<DOC>
[107th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:87388.wais]
HOMELAND SECURITY: SECURING STRATEGIC PORTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 23, 2002
__________
Serial No. 107-216
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
87-388 PDF
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York TOM LANTOS, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
DAVE WELDON, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Advisor
Jason Chung, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 23, 2002.................................... 1
Statement of:
Decker, Raymond, Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management Team, U.S. General Accounting Office,
accompanied by Joe Kirschbaum, Senior Analyst; and Kenneth
Goulden, vice president, Maersk Sealand.................... 54
Privratsky, Major General Kenneth L., Commander, Military
Traffic Management Command, Department of Defense; Captain
William G. Schubert, Maritime Administrator, Department of
Transportation; and Rear Admiral Paul J. Pluta, Assistant
Commandant for Marine Safety and Environmental Protection,
U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Transportation............. 5
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Decker, Raymond, Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management Team, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared
statement of............................................... 57
Goulden, Kenneth, vice president, Maersk Sealand, prepared
statement of............................................... 73
Pluta, Rear Admiral Paul J., Assistant Commandant for Marine
Safety and Environmental Protection, U.S. Coast Guard,
Department of Transportation, prepared statement of........ 34
Privratsky, Major General Kenneth L., Commander, Military
Traffic Management Command, Department of Defense, prepared
statement of............................................... 7
Schubert, Captain William G., Maritime Administrator,
Department of Transportation, prepared statement of........ 24
HOMELAND SECURITY: SECURING STRATEGIC PORTS
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 23, 2002
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs
and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Putnam, Gilman, Schrock,
Tierney, Allen, Watson, and Lynch.
Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and
counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy advisor; Thomas
Costa, professional staff member; Jason M. Chung, clerk; and
David Rapallo, minority counsel.
Mr. Shays. A quorum being present, this hearing of the
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and
International Relations entitled, ``Homeland Security:
Protecting Strategic Ports,'' is called to order. I welcome our
witnesses and I also welcome our guests.
This is the first of two hearings the subcommittee will
convene on port security. Today we examine force protection
measures and other precautions at the strategic seaports
through which the bulk of U.S. military personnel and material
pass in the event of a major mobilization. In 2 weeks, at
Congressman Putnam's request, the subcommittee will hear
testimony in Tampa, Florida, on security enhancements at
critical commercial ports.
The deadly attacks on the U.S.S. Cole forced the Department
of Defense to confront vulnerabilities of harbor operations
abroad and at home. Even before that, the Inter-Agency
Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports reported
widespread, systemic weaknesses in procedures and policies to
protect military property and personnel at the dock.
The Commission found security standards lacked consistency.
Readiness is seldom tested in portwide exercises. Complex,
unclear lines of authority between multiple Federal agencies,
State regulators, local governments and private entities all
but guarantee a fragmented, uncoordinated response to a
portside attack.
More recently, the General Accounting Office surveyed a
number of strategic seaports to assess security, management,
and coordination. They found weaknesses in threat
communication, risk mitigation, and resource allocation. Lack
of end-to-end security planning means some military equipment
is completely outside DOD control during transit.
In this war, the front line is here at home. Last century's
approaches to maritime security will not win the modern battle
to secure strategic ports.
Our witnesses today will describe efforts to strengthen
security planning and force protection at strategic seaports.
We appreciate their time and the expertise they bring to our
discussion of these important issues.
At this time I would recognize Mr. Schrock if he has any
comment he would like to make.
Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for being here today.
I represent the Second Congressional District of Virginia,
which includes Norfolk and Virginia Beach and will eventually
include Virginia's eastern shore and a portion of Hampton. The
District I represent boasts 384 military commands, eight major
bases, including four four-star commands, and the giant Norfolk
Naval Base.
Hampton Roads has the best natural deep-water harbor on the
east coast of the United States. Fifty-foot deep unobstructed
channels provide easy access and maneuvering room for the
largest of today's container ships. The port is located just 18
miles from open sea on a year-round ice-free harbor.
The strategic location of the Port of Hampton Roads and its
transportation infrastructure offer steamship lines and
shippers access to two-thirds of the U.S. population. The Port
of Hampton Roads transports more intermodal containers to more
cities than any other port in the United States.
I have just described one of the most attractive terrorist
targets in the United States. A ship sailing through Hampton
Roads steams within a few hundred yards of the Norfolk Naval
Base, home of the Atlantic Fleet, and Fort Monroe, home of the
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Fort Eustis, home of
the U.S. Transportation Command, is a short distance, a few
miles up the James River.
The detonation of a ship-based weapon of mass destruction
would have disastrous effects on our military and our economy.
This is a nightmare we cannot allow. How are we going to
prevent this scenario? Specifically, how are we going to keep
these very lethal threats from endangering our ports of
embarkation and military bases? That's what I'm hoping we can
discuss today.
Every time I cross over the Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel, as
I did yesterday coming here, I think ``what if,'' and the what-
ifs scare me to death. Fortunately, I am starting to see signs
of detectors on the bridge now, and that made me feel better
than I have felt in a long time, but I know a lot more needs to
be done, and I'm one who is willing to do anything I can to
help solve this problem and prevent a disaster. That is my No.
1 issue in Congress right now--port security. We'll do anything
to make sure our ports are secure.
Again, I thank you for being here. I thank you for what
you're doing. I look forward to hearing your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
At this time the Chair would recognize the vice chairman of
the committee, Mr. Putnam.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for your
leadership on this issue and your allowing the subcommittee to
come down to Florida to focus in a second phase of this hearing
on port security in our area.
As we focus today on the strategic seaports, these are
those which offer the most attractive target to terrorists, as
Mr. Schrock has pointed out, but they also offer what should be
the most well-defended, well-guarded opportunities for
terrorists to hit our seaports. I believe that there has been a
pattern established where terrorists go after our more soft
targets.
But it is disconcerting to note, as the GAO did, that even
at these strategic seaports, which should be the best-defended,
which should be the most well-guarded, there is no
comprehensive process to mitigate vulnerabilities or prioritize
resource distribution, no comprehensive mechanism for
developing and communicating threat information, no mechanism
in place to assess and communicate comprehensive threat
information across agencies.
This is a recurring theme in our entire homeland defense
and our entire national security strategy. Nobody is talking to
anyone. There is no communication at any level. That, to me, is
the most disturbing part of this entire GAO report and its
entire discussion about homeland security.
While I, along with a lot of others, have pinned our hopes
that the creation of a new department is going to improve
communication and improve coordination, the bottom line is
nobody is talking to each other now and we can only hope that
they will begin to talk to each other in the future.
As we evaluate those threats of bio-terror release in one
of the ports that would make incoming ships impossible to
disembark in these ports and make the outgoing ships from the
ports impossible to leave through quarantine or some other
purpose; as we evaluate the threats of destroying a ship and
clogging up the shipping panels; as we evaluate the patchwork
of agencies--local, State, and Federal, Coast Guard and DOD--
that share responsibility for these seaways, it becomes more
and more clear that we have not adequately analyzed the threats
that face our borders.
I look forward to the testimony today, and I thank the
chairman for his leadership on this issue.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
At this time the Chair recognizes Mr. Gilman, welcomes him.
We welcome him and will hear his statement now if he would like
to make one.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. You always come prepared, sir.
Mr. Gilman. I thank you for holding this important and
timely hearing. Due to events of September 11th and the attack
on our U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, it has become increasingly clear
that port security is an integral component within the broader
context of our Nation's security and deserves much more
attention than it has received in prior years as we work toward
the consolidation of our homeland security responsibilities
under a single Federal department.
It is imperative that we address this issue of port
security. According to the GAO report, which is a focus of
today's hearing, no single entity presently coordinates threat
information among the myriad local, State, and Federal agencies
with jurisdiction over our Nation's strategic seaports.
Moreover, the GAO report asserts that the Department of Defense
current system of protecting our Nation's military forces and
equipment as they are deployed throughout our seaports is
inadequately structured to today's security realities.
As the war on terrorism evolves, the likelihood that our
Nation will deploy greater number of troops and equipment by
way of these seaports is extremely high. Ensuring that our
troops and equipment are not subject to sabotage, to theft, or
attack on our own soil is essential. Accordingly, we welcome
the testimony of today's distinguished panelists and hope that
these participants can address the most critical issues
regarding port security and the deployment of our Nation's
military personnel and equipment through these vital seaports.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
Before I recognize our witnesses, I will take care of some
housekeeping here and ask unanimous consent that all members of
the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in
the record and that the record remain open for 3 days for that
purpose. Without objection, so ordered.
I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statements in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
At this time I will recognize our first panel. We have
General Kenneth Privratsky, Commander, Military Traffic
Management Command, Department of Defense; Captain William G.
Schubert, Maritime Administrator, Department of Transportation;
and we have Admiral Paul J. Pluta, Assistant Commandant for
Marine Safety and Environmental Protection, U.S. Coast Guard,
Department of Defense [sic], hopefully soon to be the
Department of Homeland Security.
I would invite the witnesses to stand so I can swear you
in, and then we will begin to hear your testimony.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. We note for the record all three of our
witnesses responded in the affirmative.
We will begin with you, General, and do welcome you here.
Thank you for coming.
STATEMENTS OF MAJOR GENERAL KENNETH L. PRIVRATSKY, COMMANDER,
MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;
CAPTAIN WILLIAM G. SCHUBERT, MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION; AND REAR ADMIRAL PAUL J. PLUTA, ASSISTANT
COMMANDANT FOR MARINE SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, U.S.
COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
General Privratsky. Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak today on the
issue of security as it relates to the movement of military
cargo through strategic seaports. We have been blessed over the
years with patriotic commercial port owners and operators, a
robust strategic port infrastructure, excellent civil and
military cooperation at all levels, and, until the events of
September 11th, a relatively risk-free homeland. Like others
appearing today, we in the Military Traffic Management Command
have been reassessing requirements since that day.
I have submitted written comments for the record. In this
opening statement, I would like to give you a sense of our
ongoing efforts to keep deployments safe.
There are a significant number of players involved in the
process of deploying units by sea. Considerable advanced
planning and coordination is essential. One method used with
success has been the National Port Readiness Committees. They
create forums for everyone to understand clearly their roles
and responsibilities and to surface potential issues or
threats.
We in the Military Traffic Management Command also conduct
extensive planning with deploying units, which includes
identifying sensitive or hazardous cargos that may present
special security concerns.
Because of GAO's assistance a year ago, we have made
significant progress in safeguarding ammunition shipments to
the Department of Defense's three ammunition ports. During
deployments, events follow carefully scripted plans. They do
not commingle with other commercial port activities. We have
had lots of opportunity to practice. In the last 18 months, we
have conducted 62 exercises or deployments, all without
incident.
Following September 11th we added much emphasis. We asked
for and received external assistance in assessing threats both
at DOD-owned and commercial strategic ports, and we are
implementing recommendations.
We in the Military Traffic Management Command are
instituting a new port terminal risk analysis for use on each
deployment operation. We also centralized command and control
of operations at a single location at Ft. Eustis, Virginia,
under the direction of a one-star general. That was something
planned to be accomplished by June 2003. After September 11th,
we accelerated our timeline. We now have a robust 24/7
operation managing surface transportation worldwide.
Prior to September 11th we had no significant intelligence
capability within my command. Now we are adding that and have
Reservists in our Operation Center in the interim developing
intelligence. We routinely receive intelligence information
from the Army military intelligence community and the U.S.
Transportation Command. We have secure communications with some
commercial carriers and associations to share information. As a
result, we are much better prepared to see and communicate
threats than we were last fall. All of us, however, remain on a
journey at this point. We have made much progress, but there is
certainly more that can and should be done. Toward that end, I
look forward to seeing the results of GAO's examination on
security measures. We will work hard to make our processes
better.
I see positive developments in the legislation currently
being worked by congressional conferees. Provisions directing
Department of Transportation to assess the safety of all U.S.
ports and to prepare anti-terrorism plans are critical. We
agree with the need to have background checks and security
identification issued by a central agency. We also are
interested keenly in those measures that improve cargo
identification and screening.
In closing, I would like to commend Congress for taking a
national approach to port security. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to
your questions.
Mr. Putnam [assuming Chair]. Thank you, General.
[The prepared statement of General Privratsky follows:]
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Mr. Putnam. Captain Schubert, welcome to the committee.
Captain Schubert. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here with
you today to discuss the role of strategic commercial ports in
homeland security.
The Maritime Administration plays an integral part in the
deployment of U.S.-flagged vessels carrying military personnel
and supplies to the theater. During a deployment, the Maritime
Administration, also known as MARAD, serves to ensure that our
commercial port facilities are available to the Department of
Defense for military load-outs. In peacetime, MARAD acts as an
advocate for our Nation's port community, which is a critical
component of our economy.
The emergency operating arm of MARAD, the National Shipping
Authority, is responsible for the acquisition and operation of
ships for the defense service and for the coordination of
shipping and U.S. commerce and the administration of the U.S.
Government's war risk insurance program. Also, in the event of
a national emergency, the National Shipping Authority
administers a program to assure the priority use and allocation
of commercial port facilities. If this authority is invoked, my
responsibility is to serve as the director of the National
Shipping Authority.
Coordinating port security during mobilization is not new
to MARAD. It is an issue that we have been addressing for many
years through the port readiness programs and the National Port
Readiness Network.
The National Port Readiness Network has established Port
Readiness Committees at each of our designated 13 strategic
commercial ports. The local captain of the U.S. Coast Guard,
Captain of the Port, are the chairpersons of those committees.
MARAD chairs both the National Port Readiness Steering and
Working Groups. These organizations provide coordination and
cooperation to ensure readiness of commercial ports to support
force deployment during contingencies and other defense
emergencies.
To maintain heightened readiness and performance at
strategic ports, MARAD assists its National Port Readiness
Network partners in conducting port readiness assessments,
monthly readiness status reports, mobilization planning,
vulnerability assessments, and improving the deployment
process. We have also partnered with the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency and other groups in the development of risk
assessments at our strategic ports.
MARAD is also concerned with port security because of its
role in providing strategic sealift to the Department of
Defense. Through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement,
also known as VISA, and the maritime security program, known as
MSP, MARAD administers an emergency preparedness program that
utilizes civilian transportation resources in a defense
emergency.
MSP and VISA stem from DOT's authority under the Defense
Production Act to prioritize sealift capacity for national
defense purposes.
Since September 11th, a number of changes have occurred to
improve port security. Obviously, port security is a major
concern today, both in Congress and within the administration.
Secretary Mineta has stated, ``Protecting seaports and port
facilities against the threat of terrorism is imperative.'' The
terrorist attacks have resulted in a renewed focus of security
of our transportation systems, and we at the Department of
Transportation are aggressively meeting these challenges on
several fronts.
Congress is to be commended for its swift action in passing
the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year
2002, which included port security grant funding. From this
supplemental appropriation, DOT was able to award 77 port
security grants, totaling $92.3 million, including $38.1
million for our 13 strategic ports. That's roughly 41 percent
of the total. These funds will be used to enhance facilities
and operational security, provide for security assessments, and
explore the use of new technology to improve maritime security.
As you know, port security legislation currently awaits
action by the congressional conferees. Although neither bill
has specifically addressed port security during a period of
mobilization, the security measures that will flow from the
passage of this legislation will certainly enhance security
throughout the port system.
Since September 11th, MARAD has also focused on providing
port security training and implementation of technology to
improve security. In August of this year the U.S. Merchant
Marine Academy's Global Maritime and Transportation School,
which is administered by MARAD, will conduct security training
for the State of Florida law enforcement officials.
On the international level, DOT and MARAD are working with
the International Labor Organization, or ILO, to implement
smart card technology to provide a reliable, secure mariner
identification system in order to track employment records,
minimize fraudulent documentation, and facilitate access to
secure areas. A uniform and verifiable transportation worker
identification card could facilitate the smooth flow of
commerce and also promote security. Other technological
innovations include cargo and container tracking systems and
electronic container seals.
In conclusion, I have every confidence that the Port
Readiness Network--this is due to my personal experience during
Desert Storm/Desert Shield. In 1991, when I was based in
Houston working for MARAD I was involved with the Port of
Houston's day-to-day deployment activities. I can tell you we
all pulled together. There was excellent cooperation between
the Military Traffic Management Command, the Coast Guard and
MARAD and State and local governments. We all knew our jobs and
we did them well.
I would like to make a special mention that the Coast Guard
performed an outstanding job in providing both shoreside and
water-based force protection. We were able to secure our work
area, credential dock workers, and load ships bound for the war
zone without any serious disruption in commercial service. We
were determined then and we are determined now.
I want to thank the chairman and members of this committee
for the opportunity to address you here today, and I look
forward to working with you on this vitally important issue in
the future.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Captain.
[The prepared statement of Captain Schubert follows:]
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Mr. Putnam. At this time the Chair recognizes Admiral
Pluta. Welcome to the subcommittee.
Admiral Pluta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr.
Chairman and distinguished members of the committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the
Coast Guard's efforts in protecting our Nation's strategic
seaports. The Coast Guard, with primary authority from the
Espionage Act of 1917, and the Magnuson Act of 1950, is the
lead Federal agency for reducing, preempting, deterring, and
defending against security threats targeting ports, waterways,
and the coastal areas of the United States and its territories.
As a unique instrument of national security, the Coast
Guard is the only military service with civil law enforcement
authority, regulatory and safety responsibilities, and Captain
of the Port authorities. These authorities prompted a
memorandum of agreement signed in 1995 by the Secretaries of
Transportation and Defense, the Chief of Naval Operations, and
the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard to provide
interdepartmental recognition of Coast Guard capabilities in
support of the national military strategy. The memorandum of
agreement establishes port operations, security, and defense as
a mission of the Coast Guard, including the use of Coast Guard
forces to help provide anti-terrorism force protection from
military forces in the United States and overseas.
It is through a well-defined command and control structure
at the local level and strong partnerships with key public and
private port stakeholders that the Coast Guard is able to
accomplish these missions. Guided by the National Port
Readiness Network, the Captain of the Port is the lead agency
responsible for coordinating Federal, State, and local
resources, as well as private entities in the port region, in
executing port security responsibilities during any
mobilization or national defense contingency operation. This is
accomplished primarily through port readiness, harbor safety,
and port security committees at the local level.
As a former Captain of the Port for the strategic ports of
Wilmington, North Carolina; Morehead City, North Carolina; and
Southport, North Carolina, I can't emphasize enough the
importance of a coordinated approach by all maritime players in
carrying out this critical function of port security,
especially as the United States continues its overseas military
operations.
Additionally, the Captain of the Port could receive
significant assistance through the passage of pending
comprehensive port security legislation currently being
reviewed in conference. Through a well-developed hierarchy of
port security plans, Federal, State, and local security
activities and resources will be more effectively aligned in
addressing our collective homeland security responsibilities.
The Coast Guard has been working closely with the
Transportation Command, the Military Sealift Command, the
Military Traffic Management Command, Department of Navy, and
the Maritime Administration to identify gaps, validate security
requirements, and establish a scheduling process for
coordinating Coast Guard waterside security during priority
outlooks.
Another key initiative in closing security gaps has been
the increased emphasis on vulnerability assessments for U.S.
seaports. Even before the events of September 11th, the Coast
Guard was actively working with DOD on their methodology for
identifying port vulnerabilities in strategic seaports.
Although the principles of port security for strategic
seaports are built around the prevention of a terrorist event,
safeguarding our strategic seaports against a broad spectrum of
threats requires a comprehensive maritime domain awareness. A
robust maritime domain awareness will provide all leaders with
the knowledge base needed to frame the optimum policies,
decisions, and operations to protect our strategic seaports.
The importance of protecting and supporting the movement of
military forces and supplies through U.S. seaports is never
more critical than it is today. Protecting military load-outs
in the continental United States and its territories is a
longstanding mission of the Coast Guard that requires a well-
coordinated effort with our Government and industry partners.
It is incumbent upon our Government agencies and military
services to balance the resources and meet the challenge of
protecting our critical military assets and infrastructure.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
I will be happy to answer any questions that you might have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Putnam. You're very welcome, Admiral.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Pluta follows:]
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Mr. Putnam. We appreciate the entire panel being here and
we thank you for your thoughtful opening statements.
We have a journal vote pending, so the subcommittee will
stand in recess for a few moments. We will be back as soon as
possible. Subcommittee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Putnam. The subcommittee will reconvene. My apologies
to the panel. Our logistics command here in Congress also has
some systemic problems.
At this time I would like to recognize Mr. Schrock for any
questions that he may have.
Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm going to emphasize again how important this issue is to
me. I'm sorry there aren't more Members here because the bad
guys got us one way before, and I think the next way they are
going to do it is by sea. I don't like to scream ``fire'' in a
crowded theater and I'm not Chicken Little with ``the sky is
falling,'' but, by golly, if we don't address this thing we're
going to have another September 11th and it is going to be in
the waters of America. We just have to prevent that.
This is a broad question, General, but you talked about
cargo and identification screening. I'm just trying to figure
out how we solve that. I hear a lot of people say, ``We need to
make sure when the container ships come to our shores, when
they are off-loaded they are checked.'' I'm here to tell you
that's too late. If a ship leaves Alexandria, Egypt, with a
little weapon on it and it gets behind our carrier piers in
Norfolk, for instance, and GPS system sets it off, it is too
late. But how do we do that? I know that's a terrible question
to ask, but I try to think of that all the time and don't know
how to do it unless you get all these other countries to agree
to do something like that. But how do we do that?
General Privratsky. Sir, I don't think there is a single
answer to how you do that. I don't think that you can check
containers adequately at either end of the supply chain and
make it effective. I think, as we work toward the best
solutions, we are going to find ourselves leveraging our robust
technology capabilities, analyzing patterns, analyzing
shippers, analyzing cargo, analyzing discrepancies related to
all of that, to use technology to try to identify what we then
see as being particularly risky, and then applying our cargo
screening toward that.
I do not see a future where we will ever be able to screen
all cargo at either end, or we're going to bring supply chains
to their knees.
Mr. Schrock. It would certainly impact commerce. Admiral.
Admiral Pluta. Thank you, sir. I thought it would be worth
mentioning, the concepts behind the approach we are taking in
concert with all the agencies involved with this challenge, and
I think it is the biggest challenge that we face in the
security realm, the cargo security part, particularly
containerized cargo.
The solution set that we are focusing on is end-to-end
cargo integrity from the point that the box is loaded to the
point that it arrives at its destination, and that includes
having a trusted agent at the loading, having a higher,
sophisticated kind of locking system and better containers that
can be interrogated electronically, and have a chain of custody
as it moves along all the way from its point of loading to the
point of destination--a lot of information sharing that needs
to be done, manifesting, proper manifesting of the cargo.
What helps that is that we are putting into place security
requirements, both domestically and internationally, for people
to do cargo security, in particular, better so that we can
recognize those companies that do security well, have solid
security plans in place, and do vet them and audit them
properly, and those people can--we don't need to waste our time
looking at people who do security well. We can focus on those
that we know less about. And so it is an incentive program that
will help us get that job done because of the millions of
containers that come into our ports. It is a very difficult
problem.
Mr. Schrock. I think I heard there were 16,000 containers
off-loaded in America every single day. That's a lot.
Admiral, let me followup with you. First of all, let me
tell you how wonderful I think the Coast Guard is. I mean,
their mission has not been fully appreciated over the years,
and I think now we certainly understand how important the
future role of the Coast Guard is going to be--and that's from
a guy who wore the Navy uniform for 24 years. You're part of
our sea services, and I'm really proud of what you do. And I
want to make sure, if Congress isn't giving you what you need,
keep coming back and screaming. Jim Loy, Admiral Loy, former
commandant, was the first head of the services who had the
courage to stand up and say, ``Congress, enough is enough.
Unless you give us the funding to do what we need, we can't do
any more.'' I thought that took a lot of courage, and the
others fell in line behind him.
You talk about a coordinated approach. I had a working
group over in Anacostia, I believe it was--over in Suitland
several months ago, and had 15 Government agencies there. What
I found was, you know, I think interoperability, keeping
agencies being able to talk to one another is very important in
sharing information, but what I found was that a lot of the
agencies would love to share some of that information but by
law they can't, which just makes absolutely no sense to me. Are
you finding that the case? How do we break that down? I guess
it's going to have to come from here, most of it, to pass laws
to get rid of laws so you all can talk to one another. Has that
been a problem for you all?
Admiral Pluta. Yes, sir, it has been a big challenge. Ever
since the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection, we recognized that there would be difficulty
sharing classified threat information with the people who
actually own the infrastructure--in large measure, the private
sector. So the concept that the Presidential decision directors
put in place was ISACs, they call them--Information Sharing and
Analysis Centers--so that the FBI, when they get credible
threat information, can share them through the ISAC right
directly to the people who need it.
As we speak, Coast Guard people, FBI people, people from
the maritime community are putting together an Information
Sharing and Analysis Center for the maritime mode to get that
threat information and be able to share it widely. The
challenge will be to get the security clearances to the people
who ultimately need that classified information.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Schrock. All right. That's good news.
Let me just ask one more question, Mr. Chairman, and then I
will keep quiet.
Captain, you talked about security assessments, you all
were doing security assessments. I guess that's a follow-on to
what I asked the admiral. Are you able to do those in
conjunction with other agencies, or are there stumbling blocks,
roadblocks in the way that prevent you from doing that?
Captain Schubert. The security assessments--there's really
on two fronts that's being done. The Coast Guard is--and
Admiral Pluta could address this I more detail--is developing a
standard to do what we call ``port security assessments.''
These are very comprehensive assessments, and there have been
some that have been done. At least two of the thirteen
commercial strategic ports have been completed, and there are
plans ahead to do the rest of them.
The other security assessments when we talk about it was
through the port grants that we just--that I just mentioned
earlier in my opening statement. We have funded out--of the
$92.3 million, approximately $5 million of that went to help
ports do their own security assessments, and approximately
$633,000 of that were security assessments to help fund the
ports in the 13 strategic ports that had requested money to do
that. So that's really where we are.
Admiral, did you want to add anything?
Admiral Pluta. Sir, the port vulnerability or port security
assessments, we're planning on hitting all 55 of the strategic
and economical ports in the United States over the next 3
years. It is resource-constrained evolution. We hope to get
eight accomplished this year, and we will have all the
strategic ports front loaded in that because we weighed heavily
in that direction.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Schrock. Well, thank you to all. Just know that if
there is any way I can carry your water and help you with this,
I'm here all the time to help you with that, and I'm not
kidding. It is a huge issue for me, and I want to help you in
any way I can.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Schrock.
We'll note for the record that Mr. Allen and Ms. Watson
have arrived. At this time, the Chair recognizes Mr. Allen for
7 minutes.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I may not need all of
that.
I apologize for not being here for your testimony.
The port in my District, Portland, Maine, is probably not
going to have a lot of troops moving through it, but I do want
to ask you, Admiral Pluta, about the Coast Guard's general role
with respect to ports--port security. I'm thinking, of course,
of my own. In particular, to what extent is the Coast Guard
working to develop affiliations with others who are using the
ports in the ports available to keep their eyes and ear open?
By way of background, just to give you sort of the setting
for my question, I was touring. I went out in the harbor, the
Portland Harbor, the other day with the waterfront director and
a variety of other people. It is clear that what we're trying
to do there is, from the local fire fighters on the fire boat,
to the Coast Guard, to the fishermen, to all the others who are
out there using the port, there is a sense that we need to use
all of the people who are using the port for other reasons and
tie them together somehow to be the eyes and ears in order to
protect the area. That's separate from the whole issue of
commercial transportation and containers and so on.
But I wondered at your level whether you're giving some
thought to that issue and how you are approaching it.
Admiral Pluta. Thank you, sir.
The answer to your question is yes, absolutely. We have
been working that issue since September 11th. In particular, up
in your area the First District commander, Admiral Cray, is
working with the fisheries community. I can't remember the
specific name of the program, but it is--Coast Watch is the
name of the program. In particular, working with the fishermen,
telling them specifically what sorts of suspicious things we
might be interested in hearing and who to contact--``Here's the
telephone number, here's the contact point.''
We have worked not only that up in your area but around the
country. On the national level, we've entered into memorandum
of agreement with the American Pilots Association. In large
measure, the pilots are the first Americans that set foot on a
foreign-flagged vessel when they come into the United States.
Also, the National Cargo Bureau, which is the first view of
cargo that comes into our country. And we published an 800
number, our own 7-by-24 national response center for people to
call in for any suspicious activity. We have Port Readiness
Committees at every port around the country, including
Portland, where all of the port stakeholders come together to
discuss security issues.
So we have tried to--we know that we don't have enough
resources to do this job ourselves, sir, and so we have reached
out in large measure to try to help expand our forces.
Mr. Allen. One more question. Again, it is not the precise
subject of this hearing, but I have been told that the
resources of the Coast Guard after September 11th have been
diverted really to protecting the homeland, and, of course, up
and down the Maine coast the search and rescue function, the
sort of watching out for fishing vessels and just being
available for all of those other tasks has been a real concern.
How are you now trying to balance your different roles and
functions, the ones you were focused on before September 11th
and the new significance of homeland security? How are you sort
of not giving up the old to take on the new?
Admiral Pluta. Thank you for that question, sir. It is very
important to us because we consider that everything we do plays
a role in national security one way or the other. The security
of our citizens is equally as important in their day-to-day
safety, life at sea, as it in the anti-terrorism context. So,
in simple answer to your question, right after September 11th,
because no one in the country knew what to expect next, we
diverted all of our assets to defending our ports, and we spent
up to--about 58 percent of our operating expenses of our budget
were directed at maritime security.
We recognized we couldn't sustain that. We needed to get
back to fisheries patrol, search and rescue, drug enforcement,
migrant interdiction, and so over time we migrated those larger
assets back to those missions, and what the Commandant of the
Coast Guard established is a multi-year strategy to get us
sufficient resources to do all of those things.
We're starting to commission maritime safety and security
teams--there will be six of them scattered around the country
initially--so that they could be our domestic surge capability
should another terrorist event occur so that we wouldn't have
to divert search and rescue and law enforcement assets to do
that job.
But we haven't degraded our capability. We are back to not
full capacity but near full capacity in those missions, and we
are working over the multi-year strategy with your help, sir,
to get back to the point where we can do both for the country.
Mr. Allen. Admiral, thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Putnam. You're very welcome. And we'll note for the
record that Mr. Tierney from Massachusetts has joined us, and
the Chair recognizes the chairman of the subcommittee, Mr.
Shays.
Mr. Shays. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Pluta, I was not being facetious when I was saying
hopefully you will find yourself under not the Department of
Transportation but the Department of Homeland Security. I am
intrigued by the sense that I get from your testimony that you
all feel that coordination is pretty good. Is that an accurate
statement among all three?
Admiral Pluta. Not perfect, Mr. Chairman, but certainly
better than it ever has been.
Mr. Shays. And, Captain, you nodded your heard, so that's a
yes?
Captain Schubert. Yes, I agree with that. Not perfect, but
we do work well together. And I think what is most important is
when the balloon went up for the Gulf War, that should be one
of the best examples of how we can really work together, and we
did work together very well.
Mr. Shays. General.
General Privratsky. Sir, I am cautiously optimistic. There
is no question that since September 11th that our focus has
shifted more to security than readiness in port operations, and
our Port Readiness Committees by name are becoming more and
more Port Security Committees because of that shift in
emphasis. In September we just did not view the threats to our
homeland as we view them today, and so there has definitely
been a migration of focus toward more security.
Mr. Shays. Let me make reference to the GAO, who will
testify later today. They said, ``Uncertainties regarding the
seaport security environment exist because comprehensive
assessments of threat, vulnerability, and critical port
infrastructure functions have not been completed and there's no
effective mechanism to coordinate and disseminate threat
information at the seaports.''
Should I read it again, or did you all hear it? I'd like
you to respond to that. Why don't we start with you, General?
General Privratsky. In terms of risk assessments, we have
had a very systematic number of assessments for ports underway
over the past several years. Specifically, if we looked at one
of the ports that garners a lot of my attention, our ammunition
port at Sunny Point, we had two----
Mr. Shays. I'm sorry. Sunny Point is which State?
General Privratsky. North Carolina.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
General Privratsky. It's our high-volume ammunition port.
We had two threat assessments at that port pre-September 11th
and after September 11th we had another one conducted by
Department of Army, and we have implemented recommendations
from those.
U.S. Transportation Command has requested the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency assessment of strategic ports. Four
have been conducted to date. Others will follow.
And so I think that there is a thorough assessment. I know
at that ammunition port I mentioned that we have taken very
deliberate action after those assessments and we're a lot
different now than we were in September and we'll be different
in the future.
Mr. Shays. Before I leave you, General, let me ask you, you
responded to the threat assessment. The second part of that
comment was that critical port infrastructure functions have
not been completed and there's no effective method to
coordinate and disseminate threat information at the seaport.
Take that point about infrastructure not being completed.
General Privratsky. Well, we have an integrated priority
list of projects that is managed by the U.S. Transportation
Command to resource fixes toward strategic ports. I can provide
a more-detailed answer for the record for you on that.
Mr. Shays. Let me just stick with you again, General, to
say in the report from GAO they say, ``We identified two
significant weaknesses associated with DOD's force protection
process for deployments through domestic seaports. First, DOD
lacks a central authority responsible for overseeing,
coordinating, and executing force protection measures while
military forces deploy from domestic installations through U.S.
seaports.'' Can you respond to that?
General Privratsky. There is no centralized DOD authority
for controlling that, but port security falls underneath the
Coast Guard, and that at a local level comes together at the
Port Readiness Committees, of which my command plays routinely.
Mr. Shays. Let me just jump then to the Coast Guard. I've
always gotten the feeling that the Department of Transportation
considers the Coast Guard somewhat of a step-child, with no
disrespect to step-children, but, frankly, it hasn't been
funded properly by Congress. I think we all know that and we've
known it for a number of years.
I'll leave with that negative note and I'll come back for a
second round, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Watson from California. Mr.
Watson, do you have questions?
Ms. Watson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for being here.
I have a District that once included the coastline of
Southern California. However, most of our military
transportation and so on, our military transferrals, are out of
the, I think, Stockton Harbor. Maybe some of you are aware.
My question to anyone who can respond is: how far out does
the line go? Is there a possibility that the enemy could be
within, say, a 20-mile radius, a 30-mile radius, and still do
damage to us? Do we scout out beyond that line for any kind of
craft that might have mal-intent? Can you just respond in
general, please?
Admiral Pluta. Thank you, Ms. Watson. Yes, we have
jurisdiction. The Coast Guard has jurisdiction out to the 200-
mile exclusive economic zone of our country.
Ms. Watson. 200 miles.
Admiral Pluta. We're working on, with Congress' help,
enabling legislation for us to require automatic identification
systems for vessels. They will all be required to carry
transponders which transmit information about their name, their
flag, last port of call, things such as that.
We also, because the bad guys will turn it off, we also are
working with the Department of Defense on surveillance systems
so that we can cross-check the responder information and be
able to tell the legitimate traffic from those that may not be.
And so we do have the jurisdiction, we exercise the
jurisdiction. We identify 96 hours before a vessel is scheduled
to arrive at the United States. We will identify whether or not
they have any suspicious crew members or any problems with
their cargo, and we will keep them out of port and board them
with a multi-agency boarding off-shore before we'll ever let
them in port if we suspect that there might be something amiss.
So it's not just a port-related focus, although that's very
important. We're also concerned about the maritime domain
awareness of knowing which vessels, which cargo, which people
are coming in the direction of the United States.
Ms. Watson. Let me go back to a little history. We were all
stunned by the ``U.S.S. Cole'' incident. As I understand, that
was supposed to be a craft bringing food to the ship?
Admiral Pluta. I'm not familiar specifically. I thought it
might have been an anchor-handling vessel or an anchor-handling
crew that they thought it was or could have been bringing food.
In any case, we are concerned about a Cole-type event, and
particularly working with the U.S. Navy. That's why we identify
vessels of high interest, and if we suspect that there might be
a crew member who has a suspect background, we will put Coast
Guard people on board as that vessel transits in, and we'll put
Coast Guard vessels alongside to escort it if it is a high-
consequence vessel like a Navy vessel or a cruise ship or
something like that, so that our escort vessel will be able to
shoulder away any small boat that may want to come by.
In the case of Naval vessels, we'll establish a Naval
vessel protection zone around their assets, and by law people
that enter that zone will be violating the law and we can
enforce that against them.
So yes, we factor in Cole-type incidents. We don't have
enough assets currently, but with our multi-year budget
strategy and with what is coming into the Coast Guard and
what's coming into the Department of Defense, we will be able
to deal with that threat, as well.
Ms. Watson. Being a late arrival--and I apologize for
that--you might have mentioned this, but have you graded and
rated the ports as to their vulnerability, as to those who are
at higher risk? And, if so, is there a list available?
Admiral Pluta. Yes, ma'am. There is a list of strategically
and economically important ports to the United States that the
Department of Transportation has focused on in cooperation with
the Department of Defense, and so we are focusing our attention
on those 55 of the 361 ports in the United States first.
Ms. Watson. Are they ranked?
Admiral Pluta. Yes, ma'am. It's a classified document and
we can provide that to you in a separate forum.
Ms. Watson. Yes. I just want to know how many are on the
west coast, California, if somebody could get that to me.
Admiral Pluta. Could we get back to you off-line on that,
ma'am?
Ms. Watson. Yes. I just want to add that right after
September 11th we did hold a forum out in California in Los
Angeles about preparedness and readiness across the board, and
our big concern was about our Port of Los Angeles, but troop
movement usually is out of, as I said, the Stockton area, the
North Bay area.
I must commend them for, you know, the constant vigilance.
I would just like to know are we up to par, have we done all
that we can do, and what kind of risks or vulnerability do we
face. So if you could get that information to me I can join
with my colleagues from California to be sure that we see that
our various military units and those people responsible are
keeping at this in securing. I'd appreciate that information.
Admiral Pluta. Thank you, Ms. Watson. We will provide you
with that list, and with your help over time I think we'll get
to where we need to be to provide all the protection your ports
deserve.
Ms. Watson. We're there.
Admiral Pluta. Thank you.
Ms. Watson. Thank you.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Ms. Watson.
Ms. Watson. Thank you.
Mr. Putnam. Captain Schubert, as the maritime
administrator, you are also director of the National Shipping
Authority, and that position is only mobilized in times of
emergency; is that correct?
Captain Schubert. That's correct. The President needs to
invoke a national emergency or war.
Mr. Putnam. And when was the last time that was mobilized,
that occurred?
Captain Schubert. It is kind of interesting. During Desert
Storm--the last time it was evoked was probably--I'd have to
get back to you on exact answer, but I want to reflect back to
Desert Storm/Desert Shield. During that mobilization we acted
under the National Port Readiness Network as if it was invoked,
and we actually did issue one priority order to a ship yard
under that authority. So I would say that was probably the last
time it was invoked, because we did invoke or issue a priority
order to utilize commercial facilities, and it was done once
during that engagement.
Mr. Putnam. So it is--but even in that situation it wasn't
really fully engaged. It was used in that instance; is that a
fair characterization?
Captain Schubert. Yes, and there's an interesting reason
why it wasn't fully engaged. Again, I'll relate to the Port of
Houston, which was the second-largest load-out port. In that
instance, the MTMC and MARAD worked very closely together as to
what the requirements are.
Our role is to make sure that, when we go in and prioritize
and allocate public resources, that it does not disrupt
commerce to--has the least impact on the disruption of normal
flow of commerce.
In this case, in Houston we were able to negotiate with the
Port of Houston to use one berth, basically one berth that they
had as a primary load-out without disrupting the commercial
flow, so we were able to do that without actually issuing what
we call a ``port planning order.'' That was modeled pretty much
throughout the United States.
Mr. Putnam. Does it concern you that in time of war the
plans that are in place for a war or for a national emergency
were not fully engaged, which begs the question of whether we
have the right plans in place? And, second, that we were
essentially responding to the war effort in a logistics
capacity by doing what was most convenient for commercial
shippers?
Captain Schubert. No, that didn't concern me on either
count. We weren't just doing--first of all, to answer the last
part of your question, we weren't just concerned about
commercial shippers, but that is the reason why, under the
Defense Production Act, that civilian agencies have those roles
of prioritizing and allocating resources. It is so that we
don't disrupt.
But in this case we had, I think, a very effective load-out
scenario. We moved more cargo during that 6-month period than
we did during the entire Korean War. It worked very well, very
efficiently. The Government agencies that were involved in the
Port Readiness Network worked very well together. We
established communications. We did, during that engagement,
establish secure communications with all the ports. We had a
credentialling system that we stood up almost overnight. It
worked very well, and I think we learned a lot of good lessons
from that.
Mr. Putnam. Let me come back to that. General, you
mentioned that your committees, your Readiness Committees, have
essentially shifted from being Readiness Committees to being
Security Committees. Could you elaborate on the consequences of
that shift?
General Privratsky. I didn't mean to imply that we have
shifted, but we are shifting. On September 11th the risks to
our homeland were different than they are today, and when Port
Readiness Committees met routinely, quarterly in most cases, at
the 13 commercial strategic ports, they met to discuss the
readiness of the port to deploy the forces. Less time was spent
then discussing security implications because we were
perceiving the environment differently than we do today.
Now, when those Port Readiness Committees meet there is an
open discussion of intelligence information. All those
committees have met at those 13 commercial ports since
February. The ones in California have met just this month.
There is an open dialog sharing of intelligence information.
Our ability to provide information to those committees is
much better today than it was in September. As I mentioned in
my written and oral testimony, we have a more robust
intelligence capability in my command, and our links to other
commands are better. That information throughout the Military
Traffic Management Command is disseminated down to the level
where they enter that Port Readiness Committee.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you. My time has expired.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
Admiral Pluta, before September 11th or immediately
following September 11th the Coast Guard was very involved in
protective activities, am I right?
Admiral Pluta. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. When you undertook those activities, did you
do so under some existing memorandum of agreement with various
other agencies, or just a plan that the Coast Guard had
designed on its own to spring into action?
Admiral Pluta. I don't think I could point to a memorandum
of understanding that caused us to do what we did on September
11th, we just did what we always do--we respond. We are a
response organization. We saw a need and we didn't know where
the next threat was coming from, so we put everything we had to
work guarding the ports of the United States of America, sir.
Mr. Tierney. And since that day have you changed that
posture at all? Are you still performing under that sort of
independent mandate, or have you since then worked out
memorandum of agreement or other arrangements with other people
to divide up the responsibilities and address them?
Admiral Pluta. There has been a lot more networking, sir,
with regard to everything that we do in the ports, obviously.
We have gone back to the traditional missions with the assets
that we pulled out of service to go and defend the ports, and
so that we could get back to the important drug interdiction,
migrant interdiction, safety of life at sea, fisheries
enforcement, those missions. But in the ports, themselves, we
recognize that we couldn't do this job alone and we shouldn't
do this job alone. It shouldn't be just borne by the Federal
Government. It should be borne by all the agencies, as well as
State and local, as well as the private sector. So we've
outreached a lot, we've had a lot of public meetings, we've
sent out guidance. We are working internationally to get a
global solution to our problems. And, yes, sir, we are a
networking organization because of how small we are, and we
exercise that to the max.
Mr. Tierney. Has there been any conversation with the Coast
Guard and the Department of Defense with respect to plans
announced by the Department of Defense to do a Northern
American Command?
Admiral Pluta. Yes, sir. We have been in at the ground
floor on the development of NORTHCOM all along the way, and we
intend to ensure that Coast Guard is strongly represented as a
member of that staff, with your approval, with a flag officer
as well as a robust staff to support that flag officer and the
northern commander.
Mr. Tierney. What do you know so far about the plans of how
the Coast Guard's responsibilities and the Navy's
responsibilities will play off one another as that develops?
Admiral Pluta. If anything, the September 11th event has
caused our relationship to even strengthen. We had a NAVGUARD
Board to coordinate our issues before, and resources largely
flowed from the Coast Guard to the Navy. But, due to the fact
that we are the lead Federal agency for maritime security, the
Navy has chopped vessels for our use to protect the ports of
the United States and have worked ever more closely with us on
sharing intelligence, doing analysis, and our day-to-day
operational readiness.
Mr. Tierney. And as far as you can tell, is that the
direction that this NORTHCOM is heading in--that it will
continue to be a cooperative relationship and that the Navy
will share resources----
Admiral Pluta. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney [continuing]. As opposed to having any sort of
disturbance as to who is going to control what?
Admiral Pluta. Yes, sir. It has been a very cooperative
effort and I think the NORTHCOM is going to be focused on the
maritime defense as opposed to maritime security, the
preventive part of it. But the Coast Guard is integral to both
of those issues, so we have been welcomed. One of my capstone
classmates is putting that together for the Department of
Defense. Very close relationship, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Tierney.
We're going to finish out the first round with the other
gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, and then have a second
round for those who have additional questions.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, Commander, Captain, thank you very much for your
courtesy in appearing before this committee and informing us.
I want to say that I represent the Port of Boston,
especially a significant portion of the maritime port. I share
that honor with Congressman Capuano and also Mr. Tierney.
I just wonder if, in speaking of these 14 ``strategic
ports'' through which we move military personnel and material,
are there any lessons that can be learned for the other? I'm
hoping, by the way, that the Port of Boston is on this larger
list of 55 ports. I don't know. I don't have that classified
list yet, but I will have it soon. Are there lessons that we
can learn, structurally or in terms of preparation, to address
the concerns that you see in these ``strategic ports'' that
would be useful in the larger grouping of 55 ports? Anyone?
Admiral Pluta. Thank you, Mr. Lynch. I think the rest of
the ports can learn very from those ports. Having been a
chairman of a Port Readiness Committee and having had that
history since the 1980's, where the Port Readiness Network
matured, it helped us prosecute the Gulf War in all our ports
because the MTMC commander, the Coast Guard Captain of the
Port, the State Port of North Carolina in that case, we all
knew each other, our people knew each other, we knew each
other's facilities, and it was natural for us to flow into an
accelerated mode.
In the other ports there were no Port Readiness Committees,
and so I think part of the pending legislation that the
conferees are working on and maritime security is to have a
legal requirement that there be Port Security Committees in
those other ports to perform largely the same function with
also some additional members, like from the intelligence
community and the Federal and State and local law enforcement
community--FBI, State police, those kind of folks--to make sure
that threat information is fresh and new.
So the lessons learned for me, sir, are that the Port
Readiness Committee concept works and we ought to export that
success to the other ports of the United States.
Mr. Lynch. The other question I had is regarding
containerized cargo. I know that a very small percentage of
that is being inspected right now, and I know you spoke earlier
of the efforts to move our borders out, so to speak, so that
there is some type of screening process that might occur if we
have some indication that there might be questionable persons
or cargo on a particular ship. But are there any, I guess,
systematized processes that you see being implemented in the
near term that might address the problem that we have, for
example, in the Port of Boston where we have, you know,
shipping lines from China and from the Middle East and from
Europe--well, the Mediterranean, let's say--coming on a weekly
basis into the port of Boston?
Captain Schubert. I would like to address this first, and
if you want to add, Admiral--first of all, I wanted to mention
it earlier with regards to the container movement of container
cargo, that in this area there has been very good cooperation
amongst all the Federal agencies to address this issue. In
fact, as we speak right now there is what we refer to as the
``inter-agency container working group'' working on it up at
the Merchant Marine Academy up at King's Point from Monday to
Wednesday to try to consolidate and come up with some
additional action items to address this issue.
Our main concern I think is, as you say, pushing the
borders out is that we want to know--we want to have some form
of pre-inspection of cargo and screening cargo before it is
actually loaded on a ship that's coming to the United States.
But, again, there is some specific recommendations from this
container working group. The first report was last February, in
that timeframe. Some of those initiatives have been
implemented, and it is an example of very close cooperation
amongst all the Federal agencies.
Admiral Pluta. Mr. Lynch, just to inform the committee,
there are several pilot projects going on under the umbrella of
Operation Safe Commerce. One that has already been completed
followed a containerized shipment of lights from a manufacturer
in Slovakia through Germany to Canada and then down to New
England. We are learning our lessons there.
There are other pilot projects on the west coast. I know
the Port of Seattle is forming some bilateral partnerships and
pilot projects with Singapore and with China, several ports in
China, and so we are learning how to do that, how to maintain
the integrity of those pieces of cargo.
Also, a lot of this has to do with information sharing--the
required proper manifesting of information and getting it to
the people who need it in a timely fashion, protecting the
commercial interests but allowing the Government agencies to
draw from it. So we put out a notice of proposed rulemaking on
our 96-hour advanced notice of arrival requirements to require
that electronic cargo manifest information be forwarded
directly to U.S. Customs at least 96 hours before a vessel
arrives here.
So the coordination, the providing of that sort of an
electronic data base and information sharing capability I think
is key to our getting this, and supporting through R&D or
Federal funds the kind of pilot projects where we can learn to
do this properly.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Admiral, just on that last point--and
this is my last question--what type of penalty befalls a
company--let's just say on your very point where the bill of
lading has to say, you know, exactly what is in the container
that is coming into the port. Let's just say that is not--that
the bill of lading is not correct, that a shipper is actually
putting things in a container that he has not declared on the
invoice, and that there is potentially a breach of security.
What happens to that shipper who is in violation?
Admiral Pluta. Mr. Lynch, sir, we're working with the
Department of Justice on how to best structure the legal
framework for penalties, but at the very minimum if somebody
fails to comply with the 96-hour advanced notice of arrival
requirement they won't be permitted in port, and that's going
to interrupt their supply chain, and that's going to slow down
their business, and they're not going to put themselves in that
position if they are a competent operator. So that's one
measure, and, as I said, the Department of Justice is helping
us to deal with that.
If I might, may I transfer the floor to----
Mr. Lynch. Sure.
Captain Schubert. If we're talking about an issue of cargo
description as manifested, it would refer to as a
``misdescription of cargo,'' and that really falls within the
realm of the Federal Maritime Commission.
Now, if we're talking about misdeclaring cargo at
customers, then I'm sure there are penalties there, but the--
for a misdescription of cargo, the Federal Maritime Commission
does have pretty steep penalties for that.
Mr. Lynch. It just seems to me that we are going to need
the cooperation of foreign shippers to police their own cargo
or their own containers before they come into this country in
an effort to move the borders out.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Lynch.
Let me just ask a quick question to followup from Mr. Lynch
before we yield to the chairman.
In 1998, according to testimony that this subcommittee
received last week, 1998 a private weapons collector imported
not one but two scud missiles from Czechoslovakia into the Port
of Long Beach. What was the penalty to the shipper for mis-
identifying, or how did we correctly identify that scud
missiles were coming in and no one caught it?
Admiral Pluta. I can't answer your question, Mr. Chairman.
I was unaware of that event. It's a Customs declaration kind of
an issue. I can't speak for them. I'm sorry, sir, but I can't
answer.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, you are recognized.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I almost would be overwhelmed if I had to figure out how to
protect our ports, in part because almost every military part,
it strikes me, is a domestic port--I mean, has a non-military
function, as well. Is that fairly accurate, Captain?
Captain Schubert. Yes. I'd say that, from a percentage
basis of cargo that's moving through our ports on a regular
basis, it's a very small percentage. A very small percentage of
our cargo would be DOD cargos, if that's what you're asking.
Mr. Shays. When I was asking earlier about the whole issue
of vulnerability and threat assessment, I'm unclear as to what
agency is responsible for conducting seaport-specific terrorism
vulnerability and threat assessment.
Captain Schubert. I would view that--as I mentioned
earlier, the Coast Guard has gone out to develop a very
detailed, comprehensive port--we don't call it port
vulnerability assessments--port security assessment on a way to
do that on the 55 ports, and I believe Admiral Pluta could
address that, but I believe the Coast Guard, as our primary
agency for homeland security, is responsible for that.
Admiral Pluta. Mr. Chairman, if I might add?
Mr. Shays. Yes. Sure.
Admiral Pluta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I mentioned
earlier, we have sought funds and received some to conduct
vulnerability of port security assessments here at the--at
first the most important ports in the United States, and
eventually all of them. This would be a comprehensive
assessment by a contractor with Coast Guard oversight to look
at all aspects of vulnerability of the entire port, not just a
single facility.
I think, to contrast with what General Privratsky was
talking about, he is mainly concerned, I believe, with the
facility, itself, under MTMC and worrying about it from both
the shore side and the water side. Our concern is the entire
port. One facility may be very well protected and the one right
next door not well protected. We want to uncover those kind of
vulnerabilities and look at such things as where do they get
their power from, how well is their information protected, and
then how is access control provided, lighting, fencing, the
whole nine yards.
Mr. Shays. And I make an assumption that you have not had
the resources to do it so we do not at this time really have an
assessment of vulnerability and threat. I mean, we are doing it
but we don't have it.
Admiral Pluta. Yes, sir. We have five completed. We hope to
do eight at least this year with the funds available to us.
Mr. Shays. And how many are we talking about?
Admiral Pluta. I'm sorry, sir?
Mr. Shays. How many would we be talking about totally?
Admiral Pluta. Fifty-five, sir.
Mr. Shays. And so, General, would you kind of, based on
what the admiral told me, put it in context with what you were
telling me about?
General Privratsky. The fifty-five, seventeen of those
ports are strategic ports, and of those thirteen are
commercial, and of those thirteen there have been risk
assessments conducted on four of the commercial ports. Of the
DOD facilities, there have been extensive risk assessments done
on two, those at Sunny Point, North Carolina, and Concord,
California.
Mr. Shays. And are those ports--sorry for my ignorance--are
those ports exclusive military, or are they ports that folks
sail out of for pleasure and commercial ships come in?
General Privratsky. Our port at Sunny Point, North
Carolina, is a DOD installation. It is our primary port for
shipping ammunition. We do have----
Mr. Shays. These are weapons ports. I'm sorry, but what I'm
asking is--the ports are fairly large, so do you have a part of
a major harbor or----
General Privratsky. These are exclusive use Department of
Defense facilities. At Sunny Point I do have the capability and
the approval authority to move commercial shipments through
there, and I have executed that a half dozen times in the past
year-and-a-half through an extensive coordination process.
Mr. Shays. Let me just conclude by asking each of you to do
a proper threat--to do the things that were mentioned by GAO,
the comprehensive assessment of threat, vulnerability, and
critical port infrastructure and functions, to do the proper
overseeing, coordination, executing force protection, what type
of dollars are we talking about?
Admiral Pluta. Mr. Chairman, the assessments--average cost
of a comprehensive assessment of an entire port area like I
have been talking about is about $500,000, a half million
dollars apiece to do that.
Mr. Shays. And if you had all the money necessary, would
you have the personnel to do it, or is there a time issue, as
well? I mean, in other words, is there a limit to how quickly
we can do this?
Admiral Pluta. Mr. Chairman, I think there is--we could do
it quicker than we have planned right now. We are using a
contractor, and we are going to--the Coast Guard role and our
other agencies that are helping us do oversight are going to
just be overseeing the contractor's work. So it is a matter of
how many people the contractor can get geared up to do the job.
They have been working on first a model port assessment
template that we can apply to every port, not that one size
fits all, but we need to look at the same elements as we look
at every port. So that work is nearly complete, and then they
will be ready to roll it out and try it out on ports.
We have learned what we've learned today through working
with DTRA on threat reduction to defense ports, but it is--I
think it is more resource constrained than time constrained,
Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Mr. Putnam. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
At this time we recognize the distinguished chairman
emeritus of the International Relations Committee, Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I address this to the entire panel. I regret I had to go to
another meeting and was detained from coming back on time. What
is the role of the Merchant Marine in port security or security
in high seas? Can I address that to the whole panel?
Captain Schubert. Well, first of all, in my opinion, the
safest way to move cargo is under--is on a U.S.-flagged vessel
with U.S.-owned and U.S.-crewed crew on board the ship. That is
the basis for the Cargo Preference Act of 1904 which mandates
that all military cargo move on U.S.-flagged ships.
But the bit for security, it is--I certainly feel better,
you know--I gave some testimony a couple of weeks ago about
some of the issues around what we call ``open registries, flag
inconvenience.'' So we are quite concerned that some of these
ships that are coming in and out of our ports, that we need to
increase the knowledge and standardized way of credentialling
worldwide so we know who is on those ships.
Outside of that, we have the IMO efforts that the Coast
Guard is engaged in, which I believe will designate a security
officer aboard our ships.
Did you want to add to that, Admiral?
Admiral Pluta. If I may, Mr. Chairman Emeritus, thank you,
sir. What the administrator said is true. We are depending upon
the mariner to be our eyes and ears, as well as making sure
that the vessel security plans that we will require both
domestically and internationally for all flagged vessels, there
be a vessel security officer on board designated to make sure
that the security measures are implemented on that ship, and
that could be things like making sure you know all of the crew
members and passengers on board and whether or not they are
clean, making sure that any of the cargo--all the cargo on
board has been properly vetted, and those sorts of things. We
also will require a company security officer to oversee their
whole fleet of ships, likely to be a former Merchant Mariner.
Mr. Gilman. Admiral Pluta, is there some special training
for these security officers on each ship?
Admiral Pluta. Yes, sir, there will be a list of required
competencies that they have to have and required training that
they have to have, and then they have to train the rest of the
crew in what their responsibilities will be.
Mr. Gilman. Who will be doing that training initially?
Admiral Pluta. You want to answer that?
Captain Schubert. We're still waiting for the pending
legislation to port security to pass, and it will address that
to some degree, but from the viewpoint of the Department, we
believe that we have resources out there like the U.S. Merchant
Marine Academy at King's Point and Global Maritime
Transportation School at King's Point that can be used for
that.
Mr. Gilman. But they're not using them at the present time;
is that correct?
Captain Schubert. I could say not only the Merchant Marine
Academy, but the State schools are implementing security
courses at their schools as we speak, but, as I mentioned in my
opening statement, the Global Maritime Transportation School at
King's Point is currently training--actually, in August will be
training from the State of Florida law enforcement officers
from the State of Florida, and this will be, I think, the first
real class dedicated exclusively to do that.
Mr. Gilman. So right now there is no overall training in
place; is that right?
Captain Schubert. It's not--correct, sir. It's not in place
yet because we were waiting for the final legislation to come
out of conference to see how it will define those
responsibilities.
Mr. Gilman. I hope you are going to be able to expedite
that. How do we currently monitor private boat owners from
international ports like yachts, fishing vessels? How do we
monitor all of that?
Admiral Pluta. Mr. Chairman Emeritus, I don't think that we
monitor. We monitor the vessels that do come into the United
States, but, as far as the private vessels, I don't think there
is--they're below the cutoff for our 96-hour advanced notice of
arrival requirements. We hope to get all vessels under that
same requirement so that we can see all foreign yachts and
foreign fishing vessels and foreign other vessels coming into
the United States, but currently we have no requirement for
that, sir.
Mr. Gilman. So right now, Admiral, they are under the radar
screen, right? They're not up on the screen?
Admiral Pluta. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We appreciate the distinguished panel's comments. There may
be additional comments submitted for you to answer for the
record. At this time we will excuse the first panel and seat
the second panel.
The subcommittee is pleased to welcome Mr. Raymond Decker,
the director of Defense Capabilities and Management Team with
the U.S. General Accounting Office, and Mr. Kenneth Goulden,
Vice President of Maersk Sealand. Welcome to the subcommittee,
gentlemen.
As you know, this is a subcommittee that does swear in
witnesses, so I would ask that you please stand and raise your
right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Putnam. Note for the record that the witnesses
responded in the affirmative.
It is a pleasure to have you with us, and we will begin
with Mr. Decker. You are recognized.
STATEMENTS OF RAYMOND DECKER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
AND MANAGEMENT TEAM, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
ACCOMPANIED BY JOE KIRSCHBAUM, SENIOR ANALYST; AND KENNETH
GOULDEN, VICE PRESIDENT, MAERSK SEALAND
Mr. Decker. Thank you very much, Mr. Putnam, Chairman
Shays, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am pleased
to be here today to participate in a hearing on homeland
security, securing strategic ports with an emphasis on the
security coordination measures through our military movements
through these vital portals.
As requested, my testimony will focus on the security
environment at domestic strategic seaports used by the
Department of Defense for military deployments and the
Department's process for securing these military deployments
through those ports. My comments are based on preliminary
results of the work we are currently conducting on this issue
for the subcommittee. We plan to provide the subcommittee with
a report this fall.
I have asked my senior analyst in charge responsible for
this area, Mr. Joe Kirschbaum, to join me at the witness table.
The October 12, 2000, attack on the U.S. destroyer ``U.S.S.
Cole'' in the Port of Aden illustrated the danger of non-
traditional threats to U.S. ships in seaports. The September
11th attacks heightened the need for a significant change in
conventional anti-terrorism thinking. The new security
environment assumes that all U.S. military assets here and
abroad are vulnerable to attack and a domestic physical
infrastructure such as our commercial seaports is recognized as
highly vulnerable to potential terrorist attack. These seaports
are vital to our national security, and during a major conflict
95 percent of the Department of Defense's equipment and
material needed for overseas military operations would pass
through them.
Uncertainties regarding the seaport security environment
exist for several reasons. First, comprehensive assessments of
threat, vulnerability, and critical port infrastructure and
functions which we would call ``criticality'' have not been
completed. These assessments underpin the risk management
approach that I have previously described in past hearings
before this subcommittee and the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs.
As you are aware, risk management is a balanced,
systematic, and analytical approach to determine the likelihood
that a threat could adversely affect individuals, physical
assets, or functions, and then identify actions to reduce the
risk, mitigate the severity of the consequence of the event,
and reasonably manage uncertainty.
Second, no effective process exists to receive, analyze,
evaluate, and disseminate the spectrum of threat information at
seaports. Most threat information at the ports is received
informally through personal contacts with law enforcement
individuals. No formal mechanism exists to ensure that all
threats are factored into the risk-based decisionmaking process
with actionable information transmitted in a timely manner to
all relevant organizations.
Recent efforts by the Coast Guard and other agencies at the
ports are attempting to address many of these weaknesses, and
you heard many of the witnesses in the previous panel discuss
this. The Coast Guard has initiated vulnerability assessments
of the port's infrastructure and is deploying additional teams
dedicated to seaport authority functions. The first Marine
safety and security team was deployed 3 weeks ago to Seattle
and will provide SWAT-team-like support to investigate
suspicious vessels before they enter U.S. ports.
In 1999, the Coast Guard discussed in a strategic plan the
concept of maritime domain awareness, which links information
fusion, risk management principles, and decisionmaking process.
With the support of the National Security Council, this concept
is being validated at the Coast Guard's Intelligence
Coordination Center in Suitland through real-world application.
On the congressional front, proposed legislation, Senate
Resolution 1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001,
should assist those officials and organizations responsible for
the safe and secure operation of our seaports to better focus
resources and actions against future threats. Several key
provisions of the legislation include: the establishment of a
national level and port and local port security bodies to plan
and oversee security measures, the conduct of port
vulnerability assessments, and background checks for port
workers and development of access controls to sensitive areas.
There is much more in that resolution that will be very
beneficial.
The implementation of these provisions and others will help
create an effective framework to better understand the threat
environment and the importance of the continuous assessment of
threat to support daily operations, as well as short-and long-
term planning. We believe the current enhanced security-related
activities discussed earlier, coupled with the measures of S.R.
1214, should continue to improve the security posture of our
seaports.
Now I would like to comment on Department of Defense's
force protection process for deployments through domestic
seaports. During the conduct of our work, we identified two
significant weaknesses in the process. First, there is no
Department of Defense focal point tasked to provide overall
oversight, coordination, and execution of domestic force
protection measures from fort-to-port military movements. Since
a military movement of equipment or material normally involves
the parent military unit, the Military Transportation
Management Command, Port Readiness Committee, Military Sealift
Command, and with each of these elements responsible for a
different portion of the journey, there are varying degrees of
force protection planning, execution, and risk management
application.
Complicating this issue further is the fact that non-
Government parties may be contracted to provide transport by
road and rail. As a result, potential force protection gaps and
weaknesses requiring attention and action outside the purview
or awareness of any one element may exist.
In contrast, once a military shipment reaches its overseas
debarkation point, a military element at the Unified Command
level is responsible for the overall force protection planning
and execution for the safe off-load and transport to its final
destination. This capability provides oversight of all phases
of the movement, especially when non-U.S. entities are
involved.
Second, during the movement of military equipment or
material by ship, the Department sometimes relinquishes control
of these items to non-Department-of-Defense entities to include
foreign-flagged ships crewed by non-U.S. citizens. Although
this practice is consistent with current Department policies
and procedures, it limits the Department's ability to provide
security oversight while the equipment is in transit and
potentially increases the risk involving these vital cargos.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, the events of September 11th
heightened the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to non-
traditional attack, and the resulting new environment warrants
that more attention be focused on vital military deployments
through strategic commercial seaports.
A risk management approach will wisely guide both military
and civilian leaders and managers as they make important
decisions affecting planning and actions to better prepare
against potential attacks and mitigate the consequences of
adverse events. However, the current uncertainties in the
security environment at our domestic ports and weaknesses in
the Department of Defense's force protection approach increase
the potential risk to military deployments that could adversely
affect U.S. overseas operations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. We would be
pleased to respond to any questions you, the committee, may
have.
Mr. Shays [resuming Chair]. Thank you, Mr. Decker. I
appreciate all the work you do before this committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Decker follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Mr. Goulden at Maersk Sealand.
Mr. Goulden. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it
is a pleasure for me to appear here before you today to speak
about security coordination measures at strategic seaports
during mobilization of military cargo. Maersk shares your
commitment to ensuring that security measures are in place to
protect military personnel and cargo during mobilizations.
By way of background, Maersk is one of the largest
providers of global intermodal transportation services in the
world. We have built and operate an integrated transportation
network covering 100 countries. Our network includes more than
250 ocean-going vessels, numerous terminals on five different
continents, including 12 ocean terminals here in the United
States, over 800,000 shipping containers, business
relationships with trucking companies and railroads around the
world, and sophisticated information management systems to
track each shipment from initial order to final delivery.
One of Maersk's most important customers is the U.S.
Government and the Department of Defense, in particular. Two of
our main business areas with the Department of Defense are,
one, ship ownership and management services, and, two, global
intermodal transportation services.
With respect to ship ownership management services, Maersk
owns and/or operates a sizable fleet of ships exclusively for
the U.S. military. The fleet includes two ammunition ships,
eight large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships known as LMSRs,
five maritime prepositioning ships, and twelve surveillance
ships. These ships typically call at seaports controlled by the
U.S. military.
Maersk also provides the military with global intermodal
transportation services using our commercial intermodal
network. Currently Maersk transports approximately 30,000 40-
foot equivalent containers each year for the Department of
Defense.
In addition to providing peacetime support, Maersk supports
the military mobilization requirements through its
participation in the maritime security program and the
voluntary intermodal sealift administration known as VISA.
Under these programs, Maersk has committed to provide the U.S.
military with more intermodal and vessel capacity capabilities
during a mobilization than any other carrier in the world. This
commitment is memorialized in pre-negotiated contracts to
facilitate a quick and seamless transition from peacetime to
contingency operations.
Earlier, General Privratsky provided the subcommittee with
testimony that focused primarily on security of military
organic transportation networks. The military also relies on
commercial intermodal networks and assets. The focus of my
testimony is the security of commercial intermodal networks
during both peacetime and military mobilizations.
Mobilizations and major deployments will be accomplished
under the VISA program. One important component of the VISA
program is the Joint Planning and Advisory Group known as JPAG.
The JPAG provides a forum for the military and VISA carriers to
exchange information, both classified and unclassified, and
coordinate actions to develop concepts of operations. Through
pre-negotiated contracts, the JPAG will have a number of tools
at its disposal and can incorporate these into CONOPS to
protect military cargo. The security measures included in the
CONOPS will be in addition to the many security measures that
Maersk has in place to protect its commercial intermodal
network and the cargo that moves through it.
Since September 11th, Maersk has hardened its existing
security systems and procedures. Maersk also was one of the
first carriers to participate in the voluntary U.S. Customs
trade partnership against terrorism initiative known as C-TPAT.
As part of that initiative, Maersk is conducting global
security assessment and gap analysis, which should be completed
within the next 30 days. Maersk will followup that assessment
by implementing appropriate measures to address any identified
security gap or weakness.
We have made good progress in improving security, but still
have a big job in front of us. Without a doubt, it is a complex
and multi-faceted endeavor that requires the leadership and
coordination of the Federal Government.
The Federal Government must establish and enforce
standardized security requirements for each participant and
each node in the intermodal transportation process. Without
mandatory security standards, the competitive environment makes
it commercially impossible for an individual company on its own
initiative to impose additional security requirements on
customers and suppliers. When establishing security
requirements, the Federal Government must be mindful of the
impact that such requirements could have on the network
performance and strike an appropriate balance. We must be
careful that security measures do not cause bottlenecks that
reduce network velocity and ultimately disrupt military
mobilizations and international commerce.
In closing, Maersk believes that the proposed legislation,
if enacted and properly implemented, would result in better
management and coordination of security efforts. In particular,
Maersk supports standardized cargo documentation requirements;
national systems for identification cards and personnel
credentialling; uniform standards for container security;
coordinated security assistance, plans, and response teams.
Improving the security of the intermodal transportation will
inevitably have a positive impact on the military cargo moving
through commercial networks during a mobilization; therefore,
Maersk believes that the proposed legislation is an important
step in the right direction.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify before you today.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Goulden follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Let me ask what may appear to be somewhat of a
facetious question, but it is not intended that way. I'd like
to just see where it leads us.
Tell me something hopeful. Tell me something encouraging
about our ability to protect our strategic resources at our
seaports. I'll throw it open to you first, Mr. Decker, and then
to Mr. Goulden.
Mr. Decker. Mr. Chairman, could I ask for a rephrasing of
the question, please?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Decker. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I'll preface it by saying as I listened to the
testimony I feel like--and as I think of what I've seen in my
work chairing this committee, I don't know a lot that I can
feel encouraged about in our capabilities to protect vital
resources in our ports. Given, in particular, that a lot of the
ports have dual use--they really have three. They have
military--our harbors do. They have military, they have
commercial, and they have recreational uses. I don't feel that
we have an infrastructure in place that is particularly good at
protecting our facilities. I don't feel we have the manpower. I
don't feel we have the coordination yet. I don't think we've
done our risk assessment. I don't think that we've developed a
strategy. So I started to get a little depressed about it.
Tell me some hopeful things that I can say, ``Oh, gosh,
this is better than I think.''
Mr. Decker. Sir, I think one of the most hopeful aspects,
besides the good work that I think people are trying to do at
the different executive agencies at different levels, are the
provisions in the Senate Resolution 1214. Really, that
legislation, with its counterpart House resolution, which is an
amendment to that resolution, really provides for the first
time a tremendously top-down-to-the-bottom-level framework that
is going to help the national leadership as well as the local
officers that are responsible for working port security issues
with tools that will allow them to move forward. This will take
some time, though, for this to evolve.
If you look at a couple of the major points that were
brought up earlier, some of the issues that are being worked
on, port vulnerability assessments, this legislation prescribes
that there has to be some standards applied and there has to be
some consistency with how they are done across the board. Right
now that's not the case.
Department of Defense has had a very long program of force
protection in which they have come up with a good process for
vulnerability assessments, and I was encouraged to hear that
DTRA is going to be involved working with the Coast Guard, with
the Maritime Administration, and others--MTMC--to work on that.
So legislation is part one.
Part two is I think that there are a lot of response-type
actions that are positive. The one I mentioned about the Coast
Guard with their SWAT-like teams that go out and look at
suspicious vessels before they get into a port, that's
positive, the studies that are ongoing looking at sea container
security issues. But there is a lot a question about are we
better today than we were a year ago, you know, independent of
September 11th, and I'm not really sure I can answer that, with
the work that we've done. I just sort of share your concerns.
Mr. Goulden. Your concerns are well placed, but, having
said that--and I think everyone recognizes that--the amount of
focus today as opposed to prior to September 11th is
incredible. You can't go anywhere in our business and not have
security be a mainstay portion of it. There are pilots in
place, the Customs C-TPAT partnering agreement that I talked
about, security.
Mr. Shays. You mean pilot programs?
Mr. Goulden. Pilot programs in place like the C-TPAT.
Mr. Shays. Because you do have pilots at your harbors.
Mr. Goulden. At the ports we have pilots. Yes, we do. You
got it. Pilot programs. You got it. Security seals, our other
pilot programs that are in place. There have been a few more
mentioned here.
The industry is thirsty for answers on how to improve the
system and how do they participate in the system. There is a
growing recognition that cargo plays an important part, and it
is the whole intermodal network, not just one node.
Granted, the port is where everything comes in and out of,
but knowledge of things away from there which are much more
difficult to assess are now being looked at as the long-term
solution to offer some protection to the ports.
So I think there is a lot to be hopeful for. We certainly
aren't there yet.
Mr. Shays. Your company has contracts, as you pointed out,
obviously, with the military to ship. Are all your ships
dedicated to military transportation, or is it--do you
sometimes--do you have some ships just totally dedicated and
other ships that are used where needed?
Mr. Goulden. Correct. We have a group of vessels where we
either own those vessels and charter them and manage them for
the U.S. Government or we manage U.S. Government vessels for
them, and those are totally dedicated to the Department of
Defense and the work that the Department of Defense does.
Mr. Shays. So any transportation of military hardware is on
a dedicated ship?
Mr. Goulden. There is a set that's done that way. We also
have 23 vessels that we operate in our commercial fleet, so of
250 worldwide vessels, 23 of those would be in commercial
operation off of U.S. shores integrated into that commercial
fleet. By and large, the majority of the cargo on those ships
is commercial cargo moving in and out of foreign commerce of
the United States through U.S. ports.
We also move about 30,000 40-foot equivalents for the U.S.
military in peacetime in foreign commerce on those same U.S.-
flagged vessels, which are U.S. flagged, crewed by U.S. crew
members and U.S. citizens, and operated by us in our fleets.
They are also documented U.S.-flagged vessels.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Decker, General Privratsky's testimony stated that the
Military Traffic Management Command coordinates with other
organizations and shares information. Your study and testimony
implies there is need for significant improvement, so I'd like
to ask how should the MTMC improve coordination of force
protection measures.
Mr. Decker. Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me, I'd like to
have my colleague, Mr. Kirschbaum----
Mr. Shays. I'd be delighted to have him respond.
Mr. Decker [continuing]. Provide a comment on that, if you
will.
Mr. Shays. The question is, is he delighted to respond?
[Laughter.]
Do you want me to repeat the question?
Mr. Kirschbaum. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. By and
large, at the ports we visited--the point the general made
about the coordination mechanisms at the Port Readiness
Committees and the role that his command plays, from our view
is fairly systematic. They do have processes in place and they
follow them fairly closely and they are most assuredly
dedicated individuals.
Where the variance comes in is in the stages of the
deployment process from the fort to the port, as Mr. Decker
alluded to earlier, where there are several phases at which
force protection concerns are critical, but the actual
transport is changed. It is changed hands from the military
installation, from road or rail movement, and then at some
point at the port when the military equipment changes over. At
the port, itself, that Port Readiness Committee structure is in
place where you have MTMC coordinating with the Coast Guard,
with local military commanders. That same level of planning, of
assessments, and of coordinated force protection measures
cannot be traced to the same level at all stages of that
deployment. It's when you step back to that overall view you
see that there's a potential that the same level of planning
has not been done throughout the entire process. That's the
difference.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Goulden, when military hardware, equipment, is loaded
on non-DOD ships--in other words, on one of your ships--what
kind of security arrangements are made? Do you carry any
military flag? Do you have military personnel on board? Are you
treated like a commercial ship or like a military ship?
Mr. Goulden. We're treated as a commercial ship. The cargo
that comes on into the port and loaded for DOD onto our vessels
would be treated as the same unless the U.S. military asks for
special treatment. Our contracts enable them to say that they
could have a super cargo, that they would want someone to watch
that cargo all the way through from loading to destination and
then hand it off at the other end. That assessment of their
cargo and how they want it handled is done by theirs, and our
contractual relationship enables us to implement the terms that
they would like.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Is there any question that any of the
three of you feel that we need to put on the record and want to
ask yourself the question and answer it? Is there a question
that you think we need to put on the record?
Mr. Goulden. Not from me.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Decker.
Mr. Decker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to just pursue that
question you asked.
Mr. Shays. Sure.
Mr. Decker. And with the help of our distinguished
colleague, perhaps illuminate more on the issue.
Mr. Shays. Sure.
Mr. Decker. A concern that we raised had to do with the
military equipment being transported on ships of foreign flag
with crews from other countries.
Mr. Shays. Let me be clear. So these are--your ships would
not necessarily be U.S.-flagged ships?
Mr. Goulden. We would move military cargo that was booked
with us on our U.S.-flagged vessels. In the event no U.S.-
flagged vessel was available, a determination of non-
availability would be made, then the military has the right to
authorize the cargo to be booked on one of our foreign-flagged
vessels.
Mr. Shays. Sorry, Mr. Decker. I just wanted to ask him.
Mr. Decker. No. In fact, that's exactly where I was headed
with the question. When we did some of our site work, we looked
at the ship manifests, the cargo on nine ships of different
flags, and also the crew manifest, the crew list. And what we
noted--and these were in support of military operations
overseas, not a mobilization but ongoing operations--the ships,
by and large, except for one, was of a foreign--all foreign
flagged. Now, some is I think flag of convenience for other
reasons, but several were owned by foreign countries and
therefore--and then flagged in different countries. Crews were
totally from other countries. Yet, on these ships during the
missions we looked at you had Bradley fighting vehicles, 155
millimeter howitzers, Black Hawk helicopters, machine guns,
night vision goggles, nuclear biological chemical defense
equipment, and it just goes on--communications equipment.
Mr. Shays. So you would draw from that what?
Mr. Decker. Well, a concern that perhaps--and maybe the
risk is acceptable, but do we know everything we need to about
the ships and the crews that are not under U.S. flag or U.S.
control, that the risk is acceptable when we move high-value,
very sensitive, important equipment.
I thought my colleague would be able to, from his
perspective, knowing the business, might be able to share some
insight on that.
Mr. Shays. Would you care to respond to that?
Mr. Goulden. I'm not familiar with the statistics, so I
don't know if these were spot charters or liner operations or
whatever, but I do know that the Military Sealift Command
routinely charters vessels that are foreign flagged once
they've made a determination that there are no U.S.-flagged
vessels available.
Mr. Shays. And do they do that through you or do they do it
independently?
Mr. Goulden. No, they do it independently. They do a
request for bid and people put in proposals.
Mr. Shays. And how much of the non-military-transported
goods do you think your company does? Do you do 10 percent of
it, 50 percent of it?
Mr. Goulden. In what we would call ``liner traffic,'' cargo
that moves within a specific contract called the ``universal
service contract 03,'' which is managed by the Military Traffic
Management Command, on a global basis in foreign commerce we
probably handle somewhere between 45 and 50 percent of the
cargo.
Mr. Shays. You had a lot of explanation before you got to
that number.
Mr. Goulden. Well, you don't want to confuse it----
Mr. Shays. Yes, I understand.
Mr. Goulden [continuing]. With domestic cargo and other
cargos.
Mr. Shays. So you do almost half?
Mr. Goulden. Yes, approximately half. Correct.
Mr. Shays. So can I infer that the other half is going on
non-U.S.-flagged ships?
Mr. Goulden. No, you cannot.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Goulden. The other half would go on competitors that
are U.S. flag operators with U.S. citizen crews, similar
companies just like my own--American President Lines, Lykes
Lines, Farrell, Central Gulf Waterman--make sure I get them all
in there, because they won't be happy with me if I don't. But
they all participate in the same contract and would handle the
rest of the cargo.
Mr. Shays. Gentlemen, is there anything else we need to put
on the record?
[No response.]
Mr. Shays. Then I'd like to thank you. I appreciate your
testimony. I appreciate your putting this on the record. I
think this is clearly a work in process and a new area for this
committee, so we will be getting into it in a lot more depth.
Thank you.
This hearing is adjourned.
Mr. Decker. Thank you.
Mr. Goulden. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned,
to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
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