News April-June 2004
News Release: May 5, 2004 | View Printable PDF Version |
Docket Numbers: EL03-236-000 |
COMMISSION SETS BROAD POLICY FOR COMPENSATING MUST-RUN GENERATORS
IN ORGANIZED POWER MARKETS
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission today outlined broad general
principles on the pricing for must-run generating units. In taking
today's action, the Commission sought to balance the need for reliable
electric service, along with the need for adequate incentives to
attract investment while ensuring just and reasonable electric rates
for customers. The Commission has characterized such issues as "Reliability
Compensation" issues.
The Commission noted that while today's order stems from a PJM Interconnection
tariff, it has broader implications for all organized power markets.
Recognizing that there may be regional variations depending on market
design and market differences, the Commission set a broad outline
to ensure that policies governing generators needed for reliability,
but subject to local market power mitigation, are consistent. The
Commission's analysis for such policies will look not only at the
current market but future needs - it will review short- and long-term
reliability compensation issues, and focus needed remedies on improved
market design.
If an organized market indicates significant reliability compensation
issues, appropriate market design improvements may offer a resolution.
Market design features that may work as solutions include: locational
installed capacity; locational operating reserves; locational pricing
for energy when there is local operating reserves scarcity; and
higher bid caps.
Where short- or long-term reliability compensation issues are identified,
the solution must be such that the revenue produced by the proposed
solution is adequate to solve the problem and include safeguards
to prevent the unwarranted exercise of market power, the Commission
said. The value of services needed for local reliability must be
adequately reflected in the market and apparent to both buyers and
sellers.
In instances where these solutions may not work, the Commission
would consider other specific proposals such as an RTO/ISO administered
auction or generator-specific contracts entered into by the RTO/ISO.
These solutions should "be viewed as backstops to the market design
solutions." the Commission said.
In today's order, the Commission found that PJM's market design
does not present significant problems, in large part because PJM's
market design ensures construction of adequate transmission infrastructure.
However, the Commission identified certain provisions of the PJM
tariff that must be revised to better address certain issues. For
example, the Commission required changes in the manner which generators
needed for reliability can seek modification of local market power
mitigation to allow for sufficient compensation.
The Commission held a two-day technical conference in February to
address these issues noting that the issue of how to price must-run
generating units has arisen in other markets outside of PJM and
that these issues are fundamental to the efficient design and operation
of electric markets (Docket No. PL04-2-000). Today's order reflects
the comments and discussion received by the Commission.
R-04-14
View Printable PDF Version |