Statement for the Record by Dr.
Gordon C. Oehler,
Director, Nonproliferation Center
to the Senate Armed Services Committee
The Continuing Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction
March 27, 1996
Overview
The Threat of Nuclear Diversion
The Growing Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat
Iraq: A Country Study
Efforts to Control Weapons Proliferation
Intelligence Community Response
Strategic Planning Process
Intelligence Successes to Date
Appendix
A--Chronology of Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix
B--Chemical Agents
Appendix
C--Biological Agents
The Director of Central Intelligence, John Deutch, recently described a
number of troubling developments in the world. He noted that the increasingly
troubled post-Cold War world has, in a curious way, made us yearn for the dark
days of the 1960s and 1970s when we knew the kind of target we were dealing
with and the problems we were facing. One reason for this is that not only a
number of sovereign states, but now individual groups, have become willing to
buy or sell the technologies necessary to produce weapons that could have
devastating effects on economic or population centers.
Although the threat of a nuclear attack involving hundreds or perhaps
thousands of weapons from the former Soviet Union has diminished, another
threat has arisen: the potential acquisition of nuclear materials or even
nuclear weapons by states hostile to the United States or by terrorists
intent on staging incidents harmful to US interests. We currently have no evidence
that any terrorist organization has obtained contraband nuclear materials.
However, we are concerned because only a small amount of material is necessary
to terrorize populated areas.
The chilling reality is that nuclear materials and technologies are more
accessible now than at any other time in history--due primarily to the
dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the
region's worsening economic conditions. This problem is exacerbated by the
increasing diffusion of modern technology through the growth of the world
market, making it harder to detect illicit diversions of materials and
technologies relevant to a nuclear weapons program.
As you know, many of the technologies associated with WMD programs,
especially chemical and biological technologies, have legitimate civilian or
military applications unrelated to WMD. For example, chemicals used to make
nerve agents are also used to make plastics and to process foodstuffs; trade in
those technologies cannot be banned. As dual-use technology and expertise
continue to spread internationally, the prospects for chemical and biological
terrorism increase. The relative ease of production increases our concern that
the use of both chemical and biological weapons is attractive to terrorists.
Moreover, the proliferation of WMD to more and more nations has increased the
possibility that one or more of these states may choose to provide such weapons
to terrorists.
At least as worrisome is the likelihood that terrorist groups or cults can
acquire or develop chemical and biological weapons on their own. The incidents
staged in March 1995 by the Japanese cult Aum
Shinrikyo demonstrate that the use of WMD is no longer restricted to the
battlefield. Japanese authorities have determined that the Aum was working on
developing the chemical nerve agents sarin and VX. The Aum was able to
legitimately obtain all of the components that it needed to build its massive
chemical and biological infrastructures. However, terrorist groups and violent sub-national
groups need not acquire the massive infrastructure that the Aum had assembled.
Only small quantities of precursors, available on the open market, are needed
to manufacture deadly chemical or biological weapons for terrorist acts.
Extremist groups worldwide are increasingly learning how to manufacture
chemical and biological agents, and the potential for additional chemical and
biological attacks by such groups continues to grow.
[Top of page]
The Intelligence Community is taking all possible measures to aggressively
support US Government efforts to ensure the security of nuclear materials and
technologies. Let me first review why we are concerned about the security of
nuclear materials.
Russia and the other
states of the former Soviet Union are not the
only potential sources of nuclear weapons or materials. The reported theft of
approximately 130 barrels of enriched uranium waste from a storage facility in South Africa,
which was covered in the press in August 1994, demonstrates that this problem
can begin in any state where there are nuclear materials, reactors, or fuel
cycle facilities.
A few countries whose interests are inimical to the US are attempting to acquire nuclear weapons--Iraq and Iran being two or our greatest
concerns. Should one of these countries, or a terrorist group, acquire one or
more nuclear weapons, they could enormously complicate US political or military activity, threaten or
attack deployed US or allied forces, or possibly conduct an attack against the US.
Years ago there were two impediments to would-be proliferators: the
technical know-how for building a bomb and the acquisition of the fissile
material. Fissile material is the highly enriched uranium or plutonium atoms
that split apart in a chain reaction and create the energy of an atomic bomb.
Today the major impediment to a nation committed to acquiring a nuclear
capability is the acquisition of fissile material. While it is by no means easy
to make a nuclear weapons, knowledge of weapons design is sufficiently
widespread that trying to maintain a shroud of secrecy around this technical
knowledge no longer offers adequate protection.
The protection of fissile material in the former Soviet
Union has thus become even more critical at the same time that it
has become more difficult. Many of the institutional mechanisms that once
curtailed the spread of nuclear materials, technology, and knowledge no longer
exist or are present only in a weakened capacity and effective new methods of
control have yet to be fully implemented for a large portions of the world's
nuclear related materials, technology, and information.
At the same time, there is concern that terrorist groups could obtain and
use, or threaten to use, nuclear materials. Nuclear materials are divided into
two categories: 1) fissile materials, such as plutonium-239 or uranium-235, and
2) other radioactive materials, such as uranium-238, cesium-137, or cobalt-60.
We, of course, track possible diversions of plutonium and uranium. But we also
are concerned that non-fissile, radioactive materials could be used in a
terrorist device designed to create psychological or economic trauma or to
contaminate buildings, water supplies or localized areas.
The list of potential proliferators is not limited to states with nuclear
weapons ambitions. There are many non-state actors, such as separatists and
terrorist groups, criminal organizations, and individual thieves who could
choose to further their cause by using fissile or non-fissile (but radioactive)
nuclear materials. Despite press articles claiming numerous instances of
nuclear trafficking worldwide, we have no evidence that any fissile materials
have been acquired by terrorist organizations. We also have no indications of state
sponsored attempts to arm terrorist organizations with nuclear
material--fissile or non-fissile. Unfortunately, this does not preclude the
possibility that a terrorist group could acquire enough nuclear material,
potentially through illicit trades, to conduct an operation, especially one
specifically designed to incite panic.
A non-state actor does not necessarily need fissile material--which is more
difficult to acquire--for its purposes. Depending upon the group's objectives,
any radioactive material could suffice, but the use of non-fissile materials
would likely result in very little physical damage with low levels of
contamination. But non-fissile radioactive materials dispersed by a
conventional explosive or even released accidentally could cause damage to
property and the environment, and cause social, political, and economic
disruption.
Examples of non-fissionable, radioactive materials seen in press reports are
cesium-137, strontium-90, and cobalt-60. These cannot be used in nuclear
weapons but could be used to contaminate water supplies, business centers,
government facilities, or transportation networks. Although it is unlikely they
would cause significant numbers of casualties, they could cause physical
disruption, interruption of economic activity, post-incident clean-up, and
psychological trauma to a workforce and populace. Non-state actors already have
attempted to use radioactive materials in recent operations. For example:
- In November 1995, a Chechen
insurgent leader threatened to turn Moscow
into an eternal desert with radioactive waste, according to press reports.
The Chechens directed a Russian news agency to a small amount of
cesium-137 in a shielded container in a Moscow park which the Chechens claimed
to have placed. Government spokesmen told the press that the material was
not a threat, and would have to have been dispersed by explosives to be
dangerous. According to Department of Defense assessments, there was only
a very small quantity of cesium-137 in the container. If it had been
dispersed with a bomb, an area of the park could have been contaminated
with low levels of radiation. This could have caused disruption to the
populace, but would have posed a minimal health hazard for anyone outside
the immediate blast area.
- The Japanese cult Aum
Shinrikyo, which attacked Japanese civilians with deadly gas just one year
ago (March 20, 1995) also tried to mine its own uranium in Australia
and to buy Russian nuclear warheads.
Traditional terrorist groups with established sponsors probably will remain
hesitant to use a nuclear weapon, for fear of provoking a worldwide crackdown
and alienating their supporters. In contrast, a new breed of multinational
terrorists, exemplified by the Islamic extremists involved in the bombing of
the World Trade Center, might be more likely to consider such a weapon if it
were available. These groups are part of a loose association of politically
committed, mixed nationality Islamic militants, apparently motivated by
revenge, religious fervor, and a general hatred for the West.
[Top of page]
The danger that a terrorist organization like the Aum Shinrikyo could again
acquire the capability to launch an attack using chemical or biological weapons
continues to grow. Since the November 1995 hearing on the worldwide chemical
and biological weapons threat before the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, the Intelligence
Community has been engaged in continuing dialogue with Senator Nunn regarding
the Aum Shinrikyo and information the Senator's staff collected. We continue to
assess and analyze the threat of a terrorist chemical or biological weapons
attack, a threat that remains ever present.
The Aum Shinrikyo attacks in June 1994, in Matsumoto, Japan, which killed
seven and injured 500, and on the subway in Tokyo in March 1995, which killed
12 and injured 5,500, were the first instances of large-scale terrorist use of
chemical agents, but a variety of incidents and reports over the last two years
indicate a growing terrorist interest in these weapons. These incidents
include, but are not limited to:
- In February 1996, German
police confiscated from a Neo-Nazi group a coded diskette that contained
information on how to produce the chemical agent mustard gas. German
police have stated that there are no indications yet of intent or effort
to manufacture the agent.
- Tajik opposition members
lacing champagne with cyanide at a New Years celebration in January 1995,
killing six Russian soldiers and the wife of another, and sickening other
revelers.
- Press reports of the PKK
(Kurdistan Workers' Party, a guerrilla group that opposes the Turkish
Government) in southeast Turkey
poisoning Turkish water supplies with cyanide.
Such examples reflect an increased interest in and a capability to produce
chemical and biological agents. Open source literature--including access to the
Internet--provides instructions on how to make some chemical agents.
Terrorist interest in chemical and biological weapons is not surprising,
given the relative ease with which some of these weapons can be produced in
simple laboratories, the large number of casualties they can cause, and the
residual disruption of infrastructure. Although popular fiction and national attention
have focused on terrorist use of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological
weapons are more likely choices for such groups.
- In contrast to the
fabrication of nuclear weapons, the production of biological weapons
requires only a small quantity of equipment.
Even very small amounts of biological and chemical weapons can cause massive
casualties. The fact that only 12 Japanese died in the Tokyo subway attack de-emphasizes the
significance of the 5,500 people who required treatment in hospital emergency
rooms. Such a massive influx of injured--many critically--has the potential to
overwhelm emergency medical facilities, even in a large metropolitan area.
- Terrorist use of these
weapons also makes them weapons of mass disruption because of the
necessity to decontaminate affected areas before the public will be able
to begin feeling safe.
Although the Aum Shinrikyo case demonstrates that terrorists can produce CW,
they also may be able to directly acquire these weapons via other means:
- Theft of agents from
research labs;
- Acquisition of commercially
available poisons;
- Theft of chemical munitions
held by the military;
- Receipt of ready-made
chemical weapons from a state sponsor.
The continued willingness of such states as Iran,
Libya and Syria to
support terrorism highlights the danger of state sponsorship of a terrorist's
chemical or biological weapons program. Although we have no evidence of state
sponsors providing chemical or biological weapons or the technologies to
produce them to terrorist groups, recent revelations about Iraq's well hidden chemical and
biological programs highlight the difficulty in detecting national programs to
develop such weapons and disperse them to terrorist entities.
[Top of page]
The investigation of Aum leader Shoko Asahara has resulted in a number of
revelations about the cult's activities. Press reports allege that:
- Asahara ordered the
capability to produce sarin beginning in 1993; a large agent production
complex was not operational until March 1994.
- Some evidence suggests that
the group may have tested sarin on sheep in Australia. Press reports claim
that examination of some 30 sheep carcasses at an abandoned Aum site in Australia
revealed the presence of sarin and other pesticides of similar structures.
- Aum planned to produce
enough agent to annihilate a large Japanese city by spraying it from a
helicopter. Aum possessed a Russian helicopter and two drone airplanes
that, with modifications, could have been capable of delivering chemical
and biological weapons. A high-ranking Aum member reportedly obtained a
helicopter pilot's license in the US. Press reports also allege
that Aum was considering chemical attacks using remote-controlled
aircraft.
- After the breakup of the
Soviet Union, Aum expanded its activities in Russia,
claiming some 30,000 followers there in addition to the 10,000 in Japan.
- Aum's Russian element
broadcast religious radio programs into Japan from the Russian Far
East.
- Video news footage
indicates that a Russian-made GSP-11 toxic gas detector was found at the
Aum compound in Japan.
Designed to be used on the battlefield, the Russian detector can also be
used in a nerve agent production/handling facility.
- Asahara intended the simultaneous
chemical strike on 10 locations in the Tokyo subway to be a massive mystery
attack that would divert attention from the cult.
- In February 1996, The Thai
police were informed by the Japanese embassy that members of Aum Shinrikyo
had arrived in Thailand
possibly to carry out terrorist activities. One individual was arrested
and later identified as an Aum member; however, there is no information
indicating that terrorist activity was planned or conducted in Thailand.
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Iraq: A Country Study
This country study examines the magnitude of Iraq's chemical and biological
warfare programs and underscores the complexity faced by international efforts
to curb the spread of these weapons. Details about the breadth of Iraq's
chemical and biological warfare programs are presented to demonstrate the broad
range of weapons that a state sponsor of terrorism has available and could
provide to terrorists if it so chooses.
The unprecedented inspections conducted in Iraq by the UN have revealed much
about Iraqi WMD programs. In the wake of the August 1995 defection of two
high-level Iraqis, the Baghdad
government turned over to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a large cache of WMD-related
documents and have revealed even more information in extensive discussions with
both UN organizations. The sudden revelation of new information underscored the
long-standing judgment that the Iraqis had made efforts to deceive UNSCOM and
the IAEA. Such behavior resulted in UNSCOM Chairman Ekeus's delivery of a
strongly worded report to the UN Security Council that was critical of Iraq's progress
in fulfilling its obligations under the UN Resolutions imposed following the
Gulf War. Despite the UN resolutions, Iraq successfully concealed
developments in both its chemical and biological warfare programs.
[Top of page]
Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program
These revelations demonstrated the ability of countries to hide capabilities
in the face of intrusive international inspection regimes and included:
- The Iraqi program to
develop the nerve agent VX actually began as early as May 1985 and
continued until December 1990 without interruption; Iraq
claimed previously that its program spanned only the period April 1987 to
September 1988.
- Iraq produced 65 tons of
chlorine, intended for the production of VX, and had more than 200 tons
each of the precursor chemicals phosphorous pentasulfide and
diisopropylamine. Together, these three precursors would have been
sufficient to produce almost 500 tons of VX.
- Iraq developed a true binary
sarin-filled artillery shell, 122-mm rockets, and aerial bombs in
quantities beyond prototype level. An Al Husayn missile with a chemical
warhead was flight-tested in April 1990.
Iraq received significant assistance from outside suppliers.
[Top of page]
Iraq's Biological Warfare Program
Following the August 1995 defections, Iraq revealed
substantial information about its extensive biological warfare program. The
Iraqi Government adopted a policy to acquire biological weapons in 1974.
Research and development began in 1975, but went into hiatus in 1978. In 1985, Iraq restarted
biological weapons research and development. Initial work focused on literature
studies, until bacterial strains were received from overseas in April 1986.
Additionally, Iraq's
revelations to the UN included the following information on the production and
weaponization of its biological agents:
- A total of 6,000 liters of
concentrated botulinum toxin and 8,425 liters of anthrax were produced at
Al Hakam during 1990. An additional 5,400 liters of concentrated botulinum
toxin were produced at the Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Institute during
the period November 1990 to January 15, 1991; 400 liters of concentrated
botulinum toxin was produced at Taji; and 150 liters of concentrated
anthrax were produced at Salman Pak.
- Production of clostridium
perfringens (a biological agent that causes gas gangrene and, when
aerosolized, can cause severe gastric effects) began in August 1990. A
total of 340 liters of concentrated agent was produced.
- Static field trials of
anthrax simulant and botulinum toxin were conducted using aerial bombs as
early as March 1988. Effects were observed on test animals. Additional
weaponization tests took place in November 1989, with 122-mm rockets. Live
firings of 122-mm rockets filled with agents were conducted in May 1990.
- Large-scale weaponization
of BW agents began in December 1990. Iraq filled more than 150
bombs and 50 warheads with agent. All these weapons were dispersed to
forward storage locations.
- Iraq worked to adapt a
modified aircraft drop tank for biological agent spray operations
beginning in December 1990. The tank could be attached either to a piloted
fighter or to an unmanned aircraft that would be guided to the target by a
piloted aircraft. The tank was designed to spray up to 2,000 liters of
anthrax on a target. Iraq
claims the test was a failure, but three additional drop tanks were
modified and stored, ready for use.
[Top of page]
International regimes continue to be expanded to slow the proliferation of
WMD. Since the 1960s, when the US
sponsored the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), this
country has recognized that proliferation is a global problem and that
combating it requires high levels of international cooperation. The United States
has, at times, exerted unilateral influence, successfully in several cases, to
discourage proliferation, but remains committed to supporting multilateral
efforts to stem proliferation. To that end, the US successfully pursued the
permanent extension of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear technologies to
countries and entities attempting to acquire such weapons.
With regard to the former Soviet Union, the Russians have accepted US assistance
in upgrading equipment, training, and procedures, in order to address
deficiencies in their security programs. Joint US-Russian cooperation on
improving material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) has been
ongoing since the signing of an agreement between MINATOM--the Russian Ministry
of Atomic Energy--and the US Department of Defense in September 1992. The
Intelligence Community has monitored the safety and security practices at
Russian non-Ministry
of Defense fissile
materials facilities for some time. A comprehensive examination revealed that
none of these facilities in Russia
or other newly independent states had adequate safeguards or security measures
by international standards for weapons-useable materials. The Intelligence Community
has assisted the policy community in identifying the most critical Russian
civilian sites handling weapons-useable material that could benefit from US
efforts. This provided a starting point for US and Russian agreement on which
facilities to concentrate initial MPC&A improvement efforts. This
cooperation has been steadily expanding and currently involves over a dozen
MINATOM facilities and a comparable number of facilities outside of Russia.
The US
also has played a significant role in Kazakstan. After several months of
sensitive negotiations, the United States
purchased from Kazakstan and brought to the US Department of Energy's facility
at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for storage, 600 kilograms of
highly enriched uranium. As a result, that material is unavailable to nuclear
traffickers and proliferation states.
Chemical and biological weapons regimes represent additional elements in the
strategy to limit WMD. These efforts include:
- The Australia Group (AG) --
Formed in 1984 as a result of the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq
war, the AG is an informal forum of states whose goal is to discourage and
impede proliferation by harmonizing national export controls on CW
precursor chemicals and manufacturing equipment, sharing information on
target countries, and seeking other ways to curb the use of chemical
weapons. It has since been expanded to include biological weapons.
- The Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) -- Opened for signature in 1993 and subsequently signed
by 160 countries, the CWC bans the use, development, production and
storage of chemical warfare agents and munitions and requires the
destruction of all existing stocks and facilities for their production.
The CWC will enter into force 180 days after the 65th country deposits
instruments of ratification (to date 47 countries have ratified the CWC).
International negotiations the bring the CWC into force are under way.
- The Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC) -- Ratified by 137 countries, the BWC prohibits the
development, production, stockpiling or transfer of biological agents and
weapons and mandates the destruction of all existing stocks.
While these international nonproliferation efforts
were not designed to prevent terrorism, they do include nonproliferation
provisions that will enhance our efforts to fight attempts by rogue states and
by terrorists to acquire, to transfer, and to use chemical weapons and their
precursors. For example, the CWC will require States Parties to cease transfers
of certain CW agents and CW precursor chemicals to non-States Parties and to
restrict such transfers to other parties. Additionally, at a BWC Special
Conference held in Geneva in September 1994, the
US,
in order to help deter violations of and enhance compliance with the BWC,
promoted the development of a legally binding instrument that increased
transparency of activities and facilities that could have biological weapons
applications.
Though they include provisions that should aid in
preventing the acquisition of WMD by terrorist entities, treaties such as the
NPT, CWC and BWC will likely be of limited effectiveness in halting the
acquisition of WMD technologies by groups determined to possess them. Even if
the CWC had been in effect at the time Aum Shinrikyo began its CW program, Aum
was purchasing only Schedule 3 chemicals--including phosphorous
trichloride--which it claimed were for the production of chemical pesticides
for use on its agricultural holdings. In addition, the Aum was in the process
of establishing its own university and would have been able to purchase
laboratory stocks of the same chemicals in Japan without attracting attention.
An effective program to combat terrorist use of
WMD will require vigorous efforts by police and intelligence agencies, from
local police through international law enforcement and intelligence
organizations, to detect and intercept possible terrorist attacks.
[Top of page]
The mission of the US Intelligence Community in the counterproliferation arena
is to support those who make and execute all four aspects of US
counterproliferation policy: preventing acquisition; capping or rolling back
existing programs; deterring use of WMD; and ensuring US forces' ability to
operate against proliferated weapons.
To achieve these ends, the Intelligence Community focuses its efforts on
providing accurate, comprehensive, timely, and actionable foreign intelligence.
The Community has also searched for new ways and opportunities to add
substantial value to counterproliferation policy decisions and activities. This
has included:
- Support to those policy
makers responsible for implementation of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons wherein the US and
other signatories have expressed their nonproliferation commitments;
- Support to those
implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, wherein the US and
other signatories have expressed their commitments to end nuclear testing;
and
- Examining the entire
Russian nuclear weapons cycle to identify areas where transparency
measures would be most effective.
- Maintaining a surge
capability to quickly deploy specialists outside the United States
to the scene of a terrorist nuclear or radiological threat to provide the
US Mission and host government advice and guidance on dealing with the
threat. During such an event, the specialists would coordinate fully with
appropriate United States Government Agencies, keeping them informed and
drawing upon their expertise if follow-up action is required.
[Top of page]
US
Intelligence has instituted a corporate strategic planning and evaluation
process for support to counter proliferation. This process contributes to the
Intelligence Community's National Needs Process and the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP),
and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) program and
Planning Guidance. A major benefit of this effort has been the establishment of
a significant Department of Defense (DoD) representation within the DCI's Nonproliferation Center. This has helped integrate
Intelligence support to DoD counterproliferation needs and actions. The
Intelligence Community also has expanded its relations with the law enforcement
community and is sharing information and resources in support of the law
enforcement community's counterproliferation efforts.
The Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on Nonproliferation and Export
Controls, related PDDs, Congressional Language, reports from government committees
engaged in counterproliferation, and policy statements of several government
agencies have shaped the Intelligence Community's counterproliferation
strategic planning process and have helped determine a list of priority
customer information requirements. These requirements are addressed in various
Intelligence Community action programs such as the Annual Strategic
Intelligence Review, the WMD Integrated Collection Strategy, the Countering WMD
Strategic Plan, and the NSC-directed country studies.
As the threat of proliferation has increased, US Intelligence capabilities
to support counterproliferation efforts have been redirected or expanded and
now include:
- Assessing the intentions
and plans of proliferating nations;
- Identifying nuclear weapons
programs and clandestine transfer networks set up to obtain controlled
materials or launder money;
- Supporting diplomatic, law
enforcement, and military efforts to counter proliferation;
- Providing direct support
for multilateral initiatives and security regimes; and
- Overcoming denial and
deception practices set up by proliferators to conceal their programs.
US Intelligence has taken
or participated in actions to address the overall challenges facing US
counterproliferation efforts, including:
- Formation of the
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (NPAC/TWG) to
enhance the coordination of R&D efforts among intelligence,
operational, policy and other elements of the US Government;
- Work on the
DCI-commissioned Technical Intelligence Collection Review (TICR) to
identify future shortfalls in sensors against WMD and related delivery
systems activities. This review addresses the 1994 Nonproliferation Review
Committee identification of technical and operational needs to increase
warning times before foreign targets achieve actual operational WMD
capability;
- Identifying funding to
maintain Technical Intelligence Collection Programs related to WMD and
delivery system tests of proliferating nations;
- Fostering the development
of new technologies with the potential to improve our ability to detect
WMD activities at significantly longer ranges than possible today. For
example, the Central Intelligence Agency has explored the efficacy of high
risk, high payoff counterproliferation-related Research and Development
initiatives;
- Establishing a relationship
to enhance cooperation between CIA and R&D components;
- Redirecting and
reorganizing intelligence activities to increase and sharpen the focus of
counterproliferation-related efforts--both analytically and operationally;
and
- Redirecting resources and
activities toward assisting Federal Bureau of Investigation and US Customs
Service efforts to identify, target, and apprehend individuals engaged in
the trafficking and smuggling of nuclear materials worldwide.
Additionally, the creation of JMIP to coordinate joint, DoD-wide
initiatives, activities and programs, will provide intelligence information and
support to multiple DoD customers and should significantly enhance US
Intelligence support to DoD's counterproliferation program.
[Top of page]
US efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have
enjoyed some successes over the past several years. Director Deutch observed
last week, I think a tremendous amount of progress has been done...to build a
serious, post-Cold War, nonproliferation intelligence capability. For obvious
reasons, we cannot describe in this forum many of our successes. Some that we
can include:
- Supporting Department of
State efforts to provide actionable intelligence to the UN Special
Commission (UNSCOM) inspection and monitoring effort in Iraq.
- Developing a list of
collection indicators to alert collectors and analysts prior to use of
chemical and biological weapons. Similar initiatives are also underway to
provide early warning for the possible diversion of nuclear materials.
- Establishing a southern
Tier Study Group designed to focus on all WMD-related proliferation issues
in the southern tier of the Former Soviet Union.
- Providing Congressional
Committees with a report that reviewed and evaluated nonproliferation
programs in the NFIP fiscal year 1996 budget submission.
But even if we could list all of our accomplishments, we would be the first
to say there is more to do. Over the next year, the Community will seek to:
- Strengthen and focus our
integrated collection strategy;
- Work to enhance the
Community's information processing capabilities;
- Implement unified and
standardized information systems, to include shared access by intelligence
and consumer organizations;
- Strengthen and broaden
foreign language training and support tools;
- continue to review and
evaluate new methodologies and technologies;
- And, as part of the DCI and
Secretary of Defense joint program and budget reviews, continue to
evaluate intelligence resources and capabilities for optimal support for
actions to counter proliferation.
In closing, I would note that intelligence is essential to countering the
proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction. The recent
anniversary of the poison gas attack in the Tokyo subway reminded all of the devastating
consequences of such an attack. The US is not invulnerable. While we
will continue to provide intelligence support to those who would have to
respond to such an event, we must do all that we can to eliminate or at least
minimize such a possibility. Of course we will continue efforts to impede and
prevent the spread and acquisition of such weapons and technology. That, however,
is not enough. Efforts to terminate developmental program and to deter weapons
use must be enhanced.
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