at Naval Air Station (NAS) Memphis, Tennessee, and then move with the Navy when NAS Memphis closes. The 1991 Base Closure Commission recommended that these courses, along with 36 other courses, be transferred to Sheppard AFB, Texas.

Justification: On March 31, 1992, the DoD Inspector General recommended that the Air Force consolidate and collocate its 16 metals training courses with the Navy. There will be no Military Construction (MILCON) costs associated with temporarily relocating the specified training courses to NAS Memphis. This is considerably less than the \$17.5 million in MILCON cost to relocate these courses to Sheppard AFB. As this training is now scheduled to move when NAS Memphis closes, the Air Force and Navy will work to achieve a cost effective approach until a more permanent site is found. Collocation of these courses with the Navy will achieve efficiencies and savings.

Impacts: There is no significant environmental impact resulting from this change. Environmental restoration of Chanute AFB will continue until complete. The impact on the community infrastructure at the new receiving base is not significant.

Changes To 1991 Base Closure Commission Recommendations

Bases identified by the 1991 Base Closure Commission as realignment receivers were evaluated by mission category along with all other bases in the United States. As part of this review, the 1991 Commission's realignment recommendations were evaluated against recent force structure reductions, as well as opportunities to operate more efficiently and effectively. The Air Force recommended changes result from analysis of changing world order, other base closures, threat and force structure plan, and budgetary reality. The Air Force continues to implement the closure and realignment of the bases recommended by the 1991 Commission.

Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Bergstrom AFB as follows: The 704th Fighter Squadron (AFRES) with its F-16 aircraft and the 924th Fighter Group (AFRES) support units will move to Carswell AFB, Texas and the cantonment area at Bergstrom AFB will close. The Regional Corrosion Control Facility at Bergstrom AFB will be closed by September 30, 1994, unless a civilian airport authority elects to assume the responsibility for operating and maintaining the facility before that date.

Justification: The 1991 Commission recommended the closure of Bergstrom AFB. The AFRES was to remain in a cantonment area. In reviewing AFRES plans for Bergstrom AFB, the Air Force found that considerable savings could be realized by realigning the Bergstrom AFRES units and aircraft to the Carswell AFB cantonment area. This realignment will result in savings in Military Construction (MILCON) funds, reduced manpower costs, and will not significantly impact unit readiness. The original 1991 realignment recommendation cost \$12.5 million in MILCON to construct a cantonment area at Bergstrom AFB. Based on the best estimates available at this time, the cost of this change is \$5.8 million in MILCON, for a projected savings of \$6.7 million. This action will also result in net manpower savings.

Impacts: There is no significant environmental impact resulting from this change. Environmental restoration of Bergstrom AFB will continue until complete. The impact on the community infrastructure at the new receiving base is not significant.

Carswell Air Force Base, Texas

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Carswell AFB as follows: Transfer the fabrication function of the 436th Training Squadron (formerly 436th Strategic Training Squadron) to Luke AFB, Arizona and the maintenance training function to Hill AFB, Utah. The remaining functions of the 436th Training Squadron will still relocate to Dyess AFB, Texas. Final disposition of the base exchange and commissary will depend on the outcome of the Congressionally mandated base exchange and commissary test program.

Justification: The 1991 Commission recommended that the 436th Training Squadron be relocated to Dyess AFB as a whole. The proposed action will result in more streamlined and efficient training operations. Transferring the fabrication function to Luke AFB will avoid duplicating this function within Air Combat Command. The Hill AFB move will ensure that maintenance training is provided in a more efficient manner.

The original 1991 realignment cost was \$1.8 million in Military Construction (MILCON). The cost for this redirect is \$0.3 million MILCON, for a projected savings of \$1.5 million MILCON.

Impacts: There is no significant environmental impact resulting from this change. Environmental restoration of Carswell AFB will continue until complete. The impact on the community infrastructure at the new receiving bases is not significant.

Castle Air Force Base, California

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Castle AFB as follows: Redirect the B-52 and KC-135 Combat Crew Training mission from Fairchild AFB, Washington to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana (B-52) and Altus AFB, Oklahoma (KC-135).

Justification: The force structure upon which the 1991 Commission based its recommendations has changed and B-52 force structure is being reduced. The Air Force currently plans to base a large number of B-52s at two locations, with Barksdale AFB serving as the hub for B-52 operations and training. Similarly, training for mobility operations is being centralized at Altus AFB. This redirect will reduce the number of training sites and improve efficiency of operations.

The original 1991 realignment recommendation cost \$78.7 million in Military Construction (MILCON). The estimated cost for this redirect to Barksdale and Altus AFBs is \$59.5 million in MILCON, for a projected savings of \$19.2 million.

Impacts: There is no significant environmental impact resulting from this change. Environmental restoration of Castle AFB will continue until complete. The impact on the community infrastructure at the new receiving base is not significant.

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding MacDill as follows: The Air Force Reserve (AFRES) will temporarily operate the airfield as a reserve base, not open to civil use, until it can be converted to a civil airport. This will accommodate the recommended reassignment of the 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES) from Homestead AFB to MacDill AFB and its conversion to KC-135 tankers. The Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) will not be transferred to Charleston AFB, South Carolina as recommended in 1991, but, instead, will remain at MacDill AFB.

Justification: The 1991 Commission recommended a realignment and partial closure of MacDill AFB. Its F-16 training mission has been relocated to Luke AFB, Arizona, and the JCSE was to be relocated to Charleston AFB. Two unified commands, Headquarters Central Command and Headquarters Special Operations Command, were left in place. The airfield was to close.

Several events since 1991 have made a change to the Commission action appropriate. The closure of Homestead AFB requires the relocation of the 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES). The best location for this unit, when converted to KC-135s, is MacDill AFB. The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) aircraft element has relocated from Miami International Airport to MacDill AFB and would like to remain permanently. NOAA is prepared to pay a fair share of the cost of airport operations.

The AFRES's temporary operation of the airfield will have reduced operating hours and services. The 1991 Commission noted a number of deficiencies of MacDill AFB as a fighter base: "pressure on air space, training areas, and low level routes...not located near Army units that will offer joint training opportunities...[and]... ground encroachment." These are largely inapplicable to an AFRES tanker operation.

Encroachment remains a problem, but the reduced number of flights and the increased compatibility of both tanker and NOAA aircraft with the predominant types of aircraft using Tampa International Airport make this viable. As an interim Reserve/NOAA airfield, use will be modest, and it will not be open to large-scale use by other military units.

The original 1991 realignment recommendation cost for the JCSE relocation was \$25.6 million in MILCON. Retaining the JCSE at MacDill AFB avoids this cost.

Impacts: The Air Force will continue to encourage transition of the airfield to a civil airport, and, if successful, DoD units could remain as cost sharing tenants. The environmental impact and the impact on the community infrastructure is not significant.

Mather Air Force Base, California

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Mather AFB as follows: Redirect the 940th Air Refueling Group (AFRES) with its KC-135 aircraft to Beale AFB, California vice McClellan AFB, California. Because of the rapidly approaching closure of Mather AFB, the 940th will temporarily relocate to McClellan AFB, while awaiting permanent beddown at Beale AFB.

Justification: Moving the 940th Air Refueling Group (AFRES) to Beale AFB is more cost effective.

The original 1991 realignment cost was \$33.7 million in Military Construction (MILCON). The estimated cost for this redirect is \$12.5 million in MILCON, for a projected savings of \$21.2 million.

Impacts: The environmental impact and the impact on the receiving community infrastructure are minimal. Environmental restoration at Mather AFB will continue until complete.

Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base (ANGB), Ohio

Recommendation: Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Rickenbacker ANGB as follows: The 121st Air Refueling Wing (ANG) and the 160th Air Refueling Group (ANG) will move into a cantonment area on the present Rickenbacker ANGB, and operate as a tenant of the Rickenbacker Port Authority

(RPA) on RPA's airport. The 907th Airlift Group (AFRES) will realign to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio as originally recommended. The 4950th Test Wing will still move to Edwards AFB, California.

Justification: The 1991 Commission recommended closing Rickenbacker ANGB, and realigning the 121st Air Refueling Wing (ANG), the 160th Air Refueling Group (ANG) and the 907th Airlift Group (AFRES) to Wright-Patterson AFB. These units were to occupy facilities being vacated by the 4950th Test Wing, which will move to Edwards AFB to consolidate test units.

The airfield at Rickenbacker is no longer a military responsibility, having been transferred by long term lease to the RPA in 1992. It will be conveyed in fee under the public benefit authority of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 when environmental restoration is complete. The State of Ohio has proposed that under current circumstances, more money could be saved by leaving the ANG tanker units at Rickenbacker ANGB than by moving it to Wright-Patterson AFB. The Air Force has carefully examined his analysis and concluded that it is correct. The current analysis is less costly than the original estimate of moving both Rickenbacker ANGB units to Wright-Patterson AFB, primarily because of the State's later burden-sharing proposal to lower the ANGS long-term operating costs at Rickenbacker.

In a related force structure move, in order to fully utilize the facilities at Wright-Patterson AFB, the Air Force recommends that the 178th Fighter Group move from the Springfield Municipal Airport, Ohio, to Wright-Patterson AFB, about 30 miles away. This unit will fit into the available facilities with little construction. The move will save approximately \$1.1 million in base operating support annually based on economies of consolidating some ANG functions with AFRES and active Air Force functions at Wright-Patterson. Since the unit moves only a short distance, retention of current personnel should not be a problem.

The 4950th will still move to Edwards AFB, California from Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, to take advantage of the enhanced military value through the efficiency of consolidating test assets.

The original 1991 realignment cost was \$37.9 million in Military Construction (MILCON). The cost for this redirect is \$26.2 million in MILCON, for a projected savings of \$11.7 million.

Impacts: The environmental impact and the impact on the receiving community infrastructure are minimal.

Defense Logistics Agency

Summary of Selection Process

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Selection Process

The Director, DLA established a DLA Base Realignment and Closure Executive Group comprised of appropriate Heads of Headquarters Principal Staff Elements. The Executive Group included both executive level civilian and military personnel. The Deputy Director, DLA served as Chairman of the Executive Group. The Executive Group acted as senior advisors to direct the effort and recommend DLA activity realignments and closures for the Director's consideration.

A Working Group was established under the direction of the Executive Group. The Working Group was comprised of a core of full-time members and support staff from all pertinent DLA technical areas. The Working Group collected and analyzed certified data, developed and evaluated recommendations for the Executive Group's consideration, conducted sensitivity analyses, and compiled documentation to support the final DLA recommendations.

In an effort to evaluate DLA activities in a fair and consistent manner the Executive Group merged similar activities together for the purposes of analysis. Categories were derived from the general mission functions of DLA. As a result, DLA defined their five categories as Regional Headquarters, Defense Distribution Depots, Inventory Control Points, Service Support Centers and one-of-a-kind activities such as the Defense Clothing Factory.

After organizing DLA activities into general categories, studies were undertaken to determine the data requirements for conducting a comprehensive activity analysis within each category. Comprehensive data calls were designed to support the excess capacity; military value; and economic, environmental, and community analyses required by DoD guidance in accordance with the selection criteria and corresponding DLA Measures of Merit. The data was requested from Primary Field Level Activities (PFLA), Principal Staff Elements (PSE) within DLA Headquarters, and other governmental and commercial agencies.

The DLA Internal Control Plan for the collection and analysis of data was developed specifically for this effort. The plan provided overall policy guidance and procedures to ensure that data was: consistent and standardized, accurate and

complete, certifiable as required by law, verifiable by HQ DLA PSE and PLFA functional managers, auditable by DLA internal review offices and external audit and inspection agencies, and replicable using documentation developed during data collection.

An Internal Control Checklist was developed and distributed as a working document to achieve the objectives of the Internal Control Plan, including the requirement for field commanders to certify the accuracy of their data. To further ensure the validity of field data, functional experts on the Working Group traveled to selected activities and performed on-site reviews to confirm that accurate, quantifiable, and certifiable data was provided in response to data calls.

In developing the capacity analysis for each category, DLA considered projections for Military Service drawdowns as reflected in the DoD Force Structure Plan, discussed changes in basing and operations with the Military Services, and considered initiatives to improve DLA operational efficiencies and effectiveness.

DLA developed a series of objective questions for each DLA activity in order to determine the amount of physical space and throughput capacity currently available at each location. The data was used to quantify the extent to which an existing DLA facility may have been constrained by physical space, throughput, span of control, or production capability.

DLA analyzed military value to determine the relative ranking of an activity with respect to other installations in the same category, rather than to serve as a performance measure. Military value criteria (the first four DoD selection criteria) were given priority consideration in the assessment of DLA installations for realignment or closure. Since DLA provides support to the Military Services, the Agency is indirectly affected by Service projected force structure changes. Given this added complexity, the Executive Group agreed that more distinctive measures should be identified to assess the military value of DLA activities. Accordingly, DLA developed Measures of Merit to fully address the military value of its activities. DLA's four measures of merit included Mission Essentiality, Mission Suitability, Operational Efficiencies, and Expandability.

The next step in the process was to identify activities with the potential to be realigned or closed and eliminate the remaining activities from further consideration. The results of the excess capacity analysis and the military value review served as the

basis for Executive Group decisions. Based on the analyses presented and the accumulated experience of the Executive Group, each DLA activity was reviewed, with further analysis as necessary, to identify potential prospects and eliminate other activities from further review.

Following the screening of DLA activities for excess capacity, military value, and elimination of certain activities from further consideration, scenarios were developed for closure and realignment. During the consideration of potential receiver sites for realignment and closure actions, opportunities for inter-Service/Defense Agency sharing were analyzed. Coordination with the Military Services and other Defense Agencies was vital in gathering data and developing realignment and closure alternatives.

The Working Group evaluated potential realignment scenarios using the COBRA model. The model assessed the relative economic value of realignment and closure alternatives in terms of costs, savings and return on investment. The Executive Group considered community, infrastructure, and environmental impact in accordance with DoD policy guidance, and the DoD selection criteria for impacts.

The Director DLA reviewed the recommendations of the DLA Executive Group and forwarded his recommendations to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production & Logistics on February 22, 1993.

Defense Logistics Agency

Recommendations and Justifications

Defense Electronics Supply Center (Gentile AFS, Ohio)

Recommendation: Close the Defense Electronics Supply Center (DESC) (Gentile AFS), Dayton, Ohio, and relocate its mission to the Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC), Columbus, Ohio.

Justification: DESC is one of four hardware Inventory Control Points (ICP). It is currently the host at Gentile Air Force Station in Dayton, Ohio. The only other tenant at Gentile AFS is the Defense Switching Network (DSN). The base has a large number of warehouses (vacant since the depot closed in the mid-seventies) which require extensive renovation before they could be used as administrative office space. The Agency has no plans to re-open the Depot at this location.

The hardware ICPs are all similar in missions, organizations, personnel skills and common automated management systems. The ICP Concept of Operations which takes into account the DoD Force Structure Plan, indicates that consolidation of ICPs can reduce the cost of operations by eliminating redundant overhead operations. The Consumable Item Transfer will be completed in FY 94 and consolidation can begin after that transfer has been completed.

Consolidating DESC and DCSC at both Columbus and Dayton was considered. The Columbus location provided the best overall payback and could allow for the complete closure of Gentile Air Force Station, Dayton, Ohio. DCSC currently has approval for construction of a 700,000 square foot office building which should be completed in FY 96. This building will provide adequate space for expansion of the ICP. As a result of the closure of DESC, Gentile Air Force Station will be excess to Air Force needs. The Air Force will dispose of it in accordance with existing policy and procedure. It is the intent of the Air Force that the only other activity, a Defense Switching Network terminal, phase out within the time frame of the DESC closure. If the terminal is not phased out during this period, it will remain as a stand alone facility.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one time cost for this action is \$108 million. Annual steady state savings are \$36.8 million with a return on investment in one year.

Impacts: Closing DESC will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 1.3 percent of the employment base in the Dayton-Springfield Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Note: Other 1993 closure and/or realignment recommendations bring the total impact on the Dayton-Springfield Metropolitan Statistical Area to 1.2 percent. Potential environmental and community infrastructure impacts of consolidation of DESC with DCSC are minimal.

**Defense Personnel Support Center and Defense Clothing Factory,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania**

Recommendation: Close the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and relocate its mission to the Defense Distribution Region East, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania. Close the Defense Clothing Factory, relocate the personnel supporting the flag mission, and use existing commercial sources to procure the clothing factory products.

Justification: DPSC is the host of this Army-permitted activity in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The installation also houses the Clothing Factory, the Defense Contract Management District Midatlantic, and other tenants with approximately 800 personnel. The decision to close the Clothing Factory is based on the premise that clothing requirements for the armed forces can be fulfilled cost effectively by commercial manufacturers, without compromising quality or delivery lead time. DPSC was not reviewed as part of the ICP category since it manages a much smaller number of items which have a significantly higher dollar value than the hardware ICPs. The activity has no administrative space available, but does have a small number of buildable acres. Environmental problems at DPSC would make building or extensive renovations impossible for some time in the future.

With the movement of DCMD Midatlantic and the Clothing Factory out of DPSC, the Working Group examined options to either utilize the base as a receiver or move DPSC to another location. Scenarios were built so that activities moved to locations where excess space had been identified. DISC, currently a tenant at ASO which is recommended for closure by the Navy, was considered for possible realignment to DPSC. A scenario which realigned DPSC to ASO where DLA would assume responsibility for the base was analyzed. Another, which split the three commodities at DPSC between DGSC and DCSC was also examined.

The distribution depot at New Cumberland has available buildable acres. Additionally, another recommendation moves DISC, a hardware ICP from Philadelphia to New Cumberland. This allows several activities to be consolidated. The presence of three ICPs and major DLA facilities in the area will create significant opportunities for savings and efficiencies in the future. As a result of the closure of DPSC, the property will be excess to Army needs. The Army will dispose of it in accordance with existing policy and procedure.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one time cost for these closures is \$173.0 million. Annual steady state savings are \$90.6 million with an immediate return on investment.

Impacts: Closing DPSC and the Clothing Factory will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.4 percent of the employment base in the Philadelphia Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Note: Other 1993 closure and/or realignment recommendations bring the total impact on the Philadelphia Metropolitan Statistical Area to 0.8 percent.

The closure will ultimately result in a reduction in air emissions, wastewater discharges, and solid waste.

Defense Distribution Depot Oakland, California

Recommendation: Disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Oakland, CA (DDOC), and relocate the primary mission to Defense Distribution Depot Tracy, CA (DDTC), Defense Distribution Depot Sharpe, CA (DDSC), and Defense Distribution Depot San Diego, CA (DDDC). Slow moving or inactive materiel remaining at DDOC at the time of closure will be relocated to other available storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

Justification: The decision to realign DDOC was driven by the Navy's decision to close Oakland Navy Base and Naval Air Station Alameda. The closure of the Navy Supply Center at Oakland (fleet support) and the Naval Aviation Depot at Alameda removed the customer base from Oakland. This closure along with substandard facilities contributed to the decision to realign the distribution mission out of Oakland. DDOC rated 14 out of 29 in the military value matrix. Except for two depots, all depots rated lower than DDOC are collocated with a maintenance depot. The other two depots exceed Oakland's throughput capacity and storage space.

Return on Investment: This disestablishment is in combination with the recommended disestablishment of the Tooele, McClellan, Charleston, Pensacola, and Letterkenny distribution depots. Combined estimated one-time costs for these disestablishments is \$137.0 million. Annual steady-state savings are \$31.2 million with a return on investment in two years.

Impacts: The disestablishment of Defense Distribution Depot Oakland will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.1 percent of the employment base in the Oakland Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Note: Other 1993 closure and/or realignment recommendations bring the total impact on the Oakland Metropolitan Statistical Area to 4.9 percent. There will be no significant environmental or community infrastructure impacts.

Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola, Florida

Recommendation: Disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola, FL (DDPF), and relocate the mission to Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, FL (DDJF). Slow moving and/or inactive materiel remaining at DDPF at the time of the disestablishment will be relocated to available storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

Justification: The decision to disestablish DDPF was driven by the Navy's decision to close the Naval Supply Center and Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, eliminating DDPF's customer base. The loss of customer base along with sufficient storage space in the DoD distribution system drove the disestablishment. DDPF rated 10 out of 29 in the military value matrix. All depots rated lower than DDPF are collocated with their primary customer, a maintenance depot.

Return on Investment: This disestablishment is in combination with the recommended disestablishment of the Tooele, McClellan, Charleston, Oakland, and Letterkenny distribution depots. Combined estimated one-time costs for these disestablishments is \$137.0 million. Annual steady-state savings are \$31.2 million with a return on investment in two years.

Impacts: The disestablishment of Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.2 percent of the employment base in the Pensacola Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Note: Other 1993 closure and/or realignment recommendations increase the employment base in the Pensacola Metropolitan Statistical Area by 4.2 percent. There will be no significant environmental or community infrastructure impacts.

**Defense Contract Management District Midatlantic, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
and Defense Contract Management District
Northcentral, Chicago, Illinois**

Recommendation: Disestablish Defense Contract Management District Midatlantic (DCMDM) and Defense Contract Management District Northcentral (DCMDN), and relocate the missions to DCMD Northeast, DCMD South and DCMD West.

Justification: The Defense Contract Management Districts perform operational support and management oversight of 105 Defense Contract Management Area Operations (DCMAOs) and Defense Plant Representative Offices (DPROs). Since the establishment of the DCMDs a number of DCMAOs and DPROs have been disestablished thereby reducing the span of control responsibility of the five DCMDs. Based on the assumptions derived from the DoD Force Structure Plan it is anticipated that the DCMD span of control will not increase in future years. This allows for the reconfiguration of the DCMDs by realigning responsibility for the operational activities, thereby reducing the number of headquarters facilities which perform operational support and management oversight. All plant and area operations would continue to be under geographically aligned Districts. The Military Value analysis resulted in the recommendation to disestablish the midatlantic and northcentral activities and relocate their missions to the three remaining districts.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one time costs for this closure are \$18.7 million. Annual steady state savings are \$20.1 million with an immediate return on investment.

Impacts: Disestablishment of DCMD Midatlantic will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.0002 percent of the employment base in the Philadelphia Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Note: Other 1993 closure and/or realignment recommendations bring the total impact on the Philadelphia Metropolitan Statistical Area to 0.8 percent

The disestablishment of DCMD Northcentral will have a similar negligible impact on the local economy in the Chicago Metropolitan Statistical Area. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.0002 percent of the employment base in the Chicago Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery.

There are no significant environmental or community infrastructure impacts resulting from these actions.

**Defense Logistics Service Center and Defense Reutilization and
Marketing Service, Battle Creek, Michigan**

Recommendation: Disestablish the Defense Logistics Services Center (DLSC) and collocate its mission with the Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC), Columbus, Ohio.

Relocate the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service, Battle Creek, Michigan, to the Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC), Columbus, Ohio. DCSC will provide all necessary support services for the relocated personnel. Two separate functional areas, Logistics Information Management and Logistics Information Distribution, will be assigned to the DLA Inventory Control Point (ICP) to accommodate the operational mission areas now performed by DLSC.

Justification: With the implementation of DMRD 918, "Defense Information Infrastructure Resource Plan," the responsibility for Central Design Activity (CDA) and Information Processing Centers (IPC) were assigned to the Defense Information Technology Service Organization. As a result of the realignment the continued need of DLSC as a stand alone organization was evaluated. By consolidating functions at a DLA ICP, all support services can be performed by the receiving activity. Some of the functions currently being performed by DLSC NATO Codification personnel can be distributed among the remaining DLA hardware centers, thereby consolidating similar functions. This relocation also places HQ DRMS Battle Creek, Michigan, and Operations East, Columbus, Ohio, with a DLA Inventory Control Point to facilitate overall materiel management. Savings result from moving DLSC and DRMS from GSA-leased space.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one time cost for these actions is \$33.9 million. Annual steady state savings are \$55.6 million with an immediate return on investment.

Impacts: Disestablishing DLSC and relocating DRMS will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 2.2 percent of the employment base in the Battle Creek Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Potential environmental and community infrastructure impacts of these actions are minimal.

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania (DDLDP) and relocate the depot's functions and materiel to Defense Distribution Depot Tobyhanna, PA (DDTP), Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, AL and Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX (DDRT). Active consumable items will be moved to Defense Depot New Cumberland, PA, and Defense Depot Mechanicsburg, PA. Any remaining materiel will be placed in available storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

Justification: The decision to disestablish DDLDP was driven by the Army decision to realign the Letterkenny Army Depot and consolidate its depot maintenance functions with those existing at Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA, Anniston Army Depot, AL, and Red River Army Depot, TX. Realignment of DDLDP's primary customer and substandard facilities drive the decision to relocate the distribution mission to DDRT. DDLDP rated 25 out of 29 in the military value matrix. All depots rated lower than DDLDP are collocated with their primary customer, a maintenance depot.

Return on Investment: This disestablishment is in combination with the recommended disestablishment of the Tooele, Oakland, Charleston, Pensacola, and McClellan distribution depots. Combined estimated one-time costs for these disestablishments is \$137.0 million. Annual steady-state savings are \$31.2 million with a return on investment in two years.

Impacts: The disestablishment of Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 1.1 percent of the employment base in the Franklin County Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Note: Other 1993 closure and/or realignment recommendations bring the total impact on the Franklin County Metropolitan Statistical Area to 8.9 percent. There will be no significant environmental or community infrastructure impacts.

Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, South Carolina

Recommendation: Disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, SC (DDCS), and relocate the mission to Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, FL (DDJF). Slow moving and/or inactive materiel remaining at DDCS at the time of the realignment will be relocated to available storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

Justification: The decision to realign DDCS was driven by the Navy's decision to close several naval activities in Charleston, SC, eliminating DDCS's customer base. The loss of customer base along with sufficient storage space in the DoD distribution system drove the disestablishment. DDCS rated 6 out of 29 in the military value matrix. All depots rated lower than DDCS are collocated with their primary customer, a maintenance depot.

Return on Investment: This disestablishment is in combination with the recommended disestablishment of the Tooele, McClellan, Pensacola, Oakland, and Letterkenny distribution depots. Combined estimated one-time costs for these disestablishments is \$137.0 million. Annual steady-state savings are \$31.2 million with a return on investment in two years.

Impacts: The disestablishment of Defense Distribution Depot Charleston will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.2 percent of the employment base in the Charleston Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Note: Other 1993 closure and/or realignment recommendations bring the total impact on the Charleston Metropolitan Statistical Area to 15 percent. There will be no significant environmental or community infrastructure impacts.

Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, Utah

Recommendation: Disestablish Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, Utah (DDTU). Relocate the depot's functions/materiel to Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX (DDRT). Any remaining materiel will be placed in available space in the DoD Distribution System.

Justification: The decision to disestablish DDTU was driven by the Army decision to realign Tooele Army Depot and consolidate its depot maintenance functions with those existing at Red River Army Depot. The realignment of DDTU's primary customer and the substandard facilities drive the decision to disestablish DDTU and relocate its functions and materiel to DDRT. DDTU rated 18 out of 29 in the military value matrix. With the exception of one depot (Columbus, Ohio), lower rated depots are collocated with their primary customer, a maintenance depot. The Columbus depot has almost twice the storage capacity and four times the issue throughput capacity as DDTU.

Return on Investment: This disestablishment is in combination with the recommended disestablishment of the Letterkenny, Oakland, Charleston, Pensacola, and McClellan distribution depots. Combined estimated one-time costs for these disestablishments is \$137.0 million. Annual steady-state savings are \$31.2 million with a return on investment in two years.

Impacts: The disestablishment of Defense Distribution Depot Tooele will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 3.4 percent of the employment base in the Tooele County Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Note: Other 1993 closure and/or realignment recommendations bring the total impact on the Tooele County Metropolitan Statistical Area to 34.1 percent. There will be no significant environmental or community infrastructure impacts.

Defense Contract Management District West, El Segundo, California

Recommendation: Relocate the Defense Contract Management District West (DCMD West), El Segundo, CA, to Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Los Angeles, CA.

Justification: The DCMD West is currently located in GSA-leased administrative space in El Segundo, CA. Significant savings will result by moving the organization from GSA space to a building on Government property at Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA. A number of available DoD properties were considered as potential relocation sites. The Naval Shipyard was selected because it does not involve the payment of Personnel Change of Station (PCS) costs. This move may require new construction to provide a building to receive the DCMD West.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one time costs for this relocation are \$12.4 million. Annual steady state savings are \$6.0 million with an immediate return on investment. The estimated one time cost includes the potential cost of construction, should that be required.

Impacts: Relocating DCMD West will have no negative impact on the local economy since it is an intra-area move. However, DCMD West is receiving personnel as a result of the overall DCMC consolidation. There is no significant environmental or community infrastructure impact resulting from this relocation.

Defense Industrial Supply Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Relocate the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC), a hardware Inventory Control Point (ICP), located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to New Cumberland, Pennsylvania.

Justification: DISC is a tenant of the Navy's Aviation Supply Office (ASO) located in Philadelphia. With the Navy decision to close ASO during BRAC 93, DISC must either be relocated or remain behind and assume responsibility for the base.

The Executive Group considered options where square footage or buildable acres existed. Also, only locations where ICPs currently exist were considered.

Collocation with DCSC, DESC and DGSC were also considered. DGSC has buildable acres but no space available. DESC has warehouse space and DCSC will have administrative space in 1997. However, with the recommended closures of DESC and realignment with DCSC, the additional move of DISC to DCSC was considered too risky. Scenarios were run splitting DISC among the remaining hardware centers and splitting DISC between DCSC and DGSC. Both options were considered too risky because proposed moves split managed items to multiple locations.

Locating DISC at Defense Distribution Region East, a DLA activity located at New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, and the presence of three ICPs and major DLA facilities in the area will create significant opportunities for savings and efficiencies in the future. The relocation of DISC to New Cumberland provides the best payback for DoD. The relocation allows the Navy to close and dispose of ASO.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one time cost for this relocation is \$95.6 million. Annual steady state savings are \$20.7 million with a return on investment in four years.

Impacts: Relocating DISC will have an impact on the local economy. The projected potential employment loss, both direct and indirect, is 0.2 percent of the employment base in the Philadelphia Metropolitan Statistical Area, assuming no economic recovery. Note: Other 1993 closure and/or realignment recommendations bring the total impact on the Philadelphia Metropolitan Statistical Area to 0.8 percent. The potential environmental impacts of relocating DISC to New Cumberland are minimal and there are no community infrastructure impediments.

Defense Information Systems Agency

Summary of Selection Process

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Process

As a first step in the consolidation process, the Director of the Defense Information Technology Services Office (DITSO) established the DoD Data Center Consolidation Planning Team to develop a Data Processing Center (DPC) consolidation plan. The Planning Team adopted a site selection process that calls for identifying the existing sites that have the greatest potential for serving as consolidated DPCs. The methodology involved the following steps:

- o Identify the candidate DPCs
- o Validate site information and apply ranking criteria
- o Determine the total data processing requirement
- o Determine the appropriate number of megacenters
- o Develop a technical plan for migration of DoD data processing workload from the existing DPCs to the megacenters

The methodology carefully considered the risks associated with both site selection and consolidation. The plan builds on the work done by the Services in support of Defense Management Report Decision 924. Site selection risk has been further reduced by conducting a sensitivity analysis on the site selection criteria.

The methodology for ranking the megacenters involved a two step process. First, the criteria for selecting a megacenter site were identified. These criteria were then weighted according to their importance as a discriminator in the ranking of sites, with the total weights adding to 100 percent. The criteria fell into three broad categories: 1) Facilities criteria, which account for 50 percent of the total weight, 2) Security criteria, which account for 35 percent of the total weight, and 3) Operations criteria which account for 15 percent of the total weight. Each site could receive a total of ten points for each of the criteria. The points assigned were then multiplied by the weight factor for each criterion and summed to determine the score for each potential megacenter site.

Thirty-six megacenter candidates were scored against the criteria to establish a candidate ranking. Site visits were made to validate the Service-supplied data.

The number of megacenters required was determined by totaling the processing workload requirements of all sites to be consolidated and distributing these requirements, beginning with the top-ranked site, until all the requirements were satisfied. A sensitivity analysis was performed to determine how much the site ranking order depended on the weights assigned to each criterion and the inclusion or exclusion of a specific criteria.

Defense Information Systems Agency

Recommendation and Justification

DoD Data Center Consolidation

Recommendation: Execute a DoD-wide Data Center Consolidation Plan that disestablishes 44 major data processing centers (DPCs) by consolidating their information processing workload into fifteen standardized, automated "megacenters" located in existing DoD facilities.

The 44 DPCs recommended for disestablishment are located at the following DoD installations:

Navy Sites

NCTS San Diego, CA
NSC Puget Sound, WA
NSC Norfolk, VA
NAWC AD Patuxent River, MD
NAWC WD Point Mugu, CA
NSC Pearl Harbor, HI
NAS Whidbey Island, WA
TRF Kings Bay, GA
NAS Key West, FL
NAS Oceana, VA
NCTAMSLANT Norfolk, VA
NCTS New Orleans, LA
CRUITCOM Arlington, VA
NARDAC San Francisco, CA
NCCOSC San Diego, CA

NSC Charleston, SC
ASO Philadelphia, PA
NCTS Pensacola, FL
NAWC WD China Lake, CA
FISC San Diego, CA
FACSO Port Hueneme, CA
TRF Bangor, WA
NAS Brunswick, ME
NAS Mayport, FL
EPMAC New Orleans, LA
BUPERS Washington, DC
NCTS Washington, DC
NCTAMS EASTPAC Pearl Harbor, HI
NAVDAF Corpus Christi, TX

Marine Corps Sites

MCAS Cherry Point, NC
RASC Camp Pendleton, CA

RASC Camp Lejeune, NC
MCAS El Toro, CA

Air Force Sites

CPSC San Antonio, TX
AFMPC Randolph AFB, TX

7th CG, Pentagon, VA
RPC McClellan AFB, CA

Defense Logistics Agency Sites

IPC Battle Creek, MI
IPC Philadelphia, PA

IPC Ogden, UT
IPC Richmond, VA.

Defense Information Systems Agency Sites

DITSO Indianapolis IPC, IN
DITSO Columbus Annex (Dayton), OH

DITSO Kansas City IPC, MO

Recommended Megacenter Locations

- o Columbus, Ohio
- o Ogden, Utah
- o San Antonio, Texas
- o Rock Island, Illinois
- o Montgomery, Alabama
- o Denver, Colorado
- o Warner-Robins, Georgia
- o Huntsville, Alabama
- o Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania
- o Dayton, Ohio
- o St. Louis, Missouri
- o Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
- o Jacksonville, Florida
- o Chambersburg, Pennsylvania
- o Cleveland, Ohio

Justification: A DPC is an organizationally defined set of dedicated personnel, computer hardware, computer software, telecommunications, and environmentally conditioned facilities whose primary function is to provide computer processing support for customers. The DPCs to be closed were transferred from the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) under the guidelines of Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) 918. Rapid consolidation of these facilities is necessary to accommodate a significant portion of the DMRD 918 budget savings totaling \$4.5 billion while continuing to support the mission and functions of DoD at the required service levels.


Consolidation of DPCs is one of several cost saving initiatives underway within DISA. Best industry practice in the private sector has established the viability and desirability of this approach. It will position DoD to more efficiently support common data processing requirements across Services by leveraging information technology and resource investments to meet multiple needs. In the long term, it will increase the Military Departments' and Defense Agencies' access to state-of-the-art technology while requiring fewer investments to support similar Service needs. This is an aggressive plan that will ultimately position DoD to support business improvement initiatives, downsizing, and streamlining through the efficient use and deployment of

technology. DISA has undertaken an extensive evaluation of candidate megacenters to ensure that the facilities, security, and ongoing operations will support an efficient and flexible Defense Information Infra-structure capable of meeting the requirements of the Defense community.

During the evaluation process the IPC at McClellan Air Force Base rated high enough to be selected as a megacenter site. However, with the Air Force's recommendation to close McClellan Air Force Base the McClellan IPC was removed from further consideration.

Return on Investment: Total estimated one time cost for this recommendation is \$408 million. Annual steady state savings are \$290 million with an immediate return on investment.

Impacts: The consolidation will have minimal impact on the communities and environment at both the existing and target DPC sites.



Chapter 5

Implementation

Introduction

Public Law 101-510, besides establishing the procedures for selecting bases to be closed or realigned, establishes procedures for carrying out approved closures and realignments. The law also describes the applicability of other public laws and Federal regulations to the implementation of base closures and realignments (see Appendix A).

Requirement to Close and Realign Bases

The Secretary of Defense must close and realign all military installations recommended for closure and realignment by the Commission, unless the President does not approve the recommendations or a Congressional joint resolution of disapproval is enacted.

The Secretary must initiate all the closures and realignments within two years and complete all the closures within six years, beginning from the date the President approves the recommendations.

Implementation Procedures and Funding

The Secretary may (in implementing the approved base closures and realignments) acquire land, construct replacement facilities, and plan and design for relocating activities.

Public Law 101-510 establishes a special Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990, to fund costs associated with closing and realigning bases. The Secretary may also use the Account to provide: economic adjustment assistance to communities; community planning assistance; and, outplacement assistance to civilian employees. There is a separate base closure account for implementing the recommendations of the 1988 Base Closure Commission.

The Secretary may use the Account to provide for environmental restoration and mitigation at closing and realigning bases. The Secretary is required to ensure that environmental restoration of property made excess as a result of closing or realigning bases be carried out as soon as possible with funds available for such purposes.

Property Disposal

The Administrator of General Services is required to delegate to the Secretary of Defense the Administrator's property disposal authorities under public law to: utilize excess property; dispose of surplus property; grant approvals and make determinations; and, make excess or surplus property available for wildlife conservation purposes. The Secretary is required to follow General Services Administration property disposal regulations in carrying out his authorities.

Before the Secretary can dispose of any surplus real property or facility, he is required to consult with the Governor of the State and the heads of local governments about the local community's plans for the use of the property. For over 30 years, DoD has helped local communities plan for the reuse of closing bases. This program, managed by DoD's Office of Economic Adjustment, is discussed later in this chapter.

The Secretary may transfer real property or facilities at a closing or realigning base to a Military Department or the Coast Guard, with or without reimbursement. This authority is important to help ensure DoD retains its best assets in cases where the need for transfer from one Department to another could not be identified during the base closure and realignment selection process.

Applicability of the National Environmental Policy Act

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) will apply to the actions DoD takes in implementing approved base closures and realignments. NEPA will apply in disposing of property and in relocating functions from a base being closed or realigned to a receiving base. However, in applying NEPA to property disposal or relocating functions, DoD need not consider: (1) the need for closing or realigning the base; (2) the need for transferring functions to a base selected as a receiving base; or (3) alternatives to the closing, realigning or receiving bases.

Congressional Oversight

DoD is required to report annually to the Defense Committees of Congress the following information concerning implementation of approved base closures and realignments:

- o A schedule of closure and realignment actions for the year,
- o The costs required and savings to be achieved,
- o An assessment of the environmental effects of the actions,

- o A description of actions at receiving bases, and
- o An assessment of the environmental effects at the receiving bases.

Finally, DoD is required to report to the Congress the funds remaining in the Base Closure Account after the Account has terminated. Unobligated funds which remain in the Account after termination will be held in the Account until transferred by law.

Easing the Impact

Closing military bases is difficult, especially for the people affected. DoD has for years managed programs designed to assist communities, homeowners and employees in adjusting to the closure of bases. We intend to improve the existing programs and to create new economic growth initiatives (see Appendix C).

Economic Adjustment Assistance

Economic adjustment assistance for communities can alleviate local impacts of Defense program changes. Impacts may result from major base closure or realignment actions that reduce local employment. Other actions may increase Defense activity and place new demands on communities for increased public services (sewer, water, roads, schools, etc.). Changes can impact on individuals and have secondary effects on area businesses, local governments, and other elements of the local economy.

The Department takes the lead in efforts to alleviate these problems. An Economic Adjustment Program was initiated for this purpose in May 1961. Since 1970, adjustment assistance has been enhanced through the President's Economic Adjustment Committee (EAC) which is composed of 23 Federal Departments and Agencies, and chaired by the Secretary of Defense. The DoD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) serves as the permanent staff for the Committee.

The EAC works with local, state and Federal Agency representatives to develop strategies and coordinate action plans to generate new job opportunities and to alleviate social and economic impacts resulting from Defense program changes. Whenever possible, former military bases are converted for productive civilian uses, i.e. airports, industrial parks, schools, hospitals, recreational areas, etc. Available Federal, state and local government resources are utilized to spur private sector investments and jobs.

DoD plans to increase significantly the scope of activities undertaken by OEA. OEA is responsible for leading DoD's efforts to work with communities severely affected by base closures and other reductions in defense spending. OEA works

closely with other federal, state, and local government organizations in order to bring the full range of assistance programs to bear on affected communities. DoD will increase OEA's budget dramatically from about \$8 million in FY 1992 to nearly \$30 million in FY 1993.

With its increased budget, OEA will offer grants to help community organizations transition from a planning function to an operational entity. Previously, OEA funded the planning function only. OEA also plans to invite grants from states to support local community adjustment and business assistance programs; up to \$2.5 million is earmarked for this purpose. OEA will also make grants to help states and local governments develop community adjustment and economic diversification plans and establish demonstration projects in four areas.

Economic Growth Results

The Office of Economic Adjustment periodically surveys the economic progress of nearly 100 communities affected by base closures during the past 32 years. The survey measures job replacement generation and reuses for the former bases, as accomplished and reported by the communities themselves. The survey findings are conservative since they exclude secondary and off-base jobs. The 1990 survey found:

- o New jobs replace DoD civilian losses. A total of 158,000 civilian jobs are now located on former defense facilities to replace the loss of 93,000 former DoD civilian and contractor jobs.
- o New educational opportunities. Many four-year colleges and post-secondary vocational technical (vo-tech) institutes or community colleges, as well as high school vo-tech programs have been established at former bases. The reuse of the former Defense facilities for new vocational technical education has provided a strong job-inducement contribution to future community economic development programs.
- o Student enrollments. There are 73,000 college and post-secondary students; 20,000 secondary vo-tech students; and 62,000 trainees now receiving education and training at 57 former Defense bases.
- o Industrial and aviation uses. Office industrial parks or plants have been established at 75 of the former Defense bases. Forty-two of the former bases are being used as municipal or general aviation airports.

Currently, OEA is working with 38 communities near bases recommended for closure by the 1988 and 1991 Base Closure Commissions (see Appendix F). OEA has provided \$10 million, over the last three years, in Community Planning Assistance Grants to affected locations for economic adjustment organization costs and to help develop local base redevelopment plans. Working through the EAC, OEA is also helping these communities implement their adjustment plans. With funds transferred from DoD, the Economic Development Administration of the Department of Commerce, will make 33 grants totalling \$50 million for utility infrastructure improvements, business loan funds, and state level adjustment planning activities. Similarly, with DoD funds, the Department of Labor has made 45 grants totalling \$40 million for worker adjustment assistance and retraining.

Until the property at the closing bases is disposed of for public and private use, redevelopment is understandably limited. Most of the bases recommended for closure in 1988 and 1991 have yet to close. However, several communities affected are solidly on the way to economic recovery helped by DoD's willingness to temporarily lease portions of bases before closure. Lockheed Aerospace has leased hangars at Norton AFB for aircraft overhaul and maintenance, creating 800 jobs. A major trucking company, J.B. Hunt, recently opened a truck driver training center at the England Industrial Air Park and Community (former England AFB). At the Pease International Tradeport (former Pease AFB) a variety of new activities have created more than 1,000 jobs. Among the major tenants are the U.S. Passport and Visa Processing Center and the Business Express (Delta Airlines) maintenance facility. And at the former Naval Air Station Chase Field in Beeville, Texas, 400 family housing units have been leased, and Prostar Aircraft, a manufacturer of small planes used primarily for agriculture and recreational purposes, began production at the base in March 1993.

The transition period (often 3-5 years) from military to civilian use of a former base can be difficult for many communities. Yet, the experience of communities affected by earlier base closures clearly indicates successful adjustment is possible. Moreover, communities become more diversified and economically stable. The Department of Defense is committed to helping affected communities throughout transition.

Environmental Restoration at Closing Bases

DoD is obligated under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) to restore contaminated sites on military bases, whether they are closing or not.

DoD is committed to restoring closing bases to safe condition within the capabilities of technology and the availability of funds. The Base Closure Account, described earlier in this chapter, is used to fund this environmental restoration at closing bases or at realigning bases where the cleanup action is driven by requirements of the realignment.

DoD wants to ensure, wherever possible, that environmental cleanup is not a barrier to economic recovery. DoD has spent and will continue to spend significant defense resources on environmental restoration, but will need help from Congress and the Environmental Protection Agency to streamline the process.

DoD has several initiatives underway to expedite the environmental restoration process and thereby speed local economic recovery.

In 1990, DoD formed an environmental response task force which, in October 1991, reported on ways to: improve interagency coordination of environmental response actions; streamline and consolidate regulations, practices and policies; and, improve environmental restoration at bases that were being closed under the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988. This task force is being reconvened in fiscal year 1993 and will provide yearly reports to Congress until the base closure process is completed.

DoD has established a model program which will test: expediting clean-up; accelerating the contracting process; alternatives for avoiding disputes; concurrent regulatory review; and, options for local reuse while clean-up is in progress.

DoD, in conjunction with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Military Services, State and local regulatory offices, and State and local reuse/redevelopment organizations, is conducting a series of base closure and realignment (BRAC) Interagency Acceleration Initiatives Conferences. These conferences, organized on an EPA regional basis, promote discussions between appropriate parties and foster the potential implementation of some 47 acceleration initiatives at closing installations. The acceleration initiatives, in five major categories of management, process, technology, contracting, and training, were developed to promote the timely environmental restoration and fast return of closing DoD installations.

Homeowners Assistance Program

The Homeowners Assistance Program (HAP) was authorized by Congress to assist eligible military and federal civilian homeowners who, through no fault of their own, face a financial loss when selling their homes in an area where real estate values have declined because of a base closure or realignment.

In general, HAP works in three ways. The Government helps eligible employees who cannot sell their homes within a reasonable time by either: buying their homes for 75 percent of their pre-closure announcement value; or reimbursing them for most lost equity should the homeowners sell the house for less than the pre-closure announcement value. The program also provides relief for displaced employees facing foreclosure.

To be eligible for HAP benefits, the applicant must be a military member (Coast Guard included), federal civilian or non-appropriated fund employee assigned or employed at or near the installation announced for closure or realignment, and be the owner-occupant on the announcement date. Eligibility is also extended under certain conditions to personnel on overseas tours or those ordered into on-base housing within a specified period prior to the closure or realignment announcement.

The program is initially funded with appropriated funds; however, the fund is replenished with the proceeds from the sale or rental of houses purchased by the Government under the program.

Civilian Employee Assistance

The DoD Priority Placement Program is another program that was established to help DoD civilian employees adjust to the base closures of the 1960s.

A state-of-the-art automated referral system is currently in operation. Over the years since its inception, the referral system has helped more than 106,000 employees find new assignments. This system supports the Priority Placement Program and is cost effective. Periodic surveys have shown that 99 percent of placements are considered successful by the supervisors with whom the employees have been placed. Over two-thirds of the employees placed through the system have maintained their pay grades and salaries, or have advanced. Nearly the same number of placements have been within the commuting area of the original jobs. When that is not possible, relocation expenses are paid when an employee is placed in a job outside the present commuting area. The program has successfully placed nearly every employee willing to relocate.

The Office of Personnel Management's (OPMs) Interagency Placement Assistance Program (IPAP) and Displaced Employee Program (DEP) are newer programs also designed to help to place employees separated or about to be separated from their positions by a reduction in force. OPM is in the process of combining these programs into one.

DoD has also recently established the Defense Outplacement Referral System (DORS). DORS is a voluntary, automated referral system available to DoD employees and their spouses seeking employment and to employers seeking workers. Both register in the DORS system. Employers identify skills they need and individuals list the skills they possess. The system electronically provides registered employers the resumes of individuals who meet their skill requirements.

Recent legislation requires the Office of Personnel Management to establish a Government-wide vacancy list. Candidates seeking Federal employment will no longer have to make numerous inquiries about vacancies, but can query this one source. The Office of Personnel Management is also required to establish procedures for non-DoD Agencies to give displaced DoD employees full consideration for vacancies filled from outside their Agencies.

The Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) allows the release of placement assistance and retraining monies to those employees who are to be involuntarily separated from their positions. In most situations, employees identified for separation will be eligible for these funds six months prior to separation. Employees at installations on the base realignment and closure list are eligible for these monies 24 months prior to the closure date.

Employees who have received reduction in force separation notices will be allowed to stay on DoD's rolls beyond the reduction in force (RIF) date if they have enough annual leave to carry them to first retirement eligibility or to meet the eligibility criteria to carry Federal Employee Health Benefits (FEHB) into retirement (five years of coverage). DoD employees who are enrolled in FEHB and who are involuntarily separated by RIF may elect to continue FEHB enrollment (for up to 18 months following separation) and pay only the employee portion of the cost.

A post closure hiring preference will also be afforded employees adversely affected by base closures. They will be given the right of first refusal for jobs created

by award of contracts to prepare the base for closure or to maintain the base after closure. Employees will be notified of skills required by the contractor and will apply directly to the contractor.

Activities expecting major reductions may request Voluntary Early Retirement Authority (VERA) from OPM. Eligible employees (those 50 years of age with 20 years of service or those with 25 years of service at any age) may be offered this opportunity. Additionally, VERA may be expanded to non-downsizing organizations to create vacancies for other employees scheduled for separation.

Finally, separation pay incentives may be approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to be used at activities that are downsizing or at activities that are not downsizing, but where vacancies could be created to place employees who would otherwise be separated. The incentives or bonuses are to be used for targeted surplus occupations, grades and locations. The incentives are lump sum bonuses up to \$25,000 for employees who resign, or who elect early retirement or regular (optional) retirement. These incentives may not be offered in the final stage of base closure but may be used in earlier phases.

Tools to Help Commanders Close Bases

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has the authority to waive dual compensation restrictions for retired military members or civilians hired at closing bases to fill critical positions. The waivers can only be granted for temporary appointments at bases within two years of their scheduled closure dates.

Job swaps allow Commanders to staff critical jobs at closing bases and create placement opportunities for employees who would otherwise be separated. Job swaps are an exception to the Priority Placement Program. Employees at closing bases may swap jobs with employees at non-closing bases who are, or will soon be eligible for retirement (including discontinued service retirement). Job swaps may be authorized only when the position at the closing base has been specifically identified as critical and continuing (one year or more) and the swap has been approved by the supervisors of both employees. This provision may also be used to fill vacant critical positions at a closing installation.

Generally, employees at closing bases are eligible for unlimited annual leave accrual (elimination of the 240 hour cap). However, employees at a realigning base who work for an activity not impacted by the realignment are not eligible (i.e., employees at the realigning base whose activity will continue in the same location after realignment are not eligible).

Appendices

Appendix A

Public Law 101-510, as amended

PROVISIONS OF LAW RELATING TO BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

(as amended through P.L. 102-590; December 31, 1992)

1. DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT OF 1990 AND RELATED PROVISIONS

(Title XXIX of P.L. 101-510, approved Nov. 5, 1990, 10 U.S.C. 2687 note)

TITLE XXIX—DEFENSE BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

PART A—DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SEC. 2901. SHORT TITLE AND PURPOSE

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This part may be cited as the “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990”.

(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this part is to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.

SEC. 2902. THE COMMISSION

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established an independent commission to be known as the “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission”.

(b) DUTIES.—The Commission shall carry out the duties specified for it in this part.

(c) APPOINTMENT.—(1)(A) The Commission shall be composed of eight members appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(B) The President shall transmit to the Senate the nominations for appointment to the Commission—

(i) by no later than January 3, 1991, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 102nd Congress;

(ii) by no later than January 25, 1993, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 103rd Congress; and

(iii) by no later than January 3, 1995, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 104th Congress.

(C) If the President does not transmit to Congress the nominations for appointment to the Commission on or before the date specified for 1993 in clause (ii) of subparagraph (B) or for 1995 in clause (iii) of such subparagraph, the process by which military in-

stallations may be selected for closure or realignment under this part with respect to that year shall be terminated.

(2) In selecting individuals for nominations for appointments to the Commission, the President should consult with—

(A) the Speaker of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of two members;

(B) the majority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of two members;

(C) the minority leader of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of one member; and

(D) the minority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of one member.

(3) At the time the President nominates individuals for appointment to the Commission for each session of Congress referred to in paragraph (1)(B), the President shall designate one such individual who shall serve as Chairman of the Commission.

(d) TERMS.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each member of the Commission shall serve until the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which the member was appointed to the Commission.

(2) The Chairman of the Commission shall serve until the confirmation of a successor.

(e) MEETINGS.—(1) The Commission shall meet only during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995.

(2)(A) Each meeting of the Commission, other than meetings in which classified information is to be discussed, shall be open to the public.

(B) All the proceedings, information, and deliberations of the Commission shall be open, upon request, to the following:

(i) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability, and Support of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority party member.

(ii) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority party member.

(iii) The Chairmen and ranking minority party members of the Subcommittees on Military Construction of the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittees designated by such Chairmen or ranking minority party members.

(f) VACANCIES.—A vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment, but the individual appointed to fill the vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term for which the individual's predecessor was appointed.

(g) PAY AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.—(1)(A) Each member, other than the Chairman, shall be paid at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which the

member is engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Commission.

(B) The Chairman shall be paid for each day referred to in subparagraph (A) at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) Members shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with sections 5702 and 5703 of title 5, United States Code.

(h) DIRECTOR OF STAFF.—(1) The Commission shall, without regard to section 5311(b) of title 5, United States Code, appoint a Director who has not served on active duty in the Armed Forces or as a civilian employee of the Department of Defense during the one-year period preceding the date of such appointment.

(2) The Director shall be paid at the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

(i) STAFF.—(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Director, with the approval of the Commission, may appoint and fix the pay of additional personnel.

(2) The Director may make such appointments without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and any personnel so appointed may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that an individual so appointed may not receive pay in excess of the annual rate of basic pay payable for GS-18 of the General Schedule.

(3)(A) Not more than one-third of the personnel employed by or detailed to the Commission may be on detail from the Department of Defense.

(B)(i) Not more than one-fifth of the professional analysts of the Commission staff may be persons detailed from the Department of Defense to the Commission.

(ii) No person detailed from the Department of Defense to the Commission may be assigned as the lead professional analyst with respect to a military department or defense agency.

(C) A person may not be detailed from the Department of Defense to the Commission if, within 12 months before the detail is to begin, that person participated personally and substantially in any matter within the Department of Defense concerning the preparation of recommendations for closures or realignments of military installations.

(D) No member of the Armed Forces, and no officer or employee of the Department of Defense, may—

(i) prepare any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of the performance on the staff of the Commission of any person detailed from the Department of Defense to that staff;

(ii) review the preparation of such a report; or

(iii) approve or disapprove such a report.

(4) Upon request of the Director, the head of any Federal department or agency may detail any of the personnel of that depart-

ment or agency to the Commission to assist the Commission in carrying out its duties under this part.

(5) The Comptroller General of the United States shall provide assistance, including the detailing of employees, to the Commission in accordance with an agreement entered into with the Commission.

(6) The following restrictions relating to the personnel of the Commission shall apply during 1992 and 1994:

(A) There may not be more than 15 persons on the staff at any one time.

(B) The staff may perform only such functions as are necessary to prepare for the transition to new membership on the Commission in the following year.

(C) No member of the Armed Forces and no employee of the Department of Defense may serve on the staff.

(j) OTHER AUTHORITY.—(1) The Commission may procure by contract, to the extent funds are available, the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants pursuant to section 3109 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) The Commission may lease space and acquire personal property to the extent funds are available.

(k) FUNDING.—(1) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission such funds as are necessary to carry out its duties under this part. Such funds shall remain available until expended.

(2) If no funds are appropriated to the Commission by the end of the second session of the 101st Congress, the Secretary of Defense may transfer, for fiscal year 1991, to the Commission funds from the Department of Defense Base Closure Account established by section 207 of Public Law 100-526. Such funds shall remain available until expended.

(l) TERMINATION.—The Commission shall terminate on December 31, 1995.

(m) PROHIBITION AGAINST RESTRICTING COMMUNICATIONS.—Section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, shall apply with respect to communications with the Commission.

SEC. 2903. PROCEDURE FOR MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

(a) FORCE-STRUCTURE PLAN.—(1) As part of the budget justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the budget for the Department of Defense for each of the fiscal years 1992, 1994, and 1996, the Secretary shall include a force-structure plan for the Armed Forces based on an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the six-year period beginning with the fiscal year for which the budget request is made and of the anticipated levels of funding that will be available for national defense purposes during such period.

(2) Such plan shall include, without any reference (directly or indirectly) to military installations inside the United States that may be closed or realigned under such plan—

(A) a description of the assessment referred to in paragraph (1);

(B) a description (i) of the anticipated force structure during and at the end of each such period for each military department (with specifications of the number and type of units in

the active and reserve forces of each such department), and (ii) of the units that will need to be forward based (with a justification thereof) during and at the end of each such period; and

(C) a description of the anticipated implementation of such force-structure plan.

(3) The Secretary shall also transmit a copy of each such force-structure plan to the Commission.

(b) SELECTION CRITERIA.—(1) The Secretary shall, by no later than December 31, 1990, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the criteria proposed to be used by the Department of Defense in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part. The Secretary shall provide an opportunity for public comment on the proposed criteria for a period of at least 30 days and shall include notice of that opportunity in the publication required under the preceding sentence.

(2)(A) The Secretary shall, by no later than February 15, 1991, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the final criteria to be used in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part. Except as provided in subparagraph (B), such criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, along with the force-structure plan referred to in subsection (a), in making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before March 15, 1991.

(B) The Secretary may amend such criteria, but such amendments may not become effective until they have been published in the Federal Register, opened to public comment for at least 30 days, and then transmitted to the congressional defense committees in final form by no later than January 15 of the year concerned. Such amended criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, along with the force-structure plan referred to in subsection (a), in making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before February 15 of the year concerned.

(c) DOD RECOMMENDATIONS.—(1) The Secretary may, by no later than April 15, 1991, March 15, 1993, and March 15, 1995, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees and to the Commission a list of the military installations inside the United States that the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment on the basis of the force-structure plan and the final criteria referred to in subsection (b)(2) that are applicable to the year concerned.

(2) The Secretary shall include, with the list of recommendations published and transmitted pursuant to paragraph (1), a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendation for each installation, including a justification for each recommendation.

(3) In considering military installations for closure or realignment, the Secretary shall consider all military installations inside the United States equally without regard to whether the installation has been previously considered or proposed for closure or realignment by the Department.

(4) In addition to making all information used by the Secretary to prepare the recommendations under this subsection available to Congress (including any committee or member of Congress), the Secretary shall also make such information available to the Commission and the Comptroller General of the United States.

(5)(A) Each person referred to in subparagraph (B), when submitting information to the Secretary of Defense or the Commission concerning the closure or realignment of a military installation, shall certify that such information is accurate and complete to the best of that person's knowledge and belief.

(B) Subparagraph (A) applies to the following persons:

(i) The Secretaries of the military departments.

(ii) The heads of the Defense Agencies.

(iii) Each person who is in a position the duties of which include personal and substantial involvement in the preparation and submission of information and recommendations concerning the closure or realignment of military installations, as designated in regulations which the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe, regulations which the Secretary of each military department shall prescribe for personnel within that military department, or regulations which the head of each Defense Agency shall prescribe for personnel within that Defense Agency.

(6) In the case of any information provided to the Commission by a person described in paragraph (5)(B), the Commission shall submit that information to the Senate and the House of Representatives to be made available to the Members of the House concerned in accordance with the rules of that House. The information shall be submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives within 24 hours after the submission of the information to the Commission. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to ensure the compliance of the Commission with this paragraph.

(d) REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION.—(1) After receiving the recommendations from the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c) for any year, the Commission shall conduct public hearings on the recommendations.

(2)(A) The Commission shall, by no later than July 1 of each year in which the Secretary transmits recommendations to it pursuant to subsection (c), transmit to the President a report containing the Commission's findings and conclusions based on a review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary, together with the Commission's recommendations for closures and realignments of military installations inside the United States.

(B) Subject to subparagraph (C), in making its recommendations, the Commission may make changes in any of the recommendations made by the Secretary if the Commission determines that the Secretary deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in subsection (c)(1) in making recommendations.

(C) In the case of a change described in subparagraph (D) in the recommendations made by the Secretary, the Commission may make the change only if the Commission—

(i) makes the determination required by subparagraph (B);

(ii) determines that the change is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in subsection (c)(1);

- (iii) publishes a notice of the proposed change in the Federal Register not less than 30 days before transmitting its recommendations to the President pursuant to paragraph (2); and
- (iv) conducts public hearings on the proposed change.
- (D) Subparagraph (C) shall apply to a change by the Commission in the Secretary's recommendations that would—
- (i) add a military installation to the list of military installations recommended by the Secretary for closure;
- (ii) add a military installation to the list of military installations recommended by the Secretary for realignment; or
- (iii) increase the extent of a realignment of a particular military installation recommended by the Secretary.
- (3) The Commission shall explain and justify in its report submitted to the President pursuant to paragraph (2) any recommendation made by the Commission that is different from the recommendations made by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c). The Commission shall transmit a copy of such report to the congressional defense committees on the same date on which it transmits its recommendations to the President under paragraph (2).
- (4) After July 1 of each year in which the Commission transmits recommendations to the President under this subsection, the Commission shall promptly provide, upon request, to any Member of Congress information used by the Commission in making its recommendations.
- (5) The Comptroller General of the United States shall—
- (A) assist the Commission, to the extent requested, in the Commission's review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c); and
- (B) by no later than April 15 of each year in which the Secretary makes such recommendations, transmit to the Congress and to the Commission a report containing a detailed analysis of the Secretary's recommendations and selection process.
- (e) REVIEW BY THE PRESIDENT.—(1) The President shall, by no later than July 15 of each year in which the Commission makes recommendations under subsection (d), transmit to the Commission and to the Congress a report containing the President's approval or disapproval of the Commission's recommendations.
- (2) If the President approves all the recommendations of the Commission, the President shall transmit a copy of such recommendations to the Congress, together with a certification of such approval.
- (3) If the President disapproves the recommendations of the Commission, in whole or in part, the President shall transmit to the Commission and the Congress the reasons for that disapproval. The Commission shall then transmit to the President, by no later than August 15 of the year concerned, a revised list of recommendations for the closure and realignment of military installations.
- (4) If the President approves all of the revised recommendations of the Commission transmitted to the President under paragraph (3), the President shall transmit a copy of such revised recommendations to the Congress, together with a certification of such approval.

(5) If the President does not transmit to the Congress an approval and certification described in paragraph (2) or (4) by September 1 of any year in which the Commission has transmitted recommendations to the President under this part, the process by which military installations may be selected for closure or realignment under this part with respect to that year shall be terminated.

SEC. 2904. CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Subject to subsection (b), the Secretary shall—

(1) close all military installations recommended for closure by the Commission in each report transmitted to the Congress by the President pursuant to section 2903(e);

(2) realign all military installations recommended for realignment by such Commission in each such report;

(3) initiate all such closures and realignments no later than two years after the date on which the President transmits a report to the Congress pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or realignments; and

(4) complete all such closures and realignments no later than the end of the six-year period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or realignments.

(b) **CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL.**—(1) The Secretary may not carry out any closure or realignment recommended by the Commission in a report transmitted from the President pursuant to section 2903(e) if a joint resolution is enacted, in accordance with the provisions of section 2908, disapproving such recommendations of the Commission before the earlier of—

(A) the end of the 45-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits such report; or

(B) the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which such report is transmitted.

(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection and subsections (a) and (c) of section 2908, the days on which either House of Congress is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain shall be excluded in the computation of a period.

SEC. 2905. IMPLEMENTATION

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—(1) In closing or realigning any military installation under this part, the Secretary may—

(A) take such actions as may be necessary to close or realign any military installation, including the acquisition of such land, the construction of such replacement facilities, the performance of such activities, and the conduct of such advance planning and design as may be required to transfer functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for use in planning and design, minor construction, or operation and maintenance;

(B) provide—

(i) economic adjustment assistance to any community located near a military installation being closed or realigned, and

(ii) community planning assistance to any community located near a military installation to which functions will be transferred as a result of the closure or realignment of a military installation,

if the Secretary of Defense determines that the financial resources available to the community (by grant or otherwise) for such purposes are inadequate, and may use for such purposes funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for economic adjustment assistance or community planning assistance;

(C) carry out activities for the purposes of environmental restoration and mitigation at any such installation, and shall use for such purposes funds in the Account;

(D) provide outplacement assistance to civilian employees employed by the Department of Defense at military installations being closed or realigned, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for outplacement assistance to employees; and

(E) reimburse other Federal agencies for actions performed at the request of the Secretary with respect to any such closure or realignment, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense and available for such purpose.

(2) In carrying out any closure or realignment under this part, the Secretary shall ensure that environmental restoration of any property made excess to the needs of the Department of Defense as a result of such closure or realignment be carried out as soon as possible with funds available for such purpose.

(b) MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY.—(1) The Administrator of General Services shall delegate to the Secretary of Defense, with respect to excess and surplus real property and facilities located at a military installation closed or realigned under this part—

(A) the authority of the Administrator to utilize excess property under section 202 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483);

(B) the authority of the Administrator to dispose of surplus property under section 203 of that Act (40 U.S.C. 484);

(C) the authority of the Administrator to grant approvals and make determinations under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)); and

(D) the authority of the Administrator to determine the availability of excess or surplus real property for wildlife conservation purposes in accordance with the Act of May 19, 1948 (16 U.S.C. 667b).

(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (C), the Secretary of Defense shall exercise the authority delegated to the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1) in accordance with—

(i) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing the utilization of excess property and the

disposal of surplus property under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949; and

(ii) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing the conveyance and disposal of property under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)).

(B) The Secretary, after consulting with the Administrator of General Services, may issue regulations that are necessary to carry out the delegation of authority required by paragraph (1).

(C) The authority required to be delegated by paragraph (1) to the Secretary by the Administrator of General Services shall not include the authority to prescribe general policies and methods for utilizing excess property and disposing of surplus property.

(D) The Secretary of Defense may transfer real property or facilities located at a military installation to be closed or realigned under this part, with or without reimbursement, to a military department or other entity (including a nonappropriated fund instrumentality) within the Department of Defense or the Coast Guard.

(E) Before any action may be taken with respect to the disposal of any surplus real property or facility located at any military installation to be closed or realigned under this part, the Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Governor of the State and the heads of the local governments concerned for the purpose of considering any plan for the use of such property by the local community concerned.

(c) APPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969.—(1) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) shall not apply to the actions of the President, the Commission, and, except as provided in paragraph (2), the Department of Defense in carrying out this part.

(2)(A) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 shall apply to actions of the Department of Defense under this part (i) during the process of property disposal, and (ii) during the process of relocating functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation after the receiving installation has been selected but before the functions are relocated.

(B) In applying the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the processes referred to in subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the military departments concerned shall not have to consider—

(i) the need for closing or realigning the military installation which has been recommended for closure or realignment by the Commission;

(ii) the need for transferring functions to any military installation which has been selected as the receiving installation;

or

(iii) military installations alternative to those recommended or selected.

(3) A civil action for judicial review, with respect to any requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the extent such Act is applicable under paragraph (2), of any act or failure to act by the Department of Defense during the closing, realigning, or relocating of functions referred to in clauses (i) and (ii)

of paragraph (2)(A), may not be brought more than 60 days after the date of such act or failure to act.

(d) **WAIVER.**—The Secretary of Defense may close or realign military installations under this part without regard to—

(1) any provision of law restricting the use of funds for closing or realigning military installations included in any appropriations or authorization Act; and

(2) sections 2662 and 2687 of title 10, United States Code.

SEC. 2906. ACCOUNT

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—(1) There is hereby established on the books of the Treasury an account to be known as the “Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990” which shall be administered by the Secretary as a single account.

(2) There shall be deposited into the Account—

(A) funds authorized for and appropriated to the Account;

(B) any funds that the Secretary may, subject to approval in an appropriation Act, transfer to the Account from funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for any purpose, except that such funds may be transferred only after the date on which the Secretary transmits written notice of, and justification for, such transfer to the congressional defense committees; and

(C) except as provided in subsection (d), proceeds received from the transfer or disposal of any property at a military installation closed or realigned under this part.

(b) **USE OF FUNDS.**—(1) The Secretary may use the funds in the Account only for the purposes described in section 2905(a).

(2) When a decision is made to use funds in the Account to carry out a construction project under section 2905(a) and the cost of the project will exceed the maximum amount authorized by law for a minor military construction project, the Secretary shall notify in writing the congressional defense committees of the nature of, and justification for, the project and the amount of expenditures for such project. Any such construction project may be carried out without regard to section 2802(a) of title 10, United States Code.

(c) **REPORTS.**—(1) No later than 60 days after the end of each fiscal year in which the Secretary carries out activities under this part, the Secretary shall transmit a report to the congressional defense committees of the amount and nature of the deposits into, and the expenditures from, the Account during such fiscal year and of the amount and nature of other expenditures made pursuant to section 2905(a) during such fiscal year.

(2) Unobligated funds which remain in the Account after the termination of the Commission shall be held in the Account until transferred by law after the congressional defense committees receive the report transmitted under paragraph (3).

(3) No later than 60 days after the termination of the Commission, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense committees a report containing an accounting of—

(A) all the funds deposited into and expended from the Account or otherwise expended under this part; and

(B) any amount remaining in the Account.

(d) **DISPOSAL OR TRANSFER OF COMMISSARY STORES AND PROPERTY PURCHASED WITH NONAPPROPRIATED FUNDS.**—(1) If any real property or facility acquired, constructed, or improved (in whole or in part) with commissary store funds or nonappropriated funds is transferred or disposed of in connection with the closure or realignment of a military installation under this part, a portion of the proceeds of the transfer or other disposal of property on that installation shall be deposited in the reserve account established under section 204(b)(4)(C) of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (10 U.S.C. 2687 note).

(2) The amount so deposited shall be equal to the depreciated value of the investment made with such funds in the acquisition, construction, or improvement of that particular real property or facility. The depreciated value of the investment shall be computed in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.

(3) The Secretary may use amounts in the account (in such an aggregate amount as is provided in advance in appropriation Acts) for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, and improving—

(A) commissary stores; and

(B) real property and facilities for nonappropriated fund instrumentalities.

(4) As used in this subsection:

(A) The term “commissary store funds” means funds received from the adjustment of, or surcharge on, selling prices at commissary stores fixed under section 2685 of title 10, United States Code.

(B) The term “nonappropriated funds” means funds received from a nonappropriated fund instrumentality.

(C) The term “nonappropriated fund instrumentality” means an instrumentality of the United States under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces (including the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, the Navy Resale and Services Support Office, and the Marine Corps exchanges) which is conducted for the comfort, pleasure, contentment, or physical or mental improvement of members of the Armed Forces.

(e) **ACCOUNT EXCLUSIVE SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROJECTS.**—Except for funds deposited into the Account under subsection (a), funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may not be used for purposes described in section 2905(a)(1)(C). The prohibition in this subsection shall expire upon the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this part.

SEC. 2907. REPORTS

As part of the budget request for fiscal year 1993 and for each fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense committees of Congress—

(1) a schedule of the closure and realignment actions to be carried out under this part in the fiscal year for which the request is made and an estimate of the total expenditures required and cost savings to be achieved by each such closure and realignment and of the time period in which these savings

are to be achieved in each case, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such actions; and

(2) a description of the military installations, including those under construction and those planned for construction, to which functions are to be transferred as a result of such closures and realignments, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such transfers.

SEC. 2908. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF COMMISSION REPORT

(a) **TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION.**—For purposes of section 2904(b), the term “joint resolution” means only a joint resolution which is introduced within the 10-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under section 2903(e), and—

(1) which does not have a preamble;

(2) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: “That Congress disapproves the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission as submitted by the President on _____”, the blank space being filled in with the appropriate date; and

(3) the title of which is as follows: “Joint resolution disapproving the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.”.

(b) **REFERRAL.**—A resolution described in subsection (a) that is introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. A resolution described in subsection (a) introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(c) **DISCHARGE.**—If the committee to which a resolution described in subsection (a) is referred has not reported such resolution (or an identical resolution) by the end of the 20-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under section 2903(e), such committee shall be, at the end of such period, discharged from further consideration of such resolution, and such resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.

(d) **CONSIDERATION.**—(1) On or after the third day after the date on which the committee to which such a resolution is referred has reported, or has been discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of, such a resolution, it is in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. A Member may make the motion only on the day after the calendar day on which the Member announces to the House concerned the Member's intention to make the motion, except that, in the case of the House of Representatives, the motion may be made without such prior announcement if the motion is made by direction of the committee to which the resolution was referred. All points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion is highly privileged in the House of Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a

motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the respective House shall immediately proceed to consideration of the joint resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business, and the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of.

(2) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 2 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. An amendment to the resolution is not in order. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. A motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.

(3) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in subsection (a) and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.

(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate.

(e) CONSIDERATION BY OTHER HOUSE.—(1) If, before the passage by one House of a resolution of that House described in subsection (a), that House receives from the other House a resolution described in subsection (a), then the following procedures shall apply:

(A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee and may not be considered in the House receiving it except in the case of final passage as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii).

(B) With respect to a resolution described in subsection (a) of the House receiving the resolution—

(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no resolution had been received from the other House; but

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the other House.

(2) Upon disposition of the resolution received from the other House, it shall no longer be in order to consider the resolution that originated in the receiving House.

(f) RULES OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE.—This section is enacted by Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a resolution described in subsection

(a), and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

SEC. 2909. RESTRICTION ON OTHER BASE CLOSURE AUTHORITY

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Except as provided in subsection (c), during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 1995, this part shall be the exclusive authority for selecting for closure or realignment, or for carrying out any closure or realignment of, a military installation inside the United States.

(b) **RESTRICTION.**—Except as provided in subsection (c), none of the funds available to the Department of Defense may be used, other than under this part, during the period specified in subsection (a)—

(1) to identify, through any transmittal to the Congress or through any other public announcement or notification, any military installation inside the United States as an installation to be closed or realigned or as an installation under consideration for closure or realignment; or

(2) to carry out any closure or realignment of a military installation inside the United States.

(c) **EXCEPTION.**—Nothing in this part affects the authority of the Secretary to carry out—

(1) closures and realignments under title II of Public Law 100-526; and

(2) closures and realignments to which section 2687 of title 10, United States Code, is not applicable, including closures and realignments carried out for reasons of national security or a military emergency referred to in subsection (c) of such section.

SEC. 2910. DEFINITIONS

As used in this part:

(1) The term “Account” means the Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990 established by section 2906(a)(1).

(2) The term “congressional defense committees” means the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.

(3) The term “Commission” means the Commission established by section 2902.

(4) The term “military installation” means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility. Such term does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbors projects, flood control, or other projects not under the primary jurisdiction or control of the Department of Defense.

(5) The term “realignment” includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions but does not include a reduction in force resulting from work-

load adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, or skill imbalances.

(6) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Defense.

(7) The term "United States" means the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

SEC. 2911. CLARIFYING AMENDMENT

Section 2687(e)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by inserting "homeport facility for any ship," after "center,"; and

(2) by striking out "under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department" and inserting in lieu thereof "under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility,".

Part B—Other Provisions Relating to Defense Base Closures and Realignments

SEC. 2921. CLOSURE OF FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the termination of military operations by the United States at military installations outside the United States should be accomplished at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense at the earliest opportunity;

(2) in providing for such termination, the Secretary of Defense should take steps to ensure that the United States receives, through direct payment or otherwise, consideration equal to the fair market value of the improvements made by the United States at facilities that will be released to host countries;

(3) the Secretary of Defense, acting through the military component commands or the sub-unified commands to the combatant commands, should be the lead official in negotiations relating to determining and receiving such consideration; and

(4) the determination of the fair market value of such improvements released to host countries in whole or in part by the United States should be handled on a facility-by-facility basis.

(b) RESIDUAL VALUE.—(1) For each installation outside the United States at which military operations were being carried out by the United States on October 1, 1990, the Secretary of Defense shall transmit, by no later than June 1, 1991, an estimate of the fair market value, as of January 1, 1991, of the improvements made by the United States at facilities at each such installation.

(2) For purposes of this section:

(A) The term "fair market value of the improvements" means the value of improvements determined by the Secretary on the basis of their highest use.

(B) The term "improvements" includes new construction of facilities and all additions, improvements, modifications, or renovations made to existing facilities or to real property, with-

out regard to whether they were carried out with appropriated or nonappropriated funds.

(c) **ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL ACCOUNT.**—(1) There is established on the books of the Treasury a special account to be known as the “Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account”. Except as provided in subsection (d), amounts paid to the United States, pursuant to any treaty, status of forces agreement, or other international agreement to which the United States is a party, for the residual value of real property or improvements to real property used by civilian or military personnel of the Department of Defense shall be deposited into such account.

(2) Money deposited in the Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account shall be available to the Secretary of Defense for payment, as provided in appropriation Acts, of costs incurred by the Department of Defense in connection with—

(A) facility maintenance and repair and environmental restoration at military installations in the United States; and

(B) facility maintenance and repair and compliance with applicable environmental laws at military installations outside the United States that the Secretary anticipates will be occupied by the Armed Forces for a long period.

(3) Funds in the Department of Defense Overseas Facility Investment Recovery Account shall remain available until expended.

(d) **AMOUNTS CORRESPONDING TO THE VALUE OF PROPERTY PURCHASED WITH NONAPPROPRIATED FUNDS.**—(1) In the case of a payment referred to in subsection (c)(1) for the residual value of real property or improvements at an overseas military facility, the portion of the payment that is equal to the depreciated value of the investment made with nonappropriated funds shall be deposited in the reserve account established under section 204(b)(4)(C) of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act. The Secretary may use amounts in the account (in such an aggregate amount as is provided in advance by appropriation Acts) for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, or improving commissary stores and nonappropriated fund instrumentalities.

(2) As used in this subsection:

(A) The term ‘nonappropriated funds’ means funds received from—

(i) the adjustment of, or surcharge on, selling prices at commissary stores fixed under section 2685 of title 10, United States Code; or

(ii) a nonappropriated fund instrumentality.

(B) The term ‘nonappropriated fund instrumentality’ means an instrumentality of the United States under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces (including the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, the Navy Resale and Services Support Office, and the Marine Corps exchanges) which is conducted for the comfort, pleasure, contentment, or physical or mental improvement of members of the Armed Forces.

(e) **NEGOTIATIONS FOR PAYMENTS-IN-KIND.**—Before the Secretary of Defense enters into negotiations with a host country regarding the acceptance by the United States of any payment-in-

kind in connection with the release to the host country of improvements made by the United States at military installations in the host country, the Secretary shall submit a written notice to the congressional defense committees containing a justification for entering into negotiations for payments-in-kind with the host country and the types of benefit options to be pursued by the Secretary in the negotiations.

(f) **REPORT ON STATUS AND USE OF SPECIAL ACCOUNT.**—Not later than January 15 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the operations of the Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account during the preceding fiscal year and proposed uses of funds in the special account during the next fiscal year. The report shall include the following:

(1) The amount of each deposit in the account during the preceding fiscal year, and the source of the amount.

(2) The balance in the account at the end of that fiscal year.

(3) The amounts expended from the account by each military department during that fiscal year.

(4) With respect to each military installation for which money was deposited in the account as a result of the release of real property or improvements of the installation to a host country during that fiscal year—

(A) the total amount of the investment of the United States in the installation, expressed in terms of constant dollars of that fiscal year;

(B) the depreciated value (as determined by the Secretary of a military department under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense) of the real property and improvements that were released; and

(C) the explanation of the Secretary for any difference between the benefits received by the United States for the real property and improvements and the depreciated value (as so determined) of that real property and improvements.

(5) A list identifying all military installations outside the United States for which the Secretary proposes to make expenditures from the Department of Defense Overseas Facility Investment Recovery Account under subsection (c)(2)(B) during the next fiscal year and specifying the amount of the proposed expenditures for each identified military installation.

(6) A description of the purposes for which the expenditures proposed under paragraph (5) will be made and the need for such expenditures.

SEC. 2922. MODIFICATION OF THE CONTENT OF BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ALTERNATIVE UTILIZATION OF MILITARY FACILITIES

(a) **USES OF FACILITIES.**—Section 2819(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100-456; 102 Stat. 2119; 10 U.S.C. 2391 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2), by striking out “minimum security facilities for nonviolent prisoners” and inserting in lieu thereof “Federal confinement or correctional facilities including shock incarceration facilities”;

(2) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (3);
 (3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
 (4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (4):

"(4) identify those facilities, or parts of facilities, that could be effectively utilized or renovated to meet the needs of States and local jurisdictions for confinement or correctional facilities; and".

(b) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to the first report required to be submitted under section 2819 the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, after September 30, 1990.

SEC. 2923. FUNDING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS SCHEDULED FOR CLOSURE INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense Base Closure Account for fiscal year 1991, in addition to any other funds authorized to be appropriated to that account for that fiscal year, the sum of \$100,000,000. Amounts appropriated to that account pursuant to the preceding sentence shall be available only for activities for the purpose of environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned under title II of Public Law 100-526, as authorized under section 204(a)(3) of that title.

(b) **EXCLUSIVE SOURCE OF FUNDING.**—(1) Section 207 of Public Law 100-526 is amended by adding at the end the following:

[Amendment omitted]

(c) **TASK FORCE REPORT.**—(1) Not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 5, 1990], the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report containing the findings and recommendations of the task force established under paragraph (2) concerning—

(A) ways to improve interagency coordination, within existing laws, regulations, and administrative policies, of environmental response actions at military installations (or portions of installations) that are being closed, or are scheduled to be closed, pursuant to title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526); and

(B) ways to consolidate and streamline, within existing laws and regulations, the practices, policies, and administrative procedures of relevant Federal and State agencies with respect to such environmental response actions so as to enable those actions to be carried out more expeditiously.

(2) There is hereby established an environmental response task force to make the findings and recommendations, and to prepare the report, required by paragraph (1). The task force shall consist of the following (or their designees):

(A) The Secretary of Defense, who shall be chairman of the task force.

(B) The Attorney General.

(C) The Administrator of the General Services Administration.

(D) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

(E) The Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army.

(F) A representative of a State environmental protection agency, appointed by the head of the National Governors Association.

(G) A representative of a State attorney general's office, appointed by the head of the National Association of Attorney Generals.

(H) A representative of a public-interest environmental organization, appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 2924. COMMUNITY PREFERENCE CONSIDERATION IN CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

In any process of selecting any military installation inside the United States for closure or realignment, the Secretary of Defense shall take such steps as are necessary to assure that special consideration and emphasis is given to any official statement from a unit of general local government adjacent to or within a military installation requesting the closure or realignment of such installation.

SEC. 2925. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

(a) **NORTON AIR FORCE BASE.**—(1) Consistent with the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, the Secretary of the Air Force may not relocate, until after September 30, 1995, any of the functions that were being carried out at the ballistics missile office at Norton Air Force Base, California, on the date on which the Secretary of Defense transmitted a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives as described in section 202(a)(1) of Public Law 100-526.

(2) This subsection shall take effect as of the date on which the report referred to in subsection (a) was transmitted to such Committees.

(b) **GENERAL DIRECTIVE.**—Consistent with the requirements of section 201 of Public Law 100-526, the Secretary of Defense shall direct each of the Secretaries of the military departments to take all actions necessary to carry out the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure and to take no action that is inconsistent with such recommendations.

SEC. 2926. CONTRACTS FOR CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION ACTIVITIES

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT OF MODEL PROGRAM.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act [Nov. 5, 1990], the Secretary of Defense shall establish a model program to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the base closure environmental restoration program.

(b) **ADMINISTRATOR OF PROGRAM.**—The Secretary shall designate the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment as the Administrator of the model program referred to in subsection (a). The Deputy Assistant Secretary shall report to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.

(c) **APPLICABILITY.**—This section shall apply to environmental restoration activities at installations selected by the Secretary pursuant to the provisions of subsection (d)(1).

(d) **PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.**—In carrying out the model program, the Secretary of Defense shall:

(1) Designate for the model program two installations under his jurisdiction that have been designated for closure pursuant to the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526) and for which preliminary assessments, site inspections, and Environmental Impact Statements required by law or regulation have been completed. The Secretary shall designate only those installations which have satisfied the requirements of section 204 of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526).

(2) Compile a prequalification list of prospective contractors for solicitation and negotiation in accordance with the procedures set forth in title IX of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Public Law 92-582; 40 U.S.C. 541 et seq., as amended). Such contractors shall satisfy all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. In addition, the contractor selected for one of the two installations under this program shall indemnify the Federal Government against all liabilities, claims, penalties, costs, and damages caused by (A) the contractor's breach of any term or provision of the contract; and (B) any negligent or willful act or omission of the contractor, its employees, or its subcontractors in the performance of the contract.

(3) Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, solicit proposals from qualified contractors for response action (as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601)) at the installations designated under paragraph (1). Such solicitations and proposals shall include the following:

(A) Proposals to perform response action. Such proposals shall include provisions for receiving the necessary authorizations or approvals of the response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies.

(B) To the maximum extent possible, provisions offered by single prime contractors to perform all phases of the response action, using performance specifications supplied by the Secretary of Defense and including any safeguards the Secretary deems essential to avoid conflict of interest.

(4) Evaluate bids on the basis of price and other evaluation criteria.

(5) Subject to the availability of authorized and appropriated funds to the Department of Defense, make contract awards for response action within 120 days after the solicitation of proposals pursuant to paragraph (3) for the response action, or within 120 days after receipt of the necessary authorizations or approvals of the response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies, whichever is later.

(e) **APPLICATION OF SECTION 120 OF CERCLA.**—Activities of the model program shall be carried out subject to, and in a manner consistent with, section 120 (relating to Federal facilities) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620).

(f) **EXPEDITED AGREEMENTS.**—The Secretary shall, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, assure compliance with all applicable Federal statutes and regulations and, in addition, take all reasonable and appropriate measures to expedite all necessary administrative decisions, agreements, and concurrences.

(g) **REPORT.**—The Secretary of Defense shall include a description of the progress made during the preceding fiscal year in implementing and accomplishing the goals of this section within the annual report to Congress required by section 2706 of title 10, United States Code.

(h) **APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING LAW.**—Nothing in this section affects or modifies, in any way, the obligations or liability of any person under other Federal or State law, including common law, with respect to the disposal or release of hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601).

Appendix B

Section 2687, Title 10, United States Code

§ 2687. Base closures and realignments

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no action may be taken to effect or implement—

(1) the closure of any military installation at which at least 800 civilian personnel are authorized to be employed;

(2) any realignment with respect to any military installation referred to in paragraph (1) involving a reduction by more than 1,000, or by more than 50 percent, in the number of civilian personnel authorized to be employed at such military installation at the time the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned notifies the Congress under subsection (b) of the Secretary's plan to close or realign such installation; or

(3) any construction, conversion, or rehabilitation at any military facility other than a military installation referred to in clause (1) or (2) which will or may be required as a result of the relocation of civilian personnel to such facility by reason of any closure or realignment to which clause (1) or (2) applies, unless and until the provisions of subsection (b) are complied with.

(b) No action described in subsection (a) with respect to the closure of, or a realignment with respect to, any military installation referred to in such subsection may be taken unless and until—

(1) the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned notifies the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives, as part of an annual request for authorization of appropriations to such Committees, of the proposed closing or realignment and submits with the notification an evaluation of the fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and operational consequences of such closure or realignment; and

(2) a period of 30 legislative days or 60 calendar days, whichever is longer, expires following the day on which the notice and evaluation referred to in clause (1) have been submitted to such committees, during which period no irrevocable action may be taken to effect or implement the decision.

(c) This section shall not apply to the closure of a military installation, or a realignment with respect to a military installation, if the President certifies to the Congress that such closure or realignment must be implemented for reasons of national security or a military emergency.

(d)(1) After the expiration of the period of time provided for in subsection (b)(2) with respect to the closure or realignment of a military installation, funds which would otherwise be available to the Secretary to effect the closure or realignment of that installation may be used by him for such purpose.

(2) Nothing in this section restricts the authority of the Secretary to obtain architectural and engineering services under section 2807 of this title.

(e) In this section:

(1) The term "military installation" means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility, which is located within any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, or Guam. Such term does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbors projects, or flood control projects.

(2) The term "civilian personnel" means direct-hire, permanent civilian employees of the Department of Defense.

(3) The term "realignment" includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions, but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, skill imbalances, or other similar causes.

(4) The term "legislative day" means a day on which either House of Congress is in session.

Appendix C

Secretary of Defense Transmittal Memorandum



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

12 MAR 1988

Honorable James Courter
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
1700 North Moore Street
Suite 1425
Arlington, VA 22209

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to Public Law 101-510 as amended, I hereby transmit, as an enclosure to this letter, a list of military installations inside the United States that I recommend for closure or realignment on the basis of the force structure plan and final criteria established under that law. Also enclosed is a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendation for each installation, with a justification for each recommendation.

I am recommending the following actions:

Major base closures	31
Major base realignments	12
Smaller base or activity closures, realignments, disestablishments, or relocations	<u>122</u>
Total recommendations	165

These recommendations support our national goals of maintaining military effectiveness while drawing down the force, reducing the deficit, and reinvesting in America.

Our overall base closure policy is an important part of this effort. The policy has five compelling characteristics:

- o It saves money that would otherwise go to unnecessary overhead.
- o It supports military effectiveness by reducing the competition for ever scarcer resources.
- o It is fair and objective.
- o It hits bases overseas harder than those at home.
- o It supports the investment necessary to foster economic growth.

But as we implement the policy, we recognize a special obligation to the people -- military and civilian -- who won the cold war. We will meet that obligation.

SAVING TAXPAYER DOLLARS AND MAINTAINING MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

Closing military bases worldwide saves taxpayer dollars; permits DoD to invest properly in the forces and bases it keeps in order to ensure their continued effectiveness; and frees up valuable defense assets (people, facilities and real estate) for productive private sector reuse.

The defense budget will decline by more than 40 percent in real terms from 1985 to 1997, and military personnel in the United States will be reduced by 30 percent. Base closures have lagged behind this overall drawdown. No bases were closed until two years ago, following decisions made in the 1988 and 1991 rounds of base closures. Under those two rounds, domestic base structure was reduced by only nine percent, measured by plant replacement value.

Plant replacement value is what it would cost to replace all the buildings, pavements, and utilities at a base. We measure our progress in terms of plant replacement value because it is a better measure of magnitude than simply counting large bases and small bases equally.

Failure to close bases in line with reductions in budgets and personnel constitutes a double hit: Resources are drained into bases we don't need, and therefore are not available to buy the things we do need.

THE PLANNED 1993 ROUND OF CLOSURES WILL SAVE \$3.1 BILLION PER YEAR

The following table shows the costs and savings associated with the 1993 closures and realignments:

Net costs in FY 1994 through 1996	\$1.7 billion
<u>Net savings in FY 1997 through 1999</u>	<u>\$5.7 billion</u>
Net savings during implementation	\$4.0 billion
 Annual savings thereafter (\$FY99)	 \$3.1 billion

The 1993 program, coupled with the previously approved 1988 and 1991 closures, will reduce the domestic base structure by about

15 percent (measured by replacement value). All three rounds of closures together, when complete in 1999, will produce \$5.6 billion in annual recurring savings, measured in FY 1999 dollars.

BEING OBJECTIVE AND FAIR

Congress has given the Executive Branch extraordinary authority to close domestic bases, provided the Executive Branch follows the established rules strictly and keeps faith with the Congress.

This means using an objective, fair analytical process for closing bases that will withstand scrutiny by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, the General Accounting Office, Congress and the public. The process has worked well so far.

The Military Departments and Defense Agencies made their recommendations to me on February 22, 1993. The Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense reviewed the recommendations and underlying analyses to ensure that the law and DoD policies were followed.

I am not recommending any base for closure that would conceivably be kept open under a revised force structure plan.

My recommendations are consistent with a six-year force structure plan. The plan DoD has used is the Bush Administration's "base force." The legal deadline for recommendations precluded us from making changes based on future force reductions not yet decided.

The "base force" has twelve active Army divisions; we will have room to station all of them. It has twelve carriers; we will have room to berth all of them. It has 1098 active Air Force fighters; we will have room to beddown all of them.

Unless the force structure is increased above the "base force," we will have all the bases we need.

I am confident, therefore, that future changes will decrease force structure, and will require more, not fewer, base closures than those I will recommend at this time.

While the recommendations stand on their own merits, it is important to note two additional points. First, with respect to maintenance depots, there was not sufficient time for the Office of

the Secretary of Defense to review all potential interservicing possibilities. I suggest that the Commission examine those possibilities. Second, some installations host non-defense government activities, and it was not possible to evaluate fully the net impact of the recommendations on those activities. I suggest that the Commission devote some attention to those potential impacts.

CONSIDERING REGIONAL IMPACTS CAREFULLY

I have carefully considered the regional economic impacts of these necessary, yet tough, closure decisions. In looking at the regional impacts, I considered the cumulative economic impact of previously approved closures and the ones I am recommending. I am concerned not only about the impacts at bases on our 1993 closure list, but also about the effects at bases closed by earlier rounds.

REDUCING OVERSEAS BASES EVEN MORE

DoD is reducing its military forces and its overseas base structure much more than in the U.S.

DoD has, to date, announced it will end or reduce its operations overseas at sites accounting for 28 percent of replacement value.

Our plan is to reduce the replacement value of the overseas base structure by 35-40% as we complete our reduction in personnel stationed overseas to about 200,000.

DoD base spending overseas will also decline dramatically, both because of troop reductions and because Japan and Korea are paying an increasing share of the costs of stationing U.S. forces there.

While DoD will continue to reduce its forward deployed forces, those forces have played a fundamental role in regions vital to the national interest. Permanently stationing and periodically deploying forces overseas have been key to averting crises and preventing war. They show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, provide crisis response capability, and promote U.S. influence and access throughout the world.

SUPPORTING THE REINVESTMENT NECESSARY TO RESTORE ECONOMIC GROWTH

Closing domestic bases and reducing DoD's weapons and equipment purchases are critical elements of a balanced defense drawdown -- one which will preserve a fully capable, albeit smaller, military.

Nationally, the drawdown in defense spending does not pose any extraordinary problems for the economy. The economic impact of the planned drawdown is actually smaller than the impacts after the Korean and Vietnam wars. However, the impacts are substantial in regions where the local economy depends heavily on defense spending.

There are three ways DoD can help support economic growth: investing in people, investing in industry, and investing in communities.

Investing in People

DoD can help support economic growth through a host of initiatives that will ease the transition for displaced workers (military, civilian and private sector):

- o **Military:** DoD has a number of programs to ease the transition of military personnel into the civilian job market including separation bonuses, early retirement incentives, educational assistance, civil service employment preference and extended health benefits.

- o **Civilian:** DoD eases the transition for the civilian work force through a number of programs including priority placement for other government jobs, out-placement referral for private sector jobs, joint participation with individual states in retraining programs, post-closure hiring preference with contractors, voluntary early retirement authority and separation pay incentives.

- o **Homeowners Assistance:** DoD helps military and civilian homeowners who face a financial loss selling their homes when real estate values have declined as the result of a base closure decision.

- o **Private Sector:** Many defense-related private employers have transition assistance programs for their employees who face layoffs. The Federal Government has a well-established role which

complements state and local government and private employer efforts, including initiatives under the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, the Employment Services Program, the unemployment insurance system, and the health benefits system. The Department of Defense is participating in the Interagency Task Force on Dislocated Workers to help focus additional attention on this critical area.

Investing in Industry

DoD can help support economic growth by promoting high-wage job growth through investment in dual-use technologies and by better integrating the commercial and military business sectors:

- o Dual-use Technology: About \$1 billion of FY 1993 DoD funds are for support of dual-use technologies.

- o Industrial Base: DoD is looking to expand industry access to maintenance and overhaul work.

- o Energy Conservation: DoD is encouraging energy conservation projects and is making such investments.

Investing in Communities

DoD can help support economic growth by promoting productive private sector reuse of base facilities and real estate no longer needed by defense.

History shows us that most local communities economically recover from base closures and actually end up better off, with more jobs and a more diverse economic base -- but in the past the recovery has been too slow and too costly.

DoD is developing a new reuse and reinvestment strategy with initiatives that will: close bases more quickly, thereby making them available for reuse more quickly; promote reuse opportunities, in concert with local community efforts; and, refocus DoD internally to consider, for the first time, the trade-offs between DoD needs and local community needs. The law gives me considerable authority to decide whether the land is sold or given away, and to whom it should go.

DoD's Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) spearheads the President's Economic Adjustment Committee which focuses Federal assistance programs on adversely affected communities. OEA also gives planning assistance grants to affected communities. In addition, DoD funds (\$80 million in FY 1993) will help the Economic Development Administration to assist communities.

DoD wants to ensure, wherever possible, that environmental cleanup is not a barrier to economic recovery. DoD has spent and will continue to spend significant defense resources on environmental restoration, but we will need help from Congress and the Environmental Protection Agency to streamline the process.

Lastly, we will create, in coordination with other Cabinet agencies, a new community economic redevelopment fund to help communities most affected by base closures. The fund will be used as a catalyst to spur new economic growth, especially where recovery would be difficult. Funding will be provided by setting aside a portion of the net savings from base closures.

I have sent identical letters, with enclosures, to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, and published this letter, with enclosures, in the Federal Register.

Sincerely,



List of Enclosures and Tables:

Enclosure:

DoD recommendations pursuant to P.L. 101-510: List of the military installations inside the United States recommended for closure or realignment, with a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendation for each installation, and the justification for each recommendation.

Tables:

Table 1: 1988 and 1991 Closures and Realignment
 Table 2: Cumulative Reductions of Domestic Bases

Appendix D

DoD Policy Memoranda

Index of Memoranda

- o 1993 Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC 93) -- Policy, Procedures, Authorities and Responsibilities, May 5, 1992
- o 1993 Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC 93) -- Redlegation of Authority, May 5, 1992
- o Base Closure Policy Memorandum One, August 4, 1992
- o Base Closure and Realignment Proposals in Support of Streamlining of Defense Depot Maintenance Activities, December 3, 1992
- o Base Closure Policy Memorandum Two, December 4, 1992
- o 1993 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 93) Recommendations, December 9, 1992
- o 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Selection Criteria, December 10, 1992
- o Base Closure Cumulative Economic Impact, December 24, 1992
- o Force Structure Plan for the Armed Forces for use in Base Closure and Realignment Process in 1993 (SECRET), January 19, 1993
- o Base Closure and Realignment -- Additional Guidance, January 28, 1993



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

05 MAY 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: 1993 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 93)

Reducing the Department's unneeded physical plant through base closures and realignments is a top Defense priority. We have made good progress so far. I look to you, individually and collectively, to recommend further reductions consistent with DoD's planned force reductions.

We must begin the 1993 base realignment and closure process now. Significant reductions in our physical plant can only be achieved after careful studies involving not only structural change, but also operational and organizational change.

The attached establishes policy, procedures, authorities and responsibilities for selecting bases for realignment or closure under Public Law 101-510, as amended by Public Law 102-190. This guidance supersedes Deputy Secretary of Defense memoranda of October 25, 1990, and December 10, 1990.

Donald J. Atwood

Attachment

**1993 BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES (BRAC 93)
POLICY, PROCEDURES, AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

Purpose

The guidance herein establishes the policy, procedures, authorities and responsibilities for selecting bases for realignment or closure under Public Law 101-510, as amended by Public Law 102-190. The guidance supersedes Deputy Secretary of Defense memoranda of October 25, 1990, and December 10, 1990.

Background

Title XXIX, Part A of Public Law 101-510 established the exclusive procedures under which the Secretary of Defense may pursue realignment or closure of military installations with certain exceptions. The law established an independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to review the Secretary's recommendations in calendar years 1991, 1993 and 1995.

Applicability

This guidance applies to those base realignment, closure and consolidation studies and recommendations which must, by law, be submitted to the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (the 1993 Commission) for review.

Exceptions

This guidance does not apply to actions which:

- o Implement realignments or closures under Public Law 100-526, relating to the recommendations of the 1988 Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (the 1988 Commission);
- o Implement realignments or closures under Public Law 101-510, relating to the recommendations of the 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (the 1991 Commission);
- o Study or implement realignments or closures to which Section 2687 of Title 10, United States Code, is not applicable;
- o Reduce force structure unless the reduction results in a base closure or realignment subject to Public Law 101-510. Reductions in force structure may be made under this exception even if the units involved were designated to relocate to a receiving base by the 1988 or the 1991 Commission; or

o Impact any facilities used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbor projects, flood control, or other projects not under the primary jurisdiction or control of the Department of Defense.

Policy Guidance

Base realignment, closure or consolidation studies that could result in a recommendation for a base closure or realignment, other than actions covered by an exception above, must meet the following requirements:

o The studies must have as their basis the Force Structure Plan required by Section 2903 of Public Law 101-510;

o The recommendations must be based on the final criteria for selecting bases for closure and realignment required by that Section; and

o The studies must consider all military installations inside the United States (as defined in the law) on an equal footing, including bases recommended for partial closure, realignment, or designated to receive units or functions by the 1988 or 1991 Commissions.

DoD Components may propose changes to previously approved designated receiving base recommendations of the 1988 and 1991 commissions provided such changes are necessitated by revisions to force structure, mission or organization since the commission recommendation was made. Documentation for such changes must involve clear military value or significant savings, and be based on the final criteria

Comprehensive studies of your base structure may begin now using the selection criteria included in this memorandum and the force table in the Secretary of Defense's March 19, 1991, force structure plan. Your studies must be revalidated against the final selection criteria and the final force structure plan when promulgated.

Record Keeping

DoD Components shall, from the date of this memorandum, develop and keep:

o Descriptions of how base realignment and closure recommendations were made, including minutes of all deliberative meetings;

o Descriptions of how recommendations met the final selection criteria and were based on the final force structure plan;

- o All data, information and analyses considered in making base realignment and closure recommendations; and
- o Documentation for each recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to realign or close a military installation under this law.

Internal Controls

DoD Components must develop and implement an internal control plan for these base realignment, closure or consolidation studies to ensure the accuracy of data collection and analyses. At a minimum, these internal control plans should include:

- o Uniform guidance defining data requirements and sources;
- o Systems for verifying the accuracy of data at all levels of command;
- o Documentation justifying changes made to data received from subordinate commands;
- o Procedures to check the accuracy of the analyses made from the data; and
- o An assessment by your auditors of the adequacy of your internal control plan.

Responsibilities

o Nominations: The FY 1992 Defense Authorization Act requires that all eight commissioners be nominated by the President no later than January 25, 1993, or the 1993 process will be terminated. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense will handle all matters relating to the Secretary's recommendations to the President for appointments to the 1993 Commission. All inquiries from individuals interested in serving on the Commission should be referred to the Assistant to the Secretary.

o Commission Support: The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) (USD(A)) and the Director of Administration and Management will coordinate the Department's support to the 1993 Commission.

o Final Selection Criteria: The USD(A) in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other officials as may be appropriate, shall consider whether the final selection criteria developed in accordance with Public Law 101-510 should be amended. Proposed amendments to the selection criteria must be made in accordance with Public Law 101-510 and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

o Force Structure Plan: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the USD(A), DoD Comptroller, and such other officials as may be appropriate, shall develop the force structure plan in accordance with Public Law 101-510, as amended, and submit it to the Secretary of Defense for approval. Pending issuance of the force structure plan by the Secretary of Defense, DoD components shall use the force table in the force structure plan promulgated by the Secretary of Defense on March 19, 1991.

o Additional Instructions: The USD(A) may issue such instructions as may be necessary: to implement these policies, procedures, authorities and responsibilities; to ensure timely submission of work products to the Secretary of Defense and to the 1993 Commission; and, to ensure consistency in application of the selection criteria, methodology and reports to the Secretary of Defense, the 1993 Commission and the Congress. The authority and duty of the Secretary of Defense to issue regulations under Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510 as amended are hereby delegated and assigned to the USD(A). The USD(A) should exercise that authority in coordination with other DoD officials as appropriate.

o Primary Point of Contact: The USD(A) shall be the primary point of contact for the Department of Defense with the 1993 Commission. Each DoD component shall designate to USD(A) one or more points of contact with the 1993 Commission. USD(A) shall establish procedures for interaction with the 1993 Commission similar to the procedures used to interact with the 1991 Commission.

o Internal Controls: The DoD Inspector General shall be available to assist the DoD Components in developing, implementing and evaluating internal control plans.

Submitting Recommendations

The Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Directors of the Defense Agencies, and the heads of other DoD Components shall (without delegation) submit their recommendations for base realignments or closures under this law to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) for appropriate processing and forwarding to the Secretary of Defense for approval.

The USD(A) shall issue a schedule to ensure submission of recommendations to the 1993 Commission by March 15, 1993, allowing adequate time for action by the Secretary of Defense.

Selection Criteria

The following selection criteria shall be used to begin base structure studies and to make base realignment and closure recommendations. Studies must be revalidated against the final selection criteria approved by the Secretary of Defense in the event that the final selection criteria differ from those set forth below.

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.
8. The environmental impact.



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

May 5, 1992

ACQUISITION

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: 1993 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 93)

I hereby redelegate to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics all the authorities and responsibilities delegated to me by the Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum of today's date titled, "1993 Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC 93)."


Don Kockey



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

August 4, 1992

11

PRODUCTION AND
LOGISTICS

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: 1993 Base Closure Policy Memorandum One

Background

Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum of May 5, 1992, (attached) established policy, procedures, authorities, and responsibilities for closing and realigning bases under Public Law (P.L.) 101-510, as amended by P.L. 102-190, for the 1993 base closure process (BRAC 93). The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition delegated USD(A) authorities and responsibilities to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics (ASD(P&L)) on May 5, 1992, (also attached). This memorandum is the first in a series of additional ASD(P&L) policy memoranda implementing the Deputy Secretary's BRAC 93 guidance. ASD(P&L) policy memoranda of January 7, February 13, March 7 and March 26, 1991, are hereby cancelled.

Cumulative Impacts on Installations

P.L. 101-510 stipulates that no action may be taken to carry out a closure or realignment that exceeds the thresholds set forth in the Act, until those actions have obtained final approval pursuant to the Act.

In determining whether the Act's numerical closure or realignment thresholds are met, independent actions that result in closures or realignments shall be considered separately. In other words, the cumulative impact of independent actions need not be considered when determining application of the Act. However, closure or realignment actions shall not be broken into smaller increments for the purpose of avoiding application of the Act. Subject to the foregoing, closure or realignment actions that do not exceed the numerical thresholds set forth in the Act may proceed outside the established BRAC 93 process. Questions whether or not proposed actions are independent should be referred to DoD Components' General Counsel.

Applicability of P.L. 101-510

DoD Components must use a common date to determine P.L. 101-510 applicability. For BRAC 93, the common date will be September 30, 1992, the last quarter of actual data available for use in making BRAC 93 recommendations before March 15, 1993, reporting deadline.

Also, nonappropriated fund employees are not direct hire, permanent civilian employees of the Department of Defense, as defined by P.L. 101-510, and therefore should not be considered in determining applicability of the law.

Activities in Leased Space

DoD Component organizations located in leased space are subject to P.L. 101-510. Civilian personnel authorizations of organizations in leased space, which are part of an organization located on a nearby military installation or one within the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA), shall be considered part of the civilian personnel authorizations of that installation. Each DoD Component should aggregate the remaining civilian personnel authorizations of their organizations in leased space within a MSA and consider the aggregate to be a single installation for applying the numerical thresholds of P.L. 101-510. For the National Capital Region (NCR), the NCR, as defined by the National Capital Planning Act (40USC71), will be used as the MSA.

Categories of Bases

One of the first steps in evaluating the base structure for potential closures or realignments must involve grouping installations with like missions, capabilities, or attributes into categories, and when applicable, subcategories. Categorizing bases is the necessary link between the forces described in the Force Structure Plan and the base structure. Determining categories of bases is a DoD Component responsibility.

Capacity/Military Value Analyses

Another early evaluation step is determining whether each category/subcategory has potential excess capacity for the end state force levels contained in the Force Structure Plan. Should no excess capacity be found in a category/subcategory, there is no need to continue analyzing that portion of the base structure, unless there is a military value or other reason to continue the analysis. Bases in such categories/subcategories shall remain available as potential receivers of missions or functions.

Conversely, if you recommend a base for closure or realignment, your analysis must have considered all bases within that category/subcategory, as well as cross-category opportunities. If in applying the military value criteria, you find bases that are militarily/geographically unique or mission-essential (such that no other base could substitute for them) you may justify that fact and exclude these bases from further analysis.

Criteria Measures/Factors

DoD Components must develop and use one or more measures/factors for applying each of the final criteria to base structure analyses. While objective measures/factors are desirable, they will not always be possible to develop. Measures/factors may also vary for different categories of bases. DoD Components must describe the relationship between each measure/factor used and the final criteria in BRAC 93 documentation.

Cross-Category/Multi-Service Opportunities

DoD Components should continually look for cross-category opportunities, and cooperate with sister Services and Defense Agencies to pursue multi-service asset sharing or exchange, throughout the BRAC 93 process.

COBRA Cost Model

DoD Components must use the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) cost model to calculate the costs, savings and return on investment of proposed closures and realignments. Dollar inputs to COBRA will be in FY 1994 constant dollars. The Army is executive agent for COBRA. Model improvements and documentation will be completed by October, 1992.

Data Certification

Section 2821(e) (3) of P.L. 102-190 amended P.L. 101-510 and required specified DoD personnel to certify to the best of their knowledge and belief that information provided to the Secretary of Defense or the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission (the 1993 Commission) concerning the closure or realignment of a military installation is accurate and complete.

The Deputy Secretary's BRAC 93 memorandum requires DoD Components to establish an internal control plan to ensure the accuracy of data used in BRAC 93 analyses.

In view of the above, DoD components shall establish procedures and designate appropriate personnel to certify that data collected for use in BRAC 93 analyses is accurate and complete to the best of that person's knowledge and belief. DoD Components' certification procedures should be incorporated with the required internal control plan. Both are subject to audit by the General Accounting Office. Finally, Secretaries of the Military Departments, Directors of Defense Agencies, and heads of other DoD Components must certify to the Secretary of Defense that data used in making BRAC 93 recommendations to the Secretary are accurate and complete to the best of their knowledge and belief.


Information provided to the 1993 Commission pursuant to a request after March 15, 1993, must also be certified. However, ASD(P&L) involvement must be maintained, as ASD(P&L) has been designated the primary point of contact for DoD with the 1993 Commission. Also, DoD Component certification procedures must not result in lengthy delays in providing requested information. DoD Components must therefore establish special procedures to ensure not only that appropriate certifications are made by designated personnel, but also that responses to requests for information are timely, while allowing sufficient time for DoD Component headquarters and ASD(P&L) involvement.

Force Structure Plan

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should coordinate the Force Structure Plan required by the Deputy Secretary's BRAC 93 memorandum with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the General Counsel, in addition to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, ASD(P&L), and DoD Comptroller.

Dissemination of Guidance

DoD Components shall disseminate the Deputy Secretary's guidance, this policy memorandum, and subsequent policy memoranda as widely as possible throughout their organizations.


Colin McMillan
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Production and Logistics)

Attachments



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000



December 3, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION

SUBJECT: Base Closure and Realignment Proposals in Support of Streamlining of
Defense Depot Maintenance Activities

To streamline defense depot maintenance activities and increase efficiency, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, shall prepare integrated proposals, with cross-Service inputs, to streamline defense depot maintenance activities, for the Secretary of Defense's consideration for submission to the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510). Such proposals shall be designed to support the following lead Military Department assignments for defense-wide depot maintenance:

- Department of the Army lead -- ground weapon systems and equipment
- Department of the Navy lead -- ships, other watercraft, and ship systems
- Department of the Air Force lead -- fixed and rotary wing aviation and aviation systems.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition may issue such instructions as may be necessary to implement this memorandum. Instructions to the Military Departments shall be issued through the Secretaries of the Military Departments.



PRODUCTION AND
LOGISTICS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

04 DEC 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT: Base Closure Policy Memorandum Two

Background

This memorandum is the second in a series of additional ASD(P&L) policy guidance implementing the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Deputy Secretary's 1993 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 93) guidance of May 5, 1992. ASD(P&L) Policy Memorandum One was dated August 4, 1992.

Military Treatment Facility (MTF) Analyses

The Secretaries of the Military Departments will be responsible for including Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs) in their BRAC 93 analyses. Nominations of the Military Departments of MTF closures or realignments will be reviewed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)) and returned to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The final recommendations of the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the Secretary of Defense will include the views of the ASD(HA), if different from those of the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments and ASD(HA), working together through the Health Affairs Base Closure Joint Service Working Group, may also identify MTFs as candidates for closure or reduction, such as when multiple DoD health care delivery activities create overlapping catchment areas or when small beneficiary populations reside within areas where more cost effective alternatives should be considered. Working group recommendations will be forwarded to the Secretaries of the Military Departments for inclusion in their final recommendations as appropriate. If the Secretary of a Military Department disagrees with a closure recommendation forwarded by the Health Affairs Base Closure Joint Service Working Group, the Secretary shall forward the Group's recommendation with the Secretary's reason for disagreeing, to the Secretary of Defense.

Return on Investment (ROI)

Return on investment must be calculated, considered and reported with DoD Components' justifications for each recommended closure or realignment package. All costs and savings attributable over time to a closure or realignment package, subject to the below guidance, should be calculated, including costs or savings at receiving locations. Costs or savings elements that are identified, but determined to be insignificant, need not be calculated. However, DoD Component records should indicate that determination.

The Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model calculates return on investment. ASD(P&L) Policy Memorandum One required the Military Departments and Defense Agencies to use the current COBRA version (4.0), in order to ensure consistency in methodology. Although the model does not produce budget quality data, it uses standard cost factors and algorithms to estimate costs and savings over time.

We recognize that Military Department and Defense Agency planning and accounting mechanisms are sufficiently different to warrant Department/Agency specific standard cost factors in the COBRA model. DoD Component documentation must justify the use of such cost factors.

Attachment 1 provides additional guidance on the COBRA model and return on investment calculations for those rare instances when it is impossible to use the COBRA model for calculations.

Specific instructions follow for the calculation of health care costs, unemployment costs, Homeowners Assistance Program and environmental costs, and savings for input to the COBRA model.

o Health Care Costs

oo CHAMPUS Costs Base closures and realignments can have an impact on CHAMPUS costs DoD-wide. These net cost impacts must be included in analyses of closures or realignments involving Military Treatment Facilities.

oo Medicare Costs Medicare costs will not be included in DoD Component cost analyses. The Medicare program consists of Part A (hospital and related costs) and Part B (supplemental costs). Part A is financed by Medicare payroll taxes. The only appropriated funds used to support Medicare are those portions of the Part B costs that exceed the monthly premiums paid by the members/beneficiaries. Therefore, total Medicare appropriations will not significantly change return on investment calculations.

o Unemployment Costs The Military Departments and Defense Agencies annually budget unemployment contributions to the Federal Employees Compensation Account for DoD military and civilian employees. DoD Components should include the contributions attributable to closures and realignments in their cost calculations.

o Homeowners Assistance Program (HAP) The Secretary of the Army will provide each Military Department and Defense Agency with a list of installations that have a reasonable probability of having a HAP program approved, should the installation be selected for closure or realignment. HAP costs will be included for each of the installations so identified by the Secretary of the Army.

o Environmental Restoration Costs Environmental Restoration costs at closing bases are not to be considered in cost of closure calculations. DoD has a legal obligation for environmental restoration regardless of whether a base is closed or realigned. Where closing or realigning installations have unique contamination problems requiring environmental restoration, these will be considered as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse of the installation.

o Environmental Compliance Costs Environmental compliance costs can be a factor in a base closure or realignment decision. Costs associated with bringing existing practices into compliance with environmental rules and regulations can potentially be avoided when the base closes. Environmental compliance costs may be incurred at receiving locations also, and therefore will be estimated.

o Land Value Given existing statute and practice regarding the disposal of real property, especially public benefit transfers, land and facilities value may not always be realized. In cases where some proceeds can be expected, Military Departments and Defense Agencies must estimate the amount to be received for such real property. Estimated land and facility value will generally be based on the anticipated highest and best use for the land and facilities, assuming appropriate zoning, unless readily available information indicates that zoning is likely to be more restrictive. Where installations have unique contamination problems, a portion of the installation may have to be segregated from disposal so that community reuse may proceed on the balance. Estimated value should be adjusted: for any such parceling, including discounting proceeds when sale of contaminated property is possible only after cleanup is complete; for reduced prices where property is likely to be sold for restricted uses; or, when significant public benefit discount transfers are anticipated.

o Force Structure Savings The savings associated with force structure drawdowns shall not be included in the return on investment calculations. While decreased force structure will often be the underlying reason for recommending base closures or realignments, the savings associated with closing bases should be founded on the elimination of base operating support (BOS), infrastructure and related costs.

o Military Construction Military Departments and Defense Agencies will describe anticipated construction requirements (barracks square feet, etc.) to implement a BRAC recommendation and not actual projects. These requirements only become projects during the implementation phase after the Commission meets and after installation site surveys are conducted and formal project documents (DD 1391s) are prepared.

o Construction Cost Avoidances Closing and realigning bases can result in construction cost avoidances. Cost avoidances should include FY94-99 programmed military and family housing construction that can be avoided at the closing or realigning base, other than new-mission construction.

COBRA Model Assumptions

The following statements clarify certain cost assumptions written into the COBRA model:

- o Local Moves. Moves of less than 50 miles will not incur PCS moving costs.

- o Priority Placement System Costs. Forty-one percent of all employees placed in other jobs through the DoD Priority Placement Program will be relocated at government expense (based on historical data).

- o Students. For the purposes of return on investment calculations, relocation of students will only impact the COBRA model's calculation of overhead costs, and as appropriate, estimates of military construction requirements.

Economic Impacts

Attachment 2 provides guidance on the calculation of economic impact on closing, realigning and receiving communities.

Environmental Impacts

Attachment 3 provides guidance on documenting environmental impact considerations at closing, realigning and receiving locations.

For environmental impact considerations, there is no need to undertake new environmental studies. DoD Components may use all available environmental information regardless of when, how or for what purpose it was collected. If a DoD Component should choose to undertake a new environmental study, the study must collect the same information from all bases in the DoD Component's base structure, unless the study is designed to fill gaps in information so that all bases can be treated equally. Attachment 3 provides a sample of the reporting format used to summarize the environmental consequences of closure or realignment of an installation.

Receiving Bases

DoD Components must identify receiving bases for large units or activities, including tenants which are to be relocated from closing or realigning bases. The COBRA model will calculate the costs for relocating such units or activities. DoD Components do not need to identify specific receiving bases for units or tenants with less than 100 civilian/military employees. Finding homes for these activities can be left to execution. However, DoD Components should establish a generic "base x" within the COBRA model to act as the surrogate receiving base for the aggregation of these smaller units or activities, in order to ensure completeness of cost and savings calculations.

Reserve Enclaves

On each base designated for closure or realignment the future of guard and reserve units of all Military Departments residing on or receiving support from that base must be considered. Once a decision has been made to include an enclave or relocate guard and reserve units, the effected unit identifications must be included in the DoD Component's recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Military construction and repair costs of fitting out an enclave for reserve component or guard use will be estimated.

Community Preference

Military Departments and Defense Agencies must document the receipt of valid requests received under section 2924 of P.L. 101-510 and document the steps taken to give them special consideration. Such documentation is subject to review by the General Accounting Office, the Commission and the Congress.

Release of Information

Public Law 101-510, as amended, established the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to review the Secretary of Defense's recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations and to conduct public hearings on the recommendations. Unless specifically required by law, data used by the DoD Components to analyze and evaluate military installations will not be released until the Secretary's recommendations have been forwarded to the Commission.

The General Accounting Office (GAO), however, has a special role in assisting the Commission in its review and analysis of the Secretary's recommendations and must also prepare a report detailing the Secretary's selection process. As such, the GAO will be provided, upon request, with as much information as possible without compromising the deliberative process. The Military Departments and Defense Agencies must keep records of all data provided to the GAO.

Actions With Multiple Installation Impacts

This expands the policy guidance on cumulative impacts on installations previously provided in ASD(P&L) Policy Memorandum One.

As the DoD Components review their base structure or conduct functional studies with base closure or realignment impacts, a determination must be made as to whether a review or study impacting more than one installation should be considered a single action under P.L. 101-510. To be considered a single action, the review or study must:

- (1) Result in the closure or realignment of at least one installation which would trigger the numerical thresholds of P.L. 101-510; and
- (2) Involve inextricably linked elements, in that failure to proceed with any one element of the action would require reevaluation of the entire action.

Reporting Formats

Attachment 4 describes the reporting formats for: (1) the anticipated DoD report to the Commission, and (2) Military Department and Defense Agency justifications for their March 15, 1993, closure and realignment recommendations.

Col. McVicker

Attachments

1. Return on Investment Calculations
2. Economic Impact Calculations
3. Environmental Impact Considerations
4. Report Format

Return on Investment Calculations (COBRA Alternative)

In those rare instances when use of the COBRA model is not possible, Return on Investment can be calculated as follows:

- 1) Array all the calculated costs and savings by fiscal year for the closure or realignment option. Costs and savings should be arrayed uninflated for 20 years.
- 2) Discount each year of the net costs or savings using a 10 percent discount rate.
- 3) Determine the fiscal year the closure or realignment is completed. The year of the closure is defined as the year in which the majority of personnel have left, and the mission and functions cease to be performed at the installation. For these calculations, a closure or realignment can be considered complete even if the installation is in caretaker status.
- 4) Count the number of years, after the year of completion, it takes for the net present value to reach zero or become negative. This number is the return on investment years.
- 5) Sum the discounted net costs/savings for the 20-year period. This sum is the 20-year net present value.

OMB Circular A-94 applies to these calculations, in general, by specifying a 10 percent discount rate and zero percent inflation.

Exceptions to the above guidance will be considered on a case by case basis by ASD(P&L) if warranted.

Attachment 1

Economic Impact Calculations

Economic impact on communities will be measured by the direct and indirect effect on employment at closing and realigning bases, as well as at receiving locations.

The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) will design and update computer spreadsheets with the appropriate multipliers to measure indirect economic impacts.

The Military Departments and Defense Agencies will be responsible for determining changes in military, civilian and contractor employment at each base. Only contractor personnel employed on the base, or in the immediate vicinity, which support on-base activities will be considered. This is the direct employment impact. The OEA spreadsheets have a place for entry of this data which will be a Military Department and Defense Agency responsibility. Once entered, the computerized spreadsheet will calculate the economic impact (the direct and indirect effect on employment) of the closure or realignment for each affected installation. The military and DoD civilian data used for calculating the economic impact must be the same as used in the COBRA model.

Environmental Impact Considerations

SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
RESULTING FROM CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT ACTION AT:

Installation Name

Location

(Provide a summary statement and status for the following environmental attributes at each installation affected by the closure/realignment action, including receiving installations. These key environmental attributes are not meant to be all inclusive. Others may be added as appropriate.)

- o Threatened or Endangered Species
- o Wetlands
- o Historic or archeological sites
- o Pollution Control
- o Hazardous Materials/Wastes
- o Land Use and Airspace Implications
- o Programmed Environmental Costs/Cost Avoidances

Department of Defense
Base Closure and Realignment
Report to the Commission

Executive Summary (Volume I)

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
| 1. 1993 Base Closure Procedures | P&L |
| 2. Force Structure Summary - Unclassified | Joint Staff |
| 3. Final Criteria | P&L |
| 4. Compilation of Recommendations | P&L |
| 5. Implementation | P&L |

Appendices

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----|
| i. Public Law 101-510 (as amended) | P&L |
| ii. Section 2687, Title 10, US Code | P&L |
| iii. DoD Policy Memoranda | P&L |
| iv. Base Structure Summary | P&L |
| v. History of Base Closures | P&L |
| vi. Index of Affected Bases & Personnel Impacts | P&L |

Force Structure Plan (classified) (Volume II)

Joint Staff

Department of the Army Analyses and Recommendations (Volume III)

Army

1. Executive Summary
2. Statement of Purpose
3. Service Projected Force Structure
4. Service Process
5. Description of Analyses
6. Recommendations (see attached format)
7. Budget Impacts
8. Classified Appendices (if required)

Department of the Navy Analyses and Recommendations (Volume IV)

Navy & Marine Corps

1. Executive Summary
2. Statement of Purpose
3. Service Projected Force Structure
4. Service Process
5. Description of Analyses
6. Recommendations (see attached format)
7. Budget Impacts
8. Classified Appendices (if required)

Department of the Air Force Analyses and Recommendations (Volume V)

Air Force

1. Executive Summary
2. Statement of Purpose
3. Service Projected Force Structure
4. Service Process
5. Description of Analyses
6. Recommendations (see attached format)
7. Budget Impacts
8. Classified Appendices (if required)

Defense Agencies Analyses and Recommendations (Volume VI)

Defense Agencies

1. Executive Summary
2. Statement of Purpose
3. Agency Projected Force Structure
4. Agency Process
5. Description of Analyses
6. Recommendations (see attached format)
7. Budget Impacts
8. Classified Appendices (if required)

Attachment 4.

Name of Recommendation
(e g., John Q. Public Naval Air Facility, [State])

Recommendation: Describe what is to be closed and/or realigned; units, functions or organizations that will be eliminated or moved; identify the receiving installations, if applicable; and describe units functions or organizations that will remain on the base, if applicable.

Justification: Explain the reasons for the recommendation: i.e., force structure reductions, mission transfer, consolidation or elimination, excess capacity, etc., as applicable.

Impact: Describe the impact the recommendation will have on the local community's economy in terms of direct and indirect employment loss. Also include an estimate of the cost of implementing the recommendation and expected annual savings after implementation.



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000
December 9, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: 1993 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 93)
Recommendations

The Secretaries of the Military Departments and other DoD Components shall submit their recommendations for base realignments or closures under Public Law 101-510 to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics) by 8:00am on February 22, 1993.

ASD(P&L) will process and forward the recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for approval. Recommendations should be submitted in the format described in ASD(P&L) Base Closure Policy Memorandum Two.

Colin McMillen



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

10 December 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Selection Criteria

The attached 1993 Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC 93) Selection Criteria, required by Section 2903(b) of P.L. 101-510, form the basis, along with the force structure plan, of the base closure and realignment process. DoD components shall use these criteria in the base structure analysis to nominate BRAC 93 closure or realignment candidates. The criteria will also be used by the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in their review of the Department of Defense final recommendations.

D. J. Atwood

Attachment

**Department of Defense Final Criteria
for
Closing and Realigning
Military Installations Inside the United States**

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.
8. The environmental impact.



PRODUCTION AND
LOGISTICS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-8000

December 24, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (INSTALLATIONS,
LOGISTICS AND ENVIRONMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (INSTALLATIONS
AND ENVIRONMENT)
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
(INSTALLATIONS)

SUBJECT: Base Closure Cumulative Economic Impact

Base Closure Policy Memorandum Two included guidance on the calculation of economic impact at closing, realigning or receiving bases during the 1993 round of base closures (BRAC 93). Specifically, the Military Departments and Defense Agencies are responsible for determining changes in military, civilian and contractor employment at each base recommended for closure, realignment or as a receiving base, and entering this data into the economic impact spreadsheet supplied by the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA).

To ensure that the impact of previous closures and realignments are reflected in cumulative economic impact considerations, data must also be entered for closed, realigned or gaining bases identified during BRAC 88 and BRAC 91. This information should be readily available in your BRAC 91 economic impact spreadsheet printouts. Any adjustments to previous BRAC 88 or BRAC 91 actions necessitated by BRAC 93 recommendations should also be made on the spreadsheets (i.e., personnel now going to Base "Y" instead of Base "X", etc).

We will combine Department/Agency spreadsheets to determine DoD-wide cumulative economic impact within each defined geographic area.

If you have any questions please contact Mr. Dom Miglionico at 697-8050.

David J. Berteau
Principal Deputy



JAN 28 1993

PRODUCTION AND
LOGISTICS

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (INSTALLATIONS,
LOGISTICS AND ENVIRONMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (INSTALLATIONS AND
ENVIRONMENT)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
(INSTALLATIONS)
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Base Closure and Realignment--Additional Guidance


As we go through the final weeks of preparation before presenting a list of closure candidates to the Secretary, I want to review a few remaining details for your submissions which are due on February 22, 1993,

- o We will need 5 hard copies of your unclassified section and 5 copies of your classified submission (if required) of the final report (refer to ASD(P&L) Base Closure Policy Memorandum Two, attachment 4). We will need additional copies in March for distribution to the Commission, Congress, the GAO, etc.
- o Your "Recommendation" pages need not necessarily be limited to one page. The importance your "one-page" recommendations and justifications will play in this process cannot be over emphasized, especially the recommendations, which must be complete. Therefore, the ability to withstand public and Commission scrutiny overrides the desire for brevity. Although they are part of your final report, we will also need your "Recommendation" pages on a 5 1/4" or 3 1/2" floppy disk in WordPerfect 5.0 or 5.1.
- o We will need a copy of the COBRA Personnel Movement Report (refer to page 125, COBRA User's Manual) for each base in your closure/realignment scenarios.

- o We will need a printout and computer disk of your economic impact spreadsheets for your BRAC 93 recommendations.
- o We will also need the number of military, civilian, and estimated Base Operating Support contractor employees on board each of your BRAC 88 and BRAC 91 closures and realignments as of June 30, 1991. This information will be used to calculate DoD-wide cumulative impact by OASD(P&L). Refer to ASD(P&L) memorandum of December 24, 1992.
- o The above data and information is all due February 22, 1993.

Based on our review of the new OMB Circular A-94 (October 29, 1992) the discount rate for COBRA Return on Investment Calculations has been changed to 7 percent vice 10 percent. Please make this change to the COBRA standard factors file and note the change in your copy of Base Closure Policy Memorandum Two, dated December 4, 1992. Also, since the COBRA model is being continually refined, please delete any references to "version 4.0" in the memorandum.

Finally, I want to take this opportunity to thank you and your staffs for all your support and hard work during this BRAC 93 process.


David J. Berteau
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Production and Logistics)

Appendix E

DoD Base Structure - Summary of Domestic and Overseas Reductions

Table 1A - Major Domestic Closures

	<u>U.S. Bases</u>	<u>BRAC 88</u>	<u>BRAC 91</u>	<u>BRAC 93</u>	<u>Bases Remaining</u>	<u>Reduction</u>
Army	109	-7	-4	-2	96	12%
Navy/USMC	168	-4	-9	-23	132	21%
Air Force	206	-5	-13	-4	184	11%
Defense Agencies	<u>12</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>-2</u>	<u>10</u>	17%
Totals	495	-16	-26	-31	422	15%

Table 1B - Major Domestic Realignments

	<u>BRAC 88</u>	<u>BRAC 91</u>	<u>BRAC 93</u>	<u>Bases Affected</u>
Army	10	5	4	19
Navy/USMC	1	12	5	18
Air Force	0	2	3	5
Defense Agencies	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	11	19	12	42

**Table 1C - Summary of Domestic Plant Replacement Value (PRV) Reductions
(\$Billions)**

	<u>FY91</u>	<u>BRAC 88/91</u>	<u>BRAC 93</u>	<u>PRV Remaining</u>	<u>Reduction</u>
Army	151.9	-14.9	-3.7	133.3	12%
Navy/USMC	170.6	-10.7	-17.8	142.1	17%
Air Force	<u>160.5</u>	<u>-19.2</u>	<u>-7.6</u>	<u>133.7</u>	17%
Totals	483.0	-44.8	-29.1	409.1	15%

Note: Plant replacement value is what it would cost to replace all the buildings, pavements, and utilities at a base. DoD measures progress in terms of plant replacement value because it is a better measure of the magnitude of reductions in infrastructure than simply counting large bases and small bases equally.

Table 2A - Base Structure - Summary of Actions to End or Reduce Operations Overseas

(Number of Sites)

	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>Announced to Date</u>	<u>Remaining</u>	<u>Reduction</u>
<i>Europe</i>				
Army	847	440	407	52%
Navy/USMC	85	24	61	28%
Air Force	470	185	285	39%
<i>Pacific/East Asia</i>				
Army	112	18	94	16%
Navy/USMC	26	11	15	42%
Air Force	79	8	71	10%
<i>Western Hemisphere/ Misc. Locations</i>				
Army	15	13	2	87%
Navy/USMC	9	3	6	33%
Air Force	<u>26</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>24</u>	8%
Totals	1,669	704	965	42%

Table 2B - Base Structure - Summary of Overseas Reductions by Plant Replacement Value (PRV)

(\$Billions)

	<u>FY 91</u>	<u>Announced to Date</u>	<u>Planned Thru FY 96</u>	<u>Total Reduction</u>	<u>Reduction</u>
Army	53.9	17.9	6.0	23.9	44%
Navy/USMC	26.4	6.4	1.0	7.4	28%
Air Force	<u>60.2</u>	<u>19.2</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>22.2</u>	37%
Totals	140.5	43.5	10.0	53.5	38%

Appendix F

History of Base Closures

Background

In the early 1960s, under the direction of President Kennedy, Secretary of Defense McNamara developed and subsequently implemented the most extensive base realignment and closure program in the history of the United States. Hundreds of base closures and realignments took place during this period, and more than 60 major bases were closed. Criteria governing bases selected for closure were established primarily within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with minimal consultation with the Military Departments or the Congress.

The Congress had not anticipated the broad extent of these actions, and their cumulative political impact was substantial. With very few exceptions, the closure actions were viewed negatively by the Congress.

Legislative History of Section 2687

In 1965, the Congress passed legislation setting up reporting requirements designed to involve itself in any DoD base closure program. The legislation was vetoed by President Johnson and the confrontation between the Executive and Legislative branches of government grew. Despite this situation, the Department of Defense was able to complete base realignments and closures routinely throughout the 1960s.

During the early 1970s, the Department found it increasingly difficult to realign or close installations due to repeated attempts by the Congress to regulate the base closure process and to limit or deny base closure funding. In 1976, the Military Construction Authorization Bill contained a provision prohibiting any base closure or reduction of more than 250 civilian employees until the Department had notified Congress of the proposed actions, assessed the personnel and economic impacts, followed the study provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and waited nine months. This bill was vetoed by President Ford and the Congressional veto override effort failed.

In 1977, however, President Carter approved legislation requiring the Department to notify Congress that a base is a candidate for reduction or closure; prepare local economic, environmental, and strategic consequence reports; and wait 60 days for Congress' response. The legislation was codified as Section 2687, Title 10, U.S. Code and is at Appendix B. Section 2687, coupled with the requirements of NEPA, effectively brought base closures to a halt.

The Next Decade

For the next decade after passage of Section 2687, all attempts at closing major installations met with failure, and even proposed movements of small military units were frustrated.

Given that situation, President Reagan's Administration began discussing with the Congress the development of a comprehensive proposal recommending base closures to Congress. The President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (The Grace Commission) included in its 1983 report a finding that economies could be made in the base structure. They recommended that a non-partisan, independent commission be established to study the base closure issue in a less constrained process and submit a list of closures. Nothing came of these early efforts.

The 1988 Base Closure Commission

In 1988, Secretary of Defense Carlucci recognized that the stalemate between the Executive Branch and Legislative Branch had to be broken. The Defense budget by 1988 had declined for three straight years from the 1985 peak of the Reagan Administration buildup and was predicted to decline further.

On May 3, 1988, Secretary Carlucci chartered the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure to recommend military bases within the United States for realignment and closure. Legislation subsequently passed by the Congress and enacted by the President (Public Law 100-526) endorsed this approach and provided relief from certain statutory provisions which were impediments to the completion of base closures.

Enactment of this legislation constitutes an agreement between the Legislative and the Executive Branches that improvement in the military basing structure could be a means of realizing savings in the defense budget, while not impairing the ability of the armed forces to carry out their missions.

The 1988 Commission's Recommendations

The 1988 Base Closure Commission issued its report in December of 1988. It recommended closing 86 military installations and realigning 13 installations. An additional 46 installations were designated for increases as units and activities relocated as a result of the recommended closures and realignments. A recap of the major 1988 base closures and realignments is at Table 1 of this Appendix.

The 1988 Commission was required to base its recommendations on the force structure anticipated in 1988, which was stable. Even so, they recommended the closure of about 3 percent of the domestic base structure.

Implementing the 1988 Commission's Recommendations

Secretary Carlucci was required by Public Law 100-526 to accept or reject the 1988 Commission's recommendations in their entirety. In January of 1989, he accepted all of the recommendations. The law provided Congress with the same opportunity and by May of 1989, the Congressional review period expired without the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval. Consequently, the recommendations of the 1988 Commission now have the force of law.

DoD's planning, budgeting and implementation of the 1988 recommendations is on track. The closures and realignments were required to begin by January of 1990 and must be completed by October of 1995. DoD's comprehensive financial plan for these closures indicates that DoD will realize a net savings during implementation (FY 89-95) of over \$300 million and annual savings of \$700 million each year thereafter. These savings could be further enhanced if expected land sale proceeds of \$1.1 billion are realized.

The January 1990 List of Candidates

The world situation was changing fast at the end of 1989 as DoD was preparing to send its revised FY 1991 Budget to the Congress. The Berlin wall had fallen, the Warsaw Pact was weakening, democracy was spreading throughout the region, and Soviet-U.S. relationships were improving worldwide.

It became clear that DoD's force structure and budget could decline dramatically over the next several years, in response to reduced tensions and threats worldwide. Base closures and realignments, therefore, became a part of each Military Department's budget strategy for balancing their base structure with their declining force structure.