<DOC> [107th Congress House Hearings] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access] [DOCID: f:87891.wais] HOW EFFECTIVELY IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARING FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK? ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ AUGUST 22, 2002 __________ Serial No. 107-225 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house http://www.house.gov/reform ______ 87-891 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2003 ____________________________________________________________________________ For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512ÿ091800 Fax: (202) 512ÿ092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402ÿ090001 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------ JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma (Independent) Kevin Binger, Staff Director Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois DOUG OSE, California MAJOR R. OWENS, New York ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York Ex Officio DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California Bonnie Heald, Deputy Staff Director Chris Barkley, Assistant C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on August 22, 2002.................................. 1 Statement of: Ganske, Hon. Greg, a Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa.............................................. 2 Gilchrist, Mary J.R., director, University of Iowa Hygienic Laboratory; Christopher G. Atchison, associate dean for public health practice, College of Public Health, University of Iowa; Dr. Manjit Misra, director, seed sciences, Iowa State University; Richard Hainje, Director, Region VII of the FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency; James F. Bogner, Special Agent in Charge, Omaha Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Paul L. Posner, Managing Director, Federal Budget Issues, Strategic Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office..................... 67 Leach, Hon. James, a Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa.............................................. 3 Pate, Paul D., mayor of Cedar Rapids; Ned Wright, director, Linn County Management Agency; Chief Stephen C. Havlik, Cedar Rapids Fire Department; Douglas A. Feil, director, environmental training programs, Kirkwood Community College, Cedar Rapids, IA; and Bruce Lacy, nuclear business assets manager for Alliant Energy, Duane Arnold Energy Center, Cedar Rapids, IA................................... 5 Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Atchison, Christopher G., associate dean for public health practice, College of Public Health, University of Iowa, prepared statement of...................................... 78 Bogner, James F., Special Agent in Charge, Omaha Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared statement of..... 115 Feil, Douglas A., director, environmental training programs, Kirkwood Community College, Cedar Rapids, IA, prepared statement of............................................... 40 Gilchrist, Mary J.R., director, University of Iowa Hygienic Laboratory, prepared statement of.......................... 70 Hainje, Richard, Director, Region VII of the FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, prepared statement of. 102 Havlik, Chief Stephen C., Cedar Rapids Fire Department, prepared statement of...................................... 31 Misra, Dr. Manjit, director, seed sciences, Iowa State University, prepared statement of.......................... 95 Pate, Paul D., mayor of Cedar Rapids, prepared statement of.. 8 Wright, Ned, director, Linn County Management Agency, prepared statement of...................................... 15 HOW EFFECTIVELY IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ASSISTING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARING FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK? ---------- THURSDAY, AUGUST 22, 2002 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, Iowa City, IA. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:10 p.m., in the Main Lounge, Iowa Memorial Union, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, Hon. Stephen Horn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Leach and Ganske. Staff present: Bonnie Heald, deputy staff director; Christopher Barkley, assistant to the subcommittee; Michael Sazonov, staff assistant; Meghan Gutierriez and Curt Mercadante, Dr. Ganske's Staff; Bill Tate, Mr. Leach's Staff; Norine Zamastil, University of Iowa. Mr. Horn. A quorum being present, this hearing of the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations will come to order. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the most devastating attacks ever committed on the U.S. soil. Despite the damage and enormous loss of life, the attacks failed to cripple this Nation. To the contrary, Americans have never been more united in their fundamental belief in freedom and their willingness to protect that freedom. The diabolical nature of these attacks and then the deadly release of anthrax sent a loud and clear message to all Americans: We must be prepared for the unexpected. We must have the mechanisms in place to protect this Nation and its people from further attempts to cause massive destruction. The aftermath of September 11th clearly demonstrated the need for adequate communication systems and rapid deployment of well-trained emergency personnel. Yet despite billions of dollars in spending on Federal emergency programs, there remain serious doubts as to whether this Nation is equipped to handle a massive chemical, biological or nuclear attack. Today, the subcommittee will examine how effectively Federal, State and local agencies are working together to prepare for such emergencies. We want those who live in the great State of Iowa and the good people of the cities such as Iowa City and Cedar Rapids to know that they can rely on these systems, should the need arise. We are fortunate to have witnesses today whose valuable experience and insight will help the subcommittee better understand the needs of those on the front lines. We want to hear about their capabilities and their challenges, and we want to know what the Federal Government can do to help. We welcome all of our witnesses and look forward to their testimony. I'm delighted to have with us, and without objection they will be in full matters on this particular subcommittee, and they are Mr. Ganske and Mr. Leach. No State has two statesmen like these two gentlemen, and Iowa should be very proud of both gentlemen. And I will start with Mr. Ganske and then Mr. Leach. The first statement. STATEMENT OF HON. GREG GANSKE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA Mr. Ganske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and the House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations for coming to Iowa to examine how the Federal Government is assisting State and local governments prepare for potential terrorist attacks involving biological, chemical or nuclear agents. This is the latest of many steps taken by our Government to respond to these threats. My own House Energy and Commerce Committee passed legislation based on a bill I introduced in the House, along with my colleague, Senator Bill Frist in the Senate, which the President later signed into law. Mr. Chairman, on September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the most devastating attack ever committed on our soil. Ever since September 11th and the anthrax attacks on the U.S. Capitol, Americans are, rightly so, concerned about the threat of biological and chemical warfare. The threat of further chemical and biological agents is real. The ease with which biological and chemical agents can be concealed and their potential to effect large segments of the population beyond those initially exposed only increases their appeal to terrorists. A terrorist attack using a deadly agent could kill or sicken millions of Americans. Many countries have developed biological warfare capabilities in spite of the fact that there are treaties against it. While the Center for Disease Control designates 36 different pathogens or germs as extremely dangerous, we are most threatened by about 10 to 15 agents. These agents share the ability to be easily produced, stored and can cause thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of deaths. The most commonly known agents on that list are anthrax and smallpox. It was my opinion that before September 11th there was no hospital in this country capable of handling an epidemic. Whether we're talking about Johns Hopkins in Baltimore or the University of Iowa Medical Center here in Iowa City--and, Mr. Chairman, I want to point out how appropriate it is to have this type of hearing in Iowa City, with its high concentration of health care providers and services--our local hospitals have no excess capacity to handle massive numbers of sick patients. In fact, many hospitals do not have the expertise to detect a biologic attack rapidly enough to effectively limit the dispersion. We need to be able to monitor our air, water, land and fellow humans to promptly detect infection. Once detected, we need resources to treat the disease by containing outbreaks and treating affected people. We need medicines and vaccines to combat these biologic agents. Recognizing these threats, last year, Senator Frist and I introduced the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act both in the House and the Senate. This legislation strengthened our Public Health infrastructure and enhanced our national security in the wake of the events of September 11th. Congress used our bill as a template for the bioterrorism protection legislation that President Bush signed into law this past June. The new law strengthens Public Health preparedness, enhances controls on biologic agents and protects our food, drugs and drinking water supplies. It authorizes increased funding through grants to States, local governments and other public and private health-care facilities to improve preparedness, to enhance laboratory capacity, to educate and train health-care personnel and to develop new drugs, vaccines and therapies. It also increased funding for the CDC and established a national data base of dangerous pathogens and biologic agents. This bioterrorism bill is much needed, but I should point out that it is the first step in addressing this. It is a bill that authorizes the expenditures. Today, Congress is dealing with the funding of that bill that isn't allowed. Mr. Chairman, as a Nation, we're taking steps to prevent, detect and respond to those attacks, those potential attacks. We recognize that it is always best to plan for the worst and hope for the best. As the old adage reminds us, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. As a physician, I know that very well. However, even with extensive spending on Federal programs, I think there still remains a serious concern about the threat of a chemical, biological or nuclear attack. I'm anxious to learn today from fellow Iowans strategies that they think will help us to prevent such a catastrophe. There is an old joke, with the saying, ``I'm from the Federal Government and I'm here to help.'' But in this hearing, we are here to help and to learn from you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for coming to Iowa. Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. The other gentleman from Iowa we're delighted to have here, Mr. Leach. STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA Mr. Leach. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's an honor to welcome you here to this town. As many of you know, Steve is a former college president and one of the most distinguished Members of our body. I will only make a very brief set of comments. One, if you take the Twentieth Century, it was largely about three phenomenons: war, science and communication. We know about the first world wars that have ever occurred on the planet, we know about the shrinking of the globe in terms of communications. And then, in terms of science, we have the dual dimensions of splitting the atom that has brought us nuclear energy. It's also brought us the capacity to destroy people through weapons. Likewise, symbolically, splitting the gene has brought us the greatest new techniques of treating illness, but it's also brought us weapons of war. And the real challenge is how we are prepared to deal with both the nuclear and the biochemical issues. I will conclude by saying that it's truly important that America be prepared in the medical sciences. This is far more significant than any kind of nuclear shield. It is also really important that we deal with the causes of people wanting to develop these weapons. So, in a dual sense, we've got to be concerned with understanding as well as for preparedness for people who don't understand each other. So this hearing is largely about preparedness, it's a very important hearing, and I appreciate Congressman Horn coming to this State as well as a series of other stops around the Country to develop a congressional response to the issues before us. Thank you. Mr. Horn. I thank the gentlemen, and we will now begin with the presenters. This is an investigating committee, so let me examine a few things here. We're going to ask each presenter, as a group, to have an oath, affirmant for the whole truth and nothing but the truth, in a minute. We are delighted that you've been here. Your papers are excellent that we've seen and looked at at 12 midnight or 2 a.m., because we moved around, and then we see some of these documents, and it's been excellent in Kansas and other places that we've been. Iowa is sort of a green carpet of soybeans and corn and everything. And as one person said, he finally found a farmer that's smiling, and this is the year. So we're delighted to have the Mayor of Cedar Rapids here, Honorable Paul D. Pate. And, if you will, all of you, raise your right hands. OK. Clerk will note that the six members have taken the oath. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Horn. We'll start with Mr. Pate, and then we'll just go right down the line. When I call your name, under our rules, your full document is automatically put in the record at that point, and we would like you to summarize somewhere between 5 minutes and 10 minutes to give us the feeling. We've all read it--the staff, myself, so forth and we're glad to have the Mayor. And so, Mayor Pate, the floor is all yours. STATEMENTS OF PAUL D. PATE, MAYOR OF CEDAR RAPIDS; NED WRIGHT, DIRECTOR, LINN COUNTY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; CHIEF STEPHEN C. HAVLIK, CEDAR RAPIDS FIRE DEPARTMENT; DOUGLAS A. FEIL, DIRECTOR, ENVIRONMENTAL TRAINING PROGRAMS, KIRKWOOD COMMUNITY COLLEGE, CEDAR RAPIDS, IA; AND BRUCE LACY, NUCLEAR BUSINESS ASSETS MANAGER FOR ALLIANT ENERGY, DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER, CEDAR RAPIDS, IA Mayor Pate. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Leach and Representative Ganske, and distinguished guests. As mentioned, I am the Mayor of the city of Cedar Rapids. First, let me thank you for holding this hearing here today. This topic is important to the Heartland and in particular to communities the size of that which I am the Mayor. We all know, many of the terrorists who struck on September 11th of last year entered into the air system through airports in areas smaller than those in major, metropolitan areas, places much like the Cedar Rapids-Eastern Iowa Airport. We appreciate the efforts made at the Federal level to help secure airports, but many of the mandates have come without funds. For example, staffing the law enforcement officer at the Eastern Iowa Airport 16 hours each day from May 10, 2002 through December 1, 2003 will cost us $300,917. The Transportation Security Administration has only allocated $27,404 in reimbursements due to the rejection of the $5.1 billion in funding designated in the Supplemental Spending Bill as contingency emergency. The Eastern Iowa Airport also anticipates added security costs of $586,240 for vehicle inspections from September 11, 2001, through September 30, 2002. Their costs have only been reimbursed through April 2002. For this, and other reasons that follow, I'm asking for more Federal assistance through funding and more freedom at the State level to direct those funds to communities. In our community, we realize that we are an important part of the food production process also. In watching and listening to and reading the news each day, this point is echoed across the country. The breadbasket of this Nation is in need of additional money for protection of the resources we provide to the world through value-added agriculture. As farm fields are of great importance, the companies and infrastructure that process those raw products are just as important. Not a day goes by in any metropolitan area that you don't hear a siren. Sometimes those sirens are false alarms; but, many times, the sirens mean there's a life hanging in the balance. People are more mindful than ever of air traffic above them and the ground traffic around them. Our children see the world differently. Their teachers teach about life skills differently. Schools and communities have been forced to reassess their ability to perform in a disaster situation. Whether it's from a fire, an automobile accident or other medical emergency, all too often, our men and women in police, fire and EMS are called to someone's last, best hope of survival. These people are part of the front lines, the first responders that will take action in the case of a terrorist attack. Companies, big and small alike, local, State and Federal Government agencies have reallocated precious resources based on what used to be a worst-case scenario, what could become a stinging reality. During the U.S. Mayors Conference summit in January of this year, I visited Ground Zero. It was a very sobering experience, to say the least. It was humbling to see both the destruction and the dedication in New York and at Washington. One thing came through loud and clear from that visit, though: By refocusing on public safety, our communities have refocused on one of the essential goals of every governmental body--the safety and security of the individual. What we are talking about today is the next step. From Iowa's Emergency Management Division through local fire and police department officials, from the proposed National Mass Fatalities Institute in Cedar Rapids to information provided from the point of view of the HAZMAT community, all these messages talk about one thing that is key to making everything work: preparedness. From our homes to our city halls, preparedness is the key to efficient, timely and effective action and reaction. By making our communities safer in so many different ways, you make them more productive. Our towns become more inviting places to live, build businesses and grow. It's not even about new rules or legislation. It's about funding. By taking all that you hear today back to Washington, you will take information away that benefits all our communities. It's a strong investment in the future. Cedar Rapids has the only municipally operated helicopter fleet in the State. In the 30 years that the Cedar Rapids Police Department's Aviation Department has been in operation, it runs from Minneapolis to Kansas City, to the Mississippi River on the East, and by Iowa's borders with Minnesota and Missouri. This area is home to approximately two-thirds of Iowa's population. The helicopter fleet, and the officers that operate and maintain it have been key in apprehending individuals with Federal and State warrants and prison escapees, as well as locating missing children and adults. The Cedar Rapids Police Department helicopter fleet assisted in 5,548 calls and directly enabled 130 arrests through the end of July of this year. The fleet has responded to nearly 3,000 calls and directly enabled 124 arrests throughout Eastern Iowa. The helicopter fleet played a key role in rescue efforts surrounding the severe flash flooding in our area June 4th that damaged more than 500 homes in the Cedar Rapids area alone. Thanks to dedicated rescue personnel and resources like the helicopter fleet, everyone was evacuated safely from homes surrounding the flood waters. The maintenance crew also maintains the St. Luke's Hospital LifeGuard, or MediVac, helicopter. In addition, the events of September 11, 2001, make the necessity of this fleet that much more apparent. Cedar Rapids Police Department has increased air patrols and surveillance over the Duane Arnold Energy Center, Iowa's only nuclear power facility. This has created a situation whereby the already aged fleet is being additionally taxed. Also, patrols have increased over the water pollution control and the water treatment facilities as well. These facilities serve not only Cedar Rapids but much of the metro area. The city of Cedar Rapids needs $5.1 million in Federal funding to replace the police department's helicopter fleet, which is nearly obsolete. These funds will assist in purchasing and equipping three new helicopters. We are close to being forced into a situation where these helicopters will be cannibalized in order to utilize parts that are out of production. I would just note that these are Vietnam-era helicopters, 1968 and 1969. Each time the President, Vice President or cabinet officials travel to Eastern Iowa, our helicopters are called on to provide protection; and for all these missions, we cannot charge the appropriate community or governmental entity for time or resources, because the helicopters are military surplus, and Federal Rules prohibit us from recouping the costs from what is a mutual-aid response on the part of the city of Cedar Rapids. As a parting comment, I want to inform you that the city of Cedar Rapids and the Linn County Board of Supervisors have provided and pledged nearly $1 million to fund a home for the National Mass Fatalities Institute in our city. This operation serves to aid in the coordination of activities, to protect public safety and to respond in the case of a catastrophic event. Federal funding for this operation is necessary. It will benefit people nationwide through the cost effectiveness of staff and resources to serve our country. Ladies and gentlemen, I want to thank you for what you do in deliberating over these issues and the funding connected with them. Much of it goes unnoticed, because no one sees the attack that never occurred or notices the life that was never in jeopardy. But we trust that because of the efforts you may have made here to learn today by listening, we will be a more safe and secure community, State and Nation. Thank you for the opportunity to share these remarks. [The prepared statement of Mr. Pate follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.002 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.003 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.004 Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. And we now have Ned Wright, the Director of the Linn County Management Agency. Mr. Wright. Mr. Wright. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, Congressman Ganske and Congressman Leach. Thank you for the opportunity to speak before this congressional subcommittee. As you stated, I am Ned Wright, I'm the Director of Emergency Management for Linn County, Iowa. My comments will address the perspective of this committee from a local level. My comments are my own and from my counterparts in the Iowa Emergency Management Association. The front line on the war on terrorism is right here at the local level. Lives will be saved or lost based on the initial response by local government assets. No matter what the program that is in place at the Federal or State level, the actions that will make a difference are at the local level. The basic principal of emergency response is, whatever the incident, the local jurisdiction will be the first on the scene. No matter what State and Federal resources are systemically available, it takes time to get these resources to the incident. The better prepared a local jurisdiction is to handle any event, the safer the community will be. This is not to say that State and Federal resources are not needed and that they don't do an outstanding job. They're just not always readily available. In the Midwest, our communities are protected by a partnership of paid and volunteer organizations, different systems but both professional in their own way. If we were to have an act of terrorism against any of our communities, the call for response will be met by all. This is a fact of life here, and we must ensure that the training and preparedness needs of full-time departments are met with the same vigor as those of our volunteer departments. This is a total-force concept. My counterparts and I are at the bottom of a big funnel as we address homeland security issues. It appears that at the Federal and State level, staffing for homeland security is growing. Policy and program initiatives are rolling off the presses. Speeches are being made, charts and graphs are everywhere, but at the end of the day, have any of these programs and initiatives made any first responder better trained, equipped or prepared to respond to the next event? We hear of the billions of dollars coming out of Congress to fight the war on terrorism. We're just starting to receive our nickel. As we approach the anniversary of September 11th, we are getting reports from researchers and consultants on what happened, what went right, what went wrong, and what could have been done better. I wonder how much money was spent to tell us what the police and fire did and did not do after the fact, and if that money had been spent to train and prepare these heroes, what a difference this could have made. We at the local level are responsible for the safety of our people, not the State and not the Federal Government. At the end of the event, when State and Federal resources return to their home locations, I am the guy who will see my friends and neighbors at Wal-Mart or at church. I'm the one who is asked why or why not something happened. I'm the one that's responsible for coordinating their safety, and I take that job very seriously. We must do all in our power to reverse the efforts in the war on terrorism and to fix the local problems before we expand the efforts at the State and Federal level. We are starting to see funds become available, but we are the last ones at the table. Since we are the front line, the soldiers in this effort, we need to be heard and listened to about our needs. We at the local level know what we need to do. We just don't need our hands tied and hindered from doing what we know is right. One size does not fit all. What works in New York City and Los Angeles may not be appropriate for Cedar Rapids and Iowa City. Congress needs to listen to our needs, and I appreciate you doing that by your visit here today. The Federal agencies responsible to you for these homeland security programs need to get out of Washington and to get out here and see what is needed and see how the existing programs are working before designing new ones. The State's first priority should be to get all local communities adequately staffed and provided with resources even though the local public can not see the need. Remember, no matter how great a comprehensive program is in Washington or in Des Moines, it will not be successful until local resources are available to put that program into place. In my written presentation, I allude to working hard in Linn County to address chemical, biological, and radiological issues. Much of our efforts have come from the bottom up and not the top down. My community leaders have made a commitment to protect the public by supporting the efforts of the Emergency Management Agency in coordinating community-wide training, education and preparedness efforts. My dream would be that the other 98 counties would enjoy the same support and resources. But, at the same time, I must be the first to acknowledge that much of our success is based on the strong bond of partnership of over 25 years with the Duane Arnold Energy Center, which is Iowa's only nuclear power plant. Through their continued efforts and resources, we are one of the best prepared communities in the Midwest. Other Iowa communities are not so fortunate. We built on our successes, and that's why this community has initiated many of the early terrorism preparedness programs and other similar programs, because we knew what we needed to do to be prepared. As an example, we developed a model Mass Fatalities Incident Response Plan that led to the establishment of the National Mass Fatalities Institute, and we were one of the first mid-sized communities to address biological preparedness. I hope you will see that no matter what programs are developed at the Federal and State level, unless the local base is strong and solid, you cannot build on a successful homeland security program. Our mission has always been to protect our public from any hazard from tornadoes and floods to chemical releases and airplane crashes, and now we face terrorism as well. We will continue to do the best that we can with the resources we are provided. We only ask that you respect the local government to know what is best for each of our communities and to support these efforts that we feel are the best for our community. Through this support, we will be strong, and we will be prepared to respond to any emergency event, recover from that emergency and continue growing as a strong and vital community. We will be the backbone of our strong Nation. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Wright follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.005 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.006 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.007 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.008 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.009 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.010 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.011 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.012 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.013 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.014 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.015 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.016 Mr. Horn. Thank you. And we appreciate that, Mr. Wright, right from the grass roots. Keith Erickson is the director of the Linn County Department of Public Health. So we have the Management Agency and the Public Health aspect. Mr. Erickson. I am Keith Erickson, Director of Linn County Public Health, located in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. I appreciate this opportunity to present testimony on how the Federal Government is assisting State and local governments in preparing for a potential attack involving biological, chemical or nuclear agents at this Field Hearing of the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations from a local Public Health perspective. Concerns of the local Public Health officer: Local Public Health infrastructure must be strengthened in order to adequately respond to potential terrorist attacks, especially when involving biological agents. The Public Health infrastructure must be based upon core Public Health functions and the essential Public Health Services. This will involve training and supporting the current work force, hiring additional Public Health workers: for example, epidemiologists, Public Health planners, Public Health educators, information technology specialists, and improving electronic surveillance systems, laboratory capacity and improving local facilities. Funds allocated for this purpose will have to be dual use so as to respond not only to man-made acts of terrorism, but also to respond to the natural occurrence of emerging infectious diseases. This dual use is important in maintaining a high level of readiness and proficiency. The increased capacity and capability to do disease surveillance, an epidemiologist on a daily basis will prepare us to respond in a timely fashion to a bioterrorism event. Be reminded that the threat of agroterrorism in Iowa is significant. Any surveillance system must involve agriculture and veterinary medicine. The anthrax events and hoaxes after September 11, 2001 demonstrated the need for Public Health to respond on a 24- hour/7-day-a-week basis. Indeed, the expectation of our community partners, including fire, law enforcement, HAZMAT and emergency management personnel, is that Public Health will be actively involved in a biological event, even though we are organized on an 8-hour/5-day-a-week operation. In our local jurisdiction, we have been conducting emergency management drills for more than 25 years because of the Duane Arnold Energy Center, a nuclear power plant in Linn County. These drills, FEMA training and Nuclear Regulatory requirements have prepared Public Health and our community partners to respond to a nuclear event. This has provided a template for action to respond not only to nuclear but chemical and natural disasters as well. This was clearly demonstrated in July 1985, when Toxic Tuesday, a chemical fire at the old Sewage Treatment Plant, caused the evacuation of thousands of citizens from Cedar Rapids in the middle of the night. These experiences should be incorporated into any biological preparedness plans in the future. And I just want to show you the headlines from the Cedar Rapids Gazette which talks about mass evacuations in Cedar Rapids. I know the Congressmen remember this. I'd also piggyback on what the Mayor said. You'll notice the helicopter up here. I was in that helicopter. That was made available to Public Health to lay out the coordinates to coordinate the evacuation, and I thank the city of Cedar Rapids for making that available. Funding for these activities should be split into two systems: one to the State to address all 99 counties in a coordinated regional effort, and one directly to the metropolitan statistical areas of Iowa, based upon need. It is important that allocation of these funds be population-based, available when needed, and based upon a national set of goals and objectives with appropriate accountability. There are more than 3,000 local Public Health agencies in the United States. The National Association of County and City Health Officers is the national voice for local Public Health. I would urge that you listen to this voice in regard to domestic preparedness and bioterrorism. In summary, we have an unprecedented opportunity to strengthen local Public Health infrastructure so that it has the capacity to respond to both emerging infectious diseases and terrorist attack involving biologic, chemical or nuclear agents in a timely fashion. Provide local agencies with the resources to hire, train and support a Public Health work force, and we will protect the public's health. Thank you for this opportunity to present this testimony. Mr. Horn. Thank you. That's very helpful. We now have Chief Steve Havlik of the Cedar Rapids Fire Department. We're glad to have you here, Chief. Chief Havlik. Thank you. Thank you, distinguished members of today's subcommittee hearing, for allowing me to testify today. I would like to take this opportunity to express some thoughts and concerns related to weapons of mass destruction. We at the Cedar Rapids Fire Department are very grateful for the assistance we have received from the Domestic Preparedness Program sponsored by the Federal Government. These programs have given our Department the opportunity to participate in various training opportunities that have heightened our organization's awareness and capabilities. The training received has given us the ability to expand upon what we believe is a strong chemical response capability. Hazardous material response for our organization historically has been responding to incidental spills and leaks. We must now be prepared to address multi-dimensional hazards. Assistance from the Federal Government has allowed us to initiate the mandated procedures and training. This will help us better respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. We have been privileged to be the beneficiary of a grant from the Department of Justice. This grant has provided Cedar Rapids Fire Department with some of the essential equipment needed to evaluate and respond to a possible terrorist attack. Aside from providing more opportunities for procurement of necessary equipment, there exists an increasing need for resources to maintain and buildupon our current capabilities. There are two very important issues we are currently addressing: What will be the funding source to provide for proper maintenance and upkeep for the equipment furnished, and how can we address the needed staffing costs associated with required training programs? There are appreciable costs associated with maintaining specific pieces of instrumentation. These expenditures will have to be budgeted for in the future. For example, replacing sensors and consumption of calibration gas is an ongoing requirement and can be an expenditure of approximately $1,000. Ultimately, the most urgent need is providing adequate staffing levels while personnel are engaged in training for response to these types of incidents. As part of our bargaining agreement, we compensate our personnel for their scheduled time, as well as additional time outside the normal work schedule. The training that is provided requires significant time beyond scheduled-duty assignments. Budgetary constraints have made it very challenging for departments such as ours to adequately fund for personnel costs for weapons of mass destruction training. As Fire Chief, I'm often faced with a difficult dilemma. I can ask our responders to participate in training utilizing our own personal resources, or I can cut response capabilities below mandated staffing levels to provide training time. Consequently, this has directly affected our ability to provide the manpower to properly respond to other emergencies. Oftentimes, our personnel go to great lengths to participate. Our firefighters have incurred personal costs as well as making family sacrifices to assure their participation and attendance. As Fire Chief, it is difficult to consistently ask members to make these sacrifices. Being located in the Heartland, agriculture is paramount to our economy. Many of the agricultural-based industries use and store chemicals. These chemicals enable them to process their product in a cost-effective manner. Fortunately, technology, innovation, and a strong commitment to process safety management have led to a responsible co-existence in our communities. Unfortunately, recent events have demonstrated that certain individuals and groups, extreme in their views and cold-blooded in their actions, can impact us in ways we never imagined. Iowa is one of the largest storers of chemicals that are toxic by inhalation. The chemical hazards that are inherent with an agricultural economy must be addressed and contingencies formulated to properly protect the public. When a bona fide threat is apparent, it is absolutely necessary for information to make its way to the jurisdictional agencies. When a potential chemical threat exists, a formal communication conduit must be assured. This enables us to move confidential information into the hands of responders without obstructions or delays. Communicating and sharing information such as publishing alerts on a secure, data- sharing network would prove invaluable to responding personnel. Decontamination remains a broad challenge. Responders need to comprehensively address the possibility of a nuclear, biological or energetic device in conjunction with a chemical event. These devices pose labor- and equipment-intensive circumstances. This type of terrorist activity presents unique challenges to the conventional decontamination process. Assistance is needed to provide decontamination equipment that is lightweight, mobile and has the ability to decontaminate large numbers effectively and efficiently. Additionally, assistance is needed for equipment that can perform in inclement weather and has capabilities to handle nonambulatory victims. Equipment with these characteristics is available through several manufacturers. However, they are cost-prohibitive for our agency due to budget constraints at this time and in the foreseeable future. Once properly equipped, our local responding agencies remain faced with logistical and communication hurdles. Cooperation and integration of response efforts within multiple agencies are very much needed. This includes initial response and advanced medical care, as well as assistance from Public Health agencies. To ensure a coordinated response, teamwork, communication and interagency training need improvement. Ultimately, this takes time, money and resources to reach the needed level of capability. Once again, I'd like to thank you for allowing me to offer this testimony to this subcommittee. Hopefully, I've communicated the compelling need to provide the vital resources that will support our current and future capabilities. These resources will better help us prepare for and respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Thank you. Mr. Horn. Thank you, Chief. [The prepared statement of Chief Havlik follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.017 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.018 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.019 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.020 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.021 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.022 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.023 Mr. Horn. Our next presenter is Douglas A. Feil, director, Environmental Training Programs, Kirkwood Community College, Cedar Rapids, IA. Mr. Feil. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to address you on what our Nation's Federal Government is doing and has not yet had the opportunity to do to assist State and local governments in preparing for potential terrorist attack. Kirkwood Community College has developed a partnership with our city, local industry, the county, and the county Emergency Management Agency and several of Kirkwood's federally funded training programs. The goal of the partnership is to build and operate a multi-use Community Training and Response Center to prepare and direct our community's response to real and potential terrorist attack and provide a training space for several Kirkwood programs that have a national constituency. The proposed center will provide an emergency operation center for Linn County area and office space for the Linn County Emergency Management Agency. It will also provide office space for the ``first in the Nation'' CDC-funded National Mass Fatalities Institute that has a mission to prepare communities to respond to and recover from mass fatalities incidents. This institute provides advanced-level response training to prepare our emergency planners and responders to plan for and respond to disasters. The center will also provide classrooms, computer lab and auditorium for the Hazardous Materials Training and Research Institute. The purpose of this federally funded institute is to promote worker protection and the maintenance of a clean and safe environment through education and training. This includes training on response to and the cleanup after a nuclear, chemical or biological attack. Since 1987, HMTRI has trained over 120,000 workers with our network of 80 partner colleges across this Nation. The center will also provide office space for CRADLE, an innovative recordkeeping and student assessment center created in direct response to the distance conferencing, education and training needs of the region driven by homeland security issues. We will soon be of the ability to record and track those prepared to assist in a local, State or national emergency. The mission of the Community Training and Response Center is to draw upon the unique strengths of the organizations it houses in order to prepare communities across the country for a skilled response to emergency situations and provide facilities for a coordinated response to real emergencies in Eastern Iowa. The Community Training and Response Center will be a $4 million, 16,000-square-foot hardened facility to be built on the Kirkwood Community College campus. The center will leverage resources of college and community operations that have similar missions. In the center, they will share common facilities and equipment to create an efficient and effective regional response that brings benefits to the college, industry, the city, the county, the State and the Federal Government. At the local level, the efficiency and effectiveness of this approach has been recognized, and 50 percent of the $4 million facility cost has already been pledged. Now the Federal Government has an opportunity to assist the State of Iowa and our local governments in funding the final 50 percent of the project. All of the facility's users have similar missions that naturally complement each other. Their personnel have similar skills that can support the missions of all users in a time of need. Each organization is a ``best practices'' showcase. Co- locating the operations maximizes the best qualities of each while effectively using taxpayer money. The organizations will provide a synergy of time, talent and resources for the betterment of the local community and the Nation. We ask you to support Federal funding of this multi-use emergency response and training facility for Eastern Iowa and our country. We believe this dual-use facility serves as a model for other communities focused on preparing for terrorist attack. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Feil follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.024 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.025 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.026 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.027 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.028 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.029 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.030 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.031 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.032 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.033 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.034 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.035 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.036 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.037 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.038 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.039 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.040 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.041 Mr. Horn. Thank you. We now have our last presenter of this panel, and that's Bruce Lacy, the nuclear business and assets manager for Alliant Energy, Duane Arnold Energy Center. Thanks for coming, Mr. Lacy. Mr. Lacy. Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak. I apologize that, given the period of time in which I knew I was going to be here today, I didn't have an opportunity to give you some paper to read along with, but--I represent the owners of the Duane Arnold Energy Center and those people who are responsible for its operation, Iowa's only electric generating plant that received its energy from the splitting of the atom. We've been a safe and reliable part of the electric energy infrastructure here in Eastern Iowa since 1974, and I wanted to speak directly to the issue of the security of our facility and the role that we have in the community. First off, I'd like to say I appreciate very much the prior comments acknowledging the role that we have played supporting the community in the development of emergency preparedness. Local, county, State, Kirkwood, all of these are people that we've been working with for nearly two decades in terms of emergency preparedness, and we're proud of our role in that. Specifically regarding security at our nuclear facility, security is not a new issue for us. It was in the late 1970's that security became a major function. Some of you who are familiar with the community for more than two decades might remember the date when the Duane Arnold plant didn't have guards, didn't have fences, didn't have Jersey barriers, things like this. That all started showing up in 1979. And we have systematically made improvements both in the physical design of security measures and in the staffing ever since then. I think a very good example of that is the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. That resulted in the initial placement of Jersey barriers around the plant that supplemented the already- existing fences and professional security force that we had. So we were already very well prepared prior to September 11th. But nothing is ever perfect, nothing is ever good enough. September 11th taught us all messages; and after September 11th, we, like everybody else, further improved. It's just, the platform from which we were starting at the nuclear plant was already much higher and much better established than virtually any other facilities around the Nation. And I speak in that regard on behalf of all of the commercial electric generating plants in the Nation. It's something that we as a Nation can be proud of. We take our responsibility very seriously. Some of the improvements that we've made, I will not go into detail on that, but we have increased our staff. We've increased certain types of physical barriers associated with the power plant. In a short quote from our security director at the plant, I like to think in terms of the four D's. The first D is to deter. And by being well prepared, you deter people from even thinking about coming to your facility and doing something wrong. Second, for those who are unwise and not deterred, then you want to detect them. We've done various things that will allow us to detect hostile parties much earlier than what we were prepared to detect before. Third, you want to defend the facility. By the addition of staff and various measures, we've further enhanced our ability to defend the facility. And, last, and the most serious point is, should you fail on the first three D's, be prepared to defeat on the fourth D. We've made improvements in all of these areas associated with our power plant. I would like to offer the commercial U.S. electric generating industry as a model for the Nation in terms of preparedness, both before and after September 11th, and as a model of cooperation with our local communities, again, appreciating the earlier remarks on this panel for what has been accomplished in Eastern Iowa, and I would say that is no exception across the Nation to other communities that have nuclear power plants in their midst. As Congress goes forward, I strongly ask that you rely on the best information available regarding the types of potential threats that you want to direct resources and help to. In the case of my own industry, I am very well aware that it is easy to be misunderstood. That the electric generating activities that take place at our facility are just one of many aspects of nuclear-related issues that might take place around the country, but that we should not make decisions based on fear or manipulation of facts in our response and that, as the Congress has the opportunity to set forth policies, programs and provide resources, that not be done in a manner that is discriminatory, again, based on fear or inappropriate perception. Now, those of us who own the plant and are responsible for the operation of the plant, we take great responsibility and feel great responsibility in this to ensure that it is a safe and securely operated facility. I want to say that we're very proud of the people--it's ultimately people, as I'm sure everybody on this panel would agree--it's ultimately people that make the difference. We have a lot of outstanding people that we should be proud of at our power plant, both in the operation of the facility and in the security of the facility. I'm very pleased at the cooperation and the coordination of local, State and Federal, all levels; and I'm confident that the people who live in our community will not be subjected to any threat of terrorist attack associated with activities at our facility based on what we were doing before September 11th, based on the things that we've done after September 11th and probably, most fundamentally, on the commitment that we all have to always learn and always seek a better way. As time goes on, we're going to learn and we're going to even further improve, if we're going to keep our community safe, as part of the community. So, in conclusion, we're counting on Congress to direct the public resources and the public policy in the direction most in need of help; and it appears to me that is for our local, State and Federal infrastructure. I'm not asking for any money. Based on rational and objective, well-thought-out considerations of the threat, and I commend you to recognize, again, the outstanding example of the industry that I'm part of, the commercial nuclear electric generating industry in this Nation, be seen as a model for success not just in communities with nuclear plants but communities that may have other issues that require an equal level or comparable level of attention. I want to thank you very much for the opportunity to speak today. Mr. Horn. Well, thank you. And now that we've got the individual statements, we're going to turn to questions, and each Congressman will have 10 minutes for questioning, and we'll rotate it until everybody is exhausted. We still have a panel two to come with some very exciting things. So, the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Leach, the senior member, the one we all go to to get advice, so--he's sort of Socrates. Mr. Leach. Thank you, Steve. Let me say, as I'm sitting and listening to this group, I'm really struck by the high degree of professionalism. I'm also struck by the notion that we have this society in which there are differing levels of Government. You have local government, State government and National Government, and then different elements. And I am really impressed with Linn County. I must tell all of you what a wonderful degree of thoughtfulness you've put into where you are. And then, to a College President/Chairman, let me say that, last year, Kirkwood Community College was rated the No. 1 community college in the United States; and we're very proud of the College in many areas, but you are now becoming a leader in a particular area, in preparedness. And then, interestingly, when we think about these levels of government--and this is going to apply to the next panel-- America also needs some regional responses. That is, there's a local response, a national response, a State response. As I look at the Kirkwood proposal, it's basically one that is a regional or national dimension. In fact, your Mass Fatalities Center is a national program. Your other efforts in the preparedness area really fit into a regional context. So, in terms of suggestions, for the report of this subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, I would like to underscore the regionality dimension of preparedness in programs like Kirkwood's, and potentially certain things in the State laboratories I think can be considered in a regional dimension as well as a State dimension. In fact, when we go with the issues of communication, we all know there--sometimes within agencies, and we had a problem within the FBI with that information going upstream and downstream and how it's being treated, then, between agencies. But the community colleges, as, again, symbolized by Kirkwood, and symbolized by the State of Iowa with certain commitments the State has made, have the best communications between institutions of any in the country. And I think that's a model that also ought to be a part of--although it's kind of implicit in your particular approaches. But I really have one precise question, and that relates to the Kirkwood issue, and that is, just what is it that you're requesting from the Government in terms of funding, in the near term and then on a sustaining basis? Mr. Feil. In the near term, we have proposed this $4 million facility. Our local, State, county and industry have come up with a pledge of 50 percent of that. We are looking for assistance, either directly from the Federal Government or through the State, an additional $2 million to build this facility that will both provide the emergency response capabilities within the area and provide training within the region. In a long-term basis, we are looking for continual assistance in funding both our National Mass Fatalities Institute and the various programs that the Hazardous Materials Training and Research Institute and CRADLE have in training, and we assist community colleges across the Nation to provide training in their own, say, backyard, in their own localities, and we have community colleges from across the Nation that come to us, and we share Iowa's resources with them, and they take them home to share with their community; so we are looking for assistance there over a long-term basis. Mr. Leach. I appreciate that. And I would also say to the chairman, again, as you prepared in your report, there are aspects that are deeply scientific and deeply health care related---- Mr. Feil. Yes. Mr. Leach [continuing]. At a theoretical level in preparedness; but the community college system in the United States, which is unique in the world, is probably the best system in potential for training at the practical level of local communities, and I think it's something that we shouldn't lose sight of and we ought to be looking for benchmark kinds of approaches. And as I look at what Kirkwood has been developing, I'm exceptionally impressed as a national model, not simply as a local model. Before my time expires, I just want to ask one question of Mr. Lacy. You've given a very strong statement about what your facility in Palo has done in terms of security, and you've mentioned you are not looking for Federal funds, but are there things that Congress and the executive branch can be doing that could be helpful to your facility and your kind of facility at this time? Mr. Lacy. Thank you very much for that question. And, yes, indeed, there are some suggestions that I would offer there. We understand and accept that we have a responsibility to provide some level of protection at our site. I understand that there's debate by some as to whether that should be changed. I would say that there needs to be Federal legislation, not only just for our facility, but maybe other facilities, where people are expecting a law enforcement-type capability associated with the facility. Then we need Federal legislation to support authority for some kind of law enforcement function at the site, and that does not exist right now for our facility. I think a second area has to do with background investigations of personnel. Frankly, given the regulatory regime and the state of Federal laws, it's easier for a gun dealer to do a background investigation on somebody than it is for us. I believe that deserves legislative attention. And a third area where I believe Federal activity would be appropriate, and this may be the most difficult of all, is the Homeland Security Office and their issuance of threat advisories. I think there's opportunity there and probably some legislative support appropriate for them to help them issue more meaningful threat advisories. I mean, there's kind of a limit to the number of times that you can say you need to have things at the highest, the most high, the very high, the absolutely high. Somehow or other, that needs to be turned into a more meaningful thing. And for whatever facilities that the Nation feels it needs to provide individual protection as we accept responsibility for at our nuclear electric plant, the Federal legislation needs to be respectful that we can't expect those individual facilities to be prepared to defend against things that are fundamentally acts of war. At some point, an act of war becomes a national issue, not a local issue. So those are the suggestions that I would offer. Thank you very much for the question. Mr. Leach. Thank you, Mr. Lacy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. Thank you. And now we'll yield 10 minutes for questioning by your other fine Congressman, and that's Mr. Ganske. Mr. Ganske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel. You know, I detected something of a common theme from all of your testimony, and that was, please give us help, but watch out for the unfunded mandates. Is that fair to say? I see the Mayor of Cedar Rapids nodding his head in full agreement right there. The way that we wrote the Bioterrorism Preparedness Bill was designed to do so. We have a proviso that for a State to apply for grants, then there needs to be a State preparedness plan. So I was disappointed to find out just before the hearing that Ellen Gordon, the Homeland Security Advisor for the State of Iowa, did not show up today--apparently she had some conflicts, although she had apparently indicated she would be here previously--because I was interested in getting some information from her on how the State Bioterrorism Preparedness Plan is coming along? I mean, is it adequate, is the State getting cooperation from the localities, are the localities getting input into the State, is there any way that we can help in that regard? Now, as I mentioned before in my statement, we have actually budgeted about $4.4 billion for these types and other types of grants that you're looking at applying for. We need to go through an appropriations process, we need to get that money into the pipeline. But it's important for you, as we've gotten some indication from this afternoon, that you are also making progress in terms of your analysis of what your needs are. Chief Havlik, I must say that I was very impressed with my visit recently to the Cedar Rapids Fire Department. The level of commitment of the men and women that you have working in that department, Mayor, I think they're doing a great job. And, Mr. Lacy, you're working with them, and others have mentioned--Mr. Wright, for instance--the fact that Cedar Rapids has been a little in the forefront of some of this planning simply because you have a nuclear power plant located, really, right up to the city limits for metropolitan Cedar Rapids. Mayor Pate, maybe you can tell me, it seems to me like that nuclear power plant is located closer to Cedar Rapids than just about any other power plant in the United States. Is that an accurate impression? Mayor Pate. I'm not sure how every plant is in the country, but it's distinctly close to us, and it's been a significant partner in our efforts to respond with good planning. And, if I could, Congressman, I just want to give credit where it's due. I think, as Mr. Wright mentioned, it was a template for us; but, you know, we, as an emergency management group collectively, do continually drills. I'm trying to think--this year alone, we did the airport, in response, you've done the smallpox, three nuclear power plants, an earthquake; so, you know, we're continuing to drill and drill and drill and try to prepare for what might come our way. Mr. Ganske. Would anyone on the panel like to address this particular question? Mr. Horn. I think Mr. Erickson. Mr. Ganske. Mr. Erickson, you were nodding your assent about the proximity of the power plant? Mr. Erickson. I believe that if you take the 10-mile EPZ that runs down the middle of First Avenue in Cedar Rapids, and since it splits the city, you have to take the whole city, so that means there's a greater population within a 10-mile EPZ of a nuclear power plant at Duane Arnold than any other facility in the country. Mr. Ganske. In the country? Mr. Erickson. Yes. Mr. Ganske. Mr. Lacy, I have to ask this question, because I've toured the power plant. I know that you're running out of storage capacity. Do you have an opinion on what we should do with that spent nuclear fuel, and what would be the safest thing to do with it? Mr. Lacy. Yes, If I might just supplement the two prior responses. The Duane Arnold Energy Center does not have the largest population, although it certainly has one of the largest, so, I--not to contradict, but I think we're No. 10 or something like that. I think there are nine other facilities that have a higher populated area than we do. But, certainly-- -- Mr. Ganske. The proximity is very close. Mr. Lacy. Yes, certainly, proximity and high population. And I think that's a strong motivation for us, as our role in the community, for this cooperation that we talk about on that. With regard to the used fuel that has been safely stored at our facility since we started up in 1994, we are developing additional storage capability at our site for the safe storage of that fuel, and that storage will be just as safe there as it is in our existing facility at the site. I want to commend the U.S. Congress for their action approximately a month and a half ago supporting the President's decision to go ahead and develop a permanent repository for the storage of used fuel at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. And while I will always state with confidence that the fuel on an interim basis is safely stored at our facility, we're talking about decades of interim storage. If you're going to look at centuries of permanent storage, consolidation at a single, well-designed, well- secured site is something that is absolutely the right thing to do. It's something that we as a Nation are fortunate that we have the opportunity to go forward on, so I want to thank the Congress for their support in that area. Mr. Ganske. Mayor Pate, you were talking about several infrastructure needs for Cedar Rapids. Are you in the process of putting together a list of those needs in preparation, for presenting grant proposals for the additional spending that we will provide from the Federal Government? Mayor Pate. Actually, Congressman, we've already done that and submitted it to our Iowa congressional delegation for their review, and we'll be following up with that. In fact, I'll be in Washington I believe the 9th or 10th of September--I don't have a calendar in front of me--in an effort to reinforce some of these costs and priorities, and I'll make sure that a copy is forwarded to your special attention, too, but it itemizes, goes through several of the items I mentioned here, goes into more detail on the National Mass Fatalities Facility and, of course, some of the other expenses that we're incurring right now. The Fire Chief didn't go into a lot of detail, but we've spent--and I'm sure other fire departments have--extensive amount of money on response to anthrax calls when that was going on, and those were costs we absorbed internally, and, again, trying to better prepare for those things, those costs are there, and I'll make sure that those are clearly spelled out for you and the rest of the delegation. Mr. Ganske. Chief Havlik, you have a vehicle there, I believe, in your department that is able to respond to chemical-type contaminations. Can you describe that a little bit? Chief Havlik. Well, it's actually a converted pop truck/ vehicle that we've converted into our Special Operations Unit, and it contains all our hazardous material, all our high- and low-angle, confined space, water-rescue equipment, so it's really a very specialized vehicle. It covers a lot of different areas in our department, but we do use it quite a bit, and we actually would like to get something a little newer and a little bigger that we could actually--we have got so much equipment, we don't have room for it in that vehicle, but it is very versatile, does a good job for us. You'd be surprised how many special-operations calls we do have in a city with, obviously, the river running through it and so forth, so--it's a very good vehicle and it gets quite a bit of use. Mr. Ganske. Now, in Japan in 1995, in a subway, there was a chemical attack using serin gas. Let's just say that there were a terrorist attack at some major gathering in Cedar Rapids, and so you were called to respond, and you got there and you saw an awful lot of people on the ground. What would you do? How would you activate the community services to handle 50, 60, 100 people that could be injured at one time? Chief Havlik. Well, first of all, we would initiate an incident command system which we use exclusively on the fire department, and we would get all the players involved that would be able to make choices. Maybe somebody from the council, Linn County Health, police department, fire, all the departments, Ned Wright from EMA, all the departments that would have input, and get together in one spot so we could make decisions based on the events that were happening. We have some equipment, some monitors, that we've received from the Federal Government--actually, a Department of Justice grant. We would be able to take this equipment and, hopefully, identify the product that we're dealing with. That would be the first step, identify what it is. And then we have some resources. We should be able to find out what we need to do, how far we need to evacuate, what resources we need to take care of that situation. But any time something like that is released, it's going to cause some major problems. The main reason there, it's going to take awhile just to identify what the product is. But we do have some equipment that we just received, and we've been playing with it a little bit, and it's some stuff that's definitely going to help us identify the product and help us determine what to do. Mr. Ganske. So would your special team show up in full contamination suits? Chief Havlik. Yes. We have the Level A, Level B, all types of suits. We have a very excellent HAZMAT team, and they would definitely show up, and they would be the ones to actually try to mitigate the situation. Mr. Ganske. How many people would be in a team like that? Chief Havlik. Well, they go in in teams of two, but we have about 35 members in our department that are cross-trained in all the different disciplines I mentioned, so we have a pretty good-sized HAZMAT team, and we have some excellent equipment also. Mr. Ganske. But, really, what you're pointing out is that, when a team of two arrives, and you may have a room like this-- -- Chief Havlik. Sure. Mr. Ganske [continuing]. You're going to need a lot of help, you're going to need pull people out, get extra people there, you're going to need to have additional equipment. You can't just call people in and have them contaminated as well. Chief Havlik. Right. Mr. Ganske. You're talking about what hospitals have told us, on a physical plant level, as well as personnel, and that is that you need additional help to be able to handle what we would call a surge. Chief Havlik. Yes, I agree. Mr. Ganske. Not just a truck turning over and having some chemicals---- Chief Havlik. Yes. Our HAZMAT people, our technicians, would be able to go inside the business or where the truck turned over and actually try to mitigate that, but we're going to need people in the other zones to take the people as they come out to decontaminate them and so forth, so it is a very labor intense-type situation to handle something like that. Mr. Ganske. Now, has anyone talked about our National Guard involvement in any of this? Mr. Wright. Congressman, just speaking from that, we have been working with our civil support team in Des Moines, and they participated in our smallpox exercises and our other training. But, as I mentioned, they're several hours away, and a lot of the things that we're looking at right now is ensuring that even though these--support is there, we've got support not only in Des Moines and Kansas City and other places within this total response system, but for the first several hours, this is a local responsibility. One of the things that we've been doing is training using all of our resources, not only within the city and the county, to be able to meet these things, to ensure that our first responders--and when we talk ``first responders,'' sometimes we're talking about law enforcement, fire and EMS, but we're also talking about the Red Cross, Emergency Management, Public Works, so there's a lot of people that would be coming into play on this. And we're looking at the resources to provide training from across the board, not just for the entry teams. We have been training and preparing and equipping our two hospitals, because we knew that they also needed that, whether it was weapons of mass destruction, but, as we mentioned, all the chemicals that we have here. We're really looking more at a potential target being the chemicals that we already have existing just being released into the public, not something such as the Oklahoma City, where it was brought into the community. But we are looking at training across the board, and we are using Kirkwood and other opportunities that we have to spread that training around; and through our mutual aid, we've got 20 fire departments in Linn County, three of which are paid, the rest are volunteers. We are trying to make sure that those, which was the second wave, are also trained, because it does no good for them to also get to a scene and not have the proper equipment. If they can just look at it from afar, that doesn't do any good. So that's one of the efforts we're looking at, is to provide those resources across the board just because of the risks that we have in our community. Mr. Ganske. I thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. Does Mr. Leach have any other further questions? Mr. Leach. No. Mr. Horn. OK. We will now, then, have the panel 2 come forward: Dr. Mary J. R. Gilchrist, Director, University of Iowa Hygienic Laboratory; Christopher G. Atchison, Associate Dean for Public Health Practice, College of Public Health, University of Iowa; Dr. Manjit Misra, Director, Seed Sciences, Iowa State University; Richard Hainje, Director, Region VII of the FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency; James F. Bogner, Special Agent in Charge, Omaha Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and then our wrap-up person which we always use, and that will be Mr. Paul L. Posner, the Managing Director, Federal Budget Issues, Strategic Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office, which reports to the Comptroller General of the United States, has a very fine group here and all around the country, and we ask them to say, are we missing anything. So that will be panel two. If you will stand up and raise your right hand, we'll have you take the oath. And any staff that go with you, just bring them in, too, so we don't have to go through this again. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Horn. The clerk will note that all six witnesses have affirmed. So we will start here with Dr. Gilchrist, and we're delighted to have you here. STATEMENTS OF MARY J.R. GILCHRIST, DIRECTOR, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA HYGIENIC LABORATORY; CHRISTOPHER G. ATCHISON, ASSOCIATE DEAN FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE, COLLEGE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA; DR. MANJIT MISRA, DIRECTOR, SEED SCIENCES, IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY; RICHARD HAINJE, DIRECTOR, REGION VII OF THE FEMA, THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; JAMES F. BOGNER, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, OMAHA DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; AND PAUL L. POSNER, MANAGING DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUDGET ISSUES, STRATEGIC ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE Ms. Gilchrist. Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the Iowa delegation, thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony regarding the Federal role in support of local and State preparedness for bioterrorism, chemical terrorism and nuclear terrorism. The University Hygienic Laboratory, which I direct, is a member of the LRN, the bioterrorism response network instituted by the CDC and the Association of Public Health Laboratories. The Laboratory Response Network was formed during the years 1999 through 2001, when we met our first real challenge dealing with anthrax letters and many thousands of hoaxes and perceived threats. We were modestly funded during those years of preparation. Our laboratory was funded for $100,000 last year to meet the threat of bioterrorism. One industry alone told us that we had saved them ``millions of dollars,'' because our testing kept their assembly lines running when questionable powders were detected on devices and parts. Because we served our local populace, we stretched ourselves far beyond capacity. We would not expect a remote laboratory serving many jurisdictions to have done as well. I recognize and honor the Federal Government for its wisdom in making bioterrorism response a local issue for the laboratories. Across the country, the LRN tested thousands of specimens and allayed much fear and panic, but it did not serve our populace fully. In Iowa, those who were not well served must balance our success stories. Because we had limited resources, law enforcement and local communities evaluated each case and ruled out powders that did not constitute a credible threat. We understand that some powders that were not tested, while not a real health threat, caused panic and shutdown of assembly lines at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars. It's good to note that our funding has been increased by some 15 fold, to approximately $1.5 million this year, and we are hiring additional staff so we can provide broader testing. We were lucky that our wake-up call involved few who were truly ill, and we managed to minimize fear and panic in the situation of perceived threat that swept our country. The Government was wise several years ago when it abandoned its concept of solely providing regional laboratory support and instead funded bioterrorism response laboratories in each State. Capacity for local response to bioterrorism is critical. When airlines shut down or refuse to carry specimens perceived to be risky, a laboratory must be available within driving distance of a few hours. No matter the means of transport, the turnaround time would be increased if regional laboratories were instituted for any subset of the testing. Now, our laboratory is called a regional laboratory for surge capacity, but we don't displace the capacity of the local laboratory for basic testing. I'm concerned that we need smallpox testing in our States. In the event of a smallpox threat, every rash will be suspected to be a case of smallpox. Specimens sent out of State will mean increased turnaround time and costs of health care to those who are ill or exposed. Moreover, fear will be prolonged beyond need. We must be able to do the testing locally. I have great concern about the need to bring local capacity to the States for the detection of chemical and nuclear threats. When a powder is found, its identity as a biological, chemical or nuclear agent is not obvious until it has been tested. Even if labeled as anthrax, it might be a chemical agent or a mix of biological and chemical and even nuclear materials. The capacity for detection and identification of the three types of agents should be present in each lab for at least two reasons: Firstly, it may not be possible to split a small specimen, and tandem testing in different facilities would require too much time. Second, a mixed specimen would risk the safety of the laboratory people who could only identify one type of agent and could not safely handle the other types. The responsibility for testing for chemical agents is split at the current time. The EPA has primary responsibility for testing for chemical agents and environmental samples, and the National Center for Environmental Health takes the lead if the material is a clinical specimen such as blood or urine. The matrix in which the specimen occurs, e.g., blood or soil or water, may play some role in the extraction of the sample, but the identification of the chemical is unified by the need for sophisticated instrumentation that will identify the agent, whether from environmental or clinical samples. Currently there is no program in place to test environmental samples, and this is a major gap. The NCEH has begun the process of placing testing in localities by providing funding to 5 pilot States and planning grants to 25 States that are planning to be engaged in biomonitoring in the future. I advocate that the LRN concept be expanded to include chemical testing and nuclear testing. The food laboratories of the Nation have asked to join the LRN, as have many others. Let us make this testing universal so that in the event of an outbreak, chaos does not reign, because the type of test that is done dictates where the specimen must be delivered and the identity of the laboratory where the result is available. Thank you very much for your interest in the laboratory component of our response to terrorism. [The prepared statement of Ms. Gilchrist follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.042 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.043 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.044 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.045 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.046 Mr. Horn. Thank you. We appreciate it. Maybe some of you didn't hear, because you weren't here at the first panel, but we have a little problem here on the flights. Our 6:30 flight has been canceled to get us to Denver, where we've got a hearing tomorrow, and we must make the 5 o'clock flight; and we can leave it in good hands, but it's a little difficult; and so, whence I mentioned to the first panel, the minute I put your name on there, that's--a full statement is already in the record at that point, and we need to just simply summarize it. We can't read it, and we've got to talk from the heart. Much better anyhow. So, Christopher Atchison, associate dean for public health practice, College of Public Health at the University of Iowa. Mr. Atchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. If the goal of terrorism is to disrupt a society, there's little question that an assault on America's Heartland would have a significant effect not only on the region but on the Nation. As the former Director of the Centers for Disease Control, Dr. Jeff Koplan has said, ``Either we are all protected or we are all at risk.'' Today I suggest the need for clearer guidance from the national level and will identify some strategies that should be considered. Today's discussion should not be limited to the efforts of the last 11 months. Indeed, Congress took a major step well before September 11th. The Public Health Improvement Act, House Resolution 2494, which I believe Congressman Ganske referred to, established the national policy of ``reasonable capacities'' for Public Health across the Nation. Subsequently, the Centers for Disease Control, working through the Association of Schools of Public Health, established centers for Public Health preparedness. My school, the University of Iowa and its College of Public Health, is one of 15 of these centers, and we have been working diligently at our task for more than a year in bringing people together to meet this challenge. For example, on April 8th of this year and in this very room, we hosted a conference on bioterrorism where both Senator Tom Harkin, who has repeatedly demonstrated his commitment to our Nation's Public Health system, and our own Congressman, Jim Leach, gave clear evidence of their desire to see our agenda succeed. We've also established several mechanisms, such as a train- the-trainer model involving over 65 individuals from different professions around the State, in a concerted effort to bring them together to have a coordinated preparedness plan. However, our experience is making clear other important objectives, and I want to bring these to the committee's attention. First of all, we need to promote overall preparedness through an outcomes orientation. Funding for bioterrorism preparedness is currently being distributed through multiple national agencies and multiple programs within many of those agencies. However, maximum coordination between all responders is essential for timely identification and response to a threat. This goal can best be accomplished if there's a clearly established national set of goals and objectives and competencies which will serve as a coordinating point for all preparedness-related grant and training programs. Schools especially need more information on where the practice community wants our educational resources to be directed and the outcomes of those educational offerings. Second, we need to assure a comprehensive research capacity. The Nation's response to last fall's anthrax assault demonstrates how front-line Public Health professionals face unknown challenges due to the mutation of biologic agents. Yet according to Dr. Gregory Gray, who is a partner in our Public Health Preparedness Center, and quoting him here, ``With the increasing threats of bioterrorism so real, our negligence to conduct routine surveillance for noninfluenza causes of influenza-like illnesses seems tragic.'' We recommend that a national network of influenza-like illness surveillance be established. Such a system would provide earlier detection of naturally occurring emerging viruses and also provide warning in times of covert bioterrorism acts. Third, we must assure the availability of and accountability for an appropriately trained Public Health work force. Establishing national standards would provide the strategic framework for coordinating this Public Health work force. However, it does not establish the assurance that those who would be in the work force are adequately prepared to carry out their responsibilities. In their strategic plan for the Public Health work force, CDC has laid out a comprehensive agenda for preparedness. This document should be evaluated by Congress and serve either as the framework for progress or lead to one that will. Second, CDC's strategic plan stresses the need for incentives, including credentialing or certification of the Public Health work force. If there are no standards and documentation of baseline capacity, there is little ability to assure the appropriate distribution of the Public Health work force development resources. Congress should also take steps to ensure that funding going to the States for terrorism and Public Health preparedness is coordinated with and supports the extension of resources like the preparedness centers to every State. Fourth, we should promote an atmosphere of continuous learning. Threats to the health and strategies to address those threats are continually evolving, and we must be committed to a strategy of continuous learning. However, it does not appear that this common-sense approach is always governing our preparedness efforts. Allow me to give an example summarized from a local Health official who submitted testimony to us in Iowa: Our county was visited by the Office of Inspector General, which conducted a nationwide study for the Department of Health and Human Services about State and local Health Departments' ability to detect and respond to a bioterrorism event. Our Department inquired about having access to the results of the survey we participated in and were told that they would not be made available. I feel this would have helped our Department in planning and development to share this information, truly an opportunity wasted. This example provides a final perspective on the challenge we face. The emergence of biologic threats through terrorist activity should not change Public Health's responsibility for the health of the public. Public Health officials must be seen as essential partners not only in the health system's response to terrorism but in the public safety response as well. Thank you for this opportunity to contribute to this important endeavor. [The prepared statement of Mr. Atchison follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.047 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.048 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.049 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.050 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.051 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.052 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.053 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.054 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.055 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.056 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.057 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.058 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.059 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.060 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.061 Mr. Horn. Thank you. That's very helpful. Dr. Misra, can we get a good summary? We've got your paper, and we need to move a little, so--it isn't our problem, but you know airlines---- Dr. Misra. OK, I'll--yes. Mr. Horn [continuing]. And small parts of the Nation, they just decide to quit, so---- Dr. Misra. And you need to be there early. Mr. Horn. Yes. Dr. Misra. Yes, I will then summarize from my heart. Mr. Ganske spoke about monitoring the air, water and soil for human pathogens. Mr. Leach spoke about splitting the atom and technology that has revolutionized agriculture. I'm also here to tell you that those are wonderful and good things. We also need to pay attention to the plant pathogens and pests that can be a target of agroterrorists. That's the summary, the gist of my talk, and what we need to do is to work on four areas: One is the rapid detection technology. The other is the information technology. The third is the genetic technology that Mr. Leach talked about. The fourth is seed science and technology. Being the Director of Seed Science, I must speak a little bit on seeds. Let me begin with that, seeds. United States is the largest producer and consumer of seeds in the world. And because of that position we have, seed can be a target of agroterrorists. The important thing about this is, we are not speaking of loss of human life here but loss of public confidence in our export and economic decapitation that can come due to the export of everything being shut down. The USDA very recently funded a plant laboratory diagnostic network, which is a wonderful thing and a slow beginning step toward this, but we need a seed laboratory network. There are approximately 150 seed laboratories in the country, and they are not networked. A lot of these plant disease pathogens and pests can have the very symptoms of those can be observed in the seed- testing operations. The USDA very recently designated Iowa State University to manage a national seed health system, so we have infrastructure, we have the capacity, and we have the interest to develop a seed security program. There is quite a bit of new technology, such as nanotechnology, spectroscopy, and micro-electro-mechanical technology, which can be used for sensing the air, water and soil that Mr. Ganske spoke about. Also for plant pathogens and pests. Further, what we need to do is to integrate these technologies with information technology so that whatever we find is transmitted in real time to the Federal officials and officials who can take action. The other thing that is quite important is that this information must be very truthful and valid information. Otherwise, it can also create a problem in creating fear in our consumers. So, combining the information technology with the sensing, detection technology in the real time is something that needs to be done. Regarding genetic technology, what we need to do is to develop fingerprinting for these plant pathogens and pests that are exotic that we do not want to be introduced here in a deliberate, mischievous manner. The one example that comes to mind is soybean rust. Soybean rust has created havoc in Africa and has been detected in Brazil, and there is quite a bit of concern that it can appear in our agriculture. So, how do we develop some of this technology for detecting such kind of microorganisms and microtoxins that can create problems for our food safety and security? Each year, Iowa is near the top of the Nation in production of corn and soybeans. Iowa State University has a strong tradition of serving and protecting U.S. Agriculture. Our unique strength is that we have extensive collaboration with USDA laboratories which are the germ plasm resources and also quite a bit of genetic research that is going on on campus. So these collaborations form a crucial partnership for bringing resources to protect our plant agriculture. You will notice that I did not speak too much on animal agriculture. That is deliberate. Our concept paper that we submitted to the Iowa delegation integrated animal agriculture and plant agriculture issues, but, very fortunately, we have received quite a bit of attention and funding and resources for animal agriculture. Mr. Horn. Well, if you send that to us, we'll be glad to put it in the record at this point. Dr. Misra. I'll be glad to do that. So my request is that we need significant attention to the plant agriculture. Thank you. Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Dr. Misra follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.062 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.063 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.064 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.065 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.066 Mr. Horn. Now, we have Richard Hainje, Director of FEMA in the Region VII. He and I have been following each other into how many States now? Because you've got quite a big jurisdiction. Mr. Hainje. We're up to three so far. Mr. Horn. Yeah. Mr. Hainje. In a former life, I was chairman of a Senate tax committee in the State legislature, so when the chairman tells me to hurry up, here we go. Thank you, Chairman Horn, Representative Ganske and Representative Leach, for the opportunity to testify today. I'm pleased to be with you to discuss the challenges facing emergency managers and first responders in their efforts to better be prepared to respond to acts of terrorism. FEMA provides the management expertise and financial resources to help State and local governments when they are overwhelmed by disasters. The Federal Response Plan forms the heart of our management framework and lays out the process by which interagency groups work together to respond as a cohesive team to all types of disasters. The Federal Response Plan's success is built by using the existing professional disciplines, delivery systems and relationships among the participating agencies of the plan. The national strategy for homeland security proposed by President Bush builds on the experience of the Federal Response Plan to develop one all-discipline, all-hazard plan to cover events of national significance and clarify the roles and responsibility of different levels of government. FEMA takes an active role in preparing to respond to a terrorism event. Prior to September 11th, the President tasked the FEMA Director with creating the Office of National Preparedness. The mission of the Office of National Preparedness is to provide leadership in coordinating and facilitating all Federal efforts to assist State and local first responders in emergency management organizations with planning, training, equipment and exercises. To further these efforts, the President has requested $3.5 billion in the 2003 budget to support first responders. In the recently passed 2002 Spring Supplemental, Congress provided FEMA with $100 million for State and local governments to update and enhance existing emergency operation plans. The funds for the planning initiative will be allocated to the States and other State-level entities on the basis of population. These comprehensive plans will form the foundation for the work to be done in 2003 to prepare first responders for terrorist attacks. The unique challenges that a biological or chemical scenario would present to the first responder community point out the need for effective planning. With the covert release of a biological agent, the first responders could be physicians or animal control workers instead of the traditional first responders. Across the Government, we are working to enhance our ability to detect biological attacks, better link the Public Health and emergency response communities and training equipment traditional to first responders to respond to bioterrorism. The President's proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security would strengthen the linkages that are critical to our capacity to respond to terrorism. Furthermore, the structure of this newly proposed department recognizes that FEMA's mission and core competencies are essential components of homeland security. Terrorism presents tremendous challenges, and in recent years, we've made great strides in our efforts to increase cooperation between various response communities. I have a few more comments, but I would like to just summarize and thank you for the opportunity to be here in Iowa, where I have seen many great examples of cooperation, State, local and Federal. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hainje follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.067 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.068 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.069 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.070 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.071 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.072 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.073 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.074 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.075 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.076 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.077 Mr. Horn. Well, we appreciate that, and with your legislative background, that helps us all. Now we have another fine person that follows us around, James Bogner, Special Agent in Charge, Omaha Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI has done wonders with various things that this subcommittee has done, generally with the Y2K situation, which was difficult 2, 3 years ago, and has also been very helpful in getting with the intelligence in relation to law enforcement at local areas. They've worked very good to get that growing. Thank you. Mr. Bogner. Thank you and good afternoon, Chairman Horn and members of the subcommittee. The previous mission of the FBI was generally considered to be investigate criminal acts and terrorist acts after they had occurred; but since September 11th, we understand, and Director Mueller, our Director, has ensured that we understand that our mission is now to prevention, too. It's more important to prevent an act than investigate it after the fact. In that regards, we have shifted a substantial number of resources to that end. Director Mueller has provided Congress with a reorganization plan which you have approved, and we are putting that plan into effect. We are doing that in Iowa, as well as the rest of the country, and shifting a substantial number of resources to fight counterterrorism, not only the prevention side, training side, but the many components of fighting terrorism. One component in that regard is forming a joint terrorism task force. We have done that in the States of Iowa and Nebraska. I am responsible for both States. For our area, we chose one team or one joint terrorism task force but divided it into five teams, regional teams. We did that because, in discussing this issue with about 171 law enforcement officials throughout the two States, we fully understood that it's very difficult for the law enforcement officials in one part of the State of Iowa to let their resources go, to conduct investigations, and work with us in other parts of the State or, in fact, another State. So our intent is to ensure that they are able to be responsive to their region in this State with our help and with the other Federal and State authorities there. Training is another very important component, and it's important to conduct that training at all levels and have full interaction with all of the partners, and we are a full partner in that. There are training sessions going on not only that we put on, the U.S. Attorney's office puts on through their antiterrorism task force within the State of Iowa, but, also, the Department of Justice, the Office of Domestic Preparedness is a frequent visitor to Iowa and helps with those exercises. One of the things we've also learned post September 11th is that I think previously, we concentrated on the exercises on preparation for single incidents. I was assigned to Oklahoma City in 1995, and so I understand the full impact of that particular incident, but what we are dealing with in this century is multiple incidents. And so, in our training sessions, we have shifted focus to not only looking at one problem and trying to deal with that but multiple problems, as we saw with the mailbox pipe bombs which occurred over a five-State area that we had to deal with. So that's very important in the shift in focus, and not only that, but the coordination of resources to deal with multiple events occurring within a short period of time. It's also important to develop those plans, response plans, communication plans not only at the Federal level, the State level, local level and integrate all of those. We have all found new partners that we didn't necessarily rely upon in the past, because we have had these new challenges of the nuclear, biological and chemical agents introduced into the criminal acts. And so we continue to form those new partnerships, train with them and develop contingency plans with them. I'd be happy to take any questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Bogner follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.078 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.079 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.080 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.081 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.082 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.083 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.084 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.085 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.086 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.087 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.088 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7891.089 Mr. Horn. OK. Let us get Mr. Posner to give us some thought to what we didn't do. He's the Managing Director of the Strategic Issues for the Budget Matters of the U.S. General Accounting Office and reports to the Comptroller General of the United States, a very excellent person, Dave Walker, and he also has a 15-year term, so nobody can mess with him, including the President, the Congress and everybody else. He's got a very good group, and we're delighted to have you here today, if we can get out of town. Mr. Posner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I think I'm the only member of this panel who shares your interest in making that 5 o'clock flight. We've heard today valiant efforts at all levels to address, really, a novel, unique threat. We've also heard, just to reflect, that each level is stressed, because the challenge really goes beyond one level of government, one actor in our system. The scale, the size, the complexity, the consequences simply are something that every level of government and the private sector have got to figure out ways to work together. I mean, in some respects, integration is the next step following enthusiasm; and what we really need is a national, not a Federal, set of initiatives. We need to overcome stove pipes within the Federal Government. Over 40 Federal agencies are involved in this problem. That's what the Department of Homeland Security is partly addressing. We have multiple players at State, local, regional levels of government. State and local governments are absolutely critical to anything we do at the national level in this area. Beyond just first responders, which we've heard a lot about, on page eight of our statement, we go through the six major priorities of the President's Homeland Security Strategy; and each one of them, you've got to address and work with State and local governments. The Federal Government simply does not have the resources, for example, to address security of drivers' licenses, a critical element of counterterrorism protection. The Federal Government does not hire 650,000 policemen like the State and local communities do, who are really out there, close to the local issues. The Public Health community is absolutely critical to protecting the Nation against bioterrorism. Largely, that's a function of State and local leadership. So, fundamentally, we have to figure out ways to gain State and local involvement in this issue through partnerships, and there are clear opportunities from the Federal standpoint in gaining State and local involvement and engagement and from the State and local standpoint in gaining money and expertise, but there are also risks. There are risks that the Federal Government might find its money devolved and substituted for State and local funds. Local governments face the risk of new Federal mandates, as we've heard today, in such areas as drinking water and port security and other areas that they used to own almost exclusively are now gaining new national attention. And there's a risk in public accountability of having many players involved in, say, airport security. When you think about how many different players are involved in securing airports, you have the TSA; you have the FAA; you have the State governments and local governments responsible for perimeters; you have the National Guard; you have the airlines. So the question is, who does the public turn to when something goes wrong? That's a critical issue in partnerships that we all have to face. We've seen much evolution in the past year of roles and responsibilities in this area. We've seen at the Federal level not only the Office of Homeland Security Strategic Plan but the proposed department. At the State and local level, we've seen tremendous change already in work we're doing, looking at local level. Regional compacts are starting to be discussed, mutual- aid agreements. King County, Washington, for example, in Seattle, is working through a county plan involving over 40 local governments within the county, so it's not just a Federal issue, as we've heard today. It's State and local governments, really, taking initiatives on their own. And in some ways, we are kind of evolving, in an ad hoc, pragmatic way, a national strategy without the benefit of, really, a comprehensive kind of overview in this area. What we need in this arena is, as we've heard, we have too many needs chasing too few resources, and that's a common problem as well. In this regard, we need to make sure that whatever we do as a Nation, not just the Federal Government, the State and local governments, is addressing clear goals that we all can agree on and that we have clear measures that assess how are we doing, and we don't really have those yet at the national level, and we really need to start getting on with that task. Partly, it's involving how much is enough security and how will we know it when we get it. We also need to ensure, particularly from the Federal level as well as States and local governments, that whatever we do in the area of funding is well targeted, that the Federal money in fact goes to enhance things that otherwise wouldn't be done at the State and local community. We've heard lots of needs that are really beyond the resources here, and we need to build in protections as we design these grants to ensure that those grants in fact go to promote the highest value. And so we need to make sure that we design accountability provisions to make sure that we at the national level have some comfort that's happening. So, fundamentally, the challenge is to integrate, to capitalize on the advantages that each level brings, the initiative and values of the local level, the coordination of the States and the regions in this country, and then the expertise and funding at the national level. And I would add that what we really do want is institutional capacity and leadership at the Federal level. One of the odd things is, just as the interest in intergovernmental relationships has increased, why, we no longer have the one institution we used to have that met and hashed over these things. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations went out of business a number of years ago, where Governors, mayors, county executives, State legislators and Federal cabinet secretaries would get together periodically with a very good staff to address these issues in concert comprehensively. We need to think about how we can, at the Federal level and the national level, have that kind of debate, and we need personal leadership. Epitomized most directly, as I was talking to the chairman earlier, by Harold Seidman, a person who many of us knew very well in Washington, just passed away this week, was a former major management leader at the national level, an OMB in the National Academy of Public Administration, was a mentor to many of us in showing us the way of how you respond to national challenges with humility, compassion, intelligence and wisdom, and his leadership will be sorely missed. Thank you. Mr. Horn. Thank you, and I'm delighted that you mentioned that statement. I'm sorry that he's passed away. So thank you for mentioning him. He deserves it. We will ask the gentlemen, Mr. Leach, Mr. Ganske, as to what questions, please feel free, just any one of the presenters. Mr. Leach. First, Dr. Gilchrist, I'm very impressed with your long-term leadership of the State Lab and also of your commitment to the State Lab system, and I think it's the bedrock of communications to a State. But I'd like to ask both you and Dr. Atchison about, do we have too much concentration at the CDC? And by that, I mean, the CDC, which I consider to be one of the truly wondrous U.S. Government institutions, is kind of like a pentagon for a given kind of security; and what happens if there's vulnerability? Do we have adequate backup? And should there be more decentralization? And there was an example of Dr. Misra, I mean, in the field of aspects of agriculture, that Iowa State has been designated as the Seed Health Center for the Nation. And so, as we look at various new diseases or new threats, should there be a decentralized approach where the State of Iowa might have a specialization, the State of New Hampshire another specialization, or is that totally impractical? And do you have any sense for that? Ms. Gilchrist. Thank you for that question. When September 11th happened last year, the CDC did close down, because they understood that the last plane that ended up in Pennsylvania was heading toward Atlanta. They came back to work, they worked very hard. They have one of the few biosafety Level Four facilities that currently stand in the Nation. We have one in the military in the beltway region of the United States, which is also somewhat vulnerable to--perhaps focused in an area that might be closed down. The IH agency has announced they're going to fund the building of about four new biosafety Level Four facilities to be distributed around the Nation and that they will be used not just for research but will be converted to diagnostic facilities as soon as it is necessary, if it would become necessary. In terms of then assessing, do we have enough distributed capacity, I think it's a very good question. I would advocate that we tend to increase the biosafety Level Three capacity in each of our States and improve it as much as we can. We need to assess that. We need to have some really wise decision trees to be made about, what's your initial and immediate surge capacity, what is your long-term surge capacity? We're concerned about the distribution of smallpox diagnostics to the States. We believe that the military may have some analyses that would be good to be shared and distributed to the States. We would like to see the States receive that type of diagnostics if, and only if, they are accurate--adequately accurate to be performed there and don't create some sort of a security or safety issue, and we think that's feasible. So I hope I've adequately answered my part of it. Mr. Leach. Dr. Atchison. Mr. Atchison. I think that it's more a question of role. I think the CDC has demonstrated its responsibility in serving the cutting edge of the research, particularly around infectious disease and the steps that need to be undertaken in order to identify and respond to infectious diseases. I don't believe that should be diminished. I don't think having too much knowledge in one place is bad. I think, rather, what I'm trying to articulate is the need to ensure that knowledge is appropriately distributed to people at the front lines. And I would submit that the one distinction that bioterrorism perhaps brings to the debate over the threats that we face through a terrorist activity is that it is a public and private system; that it involves physicians and other health professionals at the very, very front line who may not have, as a routine matter of governmental exchange of information, opportunity to participate in conferences and the other things that seem akin to government service. We need to establish a system, then, that extends the knowledge forward from CDC to those people at the front lines, and I think that's what they're trying to do with the Centers for Public Health Preparedness. The CDC, as leader, States maybe in a tactical way, looking at, how are we organized to ensure that it's distributed across the State effectively. And then the good kind of local implementation that you heard of discussed here from Cedar Rapids, we need to have that same kind of capacity in every village and town across our country. Mr. Leach. Let me just conclude, because I know the chairman has time constraints, but I'm very impressed with the movement of the University of Iowa into the Public Health domain and in the way it has with the Public Health School, I think that really has a lot of implications for sharing of knowledge. Also, we are extremely grateful for what, Mary, your lab has done in the last year; and as we look at these alternatives for the future, where the Federal Government has made a very minor contribution to some planning options, I'm for the maximum options. I hope that we can go forth on that basis. Your lab does fabulous work, and it's fabulously important, and it's got to be supported. Ms. Gilchrist. Thank you from--everybody in our laboratory wished they could have been here to hear it. Mr. Leach. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Horn. The gentleman from Iowa, Dr. Ganske. Mr. Ganske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, this is typical for hearings in Washington. Sometimes you get the most interesting testimony on the last panel. Nobody's around, everybody has left, but I really appreciate this panel's testimony. Maybe I can ask an interesting question that would make the people who have left already wish that they had stayed. Dr. Gilchrist--and I'll try to be brief, Mr. Chairman. I know you need to catch a plane. Mr. Horn. Take your time. Mr. Ganske [continuing]. In an emergency situation, could you use the military or VA Laboratories to augment the existing capacity here at the State level? Ms. Gilchrist. We're doing everything we can to distribute that type of responsibility and technology. You have security issues, and you have safety issues, and you have expertise issues, so it has to be thought out very well. The anthrax strain that we had in our lab was reputed to be the Ames strain, and people were very worried about us having it, and the National Guard surrounded our building for 6 weeks as a result of it. So not every hospital laboratory in the country can contain that---- Mr. Ganske. That wasn't exactly what I was talking about, for the National Guard to---- Ms. Gilchrist. There's a move to localize everything you can distribute. I've always said, distribute it as close to the patient as you can get it, and it's a challenge, it's a big challenge. We'll do the best we can. Mr. Ganske. All right. How many labs are there in Iowa that can test for nuclear agents? Ms. Gilchrist. I would say very few. Our laboratory is actually testing for a number of other States, because we have expertise that they don't have. And I would assume that there are research laboratories; I would assume that in Palo, they have that type of capacity. Our staff that do this type of work could tell you even more about it than I can, but I would say it's a handful. We need, at a minimum, to be prepared for that. Mr. Ganske. How about chemical agents? Ms. Gilchrist. You have the little black box-type devices that can be used---- Mr. Ganske. Right. Ms. Gilchrist [continuing]. For agents 1 through 10; and if it's not agents 1 through 10, what do you do? Minnesota is the source of two cases that were interesting during September 11th, and one was a greasy suitcase going around on the baggage delivery carousel that shut down the airport, because it had oozing stuff coming out of it. They took it to the Health Department laboratory, and they finally got a call from somebody who was missing a suitcase, and he said it's Ethiopian curry butter, and, you know, the FBI said, ``I don't believe it.'' So the Lab tested it, they went to the Ethiopian restaurant, and they got some Ethiopian curry butter, and they put them both in the instrument, and they determined that it was Ethiopian curry butter, and the airport opened up again. That's what we had a lot of last year. Mr. Ganske. Right. Ms. Gilchrist. We were identifying things that aren't in the little box. The little box sometimes, in Minneapolis, told them it was cyanide when it was a minuscule amount of cyanide, shut down the restaurant, you know. Mr. Ganske. Well, if we had a bag come off a plane in Des Moines, Iowa, and it had something oozing out of it, and somebody made a phone call and said, ``We're worried about this,'' now, there would be ways to test it--I know there are lots of labs that have mass spectometry, etc., that could test what the compound is; but if they were worried about a chemical terrorist agent, I don't know that they'd really want to take that in and do that. Is that the problem, part of the problem? Ms. Gilchrist. That's definitely part of the problem. Each of these is a new challenge. You have to figure out how to extract it from something. It may also extract the suitcase material, you know. So you need relatively high levels of sophistication. There probably are a few laboratories---- Mr. Ganske. What you're saying is, we don't have very much here in Iowa, and we need more capability. Ms. Gilchrist. Right. Our laboratory would be probably near the top of the list or at the top of the list of capabilities that could do it, because we do soil, water, air and clinical specimens, but we would sometimes be challenged also. Mr. Ganske. All right. We'll probably finish this up in about 10 minutes. So I just want to--is it--Dr. Atchison, am I pronouncing your name correctly? Or Atkinson? Mr. Atchison. Yeah. And, please, it's Mr. Atchison, like Atchison, Kansas. Mr. Ganske. OK. Some of my physician colleagues say that they would like to be able to vaccinate themselves and their families for smallpox, and other Public Health officials say no. Maybe we only vaccinate first responders, emergency people, but not the general public; and then if something happened, we'd put a ring around this area geographically and then we'd vaccinate everyone. Do you have an opinion on that? [Laughter.] That you can give us in about 60 seconds. Mr. Atchison. Well, as a nonphysician, I hesitate to make a---- Mr. Ganske. Well, go ahead, take a stab. Mr. Atchison. OK. I believe at this point, the threat, the risk is appropriate to a ring vaccination strategy; and I'm satisfied that Dr. Quinlisk, from the State Health Department who has articulated her opinions on this, is speaking from the point of view that seems to be prevailing across the infectious disease community at this time. Mr. Ganske. OK. Mr. Chairman, I have one additional question. Mr. Horn. Certainly. Mr. Ganske. And this will be directed to Messrs. Hainje, Bogner and Posner, and that is this: If each of you could give Congress and President Bush one suggestion for organizing our new Department of Homeland Security--maybe you've had a chance to see what we've passed in the House, maybe you haven't, but--if you had just 30 seconds each with President Bush, general or specific, what would you suggest in terms of our creation of this Department? Mr. Hainje. I'll go ahead and go first. I'm sure that I would suggest that the final product be an organization that would develop a one-plan approach to major disasters, acts of terrorism, to address as many of the scenarios as possibly can be addressed in one plan. You can't have--you can't do the exact same thing for each type of incident; but, for example, the Federal Response Plan that exists now has emergency support functions. In some cases, FEMA is just a facilitator and Public Health is the issue, and they're able to facilitate basically the business side of attempting to deal with an issue, and Public Health does their expertise. At other times, we bring in others. Mr. Ganske. So you would like something uniform and simple. Mr. Hainje. It is suggested in the strategy that there would be one plan. Mr. Ganske. OK. Mr. Hainje. I'm not sure if it's in the legislation itself, but the one plan I think would be an excellent idea. Mr. Ganske. OK. Mr. Bogner. Mr. Bogner. Well, I know our Director has met with President Bush and Governor Ridge on a regular basis and provided input to him. I'm not familiar with all of the intricacies regarding the plan and division of the work. I think that is going on at that level, and so I'll defer to our Director. Mr. Ganske. No. Now, look, this is your chance. Nobody is going to say you're doing something wrong if you--is there any one thing, when you've been thinking about this, that strikes you as being exceedingly important so that if you were there on Air Force One with the President and you've got 30 seconds, do you have--have you thought about it? Is there anything that has struck you in particular that would be important? Mr. Bogner. I think the two most important areas are absolute coordination of activities and accountability. Whether it be for the investigation, prevention or the overall homeland security issue, accountability is the key, so that whether it's the President or the citizens of the United States, know who's in charge of that particular segment of it and who is responsible for coordinating it and making sure that it gets done. Mr. Ganske. Mr. Posner. Mr. Posner. Well, I'll repeat what we have said--my boss has said, which is, let's not have management be the stepchild and the afterthought. Let's put management up front here, because that's where the devil is going to be. So let's have a deputy secretary for management right up front in the creation of the Department. That's No. 1. Someone who is a professional, who is appointed possibly for a fixed term, with possibly a contract with specific performance goals, and then let's think about creating those performance goals and not just articulating a bunch of initiatives, but let's try to baseline where we are and where we want to go. Mr. Ganske. I thank you. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Mr. Horn. Well, thank you. And particularly that last part, Mr. Posner. Your boss and me, we've talked about management. And last year, the appropriators that deal with the Department of State did put in a secretary for management, and the new one that is going through the Senate now, and we need to get that back in, and it is similar to the Department of State. Otherwise, it's just going to collapse. And we thank you, all of you, for coming, and we're sorry we're rushed a little bit, but we're trying to also solve some of the problems of Colorado. I'd like to thank the people here that helped us the most in terms of their staff: Mr. Ganske's staff, Meghan Gutierriez, and then Curt Mercadante. And Mr. Leach's staff, Bill Tate, and then Norine Zamastil of the University of Iowa, and the University staff, in general, from the desks on. Then we have the staff director and acting, to my right and your left--she's had her hands full on this trip--Bonnie Heald. And Chris Barkley, assistant to the subcommittee. And Michael Sazonov, staff assistant, has been very helpful. And our court reporter has had a tough day, I'm sure. It's very difficult when you have a lot of speakers, you've got echoes in the chamber and everything else, but, boy, there she is, right on the spot, so we thank Bev Herring for being here. Appreciate it. And with that, gentlemen, if there are no other questions, we are now adjourned. 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