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Publications:
Analysis of Proposals for a Minimum Subordinated Debt Requirement

by William W. Lang and Douglas Robertson

Abstract

Increasing the effectiveness of market discipline in regulated financial markets has emerged as a major policy issue for banking regulators. Perhaps the most prominent proposal for increasing market discipline is the proposal to require banks to issue publicly held subordinated debt. Subordinated debt holders can discipline banks either directly by demanding higher yields for riskier institutions or indirectly by means of market signals. This paper explores the fundamental rationale behind mandatory subordinated debt proposals, and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the most prominent proposals. To more clearly focus the analysis, the paper concentrates on proposals for requiring publicly traded subordinated debt, and therefore our analysis is relevant only to relatively large institutions that can feasibly issue such securities. The paper does not consider the various alternative proposals for issuing subordinated debt specifically designed for small institutions.

Our analysis indicates that a subordinated debt requirement will only modestly increase the risk sensitivity of bank costs at most large banks; however, we argue that there are substantial benefits to using subordinated debt as a market-based trigger for regulatory action. While we favor a mandatory requirement to issue subordinated debt, such a requirement should not eliminate separate minimums for equity capital, as some proponents of subordinated debt suggest.

Disclaimer

As with all OCC Working Papers, the opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or the Department of the Treasury.

Any whole or partial reproduction of material in this paper should include the following citation: Lang & Robertson, "Analysis of Proposals for a Minimum Subordinated Debt Requirement," Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, E&PA Working Paper 2000-4, March 2000.

Availability
The paper is available for viewing in Adobe's PDF format. The PDF viewer is available for download free from Adobe in versions for different platforms.

The complete paper is available in hard copy from the OCC's Communications Division. If you would like to receive a copy of a paper through the U.S. Postal Service:

  • Write to the Communications Division, Mail Stop 3-3, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Washington, DC 20219, or
  • Send an e-mail request to the Communications Division at foia-pa@occ.treas.gov.
Be sure to identify the paper(s) you want and to include your complete mailing address, including ZIP code.

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The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency was created by Congress to charter national banks, to oversee a nationwide system of banking institutions, and to assure that national banks are safe and sound, competitive and profitable, and capable of serving in the best possible manner the banking needs of their customers.

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