On the night of August 20-21, 1968, Czechoslovakia was invaded from the north, east
and south by 20 Soviet and Warsaw Pact divisions totaling some 250,000 men.1 At the same time, the positions vacated
by these units were backfilled by 10 Soviet divisions coming from positions in Hungary, Poland
and East Germany.
Once strategic points in Czechoslovakia
were occupied, most of these forces redeployed into western Czechoslovakia, where they took up positions
opposite West Germany and
neutral Austria.
With this military operation, Moscow put an end to the
“Prague Spring,” the brief flowering of political and economic democracy that began
the previous January with the appointment of Alexander Dubcek to the post of
First Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party. Initially backed by
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Dubcek had replaced the Stalinist Antonin
Novotny in December 1967.
Dubcek moved
quickly to supplant the existing repressive regime with a much more pluralist
one — “Communism with a Human Face.” Aware of the suspicion this was likely to
evoke from Moscow and the rest of
Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, Dubcek was careful to maintain Czechoslovakia’s position as a loyal ally of the
Soviet Union and member of the Warsaw Pact, insisting only on Prague’s right to internal
self-determination.
The Intelligence Community Watches
In Washington, the
Intelligence Community watched these developments with a mixture of
astonishment and growing unease. Previous liberalization efforts in Poland, East
Germany and Hungary had been brutally
repressed. But those had been rebellions against the Warsaw Pact and Soviet
dominion in Eastern Europe, which the Czech
leadership was taking great pains to avoid. Moreover, it had been apparent even
to the Kremlin that Czechoslovakia
was in need of some kind of economic reform. Czechoslovakia, which was once a
small industrial powerhouse, was now, after 20 years of communist rule, a
basket case.
The Prague Spring
thus could be viewed as actually strengthening the communist regime and, by
extension, the alliance itself.
The CIA was
cautiously optimistic. “If the new leadership in Prague
proceeds carefully and step-by-step, good progress can be made ... [I]n view of
its political, economic and military importance to the USSR and the Soviet bloc, [Czechoslovakia] cannot start an
anti-socialist or anti-Soviet policy. The USSR
would not allow this ... [but] there [is] no anti-socialist or anti-Soviet
movement involved in the new political evolution of [Czechoslovakia] … only a strong
movement for democratization and liberalization of the system.” Consequently, Moscow “…did not consider
Dubcek
as someone willing to start an anti-Soviet line.”2
Over the
spring and summer of 1968, however, Soviet patience with Prague wore thin and tensions rose. Even if Moscow was willing to tolerate a more liberal regime in Prague, Eastern European communist governments — many as
Stalinist as Czechoslovakia’s
had been — could not accept such a deviation from communist orthodoxy.
Optimism Fades
Preparations
for military action quietly went ahead: a series of Warsaw Pact military
exercises over June and July brought Soviet, East German, Polish and Hungarian
troops into Czechoslovakia.
They were in a position for a rapid takeover. They eventually departed Czech
soil, but hovered just outside the borders of the country.
CIA’s
optimism faded: Although Dubcek was reported to be in “an uneasy truce” with Moscow, time clearly was running out.3 Dubcek now was reported to be playing for
time, hoping that he could implement enough reforms quickly to present the
Kremlin leadership with a fait accompli.
Nevertheless,
“At some stage in the game,” the Agency reported, “the Soviets will … become
aware that their earlier hopes for a return to anything like the status quo
ante in Czechoslovakia
were without foundation. It is the Czech hope that this realization will have
come too late and the Soviets’ reactions will be minimal.”4
It was now
clear to CIA analysts that the Soviet POLITBURO viewed developments in Czechoslovakia with growing dissatisfaction.5 The only thing preventing the Soviet Union from intervening militarily was concern over
the impact of yet another violent repression of an Eastern European bid for
autonomy.6
On July 17,
the Office of National Estimates warned the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI): “We know of no way of foretelling the precise event in Czechoslovakia which might trigger …
extreme Soviet reaction, or of foreseeing the precise circumstances which might
produce within the Soviet leadership an agreement to move with force.”7
Two Warsaw
Pact summits at Bratislava
and Cierna nad Tisou seemed to dampen tensions, but Soviet and Warsaw Pact
forces remained encamped just outside the Czech border.
Soviet Invasion Renews the Cold War Chill
When, just
over one month later, these forces invaded Czechoslovakia, events moved with
dramatic swiftness. Within 12 hours, the brief flowering of Czechoslovakian
independence was over.
The Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia
brought a renewed chill to the Cold War. Soviet control over Eastern
Europe was reinforced. Détente was deferred and nascent arms
control negotiations were cancelled.
Most affected
were the people of Czechoslovakia,
who saw an end to their hopes for a more open society.
There was no
summer that year. The Prague Spring was followed by a Stalinist winter that
lasted another 23 years.
Read more
The CIA has
released numerous documents on the Prague Spring and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The following is but a small sampling of what is available online at CIA’s FOIA
Reading Room, http://www.foia.cia.gov/.
- CIA
Intelligence Information Cable, Political
Events and Personnel Changes in Czechoslovakia,
27 March 1968; Doc No. 242352.
-
CIA
Intelligence Memorandum, The Soviet Decision to Invade in Czechoslovakia, 21 August 1968;
Doc. No. 326291.
- ONE
Memorandum for the Director, Subject: The
Czechoslovak Crisis, 17 July 1968; Doc No. 242346.
- ONE
Special Memorandum 12-68, Subject: Czechoslovakia:
the Dubcek
Pause, 13 June 1968;
Doc. No. 95035.
The following three documents present an
interesting perspective drawn up for the White House one month after the
invasion.
-
Letter,
DCI Richard Helms to Walt W. Rostow, 20 September 1968; Doc. No. 126871.
-
CIA
Intelligence Memorandum, Military Costs of the Warsaw
Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 19 September 1968; Doc No. 126872.
- CIA
Intelligence Memorandum, Costs to Czechoslovakia,
and to the Warsaw
Pact Powers, of Actions Taken Against the Czechoslovak Economy, 19
September 1968; Doc No. 126873.
By far the largest depository of
declassified CIA documents is CREST (CIA Records Search Tool), a database
residing in the library of the College Park, Maryland facility of the US
National Archives (Archives II). CREST is searchable by title, data and text
content. The hundreds of thousands of pages stored in CREST include
-
finished
intelligence analysis;
-
Directorate
of Operations reports on the role of intelligence in the post World War II period;
-
material
on the creation, organization and role of CIA within the US Government;
-
a
collection of foreign scientific articles, ground photographs and associated
reference materials; and
-
the
CIA’s first release of motion picture film.
CREST is not accessible online, but is
well worth a visit. The following documents were found in CREST:
- Memorandum
for Deputy Director of Intelligence, SUBJECT:
Indications of Soviet Intent to Invade Czechoslovakia, 22 August 1968;
CIA-RDP79B00972A00010024004-1.
- Memorandum
to Mr. Smith, Subject: DDCI Memo on
Handling of Indications Traffic, 23 August [19]68;
CIA-RDP79B00972A000100240003-2.
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1 CIA Intelligence
Memorandum, Military Intervention in Czechoslovakia,
20 August 1968; Doc No. 1132788
2 CIA Intelligence Information
Cable, Political Events and Personnel
Changes in Czechoslovakia,
27 March 1968; Doc No. 242352, pp. 7-8.
3 ONE Special Memorandum
12-68, Subject: Czechoslovakia: the Dubcek Pause, 13 June 1968, p. 1; Doc. No. 95035.
4 Ibid., pp.
16-18.
5 Ibid., p. 4.
6 Ibid., p. 9.
7 ONE Memorandum for the
Director, Subject: The Czechoslovak
Crisis, 17 July 1968, p. 7; Doc No. 242346.
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