<DOC>
[107th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:87868.wais]
HOMELAND SECURITY: FINDING THE NUCLEAR NEEDLE IN THE CARGO CONTAINER
HAYSTACK
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 18, 2002
__________
Serial No. 107-224
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
87-868 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia DC
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JIM TURNER, Texas
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DAVE WELDON, Florida WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho ------ ------
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York TOM LANTOS, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
DAVE WELDON, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
R. Nicolas Palarino, Senior Policy Advisor
Jason Chung, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on November 18, 2002................................ 1
Statement of:
Ahern, Jayson, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field
Operations, U.S. Customs Service........................... 38
Allen, Hon. Thomas H., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Maine............................................. 2
Bennis, Rear Admiral Richard, Associate Undersecretary for
Maritime and Land Security, Transportation Security
Administration............................................. 46
Boyd, General Charles, USAF, retired, CEO and president,
Business Executives for National Security.................. 127
Hecker, JayEtta Z., Director, Physical Infrastructure Team,
General Accounting Office.................................. 5
Hereth, Rear Admiral Larry, Director, Port Security, U.S.
Coast Guard................................................ 32
Hyde, John J., director of security and compliance, Maersk,
Inc........................................................ 138
Kallstrom, James, director, New York State Office of Public
Security................................................... 72
Maloney, Hon. Carolyn B., a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York...................................... 96
McDonough, Frank M., esq., president, New York Shipping
Association, Inc........................................... 119
McGreevey, James E., Governor, New Jersey.................... 102
Nadler, Hon. Jerrold, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New York.......................................... 4
Rooney, Bethann, manager, Port Security, the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey................................. 80
Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana........................................... 3
Starer, Brian D., partner, Holland & Knight, LLP............. 128
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Ahern, Jayson, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field
Operations, U.S. Customs Service, prepared statement of.... 40
Bennis, Rear Admiral Richard, Associate Undersecretary for
Maritime and Land Security, Transportation Security
Administration, prepared statement of...................... 49
Hecker, JayEtta Z., Director, Physical Infrastructure Team,
General Accounting Office, prepared statement of........... 8
Hereth, Rear Admiral Larry, Director, Port Security, U.S.
Coast Guard, prepared statement of......................... 34
Hyde, John J., director of security and compliance, Maersk,
Inc., prepared statement of................................ 141
Kallstrom, James, director, New York State Office of Public
Security, prepared statement of............................ 75
McDonough, Frank M., esq., president, New York Shipping
Association, Inc., prepared statement of................... 121
McGreevey, James E., Governor, New Jersey, prepared statement
of......................................................... 105
Rooney, Bethann, manager, Port Security, the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey, prepared statement of.......... 83
Starer, Brian D., partner, Holland & Knight, LLP, prepared
statement of............................................... 131
HOMELAND SECURITY: FINDING THE NUCLEAR NEEDLE IN THE CARGO CONTAINER
HAYSTACK
----------
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2002
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs
and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
New York, NY.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 a.m., at
American Restaurant, Battery Park, New York, NY, Hon.
Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Souder, Maloney, Tierney,
Allen, and Nadler.
Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director/counsel;
Chris Donesa, staff director; R. Nicholas Palarino, senior
policy advisor; Grace Washbourne and Nicholas Coleman,
professional staff members; Jason Chung, clerk; and Mackenzie
Eaglen, fellow.
Mr. Shays. The quorum being present is the Subcommittee on
National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations
hearing entitled Homeland Security, Finding the Nuclear Needle
in the Cargo Container Haystack is called to order.
The Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security
comes to the Port of New York/New Jersey today for a firsthand
look at multi-agency efforts to enhance security at critical
seaports.
We thank our hosts and welcome our guests.
The volume of containerized cargo and the openness of
massive, complex port areas represent inviting vulnerabilities
that must be mitigated.
The recent report of an independent task force sponsored by
the Council on Foreign Relations called for a new emphasis on
global trade security.
According to the report, the system for moving goods
affordably and reliably around the world is ripe for
exploitation and vulnerable to mass disruption by terrorists.
Ubiquitous cargo containers are of particular concern. An
estimated 11 million containers worldwide are each loaded and
unloaded 10 times per year. 21,000 containers arrive at U.S.
ports each day. Each trip by a cargo container represents a
potential vector of stealth attack. No security standards
govern container transport.
A recent event at this port complex underscored the peril
posed by containerized nuclear cargo. 15 pounds of depleted
uranium arrived here undetected.
At a previous hearing, we learned enough fissile material
to construct a nuclear device could just as easily slip by even
the most sophisticated screening today because weapons grade
plutonium and highly enriched uranium do not emit that much
active radiation.
In the aftermath of September 11th attacks, tightened
security at ports and borders stalled the movement of parts and
equipment essential to economic activity and growth.
We learned from the dock strikes on the west cost a
disrupted port means a disrupted economy.
A qualitative, not a quantitative approach is required to
improve port security. The general accounting office concludes
programs already in place at U.S. ports for detecting illegal
fissile material or nuclear weapons are limited, focusing n
screening only a small portion of total cargo.
Various estimates about the tiny fraction of imports
actually inspected could be reassuring, not frightening, if we
could be sure the right ships and warehouse were being
inspected, those posing the most risk.
Knowing that is a matter of intelligence at ports of
origin, of diligence in the search for anomalies in a sea of
routine trade data, and of vigilance in engaging high-risk
cargos before they reach the dockside.
As the subcommittee toured the New York/New Jersey port
this morning, we gained a better appreciation of the enormity
of the task before us, finding that nuclear needle in the cargo
container haystack. Only a coordinator and sophisticated
security program one, with an intense focus and international
reach, will keep terror out of cargo containers.
All our witnesses today understand the tension between
tighter security and robust commerce and they are trying to
strike a balance that will result in safer and more productive
ports.
As evidenced by our lengthy witness list, it is a complex
job involving numerous governmental and private entities. We
appreciate their willingness to join us today and look forward
to their testimony. We look forward to their patience and
waiting to testify and we request, given the number of
speakers, that we be closer to the 5-minute rule rather than
the 10.
At this time, I recognize Mr. Allen who joins us from Maine
and has obviously very real concerns about this issue coming
from an important seaport State.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS H. ALLEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF MAINE
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing, and I would like to thank Jerry Nadler.
As many of you know well, Chairman Shays has been working
on the problem of terrorism for years, long before September
11, 2001. He has been a tireless advocate for increased
attention to terrorism preparedness.
This is just one of many hearings that he has held in an
attempt to get at our Nation's vulnerability and to call
attention to vital security needs.
I commend him for his hard work and dedication to making
America safer.
The issue of nuclear safety is one that desperately needs
to be addressed. Even a small amount of nuclear material in the
hands of terrorists could cause a great loss of life and
property damage.
It is imperative that terrorists not be able to smuggle
nuclear material into this country. I look forward to today's
testimony on port security conditions with respect to nuclear
material and for our panelist suggestions for improvement.
I also believe that many of the first responders who would
have to deal with the nuclear or hazardous material incident at
a port are not yet adequately prepared to handle such an
incident. This is a problem of national scope. And it is
appropriate and necessary to provide first responders with
Federal assistance.
I'm also concerned about the lines of communication between
Federal, State and local governments as well as with port
authorities.
I hope our panelists will discuss this topic and touch on
the problems that inevitably arise because of a lack of unified
electronic communication system.
Port security in general is a great concern to me. In my
home city of Portland, Maine, we have a very active commercial
port operation. In fact, the port of Portland is the second
largest oil port on the east cost next to Philadelphia, taking
in more than 30 million tons of crude and refined oil last
year, much of it destined for Canada.
Most of the oil used in the Canadian maritime for northern
New England comes through Portland. Portland is also the
largest international passenger port of New England, moving
more than 200,000 passengers annually.
Last year, Portland put through more tonnage than any other
port in New England.
Because we have such an active port and because of the
glaring holes in port security, I take great issue in this
issue and look forward to today's testimony and I hope it can
shed some light on the possible solutions to the problem of
port security.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Congressman Allen. I appreciate very
much your activity on this committee because you've been at the
forefront of everything we've done.
Also we're going to introduce another member of the
subcommittee who also chairs on the subcommittee on Government
Reform that's involved in our whole effort to combat drugs, and
this time I appreciate your presence and work on the committee,
Mr. Souder.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK E. SOUDER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA
Mr. Souder. Thank you very much. It's good to be here and
it's good to see each of our witnesses. I work with you on a
number of issues that clearly, in addition to the question of
catastrophic terrorism, they face a daily challenge of
narcotics, Customs and Coast Guard, immigration, trade, and
trying to look for this balance of how we can protect the
American citizens and at the same time not wreck our economy
and it's been one of the biggest challenges in funding and
resource employment.
We've held hearings in my subcommittee in Los Angeles Long
Beach Harbor, looking at similar problems in New York and I
wanted to come here today, my first visit here, looking at the
problems facing New York in particular, where we see this
interdependency of illegal activities that we need to address.
We need to make sure while we're addressing one, we're
simultaneously looking at that cross-correlation as we see the
number and people and weapons of mass destruction, all
interconnected in the same network.
We look forward to hearing your testimony today and looking
for creative ways of how we can best employ limited resources.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, gentlemen.
When the committee tours different parts of the country, we
always are appreciative when the member of the district we're
in attends the hearing, but we're particularly appreciative
having Jerry Nadler here today because he is such an
outstanding Member of Congress and also a very active member of
the fiduciary committee, and this issue is right up his alley
and we're grateful that you're our host Congress person.
STATEMENT OF HON. JERROLD NADLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. Nadler. Thank you very much. Let me start by expressing
my appreciation to Congressman Shays for conducting this
hearing and for the interest and initiative, especially in
issues he has shown over the last several years in this
important area of port security.
My district includes most of the waterfront of the west
side of Manhattan and Brooklyn, which has port facilities, some
of which you toured today, and I've been interested in this
issue.
Probably the most likely nuclear threat to the United
States is not that someone will shoot a missile at us or a
nuclear warhead, but that someone, rather a rogue State or a
terrorist group will get a hold of a nuclear weapon and put it
in a container or a ship.
If we're willing to spend a lot of money on anti-missile,
we should be willing to put comparable resources into what I
believe the greater threat lies, which is nuclear threat to an
American port.
I am gratified that the Port Security Bill that Congress
has considered, it takes steps in the right direction.
I simply want to mention a bill that I introduced a few
months ago, that probably goes further than anything else I've
seen, and maybe someone can comment on the practicality of it
or lack as they see it.
The bill essentially would require two things. It would
require that every container bound for an American port be
inspected in the foreign port by an American security team, and
sealed and certified as having been inspected by the American
team in the foreign port, and then no container be admitted
anywhere near the American port that isn't inspected by the
American team of the foreign port.
Second, that the Coast Guard inspect every ship step to
stern bound for an American port, at least 200 miles offshore.
It seems to me there's little sense of looking for nuclear
bombs in the port of Newark or the port of Los Angeles. There,
it's too late. You don't want to find it on the ship and have
it blow up as you're finding it.
I would appreciate any comment on that, as well as the
adequacy of the Port Security Bill that Congress just
considered and anything else.
I look forward to this hearing and I thank you for your
initiative.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, gentleman.
We'll be joined shortly by two Members in Massachusetts,
but we will at this time recognize our witnesses and then I'll
ask them to stand and be sworn in.
We have Ms. JayEtta Hecker, director of physical
infrastructure team, general accounting office.
I believe, Ms. Hecker, you participated in our hearing in
Tampa and we appreciate you being here.
We have Rear Admiral Larry Hereth, director Port Security,
U.S. Coast Guard. We appreciate the courtesy that your office
has shown us.
We have Mr. Jayson Ahern, Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Field Operations, U.S. Customs Service, and we also have Rear
Admiral Richard Bennis, Associate Undersecretary for Maritime
and Land Security, Transportation Security Administration.
At this time, I would request that you stand and we'll
swear you in. We swear in all our witnesses.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. I note for the record all our witnesses
responded in the affirmative. Thank you for that.
We'll start with you, Ms. Hecker.
STATEMENT OF JAYETTA Z. HECKER, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE TEAM, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Ms. Hecker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a real pleasure
to be here before you, the other member of the subcommittee and
Mr. Nadler. We're here to discuss the major initiatives
underway, to respond to what is really a grave threat and that
is the potential smuggling of nuclear materials in 1 of the 6
million containers that come into this country every year.
I have to remark that this is such a moving setting. The
symbols of the openness of this country right before us and the
symbols really that have become targets and it's a very fitting
environment for us to look at that balance of openness and the
balance of protecting what have become such vulnerable targets.
What we're talking about really used be unthinkable. It
clearly is now before us to address some of these serious
problems, and I'm able to comment on a broad range of GAO work
that's addressed some of these issues.
We have worked on nuclear smuggling, on Customs operations,
on information systems, the proposal to reform homeland
security and others, really a broad range of work across GAO to
give the overview remarks that I think the scope of this
hearing requires.
Basically it covers three specific areas. The first is to
review the current initiatives underway specifically to prevent
nuclear smuggling. Then I'll talk about some of the newer
initiatives that are being developed to go beyond the border,
and finally I'll talk about some of the significant challenges
representing moving forward in these areas.
In essence, in the first area, our work shows that the
current initiatives as you said are really limited. They're
limited by the technology. They're limited by the vast volume
of traffic coming before our ports. They're limited by the
incomplete information that's available on what is in these
containers.
Most of all, I think several of you have noted, they're
limited by the fact that screening at the ports for nuclear
weapons and nuclear materials is too late. That is not the time
you want to be finding out there is nuclear material about to
go off or perhaps going off before you're even able to detect
it.
So this whole area of nuclear detection at the port, and we
have a summary in our statement of the kinds of equipment, the
kinds of concerns we have about the equipment, the kinds of
limitations that are already there.
We also have an interesting overview of the efforts
overseas. As you know, there is a lot of effort overseas to the
stop the nuclear material from even getting out of Russia,
where it's stored.
In fact, there are portals, more portals than we have in
this country for detecting nuclear materials overseas. We have
a report out on that. There's six different agencies doing
that. We haven't been well-coordinated. The material is not--
the equipment is not often turned on. There was one that was
delayed for 2 years to be turned on because there was a dispute
over who was going to pay for the electricity.
There are really some complications in the whole array of
getting detention underway, not only here but overseas.
That brings me to the second point, which is the new
initiatives, and what is important about the new initiatives is
that they represent a fundamental ship away from interdiction
at the port to prevention and securing the supply chain in the
movement of goods and creating a chain of custody.
The initiatives that are listed in the report are
important. There's a lot of administration attention to them,
but underlying these efforts, we have to look at the fact that
there are no standards for loading containers. There are no
standards for the sealing of containers.
There are no standards for the transferring of containers
between loads. There are no standards for the documentation of
the contents of containers. There are no standards for
credentialing of cargo handlers.
There are no standards for foreign ports, although there is
an important new coverage in the new legislation for the Coast
Guard do play a role in getting oversight and review of the
vulnerability and the improvements in security at foreign
ports.
Most of all again, there is no accountability for the
shipper to really know what the contents of their containers
are and what they're shipping.
As I said, there are multiple initiatives to try to deal
with this. These are not new problems. The witnesses we will
hear from today, most of them are working on different
initiatives that I talked about. The two are the Customs, the
inspection places overseas and to work in the partnership with
firms to secure the supply chain.
There is interesting leadership on the part of the private
sector. We talked about the private sector resisting here.
There is leadership before Federal money is even available,
testing the secured, securing of the containers and testing new
equipment.
Legislation was passed in supplemental to make money
available, but it hasn't--the rules haven't been finalized so
the process couldn't really begin, but firms have gone ahead
and are actually testing in this port, in Seattle and L.A./Long
Beach, efforts are already underway.
There is a real acknowledgment of how critical moving
forward in this area is.
Unfortunately, though, this is not an easy answer. There
are at least four international organizations, if not five,
where agreement is needed to make the progress of getting these
standards. Note only is the international maritime organization
a key getting security at the ports, porter handlers, the world
customs organization, the international standards organization,
the international labor organization, all of these
international organizations are party and we have
representation, moving in each of them.
Luckily, there has been leadership by the GA and in the
APEC, there has been debate about these issues, so it's
elevated to an extremely high level of national leaders, but
these organizations still have several processes and challenges
are ahead to actually reach agreement, implement the agreement,
oversee the agreement.
Finally, the conclusions are that we clearly have major
vulnerability. The vulnerability is vast. The risk is real, and
the strategies and solutions to address these problems has to
be sustained, systematic and global. It requires an
orchestration of a complexity similar to the lunar landing.
This is a focused, and attention of a commitment that
really is requiring a major focus, a sustained focus and
unfortunately, unlike the lunar landing, it's not going to have
a day when we know we've reached it. This requires a sustained
preventive effort for many, many years to come.
That concludes my statement.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hecker follows:]
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Mr. Shays. A wonderful way to get it started. Thank you
very much.
Admiral.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL LARRY HERETH, DIRECTOR, PORT
SECURITY, U.S. COAST GUARD
Admiral Hereth. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and
distinguished members of the committee, Mr. Nadler.
As the Director of Port Security for the Office of Marine
Safety, Security and Environmental Protection at Coast Guard
Headquarters, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today on behalf of the Commandant, Admiral Collins.
As the President is on the verge of signing American
Transportation Security Act, I would first like to thank
Congress for passing this monumental piece of legislation.
This is an important step for the Coast Guard for the
security of our Nation's marine transportation system, as it
introduces a systematic approach for addressing vulnerability
of our seaports through critical activities such as port
security assessments, requirements for security clearance for
vessels and facilities.
The comprehensive container security program involves an
emphasis on the prevention and pre-emption of incidents, but
also must stress the preparedness to respond to any problems
that crop up.
The prevention of container security incidents can be
broken down into two parts.
The intrinsic security of containers, which might include
cargo identification, verification, sealing a container, and
also intransit security, which gives more with the secure
movement of containers through the marine transportation
system.
Both Customs and TSA have the challenge of improving
container security from the point of origin to the point of
destination. Coast Guard actively supports both Customs and TSA
on a variety of initiatives that you will hear about from those
representatives.
I would, however, like to point out at least two Coast
Guard initiatives contribute to security. First of all, our
maritime domain awareness program. The key element of any
protection program is situation awareness. Or in this context,
maritime domain awareness.
MDA seeks to have a full understanding of people, cargo and
vessels involved in transmitting cargo to the United States.
Under our MDA program, we spearheaded a variety of
initiatives and interagency partnership to improve our
information gathering and analysis capability. This includes a
96-hour advance notice of arrival requirement for all seaborne
vessels over 300 gross tons.
This also includes requirements for vessels to provide
Customs manifest information 96 hours in advantage of arrival
in the United States.
We believe this is a major step forward.
Additionally, Coast Guard has taken the lead in
international narcotics maritime organization. They developed
worldwide standards for maritime security.
We expect IMO will adopt these measures in just a couple of
weeks. It will enhance the security of vessels in their
international service, as well as the port facilities that
service them, both foreign and domestic.
Any security programs also needs a response capability to
deal with any potential or actual threat that might crop up. It
involves several working groups to address the response
protocols.
Unfortunately, the maritime environment provides unique
challenges to impact the performance of radiation detector
sensors.
Coast Guard has been working with the Department of Energy
and others to identify appropriate detection capabilities and
protocols.
In addition, measures, policy changes are being evaluated
by an interagency work group led by the Office of Homeland
Security.
There's been significant progress in terms of clarifying
roles and responsibilities, in defining how an organization
comes together and deals with potential problems that crop up.
In summary, the Coast Guard is the Nation's maritime
homeland security leader and will continue to partner with
other Federal, State and local agencies, maritime stakeholders
and international organizations to improve security of our
ports and containerized cargo.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Hereth follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Admiral, and there's no
question that the homeland security role of the Coast Guard
will be far more prominent, as I think most member skills
should be.
Mr. Ahern.
STATEMENT OF JAYSON AHERN, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF
FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE
Mr. Ahern. Preventing the smuggling of nuclear weapons and
radiological materials is the highest priority of the U.S.
Customs Service. Customs has developed and implemented a multi-
layered defense in-depth strategy designed to prevent nuclear
weapons and radiological materials from entering the United
States.
An important part of that strategy is pushing our zone of
security outward, so that American borders are the last line of
defense, not the first line of defense against such a threat.
Two U.S. Customs initiatives that help extend our zone of
security against the threat of nuclear terrorism are the
Container Security Initiative, also known as CSI, and the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, also known as C-
TPAT.
The purpose of CSI is to prevent terrorists from using
cargo containers to conceal nuclear weapons or radiological
materials. With CSI, U.S. Customs partners with foreign
governments to target and screen high-risk containers at the
earliest point in the supply chain.
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism or C-TPAT
initiative taps the resources of the trade community to further
reduce the risk that terrorist weapons, including nuclear or
radiological materials, could be concealed in cargo shipped to
the United States.
By partnering with U.S. importers, customs brokers,
carriers and others, we can better protect the entire supply
chain against potential exploitation by terrorists. The goal of
C-TPAT is to provide increased security from foreign loading
docks all the way to the U.S. border. To date, over 1,000
companies have agreed to participate in C-TPAT.
Under the direction of Commissioner Bonner, the Office of
Border Targeting and Analysis, also known as BTA, was
established. BTA is responsible for developing targeting
criteria to identify high-risk containers and respond to the
shifting and evolving terrorist threat. These targeting rules
are applied by Customs sophisticated Automated Targeting
System, also known as ATS, which processes commercial
information regarding cargo and containers and assigns risk-
based scores to focus the Customs screening process.
The effectiveness of ATS and the success of initiatives
such as CSI and C-TPAT are directly proportional to the
timeliness and accuracy of cargo information submitted to U.S.
Customs.
Therefore, Customs proposed a regulation requiring the
presentation of accurate, complete manifest information 24
hours prior to lading at the foreign port, and eliminating
vague descriptions of cargo, such as FAK, freight of all kinds.
This advance information will enable U.S. Customs to evaluate
the terrorist of cargo containers before they are shipped to
the United States.
In addition to the C-TPAT and CSI as well as regulatory
initiatives, Customs deploys multiple technologies to support
our layered targeting and detection process.
All cargo identified as posing a threat is screened for
security purposes. To date, Customs has deployed 101 large-
scale x-ray and gamma ray systems that assist inspectors in
screening cargo containers and conveyances for potential
terrorist weapons, including nuclear weapon and radiological
materials.
Customs also has issued over 5,000 personal radiation
detectors to provide coverage at every port of entry into the
United States. We have ordered, and will be taking delivery of,
over 4,000 additional personal radiation detectors.
To further augment our detection capabilities, we are
adding an additional layer to the screening process. U.S.
Customs is working closely with the Department of Energy, DOE,
the Transportation Security Administration, TSA, and other
concerned agencies, to deploy portal radiation detectors, which
are passive, non-intrusive systems used to screen containers
and other conveyances for the presence of nuclear and
radiological materials.
We are also in the process of deploying radiation isotope
identifiers for the purpose of further identifying the type of
radiation present after primary radiation detection screening.
This work will be integrated into the new Department of
Homeland Security as proposed by President Bush to detect and
prevent the transport of nuclear weapons or their components
into the United States.
U.S. Customs also recognizes the importance of ensuring
that U.S. technology and hardware do not become part of the
arsenal of international terrorist groups.
Therefore, Customs agents are working under Project Shield
America, to monitor strategic weapon components and sensitive
materials being exported from the United States.
U.S. Customs, in conjunction with its Federal counterparts,
is also addressing the issue of enhancing seaport security.
To meet the challenges of the seaport environment, U.S.
Customs is working with the Department of Transportation to
develop Operation Safe Commerce, a national seaport security
initiative designed to test a common set of standard security
practices governing the loading and movement of cargo
throughout the international and domestic supply chains. The
purpose of Operation Safe Commerce is to test innovative
technology solutions to enhance and maintain the security of
worldwide supply chains.
In addition, Customs is also engaged with the Department of
Transportation in the container working group, an initiative in
partnership with the private sector carriers, shippers and
importers focusing on improving sea container security.
Last, in support of their high interest vessel program.
U.S. Customs is working with the U.S. Coast Guard to identify
high-risk cargo, passengers or crew on board vessels coming to
the United States.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I will be
happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ahern follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. We appreciate the work of
the U.S. Customs Service. It's clear that your task has
increased manyfold and I know that you're going to need
cooperation from Congress to do your job.
Admiral Bennis, good morning.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD BENNIS, ASSOCIATE
UNDERSECRETARY FOR MARITIME AND LAND SECURITY, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Admiral Bennis. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Allen and members of the subcommittee, Congressman Nadler.
Since this is sworn testimony, I have to tell you how
absolutely pleased I am to be home here in New York and it's
good to be here today.
Before discussing our specific efforts to secure cargo, I
would first like to briefly mention that on September 11th I
had the privilege to be stationed here in New York City and my
position was acting commander of Coast Guard activity in New
York and in that capacity, I was proud and honored to be part
of the team, this tremendous team that came forth, the maritime
community, Port Authority, Customs, all city agencies, NYPD,
NYFD and organized the orderly evacuation of hundreds of
thousands of estranged people in lower Manhattan.
It is entirely fitting to return to New York City today to
hold this hearing, just a short distance from Ground Zero which
will forever be one of the most important reminders of our need
to protect our homeland from all enemies.
TSA is not only the Nation's leading administration charged
with securing aviation security. We celebrate our 1-year
anniversary tomorrow, in the United States, but it is charged
with the security of passengers, cargo, infrastructure and our
Nation's service transportation systems encompassing maritime,
rail, highway, mass transit and pipelines.
You asked us to come here today to talk about efforts to
screen cargo containers entering U.S. seaports and the effect
of these efforts on the free trade. In particular, you asked
about efforts to prevent weapons of mass destruction,
specifically nuclear bombs and radiological or dirty bombs from
being smuggled into and used against the United States.
This was first raised in a letter from Albert Einstein to
President Roosevelt in the 1930's when he talked about nuclear
weapons being smuggled on a ship before the days of containers
into a port and in that letter, he said it could destroy that
port and portions of any city that port resided in.
In performing our functions, we take a risk based approach.
TSA will work within the umbrella of organizations brought
together by the Office of Homeland Security to set national
standards and criteria for transportation security, while at
all times working closely with State goals.
Our goal is to not drive terrorists to the road of least
resistance. We don't want the hardened aviation security to
drive terrorists to the water, to the rails, to the highways.
TSA will continue to work closely within the Department of
Transportation.
Immediately after September 11th, Secretary Manella
mandated that the Department of Transportation work with U.S.
Customs in forming a container working group charged with
strengthening our container security protection efforts.
Soon after the container working group became a cooperative
effort between the TSA, Coast Guard, Customs, and private
sector, including the top load centers of the United States
like the Port of New York and New Jersey.
Through this cooperative effort, the container working
group created a program called Operation Safe Commerce.
Operation Safe Commerce's goal is to design a commercially
viable security system that not only detects weapons of mass
destruction hidden in cargo but will also include redundant
measures to ensure that at every stage of transportation
terrorists are prevented from introducing weapons of mass
destruction hidden in cargo.
This is otherwise known as securing the supply chain.
As you said, Mr. Chairman, we're diligently working to
secure the supply chain. TSA also participated in multi-agency
efforts involving radiological detection devices. This is an
important program led by the Office of Homeland Security.
The majority of initiatives we are considering are already
underway in New York/New Jersey and none of these initiatives
are duplicative or inconsistent with integrated initiatives
underway in New York and New Jersey, create a multilayer line
of defense inspectors.
Other initiatives underway include container security
initiative. TSA will participate pate in the sector by
increasing the data, such as the Customs service and review in
order to accomplish more thorough analysis of threats posed by
containers shipped in commerce, consistent with our integral
role of showing the Nation's transportation security.
We want to be sure the cargo moved from load to load is at
a consistent level of security of origin to destination.
TSA is a corporation within the Department of Homeland
Security, the closer partnership of the TSA is Coast Guard,
Customs, who further strengthen our mission as set forth in the
Aviation Transportation Security Act.
Another important step that TSA took in its first year was
the award for security grants, working closely with the Coast
Guard, the maritime administration, TSA awarded grants to 77
ports throughout the Nation, totaling $92 million.
Here in the New York metropolitan area alone, I'm pleased
to note TSA will award $8.9 million to the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey.
Congress has appropriated an additional $125 million for
TSA for security grants as part of the fiscal year 2002.
TSA also announced a new round of port security grants in
the near future.
Even the intermodal nature of transportation address
transportation of security and other modes of transportation.
TSA's rail cargo security branch has identified hazardous
materials initiatives, both as shipments, coordinated with
other key participants in its review of the transport of
hazardous material throughout the supply chain.
The analysis and the conclusions we develop will enable TSA
to identify best practices, and to propose standards and
performance based regulations.
We discussed earlier, which you heard, Coast Guard and
Customs are working together. I think we're working together
like we've never worked together before. Very closely, very
well coordinated, determining who has responsibility for what
and the same time assuring there's no duplication of efforts in
preventing the unlawful importation of radiological weapons,
other weapons of mass destruction in the United States. The
challenge to secure cargo is formidable but obtainable. I
strongly believe that transportation security is safer today
than it was yesterday and will be safer tomorrow than it is
today.
I will be pleased to answer any questions that you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Bennis follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Before I recognize our first witness, I think it's fair to
say we're safer today than since September 11, 2001, but we
don't feel safer because we had a false sense of safety before
September 11, 2001, and my request to all our panels is that
they be brutally candid with this committee and the American
people.
We need to speak the truth and in speaking the truth to the
American people, they'll have us do the right thing. They need
to know what the terrorists know and we need to know what the
terrorists know.
At this time, we'll hear from Mr. Souder.
We're doing the 5-minute rule with a little flexibility. If
you're on a roll, we'll let you continue.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Shays, I want to followup on this. I have a
small company in my district that is looking at container
security standards to trying to improve them.
Do you know, are there efforts underway, four or five
international groups, are there efforts underway to do the
same, similar to what we do on our fast pass on the border and
that type of thing.
If companies are agreed to certain minimum standards on
container security, on clearance and other things, that they
would be treated differently and there would be delays for
companies that don't--when we have multiple countries,
preclearance and ports, when you're looking at Customs with
this lizard of a few main companies but then lots of little
companies, that part of it is that you don't agree with the
standards, you're going to be slowed down.
Why isn't that an alternative in addition to trying to
address the development of international standards? Otherwise
it's going to take years.
Ms. Hecker. I think you probably want to hear from Mr.
Ahern because they're the ones running that program and how
it's to be used.
Mr. Souder. My fundamental concern is you may be charged at
the very beginning that we have no international standards in
four or five major categories and the question is how do we
deal with that because within the foreseeable future, 10 years,
every country in the world is not going to accept international
standards even if we have international standards, so what can
we do in the short-term to address that.
Mr. Hereth. Two programs I outlined, specifically
international standards that is precisely what you described.
Through partnership programs, we know certain countries are
maintaining security integrity through these entire supply
chains and such, upon arrival at the U.S. borders, we can focus
our technology and resources on those that are not.
Mr. Souder. In some of these cases that were addressed, we
have minimum to no international standards at this point. That
puts the disadvantage of the system at Customs and it puts a
small company at incredible disadvantage compared to a big
company.
Do you see us moving toward a standard where they can at
least voluntarily ascribe to that standard, even if they don't
have as much of a track record?
Mr. Ahern. I would say our program does not necessarily
discern large companies from small companies. Certainly some of
the large companies have greater capacity, but certainly some
of the smaller companies that have established a track record
with Customs and have established relationships with importers,
carriers, they have to go through mandatory security
assessments, so we believe it does fit the small companies.
Mr. Souder. You don't have a concern about the lack of
international----
Mr. Ahern. I think we have to have higher international
standards to do what we can do with the relationships we have
with carriers, importers, as well as foreign manufacturers.
Mr. Souder. Do you believe their approach will address the
questions satisfactory or is that a short-term approach or
would you rather see a broader approach?
Ms. Hecker. I think we have to move in many directions,
including we have to move unilaterally and bilaterally, but the
international direction is an important one, and one of the
areas we've heard from different ports and firms is the
potential to be disadvantaged, and I think that is what you're
alluding to for smaller firms.
There are ports, for example, that are raising a concern
that as certain standards are tightened domestically, it will
drive the traffic to Canadian ports, so the importance of
moving globally is really that it's a level playing field and I
think as Admiral Bennis said, you don't just drive the risk
somewhere else.
If it's easier to get containers in through Canada, and
that's the avenue that's used to smuggle the nuclear weapons
and gets across the border, what has it saved us to tighten up
on our domestic ports.
Mr. Souder. I would agree with that. I think the standard
that's being used by Customs at the port, that's why I was
looking for a general standard for all cargo that's targeted to
the United States because we can't control other countries.
I believe Customs is definitely moving in that direction.
At the very least, we should set our national standard with
rail, port or air and we're attempting to do that, but I don't
know that we can get the international cooperation.
Mr. Shays. You wanted to make a comment?
Mr. Hereth. As we raise our standards for focus on a scheme
that you have laid out, the standard will have a part A and
part B.
Part A will be required. Part B will be optional.
For those that don't adopt those parts will be further
scrutinized and delayed in transit. The scheme is not
completely in focus yet, but it's still working in that
direction.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Thank you very much for your testimony, all of
you.
Admiral Hereth, I want to ask you some questions about how
the Coast Guard is going to maintain its traditional
responsibilities while it's based on all the additional
responsibilities of dealing with the issues related to
terrorism, particularly the one we're focusing on today.
When Captain Bohn had some of us out on the boat a little
while ago, he pointed out--he made a remark, and I'm not
quoting him, so don't--I'm trying to interpret what he said.
He said on some days, we may be more concerned with a
poorly maintained, poorly staffed tanker that is at risk of
exploding than we are with the threat of a nuclear device
coming in.
It highlighted for me the challenge that the Coast Guard
faces in dealing with some traditional safety issues versus the
new threat of terrorism. Back in Maine, the Coast Guard is a
vital part of keeping our fishermen safe, conducting rescues at
sea and there is some anxiety about whether there will be
enough resources available for that.
I know you can tell me that if we have the resources we can
do it all, but I'm really interested in probing where you think
the problems may arise and what issues we need to focus on here
in Congress.
Mr. Hereth. I'll give it my best shot.
I believe there are a couple of things that need to be
addressed. One is our traditional mission obviously requires
the support. We had great support from secretary of the
administration, the Coast Guard to make sure we have all the
competency, capability and capacity that we need to continue
traditional measures in addition to security missions.
That's a huge challenge. This first year, it seems like the
funding is shifting up for a significant increase to the Coast
Guard. That will be a big boost.
I would also offer that as Captain Bohn may have discussed,
the Coast Guard operates on a first base decisionmaking
protocol in the field and having served about 10 years in not
only field offices around the country in major ports, most
recently from San Francisco, the balancing act of the staff
requiring every day is challenging but necessary, but also a
very efficient use of resources.
Certainly the Coast Guard needs to grow capabilities and
resources and we're seeing some positive movement in that
direction.
It's not so much of a stretch for the Coast Guard to
perceive people like myself who have been in the field for
years seeing how side by side, very competent, very capable.
Mr. Allen. Could you comment, Ms. Hecker?
Ms. Hecker. Yes. As we were talking about the hearing
started, we recently completed a report reviewing in detail the
balancing that the Coast Guard is having to manage on a daily
basis between its traditional missions and the security
missions.
We'll be issuing that report tomorrow, and it's now at the
Senate, so I can't really discuss it completely in detail, but
we have various specific recommendations about bad reporting by
the Coast Guard, about the balance of the mission and also an
important opportunity to really look at alternative strategies
including public partnership to address some of the tensions
occurring daily in their missions.
As I said, we would be happy to brief you and we hope it
will be helpful because as many agencies are merged into the
Department of Homeland Security, there are other missions and
this is really one that's quite critical in terms of fishery
enforcement, boating safety and many other areas.
Mr. Allen. We look forward to seeing a report. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for having
these hearings. Thank you, members of the panel, for the
testimony.
Admiral Hereth and Ms. Hecker, the International Maritime
Organization, we've been negotiating in a bilateral fashion
with a good number of countries governing almost all of the
high volume force.
How were the standards to bilateral agreements measured up
against the international standards in the IMO?
Mr. Hereth. I think maybe the way to view that is the 80 or
so countries that are involved in general security
arrangements, port facilities, domestic and on vessels, are all
agreed to a standard and those will be concluded at a
diplomatic conference in December.
As a result, a very comprehensive effort by multi-agency
effort in the United States, are participating to design the
standards.
Once that is in place, I think it will set the stage for
further refinement on the part of the security agreement. So I
think you're going to see a lot of efforts talking about work
with Customs to develop further standards.
Mr. Tierney. The IMO standards being set for port security
don't yet cover the containers?
Mr. Hereth. No. In a general way, in terms of raising the
general precautions around compartment security in general.
Specifics are under development still.
Mr. Tierney. What about the bilateral agreements that we've
been engaged in, do those cover containers?
Mr. Ahern. A couple issues I would like to speak to.
World Customs Organization, they're working on supply
chains security issues. We'll look at security standards for
the supply chain to include some of the issues relative to
container security as well.
Certainly you take a look at what we're doing with the
container security issue as well. We're looking into moving out
to the 20 megaports throughout the world for establishing the
ability to targeting, screening at the 20 megaports.
I'm happy to say at this point we have 15 of those 20 ports
already signatories to the CSI security issue worldwide.
One point as well, I think certainly we need to move up and
move up quickly ascertaining international standards.
Currently, one of the things we did was look at specific data,
which was important to us for our target system, submitted to
us 24 hours prior to waiting in foreign location for vessels
destined to the United States.
Mr. Tierney. Tell me, approximately at least, what
percentage of the exports to this country did those 20
megaports constitute?
Mr. Ahern. It flows between 65 and 70 percent, those 20
megaports.
We will not rest. Once we get the 20 megaports signed on,
then we'll take it to the next ports, to further implement as
necessary.
Mr. Souder. You said you have 15 of the 20.
Which 5 don't you have?
Mr. Ahern. I'll submit it for the record. I don't have the
remaining 5.
Mr. Tierney. Do you have a time estimate by which you think
you'll have all the exporting ports covered?
Mr. Ahern. It's our hope to be within the next couple
months. We had some progress within the last 2 months getting
some of the initial signatories. The time table is not as
precise as I would like it to be, but we're moving
aggressively.
Mr. Tierney. The remaining 35, 35 to 40 percent----
Mr. Ahern. We would take that over the next 12-month cycle
after that.
Mr. Shays. The gentleman from New York is recognized.
Mr. Nadler. I think the question is either for Ms. Ahern or
Admiral Bennis.
We're hearing that you're making agreements with foreign
ports. We're looking at their manifests. We're inspecting the
manifests, and we're looking at the operational safe commerce
program to explore options to keep pace with expanding trades
to develop practice technology to help secure cargo port of
destinations.
What would it take and why would it not be--let me put it
this way: We seem either to not think it necessary or to think
it impossible to inspect every container at every major port
before it leaves the port.
Which is it, that it's impossible or it's not worth doing?
Mr. Ahern. I'll be happy to start from my point of view on
that. Certainly it's not an impossible task. Logistically I
think it's beyond our capacity right now. We would have to have
the additional technology and resource to do it effectively.
I will tell you that what I think we need to do is we need
to make sure that the legitimate trade coming in and out of
this country is not firmly impacted by overcontrolling or
oversecuring.
We need to have better information systems, better
intelligence. We need to use our technology as efficiently as
we can.
What we have studied over the years is that the
international trade coming into this country is highly
compliant and we need to make sure we recognize that. We can't
fall on any safe sense of security or make any assumptions
without having random factors build into our----
Mr. Nadler. Highly compliant reviewing possible nuclear
weapons, highly compliant does not do the trick. You have to
have 100 percent. One nuclear weapon, there goes chaos.
My question is it shouldn't make sense to target based on
risk based targeting until you get 100 percent coverage, but we
don't seem to be aiming for 100 percent coverage.
Why should we not be aiming for a situation, aiming for a
system under which every container is inspected and certified
before it's loaded on a ship bound for the United States.
Mr. Ahern. I would offer one final point. One of the things
I do want to address is this 2 percent, that we're looking at 2
percent in the United States in containers.
I think it's important to note 100 percent of the vessels'
manifest information submitted to Customs has an ability to go
through our expert targeting systems, go through a security
screen----
Mr. Nadler. I don't understand. Why doesn't every container
need to go through security screening with technology. You're
assuming people are telling the truth on the manifests. You're
assuming that no dishonest employee is sleeping something in
the container which he doesn't tell his boss he's putting on
the manifest.
In order to give real security, why is it not necessary to
have every container inspected, physically inspected?
Mr. Ahern. We rely heavily on our target system for the
technology we have in place, and certainly as far as one event
can be of massive consequences, but right now based on our
security system we have in place, we need to do more.
Mr. Nadler. You're not answering the question.
Yes, given the resources, obviously you want to target the
resources where they're most effective. That's not the
question.
The question is would it not be better to target a--have a
lot more resources, even if it took us some time to get there,
it took us a lot of money to do it, why is it not necessary to
give us really good security to physically inspect with
radiological equipment or with the eyeball or whatever every
container before it gets put on a ship?
Is there anything other than doing that can give us that
assurance?
Mr. Ahern. I would go back to your original question and
the question that you just posed.
I think immediately after September 11th when the container
working group was put together, it did involve Customs, TSA,
Coast Guard, VOT and all the State holders, all the industry
folks, all the Federal, State, local and international people
involved in the shipment and inspection of containers and the
movement of containers, we tried to look at what the absolute
safest way to achieve the 100 percent that you're talking
about, that fine level of certainty.
I think what we all came up with coming out of that is I
guess in a perfect world, certainly 100 percent of all those
containers were physically inspected, that would achieve what
you're talking about, but after applying what that cost would
be.
Mr. Nadler. What would that cost be?
Admiral Bennis. That cost would be huge.
Mr. Nadler. What order of magnitude, are we talking about
$1 billion, $10 billion, $100 billion?
Admiral Bennis. We're easily over $10 billion.
Mr. Nadler. $20 billion?
Admiral Bennis. A lot is the answer. I'll get back to you
on that.
We looked at intelligence, bringing more information in
with regard to each container, better means of securing the
container, risk assessment, and I think as a community we all
felt that we could have a higher level of certainty doing
something other and better than 100 percent inspection.
Mr. Nadler. Doing all these other things would give you a
hire level of certainty than 100 percent inspection?
Admiral Bennis. When you put together the intelligence,
information we would receive, the actual greater amount of
electronic data that we can provide to Customs and better
partnership, working with the shippers, I think we'll have a
very, much more comfortable level at a much more lower cost.
I think the cost is prohibitive.
Mr. Nadler. The cost is another question. I can't
understand how you can have a higher level of certainty with
all this.
Admiral Bennis. I think the consensus was we gain an awful
lot of intelligence, those things, are aside from the 100
percent inspection. 100 percent inspection is a monumental
task. You asked if it was impossible. It's not impossible, but
it's certainly not easily doable.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. I want to start from the basis of just
understanding whether we have the capability ever to locate
the--discover a nuclear needle in the cargo container haystack.
I want to know if this is a goal that is even achievable. I
would like to ask each of you.
Ms. Hecker.
Ms. Hecker. We don't believe it's achievable with the
equipment in place. We think it is limited. The radiation
detention pagers that have been so prevalent, our analysis and
our review with DOE, with real expertise in this technology, is
that its capacity is limited. Its range is limited. Its
sensitivity is limited.
So that it is not a major detention tool. Similarly, the
portals which has more promise, there is one of them in place.
There are 400 planned to be in place by the end of next year,
but there is one being tested at Detroit Winston Bridge.
There are other detention devices that attach on the x-ray
machines, but they're only for small packages, so the detention
of nuclear materials is dependent upon technology that is
limited and isn't working.
I think that perhaps goes to some of your questions, Mr.
Nadler, that if we get better security what goes into the
containers, it potentially can be more assuring than scrutiny
after the fact that is not consistently reliable.
We have ongoing work looking at the targeting criteria and
the screening technology more broadly than the one I've talked
about that is used by Customs.
That work has identified a number of challenges, both about
the implementation of this targeting and the effectiveness of
these initiatives. That's all I can say about it. The rest of
the work is law enforcement sensitive.
So the answer to the question of why don't we do every
single one, I think we really have to deal with how well we're
doing what we're doing and how it can be improved before we try
to replicate it and have it on every container.
We have to get it working better. We have to get the
technology more fine-tuned. We have an outstanding
recommendation for systematic training. A training is not in
place. The strategy is not in place for the placement of the
equipment and those are fundamental concerns that we have.
Mr. Shays. Admiral Hereth, do you remember the original
question? I just want to know is our objective achievable, are
we going to ever be able to discover the nuclear needle in the
cargo container haystack.
Mr. Hereth. I don't know that anyone will give you a 100
percent yes to that.
I believe we can be significantly much higher and closer
100 percent than we are today. I think the supply chain
integrity improvements are key to this, along with a couple of
other keys.
One is intelligence and infusion of that intelligence
information from a multi-agency source and maritime environment
is a key, one of the keys to making sure we deal with things
overseas or outside of the ports, and we're focused in on that.
We're about ready to stand up to further complement the
intelligence work.
The supply chain work by Customs and others is an important
piece of this. Pushing out the borders to the screening
overseas, like Mr. Nadler was referring to, I think is another
piece of this.
While each of those individually is not a 100 percent
answer, I think when you do the percentages and add them up,
that you start to begin to approach that level where it becomes
just not an acceptable alternative. It's a target. It's too
hard.
That's our assessment on things.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Ahern, is it achievable?
Mr. Ahern. We can certainly do a much better job than we
currently are. Certainly, the Customs Service believes we need
to continue to move borders back. I believe we're doing that.
We believe we're doing that faster and we need to pick up
the pace on it.
One of the points, it does start with the information. The
information that goes in more target systems. A lot of it was
based on the fact that we were getting incorrect or incomplete
manifest information. On December 2nd we will have a targeting
system of getting this information submitted to us within 24
hours in advance of lading in foreign location.
As for technology, we want to have a layer system
technology. We do not want to have a single system that could
be potentially be concealment by terrorist organizations or
narcotics and contraband. That's why we have a layered set of
systems in place.
We're not relying on personal radiation detection pagers as
a sole interdiction source. First and foremost is the safety of
our 9,000 officers getting close to a source of radiation that
they know that with their personal safety.
I will submit to that certainly as you were getting close
to a source making your radiation pager go off, that will lead
you to believe there is something there that warrants further
review.
Mr. Shays. What we're learning is a nuclear device is not
going to set off that pager. Dirty radioactive material might,
but not a nuclear device. That was unsettling to me when I
learned it, but that's the fact. That equipment is basically
useless.
Mr. Ahern. I won't get into the capabilities of the system.
I would happy to submit information on that.
Mr. Shays. We'll come back to the material in a second.
Admiral Bennis, is it achievable?
Admiral Bennis. There are several keys to that point.
One is beyond pushing back the borders. It has to be
through the global operation. It's best achieved through
technology, through intelligence, through manpower.
And to go one step further, Congressman Nadler was asking
radiological detection at the source is better than inspection
at the source. It has to be done in combination.
The next step from that is we inspect the source, close
those doors. Then you have to rely on technology manpower to
ensure that you have security and you maintain that security as
opposed to the supply chain.
To close the doors in Brussels and say it's safe and secure
and let it go, I want to know there is technology and a system
in place to ensure the security and integrity of that
particular cargo is maintained through transit.
We need to know once it's closed up that it's secure
throughout the entire transit.
Mr. Shays. Is there hope that someday we'll be able to x-
ray a container and have a pretty decent idea what is in it?
Mr. Ahern. I think that will be something attainable. We
need to make sure we have the technology and also have the
capacity that we have facing our U.S. borders as we're securing
the homeland.
That's one of the things we need to do, a lot of this
screening when we have some natural lag time prior to moving
the vessels, as we move further modalities of trading, the
greater capacity, greater technological system, something
that's ideal.
Mr. Shays. I didn't realize my time has run out. Leave the
red light on. We'll do a second round.
Mr. Souder. I think it's important that the record show you
came up with an answer Mr. Nadler's question. I don't think $10
billion even works.
Admiral Bennis. I don't either.
Mr. Souder. Because in addition to this goal that we would
like to see, the container and see what's in it, we would have
to do it at all locations, the train and anybody who touched
that and had access to it while it was moving.
But it doesn't cover Amtrak, it doesn't cover other
shipments of biological weapons. That's our challenge as we
look at this. We're not under attack from one type of weapon.
What is clear, however, is we have to have tremendous
technology investments.
I think everyone understands, if I can ask you to
elaborate, if you have a higher level than 100 percent coverage
of the container is because we are completely confident that
our equipment, all of the subparts of the risk, unless you're
doing multiple or layered checking, you don't have the
competence that any, whether it's access machine or hand search
is 100 percent reliable because you don't know exactly what
you're looking for.
In other words, if you search every container it would give
you one aspect of it but it doesn't tell you what you're
learning from intelligence. It doesn't tell you what you're
learning about other types of things coming through and we
don't have confidence in even our best machines. It's just like
plastic guns going through an airport screening and it's not
like the bad guys aren't coming up with new things, too.
Mr. Ahern. We need to make sure, there are a variety of
different threats. You do have an array of systems that have
different capabilities that you can detect some of the other
threats that might be facing us on a particular day.
Mr. Souder. The new portals, you said we were going from
one to 400. Partly we're testing thing and moving them so
rapidly because of the need right now.
What does one of those portals cost?
Mr. Ahern. Range of $80,000. The site work that is done is
also similar in that range. It runs about $90,000.
Mr. Souder. A portal is only a fraction of coverage. I
understand that the 2 percent is merely a skim 2 percent.
The new machinery we're putting in fits into three or four.
The partial answer to the question is that if you're
looking just at one thing, and that you can get near 100
percent certainty in some areas with that, it is achievable in
one category of risk.
Mr. Ahern. You have to look at the configuration throughout
the United States, airline and sea, to define the natural
points are. We have close to 100 percent screening radiation.
Mr. Souder. It's more obviously difficult in the north. The
truth is that a good percentage of our traffic comes across
Canada, Buffalo and Windsor. To control that is to reduce the
risk.
I think that correctly what Mr. Nadler was hitting on was
to define things, you need to reduce that substantially, the
monetary concern in Congress is a little less. It's only part
of our high risk targets.
Mr. Ahern. We agree.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On September 11th, ABC
news aired an investigation they conducted in which they
smuggled into New York harbor a shipping container with 15
pounds of uranium. It was not enriched, so it did not pose a
threat. If it had been, it would have been enough for half of a
crude nuclear device and more than enough for a so-called dirty
bomb.
The Customs commissioner claimed his inspectors singled out
the ABC News container as it entered New York Harbor and said
they checked it and they ran it for radiation and also did a
large scale x-ray.
If you can elaborate that for me, I would like to know what
equipment Customs used on this particular container. And if you
could address the question--as I understand it, the uranium
came in anyway, and so if you could talk whether this is the
case, where the equipment that we were using didn't work or
whether it read the package properly, the container properly,
or where reading was all right but human beings didn't
interpret the analysis correctly, is it one of those two
things?
Is there some other explanation? Is there something that we
can learn from that incident that would help us.
Mr. Ahern. Certainly we learned from these types of
exercise, but I would point out for the record that on that
particular vessel, we believe there was 1,030 containers that
were on board and our targeting systems did work because that
was one of the few of those containers we don't get into
specific numbers. We'll have to provide those to you later.
It was one of the few containers there were targeted for
further radiation. We did that radiation screening as well as
the x-ray and we found there was no radiation emitted or
anything significant in that container that drew us to do any
further in that inspection.
Mr. Allen. If it had been enriched radiation, would it be
detected, do you think?
Mr. Ahern. That's a question of science that I'm not
qualified to answer, but I would be happy to have our research
development people, scientist provide you with that.
Mr. Allen. I would like to know the answer to that.
Mr. Shays. Not to put you on the spot, it's kind of a basic
question, and for us to have a committee--we didn't learn from
the CIA or anybody else's intelligence community that plutonium
or enriched uranium didn't give off a signal. We had to learn
it from a public organization, and so is this--are you
uncomfortable in talking about it.
Mr. Ahern. I'm not uncomfortable talking about it.
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tierney. Ms. Hecker, you mentioned a moment ago that
there was an incident and it basically involves communication
between a number of different agencies making a decision with
respect to whether to allow them to move forward or not.
Let me start by asking, if a ship were coming in that had
suspected nuclear acid on it, how many agencies would be
involved? You have the Coast Guard, I assume. You would have
the FBI presumably.
Ms. Hecker. Perhaps the Department of Energy.
Mr. Tierney. The CIA, Customs?
Ms. Hecker. Certainly.
Mr. Tierney. So at least those five.
Customs and Coast Guard are part of the new homeland
security department, but the CIA, Department of Energy and the
FBI are not.
So how are we going to determine what coordinated effort is
going to made to make a determination who is going to be in
charge of the situation, who is going to make the decision?
I know from your testimony the incident at hand, that boat
sat there for 18 hours docked before a decision was made to
send it further out.
So I guess the first question is, who made the final
decision to send it further out? Was it the Coast Guard?
Mr. Ahern. Coast Guard in connection with the other members
of that unified unit.
First of all, CIA wouldn't have been part of that mix.
Mr. Hereth. I don't believe they were part of the mix, but
the other agencies are.
Our response as coordinator, for marine responses is to
involve the people who have the expertise to make a decision.
The Coast Guard, DOE, FBI, Customs were involved in that.
Mr. Tierney. Who was in charge?
Mr. Hereth. The Coast Guard is the lead maritime Federal
agency. We have the ability to control vessels, so we can tell
a vessel not to come into a port if there is any suspicion that
we need to deal with.
That poses some dilemma having to deal with that, because
it's difficult to get equipment out there, to get people out
there, to get expertise out there to deal with a survey that's
required on a container that has some radiation materials in
it. So it's depending on where it's located.
Mr. Tierney. Can somebody tell me why it took 18 hours in
that particular incident for a decision to be made?
Mr. Hereth. I understand there were a lot of details that
went into that decision. We probably should respond for the
record on that particular issue because it gets into some of
the details.
I guess to answer your question as directly as I can, the
Coast Guard called in as soon as possible those people that
have the expertise to help make the decision and evaluate the
risk of that particular scenario. Getting the right equipment
there, getting the right people there to get the survey was the
intent of that response of the organization.
There is a work group that has been set up by the Office of
Homeland Security. That group is looking not only at what has
happened in the east coast, but it's looking for protocol
improvements, process improvements, procedure improvements.
Those efforts are underway.
Mr. Tierney. Someone suggested that one of the reasons the
ship couldn't leave is because it required higher tide for an
exit.
If that's the case, are there provisions being made for a
similar type of situation if that should arise again so if
something comes in far enough, before the problem is detected
and they can't get out because the tide isn't high enough?
Seems like a fairly serious matter.
Mr. Hereth. I don't have an answer to that particular
question. I haven't heard that particular scenario, but in
other ports I've been associated with, there are usually
clearance requirements and they may or may not be affected by
the tidal range of that particular port.
Mr. Tierney. Before I close out, Mr. Ahern, you mentioned
several times during your discussions, reliable manifests.
Will you define that? What makes a manifest reliable? Where
you would consider it reliable?
Mr. Ahern. We believe when the new manifest regulation goes
in December 2nd, the data elements specified in those 15
specific areas, within our expert submission. We need to have
those 24 hours in advance.
Mr. Tierney. Can you tell me what those are?
Mr. Ahern. I would prefer to give those to you as part of
the record afterwards. They're very similar, shipper,
importer's name, address information, other things that we've
not been receiving.
When you take those 15 data elements, based on certain
factors in this, it gives us a risk determination.
Mr. Tierney. All of those factors are provided on the
manifest by some human being that enters them on, so they're
only as good as the reliability of the person who is making the
entry.
Mr. Ahern. We do have a compliance test as well to make
sure some of the data information is accurate, but you're
correct. It's reliant on key stroking the information submitted
to Customs.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. We have a 10-minute rule so that we're able to
pursue the points to bring it to some conclusion.
In the process of my asking questions I wanted, I got some
long answers on things that needed to be part of the record. I
was wanting to get a very clear sense of whether we're going to
be able to find a nuclear needle in the cargo of a container
haystack, and the answer is no. That's the answer.
I think the answer is no because it's illogical for anyone
to explain to me, unless you can, and I'm being a good
listener, but when I--a larger containership contains how many
containers?
Mr. Ahern. 6,000.
Mr. Shays. It's stacked--no? Yes? Do we have an agreement,
6,000? It's stacked stories high in the interior of the ship
and then you can have at least seven containers atop or even
more?
Admiral.
Mr. Hereth. Six or seven.
Mr. Shays. They're tightly fitted, you don't get to walk
down the center of them, so I'm at a loss to understand when
you board the ship how you're going to find out what is in the
core of that ship in a container that has seven containers
above it and seven below it. Or less, and how many on either
side, you don't get to it.
So what impression are we trying to give to the public
right now as to our ability to search a ship once it has the
container on it.
Tell me how that happens. Do we have the ability of
equipment to be able to go through all of those containers and
know what each container is? Is this something you can't
testify to publicly?
Give me a little help here. I'm leaning to a point that
says it's got to stare us in the face that we got to know what
is in the container beforehand. If not, that's one thing, but
my view is tell the American people the truth and they'll
understand why we have to be there overseas. If we can, in
fact, know what is in containers of the ship once it's loaded,
tell me.
Can we?
Mr. Hereth. We still need work on sensors and detectors.
You can get on the vessel, you can approximate and position
equipment to determine exactly where the range and source may
be located. So to that degree, we can locate the approximate
location of the problem.
The difficulty becomes how do you deal with it in an
offshore environment, and that's where consultation and
discussion has to play into this.
Mr. Shays. Is it your testimony that we have the ability to
detect a weapon grade material on a ship?
Mr. Hereth. No, it's not.
Mr. Shays. We do not have the capability?
Mr. Hereth. I'm not a scientist. Lots of work is being done
in that area. I'm not testifying to that particular fact.
Mr. Shays. You're not testifying today that we have the
capability to detective a nuclear weapon on board the ship?
Mr. Hereth. I'm not testifying to that.
Mr. Shays. Is anyone else testifying that they have that
capability?
So it gets us to this point, which is a point you're
making, but I don't think it's emphatic enough. We have to be
able to look at these containers before they get on the ship.
Would you all agree?
Ms. Hecker.
Ms. Hecker. That's certainly the preferred way, and where
most of the emphasis is.
Mr. Shays. When you said preferred, it implies there is
another way that's not preferred, but is somehow--in fact----
Ms. Hecker. Clearly, there is still screening that will
occur domestically and that should not go away. As Mr. Ahern
said, it's certainly not what we want to be, anything but the
very, very last line of defense.
Mr. Shays. I'm attempting to pursue this line before I get
the answer from the others, but in Miami, when I was watching
containers being unloaded, it was an amazingly impressive
thing. They come off the ship, the truck is there, they're
loaded and they're sent off to St. Louis or whatever. One,
after the other, after the other, so is it your suggestion that
we have the ability without intelligence to know which one of
these containers, the 5,000, 6,000 that come off the ship,
we're going to inspect?
By the way, in Miami, it's in Miami. It's already there.
So I guess what I want is a little bit of candidness
because we have to make decisions on this side of the table as
to how hard we pressure our allies as to knowing is there a
more effective way to know what are in the containers.
I guess what I'm asking the rest of you is, is the
preferred way to look at and then define preferred for me, is
it really the best way, in fact really the only way as things
stand now to make sure that we're protected?
Admiral.
Mr. Hereth. I would say in addition to that, supplement
that with integrity and intelligence--intelligence has to play
into the equation.
Mr. Ahern. There's not a single solution to this problem.
As I submitted as part of my testimony, it needs to be a
layered set enforcement system. We believe it should originate
in foreign locations, with megaports overseas to begin the
enforcement screening for weapons of mass destruction or
implement terrorism before they get laden on the vessels coming
into the United States. We can take it one step further at the
place of manufacturing and shipping consultation.
Mr. Shays. Let me interrupt. My sense, as I listen to your
testimony, is that many, 99 percent of the challenge basically
is trying to know what is in that continuer before and then
everything else is a secondary approach. If we have the right
intelligence, if we had the right intelligence we can isolate
that container hopefully before it arrives in the port.
If it's on the ship, if the container is in the core of the
ship, it's going to be a little more difficult.
And so I guess I would like each of you, after I ask
Admiral Bennis, I would like to you rank how much of the battle
is doing it overseas before it gets here, and these are the
Customs overseas, so I'm not going to put you out of business,
Admiral Bennis.
Admiral Bennis. I think it goes back to what I said before.
The key is when you have a point of origin and maintain the
security of the containers through the process. If you know
what's it in from the point of origin, maintain it throughout
the transportation, and you're all right.
Again, as I said, that's intelligence, that's manpower. If
you get intelligence and at some point in the movement of
particular cargo there is a problem at that point, then you're
doing it based on intelligence or you're targeting container
row 8, 115, on cell 7, you're targeting a specific container,
you know exactly what you're looking at.
Mr. Shays. The purpose of this hearing is to educate us
indirectly, the American people who have to tell their
legislators how to allocate funds.
Let me ask you this: In a scale of one to ten, tell me the
importance of doing what Admiral Bennis has done.
Let me put it in percentage. Is that 90 percent of where
the effort is, 40 percent of where the effort should be. Or 10
percent.
I want each of you to do that.
I'll start with you, Admiral, and go the other way.
Admiral Bennis. I'm going 90.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Ahern.
Mr. Ahern. I believe it starts with information. 80
percent.
Mr. Hereth. 90 percent range, but let me supplement that
with----
Mr. Shays. Let me ask Ms. Hecker.
Ms. Hecker. I hesitate to put it--I want to endorse the
layered approach.
Mr. Shays. I'm not going to allow you to hesitate. The
question is pretty easy. We have to make a decision where we
put our resources and our time.
Do you think that most of this effort should be to stop it
before it comes to the United States? We should know what is in
the containers. Do you think we should put more pressure on our
allies to cooperate? Do you think we should put more emphasis
on trying to seal those containers up and knowing what is in
them before they're put on a ship?
Ms. Hecker. 80 percent.
Mr. Shays. That's not at the end of the world, I hope.
Mr. Souder. I thought you felt it should be on information.
Did you say you felt it should be on internal ports? 80 percent
of our emphasis should be on preclearance information.
Mr. Shays. We're talking preclearance.
The other, what that says to me, we already know how
important intelligence is. We know how important those other
things are. This tells me this is a big deal that we have to
spend some time and effort on. That's what it's telling me. It
tells me this needle in this haystack, let's get it before it
becomes the needle in the haystack. If you want to tell me
something different, you have time.
Admiral Bennis. I would like to add the percentages are
pretty high. This Operation Safe Commerce, it's pretty much the
census we've come to since September 11th.
Mr. Shays. It's logical. If you were doing all those things
and told me it was 30 percent--any other comment?
Mr. Hereth. One comment is to push the discussions AMO have
focused on, pushing that issue on Customs organization through
WCO, foreign countries that are shipping stuff to the United
States to comply with our standards and raise their standards
at the same time so we can develop resources overseas.
This could be supplemented with a quality assurance
program, such as foreign assessments to security levels of
ports overseas.
Mr. Shays. We asked all of our panelists if there is
anything you want to put on the record. One of our panelists
put on the record his biggest fear. His biggest fear was a
small group of scientists developing an agent that if released,
would wipe out humanity.
My biggest fear and why I'm eager to have this hearing is a
country has nuclear weapons and would not send them by missile.
They will put them on five containerships or one containership,
send them to five different cities in the United States and say
good-bye if you don't change a policy on this.
The president of the United States is faced with that
horrific decision. It wouldn't be the country--it wouldn't come
out of Iraq. It would be some distant terrorism in Indonesia
acting on behalf of some source.
Is that an unrealistic fear?
Admiral Bennis. I would say no.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Ahern.
Mr. Ahern. I would say no. It's a fear we all share.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Heckler, do you want to answer?
Ms. Hecker. I believe it's a great danger.
Mr. Shays. I want to put on the record you've been a
wonderful panel.
Is there anything you want to put on the record?
Admiral Bennis. Only thing I would add, what I've seen in
the last year is tremendous cooperation among the small
agencies. It's been phenomenal.
Mr. Hereth. No one can do it all, and in my experience
around the country, I have just come from San Francisco to the
east Coast and I've seen lots of cooperation at all levels of
Federal, State and local government. We need to continue to
push on that factor. No one agency can do it all.
Mr. Shays. Thank you all very very much.
Let's take a 5-minute break.
[Recess.]
Mr. Shays. We'll start. We have called before our panel Mr.
James Kallstrom, Director of New York State Office of Public
Security and Ms. Bethann Rooney, Manager, Port Security, The
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
We will swear our witnesses in, if you would both stand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. I would also note for the record that we have
been joined by Carolyn Maloney who is a very valued member of
the Government Reform Committee, and it's nice to have her here
as well.
This isn't quite your district, but you can throw a
baseball and reach your district from here.
Mr. Kallstrom, we'll start with you.
STATEMENT OF JAMES KALLSTROM, DIRECTOR, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE
OF PUBLIC SECURITY
Mr. Kallstrom. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and
distinguished members of the committee. On behalf of Governor
Pataki and New York State Office of Public Security, I would
like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss critical
issues relating to port security.
I would like to just take one moment and introduce John
Scanlon, who is the Director of Public Security, and Mark
Cohen, who is the deputy, and we actually have a number of
staff from the office here that have worked so hard at all
these issues for the last year.
Mr. Shays. What is your title?
Mr. Kallstrom. Senior adviser to the Governor for
terrorism. They kicked me upstairs.
The subtitle of these proceedings, Finding the Nuclear
Needle in the Cargo Container Haystack, aptly describes what
we're up against when an oceangoing containership arrives in
the New York/New Jersey seaport.
All terrorism is local. The Governor and the State of New
York have an abiding and vested interest in close coordination
of Federal counter-terrorism activities with those of State and
local government. While many of the issues discussed today will
involve Federal solutions, the local impact of any terrorist
act or threat in our port cannot be overstated. When the
Mayview Maersk arrived in Port Newark on September 22nd, to
whom did Customs and the Coast Guard turn to investigate, clear
and potentially render-safe its suspected explosive cargo? The
Port Authority Police, the Newark Police Department and the
Union County Police Department.
Make no mistake about it. There's a distinct possibility
that a nuclear bomb or fissile material can come to American
shores via cargo container or ship.
Al Qaeda has conducted maritime operations, employs suicide
bombers, has expressed a keen interest in acquiring nuclear
weapons and has conducted multiple large scale destructive
attacks against western targets and civilians. Other terrorist
groups are seeking to make similar claims.
Our seaports and the maritime system are ripe for
exploitation and vulnerable to mass disruption by terrorists.
Trade and port security must be made a national and indeed a
global priority.
If a containership passes under the Verrazano Bridge with a
nuclear, radiological or even conventional explosive device on
board, it's too late. As the September 10, 2002 Palermo Senator
incident demonstrated, there are no attractive options when a
ship suspected of containing a weapon of mass destruction
somewhere within the container that is among scores of other
containers above or below decks is tied to your dock.
Worse yet, if a ship were the delivery means of actual
weapon of mass destruction, detonated anywhere in New York
harbor or in the port, the consequences to human life, our
area's habitability, our infrastructure, our national defense,
our economy and global trade are enormously catastrophic.
A seaport operator can only do so much. A comprehensive
global maritime security strategy is required. We must know
definitively the contents of each of the other 3 million
containers that annually are handled in the port before they
arrive. We need to be assured that the cargo containers have
not been tampered with.
The State of New York supports such initiatives as
Operation Safe Commerce in order to develop dependable
arrangements for securing and monitoring cargo, starting at its
overseas point of origin to its final destination. We're
pleased that the Port Authority is the local lead in this
initiative.
The new role that amends Customs regulators to require
presentation of manifest information 24 hours prior to cargo
lading at a foreign port is a step in the right direction. The
Container Security Initiative in which U.S. Customs inspectors
are placed at foreign seaports to prescreen cargo containers
before they are shipped to America is also a step in the right
direction.
We look forward to the day when responsible government
officials verify shipments as being free of terrorist
contraband at their ports of origin prior to this dispatch to
America.
In essence, we should virtually roll back the borders of
the United States so that necessary security checks can take
place before our population is threatened by hazardous cargo.
Keeping danger at a distance would also serve to avoid security
bottlenecks that would paralyze our seaport.
Accurate detective, monitoring and reporting technology,
and electronic sealing of containers to verify the intransit
integrity of cargo shipments will also serve to protect
national and regional security while not hindering the
processing of cargo in our port.
We must be mindful of the passengers and crew members that
arrive in our ports on oceangoing vessels. The U.S. Coast Guard
and Immigration and Naturalization Service must effectively
work together to ensure that only those passengers and crew
with permission to land in the United States actually disembark
the vessels.
Of course, this permission to land must only be given to
those who are predetermined by INS to not represent a threat to
the United States. Having been checked against watch lists,
etc., we believe this capability does not exist today.
All concerned must pay scrupulous attention so that
terrorists do not use our seaports as ports of entry into our
country by a vessel gangway off the side of ships or even
inside a container. Steps must be also in place to ensure that
personnel authorized for temporary landing return to their ship
before they leave port.
We need to do logical common sense things to keep
terrorists out of the United States.
Our current structure of overlapping jurisdiction dealing
with different aspects of a ship's arrival is to say the least
not an efficient one. While we have Customs, the Coast Guard
and INS ostensibly working together, consolidation of functions
into the President's proposed Department of Homeland Security
would clearly hold one department responsible for the ship and
any of its potentially dangerous people or cargo.
It has been over a year and 2 months since the horrific
terrorist attacks on New York and America took place and we
have yet to enact legislation to create this vitally important
new department.
Finally, a word must be said concerning the safety and
security of activity in the harbor. The bombing of the USS Cole
and the French oil tanker Limburg are pointed reminders that
vessels transiting or berthed in our waterways are subject to
external attacks. Ferryboats and cruise ships are vulnerable.
Stepped up harbor security is a must.
The Staten Island Ferry that we observe go by every 10
minutes, holds up to 6,000 people.
A seaport operator such as Port Authority, in close
cooperation with Federal, State and local law enforcement, must
provide a safe operating environment for the maritime industry.
In the areas under its control, the port operator in
partnership with the maritime industry, must adopt best
practices to reduce vulnerability, prevent or deter terrorist
or criminal activity and manage the risk should deadly and
dangerous items enter our harbor after all else fails.
In this regard, the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey is a proactive partner.
We are pleased that Congress has passed the Maritime
Transportation Security bill and we're looking forward to its
enactment into law.
Finally, as a related matter, the New York State Office of
Public Security, together with the national Office of Homeland
Security, is hosting a December 12th meeting with 10
northeastern States homeland security advisors, to formalize a
working group on port security, among other issues and to
exchange ideas and experiences so that collectively we may
contribute toward ensuring that global maritime commerce is
conducted securely, safely and expeditiously.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the
committee. I'll be happy to answer any questions at the
appropriate time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kallstrom follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Ms. Rooney.
STATEMENT OF BETHANN ROONEY, MANAGER, PORT SECURITY, THE PORT
AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY
Ms. Rooney. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this hearing
and discuss critical port security issues.
The topic of port security was rarely discussed prior to
September 11th, except in the context of drug interdiction and
waterfront crime. However, the events of that day created a new
and urgent focus on the worldwide vulnerability of the marine
and intermodal transportation industry.
The nature of the ports make it extremely vulnerable. Every
container that enters or passes through our ports must be
treated as a potential weapon of mass destruction. Every
vessel, a crew member or passenger are potential terrorist and
every port a potential target.
Physical port security is absolutely critical, but it is
just one piece of a much larger puzzle.
Our collective mission must be to prevent our ports from
being the conduit for which a container laden with WMB, or
terrorists facets.
Legitimate cargo must not be used as a means to transport
potential terrorist devices.
Interdicted container carrying a WM by inspection at the
port of import is too late. Our goal should be to increase our
confidence that we know exactly what is in each container
before it is discharged. It is not possible to physically
examine the contents of each of the 6,000 containers that
arrive in the Port of New York and New Jersey each day.
The key is finding a way of separating high risk cargo in
the mass majority of legitimate containers and dealing with the
exceptions.
Creating a transportation system that balances economic
concerns with national security is our challenge. We believe
that every effort must be taken to verify the contents of the
containers before they're even loaded on a ship.
The process must include certifying that the container was
packed in a secure environment, sealed to prevent tampering and
transported under the control of the responsible party.
A chain of custody must be established that ensures the
cargo's integrity and that complete and accurate data is
provided to Customs well in advance.
As a way to test the validity of this theory, various
Federal and State agencies also with private sector partners
participate in the initiative referred to as Operation Safe
Commerce which you heard about this morning.
By verifying and securing monitoring, and sharing
information about cargo from the point of origin throughout the
supply chain to the final destination, it is our collective
vote that if we can provide constructive and tested regulations
to various domestic and international regulatory agencies on
how best to secure the supply chain, without burdening the
industry with unnecessary delays will impact international
commerce.
The Port Authority is one of the key players in this
initiative. In addition to changes in business practices, we
must leverage and able technology to secure the maritime
technology.
Today's technology and security are no longer the same
issues. We must conduct research and development, followed by a
group of concept projects for physical and data securities
systems to identify and introduce areas of technologies.
The solution should include a number of discrete
technologies capable of being operable with other stand alone
systems and the ability to analyze the data.
Technology needs to include container tracking, smart boxes
with electronic seals and sensors and non-issues of detection.
We must not only look at what problems the technology solves,
but also what problems it causes.
Many of the technologies out there today claim to have
false alarm rate of just 1 percent and are very proud of that
number.
That pride is perhaps understandable. We have to view it as
totally unacceptable. A false alarm rate of just 1/2 of 1
percent on detention equipment would equate to 36 containers a
day in our port alone.
Why is a mere 36 containers out of 6,000 a day a problem?
Every container that's considered to be a high risk container,
be it by intelligence reports or alarms generated by detection
equipment requires a cooperative response effort on the part of
numerous Federal stages and local agencies.
Each incident is different, some taking hours or even days
to render State. Most utilizing 20 to 50 percent for primarily
a stand by mode in the event something does happen.
In the case of Palermo Senator, the ship that was suspected
of having on board radioactive material, which turned out to be
ceramic tiles, it took 4 days and ultimately a team from
Washington to render it safe.
The determination to shut down terminal operations in the
specific area and even to evacuate the facility, must be made
on a case-by-case basis. Suspending operations in just one
terminal for 1 hour costs close to a half a million dollars.
And to say the obvious, a false negative can be
catastrophic. That is why in addition to improvement in
technology, we must have people with the expertise to use it to
interpret the data and to identify the responses to any alarms.
For the last 14 months, the maritime industry has almost
been exclusively focused on the potential WMD laden container
being transported to the United States.
If a container can be used for WMD, why not the 610,000
automobiles, trucks, buses and subway cars that pass through
our port every year.
In addition, we need to be just as concerned if not more
concerned, about a vessel being attacked like the USS Cole and
the French oil tanker Limburg for being used as a weapon
itself.
I don't believe that other ports have the resources to
detect, deter and prevent such incidents. The Federal
Government has a clear role to play in that regard.
It is also important to note that all freight loads have
the means to deliver a WMD; maritime, air, highway and rail.
Major gateways must pursue a defensive strategy that
complements overseas interdiction and intransit cargo security
measures within an array of sensors, screening and inspection
methods employed at key points throughout the free
transportation system.
Focusing on securing maritime containers and the related
supply chain to the exclusion of other vulnerabilities could be
our downfall. As you would expect, the Port Authority works in
close cooperation with the appropriate State and local
agencies.
However, through its office of operations and emergency
management and our public safety department, the Port Authority
has reached out to Federal agencies for help in tackling the
problems of monitoring, interdicting, mitigation and
consequence management that gateway facilities along key
interstate corridors.
The cooperation has been strong in the regional Federal
relationship. We have found the Department of Justice, Energy,
Customs, the Coast Guard and TSA to be willing and creative
partners in our efforts to apply existing methods to assist in
the tremendous challenges we face as to the transportation
agency.
We're eager to engage in discussion on original approaches
for interdiction and welcome being considered for any group of
concept or projects.
We and other ports earnestly hope that Congress followup
with actions, substantial appropriation to match the
substantial needs of the American gateways.
Beyond the enactment of the legislation, the international
maritime organization international code for security of ships
and port facilities is another essential means to which achieve
progress in maritime international freight sectors.
I hope my comments today have been helpful. The Port of
Authority is prepared to offer any additional assistance you
may require. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rooney follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
I'm going to recognize Mr. Allen first. We're going to do
the 10-minute.
And we'll just go to Mr. Allen, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Souder and
then Ms. Maloney who has joined us and then I'll go.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your testimony today.
Were you both present during the testimony given by the
prior panel?
Mr. Kallstrom. Yes.
Mr. Allen. Do you have any comment on any of the questions
or the answers they gave? We would like to at least give you
that opportunity.
Mr. Kallstrom. I through the line of questioning was very
poignant. I would agree with most of what I heard.
There is one thing I would add. I might have got the
impression that the majority of the work was overseas and not
much needs to be done in the United States.
I would rebalance that notion a little bit, that we have an
awful lot to do in the United States. We haven't had borders
that have been very tight for a long, long time. We haven't had
gateways that are tight.
Obviously, the discussion we're having today, we all know
that things can come and go.
My concern and the Governor's concern and State and local
concern is what is already here. So we should not lose track of
that also at the same time we talk about overseas.
Ms. Rooney. I would add on this issue of no standards,
similar to Mr. Kallstrom, is that we go back to this notion of
defense, where we need to have interdiction, intransit cargo
security, domestic cargo security and then use the technology
to have an array of sensors, screening and inspection of
containers where appropriate.
Mr. Allen. I want to begin with you, but I would like Mr.
Kallstrom's response as well.
We talked a lot about interagency cooperation, and
certainly that was a theme of the prior panel from the Federal
agencies, but back in Maine, I can tell you there is great
concern at the local level, but at the State level the
cooperation is not extending to the flow of funds in the way
that it should. It seems to me in the long term in order to
maintain the right kind of cooperation between Federal, State
and local authorities, there's got be a way to make the--get
the allocation of resources right.
I'd be very interested in both of you commenting on that,
how that's worked for you so far and what you think needs to be
strengthened vis-a-vis the relationship.
There's been a great deal of talk in our level how we have
to be beef up the national security, and I think there's a
recognition in Congress that a good part of the additional work
needs to be shouldered by the Federal Government.
That isn't necessarily happening, at least with the local
and State agencies I've been talking to.
Ms. Rooney. I think your question raises two points. One is
in regards to the communication and coordination among the
State and local agencies. The second is regard to funding.
I can say that we have been rather successful in both of
those regards. We have an incredibly successful working
relationship with our partners in security, both on the local
level and national level.
We have a variety of--we are participants in a variety of
committees that have polled all of these organizations
together.
On the funding side, through our office of operations and
emergency management, we have been very successful again in
working with the Department of Justice, Department of Energy
and TSA in securing funds for some of the projects that we're
looking at doing in the area of needs assessment and deploying
and testing some technology that is out there that could assist
us in our maritime, air and rail and highway systems.
Mr. Allen. For the State, what has been your experience?
Mr. Kallstrom. Well, I come from 28 years in the FBI in my
prior life, so I think we turned the corner. I think we now
understand the necessity to have better information, better
communications. I think there's a long way to go.
We have close to 700,000 State and local police in the
United States. We have 70,000 here in the great State of New
York and we need to get them more engaged in the terrorism
business. They're the eyes and ears of our citizens and they're
our first line of defense in many ways.
Two days before the tragedy that happened right up here,
one of the terrorists was stopped on Route 95 doing 90 miles an
hour. He was written a summons and let go. Police generally
don't have access to data bases. That's relevant as to them
taking any kind of action or making logical decisions on the
scene.
I think that's been widely discussed. We need to move to a
new paradigm of assisting and helping and empowering State and
locals to play a bigger role. False identification, which may
be a little bit off point, is totally out of control.
The ability to acquire identification pretty much anywhere
in the world, including this great State and other States--
Federal identification doesn't have the technology and Social
Security cards, the State identification, birth certificates,
it's things that get into a baseline I.D., most of us don't
have that type of technology.
They get you on an airplane. They get you on a boat. They
get you a whole new identify. It's a local issue that has wide
ramifications.
Mr. Allen. You said you were open to regional cooperation
with other communities. Mr. Tierney is from the Boston area.
I'm from Portland.
Has there been much going on, much exchange of information
among different port directors up and down the east coast in
dealing with some of the issues you're confronting?
Ms. Rooney. Yes, there has. One organization is the North
Atlantic Port Association, which is really from Maine to I
believe Maryland, and the other is through the American
Association of Port Authorities.
Both of those organizations have been focusing quite a bit
on port security pre September 11th actually and certainly
stepped up those efforts post September 11th.
The FAA has a port security committee and task force that
is working on port security, in particular on the legislation,
on the Federal rulemaking and the Coast Guard regulations,
Customs rules and programs that have come out.
There is quite a bit of discussion among myself, with
myself and with my counterparts around the Nation in
coordinating more activity.
Mr. Allen. Thank you.
That's really all I have.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
I think you've done a great job rounding up what went on in
the first discussion and adding your comments to it.
We're asking to reach out and extend our borders to a lot
of other countries and have them go along with the standards we
are going to set for security.
Are we prepared for this?
Mr. Kallstrom. Well, I assume we are. That's logically a
Federal issue. I don't know how those talks are going. I
suspect we are.
The recent events of the last week in the U.K. and
elsewhere, there have been terrorist acts in the last 2 weeks.
Everyone has been coming to the same conclusions we've come to
already.
I suspect we are.
Ms. Rooney. We certainly agree. We're going to be required
to do the same thing that we're asking our foreign counterparts
to do. Many of the comments that the port operators and the
shipping lines and the like have had is in evaluating these
international requirements and regulations is are we able to do
the same thing in return.
So we have been very active in those discussions.
Mr. Tierney. You've included those discussions with people
from the industry?
Ms. Rooney. Yes.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. Does the State have special efforts on
protection on security system other than Pugent Sound and there
are many more people here during rush hour that are vulnerable
on the ferry system.
Have you taken steps to beef that up? Has the Federal
Government helped you with any of that? What type of protection
do you people have?
Mr. Kallstrom. It's one of our highest concerns. We have
taken steps. We've done a lot of coordination.
I prefer not to share the technical details of that here
today. Clearly, we need a much larger Coast Guard.
I know there's a huge budget approval in the next fiscal
year. If I was empowered, I would triple the size.
Mr. Souder. You think the greatest threat would be, the
whole problem with these hearings, I would like you to say
publicly what you don't, but we talked about the USS Cole, but
rather than internal threat, have you stepped up efforts
internally in passenger screening?
Mr. Kallstrom. Within the resources available, Coast Guard
and NYPD that paroles that harbor out here, I think we're
taking logical reasonable steps.
Look out here and look at the number of vessels just going
by here during this hearing and they're voluminous and a lot of
them are packed with tourists and citizens of this great city
going back and forth and we're very concerned about it.
The type of venue, and it's on our radar screen and it's on
our first page of things that we care about. We need more
resources to adequately deal with it.
Mr. Souder. One of the challenges that we have at the
Federal level is that this would be predominately intrastate or
interstate rather than a Federal jurisdiction and at the shame
time, and obviously what you're doing is very diverse, upstate,
downstate, type of things, and figuring out how to deal with
the ferry system and it's such a huge risk, such a high point
that in the United States would you see possible ways of
addressing this--have efforts for response biological and
chemical attacks.
We have other types of--we have something that can be
tapped into for any type of screen or protection in that type
of system?
Mr. Kallstrom. We mentioned that on numerous occasions when
we had the opportunity, obviously all these issues we talked
about for hours are issues that here because we have terrorists
in the United States of America. They lived among us for many
years.
We need better adequate controls to keep terrorists out of
the country or we wouldn't be having the discussion about not
enough NYPD, not enough Coast Guard. That's why we need much
more resources.
We're dealing with the individual issue like the port, we
need to keep in furtherance of our mind the fact that we need
control and do the best we can. I believe we can do a lot
better under our existing rules and under our Constitution,
under our new process.
I don't think we have to give up our way of life to try to
do a better job of keeping people who want to kill us out of
the United States.
Mr. Souder. We dealt with the cruise ships because they're
so large. We have all kinds of procedures on cruise ships.
One of the struggles that we dealt with and it's always
going to be a challenge is how to have information sharing
because of different ways of collection, because of concerns
the State is getting too much information on individuals,
because of the particular risk, the more you have that
information spread over a lot of people the easier it is to get
it compromised, all those kind of debates.
I don't think the average American understands why we can't
have a system that when a policeman arrests somebody you don't
get specific information, they pop up that says this person,
any kind of basic warning system that somewhere in a system
where it's a pop-up.
You haven't seen that yet at this point, even if you could
call in and say we'll turn this over, something came up on my
screen.
Mr. Kallstrom. That's an outstanding comment. We go from
one extreme to the other in this country. We go from no one can
get any information for certain reasons, and then we shift back
the other way. We need some logical middle ground.
If a State trooper stops somebody on the parkway, who has
reasonable suspicion, because maybe the identification, what
they see in the car, or whatever, that person could be on a
watch list of the U.S. Government and the State trooper does
not know that.
We need a green light or red light response back from
Washington. We don't really need the information. We just need
to know should we hold onto this person. Should we bring them
to the station and FBI will show up later to interview them.
So I think you hit on something that is important, and I
think there are ways around dealing with this information.
Yes, there are reasons why we don't share information, but
I think we can build walls around the sensitive part of the
information and still provide responders on the street a better
opportunity to make decisions.
Mr. Souder. Prescreening overseas, we've seen what a short-
term strike can do in the west coast to our business in the
United States to greatly push it overseas, are we prepared and
have we analyzed how do we prepare for this type of thing and
study it adequately as we're aggressively pushing, could it
slow down the process, could it put us more vulnerable to
stoppages or will they move to the Caribbean or other places of
entry and come by train.
Ms. Rooney. Our Customs office in New York and New Jersey
has been able to quantify what increase just in the port of New
York and New Jersey would be. If they increased that from the 2
percent physical inspection that was talked about earlier to a
5 percent physical inspection, that would equate to a backlog
of 4,500 containers a month that otherwise would be going out
the facility that would be delayed.
It would require 400 additional inspectors and cost $1.2
million per month. That's the most that we can do to qualify or
rather quantify the cost in terms of delay and dollars of
additional inspections.
And therefore, when you look at that, you go back to doing
it overseas, and we've got to have this layered approach to
security that people have talked about.
Mr. Souder. If we put the pressure, might they look to go
to another port of entry and never come to New York?
Ms. Rooney. One thing we're afraid of is if we don't have
regulations at our borders, at our land borders in Canada and
Mexico, that cargo coming across our land borders will be
diverted and that is clearly a fear, that we cannot allow this
to be diverted to Canada and Mexico.
We need to have the same regulations at our border
crossings as we do at our seaports of entry, but if you look at
the foreign point of origin, and when you talk about Operation
Safe Commerce and CSI and C-TPAT and some of these initiatives,
if you put those all together and have this layered approached
to security, we believe that you will be able to have
reasonable assurance on the majority of the containers that you
don't have to stop and inspect them here.
We need to ensure at the point of origin what is going
inside that container. There's a program in place in I believe
23 other ports around the world right now that requires
precertification of all import cargo, and that's being done.
The United States and shippers that are exporting from the
United States to these other countries are participating in
that program today. And it's a person who is witnessing the
containers, taking photographs, doing a sampling of the cargo.
If we do a program like that and have the intransit,
witness the intransit visibility and you have the inspection
that Customs is not getting the information 24 hours in
advance, they have the ability to do the prescreening.
We believe that we can do a lot to solve the problem and
not do the inspections here in the United States because it is
too late for doing it here.
Mr. Souder. I would like the chairman visiting different
ports and different places around the world to look at this
from a narcotics standpoint, from the terrorist standpoint,
from a trade standpoint, immigration, at the same time at
Vancouver, for example, the American Customs facility, even at
the harbor you have to further move some of the items that
protection at the harbor does not meet the standards that
Vancouver would be more than some of the others.
We shouldn't think this is all of a sudden going to fix all
the risk. We're a long way, even if they meet some of the
standards, even some of our best allies and advance systems are
not as advanced as our own 2 percent is not even what they're
used to meeting.
This is a multi-year process as we're moving into overseas.
Ms. Rooney. If we're going to eliminate the risk 100
percent, I don't think anybody expects that we are or that we
can. It's a multi process and we have to have other measures in
place. And that would be the screening and the detection here
and all of our modes so that we can provide an extra level of
assurance.
The primary detection has to be overseas.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
At this time, the Chair recognizes Ms. Maloney.
STATEMENT OF HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Ms. Maloney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Kallstrom, for your many years of service
with the FBI. We worked together as a special agent with the
terrible TWA crash and I'm glad you're still serving our city
and State.
Ms. Rooney, thank you very much for your professional
presentation.
I must thank Chairman Shays for coming into what I believe
is the most beautiful port in the world. The most beautiful
setting to have this important hearing.
I thank my colleagues on the Government Reform Committee,
many of whom have traveled a great distance to be here today,
and I really join the President and others shining a much
needed spotlight on the security weaknesses of our seaports and
our cargo containers from abroad.
Just this morning, Secretary Manella instituted a new
program for screening baggage that goes onto our planes. They
had an event at the airport this morning. We're inspecting our
bags now at the airports, but as you pointed out, we're letting
thousands of 10-ton containers into our port without even a
glance at their contents.
I truly do believe that our Nation's ports are more
vulnerable to terrorism than our airports are. As Ms. Rooney
pointed out, less than 2 percent of shipping containers are
inspected when they enter one of a dozen of our ports, and our
port security should be in my opinion just as strong as our
aviation security is becoming.
The ABC News investigation demonstrated how vulnerable we
are with 15 pounds of uranium being transported into the
country successfully without a single hint of its movement
through our border.
My first question, that I do not want to depend on the port
of export. I don't want to depend on them. I would like the
same screening process that we're literally implementing today
at our airport to be in our country for our containers.
I must say that I've never seen our Congress more united or
determined as we have been since September 11th, and we've
joined in a bipartisan way the Maritime Security Act, and in
that act was a $90 million, it was an amendment put in by New
York Senator Schumer for new technologies to increase our
screening capabilities.
GAO recommended that we needed $2 billion for such an
effort, but we did get $90 million.
So my first question, exactly what is in place now that we
can screen these containers, not with a bodily search but with
a screener like we're doing in airports.
Do we not have any technology? What can we prepare in the
future? I applaud the efforts of our country and every country
to be very vigilant at the port of export, but as we learned
from September 11th, we have many elements already in our own
country that would be willing to work to undermine our
government and our security.
I would like a line of defense at our own ports. Many
people tell stories, you can put a bomb in the container and
detonate it over here or time it to go off.
What type of technology do we have in place now? What can
we use this $90 million to do? What more do we need to do to
come up with screening technology similar to what we're doing
now at our airports?
Mr. Kallstrom. I don't know how much the $90 million will
do for us. It's probably a drop in the bucket. We're a very
rich Nation, and I think I would agree with the Port Authority,
we need a layered approach and that layer overseas is important
for the reasons that we don't want to take this thing off the
Brooklyn pier and have it blow up there.
We have sophisticated technology in the United States, we
can interrogate containers in transit. Containers can talk to
us if someone has penetrated the container and then the Coast
Guard can take appropriate action.
Clearly, also, we need a second or third layer here in the
United States. There's no question. But I think probably the
most important layer is overseas, but we should have another
layer somewhere else.
I guess the other thing I would say is this is going to
take a long time. Unfortunately, this is such a great country
with a great heart. This has been going on for a long time.
Let's go back to 1993 when they blew up the World Trade
Center. The tunnels, United Nations, FBI office, barracks in
Saudi Arabia, USS Cole--this is not new. I wish we had started
doing this many years ago.
I don't say that for any kind of retribution. Only to make
the points that we have a lot to do and it's going to take a
long time to do it and we have to do a lot of things
simultaneously.
Ms. Maloney. Shortly after September 11th, the Intelligence
Committee came to City Hall and a hearing was held with the
police commissioner, fire commissioner and our former Mayor
Giuliani. He was very disturbed about the passage of classified
information, and he felt that the City did not receive the
necessary classified information that they should have in the
aftermath.
I know that the FBI has I believe maybe 14 offices around
the country, one is here in New York, which is supposed to be a
multi-tiered approach from the FBI to CIA, the City, fire,
police, working really in an anti-terrorism effort to share
classified, all types of information in the event you have a
September 11th, you have a working team in place to respond.
Could you comment on that program? Do you think it's
successful?
I know that sharing classified information is particularly
difficult because of sources, etc., but we want to be as
prepared as possible.
Do you think that system has worked well to be expanded to
other cities? My colleagues raised it, it's sharing the
information so that we're really right for it and could you
comment on this FBI model and whether or not you think it's
been successful.
Mr. Kallstrom. You're talking about the terrorist task
force.
The first one dealt with terrorism issues, and I think it's
worked quite well.
The problem is--it's not a problem of not passing
classified information. I can tell you right now when I had the
honor to run this office, there wasn't anything of substance
that I didn't share with the Mayor and the police commission,
regardless of their classification.
That's not the problem. The problem is there isn't enough
information about terrorists and what they're doing.
If you look at the FBI for instance over the last two or
three decades, it's a miracle the FBI solved as many cases as
they did when you look at the Attorney General guidelines.
We need better intelligence. Now we need to figure out, in
this city we have about 200 State and local police on the task
force. That leaves 69,800 not on the task force. We need to
figure out a way to get to them.
Not exactly classified information, but relevant
information of what the government knows about certain things.
Green light, red light, things like that.
Ms. Maloney. You mentioned in your testimony the need to
really clamp down on our systems so that what happened in the
past, we had these villains basically living in our country
with false IDs.
Would you elaborate on that? I remember when we caught one
of these people and they found the man who had given him the
false IDs and they gave him a fine of $20. Maybe we should
clamp down on the people who are giving these false IDs.
How can we be more vigilant in finding the other people who
are living in and planning to destroy human life, innocent
human life.
Do you think we should have a national ID card?
Mr. Kallstrom. Yes.
Ms. Maloney. Can you elaborate things we can do in this
country that we can be safer on the ID issue.
Mr. Kallstrom. The falsification of IDs is out of control.
We had an operation to get our task force, we made 400 arrests
in Queens in 90 days. It's out of control.
Ms. Maloney. When was this?
Mr. Kallstrom. Within the last 6 months. It's totally out
of control in the United States, and the world for that matter.
We need to insist that the baseline documents in this
country have security features put into them. And that's not
Big Brother. That's common sense. In this age that we live in,
it's a disgrace what we do with identification.
We have terrorists that live among us. They were observed
daily by police, shopkeepers and all kinds of people, a trooper
in Maryland--they were stopped and ticketed numerous times. Two
people that were put late on the watch list, the CIA put them
on late, they were in the phone book in San Diego.
We have so much information in the United States kept away
from our law enforcement because some subset of people think--
clearly we should not have personal information put willy-nilly
into the public.
It's not that we don't connect the dots because the FBI
didn't talk to the CIA. The FBI talks to the CIA. My best
friends are in the CIA. The data bases don't talk to each
other.
You can't get any of the data to really connect the dots.
When you're talking about billions and billions of data points
in the Federal Government, that's not a function two people
want to take about. That's a bunch of data bases not doing the
analysis.
Ms. Maloney. Thank you so much and thank you, Mr. Chairman,
and my time is up.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
I would like to ask you both of you if you could in a
fairly concise way describe to me the world that exists today
versus the world that will exist 5 years now as it relates to
port security.
What do you envision in port security 5 years from now that
you don't see today?
Ms. Rooney.
Ms. Rooney. Starting here and working back overseas, I
would imagine that everybody in the port maritime
administration and airway transportation will have a worker's
identification card. Whether we have a national ID card by then
is another question, but everybody in the transportation
industry will have an ID card.
That ID card will provide access to sensitive information
and sensitive security areas.
I would imagine that we have more sensor and detention
equipment than we have today. That certainly has been piloted
and prototyped and demonstrated to detect the radiological,
nuclear, biological and chemical threats that we're faced with.
I imagine that we'd have more personal government
resources. Clearly, we need additional resources, Customs,
agents, Coast Guard, officers and boats. I would imagine that
as we work our way out overseas that's we have provisions that
we've talked about, where there is a chain of custody from the
point of origin to destination, where there is a preinspection
of cargo overseas when required that would be determined on
Customs having information ahead of time and perhaps on the
certification of cargo at the point of origin and through the
preinspection of cargo.
I would imagine that we'd have the electronic seals and
sensors that was talked about, deployed on the containers so
that we can determine at any stage in the transportation chain
that they have been tampered with.
There will be sensors for the containers. We all know and
recognize that it's very easy to get into a container without
opening the doors. The only way to detect something inside of
them would be with a sensor inside the container.
Building this layered approach of security with the
adequate processes, procedures and personnel in place, in order
to create a complete secure transportation system.
Mr. Shays. Your point would be at this point we don't have
that.
Ms. Rooney. We don't have that to the extent that we need
to have that. We don't have it all. We're making the right
steps to get there.
Mr. Shays. I agree that we are moving along in the right
direction. The question is we have a long ways to go. And it
will take at least 5 years, correct?
Ms. Rooney. I would say so, yes.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Kallstrom, would you like to add to that?
Mr. Kallstrom. I think we'll feel relatively good 5 years
from now knowing what is in the containers when they're packed.
I think we'll have the type of security on the containers that
is fairly foolproof.
There is no reason why we can't have things put inside the
containers that provide intelligence to us, but this is about
life and death of our country and our citizens.
I this the containers will be interrogated by overhead
assets in route. They will report back to an intelligence
center that will let the Coast Guard and Customs and others
make better decisions.
Obviously, anything we're concerned about we'll try not for
offload in the United States. We'll offload it somewhere else.
Inspect it somewhere else.
We'll have a more robust central intelligence agency, and
we'll have an FBI that is much more proactive, better
intelligence. We'll have improved coordination of our
intelligence throughout State and local police and corporate
America and business communities, and we'll protect our civil
liberties.
I think the biggest risk to our civil liberties is the
action over decades. We have big problems and now we'll have
big solutions.
I think there's ways of doing these things. Clearly, we
don't want to give up our privacy. We don't want to give up on
our way of life. Five years, I think is probably optimistic.
Mr. Shays. Five years is probably optimistic?
Mr. Kallstrom. Yes.
Mr. Shays. One of the folks in the audience would have
liked me to ask this question of the previous panel but I would
like to ask it in the context of your expertise. It's a very
important question.
Routinely, legal shipments of components of the United
States's own weapons of mass destruction come into this and
other ports upon flagged vessels. Due to the responsible
agencies currently tracking these legal routine shipments, so
at least they're accounted for.
That's the question I couldn't ask the previous panel but
what I can ask you is are you told when this happens? Is the
State of New York told? Is the State of New Jersey told? Is the
Port Authority told?
Mr. Kallstrom. There are certain things we're notified
about. Probably not the whole list, but there's certain things
of a sensitive nature that we have been notified about.
I think we need to explore that notion and we're putting
work together on these issues, so that we can better anticipate
the actions we have to take at the State and local level.
Mr. Shays. We have the Governor here from New Jersey who is
going to testify.
Ms. Rooney, do you feel you were told?
Ms. Rooney. We're told when it's important. There are some
certain shipments that are quote unquote restricted in the
harbor and when necessary we're told that they're coming and
that's through the Coast Guard.
Mr. Shays. You're told there are restricted shipments. You
may not be told what they are.
Ms. Rooney. Correct.
Mr. Shays. Anything either of you would like to put on the
record before we adjourn for 15 minutes?
Mr. Kallstrom. I think it's been a very timely hearing.
Talking about one of the major vulnerabilities that we have to
deal with, and we are dealing with.
I think everything we talked about today has been discussed
in many, many venues, both in State and local level and in
Washington.
It's just a big thing to deal with. It will take some time.
I think we're on the right track now to deal with these issues.
Mr. Souder. I have one quick question.
Do you know if there is any subgroup that studies what they
think the terrorists will do in port security if we take the
steps we talked about in the next 5 years?
There's this feeling that we do things and we don't figure
out how the other guy is going to react.
Mr. Kallstrom. That's a baseline mechanism in our business
to do that in all aspects of our security.
Mr. Souder. So the answer is yes?
Mr. Kallstrom. Yes. I don't think there is a particular
group in Washington that mandates that, but clearly, what we
talk about when we get into New York, we talk about all of
those issues.
Mr. Shays. Any comment?
Ms. Rooney. I would like to add a point on the equipment
that we have in the port for cargo.
I want to note that the TSA has provided grants of over $5
million, that we have received in the port of New York/New
Jersey for passenger and ferry security to increase those
measures.
In addition, many of the pilot projects that are going on
around the country under the TSA grants are to prove technology
that can be used to increase cargo container security.
I think we need to rely on those pilot protects and more
that will come out in future rounds in order to help begin to
close the gaps.
Mr. Shays. Thank you both. You've been wonderful witnesses.
We're going to have an 11-minute break and we'll start at 15
after.
[Recess.]
Mr. Shays. This hearing will convene to take care of some
business that we haven't done. Members will be permitted to
place an opening statement in the record and that the record
will remain open for 3 days for that purpose.
Without objection, so ordered.
All witnesses will be permitted to include their written
statement on the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
At this time, the Chair is delighted to recognize and
acknowledge the presence of our third panel, the Honorable
James E. McGreevey, who is the 51st Governor of the great State
of New Jersey and as an elected official for many years in
Connecticut, pays attention to what happens in New York and New
Jersey.
Governor, your reputation is a very positive one and it's
well deserved. I know the State of New Jersey is fortunate to
have you serve as Governor and we're fortunate to have you here
to give testimony and then respond to our questions.
As you know, we swear in all our witnesses. Over the 8
years I've sworn in every witness but one and that was Senator
Byrd.
Governor McGreevey. You swore at him.
Mr. Shays. I chickened out, but if you could stand.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Shays. It's wonderful to have you here. We'd like to
hear your statement and then we'll ask you some questions.
STATEMENT OF JAMES E. McGREEVEY, GOVERNOR, NEW JERSEY
Governor McGreevey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
On the outset, I would like to thank the chairman and
members of the committee for focusing today on a critical
concern of homeland security, and namely the protection of our
cargo containers.
Also, I would like to express my gratitude to the
leadership of Governor George Pataki of New York, a dear friend
who today is represented by Senior Advisor James Kallstrom.
The allusion to the metaphorical needle in a haystack along
with our recent experience regarding the Palermo Senator and
the Mayview Maersk underscore the immediacy of security threats
we face in protecting the seaports of the Port Authority.
The Port Authority deserves our continued support,
particularly in understanding the dual risk in terms of
potential loss of life.
There are 18 million individuals served locally by the
port. The port serves a larger population of 80 to 90 million
citizens. Potential loss of life would be devastating, as would
be the economic impact.
It's been estimated that the damage to U.S. economy could
run as high as $1 trillion. In light of the west coast labor
strikes, that was approximately $1 billion.
The implements for potential terrorist attacks are
hypothetical. Refined petroleum products at any port face
potential threat for terrorists. In addition, there exists
substances that enter a port in extremely small quantities that
could have a potential for a dire impact.
A dirty bomb, for example, two ounces would have a
devastating impact if it exploded in lower Manhattan. 6,000
containers arrive in port on a daily basis so the haystack
metaphor is appropriate.
Prior to September 11th, 2 percent, or more than 3 million
containers were actually inspected. Intelligence lead efforts
increased to 5 percent, yet I understand clearly that this
stream of cargo containers is higher than that percentage.
We can clearly do better. The Nation aviation industry
receives $6.1 billion Federal appropriations. The association
of port authorities has calculated and assessed the security
cost of $2 billion and again, we understand from the home ports
the importance, we need to buildupon the container security
issue, which is collaborative and critical in high risk cargo
before it's shipped to the United States.
We must also focus on tightening Customs performance to
minimize the possibility of tampering, and clearly, it is
necessary to tighten rules related to cargo manifests, as well
as to expand the scope of those cargo manifests.
We also need to be proactive at home. Obviously field
tests, x-ray, as well as next generation, scanning sensory
equipment.
Our ports are intermodal. It's critically important that
Federal grants for detective equipment being applied be
diversified, not only through containerized shipping cargo, but
also rail and truck transportation.
Again, I think Port Newark is perhaps the most powerful
example for the necessity for an intermodal detection network.
We also need obviously to continue the integrity of leaving
or entering U.S. ports and roadways. Again, upgrading the
licensing standards, provide for better coordination,
developing and integrating FBI, INS, Customs and Coast Guard
and to maximize our abilities to detect and deter reports,
establish a tear line system, disseminating intelligence, great
information to State and local authorities on a need-to-know
basis, which we contend is critically important.
Also providing for the necessary critical review of that
tear line system so it's done in a simple, thoughtful and
efficient manner, as well as the integrating State and local
response teams, and in addition, the necessity of specialized
Federal equipment inventories that cannot be shared with
States, we need to have the State to share with our Federal
counterparts. This could potentially significantly accelerate
our critical response time.
Finally, it makes no sense to take action in a piecemeal
and disjointed manner. Security procedures at the 50 largest
ports leaves more than 300 as unguarded back doors.
Personally, I have witnessed the discrepancy in distinction
of operations between for example New Jersey ports and Delaware
river, port of Camden, port of Philadelphia and accepted
protocols of manifests that are readily evident in Port Newark,
Elizabeth Port Authority operations.
Again, I also want to say thank you for your time and also
urge the importance of understanding increased as Governor
Ridge as the president support for Coast Guard operations.
New Jersey has 127 miles of coastline. Certain perimeter
Coast Guard operations have been stretched beyond rationale
capacity, and again, we need to understand the completeness of
the Coast Guard mission and not merely respond to the focus
here today and potentially exacerbate risks to security issues.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Governor McGreevey follows:]
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Mr. Shay. Thank you, Governor.
We'll start with Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you for joining us today. I share your
concern about the Coast Guard coming from the north shore of
Massachusetts, and I know Tom Allen from Portland asked
questions of the earlier panel on the same issue, So you don't
stand alone on those concerns.
Governor McGreevey. Governor Pataki and I with Governor
Rolland have attempted to prevail in support of Govern Ridge
for his efforts, and the Coast Guard is being stretched, and we
need to understand the reality of those circumstances.
Mr. Tierney. It's being stretched considerably and we'll
have to deal with the resources. I have issues that we won't
get into--we're going to see a report that's going to be put
out by the General Accounting Office tomorrow. You may want
your office to track down a copy of that. We'll be happy to
share that with you when it comes.
If you had to prioritize what was the single most important
thing the Federal Government could do for the sate of New
Jersey at this point in time, what would you list?
Governor McGreevey. As regard to port operations or
security operations in general?
Mr. Tierney. In support of the port operations right now.
Governor McGreevey. Tear line information.
Mr. Shays. I'm sorry, I will need to swear you in.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Shays. State your name and title slowly for the record.
We'll make sure the transcriber has your official title.
Mr. Caspersen. I am director of the Office of Counter-
Terrorism for the State of New Jersey and my name is Sidney
Caspersen, S-i-d-n-e-y, J., C-a-s-p-e-r-s-e-n.
Mr. Shay. Nice to have you. I should have sworn you in
before.
Mr. Caspersen. We spoke about this earlier, I heard other
speakers speak about the sharing of information.
What we really need in the State of New Jersey for port
security or for all securities, is relevant information from
our security asset for the CIA or FBI, actionable intelligence
that we can operate from.
It's one thing to say we have a threat of some significant
value coming from overseas or maybe or maybe not it has
anything to do with the ports, but if they can give us more
specific information what type of threat, whether it be
biological or chemical so that we could deploy the appropriate
resources.
We can't deploy our resources as all of the critical
infrastructure. What we're for from the Federal Government is
some kind of guidance and help being able to deploy those
limited resources that we have to those areas which have real
actual intelligence where we can deploy resources.
Mr. Tierney. This sounds reasonable. What sort or response
are you getting when you make that request?
Mr. Caspersen. We're getting generalized information, and
when we ask for specificity, we don't get any.
Maybe the Federal Government doesn't have it. What we're
looking for, we've had discussions with the Department of
Energy and they agreed to do a private project on our critical
infrastructure where they will look at our intrastructure and
based on the threat design particular protocols to help our
response.
We also like to see the Federal Government maybe come
forward and designate some of the critical infrastructure as a
national security asset. It's unfair to expect the private
sector to put up their money to protect assets that really have
to do with the national security of the United States.
We're talking about either power or financial or other
critical infrastructure.
Governor McGreevey. We're asking--obviously post September
11th, there is a basic requirement to take every threat
seriously. Yet the State has a reasonable interest to
understand the applicability of that State, applicability of
that threat to our respective State and the nature of that
threat to make a critical judgment as to how best to respond.
And so again, tear line system would be able to provide for
this dissemination of actionable intelligence on a need-to-know
basis so that this information would be targeted in a coherent
manner to those regions of the Nation and/or States where the
threat has a potentially higher impact or for potential attack.
Mr. Tierney. What Ms. Hecker was testifying from the
general accounting office, she was pretty clear about the need
for that, the fact it was lacking also, but when you look at
the President's executive order, he basically refers to port
security expressly and indicates that Governor Ridge helped
facilitate the exchange of information.
I would guess what we have here is a failure to
communicate, as some would say, and that maybe this committee
could ask of Governor Ridge----
Governor McGreevey. Congressman, we applaud Governor
Ridge's leadership----
Mr. Tierney. I don't mean to put you in a position of
criticizing Governor Ridge. I'm trying to put this committee in
a position of finding an answer that we can get Governor Ridge
to respond to written questions or directly come in and talk to
us about where in that operation of his office would you go for
the kind of information that you want and how could we
facilitate some type of protocol for that so we can expedite
that. I think that might be a healthy approach for it.
Mr. Caspersen. The data information center that is up and
functioning, the problem, as you well know, he doesn't have an
agency yet, he is the advisor to the President, there's not
really any funding there, and the other agencies that are
working there are working part-time right now.
I think they're waiting to get that whole thing up to
speed. We're in contact with him daily and we furnish as much
information as we can. We try to keep them fully advised.
What we're really talking about here is maybe CIA, FBI
sitting down with the foreign services and getting more
analysis of the information instead of just scaring the bejesus
out of everybody in the public.
Mr. Tierney. The problem we're going to have there is that
neither the CIA or FBI are going to be under Governor Ridge in
this new department that's set up. That's an issue that we'll
raise in another context.
I thank you for your testimony today and I thank you for
your exchange.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. I would like to briefly comment on two points
you made, coming from Indiana, where our risk is probably less
than here.
First, you said the ability to target based on potential
damage and high risk is politically difficult right now because
we don't know for sure whether the terrorists will move to
softer targets, but political pressure on those of us who
aren't from the highest risk areas, if something happened in
our home area and we voted to put more money in another area,
we don't know how to work through this as a country right now.
So the common question I get is are we going to get hit
over here or over there and trying to figure in an unknown
world, politically we're trying to work through this.
I agree with the fundamental statement that there needs to
be some hard logic applied to this or we'll be on the road
chasing every new aircraft, new chemical threat problem,
nuclear--because if you don't prioritize it, you don't do
nothing well.
At the same time, this has more political risk and that's
partly why it's been difficult. Similar to the intelligence,
and this kind of scaring everybody every weekend. It's the
little boy who cried wolf story all over again, yet part of
this is because everybody wanted to put a finger on who is
responsible for September 11th and there's little tidbits of
information that the FBI and CIA should have been able to
figure out September 11th in advance.
Now we have every agency so afraid that they're putting out
announcements any time they get any kind of bit of information
and the general public is becoming immune to it.
Governor McGreevey. I think the success of our efforts
should be based upon not necessarily eliminating information.
Distributing information is a good thing, but it will be in a
critical evaluation as to how we respond to that spectrum of
information.
It is invaluable that we undertake the necessary strategic
analysis as to when we apply for critical review based upon
what information and how those critical judgments are made and
when do we disseminate those judgments to whom.
Mr. Souder. I agree with you that needs to be done at the
local level. We had a fiasco in San Francisco, California
bridges, in that some of the information that is leaking out
does come from local officials, that now have the political
pressure that previously was on the Federal officials.
In other words, they have information. If they don't share
it, they're worried they're going to get blamed and we're in a
terrible box. The general public needs to understand there is a
level of risk and sometimes it's slightly higher. The
communities are trying to figure this out.
We absolutely need to share a risk if we can; otherwise,
you don't know where to put your resources and everybody has
this higher level of anxiety and they don't know what to do.
We have to figure out as a society how to deal with that.
I want to ask you a couple of specific questions.
You had one line in your testimony, it says making shippers
accountable for their cargo contents. Do you have any specific
recommendation how to do that?
Governor McGreevey. Manifest.
Mr. Caspersen. When shippers ship overseas, the testimony
earlier from Coast Guard and others about a trusted shipper, we
need to know what is on that manifest and if that person is
doing this--if the company is in the United States, we have
ways of verifying that, so what we're looking for is a manifest
ahead of time, well ahead of time, coming into the port.
Almost like an easy pass system. Something that Customs and
the Coast Guard----
Mr. Souder. Would you propose heavy penalties if they
don't--in other words, if you're going to get--there's a
penalty because we're not going to screen as much, we're not
going to put as much pressure on.
Mr. Caspersen. If you're asking me if the penalties should
be stiffer, that's a Federal issue.
You mentioned earlier about the midwest and other areas
being targeted, even though the port is a Federal issue for the
majority of it, anything that happens there is a local issue
and the State of New Jersey and the State of New York are going
to be the ones that have to respond and be the ones who have to
clean it up until we get Federal help.
What I'm saying is when it comes to trusted shippers,
that's a Federal issue we can work out. We in the State try to
help out with our businesses.
Mr. Souder. One other question, we talked about driving the
information collection of ports overseas which we agree need to
be a part of, key part of all this.
We also talked about intercepting boats prior to them
coming in so if they do have something overseas, it doesn't
blow up in the United States.
How would this work in Camden and Philadelphia? Is there
any kind of screening coming up, Delaware River, any kind of
checkpoint that we have to some degree here?
Mr. Caspersen. We have other major issues.
This is a major trafficking place for jet fuel. So that's
an issue where that port, that naval station is where we have
our major trafficking places, coming in and out of there all
day.
Mr. Souder. Any other suggestions? We probably aren't going
to have a hearing in the foreseeable future. If you can give us
your challenges there, and how it's different from the kind of
traditional harbor where you're coming in right off the ocean.
Governor McGreevey. You can ask Governor Ridge that.
Ms. Maloney. Thank you for your testimony.
I know that you've made security issues a top priority of
your administration, particularly port security, and I know
that you were probably as troubled as I was with the ABC report
that showed that 15 pounds of uranium was literally smuggled
into this very port without any movement across many borders.
I would like to ask what are your idea of what the Federal
Government should be doing to make sure this doesn't happen
again.
Earlier, there was a lot of testimony that we should focus
on the port of export, that we should spend a lot of time
making sure that which leaves another port is reviewed, yet I
for one do not want to rely on the port of export or some other
government to secure the people and the life of Americans here
in New Jersey, New York and across our country.
What are your comments on that?
Governor McGreevey. I would go back to what was said
earlier, particularly regarding rules governing cargo manifest.
We need to ensure the integrity of container operations, by
ensuring that manifest practices are acceptable and for those
overwhelming number of companies that deal in large measure,
that also cargo manifest provide for valuable private economic
function as well as security function, so I believe that is
perhaps among the most reasonable method to track, preserve and
monitor cargo, and then in addition, to provide specifically a
tear line system for disseminating accurate intelligence on a
need-to-know basis on a case specific, so that we can act
quickly and efficiently.
It's the greatest degree that we can expand rigid,
stringent cargo manifest guidelines. That is to our advance and
provide for tear line information which will assist us in
making a critical determination as to the significance of a
threat.
Mr. Caspersen. One of the things that has been around for
hundreds of years is Lloyds of London, they have people in all
the ports around the world and these are agents of Lloyds. They
can tell you what ships come and go and whether they're in
drydock or in repair and that they should be there or shouldn't
be there.
These are the resources that we have to reach out to and
glean information from, and I'm sure the Customs and Coast
Guard are aware that these are the things, we need people
overseas to tell us what that ship is doing there.
Being aware where the containers are being packaged, of
what is in those containers before they're put on the ships.
Ms. Maloney. You mentioned in your testimony the aviation
industry receives $6.1 billion in Federal appropriations to
upgrade security, but ports received only $125 million, and I'm
sure you agree with many of us who see that the vulnerability
of our ports literally is far greater than that of the aviation
areas.
Just today, they are announcing a total new screening
operation for our airports, so I just wondered, this appears to
be exactly the type of discrepancy that might be remedied if
Governor Ridge performed the competence of threat and risk
assessment.
Would you support this kind of assessment and would you
join the members of the committee, and I believe the chairman
in calling on this type of assessment to take place for our
ports?
Governor McGreevey. I would just contend much of our
respective shape by September 11th, insofar as the tragic use
of those airliners, as well as the dramatic fear that citizens
have mentioned regarding airline security.
In addition to be responsive to those legitimate security
concerns, we need also to have such a thoughtful nationwide
assessment of threats happening in multiple areas and I would
just also suggest that it's been said earlier, the importance
of the private sector.
95 percent, we've utilized this statistic so often, 95 of
the infrastructure is controlled by the private sector. Clearly
they have to be at the table to ensure best practices in
determining what constitutes the most strategic investment and
the beneficial investment of limited security dollars.
Ms. Maloney. My time is up.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I would like you, you responded to the tear line
system and Mr. Caspersen has responded as well.
I'm unclear still as to what exists today. Let me just open
it by saying as a Member of Congress it's assumed I'm given
clearance. I would in own mind think that anyone who is elected
Governor of the State would have automatic clearance.
Mr. Caspersen. That's not the case. What is the case in
reality is this, is the Office of Homeland Security sent out 7
or 8 months ago a request to all States to identify five people
that they would like to have cleared. To my knowledge, no one
yet has received a clearance there based on those requests. Jim
Caltry was cleared based on his past job.
Governor McGreevey. If I can, Mr. Chairman, it's also been
receiving specific information, say, for example, when a threat
is transmitted to the State of New York or anyplace, is to
having a greater level of insight when that threat is unique to
the region.
Mr. Caspersen. These threats that we get, like when we just
recently got the ones against the railroads. We were talking
about in New Jersey, we send 400,000 people across the water
every day from New Jersey into Manhattan to work, a lot by rail
and by bus and we're concerned about that. How do we know what
that threat really means?
Mr. Shays. What I'd like to do is have a better idea of how
it can be helpful. We need to try to get a handle on the
Federal backlog we have of security clearances.
But it seems to me that in this war against terrorism,
there are only five people that they're trying to identify in
each State. I make an assumption one of them would have to be
the Governor, and I would think I guess the first question is
five enough and if five is enough, should this committee be
working overtime to try to get those clearances to happen.
Governor McGreevey. I believe five is enough and again,
Governor Ridge's efforts, Mr. Chairman, I think while five may
be enough, it's a separate and distinct question in determining
how information is given to this State center on a regional
basis.
Mr. Shays. The purpose of our having these hearings is to
make sure we're listening to you, and as soon as I get beyond
this point, that's what I want to get to. I just want to know
if you--your statement before us is none of the five have yet
been cleared other than one----
Mr. Caspersen. We were talking about New York, not New
Jersey. There's a variety of agencies that can issue
clearances, and we have the FBI, CIA, DOE, there are a variety
of agencies giving clearances.
Mr. Shay. Let me interrupt you. I understand a good part of
that. What we are trying to do is have a coordinated effort to
fight this war on terrorism.
We're asking the Governors to identify five people,
correct, in each State who are instrumental in fighting this
war on terrorism.
You're saying this is our highest priority. It strikes me,
and this is not a criticism with Ridge, it's just a statement,
that we as a committee would like to play a role in having that
happen.
Has the Governor been cleared?
Governor McGreevey. We have not received a form.
Mr. Shays. We will just try to speed up that process, not
just in New Jersey but everywhere and that it be given a higher
priority. That's helpful to know.
The next point, you say you need more information and you
need to understand the logic of the information, you need to
put it in some context so that you can respond to it in a way
that makes a contribution.
Is that what I should be hearing you say?
Governor McGreevey. Again, Mr. Chairman and Congressman
Tierney, folks, it's also with what we suspect will be increase
notices to the States and to regional offices, is by virtue of
the plethora of those notices not to diminish our vigilance and
the best manner in which to maintain a level of vigilance, to
provide information, to provide all information, particularly
to flag the States as to where it has potentially focused
impact on that respective State.
And that is not happening to a sufficient degree necessary.
Mr. Shays. In your statement, you mentioned obviously about
the Port Authority in New Jersey and New York. I had never
focused on when I invited you, I'm sure my staff did, about
your expertise and concern obviously with Camden and the
Philadelphia port system.
When I look at you as Governor, you have a hefty
responsibility what comes in the United States and what leaves
the United States, so this is obviously a primary concern to
you and we thank you for being here for that reason.
I'm trying to imagine what, you have given a number of
points in terms of, you talk about the port tracking,
containerized cargo shipments from ports from origin to final,
you talk about integration of Federal data base that will
enable cross-checking of shipping records.
Governor McGreevey. For example, in Port Camden,
communications were not totally integrated between port
operations, State police, and Coast Guard, so clearly the
integration of those communications systems per se provide a
critical service in and of itself.
Mr. Shays. Do most of the security functions of the State
and local communities get funded out of the income of these two
ports and are these two ports major sources of revenue to the
State of New Jersey.
Governor McGreevey. The port operations happen, Delaware
River, Port Authorities, there's the State of Pennsylvania,
State of New Jersey, port authorities respectively.
Mr. Shays. Do I make an assumption that as Governor, if you
want to make sure that anything related to security costs are
paid for by the authorities or do you also have to provide some
of your own resources to the State?
Governor McGreevey. The Coast Guard provides for critical
operation. Port Authority New York, Jersey police support as
well as the State, actually there are different protocols with
respect to Port Newark and Port Elizabeth, Port Camden, Port
Philadelphia.
The concern being is that the Coast Guard as the lead
agency, receives adequate funding. In my perspective and
Governor Pataki's perspective, we find the States shouldering
an increasing burden for the perimeter Coast Guard operations
for cargo operations.
Mr. Shays. If you were to give me the thing that is the way
you feel the most progress has been made in port security and
the least, is there an area that you think significant progress
has been made?
Governor McGreevey. There has been substantially greater
cooperation between Federal, State, local and private law
enforcement agencies which has been seismic in change in the
level of cooperation and a level of integration of effort,
which has proven invaluable, where I believe it is still
important, is in tear line information, such that while we may
have greater integration of efforts, there's not necessarily
the sharing of critical information to State authorities on a
targeted basis.
Mr. Shays. And had you not come and testified, I'm not sure
that message would have been really known to this committee to
the extent it needs to be, so it's very nice.
I basically asked the questions I need to. I don't know if
you need--is there anything you feel we should have asked you
that we didn't touch on?
Governor McGreevey. Again, my perspective is the need for
meaningful uniformity, and again, I clearly see the distinction
between Delaware River, Port Authority operations and Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey and obviously there are
significant substantial distinctions, but yet best practice is
in protocols ought to be implemented nationally by virtue of
the force of this committee.
Mr. Shays. I'm going to make a bit of a prediction, there
was tremendous desire on the part of Democrats and a number of
Republicans in Congress to have a department of homeland
security. Eventually I think they became convinced of the
logic, and there are always going to be I think disagreements
as to how we go about it.
I have tremendous hope that you're going to see a much more
invigorated Coast Guard. I believe that you'll see lots more
resources going toward it. I'm I'm wrong, it will be a gigantic
disappointment because I think there is logic to taking them--
Department of Transportation to a Department of Homeland
Security.
The other thing I think you're going to see is one of the
pillars of this operation is the first line of defense, the
State and local governments. And if the new secretary is doing
his or her job the way they need to, you're going to see one
source to get resources and one source to get information, one
source to turn to that hopefully will be very, very helpful.
We in our capacity as oversight committee will be
monitoring that to see that it happens and we'd love to have
your continued input.
Governor McGreevey. Thank you. It will be so critically
important for a Governor to have one-stop shopping, to have one
access point.
Governor Pataki and I were successful in securing
substantial dollars for operations, get it, it was
exceptionally difficult to have OMB release those dollars.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. I just want to add, by and large, there are
many of us thanks to his leadership over the last several years
on top of this terrorism issue before the chairman was able to
get the attention of this administration, but one of the things
we wanted was to empower someone like Governor Ridge to take
the position of the equivalent level of the Office of
Management Budget--one of the problems we have is we have 133
agents and only 22 of them can be put in this department.
So we're still concerned that when it comes to getting
money for the Coast Guard or getting money for another critical
area, it may not come because that particular secretary does
not have the ability to override the budget, and the best
example of that was the Department of Energy asking for a
significant amount of money to safeguard nuclear facilities in
the transport of nuclear materials only to have it overridden
by OMD and came up with a fraction of that.
I think we're going to see some improvements of concern,
that unlike World War II when we tried to reorganize the army,
navy, air force in 1947 we're tying to do it now.
There's still some idea of whether or not we properly
empowered Governor Ridge or whoever may succeed him on that,
but I know we're going to work on this committee to make it
work, however it comes out and be as helpful as it can.
Mr. Shays. I'm trying to get the last word. Just to make
sure on the reorganization of the military was in response to
the new threat of the Soviet threat, but I do agree with your
point.
Thank you.
We'll call on our next panel. Mr. Frank McDonough,
President, New York Shipping Association.
General Charles Boyd, U.S. Air Force, retired, CEO and
President, Business Executives for National Security, referred
to as BENS.
Mr. Brian D. Starer, Partner, Holland & Knight.
Mr. John Hyde, Director of Security and Compliance.
Why don't we stay standing and I'll swear you in right now.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shay. I don't want to be disingenuous and say I saved
the best for last, but I sometimes learn the most from the last
panel, in part because some of the last panel have been here
all day and have heard all the other comments and go right to
points that you think need to be made.
This is a wonderful panel and we're very grateful that all
of you are here.
Mr. McDonough, you'll go first.
STATEMENT OF FRANK M. McDONOUGH, ESQ., PRESIDENT, NEW YORK
SHIPPING ASSOCIATION, INC.
Mr. McDonough. Thank you very much. I appreciate the
opportunity to be here today.
I want to throw a little bit of cold water on what we've
heard today.
First of all, cooperation among government agencies is not
necessarily coordination. Those of us who are on the ground,
that's a very important issue.
As president of the New York Shipping Association, I have
the pleasure of representing the people who drive the ships,
move cargo, run the terminals, provide and maintain the
equipment, train and employ he labor that moves almost $90
billion of cargo throughout the port each year.
Port security has long been an issue that has confronted
us. It's been relatively easy for us to ship to this new focus.
Obviously, the best place to start is at the point of
origin. If we apply Customs efforts to develop inspection
programs at foreign ports, much of testimony today has been
directed at that, we stand behind that 100 percent.
Presceening of cargo, containers, manifests, even crew
members is a huge step forward. As you learned today,
containers are not placed on vessels in a random manner. Cargo
storage requires a high level of sophistication. There is very
little point to point vessel movement in today's world. Vessels
are shared. Multiple destinations are plotted. Containers are
loaded, off-loaded and transhipped at a number of stops in a
single trip.
Customs needs the people and the equipment to establish and
support a consistent method and timeframe in which to screen
those cargo containers before they get here. If they want us to
submit our manifests 24 hours in advance, that's all well and
good but they also have to respond back to us in sufficient
time to tell us they are going to target a container before we
sail. It's too late after we sail.
In the event the information on a suspect container is
acquired after loading, Federal agency involved needs to talk
to the vessel owners and operators before acting precipitously.
Simply ordering the vessel to stand to or make berth while
everyone figures out how to approach the situation may only
serve to increase the exposure.
If a specific container destined for Newark happens to be
targeted for inspection by the authorities in Baltimore and it
just so happens that container is buried under several hundred
or even 1,000 other containers, we need to work with the ship
owners and masters to develop a rational approach.
We also need to think about the impacts to the system.
If a ship with suspect cargo sits at anchor for several
days while the pertinent agencies try to figure out what to do
with it, consider the effect on the ship's schedule, the
customers, and the 20 to $40,000 per day that it costs to
operate that ship. Those are costs that we will all pay. Again,
what of the prolonged exposure?
We need to develop rapid reaction response teams that can
quickly clear a suspect ship or a suspect cargo. We want that
to happen as much as anybody else in this room does. We need to
have a single agency in charge. We don't have that.
We need to know who is in charge among a dozen Federal and
State agencies, because they all respond in those cases.
We need the right expertise and training. If you've got
some Navy Seals on our ships, you better keep in mind the
biggest ship those guys were on before was made of runner. We
need to have them trained.
We need someone who is going to be operating detection
devices that not only can detect the readings but interpret the
readings. The government needs to partner with the experts.
No one knows this industry better than we do. It seems
we're the first ones that the agency shuns aside when they
think there's a problem. Its approach from the law enforcement
perspective and we heard it somewhere--in one case it was
suggested take them off the ship.
We need technology. We must develop cargo tracking systems
and all the gee whiz stuff you heard about today. We have to
have that. Guards and guns aren't going to help us.
When we inspect boxes at this end, we need to use the best
equipment available. The best equipment available. Not the
least cost. I know how we do things on the low bidder.
Protecting our ports while allowing free flow of trade is a
daunting task. As we develop new technologies and meet these
challenges, cooperation and coordination, to preserve the good
in the system, is as important as enhancing our security.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McDonough follows:]
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Mr. Shays. We've been waiting for the cold water.
Do you have anything else you want to say?
Mr. McDonough. I'll wait for the questions and answers.
Mr. Shays. General Boyd.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHARLES BOYD, USAF, RETIRED, CEO AND
PRESIDENT, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. Boyd. Your committee is focused today on a principal
security risk of this country today. I commend you for taking
this issue up. I would add today it's gratifying for us to see
so many of our recommendations ought to be implemented,
including establishment of our homeland security.
There is no question that the Nation will be more secure as
a result. The work in which I am presently engaged seeks to
enhance the national security by marshalling greater
capabilities in support of the government's efforts to protect
the citizens. Particularly the organizational, business
executives for national security seeks to mobilize intellectual
and material resources, and business community in support of a
Nation's security efforts.
20 years of Congress have been aware of efforts, primarily
related to the Department of Defense and the intelligence
community. Today we're expanding our attention just as the
Nation is doing into areas, not considered the front lines of
our defense, since the objective of terrorism is in civilian
sector disruption of those things, people focus and common
purpose, then the civilian sector should have added incentive
to participate in the common defense.
BENS, since September 11th, has energized business across
country, has become involved in the crucial battlegrounds,
threats, bioterrorism, financial tracking of terrorist money.
Our most important project may also serve the area of
concern for this congressional hearing for security. I don't
think Governor McGreevey mentioned in his testimony, but in New
Jersey, BENS has established a major partnership with him and
the State government's organization for homeland events.
It's called BENS New Jersey business course, the central
purpose is to marshal resources to assist the State in areas
that are vulnerable and to address that need.
All of the business leaders we've approached so far express
interest, even enthusiasm, for two basic reasons.
I think they truly want to make a contribution from a
purely patriotic obligation and because they understand that
their own companies share in the risk posed by this new set
of--the most recent area in which we're investigating in New
Jersey has to the triangulation; university, government sector
and business.
There's much that can be done here. I recommend that
triangulation is an area of concern.
The Stephens Institute of Technology of New York and New
Jersey has a major project of looking at integrated system for
maritime status and I think as an example, this new and
existing technology, this project is funded by the Office of
Research, is directed at providing port protection of the U.S.
Navy, use of high resolution surveillance, vessel traffic,
oceanic atmospheric conditions in a prescribed area.
These techniques have great value in the commercial sector.
We have another form of government private partnership.
I would conclude also, because of recent time, we can talk
about some other things in the Q and A, but I would emphasize
that I believe in the organization I lead, and believes that we
cannot find a solution to the Nation's problem in port security
without having private business sector deeply involved, sharing
solutions and in the cost as well.
I believe this hearing will be a platform for exploring
some ideas or events and others are thinking about. I look
forward to your questions.
Mr. Shay. Thank you.
Mr. Starer.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN D. STARER, PARTNER, HOLLAND & KNIGHT, LLP
Mr. Starer. Good afternoon. I wish to thank you for the
opportunity to address you on the important topic of maritime
security.
I'm Brian Starer, national practice leader for the maritime
group of our firm. Ours is the oldest and largest maritime law
practice in the United States, founded in 1830, a few blocks
north from here.
Our New York office is about 300 feet east from Ground
Zero.
Five years ago, Haight Gardner Poor & Havens combined with
Holland & Knight, which is now the sixth largest law firm in
the Nation.
Our clients include most of the major domestic and foreign
ship owners and operators carrying cargo to and from the United
States. Since the horrific events of September 11, 2001, we
have been in the forefront of advising our clients and the
maritime industry in general on maritime security issues.
My firm's Washington office maintains an internet site
exclusively devoted to this issue, tracking Coast Guard
security zones and new security requirements so as to allow the
maritime industry worldwide to quickly be informed and adapt to
these rapidly changing developments.
I will focus my testimony today on Federal Government
efforts to screen cargo containers entering U.S. seaports and
the effect of these efforts on the free flow of trade.
I must start by saying that my firm supports all reasonable
efforts of the Federal Government to enhance maritime security
of the United States.
Not to unfairly single out any particular group, I've asked
Charlie Brown and some of his friends to help me emphasize what
I think is the heart of the issue here. I call it, what's in
the box, Charlie Brown.
Charlie Brown is walking toward Lucy's house carrying a
beautifully wrapped present to give Lucy at a birthday party.
Linus sees Charlie with this fancy box. Linus yells, what's in
the box, Charlie Brown?
Charlie Brown replies, don't know.
Linus: What do you mean you don't know?
Charlie Brown: I really don't know. My mom bought it in
this big fancy store in Toledo where it was boxed, sealed and
gift wrapped. And she only told me that Lucy would enjoy it.
Linus persists. Could it be a football? A new blanket?
Charlie Brown: Look, I told you I don't know. It could be
anything.
Linus: Let's open the box, Charlie Brown. It's the only way
we're going to know.
Charlie Brown says, we can't open it now. We'll be late for
the party and we'll miss the cake.
Linus: Well, the only way we're going to know what is
inside without opening the box is to ask your mom. She'll know.
Neither Linus nor Charlie Brown nor Lucy know the contents
of the box.
In today's supply chain world, Charlie Brown represents the
ocean carrier. Lucy is the ultimate receiver. Mom is the
shipper from Indonesia. Linus is U.S. Customs.
It seems simple, doesn't it? Linus should only have to ask
Charlie Brown's mom and they would know what is in the box.
U.S. Customs Service is requiring ship owners and
operators, I think on December 2nd, to submit electronic
manifests 24 hours prior to loading the cargo at a foreign port
if the ship is bound for the United States.
I understand Customs' hope is in this early warning, it
will allow the agency to direct its certain suspicious
containers not be loaded until they are examined.
I'm convinced that the burden of this is misallocated. The
manifest is nothing more than a compilation of information
derived from shipping documents prepared by someone else.
Virtually all cargo these days with the exception of bulk
liquid and solid cargos, such as oil and coal are packaged
generally in sealed containers. The master of the ship has no
way of knowing what he or she is being asked to carry.
All that is provided other than the cargo itself is a
shipping document prepared by the shipper. Having the master
owner or operator provide Customs with a manifest is, to use
the legal analogy, merely hearsay evidence regarding what is
actually being shipped.
The best indication of what is being shipped other than
visually examining the cargo itself is the original shipping
document. The Customs Service should be obtaining copies of the
shipping documents from the shippers or intermediaries rather
than the manifest if it truly wants to know what is being
shipped to the United States.
By obtaining these documents from the shipper or
intermediary, rather than a manifest from the ship's master,
the agency would have the cargo information sooner and would be
obtaining it from the source most likely to know what is being
shipped. In legal terms, this would be consistent with the best
evidence rule.
Every player in the international supply chain should also
adopt meaningful security plans, rather than just provide a
certificate to be framed and put on the wall.
Security measures should be only--should only be adopted if
they provide measurable increases in deterrence against
terrorism at a reasonable cost.
Absolute transportation security is only achievable by
shutting down the international transportation system. Just
think in a small way about the west coast lockout a couple of
months ago. A balance must be reached between reasonable
security levels and efficient maritime transportation.
As you noted, the purpose of this hearing is to examine
agency efforts to screen cargo containers entering U.S. ports
and the effect of these efforts on the free flow of trade. From
my perspective, this has been a mixed bag.
Certainly maritime security is vastly improved since
September 11th. There is plenty of room for enhancement.
Also, the cost today of these efforts has far exceeded
that. Ships and cargos have been needlessly delayed. Ships,
crews and the environment have been put at risk. Burdens such
as 24-hour advance manifest notice had been enacted with little
thought to the true costs and benefits or whether the agencies
slowly prepared to implement requirements.
I strongly recommend that Federal agencies meaningfully
involve the maritime industry in its security initiatives at
the planning stage rather than to apologize later for the
errors and implementation. Prevention of maritime terrorism is
a group effort and all players should be involved at all
stages. It is only then we, as a secure maritime Nation, will
be able to provide the answers, the answer to the question,
what is in the box.
I respectfully request my submitted written testimony be
made part of the record of this hearing.
Thank you for listening. I will stay to answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Starer follows:]
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Mr. Shays. All your written statements will be in the
record. That's taken care of.
Mr. Hyde.
STATEMENT OF JOHN J. HYDE, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND COMPLIANCE,
MAERSK, INC.
Mr. Hyde. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. My name is John
Hyde, and I am director of Security and Compliance for Maersk
Sealand. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and
your committee to give the perspective of an ocean carrier in
an international terminal on this very important subject.
Maersk Sealand is the largest container shipping company in
the world. We operate more than 250 container vessels and more
than 800,000 containers through a worldwide transportation
network. We provide transportation to and from six continents
and we maintain 325 offices in more than 100 countries.
Everything we do is captured by the watchwords of our
founders, which is constant care. The security of our
containers and the integrity of our transportation network are
essential to our operations at Maersk Sealand.
Mr. Chairman, you and other members of this panel know that
our national maritime transportation is a worldwide business
and it is inherently intermodal in nature. A container that is
unloaded at a U.S. seaport today can be efficiently transported
to another location in America in a matter of days.
This presents many challenges.
We've always been security conscious. The evens of
September 11th have only made us more concerned about security
threats and their potential impact on our fellow citizens, our
employees, our port facilities, our containers, our vessels and
our customers' cargo.
Also, the Nation's economy has slowed dramatically as
result of the September 11th events. Our global trade posture
has been affected in dramatic ways. We cannot ignore the very
real potential that terrorism will again visit our Nation, and
to the greatest extent we must take steps to ensure the safety
and security of our ports, our containers and our vessels.
We must do this while still maintaining a vibrant maritime
trade, which is the life of our economy.
We are responding to the challenge. We embarked on an
aggressive proactive campaign to prepare against security
threats. These include our voluntary entry into a number of
U.S. Government programs and pilot projects, such as the U.S.
Customs supercarrier issue program, business anti-smuggling
coalition, the Customs trade partnership against terrorism and
we are poised to begin participating in Operation Safe
Commerce.
It is not enough to make our operations within this country
secure. We are intensifying our efforts to secure our global
cargo network. We have a security officer within our company
responsible for providing security challenges.
Inasmuch as we have a presence in more than 100 countries,
we've established regional security offices throughout the
world. We have security that includes people from our hazardous
cargo operations, our intermodal, terminal, logistics,
container, operations, information technology, legal and
government affairs offices as well.
Certainly one aspect of our interest and concern addresses
specific subject matter of today's hearing, which would be
unknowingly transporting nuclear weapons and materials.
We at Maersk Sealand combatted smuggling of all items, but
the potential harm from nuclear weapons and material is a
provision of their smuggling is especially significant.
Please let me respond to several of the various specific
questions raised.
First you inquired as to the existence of screening
programs to prevent illegal fissile material or nuclear weapons
from being smuggled into our country. The inbound cargo
declaration that is provided in each manifest identifies among
other items the contents of the container or the cargo carried
on-board the vessel, as well as the identity of the shipper,
the port of origin, the destination within the United States.
Advance information is critical to the U.S. Government's
efforts to detect a container anomaly before it is loaded for a
U.S. port.
In addition to manifest details, carriers can and often do
provide additional data to the government agencies regarding
cargo and shippers and other relevant information about goods
on the vessel. This supplements the required manifest
information.
Pinpointing high risk containers is at minimum daunting
challenge. The manifest does provide a great deal of specific
information. We should remember that carriers, ocean carriers
in this context do not generate the manifest information. It's
provided to them by the shippers.
Carriers simply act as a conduit to such information to the
government. Under current law, a shippers generally assume no
liability when poor manifest information is provided to the
government.
We think this aspect should be reconsidered. We think the
shippers should be much more accountable for what they're
carrying on board the vessels.
We support a system that would require advance manifest
information, credible advance manifest information as far up
the supply chain as possible.
Your questions also highlighted critical element in the
deterring the transportation of dangerous nuclear weapons and
materials. The need for coordination, compatibility of
containers screening program, Federal, State, and local
authorities and commercial interest.
I regret to say in these areas we are not doing as well as
we could. It is often not clear which Federal entity is leading
the effort in maritime security incidents in screening.
This confusion is further complicated by the overlay in
State and local requirements. At times carriers do not know
exactly what information must be provided and to whom. A lead
agency must be designated and there must be better coordination
among various government entities.
I say that in the context of it is improved--it's not
simply bad and will never get better. We see improvement but we
would like to see it improving quicker.
Mandatory Federal guidelines must be issued if cargo
security is to improve and they must balance the burdens fairly
among all the participants in cargo security.
Biggest obstacles facing the agencies in the maritime
security area are their numbers. We will believe that real good
faith partnerships between government and industry must be
enhanced. Partnerships result in force multiplies and more
efficient and effective methods of achieving higher security.
If full partnerships are not permitted, the government will
deprive itself of crucial knowledge and information and
resources to accomplish their critical mission.
Government agency partnerships can be very useful in
confronting challenge of personnel training. Government
personnel will be familiarized much better with the industry's
operations if they were afforded and accepted the opportunity
to be trained within the industry itself.
We spoke about all the technological advances that are out
there. I'm not going to take them over again, but I will say
that all the advancements and new technology that is coming out
needs to be appropriate to what we're trying to accomplish to
answer the way we're doing business.
We can adjust. It has to be the determined who is
responsible for implementing some of these things. Seal
technology--again, who puts the seal on this extremely
difficult task.
These advancements must be thoroughly evaluated and tested.
We do not want to have a sense of false security.
Maersk Sealand has committed itself to an intensive effort
to make our seaports as safe as possible. This is in the
national security interest of our country, our own commercial
interests and the interest of providing a safe and secure
workplace environment for our employees.
I will be happy to attempt to answer any questions you may
have and I appreciate very much the opportunity to appear
before you this morning.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hyde follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Let me call on Mr. Souder to go first.
Mr. Souder. I want to qualify your manifest shipping--I
come from a retail background. Are you saying that the shipping
document would be like four tons, armchairs, this much two side
shares, table--the manifest would be given to the trucking
company would say a box that says chairs, in other words, the
detail is greater and are you saying the manifest is not
specific?
Mr. Starer. The manifest oftentimes is not specific. I
mean, also, the big problem is every manifest that the ship
owner operates under, generally the bills of lading is what
they take the information off of. It starts with freights, all
kinds, or general household goods, it's not specific enough.
Also, it's putting the burden in the wrong place. It's
putting it on the conduit rather than the supplier of the
goods.
Mr. Souder. I understand that point, but what I'm trying to
understand now is----
Mr. Starer. The specificity.
Mr. Souder. Yes. Could part of this be addressed by having
the bill of lading, the manifest, be more specific to
management? What does that do?
Mr. Starer. It's possible. Again, you're not going to the
source. You're using--we see it time and again in the industry
that as good as the transfer is from the shipping documents to
the manifest, mistakes are made and you're putting the emphasis
and the emphasis is being placed on secondary evidence.
Mr. Souder. I understand. I'm trying to figure out the next
question is, why didn't you do that, because the number of
shippers substantially smaller than the number--in other words,
if there is a problem in the manifest, unless you've doctored
the manifest, we go back to the next part, is that correct?
Mr. Starer. I think that I understand what you're asking. I
think the reason that the 24-hour advance rule is the way that
it's been written is in some respects it's Customs, it's
business as usual. That's what they're used to, and to come
with a radical idea of going back to the original shipping
document, I'm sure didn't cross their mind because it would
require complete change in how they approached the problem.
Mr. Souder. What I would appreciate then, I want to yield
to the chairman, but I would like to pursue this further
because I chair another subcommittee that deals with INS border
control, narcotics and a lot of border issues.
It's a broader question as to how to deal with this, we
need, you're absolutely correct, we don't need the private
sector involved. We try to fix it, fix it later, but bottom
line is when the government comes in to correct it, we're going
to increase costs to the system. What we need to do is figure
out the most efficient way to fix it and the critical path
methods comes through, the shippers, you're not liable,
obviously for the stuff in the container. That's a separate
point.
But what's the best place to do the 24-hour rule, because
we also have the manifest question on airlines, we want to see
the list of people coming in. We're having this discussion on
trains and cruise ships. We want to see manifests, and we need
to work with the industry to figure out what is the best way to
do that, how to get that information to the most efficient way,
because they put the cost pressure back, one it's so diverse,
we're going to ask you at the port to pay for those Customs
officials so you might gain short term, but you don't gain long
term.
What we need is to hold the people accountable for exposing
us to terrorist threats and when we find the most efficient way
to do it, it will be worth it to the private sector.
I think you made a good point with it. I'm trying to figure
out how to get to this point, we need to look at a greater way
to do that.
Mr. Starer. Quickly, you couldn't even think of doing this
10 years ago. Electronically, it's not only doable, it's very,
very doable. Again, Customs is going to have to change the way
they think about clearing cargo into the United States. It will
make a huge, huge difference.
Mr. Shays. I'm going to jump in.
One of the messages I'm hearing loud and clear is that you
do not believe, Mr. McDonough, you do not believe that you are
being listened to, and I want to say to you that I'm adding to
that feeling. I hear your message. I would like to see how our
committee can be a little more proactive, proactive in making
sure that you are a voice to be heard.
Mr. McDonough. It's not just you. John, by the way, is the
only person in the room who drives ships and operates
terminals, and we sat here this morning and we listened to all
the government agencies, talking about all the things they're
doing and we think that's wonderful. We pat them on the back.
We're not at the table. We haven't been invited to the
table. There are 56 corporations, operating in and out of the
Port of New Jersey. They should be at the table.
Mr. Shays. That's a major, major frankly liability to
whatever program we hope to succeed if you're not being
included, and what I should be doing, the committee should be
doing in future hearings is asking the government folks how are
you being included and forcing them to think that way.
Because I honestly don't know how we're going to succeed
unless you're being included.
I want to understand a few things about the manifest. A
manifest can be simply doctored, correct? What I'm having a
little bit of trouble understanding is you're given a manifest,
but is it reliable?
Anybody want to answer?
Mr. McDonough. That's our problem, and the reason it's our
problem is because our steamship lines, our carriers are the
ones we're asked to essentially verify that manifest because
they're the one who have to submit the manifest and frankly we
don't know exactly----
Mr. Starer. You don't have the accuracy that you would
like. The steamship company or the carrier does not know what's
in the box.
Mr. Shays. The issue of 24 hours, the ship is already long
left the port, correct, and is heading to the United States.
Mr. McDonough. That was my point, Mr. Chairman, if we
submit it 24 hours in advance, that's all well and good and
electronically, it is very feasible, but we have to have a
response back before the ship departs because otherwise you're
at sea and then you get some ridiculous recommendation that
we're going to take boxes off the ship.
Mr. Shays. You're saying a single agency in charge is a
positive thing?
Mr. McDonough. Yes.
Mr. Shays. No silver bullet--I make an assumption we'll
never have total security unless we simply have no trade. But
we can make it infinitely more difficult, and that has value,
correct? Does anyone disagree?
When I think of BENS, I think of an organization that cares
about national security, just wants to make sure our dollars
are spent there.
Are you concerned there is going to be a lot of ways to end
this effort to fight terrorists?
Mr. Boyd. Mr. Chairman, I think your characterization
depends on the early basis is accurate, and that was narrow
focus.
What we're principally doing at this phase of our history
is bringing business leaders and wisdom and their ideas into
application on discrete problems. Mostly in the department
which focused a great deal on the acquisition of business side
of defense and intelligence commission.
Now, we're focusing much more on this new brand of threats
and it turns out that we have a wonderful array of members in
our organization, about 400 business leaders, CEO, Coast Guard
who are willing to give back and want to give back something in
the way of their experiences.
Mr. Shays. Let me tighten your answer a bit. So is the
bottom line what?
Mr. Boyd. Bottom line is we can help, just as we're it
doing it in New Jersey, marshalling business leaders to help
volunteer with these various problems.
Mr. Hyde mentioned the Customs trade, a voluntary program,
but one, as far as we can gather, that's a rather weak set of
principles or standards that companies can adopt--be rewarded
in some way. There's much more to review than that.
Mr. Shays. Am I hearing that you believe that there are new
things that we can do to--you're frankly outside the maritime
industry. Are you basically saying that you think BENS, based
on business experience, can provide some new innovative ways to
deal with this whole issue?
Mr. Boyd. That's what I understand.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Hyde, I don't know if it was you who said
security should be done at a reasonable cost.
Do you want to elaborate on that whole issue?
Mr. Hyde. Since September 11th, to speak fairly bluntly, a
lot of people have come out of the woodwork with new and
innovative devices that are impressive, but the question is
what will they do, are they effective and if they are, who's to
use them, who is to monitor them, who is to make sure they're
doing the job that they're intended for.
We have a concern about putting bells and whistles on
containers, and we're not sure that they can add that much to
the security, but we are concerned that they would give a sense
of false security.
Until we can get those questions that I just articulated
answered, we're not real sure how we should support some of the
high tech innovations that are out there that are dreamed up
every day.
We believe there's a place for high tech industry. We're
not so sure that what is out there is addressing it correctly
and how it should be faced.
Mr. Shays. Let me say to all of you on this panel, the
national security subcommittee program has a special task of
fighting terrorism at home and abroad. That's in our--we're the
only committee that looks at both the State department, as well
as the defense, and looks at any aspects of terrorism.
If you all are not feeling your voices heard, I would like
to make sure that the director of my committee and others are
aware of it. Mr. McDonough, I would welcome you to be very
aggressive with my committee, and we'll start to be very
outspoken.
So maybe I can say to you the contribution that you're
making to this committee, that I would like you to see a result
on, if we met 4 months or 5 months from now you would able to
make that same claim.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. McDonough, the chairman was correct, you
were the first to speak on the issue of not being listened to.
As I understand, you took over your possession in December
2001?
Mr. McDonough. That's when I joined NYSA. I came president
on January 1st.
Mr. Tierney. Of?
Mr. McDonough. 2001.
Mr. Tierney. Post September 11th?
Mr. McDonough. Yes, yes.
Mr. Tierney. A little research on the Shipping Association
shows our staff that association hasn't always been in favor of
security measures, but that since September 11th, this position
has changed considerably.
Mr. McDonough. I will join Mr. Hyde in saying we get lots
of bells and whistles that are offered to us but they're not
necessarily cost effective.
Mr. Tierney. You mentioned in your testimony that you don't
think there is any single plan that will work for a report,
that each port security needs to be assessed individually.
Mr. McDonough. Yes.
Mr. Tierney. What is your opinion of the international port
security being developed by the international maritime
organization?
Mr. McDonough. I think it's a step forward. There's no
question about that. Right now there are no standards.
I think as we go forward, we have to work very hard, Coast
Guard, others working on the IMO, to include those in the IMO
international standards ultimately so all the ports that we
have to deal with are compliant, if you will. We have to have
international standards that are equally applicable and
enforced at all ports.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Hyde, you said shippers should be more
accountable for what they're shipping, and I want to have you
explore that a little bit more.
How would you recommend they be held accountable?
Mr. Hyde. Maybe a little background. Ocean carriers are
held accountable now under the Tariff Act of 1930, and the part
of that act that held us accountable provides penalties for
inaccurate manifests. That act was passed when shipping was
different than it is today, when the carrier would know what is
being put on board by visually seeing it.
I think that we have an opportunity here to look at how
some of these laws apply, who they apply to. The ocean carrier
simply mirrors whatever information is provided on the ship.
The shipper is the person that knows what is going in the
container and the shipper is the person who has to declare to
us what's in there and the shipper is the person that is the
first step of securing that and we believe that it's an
appropriate time now to look at what the shipper's
responsibilities should be, but the U.S. Customs does not have
a lot of rules and regulations obviously with the 24-hour rule
that are affecting overseas operations, so we believe it should
be looked into by whatever appropriate government agency, I
think Customs would be the best, and in fact maybe tie in with
what some of my colleagues were saying, before this shipper can
present a load for shipment, would have to be provide the
information to Customs.
Mr. Tierney. Do you think the carrier might have some
responsibility also?
Mr. Hyde. Well, I don't see the carrier as a law
enforcement agency obviously. I see the carrier as a powerful
instrumentality if working with the agencies involved, as we've
been saying, more involved.
Mr. Tierney. They're going to have a lot of say about who
they do business with.
Mr. Hyde. Carriers? We have to accept cargo that is legally
tendered, so we're not in the business of turning away cargo.
We do have programs in place and they're related to some of the
things I mentioned.
I don't know that I would want to suggest that an ocean
carrier should be able to authenticate what's in that
container.
Mr. Tierney. How do you recommend that the shipper be held
accountable in some meaningful way?
Mr. Starer. I think right now the way the system works and
the ship's manifest is created, the ocean carrier has no
alternative because he does not know, the operator or owner,
does not know what's in the container to necessarily declare
under a set--it's a legal term of art. If the carrier leaves
that off, the carrier can be responsible as guarantor, so they
virtually never leave off their bills of lading and manifests.
To carry it one step back further, to the shipper, if the
shippers know when a particular cargo has to reach the United
States, whether it's supply chain running beer or it's the
latest toy for Christmas, Customs knows they have to get those
through at a particular time.
It seems to me that a system, almost independent of the
present ocean carrier system would work and it could be set up
electronically in a preclearance manner to where virtually all
of the cargo that moves in routine, to and from the United
States could be identified and cleared in a routine manner, and
it would also show using the example of Heinekin beer, Heinekin
beer from Rotterdam to various parts in the United States is
routine. If suddenly Customs saw that Heinekin container moving
from Istanbul to New York, that would show an anomaly that
would require it be kicked out right away and cause Customs to
go back to the shipper and say what is going on here.
And at that point in time, they would either explain it or
not explain it. But the point is, it would never get to the
point of coming on dock side from someplace in the world.
It hits to the heart of the issue. How to do it is
something that's beyond my capabilities, most certainly.
Electronically it can be done, and I'm sure a program can be
worked out, it will make it work, it's going to require moving
the time forward so that shipper knows they've got to have
Customs clearance by X date if that cargo is going to be taken
in a sealed container to a local port and then transferred or
transported to the United States.
Mr. Tierney. Generally, are you in agreement with the
earlier panelists who indicated when it comes to security
matters concerning containers, that the most important thing we
can do is try to get the inspection done back at the point of
loading?
Mr. Boyd. All the people, I went to Long Beach 2 weeks ago,
and people on the docks, the people in the harbor, everyone
seemed to concur that the long-term approach would be one in
which things are container sealed in a real way, with
surveillance equipment inside, and at the point of which it's
loaded and between that point and the point which it comes to
Long Beach, for example, then it is immediately suspected.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you all for your testimony here today. I
have to excuse myself, but I appreciate you being here, I value
your testimony.
Mr. Souder, I believe, has some further questions before he
closes the hearing.
Mr. Souder. I think you've all made good points. We need to
check, and we'll talk further of the shippers and get back,
because I don't understand why they wouldn't be a key part of
the chain as well.
It's a different liability. You shouldn't be liable for
something you can't control. We're using you to control both
parts, and that furthermore, it tends to be the smaller
companies who aren't identified and don't have the pattern.
That's why the risk ought to be concentrated, and we clearly
need this for individuals that cross on the border--this is
kind of a new zero tolerance error.
I can also say on behalf of the Federal Government having
come out of the private sector, I understand your frustration.
I had two very particular things I wanted to ask, because
it makes sense, I haven't thought about it as much before, I
heard one of you said in the top 20, 65 percent comes from
transport, transshipper, what percentage would you say is port
of origin?
Mr. McDonough. I don't have the answer to that question.
Mr. Hyde. I would think originating cargo out of Singapore
might be less than 10 percent. In an operation like Singapore,
doing any of this is extremely difficult in terms of the
operation. The information needs to be transmitted by, as it
stands now, on the ocean carrier trying to load it on the
mainline vessel leaving Singapore, which we can do, but that
does not go far enough. We need that information transmitted
before it loads anywhere. That would be the responsibility of
whoever loaded that box.
Mr. Souder. We may have some additional written questions,
but this is my last one that relates directly what I just said.
I heard someone say in earlier testimony that on this very
point of the holding, that you could be held in Newark based on
something somebody wanted in Baltimore?
Mr. McDonough. What happens is you'll get a shipment that's
fully loaded and someone asks how many containers do these
ships carry? Some can carry up to 6,000. Majority or two-thirds
don't do that right now.
In any case, what can happen is you can get information
from any number of sources, and one of the ships stopped here
recently in the harbor was based on information that was
gathered in Halifax and they stopped the ship and wanted that
box or boxes off-loaded at some intermediary point.
And when you do that and you're sitting there with a ship,
let's say 6,000 TUs, that means 13 to 21 TEUs across and
another dozen up, it happens to be in the one in the hole, then
you're going to have an issue. It may sit there, what happened
in John's terminal a couple weeks ago, off-loading a box at a
time, taking an entire day to get to the box that you want.
That's an issue.
Mr. Souder. You're talk about the additional cross
instructions coming to the Federal Government by the private
insurers putting pressure on you to take action to make sure
you get terrorist insurance.
Mr. Hyde. Getting terrorist insurance post September 11th
is difficult. I don't deal every day in terrorist issues. Thee
has been a lot of pressure on our insurers to insure that we
are operating at a level that they're comfortable with.
We are obviously participating in some of the things that
helps us. The insurance issue has been very difficult. I don't
know much about it.
Mr. Hyde. We can't get sufficient coverage to cover their
capital investment, unless they want to pay virtually the
amount of the insurance. It's become a very critical issue for
us. It's becomes a critical issue not in terms of so much how
much it costs you to get the coverage, but also if you can't
get the coverage, you're not going to get the kind of bank
support, financial support, you need. It's a real dog chase.
Mr. Souder. They're not asking you to do certain things.
Mr. McDonough. They're not giving it to us. They're giving
it to us at unreasonable dates.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Any additional materials you want to
submit are very helpful.
The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned.]