PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS: MOBILIZING STATE BY STATE
Section 2: Snapshots of Public Health Preparedness in States and Directly Funded Localities:Tennessee
Related Website: Tennessee Department of Public Health
Tennessee Responds to a Rabies Exposure at a Mass Gathering
Broad range communications networks are critical to inform the public about disease risks.
In August 2006, approximately
150,000 people attended the
Tennessee Walking Horse National
Celebration in Shelbyville,
Tennessee. One of the horses was confirmed to have
rabies. Because horses may transmit the rabies virus to
people, the Tennessee Department of Health (TDH)
responded rapidly to assess public health risks for rabies
among people who reportedly had contact with the horse.
Coordination with local, regional, state, and federal public health officials contributed to quick notification of the public regarding rabies transmission risk. TDH immediately initiated an extensive public messaging campaign via print and television to communicate the risks associated with attending the event and contact with the rabid horse. The Tennessee Health Alert Network, CDC Health Alert Network, and Epi-X were used to quickly correspond with regional and local public health departments, emergency departments, and CDC about assessment and treatment for people exposed to the horse.
In addition to media communications, 4,200 attendees were contacted by letter. TDH consulted with 53 people who were exposed to the rabid horse and recommended boosters or post-exposure treatment as appropriate. The cooperative agreement supported TDH’s preparedness infrastructure to effectively mobilize communication networks, including the Public Information Line and the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program Universal Call Distribution Support Line to handle high call volume.
Snapshot of Public Health Preparedness
Below are activities conducted byTennessee in the area of public health preparedness. They support CDC preparedness goals in the areas of detection and reporting, control, and improvement; crosscutting activities help prepare for all stages of an event. These data are not comprehensive and do not cover all preparedness activities.
Disease Detection and Investigation
The sooner public health professionals can detect diseases or other health threats and investigate their causes and effects in the community, the more quickly they can minimize population exposure.
| Category of Activities | Specific Activity | Response |
|---|---|---|
| Detect & Report | Could receive and investigate urgent disease reports 24/7/3651 | Yes |
|
Telephone | |
| Linked state and local health personnel to share information about disease outbreaks across state lines (through the CDC Epi-X system)3 | Yes | |
| Conducted year-round surveillance for seasonal influenza4 | Yes | |
* Telephone, fax, and electronic reporting are all viable options for urgent disease reporting, as long as the public health department has someone assigned to receive the reports 24/7/365. 1 CDC, DSLR; 2005 2 CDC, DSLR; 2006 3 CDC, Epi-X; 2007 4 HHS, OIG; 2007 |
||
Public Health Laboratories
Public health laboratories test and confirm agents that can threaten health. For example, advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques and subsequent reporting to the CDC database (PulseNet) are critical to recognize nationwide outbreaks from bacteria that can cause severe illness, such as E. coli O157:H7 and Listeria monocytogenes.
| Category of Activities | Specific Activity | Response |
|---|---|---|
| Detect & Report | Number ofTennessee laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network1 | 4 |
| Rapidly identified E. coli O157:H7 using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2 | ||
|
16 | |
|
81% | |
| Rapidly identified Listeria monocytogenes using advanced DNA “fingerprinting” techniques (PFGE):2 | ||
|
7 |
|
|
86% | |
| Had a laboratory information management system that could create, send, and receive messages3 (8/05 – 8/06) | Yes | |
|
Yes | |
| Had a rapid method to send urgent messages to frontline laboratories that perform initial screening of clinical specimens3 (8/05 – 8/06) | Yes | |
| Crosscutting | Conducted bioterrorism exercise that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) | Yes |
| Conducted exercise to test chemical readiness that met CDC criteria4 (8/05 – 8/06) | Yes | |
1 CDC, DBPR; 2007 2 CDC, DSLR; 2007 3 APHL, Public Health Laboratory Issues in Brief: Bioterrorism Capacity; May 2007 4 CDC, DSLR; 2006 |
||
Response
Planning provides a framework for how a public health department will respond during an emergency. The plans can be tested through external reviews, exercises, and real events. After-action reports assess what worked well during an exercise or real event and how the department can improve.
| Category of Activities | Specific Activity | Response |
|---|---|---|
| Control | Developed a public health response plan, including pandemic influenza response, crisis and emergency risk communication, and Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)1, 2 | Yes |
| Nebraska SNS plan reviewed by CDC2 | Yes | |
|
85 | |
| Number ofTennessee cities in the Cities Readiness Initiative3 | 2 | |
| Crosscutting | Developed roles and responsibilities for a multi-jurisdictional response (ICS) with:1 (8/05 – 8/06) | |
|
Yes | |
|
Yes | |
|
Yes | |
| Public health department staff participated in training to support cooperative agreement activities4 | Yes | |
| Public health laboratories conducted training for first responders5 (8/05 – 8/06) | Yes | |
| Activated public health emergency operations center as part of a drill, exercise, or real event*†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) | Yes | |
| Conducted a drill or exercise for key response partners to test communications when power and land lines were unavailable†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) | Yes | |
| Improve | Finalized at least one after-action report with an improvement plan following an exercise or real event†6 (partial year, 9/06 – 2/07) | Yes |
* Activation means rapidly staffing all eight core ICS functional roles in the public health emergency operations center with one person per position. This capability is critical to maintain in case of large-scale or complex incidents, even though not every incident requires full staffing of the ICS. † States were expected to perform these activities from 9/1/2006 to 8/30/2007. These data represent results from the first half of this period only. 1 CDC, DSLR; 2006 2 CDC, DSNS; 2007 3 CDC, DSNS CRI; 2007 4 CDC, DSLR; 1999-2005 5 APHL, Chemical Terrorism Preparedness; May 2007 6 CDC, DSLR; 2007 |
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