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# United States Assistance For Pakistani Refugees In India B-173651

Agency for International Development  
Department of State

*BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL  
OF THE UNITED STATES*

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MAY 10, 1972



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-173651

Dear Senator Kennedy:

R In response to your request of July 14, 1971, we have made an inquiry into United States humanitarian assistance programs for Pakistani refugees in India. This is the final report in the series of reports which you requested.

Our fieldwork was completed in November 1971, and only limited consideration was given to events that occurred after that date.

In accordance with discussions with your office, we have not followed the customary practice of obtaining advance agency comments on this report.

We believe that the contents of this report would be of interest to committees and other members of Congress. However, release of the report will be made only upon your agreement or upon public announcement by you concerning its contents.

Sincerely yours,

Comptroller General  
of the United States

cl + R  
The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy  
United States Senate

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#### ABBREVIATIONS

AID	Agency for International Development
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
GAO	General Accounting Office
GOI	Government of India
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USIA	United States Information Agency

D I G E S T

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

Senator Edward M. Kennedy requested the General Accounting Office (GAO) to inquire into U.S. humanitarian aid in support of Pakistani refugees in India who had fled from the civil strife in East Pakistan. (See app. II.) The GAO fieldwork was completed in November 1971, and only limited consideration was given to events that occurred after that time.

In accordance with the request of Senator Kennedy's office, GAO has not followed its usual practice of obtaining advance agency comments on this report.

This is the final report in the series of reports requested.

FINDINGS

The Government of India (GOI) reported as of November 15, 1971, that about 9.8 million refugees (93 percent were Hindus) had fled from East Pakistan with limited food and clothing as a result of the civil strife which commenced in March 1971. Nearly 6.8 million of the refugees were reported to be in about 1,500 refugee camps in India; the remainder presumably were living with relatives or friends or in schools or other public buildings in the cities, villages, and countryside of India. As of November 1, 1971, the flow of refugees was estimated by GOI at 16,000 a day. (See p. 5.)

An October 1971 World Bank report estimated that the direct cost of supporting 9 million refugees in camps in India would approximate \$700 million from April 1, 1971, to March 31, 1972. As of November 15, 1971, there were 6.8 million refugees in camps, and the estimated costs for these refugees from April 1, 1971, through March 31, 1972, was \$570 million. According to Department of State officials, the World Bank hoped that external donors would assume the direct cost of refugee care. (See p. 5.)

As of November 15, 1971, authorized contributions of the United States Government and pledges of assistance by other external donor nations and private organizations amounted to about \$205 million--\$127.3 million in cash and commodities through the United Nations, \$65.1 million directly to GOI, and \$12.3 million through U.S. voluntary agencies. (See p. 8.)

It was U.S. policy to channel its assistance primarily through international organizations. (See p. 10.) As of November 15, 1971, the United States

had authorized about \$94.3 million in assistance--about \$82 million through the United Nations and \$12.3 million through U.S. voluntary agencies. U.S. assistance consisted of \$58.9 million for such food items as rice, vegetable oils, corn-soya milk, wheat-soya blend, and wheat and \$35.4 million for such nonfood items as trucks and jeeps, blankets, shelter materials, water supply equipment, and medical supplies. According to a Mission official, 89,112 metric tons of food commodities had arrived in India and 58,412 metric tons were in transit as of November 18, 1971.

In addition, \$400,000 granted by the United States to the United Nations was used to purchase balahar--a high-protein children's food made in India. Approximately \$8.5 million in Public Law 480 food supplies was provided by the United States to the voluntary agencies to replenish stocks which they had used to feed refugees. (See pp. 21 to 23.)

U.S. voluntary agencies, such as Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Catholic Relief Services, Church World Services, and Lutheran World Relief, provided supplemental foods, shelter material, clothing, blankets, medical care, and utensils. In addition to \$12.3 million in grants received from the U.S. Government for refugee relief assistance, about \$7.3 million in cash and supplies had been supplied by the voluntary agencies from their own resources as of December 1, 1971. (See p. 15.)

Within GOI the Central Coordinating Committee had responsibility for making decisions on the types of relief activities needed. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was designated to coordinate all U.S. activities involving aid to the refugees in India. The India Consortium met with the Deputy United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to discuss development assistance to India and its relationship to the refugee problem. (See pp. 12, 13, and 15.)


In channeling its relief assistance through the United Nations, Department of State officials stated that the United States relied on the United Nations' reporting on the end use of U.S. relief supplies and did not seek authority to directly monitor end use. Department of State officials stated also that, during the emergency situation, information on the end use of relief supplies from the United Nations was, for the most part, unavailable. The officials stated further that information on the use of relief supplies was dependent on GOI's ability to set up an adequate reporting system.

According to Department of State officials, GOI was reluctant to permit any foreign participation in implementing its refugee relief program, including stationing non-Indian personnel or U.N. personnel in the refugee camps. Because of the absence of a reliable reporting and monitoring system, the United States and other contributors had little assurance that relief supplies were being distributed effectively to the refugees. We have no knowledge, however, of misuse of U.S. relief supplies. (See p. 24.)

The United Nations was hampered in its efforts to determine the relief needs of the refugees because, according to Department of State officials, GOI was unable to compile vital information on delivery and distribution of relief supplies and on the end use of U.S. and other donor contributions.

Late in October 1971 Agency for International Development (AID) officials strongly urged that the United Nations provide regular and accurate information on the flow of relief supplies. AID officials also explained the desirability of developing an accountability system which would provide GOI and relief donors with broad management reporting on the effectiveness of relief operations and which would identify operational deficiencies to ensure timely remedial action. (See p. 26.)

Department of State and AID officials had some limited knowledge of existing problems encountered by GOI during the emergency period in its administration of the refugee assistance program. GAO obtained information from officials of the U.S. agencies, who were cognizant in general terms of the problems being encountered. These problems included curtailment of Indian State development programs because of the use of administrative personnel to care for refugees, malnutrition among refugees, difficulties in maintaining flow of relief supplies to the refugees, concern as to future maintenance of camp discipline, and poor contracting procedures for camp construction. (See p. 27.)





## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Civil strife erupted in East Pakistan on March 25, 1971.<sup>(1)</sup> As a result of the strife, the people suffered widespread dislocation, internal transportation was disrupted, and the area's economy was nearly paralyzed. Commencing as early as March 29, 1971, large numbers of East Pakistanis fled to India with limited food and clothing.

The civil strife continued, and by November 1, 1971, the flow of refugees into India was estimated by the Government of India at 16,000 a day. GOI reported that, by November 15, 1971, about 9.8 million Pakistani refugees (93 percent were Hindus) were in India. GOI said that about 6.8 million refugees were in 1,500 refugee camps in five Indian States and that the remainder were living with relatives or friends or in schools or other public buildings.

Providing for the refugees apparently caused a serious economic strain on India. In October 1971 the World Bank estimated that the direct cost of supporting 9 million refugees in camps would approximate \$700 million from April 1, 1971, to March 31, 1972. The estimate for 6.8 million refugees already in camps was \$570 million through March 31, 1972.

According to Department of State officials, the World Bank expressed hope that external donors would assume the direct cost of refugee care. The United States and other donors have pledged about \$200 million.

The estimated \$370 million that may be met by India for 6.8 million refugees represents about 8 percent of GOI's planned development program for the year ended March 31, 1972, which would have substantial consequences for an

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<sup>1</sup>As a result of the war between India and West Pakistan, East Pakistan gained its independence and established the new nation--Bangladesh. In April 1972 the United States officially granted recognition to Bangladesh.

economy that must sustain development momentum to keep up with its annual population increase of nearly 13 million. The World Bank predicted that the impact of the refugees would be even greater if they eventually were absorbed into India.

Planning for refugee needs was influenced by India's position that the refugees must be repatriated as soon as possible and that assistance may be provided only on a short-term basis. Pakistan indicated a willingness for the refugees to return, but only a small number did so.

On July 14, 1971, Senator Edward M. Kennedy requested the General Accounting Office to undertake several reviews, of which two were to cover U.S. humanitarian aid to Pakistan following the outbreak of civil war and to India in support of relief efforts among the Pakistani refugees. Our review of aid to Pakistan was covered in an earlier report to Senator Kennedy (B-173651). This report covers our review of aid for Pakistani refugees in India.

During our review we discussed the program with officials of the United States, voluntary agencies, the United Nations, and GOI. We also reviewed Department of State and Agency for International Development files made available and various reports of the United Nations, the World Bank, and GOI.

Our review efforts were impeded by Department of State and AID officials who told us that they were acting in accordance with instructions. They withheld and summarized certain records and thereby limited the availability of information needed by us in our efforts to perform a comprehensive review. The officials informed us that departmental instructions required them to restrict our access to (1) documents prepared separately or jointly by other agencies, (2) sensitive information requiring higher levels of review before release, and (3) White House correspondence.

On August 21, 1971, U.S. Embassy officials in New Delhi, India, were instructed by the Department of State not to make available to us messages reporting on sensitive discussions with GOI, the Government of Pakistan, or U.N. agencies or certain sensitive documents relating to development of U.S. policy unless authorized by higher authority.

In accordance with the wishes of Senator Kennedy's office, we have not followed our usual practice of submitting a report draft to the Department of State and AID for comment. We did discuss the program with U.S. officials in New Delhi and Washington, D.C., however, and gave consideration to their views when appropriate.

CHAPTER 2

EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE CONTRIBUTED OR PLEDGED

FOR REFUGEE RELIEF IN INDIA

According to information furnished by the United Nations to the Department of State, the following schedule shows the contributions, in cash or in kind as of November 15, 1971, by the United States and other large external donors and the methods of providing the assistance.

	Bilat- eral assis- tance	Through the United Nations	Through voluntary agencies	Total contributions and pledges Total amount	Percent
(millions)					
United States	\$ -	\$ 82.0	\$12.3	\$ 94.3 <sup>a</sup>	46.1
United Kingdom	12.0	7.2	(b)	19.2	9.4
U.S.S.R.	11.0	-	(b)	11.0	5.4
European Eco- nomic Commu- nity	8.0	-	(b)	8.0	3.9
Sweden	0.5	6.0	(b)	6.5	3.2
Japan	1.4	5.0	(b)	6.4	3.1
Federal Repub- lic of Ger- many	-	4.7	(b)	4.7	2.3
Canada	0.6	3.3	(b)	3.9	1.9
France	-	2.9	(b)	2.9	1.4
Other nations and private organizations	<u>31.6</u>	<u>16.2</u>	<u>(b)</u>	<u>47.8</u>	<u>23.3</u>
	<u>\$65.1</u>	<u>\$127.3</u>	<u>\$12.3</u>	<u>\$204.7</u>	<u>100.0</u>

<sup>a</sup>Department of State and AID used the authorized amount of \$89.5 million. The larger amount reflects the Commodity Credit Corporation costs for food provided.

<sup>b</sup>Not available.

The United Nations provided U.S. officials with the following analysis of contributions through the U.N. system as of September 30, 1971. At that time \$114.6 million had been contributed through the United Nations. Subsequent pledges increased the amount to about \$127.3 million by mid-November 1971.

	U.S. dollars <u>(millions)</u>
Paid in cash to GOI	\$ 11.7
Commodities delivered to GOI	24.7
Processed for delivery	67.5
Earmarked for, or paid by donor governments to, voluntary agencies	3.9
Earmarking under negotiations with donors	3.3
Earmarked by donors for voluntary repatriation and funds set aside for program support ex- penditure	2.7
Other receivables	0.7
Cash available	<u>0.1</u>
 Total	 <u>\$114.6</u>

The representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in India thought that most major supplies programmed would arrive in India by the end of 1971.

### CHAPTER 3

#### UNITED STATES POLICY

#### FOR PAKISTANI REFUGEE RELIEF IN INDIA

According to the Department of State, the President announced in August 1971 that the United States was to give the highest priority to the humanitarian relief program in a massive and all-out effort. In September 1971 a U.S. official, in response to our inquiry, provided us with a summary which stated that the United States hoped, by providing relief assistance to the East Pakistan refugees in India, to ensure their well-being, to bear a portion of the burden placed upon India in the midst of its own development plans, and to provide a degree of support to GOI in its pursuit of a moderate course with regard to the East Pakistan crisis.

U.S. officials stated that relief to East Pakistan, in addition to providing assistance to refugees in India, was essential to prevent famine and the further flow of refugees.

A U.S. official told us that it was U.S. policy that its relief assistance to India be part of an international refugee relief effort provided through the United Nations and U.S. voluntary agencies because the United States (1) wanted to insulate the relief operations from bilateral relations with countries in the area and (2) hoped to encourage contributions from others and to prevent duplication of effort. Although no ceiling had been set for refugee assistance, the United States contemplated providing one half of the refugee food needs and, depending on the contributions of others, a substantial percentage of refugee nonfood requirements.

U.S. officials originally considered using U.S.-owned excess Indian rupees to meet the local costs of the refugee relief program while reserving dollar assistance for foreign-exchange requirements. A Department of State official informed us in November 1971, however, that it was the view of the Department of State and AID that:

"Commitment of U.S.-owned rupees which have been accumulated from past aid would not provide any new resources for India. Instead it would represent a charge on present Indian resources, thereby creating additional inflationary pressures on the Indian economy. The GOI would therefore not regard such a commitment as real assistance."

## CHAPTER 4

### FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, THE UNITED NATIONS,

### THE INDIA CONSORTIUM, AND THE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

#### GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

GOI controlled and administered the refugee relief programs being carried out in India. Within GOI the responsibility for the programs was assigned to the Department of Rehabilitation in the Ministry of Labour and Rehabilitation. That department established an overall Central Coordinating Committee to make decisions on the types of relief activities needed.

The Central Coordinating Committee was composed of representatives from the Department of Rehabilitation; the Ministries of Food and Agriculture, Health and Family Planning, Petroleum and Chemicals, and External Affairs; the Food Corporation of India; and the Indian Red Cross. U.N. representatives also participated in the committee meetings. The committee met weekly to define relief needs and to assign priorities for procuring supplies.

Because the Central Committee was too large to deal with the technical details of the relief efforts, four subcommittees were established to evaluate and define the relief needs of the refugees and to report back to the Central Committee. These subcommittees were concerned with (1) food, (2) shelter and sanitation, (3) medicine, and (4) transportation, respectively.

Each subcommittee studied new proposals or requests and worked out arrangements with appropriate GOI ministries before submitting its plans to the Central Committee. In addition, the subcommittees reviewed GOI's "shopping list" of requirements and attempted to forecast new needs on the basis of the increasing refugee influx.

Concerned GOI ministries were required to approve certain aspects of the refugee programs. For example, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture had to approve all requests



for food commodities, the Ministry of Health had to approve all requests for medicines, and the Ministry of Economics had to approve all requests for funds. On the basis of requests approved by the cognizant ministries, the Central Committee prepared lists of needs for U.N. consideration.

The Department of Rehabilitation's Branch Secretariat in Calcutta, India, was responsible for coordinating the refugee relief effort. Commodity distributions and camp administration were handled primarily by State government civil servants, retired military officers, and/or Indian volunteer agencies. We were informed in November 1971 that GOI and the State governments had over 30,000 employees working in the refugee assistance program.

#### UNITED NATIONS

In response to GOI's request for U.N. assistance on April 29, 1971, UNHCR was designated by the United Nations to coordinate all U.N. activities involving aid to the refugees in India. On May 19, 1971, on the basis of GOI's request and a survey team's confirmation of needs, the Secretary General of the United Nations appealed to the world community to provide assistance to the refugees through the United Nations. UNHCR had contributed \$500,000 from its own resources for this purpose.

UNHCR solicited and coordinated world community assistance to help GOI. To accomplish this, an ad hoc committee having representatives from the World Food Program, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the European Office of the Secretary General was established in Geneva.

In June 1971 the U.S. Mission notified the Department of State that the Disaster Relief Committee was beginning to hold informal coordinating meetings with major donor country and U.N. representatives. U.S. Mission communications to Washington concerning meetings held in June, July, August, and September 1971 showed that U.N. agencies had reported on the principal areas where further relief assistance was needed. These areas included food, shelter, health, and transportation.

## UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND

UNICEF was the primary purchasing and shipping agent for all U.N. agencies for such commodities as special high-protein foods, shelter materials, blankets, vehicles, and heavy equipment.

UNICEF set up a two-part program to which it originally contributed \$600,000. The Alpha part was a high-protein-food-supplement feeding program administered by voluntary agencies and the Indian Red Cross for children, pregnant women, and nursing mothers. As of early in November 1971, about 750 U.N.-sponsored centers were feeding about 1.5 million recipients. In addition, the Indian Red Cross operated 300 non-Alpha feeding centers for about 75,000 people.

The Beta part was a curative program for children who were suffering from malnutrition or protein deficiency and who required special diets and medication. The operation of this part of the program, when started early in November, was the responsibility of the Indian State departments of health.

## WORLD FOOD PROGRAM

The World Food Program provided food at the requests of governments of less developed countries to help carry out economic and social development projects and to meet emergency needs. The United Nations reported on September 27, 1971, that its Food and Agricultural Organization had approved a contribution of \$3 million in food aid from World Food Program resources for refugee relief in India.

## WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

The World Health Organization was responsible for reviewing all matters concerning the health of the refugees and for working in close cooperation with UNICEF and the League of Red Cross Societies. Both the World Health Organization and the League provided medicine to the refugees and technical advice to GOI. The World Health Organization had contributed \$155,000.

## INDIA CONSORTIUM

On June 17 and 18, 1971, the members of the India Consortium met with the Deputy UNHCR to discuss development assistance to India and its relationship to the refugee problem. According to a July 1971 report on the proceedings of the June 1971 meeting, the U.N. representative emphasized that:

"\*\*\* the High Commissioner was continuing to seek the only proper solution to the problem--repatriation--and urged the governments represented in the Consortium to help create the international atmosphere which would produce in Pakistan a situation permitting the people to return to their homes."

A special session was held late in October to discuss the refugee problem and its implications on the Indian economy. The Consortium members generally agreed that:

--The international community should attempt to meet the direct costs of the refugee program through March 31, 1972.

--Assistance should be additional to development aid and should be in the form of grants.

--To reimburse GOI for goods and services provided, most new commitments should be in the form of cash or its equivalent, including cancellations of GOI indebtedness to Consortium member nations.

## UNITED STATES VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

Early in April 1971 GOI and its State governments contacted the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), Catholic Relief Services, Church World Services, and Lutheran World Relief to arrange for them to provide food for Pakistani refugees. As the number of refugees increased, the voluntary agencies supplied supplemental foods, shelter material, clothing, blankets, medical care and utensils. In November 1971 voluntary agency officials informed us that they had provided all the basic needs to a number of refugees who had been missed by GOI in its distribution programs.

In addition to grants received from the U.S. Government, about \$7.3 million in cash and supplies had been furnished by the voluntary agencies from their own resources as of December 1, 1971.

## CHAPTER 5

### UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

#### FOR PAKISTANI REFUGEE RELIEF IN INDIA

##### SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR REFUGEE AND MIGRATION AFFAIRS

The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Refugee and Migration Affairs acts on behalf of the Secretary of State in all refugee and migration matters. In this capacity the Special Assistant is responsible for:

- Formulating comprehensive policy and developing plans for, and making evaluations of, U.S. Government refugee and migration efforts.
- Providing the guidance and coordination for refugee and migration programs within the U.S. Government and assisting in the formulation of budgetary requirements.
- Exercising within the Department of State operational control of refugee and migration programs.
- Representing the United States in intergovernmental bodies, voluntary welfare agencies, and other organizations.
- Establishing a focal point for information and action for refugee and migration affairs.

A Department of State briefing document dated August 31, 1971, pointed out that the Special Assistant for Refugee and Migration Affairs had ordered his office to begin contingency planning when the Pakistani refugee exodus began in March 1971.

##### INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE FOR PAKISTAN REFUGEE RELIEF

On May 20, 1971, the Interagency Committee for Pakistani Refugee Relief was established under the chairmanship of the

Special Assistant to the Secretary for Refugees and Migration Affairs. This committee was organized to meet the urgent refugee needs and to coordinate the activities of all U.S. agencies involved in the relief effort. This committee included representatives of all concerned U.S. agencies, including AID, the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture, the Peace Corps, the United States Information Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Office of Management and Budget.

The committee representatives use the facilities of their respective agencies to provide specialized guidance and to carry out the relief committee's decisions. The Department of State's Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs provided political and policy guidance to the committee. AID's Near Eastern and South Asian office provides economic and technical guidance. The Department of Agriculture and AID's Food for Peace Office are responsible for providing the food portion of the U.S. relief effort. AID's Office for Private Overseas Programs, Disaster Relief Division, and the Department of Defense assisted in locating and procuring relief supplies in the United States. The Department of Defense provided aircraft to assist in relief operations.

In addition, other offices and agencies were called upon for technical advice and assistance. These included AID's Bureau for Technical Assistance, Office of Health, for general health problems, including cholera; AID's Office of Procurement, Resources Transportation Division, for chartering commercial aircraft to carry relief supplies to India; and the United States Information Agency (USIA) for producing and disseminating abroad information on the relief effort.

ADVISORY PANEL ON  
SOUTH ASIAN RELIEF ASSISTANCE

On August 21, 1971, the President announced the creation of the Advisory Panel on South Asian Relief Assistance, composed of a number of prominent American citizens who would help direct U.S. relief assistance efforts. The panel was assigned the tasks of reviewing all steps already taken by the administration, coordinating with the Interagency

Committee for Pakistani Refugee Relief and with the Inter-departmental Working Group on East Pakistan Disaster Relief,<sup>1</sup> and suggesting further actions which would help avert famine in East Pakistan and which would assist in the relief of East Pakistan refugees in India. The panel was requested to provide suggestions to help ensure that U.S. support of U.N. efforts in these areas was both timely and effective.

As of September 23, 1971, the Advisory Panel had held one meeting and tentatively had scheduled another meeting for October 6, 1971. No formal resolutions or recommendations were adopted or made.

#### MISSION DISASTER RELIEF COMMITTEE

With respect to U.S. organizational arrangements at the Mission level, the Deputy Director of the AID Mission in India was designated to be the Disaster Relief Officer responsible for all disaster-preparedness and relief activities. To accomplish this task, the Embassy set up a Disaster Relief Committee headed by the Disaster Relief Officer and composed of representatives from the Embassy, AID, Office of the Defense Representative, Agriculture Attache, and the United States Information Service. AID also hired someone to assist the committee in gathering information and in maintaining liaison with GOI and all relief organizations in the Calcutta area.

It was the responsibility of the Disaster Relief Committee to

--gather information, including information on the capability of India to respond to the relief needs of the refugees;

--provide to the Chief of the Mission information for decisionmaking;

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<sup>1</sup>The Interdepartmental Working Group was established in November 1970 to determine the relief needs of victims of the November 1970 cyclone in East Pakistan. The group's function later was expanded to include victims of the March 1971 civil strife in East Pakistan.

--account for U.S. contributions; and

--determine the extent of U.S. assistance needed. (See p. 21.)

### AUDIT RESPONSIBILITIES

The Office of Inspector General of Foreign Assistance had overall audit responsibility concerning U.S. assistance for refugee relief in India and Pakistan. The Acting Inspector General informed us in November 1971 that his office had not yet audited the refugee relief program in India. He stated that, although his office was responsible for reviewing transactions up to the point where relief resources were turned over to the United Nations, he recognized the need for information on the end use of such assistance. He explained, however, that such information would have to be obtained by making discreet inquiries, giving full consideration to U.S. relationships with host governments and multilateral organizations.

According to the Area Auditor General, responsibility for auditing the refugee relief activities in India provided for the review of certain voluntary agencies' operations and the agencies' responsibilities, including commodity accountability procedures and the effectiveness of the agencies' surveillance over food distribution.

On November 2, 1971, an official of the Auditor General's office in New Delhi informed us that he had been instructed by his Washington office not to visit the GOI food distribution points or refugee camps. He believed that this request stemmed, in part, from GOI's reluctance to allow foreigners to visit the refugee camps. We also were advised that the Auditor General's office in New Delhi expected to rely primarily on voluntary agency reports on the consumption of foods provided under title II of Public Law 480 and the utilization of other commodities.



## CHAPTER 6

### UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE

AID officials informed us that the U.S. Mission Disaster Relief Committee had responsibility for obtaining data on the type and amount of refugee relief assistance the United States would provide. The committee obtained this information from (1) GOI reports and discussions held with officials of GOI, the United Nations, and voluntary agencies, (2) informal coordinating meetings held every 3 or 4 weeks with representatives of other donor countries, and (3) visits by committee members to refugee camps. On the basis of information received from these sources, the committee provided the Interagency Committee for Pakistan Refugee Relief in Washington with status reports on estimated relief requirements for food and nonfood assistance. These reports were used by the Interagency Committee to determine the appropriate amount and type of assistance to be provided by the United States.

As of November 18, 1971, U.S. assistance authorized for Pakistani refugees in India totaled \$94 million. The following schedule shows the types of assistance authorized.

	<u>Total (millions)</u>
Food granted through:	
United Nations	\$50.4 <sup>a</sup>
Voluntary agencies	8.5
Nonfood assistance granted through:	
United Nations	36.1
Voluntary agencies	<u>3.8</u>
Total	<u>\$94.3</u>

<sup>a</sup>Based on Commodity Credit Corporation costs, including estimated ocean transportation costs of \$9.1 million.

FOOD ASSISTANCE

The United States, under title II of Public Law 480, authorized grants for the following food commodities under the auspices of the United Nations, from April to November 18, 1971.

Authorization date <u>1971</u>	Cost (millions)	Quantity			Commodity
		Authorized	Status as of Nov. 18, 1971		
			Arrived in India (note a)	In transit (note a)	
----- (metric tons) <sup>b</sup> -----					
June 10	\$ 0.7	500	500	-	Vegetable oil
Nov. 8 amendment	0.1	162	-	-	Vegetable oil
Nov. 8 amendment		421	-	-	Nonfat dried milk
June 16	3.2	10,000	7,468	4,037	Corn-soya milk and wheat-soya blend
Aug. 5	39.0	90,000	64,380	23,923	Rice
		50,000	16,764	15,452	Vegetable oil
		15,000	-	15,000	Soya-fortified bulgur wheat
Sept. 23	7.0	25,000	-	-	Corn-soya milk and and wheat-soya blend
Total	\$50.0 <sup>c</sup>	<u>191,083</u>	<u>89,112</u>	<u>58,412</u>	

<sup>a</sup>Figures provided to GAO by AID Mission in November 1971.

<sup>b</sup>One metric ton is equivalent to about 2,205 pounds.

<sup>c</sup>Based on Commodity Credit Corporation costs and including estimated ocean transportation costs of \$9.1 million.

In addition, \$400,000 granted by the United States to the United Nations was used to purchase balahar--a high-protein children's food made in India that consists of bulgur wheat, peanut meal, and soybean.

The bulgur wheat, balahar, corn-soya milk, wheat-soya blend, and nonfat dried milk were used for feeding refugees. The rice and vegetable oil were intended as partial compensation to GOI for indigenous food supplies being provided to the refugees.

The United States also provided approximately \$8.5 million in Public Law 480 food supplies to the voluntary agencies. These supplies consisted of about 35,000 metric tons of wheat, 1,000 metric tons of wheat-soya blend, 5,000 metric tons of corn-soya milk, 3,100 metric tons of vegetable oil, and 2,500 metric tons of nonfat dried milk. This food was provided to these agencies to replenish stocks which they had used to feed refugees.

NONFOOD ASSISTANCE

The following schedule shows the composition of the U.S. nonfood assistance provided through the United Nations by dollar grants as of November 18, 1971.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Country in which procurement was made</u>				<u>Total</u>
	<u>United States</u>	<u>India</u>	<u>Other countries</u>	<u>Data not available</u>	
	(millions)				
Trucks and jeeps	\$0.65	\$ 2.50	\$2.65	\$1.50	\$ 7.30
Shelter materials	1.50	5.50	-	-	7.00
Blankets	5.25	-	-	-	5.25
Water supply--construction, labor, and materials	-	2.75	-	1.14	3.89
Administrative expenses	-	-	-	1.51	1.51
Airlifts	.59	-	-	.84	1.43
Clothing	-	-	-	1.75	1.75
Medical supplies and services	.05	.75	.43	.13	1.36
Warehouses	.26	-	-	-	.26
Miscellaneous	-	-	.27	1.59	1.86
<b>Total</b>	<u>\$8.30</u>	<u>\$11.50</u>	<u>\$3.35</u>	<u>\$8.46</u>	<u>\$31.61</u>

The United States also granted \$3.75 million to Catholic Relief Services, CARE, Lutheran World Relief, and Church World Services. These funds were intended for the purchase of commodities, equipment, and supplies and for the procurement of services needed for refugee relief efforts.

## CHAPTER 7

### MONITORING AND PROBLEM AREAS

#### MONITORING

Department of State officials stated that, in channeling U.S. relief assistance through the United Nations, the United States relied on U.N. reporting regarding the end use of U.S. relief supplies and did not seek authority to directly monitor end use. Department of State officials also said that, during the emergency situation, information on the end use of relief supplies from the United Nations was, for the most part, unavailable. They stated that information on the use of relief supplies was dependent on GOI's ability to set up an adequate reporting system. According to Department of State officials, GOI was reluctant to permit any foreign participation in implementing its refugee relief program, including stationing non-Indian personnel or U.N. personnel in the refugee camps. In the absence of a reliable reporting and monitoring system, the United States and other contributors had little assurance that relief supplies were being distributed effectively to the refugees. We have no knowledge, however, of misuse of U.S. relief supplies.

The United Nations was hampered in its efforts to determine the relief needs of the refugees because, according to Department of State officials, GOI was unable to compile vital information on delivery and distribution of relief supplies and on the end use of U.S. and other donor contributions. A U.N. official stated that UNICEF, having a field staff of about nine representatives as of November 1971, observed GOI relief activities; however, this was not a detailed or systematic review.

In a series of meetings held between June and October 1971 with U.N. officials, U.S. officials expressed the need for meaningful reports on the use of U.S. and other donor funds and commodities provided through the United Nations. A report format was suggested that would serve not only the reporting needs of the United States but also possibly those of all donors. These U.N. reports, which were to be based mostly on information supplied by GOI, were intended to provide information on (1) goods and services the

United Nations had contracted for or had procured with U.N.-channeled funds, (2) the amount of funds actually expended, (3) deliveries of goods and services to India, (4) GOI inputs and receipts from outside the United Nations, and (5) amounts of goods and services which actually reached the refugees. U.N. officials agreed to try to obtain this information. According to Department of State officials, the United Nations expressed reservations as to whether GOI would be able to provide timely information in view of the pressure on its administrative apparatus.

U.N. officials informed GOI of the need and importance for adequate reporting on the use of commodities provided by the world community. AID officials also met with GOI in September 1971 and expressed their concern regarding the need for reports on the use of contributions. GOI officials agreed that there was a need for accountability and that the needed information would be made available. In September 1971 the AID Mission informed the Department of State that a GOI official had said that:

"\*\*\* his Ministry originally felt that taking care of the refugees quickly was more important than worrying about accounts; but now it is increasingly aware of accountability as a necessity prior to UN solicitation of more funds."

As a result of these efforts, the United Nations provided a report to the United States early in October 1971. This report included some of the requested information, such as

--total assistance, by country, provided through the United Nations;

--total assistance provided from sources outside the United Nations; and

--status of assistance provided through the United Nations, including goods procured or delivered or procurement action under way.

The report, however, did not provide information on (1) the amount of goods and services which had reached the

refugees, (2) GOI inputs, or (3) details on assistance received outside the United Nations. UNHCR stated in October 1971 that he had requested a more formal accounting of refugee activities and that GOI had agreed to provide it in the near future.

Late in October 1971 U.S. officials strongly urged that the United Nations provide regular and accurate information on the flow of relief supplies. The officials also explained the desirability of developing an accountability system that would provide GOI and relief donors with information on the effectiveness of relief operations and on identified operational deficiencies, which would thereby permit timely remedial action.

In October 1971 the AID Mission assigned several staff members to work with the United Nations in obtaining information from GOI on the use of contributions. The main task of the AID personnel was to design a system of management controls and accounting, using existing information systems as well as additional GOI inputs and analysis of voluntary agency contributions. UNHCR believed that this exercise would lead to a meaningful reporting system and expressed a desire to cooperate.

An AID Mission official commented in November 1971 that the United States had pending the development of its own reporting system, which would provide some assurance that U.S. input was reaching the refugees and was being used well. He said that a Mission staff member in Calcutta was working on a full-time basis gathering information on GOI relief programs and that he had met with representatives of GOI, the United Nations, voluntary agencies, and other donor countries and had visited the camps around Calcutta. Mission officials in New Delhi also visited the camps and talked with GOI officials in New Delhi and elsewhere. In addition, consulate officials observed the unloading and storing of relief commodities in GOI warehouses.

## PROBLEM AREAS

State and AID officials had some limited knowledge of problems encountered by GOI in its administration of the refugee assistance program. The following information concerning these problems was reported by U.S. and U.N. officials during our review.

- GOI's State governments, at the end of October 1971, were operating over 1,500 refugee camps with about 30,000 employees. As a result Indian State development programs, such as flood control, irrigation projects, and road construction, had been curtailed or, in many cases, had been stopped completely. To relieve the burden placed upon the States, GOI was taking over the operation of the larger State camps and was establishing larger central Government camps.
- The All-India Institute of Medical Sciences estimated in July 1971 that 300,000 children showed signs of malnutrition. This was approximately 50 percent of the children under 5 years of age in the refugee camps. At the end of September 1971, the number of children under 5 years of age, the category most susceptible to diseases caused by malnutrition, had risen to 900,000. Malnutrition was attributed to the poor physical condition of the children when they arrived in India and to intestinal diseases caused by overcrowding and poor sanitary conditions in the camps.
- The port of Calcutta, overworked even in normal times, was congested. Distribution from the port to the refugees was impeded by a shortage of trucks and railway cars, poor maintenance of trucks, monsoon rains, a shortage of warehouses near the refugee camps, long distances involved in transporting the commodities, and inadequate marking of relief supplies requiring the inspection of containers.
- Congestion and the lack of activity at the camps threatened the maintenance of camp discipline.

--There were indications of increasing tensions between refugees and the populace of the local communities. The local residents claimed that preferential treatment, including ensured food rations and a monetary subsidy for purchases on the local market, was given to the refugees. Some of the refugees were competing with local Indians for jobs, contrary to existing regulations.


Another irritant to the local Indian populace was the increases in certain local commodity prices brought about by the increased demands of the refugees.

--The Embassy in New Delhi, late in August 1971, reported a statement made by a U.N. official that problems in administering the refugee relief program had become increasingly serious. According to the Embassy report, the U.N. official stated that UNHCR was attempting to impress upon GOI the necessity of hiring effective managerial talent for administering the program.

--State governments, originally in charge of camp construction, were paying contractors on a time, rather than a production, basis. This led to excessive costs and work delays. After the GOI Department of Rehabilitation assumed the contracting responsibility, the contractors were paid on a work-completed basis.



# UNITED STATES ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES IN INDIA



COORDINATING COMMITTEE

EDWARD M. KENNEDY  
MASSACHUSETTS

**United States Senate**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 14, 1971

The Honorable Elmer B. Staats  
Comptroller General of the United States  
General Accounting Office  
441 "G" Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Staats:

In conjunction with my activities as Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees and its current concern over the humanitarian aspects of the Pakistan civil war, I have also been concerned over the shipments of United States military equipment to the central Pakistan Government. I have raised this issue, both publicly and privately, with officials in the Department of State, but thus far comprehensive information has not been forthcoming.

In light of widespread Congressional and public interest in this issue, I would like to request that an inquiry be made into the policy, authorization, volume and content of United States military aid to Pakistan since 1965. I am especially interested in developments since April 1 of this year.

In addition to this inquiry into United States military aid to Pakistan, I would also like to request separate inquiries into the following items:

1. United States disaster relief aid to Pakistan following the cyclone in East Pakistan in the fall of 1970;
2. United States humanitarian aid to Pakistan following the outbreak of civil war in late March of this year; and
3. United States humanitarian aid in support of relief efforts among the Pakistani refugees in India resulting from the present conflict.

The Honorable Elmer B. Staats  
July 14, 1971  
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To facilitate these inquiries, it would be helpful if you would designate a representative of the General Accounting Office to get in touch with Mr. Dale de Haan, Counsel to the Subcommittee on Refugees, for additional information.

Many thanks for your consideration and best wishes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Edward M. Kennedy". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name.

Edward M. Kennedy