

# Chapter 2000 Duty of Disclosure

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## 2000.01 Introduction

This Chapter deals with the duties owed toward the Patent and Trademark Office by the inventor and every other individual who is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application and who is associated with the inventor or the inventor's assignee. These duties, of candor and good faith and disclosure, have been codified in 37 CFR 1.56, as promulgated pursuant to carrying out the duties of the Commissioner under Sections 6, 131, and 132 of Title 35 of the United States Code.

## 2001 Duty of Disclosure, Candor, and Good Faith

37 CFR 1.56. *Duty to disclose information material to patentability.*

(a) A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. The public interest is best served, and the most effective patent examination occurs when, at the time an application is being examined, the Office is aware of and evaluates the teachings of all information material to patentability. Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this section. The duty to disclose information exists with respect to each pending claim until the claim is cancelled or withdrawn from consideration, or the application becomes abandoned. Information material to the patentability of a claim that is cancelled or withdrawn from consideration need not be submitted if the information is not material to the patentability of any claim remaining under consideration in the application. There is no duty to submit information which is not material to the patentability of any existing claim. The duty to disclose all information known to be material to patentability is deemed to be satisfied if all information known to be material to patentability of any claim issued in a patent was cited by the Office or submitted to the Office in the manner prescribed by §§ 1.97(b)-(d) and 1.98. However, no patent will be granted on an application in connection with which fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional misconduct. The Office encourages applicants to carefully examine:

(1) prior art cited in search reports of a foreign patent office in a counterpart application, and

(2) the closest information over which individuals associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent application believe any pending claim patentably defines, to make sure that any material information contained therein is disclosed to the Office.

(b) Under this section, information is material to patentability when it is not cumulative to information already of record or being made of record in the application, and

(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a *prima facie* case of unpatentability of a claim; or

(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in:

(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or

(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.

A *prima facie* case of unpatentability is established when the information compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each term in the claim its broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification, and before any consideration is given to evidence which may be submitted in an attempt to establish a contrary conclusion of patentability.

(c) Individuals associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent application within the meaning of this section are:

(1) Each inventor named in the application;

(2) Each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application; and

(3) Every other person who is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application and who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application.

(d) Individuals other than the attorney, agent or inventor may comply with this section by disclosing information to the attorney, agent, or inventor.

37 CFR 1.56 defines the duty to disclose information to the Office.

### 2001.01 Who Has Duty To Disclose

*37 CFR 1.56. Duty to disclose information material to patentability.*

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(c) Individuals associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent application within the meaning of this section are:

- (1) Each inventor named in the application;
- (2) Each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application; and
- (3) Every other person who is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application and who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application.

Individuals having a duty of disclosure are limited to those who are “substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application.” This is intended to make clear that the duty does not extend to typists, clerks, and similar personnel who assist with an application.

The word “with” appears before “the assignee” and “anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign” to make clear that the duty applies only to individuals, not to organizations. For instance, the duty of disclosure would not apply to a corporation or institution as such. However, it would apply to individuals within the corporation or institution who were substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application, and actions by such individuals may affect the rights of the corporation or institution.

### 2001.03 To Whom Duty of Disclosure Is Owed

37 CFR 1.56(a) states that the “duty of candor and good faith” is owed “in dealing with the Office” and that all such individuals have a “duty to disclose to the Office” material information. This duty “in dealing with” and “to” the Office extends, of course, to all dealings which such individuals have with the Office, and is not limited to representations to or dealings with the examiner. For example, the duty would extend to proceedings before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the Office of the Assistant Commissioner for Patents, etc.

### 2001.04 Information Under 37 CFR 1.56(a)

*37 CFR 1.56. Duty to disclose information material to patentability.*

(a) A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. The public interest is best served, and the most effective patent examination occurs when, at the time an application is being examined, the Office is aware of and evaluates the teachings of all information material to patentability. Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the

Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this section. The duty to disclose information exists with respect to each pending claim until the claim is cancelled or withdrawn from consideration, or the application becomes abandoned. Information material to the patentability of a claim that is cancelled or withdrawn from consideration need not be submitted if the information is not material to the patentability of any claim remaining under consideration in the application. There is no duty to submit information which is not material to the patentability of any existing claim. The duty to disclose all information known to be material to patentability is deemed to be satisfied if all information known to be material to patentability of any claim issued in a patent was cited by the Office or submitted to the Office in the manner prescribed by §§ 1.97(b)-(d) and 1.98. However, no patent will be granted on an application in connection with which fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional misconduct. The Office encourages applicants to carefully examine:

- (1) prior art cited in search reports of a foreign patent office in a counterpart application, and
- (2) the closest information over which individuals associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent application believe any pending claim patentably defines, to make sure that any material information contained therein is disclosed to the Office.

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The language of 37 CFR 1.56 (and 37 CFR 1.555) has been modified effective March 16, 1992 to emphasize that there is a duty of candor and good faith which is broader than the duty to disclose material information. 37 CFR 1.56 further states that “no patent will be granted on an application in connection with which fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional misconduct.”

The Office strives to issue valid patents. The Office has both an obligation not to unjustly issue patents and an obligation not to unjustly deny patents. Innovation and technological advancement are best served when an inventor is issued a patent with the scope of protection that is deserved. The rules as adopted serve to remind individuals associated with the preparation and prosecution of patent applications of their duty of candor and good faith in their dealings with the Office, and will aid the Office in receiving, in a timely manner, the information it needs to carry out effective and efficient examination of patent applications.

The amendment to 37 CFR 1.56 was proposed to address criticism concerning a perceived lack of certainty in the materiality standard. The rule as promulgated will provide greater clarity and hopefully minimize the burden of litigation on the question of inequitable conduct before the Office, while providing the Office with the information necessary for effective and efficient examination of patent applications. 37 CFR 1.56 has been amended to present a clearer and more objective definition of what information the Office considers material to patentability. The rules do not define fraud or inequitable conduct which have elements both of materiality and of intent.

The definition of materiality in 37 CFR 1.56 does not impose substantial new burdens on applicants, but is intended to provide the Office with the information it needs to make a proper and independent determination on patentability. It is the patent examiner who should make the determination after considering all the facts involved in the particular case.

37 CFR 1.56 states that each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty to disclose all information known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in the section. Thus, the duty applies to contemporaneously or presently known information. The fact that information was known years ago does not mean that it was recognized that the information is material to the present application.

The term “information” as used in 37 CFR 1.56 means all of the kinds of information required to be disclosed and includes any information which is “material to patentability.” Materiality is defined in 37 CFR 1.56(b) and discussed herein at MPEP § 2001.05. In addition to prior art such as patents and publications, 37 CFR 1.56 includes, for example, information on possible prior public uses, sales, offers to sell, derived knowledge, prior invention by another, inventorship conflicts, and the like.

The term “information” is intended to be all encompassing, similar to the scope of the term as discussed with respect to 37 CFR 1.291(a) (see MPEP § 1901.02). 37 CFR 1.56(a) also states: “The Office encourages applicants to carefully examine: (1) prior art cited in search reports of a foreign patent office in a counterpart application, and (2) the closest information over which individuals associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent application believe any pending claim patentably defines, to make sure that any material information contained therein is disclosed to the Office.” The sentence does not create any new duty for applicants, but is placed in the text of the rule as helpful guidance to individuals who file and prosecute patent applications.

It should be noted that the rules are *not* intended to require information *favorable* to patentability such as, for example, evidence of commercial success of the invention. Similarly, the rules are not intended to require, for example, disclosure of information concerning the level of skill in the art for purposes of determining obviousness.

37 CFR 1.56(a) states that the duty to disclose information exists until the application becomes abandoned. The duty to disclose information, however, does not end when an application becomes allowed but extends until a patent is granted on that application. The rules provide for information being considered after a notice of allowance is mailed and before the issue fee is paid (37 CFR 1.97(d)) and for an application to be withdrawn from issue because

one or more claims are unpatentable (37 CFR 1.313(b)(3)) or for an application to be withdrawn from issue and abandoned so that information may be considered in a continuing application before a patent issues (37 CFR 1.313(b)(5)).

37 CFR 1.56 provides that the duty of disclosure can be met by submitting information to the Office in the manner prescribed by 37 CFR 1.97 and 1.98. 37 CFR 1.97 and 1.98 have been amended effective March 16, 1992 so that information will be submitted to the Office in the manner and at the time which will facilitate consideration by the examiner. Applicants are provided certainty as to when information will be considered, and applicants will be informed when information is not considered. The Office does not believe that courts should, or will, find violations of the duty of disclosure because of unintentional noncompliance with 37 CFR 1.97 and 1.98. If the noncompliance is intentional, however, the applicant will have assumed the risk that the failure to submit the information in a manner that will result in its being considered by the examiner may be held to be a violation.

The Office does not anticipate any significant change in the quantity of information cited to the Office. Presumably, applicants will continue to submit information for consideration by the Office in applications rather than making and relying on their own determinations of materiality. An incentive remains to submit the information to the Office because it will result in a strengthened patent and will avoid later questions of materiality and intent to deceive. In addition, the new rules will actually facilitate the filing of information since the burden of submitting information to the Office has been reduced by eliminating, in most cases, the requirement for a concise statement of the relevance of each item of information listed in an information disclosure statement. It should also be noted that 37 CFR 1.97(h) states that the filing of an information disclosure statement shall not be considered to be an admission that the information cited in the statement is, or is considered to be, material to patentability as defined in 37 CFR 1.56.

### 2001.05 Materiality Under 37 CFR 1.56(b)

37 CFR 1.56. *Duty to disclose information material to patent ability.*

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(b) Under this section, information is material to patentability when it is not cumulative to information already of record or being made of record in the application, and

(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a *prima facie* case of unpatentability of a claim; or

(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in:

(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or

(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.

A *prima facie* case of unpatentability is established when the information compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each term in the claim its broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification, and before any consideration is given to evidence which may be submitted in an attempt to establish a contrary conclusion of patentability.

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Under the rule, information is not material unless it comes within the definition of 37 CFR 1.56(b)(1) or (2). If information is not material, there is no duty to disclose the information to the Office. Thus, it is theoretically possible for applicants to draft claims and a specification to avoid a *prima facie* case of obviousness over a reference and then to be able to withhold the reference from the examiner. The Office believes that most applicants will wish to submit the information, however, even though they may not be required to do so, to strengthen the patent and avoid the risks of an incorrect judgment on their part on materiality or that it may be held that there was an intent to deceive the Office.

## 2001.06 Sources of Information

All individuals covered by 37 CFR 1.56 (reproduced in MPEP § 2001.01) have a duty to disclose to the Patent and Trademark Office all material information they are *aware* of regardless of the source of or how they become aware of the information. Materiality controls whether information must be disclosed to the Office, not the circumstances under which or the source from which the information is obtained. If material, the information must be disclosed to the Office. The duty to disclose material information extends to information such individuals are aware of prior to or at the time of filing the application or become aware of during the prosecution thereof.

Such individuals may be or become aware of material information from various sources such as, for example, co-workers, trade shows, communications from or with competitors, potential infringers, or other third parties, related foreign applications (see MPEP § 2001.06(a)), prior or copending United States patent applications (see MPEP § 2001.06(b)), related litigation (see MPEP § 2001.06(c)) and preliminary examination searches.

### 2001.06(a) Prior Art Cited in Related Foreign Applications

Applicants and other individuals, as set forth in 37 CFR 1.56, have a duty to bring to the attention of the Office any material prior art or other information cited or brought to their attention in any related foreign application. The inference that such prior art or other information is material is especially strong where it is the only prior art cited or where it has been used in rejecting the same or similar

claims in the foreign application. See *Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Lambert Bros., Inc.*, 542 F. Supp. 933, 216 USPQ 976 (S.D. N.Y. 1982) wherein a patent was held invalid or unenforceable because patentee's foreign counsel did not disclose to patentee's United States counsel or to the Office prior art cited by the Dutch Patent Office in connection with the patentee's corresponding Dutch application. The court stated, 542 F. Supp. at 943, 216 USPQ at 985:

Foreign patent attorneys representing applicants for U.S. patents through local correspondent firms surely must be held to the same standards of conduct which apply to their American counterparts; a double standard of accountability would allow foreign attorneys and their clients to escape responsibility for fraud or inequitable conduct merely by withholding from the local correspondent information unfavorable to patentability and claiming ignorance of United States disclosure requirements.

### 2001.06(b) Information Relating to or From Copending United States Patent Applications

The individuals covered by 37 CFR 1.56 have a duty to bring to the attention of the examiner, or other Office official involved with the examination of a particular application, information within their knowledge as to other copending United States applications which are "material to patentability" of the application in question. As set forth by the court in *Armour & Co. v. Swift & Co.*, 466 F.2d 767, 779, 175 USPQ 70, 79 (7th Cir. 1972):

[W]e think that it is unfair to the busy examiner, no matter how diligent and well informed he may be, to assume that he retains details of every pending file in his mind when he is reviewing a particular application . . . [T]he applicant has the burden of presenting the examiner with a complete and accurate record to support the allowance of letters patent.

See also MPEP § 2004, paragraph 9.

Accordingly, the individuals covered by 37 CFR 1.56 cannot assume that the examiner of a particular application is necessarily aware of other applications "material to patentability" of the application in question, but must instead bring such other applications to the attention of the examiner. For example, if a particular inventor has different applications pending in which similar subject matter but patentably indistinct claims are present that fact must be disclosed to the examiner of each of the involved applications. Similarly, the prior art references from one application must be made of record in another subsequent application if such prior art references are "material to patentability" of the subsequent application.

Normally, if the application under examination is identified as a continuation or continuation-in-part of an earlier application, the examiner will consider the prior art cited in the earlier application. The examiner must indicate in the first Office action whether the prior art in a related earlier

application has been reviewed. Accordingly, no separate citation of the same prior art need be made in the later application.

### **2001.06(c) Information From Related Litigation**

Where the subject matter for which a patent is being sought is or has been involved in litigation, the existence of such litigation and any other material information arising therefrom must be brought to the attention of the Patent and Trademark Office. Examples of such material information include evidence of possible prior public use or sales, questions of inventorship, prior art, allegations of “fraud,” “inequitable conduct,” and “violation of duty of disclosure.” Another example of such material information is any assertion that is made during litigation which is contradictory to assertions made to the examiner. *Environ Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc.*, 43 USPQ2d 1288, 1291 (E.D. Pa. 1997). Such information might arise during litigation in, for example, pleadings, admissions, discovery including interrogatories, depositions, and other documents and testimony.

Where a patent for which reissue is being sought is, or has been, involved in litigation which raised a question material to examination of the reissue application, such as the validity of the patent, or any allegation of “fraud,” “inequitable conduct,” or “violation of duty of disclosure,” the existence of such litigation must be brought to the attention of the Office by the applicant at the time of, or shortly after, filing the application, either in the reissue oath or declaration, or in a separate paper, preferably accompanying the application, as filed. Litigation begun after filing of the reissue application should be promptly brought to the attention of the Office. The details and documents from the litigation, insofar as they are “material to patentability” of the reissue application as defined in 37 CFR 1.56, should accompany the application as filed, or be submitted as promptly thereafter as possible. See *Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc.*, 120 F.3d 1253, 1258, 1259, 43 USPQ2d 1666, 1670-71 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (patent held unenforceable due to inequitable conduct based on patentee's failure to disclose a relevant reference and for failing to disclose ongoing litigation).

For example, the defenses raised against validity of the patent, or charges of “fraud” or “inequitable conduct” in the litigation, would normally be “material to the examination” of the reissue application. It would, in most situations, be appropriate to bring such defenses to the attention of the Office by filing in the reissue application a copy of the court papers raising such defenses. As a minimum, the applicant should call the attention of the Office to the litigation, the existence and the nature of any allegations relating

to validity and/or “fraud,” or “inequitable conduct” relating to the original patent, and the nature of litigation materials relating to these issues. Enough information should be submitted to clearly inform the Office of the nature of these issues so that the Office can intelligently evaluate the need for asking for further materials in the litigation. See MPEP § 1442.04.

### **2001.06(d) Information Relating to Claims Copied From a Patent**

Where claims are copied or substantially copied from a patent, 37 CFR 1.607(c) requires applicant shall, at the time he or she presents the claim(s), identify the patent and the numbers of the patent claims. Failure to comply with 37 CFR 1.607(c) may result in the issuance of a requirement for information as to why an identification of the source of the copied claims was not made. Clearly, the information required by 37 CFR 1.607(c) as to the source of copied claims is material information under 37 CFR 1.56 and failure to inform the PTO of such information may violate the duty of disclosure.

## **2002 Disclosure — By Whom and How Made**

37 CFR 1.56. *Duty to disclose information material to patentability.*

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(d) Individuals other than the attorney, agent or inventor may comply with this section by disclosing information to the attorney, agent, or inventor.

### **2002.01 By Whom Made**

37 CFR 1.56(d) makes clear that information may be disclosed to the Office through an attorney or agent of record or through a *pro se* inventor, and that other individuals may satisfy their duty of disclosure to the Office by disclosing information to such an attorney, agent, or inventor who then is responsible for disclosing the same to the Office. Information that is not material need not be passed along to the Office.

### **2002.02 Must be in Writing**

It is clear that the disclosures under 37 CFR 1.56 must be in writing as prescribed by 37 CFR 1.2 which requires:

All business with the Patent and Trademark Office should be transacted in writing. \*\*\*The action of the . . . Office will be based exclusively on the written record in the Office.

Further, as provided in 37 CFR 1.4(b):

Since each application file should be complete in itself, a separate copy of every paper to be filed in an application should be furnished for each application to which the paper pertains, even

though the contents of the papers filed in two or more applications may be identical.

## 2003 Disclosure — When Made

In reissue applications, applicants are encouraged to file information disclosure statements at the time of filing or within 2 months of filing, since reissue applications are taken up “special” (see MPEP § 1442 and § 1442.03). However, in a reissue where waiver of the normal 2 month delay period of 37 CFR 1.176 is being requested (see MPEP § 1441), the statement should be filed at the time of filing the application, or as soon thereafter as possible.

The presumption of validity is generally strong when prior art was before and considered by the Office and weak when it was not. See *Bolkcom v. Carborundum Co.*, 523 F.2d 492, 498, 186 USPQ 466, 471 (6th Cir. 1975).

### 2003.01 Disclosure After Patent Is Granted

#### BY CITATIONS OF PRIOR ART UNDER 37 CFR 1.501

Where a patentee or any member of the public (including private persons, corporate entities, and government agencies) has prior patents or printed publications which the patentee or member of the public desires to have made of record in the patent file, patentee or such member of the public may file a citation of such prior art with the Patent and Trademark Office pursuant to 37 CFR 1.501. Such citations and papers will be entered without comment by the Office. The Office does not of course consider the citation and papers but merely places them of record in the patent file. Information which may be filed under 37 CFR 1.501 is limited to prior art patents and printed publications. Any citations which include items other than patents and printed publications will not be entered in the patent file. See MPEP § 2202 through § 2208.

#### BY REEXAMINATION

Where any person, including patentee, has prior art patents and/or printed publications which said person desires to have the Patent and Trademark Office consider after a patent has issued, such person may file a Request for Reexamination of the patent (see 37 CFR 1.510 and MPEP § 2209 through § 2220).

## 2004 Aids to Compliance With Duty of Disclosure

While it is not appropriate to attempt to set forth procedures by which attorneys, agents, and other individuals may ensure compliance with the duty of disclosure, the items listed below are offered as examples of possible procedures which could help avoid problems with the duty of

disclosure. Though compliance with these procedures may not be required, they are presented as helpful suggestions for avoiding duty of disclosure problems.

1. Many attorneys, both corporate and private, are using letters and questionnaires for applicants and others involved with the filing and prosecution of the application and checklists for themselves and applicants to ensure compliance with the duty of disclosure. The letter generally explains the duty of disclosure and what it means to the inventor and assignee. The questionnaire asks the inventor and assignee questions about

- the origin of the invention and its point of departure from what was previously known and in the prior art,
- possible public uses and sales,
- prior publication, knowledge, patents, foreign patents, etc.

The checklist is used by the attorney to ensure that the applicant has been informed of the duty of disclosure and that the attorney has inquired of and cited material prior art.

The use of these types of aids would appear to be most helpful, though not required, in identifying prior art and may well help the attorney and the client avoid or more easily explain a potentially embarrassing and harmful “fraud” allegation.

2. It is desirable to ask questions about inventorship. Who is the proper inventor? Are there disputes or possible disputes about inventorship? If there are questions, call them to the attention of the Patent and Trademark Office.

3. It is desirable to ask questions of the inventor about the disclosure of the best mode. Make sure that the best mode is described. The disclosure of the best mode may be raised in litigation. See, for example, *Carlson, The Best Mode Disclosure Requirement in Patent Practice*, 60 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 171 (1978).

4. It is desirable for an attorney or agent to make certain that the inventor, especially a foreign inventor, recognizes his or her responsibilities in signing the oath or declaration. See 37 CFR 1.69(a).

#### 37 CFR 1.69. Foreign language oaths and declarations.

(a) Whenever an individual making an oath or declaration cannot understand English, the oath or declaration must be in a language that such individual can understand and shall state that such individual understands the content of any documents to which the oath or declaration relates.

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Note MPEP § 602.06 for a more detailed discussion.

5. It is desirable for an attorney or agent to carefully evaluate and explain to the applicant and others involved the scope of the claims, particularly the broadest claims. Ask specific questions about possible prior art which might be material in reference to the broadest claim or claims. There is some tendency to mistakenly evaluate prior art in

the light of the gist of what is regarded as the invention or narrower interpretations of the claims, rather than measuring the art against the broadest claim with all of its reasonable interpretations. It is desirable to pick out the broadest claim or claims and measure the materiality of prior art against a reasonably broad interpretation of these claims.

6. It may be useful to evaluate the materiality of prior art or other information from the viewpoint of whether it is the closest prior art or other information. This will tend to put the prior art or other information in better perspective. However, 37 CFR 1.56 may still require the submission of prior art or other information which is not as close as that of record.

7. Care should be taken to see that prior art or other information cited in a specification or in an information disclosure statement is properly described and that the information is not incorrectly or incompletely characterized. It is particularly important for an attorney or agent to review, before filing, an application which was prepared by someone else, e.g., a foreign application. It is also important that an attorney or agent make sure that foreign clients, including foreign applicants, attorneys, and agents understand the requirements of the duty of disclosure, and that the U.S. attorney or agent review any information disclosure statements or citations to ensure that compliance with 37 CFR 1.56 is present. See *Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Lambert Bros., Inc.*, 542 F. Supp. 933, 216 USPQ 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) wherein a patent was held invalid or unenforceable because patentee's foreign counsel did not disclose to patentee's United States counsel or to the Office prior art cited by the Dutch Patent Office in connection with the patentee's corresponding Dutch application. The court stated, 542 F. Supp. at 943, 216 USPQ at 985:

Foreign patent attorneys representing applicants for U.S. patents through local correspondent firms surely must be held to the same standards of conduct which apply to their American counterparts; a double standard of accountability would allow foreign attorneys and their clients to escape responsibility for fraud or inequitable conduct merely by withholding from the local correspondent information unfavorable to patentability and claiming ignorance of United States disclosure requirements.

8. Care should be taken to see that inaccurate statements or inaccurate experiments are not introduced into the specification, either inadvertently or intentionally. For example, stating that an experiment "was run" or "was conducted" when in fact the experiment was not run or conducted is a misrepresentation of the facts. No results should be represented as actual results unless they have actually been achieved. Paper examples should not be described using the past tense. See MPEP § 608.01(p) and § 707.07(l). Also, misrepresentations can occur when experiments which were run or conducted are inaccurately reported in the specification, e.g., an experiment is changed by leaving out

one or more ingredients. See *Steierman v. Connelly*, 192 USPQ 433 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1975); 192 USPQ 446 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1976).

9. Do not rely on the examiner of a particular application to be aware of other applications belonging to the same applicant or assignee. It is desirable to call such applications to the attention of the examiner even if there is only a question that they might be "material to patentability" of the application the examiner is considering. It is desirable to be particularly careful that prior art or other information in one application is cited to the examiner in other applications to which it would be material. Do not assume that an examiner will necessarily remember, when examining a particular application, other applications which the examiner is examining, or has examined. See *Armour & Co. v. Swift & Co.*, 466 F.2d 767, 779, 175 USPQ 70, 79 (7th Cir. 1972); *KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, Inc.*, 585 F. Supp. 1516, 1522, 1528-29, 222 USPQ 703, 708, 713-14 (S.D. N.Y. 1984), *vacated and remanded*, 778 F.2d 1571, 228 USPQ 32 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

While vacating the summary judgment and remanding for trial in *KangaROOS*, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated that a "lapse on the part of the examiner does not excuse the applicant." 778 F.2d at 1576, 228 USPQ at 35.

10. When in doubt, it is desirable and safest to submit information. Even though the attorney, agent, or applicant doesn't consider it necessarily material, someone else may see it differently and embarrassing questions can be avoided. The court in *U.S. Industries v. Norton Co.*, 210 USPQ 94, 107 (N.D. N.Y. 1980) stated "In short, the question of relevancy in close cases, should be left to the examiner and not the applicant." See also *LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n*, 958 F.2d 1066, 22 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

11. It may be desirable to submit information about prior uses and sales even if it appears that they may have been experimental, not involve the specifically claimed invention, or not encompass a completed invention. See *Hycor Corp. v. The Schlueter Co.*, 740 F.2d 1529, 1534-37, 222 USPQ 553, 557-559 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See also *LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n*, 958 F.2d 1066, 22 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

12. Submit information promptly. An applicant, attorney, or agent who is aware of prior art or other information and its significance should submit same early in prosecution, e.g., before the first action by the examiner, and not wait until after allowance. Potentially material information discovered late in the prosecution should be immediately submitted. That the issue fee has been paid is no reason or excuse for failing to submit information. See *Elmwood Liq-*

*uid Products, Inc. v. Singleton Packing Corp.*, 328 F. Supp. 974, 170 USPQ 398 (M.D. Fla. 1971).

13. It is desirable to avoid the submission of long lists of documents if it can be avoided. Eliminate clearly irrelevant and marginally pertinent cumulative information. If a long list is submitted, highlight those documents which have been specifically brought to applicant's attention and/or are known to be of most significance. See *Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc.*, 359 F. Supp. 948, 175 USPQ 260 (S.D. Fla. 1972), *aff'd*, 479 F.2d 1338, 178 USPQ 577 (5th Cir. 1973), *cert. denied*, 414 U.S. 874 (1974). But cf. *Molins PLC v. Textron Inc.*, 48 F.3d 1172, 33 USPQ2d 1823 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

14. Watch out for continuation-in-part applications where intervening material information or documents may exist; particularly watch out for foreign patents and publications related to the parent application and dated more than 1 year before the filing date of the CIP. These and other intervening documents may be material information. See *In re Ruschetta*, 255 F.2d 687, 690-91, 118 USPQ 101, 104 (CCPA 1958); *In re van Lagenhoven*, 458 F.2d 132, 173 USPQ 426 (CCPA 1972); *Chromalloy American Corp. v. Alloy Surfaces Co.*, 339 F. Supp. 859, 173 USPQ 295 (D. Del. 1972).

15. Watch out for information that might be deemed to be prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(f) and (g).

Prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(f) may be available under 35 U.S.C. 103. See *OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc.*, 122 F.3d 1396, 1401, 43 USPQ2d 1641, 1644 (Fed. Cir. 1997)(35 U.S.C. "102(f) is a prior art provision for purposes of § 103"); *Dale Electronics v. R.C.L. Electronics*, 488 F.2d 382, 386, 180 USPQ 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1973); and *Ex parte Andresen*, 212 USPQ 100, 102 (Bd. App. 1981).

Note also that evidence of prior invention under 35 U.S.C. 102(g) may be available under 35 U.S.C. 103, such as in *In re Bass*, 474 F.2d 1276, 177 USPQ 178 (CCPA 1973).

Note 35 U.S.C. 103(c) disqualifies 35 U.S.C. 102(f)/103 or 102(g)/103 prior art which was, at the time the second invention was made, owned by or subject to an obligation of assignment to, the person who owned the first invention. See 1050 O.G. 316.

16. Watch out for information picked up by the inventors and others at conventions, plant visits, in-house reviews, etc. See, for example, *Dale Electronics v. R.C.L. Electronics*, 488 F.2d 382, 386-87, 180 USPQ 225, 228 (1st Cir. 1973).

17. Make sure that all of the individuals who are subject to the duty of disclosure, such as spelled out in 37 CFR 1.56, are informed of and fulfill their duty.

18. Finally, if information was specifically considered and discarded as not material, this fact might be recorded in an attorney's file or applicant's file, including the reason for discarding it. If judgment might have been bad or something might have been overlooked inadvertently, a note made at the time of evaluation might be an invaluable aid in explaining that the mistake was honest and excusable. Though such records are not required, they could be helpful in recalling and explaining actions in the event of a question of "fraud" or "inequitable conduct" raised at a later time.

## 2010 Office Handling of Duty of Disclosure/Inequitable Conduct Issues

Determination of inequitable conduct issues requires an evaluation of the intent of the party involved. While some court decisions have held that intent may be inferred in some circumstances, consideration of the good faith of the party, or lack thereof, is often required. In several court decisions, a high level of proof of intent to mislead the Office was required in order to prove inequitable conduct under 37 CFR 1.56. See *In re Harito*, 847 F.2d 801, 6 USPQ2d 1930 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and *FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co.*, 835 F.2d 1411, 5 USPQ2d 1112 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The Office is not the best forum in which to determine whether there was an "intent to mislead"; such intent is best determined when the trier of facts can observe demeanor of witnesses subjected to cross-examination. A court, with subpoena power, is presently the best forum to consider duty of disclosure issues under the present evidentiary standard for finding an "intent to mislead." The court proceeding involves two participating adverse parties. This is not the case in the Office, since even "protesting" parties are not permitted to participate under the rules. Also, it is the courts and not the Office that are in the best position to fashion an equitable remedy to fit the precise facts in those cases where inequitable conduct is established. Furthermore, inequitable conduct is not set by statute as a criteria for patentability but rather is a judicial application of the doctrine of unclean hands which is appropriate to be handled by the courts rather than by an administrative body. Because of the lack of tools in the Office to deal with this issue and because of its sensitive nature and potential impact on a patent, Office determinations generally will not deter subsequent litigation of the same issue in the courts on appeal or in separate litigation. Office determinations would significantly add to the expense and time involved in obtaining a patent with little or no benefit to the patent owner or any other parties with an interest.

Accordingly, the Office does not investigate and reject original or reissue applications under 37 CFR 1.56. Likewise, the Office will not comment upon duty of disclosure



issues which are brought to the attention of the Office in original or reissue applications except to note in the application, in appropriate circumstances, that such issues are no longer considered by the Office during its examination of patent applications. Examination of lack of deceptive intent in reissue applications will continue but without any investigation of inequitable conduct issues. Applicant's statement of lack of deceptive intent normally will be accepted as dispositive except in special circumstances such as an admission or judicial determination of fraud or inequitable conduct. See MPEP § 2022.05.

## 2012 Reissue Applications Involving Issues of Fraud, Inequitable Conduct, and/or Violation of Duty of Disclosure

Questions of “fraud,” “inequitable conduct,” or violation of “duty of disclosure” or “candor and good faith” can arise in reissue applications.

### REQUIREMENT FOR “ERROR WITHOUT ANY DECEPTIVE INTENTION”

Both 35 U.S.C. 251 and 37 CFR 1.175 promulgated pursuant thereto require that the error must have arisen “without any deceptive intention.” *In re Heany*, 1911 C.D. 138, 180 (1911), unequivocally states:

Where such a condition [fraudulent or deceptive intention] is shown to exist the right to reissue the patent is forfeited.

Similarly, the court in *In re Clark*, 522 F.2d 623, 627, 187 USPQ 209, 213 (CCPA 1975) indicated:

Reissue is not available to rescue a patentee who had presented claims limited to avoid particular prior art and then had failed to disclose that prior art . . . after that failure to disclose has resulted in invalidating of the claims.

It is clear that “fraud” cannot be purged through the reissue process. See conclusions of Law 89 and 91 in *Intermountain Research and Eng'g Co. v. Hercules Inc.*, 171 USPQ 577, 631-32 (C.D. Cal. 1971).

Clearly, where several patents or applications stem from an original application which contained fraudulent claims ultimately allowed, the doctrine of unclean hands bars allowance or enforcement of any of the claims of any of the applications or patents. See *Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.*, 290 U.S. 240, 245, 19 USPQ 228, 230 (1933); *East Chicago Machine Tool Corp. v. Stone Container Corp.*, 181 USPQ 744, 748 (N.D. Ill.), *modified*, 185 USPQ 210 (N.D. Ill. 1974). See also *Chromalloy American Corp. v. Alloy Surfaces Co.*, 339 F. Supp. 859, 173 USPQ 295 (D.Del. 1972) and *Strong v. General Electric Co.*, 305 F. Supp. 1084, 162 USPQ 141 (N.D. Ga. 1969), *aff'd*, 434 F.2d 1042, 168 USPQ 8 (5th Cir. 1970), *cert. denied*, 403 U.S. 906 (1971) where fraud or inequitable conduct affect-

ing only certain claims or only one of related patents was held to affect the other claims or patent. Clearly, “fraud” practiced or attempted in an application which issues as a patent is “fraud” practiced or attempted in connection with any subsequent application to reissue that patent. The reissue application and the patent are inseparable as far as questions of “fraud,” “inequitable conduct,” or “violation of the duty of disclosure” are concerned. See *In re Heany*, *supra*; and *Norton v. Curtiss*, 433 F.2d 779, 792, 167 USPQ 532, 543 (CCPA 1970), wherein the court stated:

We take this to indicate that any conduct which will prevent the enforcement of a patent after the patent issues should, if discovered earlier, prevent the issuance of the patent.

Clearly, if a reissue patent would not be enforceable after its issue because of “fraud,” “inequitable conduct” or “violation of the duty of disclosure” during the prosecution of the patent sought to be reissued, the reissue patent application should not issue. Under such circumstances, an appropriate remedy would be to reject the claims in the application in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 251. See MPEP § 1448.

The examiner is **not to make any investigation** as to the lack of deceptive intent requirement in reissue applications. Applicant's statement (in the oath or declaration) of lack of deceptive intent will be accepted as dispositive except in special circumstances such as **an admission or judicial determination** of fraud, inequitable conduct or violation of the duty of disclosure, where no investigation need be made and the fact of the admission or judicial determination exists *per se*. Also, any admission of fraud, inequitable conduct or violation of the duty of disclosure must be explicit, unequivocal, and not subject to other interpretation. Where a rejection is made based upon such an admission (see MPEP § 1448) and applicant responds with any reasonable interpretation of the facts that would not lead to a conclusion of fraud, inequitable conduct or violation of the duty of disclosure, the rejection should be withdrawn. Alternatively, if applicant shows that the admission noted by the examiner was not in fact an admission, the rejection should also be withdrawn.

### 2012.01 Collateral Estoppel

The Supreme Court in *Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found.*, 402 U.S. 313, 169 USPQ 513 (1971) set forth the rule that once a patent has been declared invalid via judicial inquiry, a collateral estoppel barrier is created against further litigation involving the patent, unless the patentee-plaintiff can demonstrate “that he did not have” a full and fair chance to litigate the validity of his patent in “the earlier case.” See also *Ex parte Varga*, 189 USPQ 209 (Bd. App. 1973). As stated in *Kaiser Indus-*

*tries Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, 515 F.2d 964, 987, 185 USPQ 343, 362 (3rd Cir. 1975):

In fashioning the rule of *Blonder-Tongue*, Justice White for a unanimous Court made it clear that a determination of patent invalidity, after a thorough and equitable judicial inquiry, creates a collateral estoppel barrier to further litigation to enforce that patent.

Under 35 U.S.C. 251, the Commissioner can reissue a patent only if there is “error without any deceptive intention.” The Commissioner is without authority to reissue a patent when “deceptive intention” was present during prosecution of the parent application. See *In re Clark*, 522 F.2d 62, 187 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1975) and *In re Heany*, 1911 C.D. 138, 180 (1911). Thus, the collateral estoppel barrier applies where reissue is sought of a patent which has been held invalid or unenforceable for “fraud” or “violation of duty of disclosure” in procuring of said patent. It was held in *In re Kahn*, 202 USPQ 772, 773 (Comr. Pats. 1979):

Therefore, since the Kahn patent was held invalid, inter alia, for “failure to disclose material facts of which \* \* \* [Kahn] was aware” this application may be stricken under 37 CFR 1.56 via the doctrine of collateral estoppel as set forth in *Blonder-Tongue*, supra.

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The Patent and Trademark Office . . . has found no clear justification for not adhering to the doctrine of collateral estoppel under *Blonder-Tongue* in this case. Applicant has had his day in court. He appears to have had a full and fair chance to litigate the validity of his patent.

See MPEP § 2259 for collateral estoppel in reexamination proceedings.

### **2013 Protests Involving Issues of Fraud, Inequitable Conduct, and/or Violation of Duty of Disclosure**

37 CFR 1.291 permits protests by the public against pending applications.

Submissions under 37 CFR 1.291 are not limited to prior art documents such as patents and publications, but are intended to include any information, which in the protestor's opinion, would make or have made the grant of the patent improper (see MPEP § 1901.02). This includes, of course, information indicating the presence of “fraud” or “inequitable conduct” or “violation of the duty of disclosure,” which will be entered in the application file, generally without comment. See MPEP § 1901.06.

Protests should be in conformance with 37 CFR 1.291(a) and (b), and include a statement of the alleged

facts involved, the point or points to be reviewed, and the action requested. Any briefs or memoranda in support of the petition, and any affidavits, declarations, depositions, exhibits, or other material in support of the alleged facts, should accompany the protest.

### **2014 Duty of Disclosure in Reexamination Proceedings**

As provided in 37 CFR 1.555, the duty of disclosure in reexamination proceedings applies to the patent owner. That duty is a continuing obligation on the part of the patent owner throughout the proceedings. However, issues of “fraud,” “inequitable conduct,” or “violation of duty of disclosure” are not considered in reexamination. See MPEP § 2280. If questions of “fraud” or “inequitable conduct” or “violation of the duty of disclosure” are discovered during reexamination proceedings, the existence of such questions will be noted by the examiner in an Office action without further comment. See MPEP § 2258.

For the patent owner's duty to disclose prior or concurrent proceedings in which the patent is or was involved, see MPEP § 2282 and § 2001.06(c).

### **2016 Fraud, Inequitable Conduct, or Violation of Duty of Disclosure Affects All Claims**

A finding of “fraud,” “inequitable conduct,” or violation of duty of disclosure with respect to any claim in an application or patent, renders all the claims thereof unpatentable or invalid. See *Chromalloy American Corp. v. Alloy Surfaces Co.*, 339 F. Supp. 859, 173 USPQ 295 (D.Del. 1972) and *Strong v. General Electric Co.*, 305 F. Supp. 1084, 162 USPQ 141 (N.D. Ga. 1969), *aff'd*, 434 F.2d 1042, 168 USPQ 8 (5th Cir. 1970), *cert. denied*, 403 U.S. 906 (1971). In *J. P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd.*, 747 F.2d 1553, 1561, 223 USPQ 1089, 1093-94 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the court stated:

Once a court concludes that inequitable conduct occurred, all the claims — not just the particular claims in which the inequitable conduct is directly connected — are unenforceable. See generally, cases collected in 4 Chisum, PATENTS, paragraph 19.03[6] at 19-85 n. 10 (1984). Inequitable conduct “goes to the patent right as a whole, independently of particular claims.” *In re Clark* 522 F.2d 623, 626, 187 USPQ 209, 212 (CCPA).

The court noted in footnote 8 of *Stevens*:

In *In re Multiple Litigation Involving Frost Patent*, 540 F.2d 601, 611, 191 USPQ 241, 249 (3rd Cir. 1976), some claims were upheld despite nondisclosure with respect to others. The case is not precedent in this court.

As stated in *Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Lambert Bros., Inc.*, 542 F. Supp. 933, 943, 216 USPQ 976, 984 (S. D. N. Y. 1984) (quoting Patent Law Perspectives, 1977 Developments, § G.1 [1]-189):

The gravamen of the fraud defense is that the patentee has failed to discharge his duty of dealing with the examiner in a manner free from the taint of “fraud or other inequitable conduct.” If such conduct is established in connection with the prosecution of a patent, the fact that the lack of candor did not directly affect *all* the claims in the patent has never been the governing principle. It is the inequitable conduct that generates the unenforceability of the patent and we cannot think of cases where a patentee partially escaped the consequences of his wrongful acts by arguing that he only committed acts of omission or commission with respect to a limited number of claims. It is an all or nothing proposition. [Emphasis in original.]

**2022.05 Determination of “Error Without Any Deceptive Intention”**

If the application is a reissue application, the action by the examiner may extend to a determination as to whether at least one “error” required by 35 U.S.C. 251 has been alleged, i.e., identified. Further, the examiner should determine whether applicant has *averred* in the reissue oath or declaration, as required by 37 CFR 1.175(a)(2), (b)(1), and (b)(2), that all “errors” arose “without any deceptive intention.” However, the examiner should not normally comment or question as to whether in fact the averred statement as to lack of deceptive intention appears correct or true. See MPEP § 1414.



MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE