<DOC>
[107th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:85726.wais]
THE CLEAN UP OF THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE'S BRENTWOOD PROCESSING AND
DISTRIBUTION CENTER
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 26, 2002
__________
Serial No. 107-178
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
85-726 WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland, Chairman
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia, DC
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut DIANE E. WATSON, California
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Russell Smith, Staff Director
Matthew Batt, Legislative Assistant/Clerk
Shalley Kim, Staff Assistant
Denise Wilson, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 26, 2002.................................... 1
Statement of:
Day, Thomas, vice president of engineering, U.S. Postal
Service; Orange, Vincent B., ward 5, Council of the
District of Columbia; Ted Gordon, senior deputy director
for public health assurance, District of Columbia
Department of Health; Dr. Rosemary K. Sokas, Associate
Director for Science, National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, CDC; and Thomas Voltaggio,
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency Region III.. 6
Hegarty, John F., national president, National Postal Mail
Handlers Union; Alan C. Ferranto, director of safety and
health, National Association of Letter Carriers; and Roy
Braunstein, legislative director, American Postal Workers
Union...................................................... 66
Martin, Louise, president, Brentwood Civic Association; and
James M. McGee, president, National Alliance of Postal and
Federal Employees.......................................... 98
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Braunstein, Roy, legislative director, American Postal
Workers Union, prepared statement of....................... 83
Day, Thomas, vice president of engineering, U.S. Postal
Service, prepared statement of............................. 10
Ferranto, Alan C., director of safety and health, National
Association of Letter Carriers, prepared statement of...... 77
Gordon, Ted, senior deputy director for public health
assurance, District of Columbia Department of Health,
prepared statement of...................................... 19
Hegarty, John F., national president, National Postal Mail
Handlers Union, prepared statement of...................... 69
Martin, Louise, president, Brentwood Civic Association,
prepared statement of...................................... 99
McGee, James M., president, National Alliance of Postal and
Federal Employees, prepared statement of................... 103
Morella, Hon. Constance A., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 109
Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, a Delegate in Congress from the
District of Columbia, prepared statement of................ 4
Orange, Vincent B., ward 5, Council of the District of
Columbia, prepared statement of............................ 50
Sokas, Dr. Rosemary K., Associate Director for Science,
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, CDC,
prepared statement of...................................... 28
Voltaggio, Thomas, Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency Region III, prepared statement of................... 39
THE CLEAN UP OF THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE'S BRENTWOOD PROCESSING AND
DISTRIBUTION CENTER
----------
FRIDAY, JULY 26, 2002
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:19 a.m., at
the Gallaudet University Kellogg Conference Center, Washington,
DC, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton (acting chairwoman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representative Norton.
Staff present: Russell Smith, staff director; Heea
Vazirani-Fales, counsel; Robert White, communications director;
Matthew Batt, legislative assistant/clerk; Shalley Kim, staff
assistant; Jon Bouker, minority counsel; Denise Wilson,
minority professional staff member; and Jean Gosa, minority
assistant clerk.
Ms. Norton. I want to call this hearing to order and
explain why I am the one calling it to order. The subcommittee
chair, Representative Morella, of course has every intention of
being here even now, but the homeland security bill, which has
some amendments that she has submitted, has been moved up and
is on the floor as we speak.
This hearing on the cleanup of the Brentwood postal
facility and the effects of the tragedy and of the cleanup on
employees and residents and customers we believe had to go
forward in any case, particularly considering that cleanup is
about to begin and that it would seriously inconvenience
members of the public and witnesses if in light of the schedule
of the Congress we were to postpone this hearing.
I must say, I have an amendment as well on the floor that
has been incorporated into an important set of amendments as an
amendment to preserve the same level of pay for civil servants
who get moved, as they now have, when consolidation occurs. I
also would very much want to be there. The difference between
Ms. Morella and me is that she is allowed to vote on her
amendment and I would not be allowed to vote anyway, so we
thought we would just as well start the hearing.
But before we take up any business with respect to
Brentwood, I would ask you to take a moment of silence in
memory of Joseph Curseen Jr. and Thomas Morris Jr., the two
Postal Service workers we lost at Brentwood in October.
Thank you.
I want to thank our chair, Representative Connie Morella,
for responding to my request for a field hearing on the
Brentwood facility and the tragedy that occurred there. The
Postal Service and District officials have had meetings in the
Brentwood community, but this is the first congressional
hearing on Brentwood over which the Congress has jurisdiction.
I asked for this hearing in the field, as it is called,
which brings the Congress to the community, rather than the
other way around, to facilitate attendance by residents and
employees and to stress the importance of ongoing congressional
oversight over Brentwood itself. I am grateful to Gallaudet
President I. King Jordan and the Kellogg Conference Center for
contributing the excellent space that we are using today for
our hearing in a beautiful facility located in the ward 5
Brentwood community not far from the post office itself.
This hearing comes as the cleanup is set to begin. However,
there are many questions that remain unanswered following the
anthrax tragedy. I will be particularly interested today in the
health effects on employees and residents who may have been
exposed, on what measures are planned to prevent any recurrence
of a bioterrorist threat or events, and on what measures will
be taken to protect the community from the substances to be
used in the Brentwood decontamination process.
This hearing also will serve an important purpose if it
helps to separate fact from conjecture, and if it helps to
relieve fears among employees and residents. Anthrax is too
serious a threat for armchair views about cause and effect.
Even the experts were wrong on anthrax. The underdeveloped
science led them to focus on the site where the deadly envelope
was opened, not on Brentwood where it was processed.
Ironically, no one died or even became ill in the Senate
Hart Building, but we lost two postal workers and two others
became seriously ill at Brentwood. The anthrax experience
encourages caution in our claims concerning what caused or will
cause what effects. Brentwood teaches us all--experts,
employees and residents alike--that understanding anthrax is a
scientific work in progress.
I am particularly concerned that some employees and
residents, whether exposed or not, fear that their health may
be in danger now or in the future. In particular, the
experience of African Americans in this country with health
abuses by government officials from forced sterilization to the
Tuskegee syphilis experiment has left residual doubts
concerning government assurances during health controversies.
The Brentwood tragedy did not help to allay such skepticism.
Yet despite the incomplete scientific understanding that
led experts to underestimate the dangers of anthrax at
Brentwood, the only way to get beyond our fears is to seek and
use the best scientific knowledge available. Therefore, today I
will ask the Centers for Disease Control to do a controlled
study to assure that there are no residual effects on the
health of employees and Postal Service customers now or in the
future, resulting from anthrax contamination or from substances
used to decontaminate anthrax.
There are a number of ways to accomplish this purpose,
including an epidemiological study of the affected D.C. workers
and residents here, compared to a comparable population where
no anthrax contamination occurred. If mortality and health
results are similar, there would be some reassurance concerning
the health of the affected population here. If not, we would
have reason to do further investigation here.
Brentwood is vastly different from Hart in size,
configuration, purpose and machinery. However, Hart, where
Senate offices are located, became the guinea pig for an
anthrax cleanup. Every precaution was taken and no cost was
spared there, we are told. The Hart Building has become the
gold standard for cleanup, detection and prevention. Members of
the Senate and their staffs and their loved ones and their
children now go into Hart every day. We must insist that no
less be done for Brentwood.
Similarly, Capitol Hill residents were the first whose
community experienced a biohazard cleanup of anthrax, using
substances that will be applied at Brentwood. The experience of
that ward 6 D.C. community with preparation for the cleanup and
its effects since, should be instructive to the ward 5
Brentwood community. We must take no chances at Brentwood. The
Brentwood tragedy revealed just how thin our knowledge of
anthrax was. We knew too little a year ago and we still know
too little. For example, the government cannot yet identify who
sent the letter.
The price employees paid at Brentwood in loss of life and
health and in continuing fears, anxiety and dislocation has
been too high. Today, employees, residents and this
subcommittee are owed the highest degree of assurance of a safe
cleanup, followed by a safe facility and a safe community. We
welcome today's witnesses and will listen with great interest
their concerns and to the remedies for those concerns.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton
follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. I would like to remind witnesses that the rules
of the Committee on Government Reform require that all
witnesses be administered an oath prior to testifying. I am
pleased to recognize our first panel of witnesses, the
Honorable Vincent Orange, Sr., who represents ward 5 and the
Brentwood community--I see he has not come yet; Thomas Day,
vice president for engineering, U.S. Postal Service; also
Dennis Baca of the U.S. Postal Service, environmental engineer
at Brentwood; Ted Gordon, senior deputy director for public
health assurance, the D.C. Department of Health; also Dr.
Vincent Nathan, assistant deputy director for the Environmental
Health Administration; Peter LaPorte, D.C. emergency
management; Dr. Rosemary K. Sokas, associate director of
science, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
CDC; also Dr. Brad Perkins, chief of meningitis and special
pathogen branch, division of bacteria and microbic diseases,
National Center for Infectious Disease Centers at the CDC;
Thomas Voltaggio, administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency Region III; also Marcus Aquino, EPA onsite coordinator.
I would ask the first panel of witnesses if you would stand
and raise your right hands to take the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. Let the record reflect
that each witness answered this question in the affirmative.
You may be seated.
We would like to hear first from Mr. Thomas Day, vice
president of engineering, U.S. Postal Service.
STATEMENTS OF THOMAS DAY, VICE PRESIDENT OF ENGINEERING, U.S.
POSTAL SERVICE; TED GORDON, SENIOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PUBLIC
HEALTH ASSURANCE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH;
DR. ROSEMARY K. SOKAS, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, CDC; THOMAS
VOLTAGGIO, ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
REGION III; AND VINCENT B. ORANGE, WARD 5, COUNCIL OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Mr. Day. Good morning, Congresswoman Norton. Thank you for
this opportunity to speak to you. We look forward to talking
about the cleanup efforts here at Brentwood, as well as our
Hamilton processing center in New Jersey. Although he is not
here, I would also like to thank Councilmember Orange for
helping us to hold a community meeting in the past on this
important issue.
I do have a prepared statement that I am going to submit
for the record, and as discussed with the staff, I will be
making a brief presentation. Before I get into that, just let
me briefly say a few words of thanks and praise to our own
employees. We do share your concerns about our postal employees
here at the Brentwood facility, as well as the surrounding
communities.
I think as everyone knows, in spite of the anthrax attack
that took place in October, postal workers around the country
continued to provide service and do their daily round to get
the mail delivered. That was especially true in Manhattan, New
Jersey, Connecticut and here in Washington. Every postal center
around the country could have been part of that deadly attack,
and those workers continued to do their jobs.
We are particularly proud of the efforts of our employees
here in Washington. Their determination and performance is
truly outstanding. It is heroic and represents the very best in
public service. So my personal thanks and praise to each and
every employee of the Washington, DC, post office.
Let me now begin my presentation. We began with the initial
management decisions of the Postal Service going back to
October. When we became aware of the severity of the situation
on October 21, we did close and secure the Brentwood facility.
We relocated workers to surrounding facilities and we began the
actions to sanitize the facility.
Congresswoman, as you mentioned, it is important that we
use the very best and brightest that are available, and we have
worked with various other Federal agencies listed on the
chart--Health and Human Services, both the CDC and NIOSH. We
have worked with the local official in the D.C. Department of
Health, EPA, OSHA, Department of Defense, and particularly
AFRRI--Armed Forces Radiobiological Research Institute. So we
have reached out to get the very best experts we can.
In terms of communicating with both the public and our
employees, again thanks to Councilmember Orange, we did have a
ward 5 community meeting on March 27. We conducted five
employee town hall meetings in May. We held a further community
update on June 27. It is all part of our ongoing commitment to
the partnerships and working with community employees' unions
and the leadership teams, particularly the ones set up here in
the District.
Let me get into a summary of our anthrax response at
Brentwood. It is a very big picture--I do not want to get into
the details. Again, the first thing we did was to seal the
building. During the process that has gone on in the last
several months, we have cleaned known hot spots. We have gone
in there and gotten to the very hottest spots where the
contamination occurred and gotten them cleaned up.
The other thing we did was to get materials out of the
building--basic materials like mail; also the equipment that we
could remove from the facility was removed, decontaminated, and
in the case of things like trays that letters are sorted into,
they were decontaminated and then destroyed.
In the same timeframe, we have also been working with
companies that have been under contract now to install the gas
treatment equipment itself. The next step, of course, that has
been ongoing is to get everyone trained for that process. We
are now at the final step, as was announced yesterday, we are
doing a limited test on Monday to test this process to assure
that the equipment works properly and does what we expect. We
believe that will go quite well.
Assuming it does go well, we will move forward to do the
full treatment of the facility--the injection or the
introduction of the chlorine dioxide gas to the facility,
assuring that is dispersed throughout the building, held at the
right concentration, temperature and humidity levels, and held
there for 12 hours. That is the gold standard that was
established at Hart. We are following the same standard that
was followed at the Hart Building.
To be sure that process works as we intend, there is an
extensive post-treatment testing procedure we will follow. This
probably has been one of the critical issues we have worked
with the local District officials on is to determine the extent
of the testing that should be done in the facility, how many
and where, to be sure that when the treatment is done, it has
been effective.
We have come up with a plan that we believe is
scientifically valid and will truly indicate that the facility
has been cleaned. To be clear, if those tests come back with
anything other than 100 percent killed, then the fumigation
will not be deemed effective and we will do it again.
Also, to point out that after the gas is introduced to the
building, the other part of the process after the 12-hour
period is to withdraw the gas, scrub it or neutralize it so
that what you are left with are harmless byproducts,
essentially salt and water. When we do get that final
certification from the D.C. health officials that the building
is clean, we will then begin the process to get the Brentwood
facility reactivated and back into use.
What you see before you now is a floor plan of Brentwood.
The red dots are where we have tested throughout the facility
and found hot spots. Just to emphasize, we have focused on some
of those key hot spots. One that I think many people are aware
of is the machine, DBCS-17, that is a delivery bar code
sorter----
Ms. Norton. Could you define ``hot spots''? Does that mean
anthrax is there?
Mr. Day. Anthrax positive, yes.
DBCS-17 was where the mail was first sorted. You can see
the cluster of positives that came up there. And of course,
this was government mail, so our government mail section in the
building also had numerous hot spots. But you can see that they
are dispersed throughout the facility--just to emphasize, that
is the need to fumigate the entire facility. A critical aspect
of this treatment is not just that we decontaminate the
interior of the building, but that while this treatment process
is going on, that we need to monitor the air outside the
building to be assured that none of the chlorine dioxide gas is
escaping.
Now, not only are we doing the monitoring, but what has
been a major activity that has gone on is the contractors have
spent months sealing every potential escape point in the
building. I will show you some pictures very quickly of what
that means. Further, before we introduce actual chlorine
dioxide, we are going to test that by injecting a neutral
substance into the building to make sure nothing is escaping.
But further, when the actual treatment is going on, we will do
air monitoring.
This chart you see depicts the radius around the building
where we will do that. In addition as was done at the Hart
Building, we will use what EPA calls the TAGA bus that will do
mobile air monitoring around the facility. We have set an
extremely low threshold, well below any level of harmful
effect, that could potentially cause a problem. If we detect
even at that very low threshold, we will shut down the process.
We will do continuous air monitoring throughout the treatment.
Again, let me just go through some pictures to give you
some visual ideas on what is going on. This is the actual
chlorine dioxide distribution system. This is actually
Brentwood itself. It has been assembled on the south side. This
is the equipment that is also, then, on the north side of the
building. An idea of what we have done in the interim, early on
in the process when we first closed down the building, we did
it on very quick notice, obviously. There was a great deal of
mail that was inside the facility.
This is what was on the platform when we shut down the
building. We have gotten the mail out of there, irradiated it,
decontaminated it, as well as the equipment you see there. What
you find now is that the platform is an open area. Two things--
one, we have decontaminated all those things that were in
there; and second, what it has done for us is it gives you a
much more open area to fumigate.
Also what has gone on, when I talked earlier about the hot
spots where the anthrax was found, this is the kind of spot
cleanup that we have conducted on the individual pieces of
automated equipment. We get right into the machine itself. It
is not just a surface cleaning of the exterior.
In sealing the building, what this picture shows you, where
you have got different things that enter in--pipes, electrical,
plumbing, whatever around it--the image on the right shows you
that even within electrical conduit, you go inside there and
seal that up. You can understand, however, that this is a
complex process to seal the building. This is a depiction of
all the skylights that are on the roof. We have also had to
seal doors, windows, and the platform docks.
In terms of other cleanup, we have gotten into the ceilings
and rafters to clean those up with spot cleanup. On a daily
basis to assure everyone that as these workers to in and do
this cleanup, there is a control zone where they enter through
and before they come back out of the building, they go through
a decontamination area. This is a process that takes place
virtually on a daily basis.
The bottom line, and to summarize ongoing actions of the
Postal Service, we are introducing other safeguards to our
entire system. Two basic things we are doing is that we are
working to validate a bio-detection system--a test that is
going on right now in Baltimore. Our intent is that system,
when validated, and it looks very good that it will be, that we
will deploy that nationwide and it will be capable of examining
a full range of biological threats, and then the other thing we
will do is vacuuming and filtration systems to protect out
employees.
We have decontaminated the mail from both Trenton and
Brentwood with irradiation. We have worked on emergency
response plans. The bottom line is we have gotten back to the
process of getting mailed delivered on a daily basis and doing
it quite effectively. We want to open the Brentwood facility as
soon as possible, but we will only do it when we are absolutely
sure that it is safe and we are ready to go back in there.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Day follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Day.
Mr. Ted Gordon--Dr. Gordon I guess it is--senior deputy
director of public health assurance, D.C. Department of Health.
Mr. Gordon. Good morning, Congresswoman Norton.
I am Theodore Gordon, senior deputy director for public
health assurance for the District of Columbia Department of
Health. I am representing Mr. James A. Buford, the acting
director of the department who is unable to be here today. I am
also joined by Dr. Vincent Nathan, the assistant deputy
director for environmental health science, the Environmental
Health Administration.
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to present
testimony to the subcommittee this morning on the department's
role and its responsibilities in an effort to decontaminate and
reopen the Brentwood Road mail processing and distribution
facility located at 900 Brentwood Road, NE, in the District of
Columbia.
Last year between October 19 and October 21, four workers
at the Brentwood facility were hospitalized with inhalation
anthrax. Two of those workers subsequently died. It is a tragic
loss to the District of Columbia, and our most sincere
condolences go out to the families of the victims.
The U.S. Postal Service and the Department of Health's
investigations have thus far determined that the letter
delivered to the Hart Senate Office Building from the Brentwood
Road postal facility contained bacillus anthracis spores, thus
contaminating both buildings. As a result, the Brentwood
facility was closed on October 21, 2001.
It has become necessary to decontaminate the facility,
particularly if the facility is to reopen. The Environmental
Health Administration is responsible for identifying and
assessing environmental issues and problems, particularly those
linked to disease, dysfunction and premature deaths. In the
decontamination of Brentwood postal facility, the Environmental
Health Administration is primarily responsible for regulatory
oversight and protecting the health and safety of the
community.
The U.S. Postal Service is using chlorine dioxide
fumigation to decontaminate the Brentwood facility, as was used
to decontaminate the Hart Senate Office Building. However, this
is the largest chlorine dioxide fumigation ever undertaken in
the United States and possibly the world. The processing has
three steps--one, pre-fumigation planning; two, chlorine
dioxide fumigation; and three, post-fumigation cleaning and
reoccupancy.
To ensure that the District's oversight and monitoring of
this effort is carried our successfully, the mayor has
assembled the Brentwood Scientific Advisory Panel charged with
responsibility for reviewing all documents related to the
decontamination activities at the site, and to include the
following--assisting in the development of public information
fact sheets and media releases; sampling protocols, air
sampling protocols; waste disposal plans; final clearance
determinations; reopening determination; and final reports.
The panel includes distinguished scientists in the field of
microbiology, engineering, medicine, epidemiology, chemistry,
toxicology and environmental health; and also members of the
postal union and ward 5 community, Councilmember Vincent
Orange, which encompasses the Brentwood facility.
We have participated in several community meetings to keep
residents informed of the status of the decontamination
process. There is nothing more important to the department than
to protect the health of the District residents. The top
technical issues of concern to the Department of Health has
been from the beginning, one, protecting the community through
the containment of chlorine dioxide gas; two, anthrax
decontamination effectiveness; three, anthrax wall cavity
sampling; four, proper chlorine dioxide dose; five, post-
fumigation anthrax sampling protocols; and six, shut-down
authority and reoccupancy clearance.
In this regard, the Department of Health has reviewed,
along with the National Institutes for Occupational Safety and
Health, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, and the Armed Forces Radiobiology
Research Institute, all results from the sampling and analysis
plan, the wall cavity sampling and demonstration plan, the
ambient air monitoring plan, the site-specific health and
safety plan, the line 17 fumigation remedial action plan, and
the negative pressure testing plan.
The Department of Health continues to review all plans
presented to us to provide advice to the U.S. Public Health
Service on sound public health science. The Department of
Health has reviewed and advised the U.S. Public Health Service
on the dispersion modeling plan for the facility and has issued
several permits for testing and operation of boilers, air-
handling units, and negative air pressure systems.
The Department of Health will be onsite during all phases
of the process, which will include the presence of EPA's TAGA
bus, which will be on the mobile or monitoring unit. The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Health
have consulted on the issuance of a Federal crisis exemption
permit for the use of chlorine dioxide gas for the fumigation.
The District has issued individual licenses to all onsite
applicators who will be handling the gas.
Finally, the Department of Health co-chairs, along with the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region III, the
Environmental Clearance Committee. The Environmental Clearance
Committee is an independent coordinated group of scientists
with expertise in disciplines relevant to the assessment and
cleanup of the facility, but independent of the U.S. Postal
Service.
It serves as the committee charged with evaluating the
effectiveness of the facility decontamination, post-fumigation
measures, and the group will then make a recommendation on the
appropriateness of reopening the facility. I might add,
Councilmember Vincent Orange will serve on the clearance
committee, as well as the two representatives from the postal
unions who represent the postal workers.
That concludes my testimony. Congresswoman Norton, I am
prepared to answer any questions you may have concerning the
work of the department on behalf of the Department of Health.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Dr. Gordon.
Dr. Rosemary Sokas, associate director for science,
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health at CDC.
Dr. Sokas. Thank you, Madam Congresswoman and members of
the subcommittee. I want to just start off by saying that NIOSH
is part of CDC. We deal with worker safety and health. I am
also happy to say that we have Dr. Brad Perkins here, who is
from Atlanta; chief, as you know, of the special pathogens
branch in the CDC's National Center for Infectious Diseases.
On behalf of the CDC and the Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry, I am pleased to describer out role in
cleanup and safety-related activities at the Brentwood Mail
Processing and Distribution Center in Washington, DC. The CDC
and ATSDR are a part of the Department of Health and Human
Services.
It is out mission to protect the public's health by
preventing and controlling injuries, illnesses and
disabilities, including those that occur from the deliberate
release of biological agents. Today, I will review CDC and
ATSDR's response activities at the Brentwood facility following
last year's anthrax attacks, describe our role in the cleanup
work being conducted at Brentwood, and discuss safety issues
involved with the decontamination and reopening of the
building.
Among the many responsibilities following the anthrax
attacks of last fall, CDC and ATSDR have been working closely
with our Federal, State and local public health partners toward
the goal of successfully remediating the buildings contaminated
by the anthrax spores. Our recommendations have been widely
disseminated to Federal, State and local health and
environmental agencies and are available at CDC's bioterrorism
Web site. Our review of the lessons learned from these
activities is ongoing and will be used to update our
recommendations for responding to anthrax contamination.
Of the buildings contaminated from the anthrax attacks last
fall, the Brentwood facility was the most severely affected. As
you all know, during October 19 through 21, four postal workers
from Brentwood were hospitalized with inhalational anthrax, and
two of these patients died as a result of their exposure. What
became all too clear was that the letters containing anthrax
spores which were sent to Senators Daschle and Leahy in the
Hart Senate Office Building had also contaminated the Brentwood
facility, which processed mail addressed to zip codes in the
Washington, DC, area.
The anthrax-contaminated letters passed through the
Brentwood facility on the morning of Friday, October 12, 2001.
The Brentwood facility was closed Sunday, October 21, when the
first diagnosis of inhalational anthrax in a Brentwood employee
was made. Beginning Monday, October 22, investigators from CDC,
the U.S. Postal Service and a postal service contractor began
evaluating the extent of anthrax contamination there.
This first investigation showed widespread contamination
inside the facility, particularly around delivery bar code
sorter No. 17, which you have already heard. That was the one
that had processed the spore-containing letters. It also showed
heavy contamination as you saw on the graph in the government
mail area.
During subsequent investigations, CDC, ATSDR, the Postal
Service and a postal service contractor conducted additional
surface samplings in the facility to thoroughly characterize
the distribution of the anthrax spores throughout the facility,
including areas where workers did not become ill and including
the building ventilation system. The broader goals of this
effort were to compare and evaluate the different methods of
collecting the surface samples and for analyzing those samples
and to evaluate the effectiveness of cleanup efforts to remove
spores from the known contaminated surfaces.
The results of this investigation were shared with the
workers from the Brentwood facility with Postal Service
management, the postal worker unions and the District of
Columbia Department of Health. This information has been
presented in scientific conferences and incorporated into our
recommendations, improving our national capacity for present
and future responses to anthrax.
Since the completion of that investigation, CDC and ATSDR
scientists have been working with experts from EPA, the D.C.
Department of Health, the Postal Service, the Department of
Defense and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
to review and provide input into the draft cleanup plans. The
goal is to provide the Postal Service and the Brentwood
incident commander and his team of consultants with the advice
they need to ensure that the cleanup plans incorporate the best
available protection for each worker and for each member of the
community. These plans address issues such as the strategies
for environmental remediation of the facility, the type of
environmental sampling needed to evaluate the effectiveness of
remediation, and measures to ensure that workers and the
general public are protected during cleanup operations.
In addition, we currently are in discussion with the Postal
Service about the quality assurance role we will play in
conducting laboratory analysis of post-cleanup environmental
samples collected from the Brentwood facility. The D.C.
Department of Health and EPA are leading a multi-agency panel
that will review the post-cleanup sampling data from Brentwood
and advise when it is appropriate to reoccupy the building and
return it to normal service.
We participate in this panel. To best protect the workers
who will reoccupy the facility, decisions need to be based on
the highest quality data that reflect site-specific findings,
using the best and most current science and sampling methods.
That sampling must be thoroughly and rigorously conducted and
techniques used for sample collection and for cleanup should be
those shown to be valid and effective. As with the Hart
Building cleanup, the standard for determining that the
building is clean should be that samples collected after
cleanup showed zero detectable anthrax spores.
As with any other public health problem, it is the goal of
the CDC to use the best science and technology available to
minimize the risk of illness and disease to the greatest extent
possible. It is not possible to eliminate risk entirely or to
guarantee that a building is absolutely free of risk. But as
with the successful reoccupancy of the Hart Building, we
believe that a science-based process can allow workers to
safely return to Brentwood and normal service to the building
to safely resume.
CDC is working with the local health department to take
other steps at the Brentwood facility such as investigating
deaths that have occurred over the past 9 months among Postal
Service employees to determine if there have been more deaths
than usual or any suspicious deaths that might be related to
anthrax. Our investigations have not found any factors
different from what would be expected during a typical year. We
plan to issue an updated version of this report in the next
several weeks.
Thank you, and I would be glad to answer any questions that
you have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sokas follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Dr. Sokas.
Administrator Thomas Voltaggio, Environmental Protection
Agency, Region III.
Mr. Voltaggio. Good morning, Congresswoman Norton.
I am Thomas Voltaggio. I am the deputy regional
administrator of the mid-Atlantic regional office of EPA. I
also have been the senior regional manager of the EPA workers
who had decontaminated the Hart Senate Office Building. I spent
roughly 3 or 4 days a week for about 3 months there,
implementing what I am gratified to learn has been called the
``gold standard.''
With me is Marcus Aquino, who is our EPA regional onsite
coordinator at the Brentwood site. We are happy to be here. In
today's testimony, I will outline EPA's role in the Brentwood
cleanup operations. I will provide a short description of the
current activities at Brentwood.
EPA's responsibilities can be divided into four categories:
one, an independent authority that is responsible for
protection of human health and the environment outside the
facility; No. 2, regulator of chemicals used to kill anthrax
spores; No. 3, a technical adviser to the U.S. Postal Service
for the remediation inside the building; and fourth, the
Federal entity that has the authority and resources to step in
at any time that the neighborhood is threatened.
EPA is the national organization whose primary mission is
the protection of human health and the environment. We are
responsible, often in partnership with our State counterparts
and the District in this case, for protecting the air, water
and the lands. Although the anthrax contamination at the
Brentwood postal facility is currently well-contained, we
continue to monitor the situation there closely to ensure that
the neighborhood is safe.
That means we are paying close attention to the proposed
cleanup remedy in the building, while at the same time we are
making sure the chemicals that are used to destroy the anthrax
spores are handled properly, and any waste products produced
during the cleanup operations are disposed of properly.
All pesticides used in the United States must be registered
with EPA. We make sure that the products work effectively and
when properly used pose no undue risk. Not surprisingly, here
are no chemicals that have been registered to treat anthrax
spores. Anyone that needs to clean an anthrax-contaminated site
must get what is known as a crisis exemption from EPA. As an
example, a crisis exemption was issued to use chlorine dioxide
gas to fumigate the Daschle office suite in the Hart Senate
Office Building. The Postal Service owns the Brentwood
facility, and it is in charge of the anthrax remediation there.
That means that aside from the regulatory function I just
outlined, EPA's role inside the fence line is to provide expert
advice on the many technical issues involved in the cleanup. If
at any time, however, EPA believes that there is an immediate
public health or environmental threat that is not being
appropriately handled by the Postal Service, then we can employ
our powers as described in the national contingency plan to
abate any such threat.
EPA has provided technical consultation about anthrax
decontamination at the request of several Federal agencies
ranging from GSA to the State Department, and privately owned
facilities from Florida to New York, as well as the Postal
Service facilities in seven States and the District. The
largest anthrax cleanup has been on Capitol Hill, where the
contaminated letters that went through Brentwood were directed.
The cleanup of the Hart Senate Office Building posed the
largest anthrax cleanup challenge ever undertaken in a building
thus far. Fumigations with chlorine dioxide gas were conducted
on December 1 and December 30, 2001. More than 3,000 test
samples taken after the cleanup showed no remaining viable
anthrax. On January 22, the Hart Building was reopened.
Hundreds of employees and thousands of visitors have safely
used the facility since then, and no one has become ill from
any anthrax-related exposure.
It was at the trailer at the closed Brentwood plant that
EPA scientists demonstrated last fall that chlorine dioxide gas
would kill weapons-grade anthrax. Chlorine dioxide is a common
disinfectant. It is used in the water spray that moistens
fruits and vegetables on grocery shelves. It kills germs on
contact, yet leaves no hazardous residue. Chlorine dioxide is
the primary disinfectant used to purify water in cities like
Los Angeles. It was used at the Hart Senate Office Building and
is about to be used at Brentwood.
Last October, EPA Federal on-scene coordinator Marcus
Aquino was dispatched to Brentwood from our regional emergency
operations center in Philadelphia. Over the past 9 months, Mr.
Aquino has been giving advice on subjects ranging from sampling
methods, various cleanup technologies and their effectiveness,
ways to ensure the building was properly sealed to prevent the
escape of anthrax spores, and safety protocols for hazardous
materials cleanup personnel. As an on-scene coordinator, Mr.
Aquino is highly trained in hazardous materials cleanup
procedures.
Even more importantly, however, he has the full resources
of the EPA and the entire national response team behind him.
That means that all the expertise and invaluable experience of
all the groups associated with the national anthrax cleanup
efforts are contributing to the Brentwood effort.
At Brentwood, EPA has issued a crisis exemption to use
chlorine dioxide gas to conduct a test fumigation of lockers in
the trailer. A second exemption has just been approved to
fumigate delivery bar code sorters 16 to 18, better known as
line 17, which are the most highly contaminated mail sorting
machines.
A third crisis exemption request will be needed before they
fumigate the entire building with chlorine dioxide. For the
fumigation of line 17, EPA brought together a group of experts
from the relevant Federal health research and regulatory
agencies to review the plan which led to a number of revisions.
This group will also review the results of the fumigation of
line 17 prior to the fumigation of the entire building.
During the fumigations of the Brentwood facility, EPA is
bringing its state-of-the-art mobile air monitoring equipment
to the site. The TAGA bus, which is the trace atmospheric gas
analyzer bus, will drive around the building during the
fumigation, sniffing out any chlorine dioxide in the unlikely
event that some might escape from the building.
If as little as 25 ppb--that is ``b'' for billion--are
detected, an investigation will immediately be triggered. If it
rises to 100 ppb, the fumigation effort would be shut down.
This is the same conservative level that is used to protect
people who work with chlorine dioxide routinely, one that is
considered safe, and that was used at the Hart Senate Office
Building.
EPA and the D.C. Department of Health have established the
Brentwood Environmental Clearance Committee, an independent
group of scientists who will review the results of all the
fumigations. This group will make recommendations on whether
the facility should be cleared for reoccupancy by postal
workers. The first meeting is set for next month.
In conclusion, EPA believes that the Brentwood cleanup
effort is moving in the right direction. We will continue to
provide technical assistance to the Postal Service, but
ultimately we recognize that the health and safety of the
citizens who live in the Brentwood neighborhood are our
responsibility. I want to ensure the subcommittee, and most
importantly the people who live in the community, that EPA will
continue to provide vigilant oversight of the cleanup
operations. Your health and safety are our primary
considerations.
I would also like to again acknowledge the work of the
other organizations that are involved in the cleanup effort--
the Postal Service, the District of Columbia's Department of
Health and its emergency management agency, the national health
agencies, especially CDC. They deserve special praise.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I will be happy
to answer any questions at the appropriate time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Voltaggio follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. Thank you Mr. Voltaggio.
Councilman Orange, you were not here when I swore in the
witnesses. I must ask you to stand therefore to be sworn in.
[Witness sworn.]
Ms. Norton. Thank you. Let the record show that Mr. Orange
answered the question in the affirmative. You may be seated. We
will be pleased to hear your testimony at this time.
Mr. Orange. Thank you very much.
Good morning, Congresswoman Norton and distinguished
members of the subcommittee. I am Vincent Bernard Orange, Sr.,
the District of Columbia councilmember representing ward 5. I
am also the chairman of the D.C. Committee on Government
Operations.
I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to
comment on the Brentwood Road mail handling and processing
facility cleanup. As you know, this cleanup represents the
largest chlorine dioxide fumigation ever undertaken in the
United States and perhaps the world. Thus, as you might
imagine, the residents and businesses of ward 5 where the
Brentwood facility is located and I are extremely concerned
about this operation.
We believe that the ultimate goal is the safety of the
residents and the employees of the facility and the full
disclosure as to all phases of the cleanup operation. This goal
was articulated loud and clear on March 27, 2002 at the first
town hall meeting hosted by me with respect to the cleanup.
Over 800 people were in attendance.
The consensus of the meeting was that the safety of the
residents and the employees of the Brentwood facility was first
and foremost. The residents expressed skepticism with the
Federal Government in their overall approach to the cleanup and
the accurate disclosure of information.
We certainly have tried to create a sense of trust and
cooperation with the Federal Government, in particular the U.S.
Postal Service who is in charge of this operation. We also
recognize, however, that the U.S. Postal Service authority is
not absolute. It has checks and balances and can be overridden
by the Environmental Protection Agency if certain conditions
were to exist. On June 27, the U.S. Postal Service held a town
hall meeting to respond to community concerns and to present an
overview of their plan of operation. We appreciate the efforts
that have been made to date.
However, we are here today to demand strict adherence to
the 72-hour notification to the public on any test runs of
fumigation and actual fumigation of the 17.5 cubic feet
facility in our community. Many residents have made it clear
that they do not wish to be present in the ward or the District
of Columbia during the cleanup operation. We would also like to
know the inventory of chemicals presently located in the ward
for the operation.
It is our understanding that the chemicals will be mixed to
form chlorine dioxide gas to be pumped into the Brentwood post
office for the decontamination process. The question is, how
much chlorine dioxide will be onsite? Will it be in excess of
the 20,000 tons as reported in the Washington Post, or the
2,000 pounds that has been reported over the past few weeks?
Are these chemicals being brought into the ward under D.C.
police and Federal police protection?
We are told that the current cleanup plan calls for no
evacuation. What is the contingency plan for evacuation? The
perimeter for the cleanup is .16 miles. Thus, Home Depot,
McDonald's, BET, etc., can still operate and street traffic can
still flow during the cleanup.
However, if it is determined that the chlorine dioxide
fumigations is escaping the Brentwood facility, how will the
businesses, customers and residents be notified in a timely
fashion? Also, Ted Gordon, who is the senior director for the
Department of Health, made a good point yesterday. From the
perspective of the Department of Health and from the sciences,
it is clearly determined that the operation that has been put
in place is sufficient.
But when you look at it from a community perspective and
you look at it from a public safety perspective, we need to
ascertain whether or not Brentwood Road should be shut down
during the actual fumigation process.
Clearly, the operation as I understand it would probably
take no more than 24 hours if everything was to go properly, so
a 24-hour shut-down of Brentwood Road just to make sure that we
do not have customers in the area if anything goes wrong, that
we will not have to deal with all the traffic that is coming
off of New York Avenue or Rhode Island Avenue into that
particular area. So that would be strictly from a public safety
community perspective, but I understand from the Department of
Health and from the science perspective that the plan that has
been placed on the table is sufficient as well.
We have been informed that a chlorine dioxide fumigation to
decontaminate line 17 where the two postal workers who lost
their lives worked will take place on Monday, July 29. How will
the results be analyzed? By whom? And when will the results of
the test run be reported to the public?
The reporting of the success or failure of this test must
be in advance of the actual full-scale chlorine dioxide
fumigation process. We have been told that it may take 5 to 7
days to actually get the results back. It may take another 2
weeks to actually analyze those results.
So looking at that timeframe, we could possibly be into the
end of August, early September before actual fumigation
process, and clearly I would think that would be unacceptable
because now we are into the school year, and to more
individuals actually being in the community. There is a school
right down the street at Brentwood Elementary School, where
noise and school is also utilizing that facility as well.
So we are hopeful that we will be able to speed up the
analysis of the test on Monday, and get those results back a
lot sooner and be able to actually start this process somewhere
in the middle of August, so we could have this all put to bed
by September.
Finally, information is needed on public information fact
sheets, daily updates and media releases, radio-broadcast
media. Where will the public information center be located?
When will the daily updates take place? Is there a Web site for
immediate updates? Is there an 800 number to call for
emergencies? All this information I believe is in place, but it
needs to be broadcast widely so everyone is aware that this is
how they can make contact with this particular operation.
I believe I have provided enough insight into the thinking
of the ward 5 community, the local elected D.C. officials, and
the city as a whole on the subject matter for this subcommittee
to take the lead in ensuring the safety and integrity of the
cleanup process. The old saying that anything that can go
wrong, will go wrong--are we prepared? At what confidence level
can the Federal Government answer this question--are we
prepared? Are adequate contingency plans in place?
I end my testimony by praying that God leads us and guides
us through this process without harm to our residents,
businesses, community and the many workers on this cleanup
process.
Thank you very much for allowing me the opportunity to
testify before this subcommittee this morning.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Orange follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Councilmember Orange.
I want to proceed with questions. I am compelled to proceed
from the remaining, the leftover concerns about health before
we get to the new concerns that are arising with respect to
decontamination and to health inside the community. I should
preface this by saying I have absolutely no compunctions about
going in Hart. I do not even think about it any longer.
So I have to say that going into a building as I do
regularly that was a building where the deadly envelope was
opened, has not bothered me. I have confidence in what was
done--so much confidence that I do not think that those--not
only do I not think about it when I go into Hart, which is
fairly often, but I think that those who go in Hart each and
every day no longer think about it. That gives me some
confidence that we can put this behind us.
But there is a great difference between Hart and Brentwood.
Nobody lost his or her life at Hart. Nobody has complained of
being ill in Hart--at least not that I know of and not that
anyone in the Congress has been informed of.
But not long ago, indeed this very month, people woke up to
read in the paper an article concerning continuing effects from
Brentwood that I must say surprised me, particularly given what
I have just told you about Hart. Essentially what this article
says, and one of the reasons I wanted this hearing to be held,
is that people cannot rely upon what they read in the newspaper
for their health. This is an official hearing where we are
trying to find out what exactly we know and what can be done
about it.
Here comes an article in the Washington Times on July 19--
``Anthrax Ailments Linger in Some, Recovery Could Require
Years.'' Dr. Sokas, you have testified about the toxicity. I
think that was a very wise thing to do. You all clearly are to
some degree following these workers trying to respond to
concerns.
But here is a newspaper article where the quotes are from
doctors who have--and here I am going to use some of the
language from the article--they have documented the symptoms in
a postal inspector from the Brentwood facility in northeast who
handled anthrax spores mailed to Members of Congress in
October. However, blood tests on the man failed to detect
anthrax.
Now we learn, again in this article--I want to hear from
the experts--we learn that 60 people seen at Sinai Hospital who
were in the Brentwood facility, who processed mail there or
worked there, that at least six of them showed some signs of
illness. These are reports from their doctors, and their
doctors are listed here. Again, the Sinai Hospital doctors
found, and here I am quoting from the article, ``previously
unreported symptoms of fluid buildup around the heart, hormone
shifts'' and so forth.
The reason I think we are taking this seriously is we
really do not know enough about anthrax. Clearly, from what we
have learned, I think, unless I hear differently from you, to
be terribly definitive about this substance. One doctor says,
basically, I have got one patient who is sick and we cannot
explain why he is sick.
Then, of course, a large proportion of folks believe they
are suffering from the effects of anthrax. The fact is that I
recognize that when there has been a major problem in a
facility there will be people who believe no matter what you
tell them that it really had to have been that. That is why I
am going to ask you the following. Leave aside the people who
cannot be convinced.
The fact is that the average person it seems to me can be
convinced by scientific studies and the scientific method
lives. I certainly am a subscriber to the scientific method. I
do not believe in conspiracies. I believe that conspiracy
theories will drive people out of this wonderful community. I
believe one does a disservice if one spreads rumors that I know
they must--do not believe what they tell you.
But I also know that there is no way to counter this kind
of rumor and conjecture except by coming forward with
definitive information so far as you have it, that people can
look to as a basis for comparison. When you find that your next
door neighbor is having symptoms that the doctor says you never
had before, even though you had regular checkups, and you were
in Brentwood, then you are going to believe your next door
neighbor and his doctor, rather than the generic assurances
from the experts and from the Postal Service that things are
going to be all right.
That is why I am asking you if--and her I suppose this is
directed to Dr. Sokas--if you would be willing to do an
epidemiological study that would take this population of
workers and residents who entered the facility and live near
the city, and compare them to a comparable group of workers in
a post office environment and residents who use that post
office, as one way, and I am open to your suggestions as to
other ways, and this is certainly consistent with the
scientific method as I know it, as one way to reassure
residents; or in the alternative, if we find differences, to
lead us to new studies so that we can protect the health of
these workers and these residents.
Dr. Sokas. Congresswoman Norton, we can today assure you
that we will discuss this with the director of CDC and respond
to you in a more complete fashion. I believe we have already in
place enough infrastructure to allow the kind of a study that
you are describing to happen to take place without much
difficulty.
But obviously, we would have to pull together the experts
from the National Center for Infectious Diseases, as well as
from the leadership of CDC. I would ask your staff to let us
know who you would like to be involved with the discussion of
that kind of work, and certainly we would bring in the other
agencies, as well as unions, who would be involved. But we will
commit to developing a proposal and then sharing it.
Ms. Norton. I very much appreciate that. I would ask the
chair when she and I can get together to have a preliminary
meeting with the appropriate actors so that the kind of study
that I think this kind of event deserves can be done. Of
course, I ask it in light of the fact that we know still so
little about anthrax, that to say that there will be no after
effects is perhaps to say what we cannot stand behind.
Dr. Sokas. Right. Congresswoman, I would like to say that
in addition to the head of CDC, obviously the Secretary for
Health and Human Services would be involved with the decision
on how that should proceed. I also would like to say that again
we clearly did not know what we did not know last October, and
that is the cardinal sin that resulted in tragic deaths. And so
we are very careful about what we say now in the future.
We did learn, however, that every piece of information that
came in over the fall taught us that what was different about
this was the behavior of the spores; that they had clearly been
treated; that they clearly were much more readily dispersed
into the air than the naturally occurring spores that had been
studied for years.
Ms. Norton. Well, just a followup on that, the notion of
what kind of hypotheses to develop is going to be very
important. The fact is if somebody sends something through the
mail, it apparently did not occur to the CDC that they were
sending cow spores. I mean, they were sending military-grade
spores. They meant to do harm. And if you had in fact
hypothesized that these were military-grade, then of course you
might have looked at Brentwood and not simply opened it,
because then of course the notion of its dispersing would have
been more apparent.
I have the greatest respect for CDC for your own work, Dr.
Sokas, and for American science, frankly. It is because I so
believe in science that I would like the best science to be
developed here so that residents can have the state-of-the-art
science. Look, if there is stuff that nobody knew, we are not
God.
But to the extent that mortals can in fact assure us that
those who have been exposed are not in danger, then people will
come back into this facility in a way that people may be
reluctant to do now. I mean, members of the community, you
might imagine--I speak about Hart, but Hart was not closed for
almost a year.
Members of the community see this as a kind of giant tomb,
and you wonder if you want to walk into that place which was so
much larger than Hart, and for which there is no precedent for
cleanup. Again, I think this can be overcome, but I think we
have to go the extra mile and be terribly proactive in trying
to do so.
I would like to ask about time. I am not a critic of the
fact that it has taken too long. I do not think people would
have wanted to go in very soon anyway. So I do not say, why
don't you do it fast. In fact, I say do it slow, just do it
right.
But I think we have--we need some sense of what, at least
roughly, a time line would be, assuming a go on the
decontamination test you are about to do. How long after that
go would we get to total decontamination? And according to what
you know now, how long would decontamination take? Bear in
mind, Mr. Voltaggio, that even at Hart, because you had never
done this before, you had to do it more than once because you
went in and you found that in fact there was still some
contamination there.
So I can only ask for your best sense at this time, and I
understand that nobody can hold you to what no human being
knows at this time, but I think we have a right to know. Do we
imagine that this facility will open, for example, in the year
2003 at all? Are we in for some terribly long-term matter where
Councilmember Orange has to prepare his community for a long
period of time to wait and therefore perhaps to have the
experts come back time and again? What is your best sense of
the steps and how long the steps will take? Is this Dr. Gordon
or Mr. Day? I do not know which of you have the best sense of
that.
Mr. Day. Congresswoman, I can at least start with the
answer. I would agree with you to say up front that we are
willing to sacrifice time in order to do this not only safely,
but with full coordination and notification not only amongst
agencies, but with the public as well. The tests that will take
place on Monday really defines how quickly we move forward.
Let's be optimistic.
We think everything that we have done to get ready for that
test that it will be successful, as quickly, and I would agree
with Councilman Orange, anything we can do to expedite the
return of those results and the analysis of the results we
certainly are interested in doing.
I believe, again assuming success of that test, that we are
within weeks of being able to do the first full fumigation of
the building. Now, it is 17 million cubic feet. The caution I
would say, as occurred in the Hart Building on a smaller scale,
I do not think we can necessarily assume that the very first
time we attempt that fumigation that we absolutely with
certainty can say that is it, we will just have to do it once.
So the fact that we can begin it in weeks hopefully does not
necessarily mean it is then finished very quickly.
Even when the fumigation is completed, it will then--let me
go back a step because the intervening step between successful
results from next week's test and beginning the fumigation
process, again hopefully weeks, are two key issues.
One, we are committed to do a community meeting before we
conduct a fumigation, to once and for all clearly outline the
procedures in terms of any notification that would be required,
what are the emergency procedures--make clear to the public and
answer any final questions, and then as agreed, do the final
72-hour notice before the fumigation would begin. So those are
other steps that would precede the actual fumigation. Then
there is the treatment, or the testing that we would have to
wait for results.
Finally, I would say in terms of when the building actually
opens, when we reach that point in time, and I am being a bit
optimistic, but if we get that done in September and we get the
clean bill of health, say, by the end of September, early
October, from the D.C. Department of Health, when we get that,
that actually then begins the time clock to get the building
ready to be occupied.
The fact that it is decontaminated of anthrax does not mean
we just open the doors. Our plan is to do a full and complete
renovation. We are going to refurbish offices, carpets,
furniture, painting, cleanup, venting out the building. We want
to do that so that when our employees come back to work, and we
think that will take a couple of months to do it properly, we
not only can tell you that the building is clean of anthrax and
been safely decontaminated, but the building really provides
the work environment that they deserve.
So even the effective cleanup, when certified by D.C.
Department of Health officials, there will still be several
months of renovation that we want to do to get that building in
the best possible shape.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Day, while you have the mic, could I ask
you where have all the workers gone? [Laughter.]
I would like to know where the workers--first of all, I
would like to know the number of workers that were there. Where
are they now? Will all of them be coming back? Will you have
difficulties attracting workers back? Have you been working
with the union on a transition to get actual people back in
that facility?
Mr. Day. Let me take it in parts. Congresswoman, I can give
you some very specific numbers and I do not know them off the
top of my head. On rough order of magnitude, we are talking
approximately 2,500 people. I can get you more specific numbers
exactly. They are represented by different unions, so I could
give you that breakdown as well.
In terms of where they are, they are working in both the
stations and branches of the District itself, but the
processing employees for the most part have gone out to other
processing centers in the D.C. metropolitan area.
What we had to do when we shut down the Brentwood facility
was to re-disperse all of that mail to other centers to
process. And again, as I was thanking and praising employees, I
think the amazing story to this is they have gone out, and that
is obviously a great inconvenience, they have got to go to
other facilities other than where they normally worked. They
are working there. They are processing the mail. Quite
honestly, the capital area was recognized as the best service
performance in the country.
So our employees have done an amazing job in a very
difficult environment. So they are spread around six other
major processing centers, but again I can give you very
specific numbers if you would like that.
Ms. Norton. I wish you would, within 30 days, for the
record.
Mr. Day. We can followup.
Ms. Norton. Is this the largest facility, I know in this
region, but is it the largest facility in the country?
Mr. Day. No, ma'am, it is not.
Ms. Norton. It is not. All right.
Let me ask about this parameter. When you say things like
25 ppb and 15 ppb--these sound like enormous disparities, so
that it is hard for the public to understand whether that is
good or bad, frankly. I would like to know how you decided on
what the parameter would be? What happens if some of the gas
escapes? What effect do you think that would have, given the
precautions that have been taken?
I am also interested in the cleaning of the machinery. Do
you do that with gas or does somebody scrub down the machinery?
Given the fact that these postal workers were exposed
apparently from the machinery, the machinery turns out to be
probably the culprit. I am very interested in that. I wish
whoever feels best able would tackle those set of questions.
Mr. Gordon. Congresswoman Norton, the Department of Health,
along with the Postal Service and EPA, conducted mathematical
models on the Brentwood facility, taking into consideration the
worst-case scenario of a major release of gas out of that
building, and establishing the perimeter of .16 miles. Now, we
have also taken into consideration----
Ms. Norton. Excuse me, Dr. Gordon, have you recommended
that this be done at a certain time of the day or evening?
Mr. Gordon. We would recommend it be started early in the
morning throughout the entire day.
Ms. Norton. On a weekday?
Mr. Gordon. Our preference would be on the weekend. That is
a discussion point that we are having.
Ms. Norton. Does it matter that there is a Home Depot and
other facilities nearby?
Mr. Gordon. From a public health science standpoint, we do
not think that the risk is that great. As in the situation with
the Hart Building, we did not evacuate businesses. We did not
evacuate residents.
Ms. Norton. You did not. This is important to note, because
if you want to find out how to do it, listen to what they did
when senators were involved. [Laughter.]
Mr. Gordon. That is correct.
Ms. Norton. Now, the testimony here is that businesses were
not evacuated. Homes were not evacuated. Have there been any
reports from businesses or homes or residents of any effects
from the decontamination?
Mr. Gordon. None whatsoever.
Ms. Norton. All right. So continue.
Mr. Gordon. We have established the same safety parameters
that were established for the senators and Congressmen around
the Hart Building. In consultation with the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, the District of Columbia and EPA set a base
standard of 25 ppb. Now, let me tell you how that was arrived.
The Federal occupational safety and health standard for
worker exposure to chlorine dioxide gas is 1,000 ppb over an 8-
hour period of time, meaning that you would have to be exposed
to concentrations of 1,000 ppb over 8 hours to exhibit clinical
symptomology of ill-health effects.
Ms. Norton. And that clinical symptomology would be what?
Mr. Gordon. Respiratory dysfunction, possible skin rash,
eyes watering, difficulty breathing. Chlorine dioxide is a
toxicant that is corrosive. Chlorine is corrosive. However, in
setting a safety standard at 25 ppb, an analogy would be this
first step in the ceiling, the ceiling being 1,000 parts and 25
being this step. At the time we did the Hart Building along
with EPA, we used the TAGA bus and other air monitoring
equipment that the Department of Health stationed around the
Hart Building. We detected no levels of chlorine dioxide gas.
In the event we would----
Ms. Norton. Not a thing escaped?
Mr. Gordon. Not a thing was detected at 25 ppb. And if it
was released at that level, you would not smell it. And if you
do smell it, it is going to smell like chlorine out of your
swimming pool. If you are in a swimming pool, that odor of
chlorine from the pool is the odor that you would detect if
there was a release. At 25 ppb, you cannot even detect it by
the human nose.
We have set a standard I place. If the machinery goes off
and we have two stationary air monitors on the roof, we have
the TAGA bus that will be moving around and we have other air
monitors around the perimeter of the building. In the event any
of those go off, there will be an immediate shut-down of the
operation, and to determine where and the location of any leak
in the building. Therefore, we feel with that standard, that
safety net, that the community is at very low risk.
Ms. Norton. What time of the day did you do the--this is
Mr. Voltaggio--what time of the day and what day of the week
did you do the decontamination at Hart?
Mr. Voltaggio. We started it at midnight, and we went
through the next day, and it was a weekend--Saturday morning
through the day Saturday is when we did the suite
decontamination.
Ms. Norton. I would only ask that you choose a time when
there are the fewest people there. Dr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. I think the reason why the department----
Ms. Norton. That is not because I fear, given the testimony
here, that there would be a health problem. I think one of our
problems, perhaps our major problems, is to contain fears and
if having few people around contains fears then why not do it
that way.
Mr. Gordon. The other reason why the Department of Health
is encouraging the Postal Service to start early in the morning
is that we also know based on the science that if there were to
be a release of chlorine dioxide gas, if it is released during
the daytime hours, exposed to the ultraviolet rays from the
sun, it breaks down very rapidly and is rendered somewhat
innocuous.
Ms. Norton. So sunlight helps?
Mr. Gordon. Absolutely. Absolutely. And that is our
recommendation on line 17, which we will start actually the
process of preparation will be Sunday and we have a target
period starting at 7 a.m., on Monday. Now, we also have a
weather station that has been constructed and is on top of the
building. The purpose of that weather station is also to
determine directional flow of the wind. In the event there is a
release, we want to know which way it is blowing and which way
it is going to go, as an additional safety net.
We think that the necessary steps have been put in place to
minimize the risk of any endangerment to this community. I must
add, people need to understand, chlorine dioxide gas is not a
gas that is flammable. It is not a gas that is going to explode
like some other toxicants. And as my colleague Tom Voltaggio
stated, it has been used over the years for decontamination of
water and fruits and vegetables and foods, and we think it is a
very acceptable means of sterilizing and decontaminating this
facility and rendering the anthrax spores innocuous.
Ms. Norton. Councilmember Orange, you have heard the
testimony here concerning cautions that are being taken. I
would like some sense of the gravamen of the concerns of the
community. The community here, as I understand it, would
involve people who live in the vicinity and people who use the
post office. Like the employees, they are going to want to go
back into that building the way they did before. What are the
major concerns you are hearing from the community?
Mr. Orange. Well, I guess the major concern is really
making sure that full disclosure and all the information is put
on the table and that it is accurate information. There is some
concern when you have a full-blown article within the
Washington Post that has all this information and people digest
that information and then the experts come back 30 days later
and say that the information in their article was erroneous.
Yet that information came from the experts and was reported
through the Washington Post.
Ms. Norton. Do you have any information of that kind that
you----
Mr. Orange. Yes, for example, the 20,000 tons of chlorine
dioxide gas that would be brought into the community, and now
we are saying it is 2,000 pounds. And then when you look at the
Hart Building and you look at the amount of chlorine dioxide
gas that was used in the Hart Building, and you do the simple
mathematics, it does not add up. It appears as though this
should be more chlorine dioxide gas being utilized at the
Brentwood facility than what is being put on the table. So the
community just wants a clear analysis of what is exactly going
to be put in the Brentwood facility.
When you look at it in terms of 17.5 million cubic feet
versus 100,000 cubic feet for the Hart Building, then you would
say, I mean clearly you would expect there to be more chlorine
dioxide gas pumped into the Brentwood facility.
Now, when you talk about the perimeter, and I agree with
Mr. Gordon and Mr. Day as it relates to the science and the
health, .16 miles perimeter is probably a safe perimeter. But
when you bring in the element of the community and then the
public safety and, like you indicated yourself, containment of
fears, then you probably would have to expand that perimeter a
little bit to at least say during the 24 hours of operation
that you need to shut down Brentwood Road; that you really
should not have any traffic flowing on that street because that
provides easy access to the facility.
What if someone decided that I am going to get a big truck
that day and I am going to fill it with explosives and I am
going to drive right into the Brentwood facility because the
street is open and it is still easy flow. So that is a
containment of fear.
We do not have any problems with the tests that are going
to take place on Monday, and let me tell you why. Because the
test itself, the gas is going to be pumped into an area that is
contained by a tent, and the tent is contained within the
facility itself, so you have an extra layer of containment.
But when the actual fumigation takes place, that tent will
not be in place, and then you just have the entire facility,
17.5 million cubic feet. So I do think that we are getting
close to all being on the same page. This clearly has been
helpful, the town hall meeting that took place on June 27, and
even the presentation that was made here today, and then the
explanation that has been given by the other experts, but I do
still believe that we should take the extra step of precaution
and really discuss and talk about those contingency plans as
well, so people will feel comfortable that there is in fact a
contingency plan just in case something goes wrong.
Ms. Norton. I am going to ask that there be meetings with
the District on this matter, to do the kind of cost/benefit--
obviously, this is bending over backward, but I think the
councilmember has raised a scenario that deserves some
consideration. Can we straighten out Councilmember Orange's
point about the amount of----
Mr. Voltaggio. Yes, I hope I can maybe clarify that some.
Chlorine dioxide is not brought onto the site. We generate
chlorine dioxide at the site. What we do bring--we will have
20,000 tons of material brought on and waste made from the
process. They will only generate 2,000 pounds of chlorine
dioxide gas.
So I think the discrepancy about the poundage I think had
to do with how much gas actually gets generated versus how much
material you have to bring onto the site to generate the gas,
because there is a chemical reaction that takes place in order
to generate the chlorine dioxide from other materials,
basically sodium bisufite, hydrochloric acid. We have bleach.
We have a number of materials that are brought on in order to
make it. But the chlorine dioxide itself is only 2,000 pounds.
Ms. Norton. When you are going to wipe those machines--and
those machines are what interests me, frankly, machines where
we think the lethal contact occurred--is that going to be with
pumping gas or are they going to be wiped down or what?
Mr. Voltaggio. I would throw that to Mr. Day.
Ms. Norton. Yes?
Mr. Day. During the processing of the actual fumigation,
the machines will be operational. They will be running. We want
to make sure that every aspect of that machine is exposed to
the gas for total disinfecting. So the equipment will be
running full-speed, even line 17, the tenting operation we are
going to do Monday, the equipment will be on and running.
Nothing will be sitting stationary. Everything will be exposed.
Ms. Norton. That is important.
Mr. Day. Congressman, I would just further point out, the
way our machine, it is automated distribution equipment, the
way they are designed really for their normal use with
maintenance, they have lids that open up so what you see is a
contained machine, but fully capable of opening all those lids
up so that all the interior portions of the machine will be
fully exposed.
Ms. Norton. So it is blowing out anything that is in there.
Mr. Orange. Congresswoman.
Ms. Norton. Yes, councilmember.
Mr. Orange. We just received an answer that there would be
20,000 tons of chemicals or materials that would be brought to
the site, and then that will actually be turned into 2,000 tons
of chlorine dioxide gas. That is precisely the type of
information that the community wants, because it was put in the
paper that it was 20,000 tons of chlorine dioxide gas.
So we are not imagining this number of 20,000 tons, and
today for the first time we got an explanation for what that
20,000 tons represents. That is what I am saying--we need a
clear accurate description of what is on that site, the actual
tonnage, the actual poundage, and the relationship----
Ms. Norton. Councilmember, are you saying that there has
been a problem in getting that kind of communication? Is it a
problem with the technical terminology? Is it a problem with
contact? Is it a problem with your office making sure that
people are in contact with you and the relevant community
members? Maybe there is a way we can straighten out some of
that right here now.
Mr. Orange. I think what it is, is maybe we are talking
past each other, as opposed to really listening to each other
and trying to really dissect the information that is made
available. As I indicated, I keep going back to that Post
article that says 20,000 tons of chlorine dioxide gas will be
pumped into this building. And then the experts come back this
week or a few weeks ago and say, no, it is 2,000 pounds.
Ms. Norton. That might have been the Post's mistake.
Mr. Orange. Yes, and it could have been, but it has never
been corrected. And I am just saying, let's correct that
information and let's see exactly what chemicals are onsite,
how those chemicals are brought into that facility and how they
will exit that facility.
Ms. Norton. Dr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Yes, I need to, as the councilman has pointed
out, I need to correct the record. I have been advised, I said
1,000 ppb was the OSHA standard. It is actually 100 ppb, and we
have set the safety net at 25. So I want the record to reflect
and correct my earlier statement.
Ms. Norton. Thank you.
$22 billion, as I understand it--is that what this cleanup
is supposed to cost?
Mr. Day. No, Congresswoman--million.
Ms. Norton. I am sorry--million, $22 million.
Mr. Day. Yes.
Ms. Norton. Do you have the cash on hand? [Laughter.]
Mr. Day. Congresswoman, actually, through the good graces
of Congress and the administration, we did get funds
appropriated.
Ms. Norton. I hate to ask this, but whenever government
does anything, there are, ``cost overruns.'' Suppose it costs
more than $22 million.
Mr. Day. Congresswoman, we were appropriated initially $175
million from the White House. Congress approved the White
House, the president the ability to give funds to agencies. We
had $175 million initially. Further, we were appropriated $500
million for emergency preparedness. Our very first----
Ms. Norton. That is for the United States of America.
Mr. Day. But what you need to understand, Congresswoman, is
that our very first priority in the emergency preparedness
plan, very clear in the plan, is decontamination and cleanup
and reoccupation of Brentwood and Trenton.
Ms. Norton. Whatever it costs.
Mr. Day. Whatever it costs. So, we have other plans. We
have fully documented how we would spend the $500 million. Our
commitment is to get this done and do it right. So the funds
are there.
Ms. Norton. Dr. Gordon, perhaps you can tell me, is the
District of Columbia being fully reimbursed for any costs it
has incurred from this crisis at Brentwood in particular?
Mr. Gordon. We have not had any direct discussions with the
Postal Service. However, the city administrator and the mayor
have instructed us to maintain a catalogue of our time and
cost, at which time we will request reimbursement from the
Postal Service.
Ms. Norton. Let me just ask the Postal Service right now.
Are you prepared to reimburse the District of Columbia fully
for any costs it incurs with respect to the Brentwood facility?
[Laughter.]
Do not hesitate now, Mr. Day. I mean, you were real quick
that whatever it costs. It is costing the District of Columbia.
We did not have anything to do with Brentwood.
Mr. Day. It is a topic that has not been discussed. We are
certainly open to the discussion.
Ms. Norton. Well, I am having that discussion with you
right now.
[Applause.]
Ms. Norton. You have really had the--the Post Office has
had all of the services of our health department and of every
other agency of the government that could be useful. The
Congress, of course, gave you money to deal with whatever your
expenses were. The expense that the District of Columbia has
incurred is an expense.
You cannot assure me that you will reimburse the District?
You are reimbursing the contractors. The District of Columbia
is a contractor in this matter. I do not want to get down and
dirty with money here, but I really am prepared and I would
like an answer within 30 days as to whether or not you are
prepared to reimburse the District of Columbia.
Mr. Day. We certainly can provide the response for you.
Congresswoman, my only reluctance is, I do not even know the
scale. So we would just have to discuss it.
Ms. Norton. You do not know the scale of what the cleanup
will be either. None of us knows the scale, but you have just
said you are going to do whatever it takes, and it seems to me
that was a good answer. Whatever it takes includes whatever the
District of Columbia has in fact done.
Mr. Day. I think we can certainly reach an agreement that
will be work for everyone.
Ms. Norton. Look, they have to provide chits like everybody
else.
Mr. Day. Congresswoman, the money was appropriated to us
from Congress. It was not derived from our revenues. We will
work to fairly compensate those parties that are part of this.
We will work it out. I do not see that as a problem.
Ms. Norton. I am going to take that as a yes and go forward
from here.
I must ask about future threats. People are going to walk
in, and I think they should be reassured, because I know you
are not going to let either your employees in or residents in
until you have done all that you have described here.
Now, that being the case, the question becomes, is
Brentwood prepared for in case there is a new bioterrorism
event? Now just a moment--let's try to get an answer here.
Let's ask. It is one thing to clean the place out. It is
another thing to prepare for the unknown, and that is part of
what it would be.
You of course have a greater sense of what might happen
now. The Congress now has appropriated all kinds of money. I
have just gotten for the Washington Hospital Center a promise
with the first funds already there to build the first
bioterrorism emergency room in the country. They are going to
be prepared if we ever need it to hand 100-plus patients per
hour in their emergency room.
I have just gotten $10 million for Children's Hospital to
do the same with respect to children. So if something happens,
we are getting the medical facilities in place. What we want to
know is, what is the Postal Service going to do to prevent the
necessity or using any such medical facilities? How will we
prevent a bioterrorist attack and how will we know if one is
occurring in the Postal Service or in Brentwood?
Mr. Day. Congresswoman, what we are dealing with in the
Postal Service is how would we detect and contain, if there
were another attack. We have two primary----
Ms. Norton. Of any substance.
Mr. Day. Biohazardous substance.
Ms. Norton. Right.
Mr. Day. We are also looking at other threats as well. We
have two primary technologies that we are actively pursuing and
testing right now that were a part of the appropriation that
Congress provided. One is called a biological detection system.
We have worked with various other Federal agencies to develop
that.
It is being tested right now in Baltimore, Maryland. Our
plan is to move forward on that, again assuming the test is
validated and it is proven effective. Right now, I would tell
you that will be the outcome. It does look like the results are
excellent.
In terms of the ability to detect, it would have very low
false positives; that it would truly tell you what happened, as
well as a very low false negative. You do not want systems that
alert you to something that really is not there. And we have
put very tight parameters on that and the system looks to be
very effective.
We would like to move forward on that, although I will
throw a caveat into our ability to move forward as quickly as
possible, and we are looking to even try to award the contract
in September. Our plan on that is to deploy it nationwide.
Brentwood, being part of our network, would be there, and
given the tragedy that they went through would be the very
first facility, along with Hamilton Township, that we would
want to put that kind of equipment. So as quickly as we can get
it, it will be in place.
The second level of technology we call a vacuuming and
filtration system. That is to put over our equipment that if
the event takes place, the anthrax escapes from the mail, we
detect it, the problem is--and let me just be clear on this--
the only detection technology that is available you have to
have an event. It has to escape to be detected. There is no way
to peer inside mail to see if there is anthrax in there.
So you find that out very quickly and you contain it, but
this vacuuming and filtration system covers our automated
distribution equipment. Right now, the DBCS-17 that everyone
has talked about is a very open piece of equipment.
Vacuuming and filtration would create a negative air-flow
that if an event took place, it would draw those spores away,
not just anthrax spores, but any hazard that might be placed in
the mail. I would emphasize the biological detection system is
done in a way that not only would detect anthrax, but we have
built it in a way that gives it the ability to detect a range
of biological hazards.
Ms. Norton. That will be in place at the time that
Brentwood is open?
Mr. Day. No. Going back to the timeframes of when we think
we can open it, the contractor's ability to get this equipment
built and functioning, there maybe somewhat of a delay there,
but that is true nationwide. Right now, we do not have that in
place.
Now, anything I can do to get it--again, our effort will be
to get it in Brentwood and Hamilton first. Anything I can do to
accelerate----
Ms. Norton. And ``first'' would mean by approximately when?
Mr. Day. We think that the equipment will be available late
next spring.
Now, the caveat I was giving you, Congresswoman, is,
working with these companies to build this technology, they
have been very clear to us, and I know this has been debated in
Congress, on the issue of indemnification. Because of the
liabilities that are associated, the legal liabilities, they
have made very clear to us unless the issue of indemnification
is rectified, they will not sign a contract with us.
Ms. Norton. Does the bill pending in the Senate now do
that, in your judgment?
Mr. Day. We believe that the legislation pending, I believe
there are different versions in both House and Senate, we
believe it will do it, and the vendors we are dealing with
believe that also. Of course, we have to wait to see what the
final legislation actually says.
Ms. Norton. Is this irradiated mail that the Congress is
now receiving considered safe, and is this the only method now
available for use in mail coming to secure environments like
the Congress?
Mr. Day. Congresswoman, I was on the Hill yesterday with
both House and Senate administrative staff, and there was a
study completed--I may defer if Dr. Sokas would like to comment
on it, to try to determine some of the effects that have been
reported and whether or not it is related to irradiated mail.
There is an ongoing effort.
My understanding is that link has not been shown, but again
I will let Dr. Sokas comment on that. In terms of, is this the
only way, we continue under guidelines we have had,
conversations and ongoing dialog with office of homeland
security, as well as advice in terms of threat from various
Federal law enforcement agencies, that we need to continue the
irradiation process.
It is the only effective way that we have found that can
decontaminate a biological hazard in the mail. There is some
discussion right now--I do not know how far you want to get
into technology--about the effectiveness of electronic beam
versus an X-ray version, but that is really kind of splitting
the hairs. It is more of the sophistication of the technology,
but it is still irradiation.
Ms. Norton. Yes. Dr. Sokas, did you want to comment on
that--irradiated mail?
Dr. Sokas. Yes, we have conducted two different studies,
one that looked at the postal workers themselves as they were
opening large bags, and there was some concern identified by a
Postal Service contractor about degradation of the plastic that
could cause some carbon monoxide as the large bags were being
opened--the plastic-covered palettes were being opened. I
believe that has been taken care of by different work practices
that would reduce that.
Ms. Norton. That is not opened. That mail is not opened at
Brentwood, is it?
Mr. Day. No, and we have eliminated the use of that
plastic.
Dr. Sokas. Right. But the second issue is, as you receive
mail in office buildings specifically, the people on the Hill
had a number of complaints. We had industrial hygienists who
went and sampled the air, as well as the materials, and we had
physicians who did interview the individuals.
Our conclusions were that the traces and particles that
were present were far below those of recognized standards for
workplace settings, and we did not feel that they were causing
some of the dry eyes and cough. The concern we mentioned at the
time in the Capitol was--this was conducted in January, of
course the humidity was quite low.
There is some clear differences in terms of the paper dust
and that sort of thing that happens. We thought that was more
of a comfort issue that could be rectified, but that was not a
hazard due to the irradiated mail.
Ms. Norton. Let me ask one final question. I have had some
complaints from my constituents. I do not now if Councilmember
Orange has had such complaints as well. I do not know if they
continued, but they have to do with delays in the mail in this
area, with people who have had to pay late fees because they
did not get their mail on time. Is this still happening? And
have you taken steps, now that this mail is dispersed
throughout the region, to avoid the problem of late delivery of
mail in this area?
Mr. Day. Congresswoman, there certainly were delays when we
shut down the facility. There was a backlog of actually
contaminated mail that needed to be treated. That backlog took
us quite a bit of time to decontaminate.
Ms. Norton. Yes, we are still getting some from that, I am
here to testify.
Mr. Day. I can't answer to what you are seeing, but let me
just tell you how long it took and where we got the backlog
cleaned up. We have continued to irradiate the destination mail
to the Federal agencies in the District, and it is the zip
codes 202 through 205 that we continue to irradiate. That
backlog for letter and oversize mail pieces was cleaned up back
in the February-March timeframe.
What was severely backlogged because we were awaiting X-ray
technology to be activated in New Jersey at the facility we
used, were packages, and we cleared the backlog of packages
back in June. We have been in a stable environment in which we
prepare, mail on the day it arrives here in this area, ship it
to New Jersey, treat it, turn it around in 24 hours, bring it
back into the D.C. area, open it, vent it so that any odor or
any other issues are----
Ms. Norton. That is congressional mail. What about the mail
of the average person?
Mr. Day. The average person----
Ms. Norton. Whose mail went through Brentwood.
Mr. Day. So the average person in the 200 zip code range,
that mail has been redistributed through the area. We use a
system of external measurement, and as I indicated earlier,
this area had the highest service numbers in the country, and
the 200 zip code range being included.
Ms. Norton. So you believe there is no delay at this time
resulting from the dispersal of the employees around the
region?
Mr. Day. Nothing related to the dispersal of the employees,
nothing related to irradiation. Certainly anecdotally, anyone
might have a story of a delayed mail piece, but our service
measures tell us that we are providing as good a service in
this area as we did before the unfortunate incident in October.
Ms. Norton. I want to thank this panel of witnesses. I have
held you longer because you had more of the answers I think
that the community and that the Congress needed than perhaps
others. We very much appreciate your testimony.
We would now like to call John Hegarty, national president
of the National Postal Mail Handlers; Alan Ferranto, director
of safety and health, National Association of Letter Carriers;
Roy Braunstein, legislative director, American Postal Workers
Union; also Corey Thompson, APWU safety and health specialist.
If you would stand and please raise your right hands so
that you may take the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. Please be seated. We are
pleased to receive your testimony.
Mr. Hegarty.
STATEMENTS OF JOHN F. HEGARTY, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
POSTAL MAIL HANDLERS UNION; ALAN C. FERRANTO, DIRECTOR OF
SAFETY AND HEALTH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LETTER CARRIERS; AND
ROY BRAUNSTEIN, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS
UNION
Mr. Hegarty. Good morning, Congresswoman Norton. My name is
John Hegarty. I am the president of the National Postal Mail
Handlers Union. I have with me today in reference to Brentwood,
Cynthia Vines, who is the branch president for the National
Postal Mail Handlers Union at the Brentwood facility, and
Richard Collins, who is on the mail security task force for the
National Postal Mail Handlers Union.
On behalf of 50,000 union mail handlers employed by the
U.S. Postal Service, including approximately 500 mail handlers
who work at the Brentwood Processing and Distribution Center, I
appreciate the opportunity to testify about the challenges
currently facing the Postal Service and all postal employees at
Brentwood.
As you probably know, the employees represented by the Mail
Handlers Union are an essential part of the mail processing and
distribution network utilized by the Postal Service to move
more than 200 billion pieces of mail each year.
Mail handlers work in all of the Nation's large postal
plants and are responsible for loading and unloading trucks,
transporting mail within the facility, preparing mail for
distribution and delivery, operating a host of machinery and
automated equipment, and containerizing mail for subsequent
delivery. Our members are generally the first and the last to
handle the mail as it comes into and leaves the postal plants.
Although I am relatively new to Washington, DC, and this is
my first visit to the area surrounding Brentwood, I have been
personally involved in the issues arising from last year's
anthrax attacks. Indeed, after attending a labor-management
grievance meeting last October at the Hamilton Township postal
facility in Trenton, New Jersey, I was one of the thousands of
postal employees who had to take several months of antibiotics
in order to ensure my own immunity from anthrax contamination.
In some small respects, therefore, I know first-hand the fear
and anxiety that now affects many postal employees.
My personal experience with the terror of anthrax adds
personal meaning to what has been and what must continue to be
our guiding principle, that our paramount concern must be the
safety and well-being of postal employees, including all mail
handlers.
This includes not only ensuring that the Brentwood facility
is free of anthrax, but also making sure that the employees are
emotionally ready, willing and able to move back into the
facility. To this end, the mail handlers union has been an
active participant in the mail security task force established
by postal management and including representatives of all
unions and employee associations, which has been meeting since
last year to ensure that all reasonable measures are being
taken to prevent any further infection from anthrax or other
biological agents.
We have also been active supporters of the efforts to
obtain sufficient congressional funding for the cleanup effort
both here at Brentwood, and at other postal facilities along
the eastern seaboard. We particularly appreciate the efforts
made by members of this subcommittee and fervently hope that
the Congress will continue to provide complete funding for the
costs imposed on the Postal Service because of the anthrax
attacks and their aftermath.
Turning to the present situation at Brentwood, again our
primary concern must be the health and welfare of the 2,000
postal employees who work at Brentwood and who, for the past 9
months, have been scattered around in neighboring postal
facilities.
To meet these concerns, the employees at Brentwood must
know, first, that all levels of government and postal
management are doing everything possible, using the best
available science and technology, to ensure that the Brentwood
facility is fully decontaminated before any worker is asked to
return; second, that they are being kept fully informed about
the latest developments, including information about the actual
cleanup so that there is no misinformation disseminated and so
that the rumor mill can be put to rest; third, that they have a
real choice on whether to return, so that employees who are
experiencing particular fear or anxiety can freely choose not
to return to Brentwood without any loss of pay or benefits;
four, that if they return to Brentwood, the employees will be
carefully monitored for any illnesses or other adverse side
effects, whether physical or emotional, especially during the
first few days and weeks after Brentwood is reopened; fifth,
that the reopening of Brentwood is not the end of our concerns,
but rather the starting point from which the Postal Service
will take whatever steps are necessary and use whatever
technologies are available to ensure that postal employees and
the mail that they process is safe; sixth, that the elected
representatives of these employees, meaning the union
representatives at the local level, are allowed to participate
in the planning and implementation for each and every step of
the project that needs to be accomplished at the Brentwood
facility.
If these general guidelines are followed, I believe that
the reopening of Brentwood can be accomplished smoothly and
successfully. But it is easier to state these guidelines than
to follow them. For example, Congress not only needs to
continue its oversight of this cleanup, but Congress also has
to continue full funding for the cleanup and for all of the
followup work that must be completed after the facility is
reopened. Postal management also has to do a better job of
making sure that complete and accurate information is being
disseminated to its employees and that questions are answered
before the rumors start flying.
The examples could continue, but there is no reason to
belabor the point. All of the participants must work together
to ensure the safety and the well-being of the employees at
Brentwood. Anything less would increase the fear and anxiety of
these postal employees who have already suffered too much.
Thank you for your time, and I would be glad to answer any
questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hegarty follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Hegarty.
Mr. Ferranto.
Mr. Ferranto. Thank you, Congresswoman. I would like to
thank you for a request for a CDC study that will assure our
members that they are safe, and not only from anthrax, but from
the decontamination process as well. We do appreciate that. I
would like to begin my testimony at this present time.
Thank you, Chairman Morella and Ranking Member Norton for
the opportunity to testify on this important subject. My name
is Al Ferranto and I am director of safety and health of the
National Association of Letter Carriers. Since September 11th
of last year, this has been a trying time for all Americans.
For those of us in the postal community, we have also been
personally confronted with challenges previously considered
unimaginable. I am happy to report that the 350,000 members of
the National Association of Letter Carriers have shown
remarkable strength in bouncing back from these attacks. We
know that there are few uniquely American experiences like the
daily ritual of reaching into the mailbox to get the mail. That
is why we went to such great lengths to be out on the streets
and serving the public last fall.
As you well know, Madam Chair, the initial response to the
anthrax attacks was chaotic, whether it was in New York,
Florida, Capitol Hill or the post office. That was due in large
part to the unprecedented nature of the circumstances. However,
within the Postal Service, unprecedented circumstances gave
rise to unprecedented levels of cooperation. The Postal Service
established a line of communication with all the employee
organizations, initially meeting on a daily basis to deal with
events as they occurred.
The Mail Security Task Force Working Group, as it has come
to be known, was formed by representatives from all of the
employee organizations and all relevant departments within the
Postal Service. At any given time, agencies with expertise in a
particular area have briefed the group. Once the immediate
anthrax threat subsided, that structure remained in place.
While we no longer meet on a daily basis, we get together
frequently to discuss the latest developments. For the last
several months, cleanup of the Brentwood facility has been the
dominant topic in those meetings.
The NALC recognizes the extraordinary challenges associated
with decontaminating the Brentwood facility. Whereas the Hart
Building cleanup dealt with 100,000 square feet, the Brentwood
Processing and Distribution Center requires covering 17 million
square feet of space. The good news is that the Hart Building
gave us a good road map to what to expect during the cleanup.
We are satisfied that the Postal Service is exercising the
right level of caution in moving forward, and are encouraged
that it has not sought to impose artificial or arbitrary
deadlines, which could lead to irresponsible actions being
taken. Using the same contractors and the same chlorine dioxide
approach also provides letter carriers, other postal employees
and postal customers with the confidence that the cleanup of
Brentwood will be as good or better than the cleanup of the
Hart Building.
As you know, at the initial stages of the anthrax
situation, some of our members did not feel they received equal
treatment to other government employees. We will not allow that
to happen again. We will not let our members return to work at
Brentwood until we are fully satisfied that it is safe for them
to do so. For that reason, there has been a high premium placed
on communications.
Our local leadership is actively involved in the process.
These are the people who have the most day to day interaction
with our rank and file members. NALC Branch 142, under the
leadership of President Joe Henry, who is here with me at this
hearing, organized a meeting of our members, as well as members
of the National Postal Mail Handlers Union at the NALC Branch
142 union hall.
They also cosponsored a meeting at the Israeli Baptist
Church along with the mail handlers and the NAACP, which was
attended by more than 300 people. President Henry also serves
on both the Brentwood Reentry Committee and the Scientific
Review Committee. The Brentwood Reentry Committee includes
representatives from the other postal unions and various
departments within the Postal Service itself. The Scientific
Review Committee is comprised of the D.C. Department of Public
Health, NIOSH, OSHA and the cleaning team, among others.
At the headquarters level, sitting on the Mail Security
Task Force Working Group has allowed us to hear about what the
Postal Service plans to say to our members so that we can be
sure they are being provided with the best possible
information.
Over the years, the NALC and its members have not been shy
about letting our voices be heard when we do not like what the
Postal Service is doing. However, at this point we are
satisfied that the Postal Service is doing all that it can to
assure the safety of our members to provide information about
how the cleanup will take place and to answer any lingering
questions that our members may still have.
On March 27, there was a town meeting that a number of
postal employees attended. Since that meeting, the Postal
Service has stepped up its efforts at providing information to
its employees. After the contract was awarded for the cleanup
of Brentwood site, there were five employee town hall meetings
conducted on May 16 and May 22. Employees were actually
provided pay for the time needed to attend them. Our members
were notified of the meetings through stand up talks on the
workroom floor and through mailings to their home. Our local
union leadership also attended the meetings.
As new information has become available, postal supervisors
have delivered stand up talks to our members to keep them up to
date. In addition, a system has been set up that our members
can ask any questions or raise concerns. There are question
forms, a toll-free number, communication facilitators at any
facility where Brentwood employees are located, Brentwood
update bulletin boards, mailings to homes, town hall meetings,
and the USPS Web site. Many of the questions gathered through
these channels are answered in writing and distributed on a
regular basis.
Our understanding is that the final step in the process
will be a review by the Environmental Clearance Committee
comprised of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Center
for Disease Control and Prevention, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, and the Armed Forces Radiobiology
Research Institute.
We look forward to hearing from this committee about the
effectiveness of the Brentwood cleanup so that we can be
confident that our members and the public we serve are
protected prior to the facility being reopened.
At the time of the attack, there were 242 letter carriers
working out of the Brentwood facility. We expect that all of
them, with the possible exception of some of those responsible
for handling government mail, will go back to work at that
location. Given the nature of the circumstances, it is
understandable that some of our members have some anxiety about
going back to work at Brentwood.
The Postal Service needs to do its part to make sure that
our members have every confidence that they are returning to a
safe and healthy workplace. So far, the Postal Service is
making that effort. Of course, until the process is completed,
we will continue to communicate regularly with our membership
and with the Postal Service.
Thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony, and I
will answer any questions you may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ferranto follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Ferranto.
Mr. Braunstein.
Mr. Braunstein. Thank you, Congresswoman Norton. Before I
begin, I just also want to concur with NALC's statement this
morning thanking you for requesting CDC to do the study. We
feel it is essentially important to our membership as well.
My name is Roy Braunstein. I am the legislative director of
the American Postal Workers Union. I am presenting APWU's
testimony on behalf of President William Burrus, who is unable
to attend personally today.
Thank you for inviting APWU to testify before this
committee on the cleanup of the U.S. Postal Service Brentwood
and Hamilton, New Jersey facilities. On behalf of the 330,000
APWU-represented employees, I wish to express our deep
gratitude for your concern.
The events of September and October 2001 will be eternally
etched in the history of our country as times of sacrifice and
courage. The lives of postal heroes Joseph P. Curseen Jr. and
Thomas L. Morris Jr. were taken by the terrorist act of
depositing anthrax into the mail stream.
They are deserving of honor and remembrance. Representative
Albert Wynn introduced legislation, H.R. 3287, in November to
rename the Brentwood postal facility in honor of Mr. Curseen
and Mr. Morris. We believe expeditious passage of the bill
would be a fitting memorial to them.
Three other members of our bargaining unit were seriously
infected by inhalation anthrax and continue their
rehabilitation 8 months later. More have suffered the
debilitating effects of cutaneous anthrax with unexpected
lingering effects. Conducting this hearing demonstrates that we
remember the heroic sacrifices of all these postal workers.
Immediately following the discovery that postal employees
had been exposed to a deadly agent, the postal community
rallied as one to assure employees and the public that mail
service would continue and that we would do our very best to
ensure the safety of the mail. Never in President William
Burrus' 44 years of postal service had he experienced the level
of cooperation between management and the employees that was
exhibited in the aftermath of the anthrax attack. Each course
of action was discussed and decided on a consensus basis, with
the overriding goal of safety and security.
While the loss of our coworkers was fresh in our minds, our
union refrained from engaging in any finger pointing, except at
the despicable individual or individuals who used the mails as
a means of distributing poison. We explained to our members
that CDC, Centers for Disease Control, the public health
agencies and postal management acted reasonably given the
information available at the time.
Regrettably, the acts of cooperation that marked the
immediate aftermath of the anthrax attacks have now been
replaced with bureaucratic posturing and no place for employee
input. As the level of cooperation gradually diminished, we
find ourselves on this date in less than a cooperative mode on
the subject of cleanup, health monitoring and employee
dislocation. The unions and employees continue to receive
regular briefings, but decisions have become unilateral, with
employee concerns subjugated to concerns about cost. Although
specific plans for cleaning up Brentwood have been completed,
they have yet to be shared in depth with the union or the
employees.
This is unacceptable. The cleanup of the Brentwood-Hamilton
facilities has been delayed unnecessarily by legal wrangling
and indecision. Because the employees have not been regularly
briefed about the process, progress and procedures, they are
less than confident of the results. I am certain you can
appreciate the apprehension the employees feel at the prospect
of returning to the buildings where their coworkers died and
suffered life-threatening illnesses.
Early on, we anticipated that every reasonable effort would
be undertaken to continually express to affected employees the
appreciation they are entitled to. Yet a series of decisions
have been made that convey the message that the danger is
passed and now it is back to business as usual.
Lingering issues remain over compensation to employees for
the loss of personal items that were in their lockers when the
facilities were closed. Reimbursement for computers and union-
owned items that were located in the facilities has not been
resolved. The responsibility and cost of transportation from
Brentwood and Hamilton to the facilities where the employees
now work has been shifted to the employees.
Even payment to private medical facilities in Hamilton for
the treatment of postal employees has been unnecessarily
delayed. Under normal circumstances, these might be considered
trivial issues. Under these unique circumstances, the employees
view them as acts of betrayal.
From the initial distribution of medication to protect
against anthrax infection, the APWU has insisted that caution
be exercised and a comprehensive medical monitoring program be
put in place. Instead, the employees have faced the blanket
denial of any lingering medical effect, as they watch more and
more coworkers expire from mysterious diseases.
Strong athletic postal workers have been struck down. The
only message that their coworkers have received have been
denial. To make matters worse, this message of denial has been
received via the news media instead of in-plant official
communications. Yet day after day, these employees continue to
move America's mail because that is their oath and their
commitment.
To date, the promised detection equipment remains just
that--a promise. In the initial months following the attack,
the Postal Service was deluged with offers of detection
equipment, much of which was found lacking in effectiveness.
Eight months later, the employees have lost confidence they
will ever be protected from a future attack.
The decisions to close government buildings while postal
facilities remained open were explainable given the information
available at the time of exposure. However, the decision to
continue to irradiate mail destined for government offices
after postal employees have been exposed to the mail in its
original form clearly reveals a two-tier system. Should postal
employees believe they are expendable, while political
representatives demand protection?
Although knowledge of the health effects of exposure to
irradiated mail is a work in progress, postal employees labor
on serving their community and their country. How many more
employees must suffer unexplainable illnesses with no
alternative but filing workers compensation claims with the
inevitable bureaucratic denials?
The employees I am privileged to represent have suffered
greatly and they deserve better. They are entitled to work in
facilities that are safe. They are entitled to recognition for
the sacrifices they have made. The opening of Brentwood and
Hamilton cleared of all contamination is a reasonable
expectation. Until the opening, the recognition of a job well
done would be appreciated.
There is still a considerable amount to be accomplished
before the Brentwood facility should be opened. We continue to
seek involvement at every level to ensure a complete
understanding of all aspects of the cleanup that would allow
the APWU to better inform our members who have risked their
lives and continue to do so in the performance of their jobs.
In closing, I again want to thank the committee for the
opportunity to testify on behalf of the members of the American
Postal Workers Union, and I am willing to address any questions
the committee may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Braunstein follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. I appreciate the testimony. We cannot have any
understanding of what has happened and what will happen without
hearing from those who represent the employees at Brentwood. In
fact, your testimony is a testament to why unions are in the
public interest. Imagine if there had been no collective
bargaining at Brentwood when this happened.
Imagine if the employees were not organized, and the Postal
Service, who obviously is management and is blamed for the
matter, in so much as blame can be ascribed to anybody, would
have been left to somehow deal with its own employees.
That would have been a completely unachievable goal. So I
think that--I hope the country is cognizant as it as of the
importance of having organized employees at the twin towers. It
was so important--I think even more important to have organized
employees at Brentwood.
Now, you have testified--the three of you have testified of
some degree of labor-management cooperation that one would
expect in a tragedy of this kind. The unions are to be
congratulated for being very watchful, without exploiting a
tragedy. It seems to me you are a case study in how to handle a
major tragedy.
At the same time, I would like to have some greater sense
of what the post office additionally needs to do as we approach
this critical time. For example, I was surprised to hear Mr.
Braunstein say that the plans henceforth for the coming period,
presumably the decontamination and thereafter, have not been
shared.
I do not understand that testimony. If you have been having
regular meetings, is it that they do not know yet what the
final plans are? Or is there some other reason why there would
be this lapse on this important issue?
Mr. Braunstein. Well, if I could, Congresswoman Norton, and
ask Corey Thompson from APWU to join me here. APWU is not on
the scientific review committee, and therefore there is more
than healthy degree of skepticism in terms of what is going on.
Ms. Norton. On the Scientific Review Committee are others
who are not scientists?
Mr. Braunstein. That is correct--other unions apparently
have been invited.
Ms. Norton. How many workers are represented by whom here?
How many workers do you represent? How many workers do you
represent, Mr. Ferranto? How many workers do you represent, Mr.
Hegarty? And are any of you on the scientific panel?
Mr. Hegarty. We represent 500 mail handlers at Brentwood
and 50,000 mail handlers nationwide.
Ms. Norton. OK. That is 500--there are about 2,500 there, I
understand. Mr. Ferranto?
Mr. Ferranto. We represent approximately 242 letter
carriers at Brentwood.
Ms. Norton. OK--500, 200. And you, Mr. Braunstein?
Mr. Braunstein. We represent in excess of 1,500.
Ms. Norton. All right. None of you, or no representatives
from your unions are on the scientific panel?
Mr. Ferranto. Branch 142, President Joe Henry serves on the
scientific panel.
Ms. Norton. How are those choices made? I mean, I should
not think that there would be any competition among unions on
that. I mean, how are those choices made?
Mr. Ferranto. It is my understanding that he was invited to
be on the committee.
Ms. Norton. That is all you know?
Mr. Ferranto. That is my understanding.
Ms. Norton. Does he share his information with the other
representatives, other unions?
Mr. Ferranto. I believe, from talking with Joe Henry, that
he is--the mail handlers also have a representative on that
committee.
Ms. Norton. Are you satisfied with the scientific panel--
with what the scientific--I mean, Mr. Braunstein, who
represents the most workers, does not have any sense of what
the plans are so he cannot reassure the 1,500 workers he
represents. How are we to get around that problem as we
approach this--the same for Mr. Hegarty, I guess--as we
approach this critical juncture?
Mr. Hegarty. My understanding is that we also have a
representative on this scientific committee and also that the
Postal Service is having meetings every Friday with the unions
to discuss what is going on at Brentwood, etc. Now, I am not
sure why the APWU is not on the committee. I think that is
something that postal management would need to deal with with
the APWU.
Ms. Norton. Well, maybe we can have--Mr. Braunstein said he
would be joined by a colleague.
Mr. Braunstein. Mr. Corey Thompson.
Ms. Norton. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. The issue of committees--I was quite
surprised as I sat there and listened to testimony of I believe
it was Dr. Gordon, as he mentioned all these plans that had
been reviewed, none of which we have had the opportunity to
see.
Ms. Norton. Have your representatives had the opportunity
to see these plans? Mr. Braunstein has not. Mr. Braunstein's
union, the APWU, has not. You are not on the committee.
Mr. Thompson. That is correct.
Ms. Norton. Why are you not on the committee and the other
two are on the committee?
Mr. Braunstein. That is one of the questions we are trying
to ascertain today.
Ms. Norton. We have got to clear this up. Go ahead.
Mr. Hegarty. Madam Congresswoman, this is Cynthia Vines.
Ms. Vines is the branch president for the mail handlers union
at the Brentwood facility and she does serve on the scientific
committee. I would like to ask her to please address this issue
briefly.
Ms. Vines. Good morning. Myself and Mr. Henry were invited
to sit on the Scientific Review Committee, and we are basically
observers.
Ms. Norton. You know you are under oath, even though I have
not--everyone who comes to the table now is under oath. Go
ahead.
Ms. Vines. Yes, we basically sit in on the committee as
observers to go back and inform the members.
Ms. Norton. I am trying to find out why two out of three of
the unions--do you have some information on why--you have
definitively? Yes. You are definitively telling me that two out
of three of the unions are on the scientific committee. We have
had a normally cooperative arrangement with management. Why is
your union not on the committee? Have you asked to be on the
committee?
Mr. Thompson. We are just finding out about a number of
these committees, and about a number of the plans that are
currently available. The process at Brentwood is an evolving
process which, as we get closer to the level of decontaminating
the facility, then it gives time for the plans to be completed,
and the written scientific plans to be completed, so the
committees are being done.
Ms. Norton. How long has there been a scientific committee?
Mr. Henry. Congressman Norton, it has been in place now for
about 3 months, 4 months.
Ms. Norton. That is a long time. Is there any
representative of the Postal Service still here? Would you step
to the table please? At this point, I think I am going to have
to ask the people who have stepped to the table to stand so I
can swear you all in. We need to understand this. Would all of
you stand up--the three people who have come. First, let me ask
them to stand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Ms. Norton. Thank you. Please sit. Would the three of you
please identify yourselves for the record? We will get you a
seat right away. Sorry. Yes, sir.
Mr. Henry. Joseph Henry, president of NALC Branch 142.
Ms. Vines. Cynthia Vines, branch president for Washington,
DC.
Mr. King. Mitch King, government relations with the Postal
Service.
Ms. Norton. Perhaps you can clear this up for us, Mr. King.
Why are two out of three of the unions represented on the
science panel?
Mr. King. I am afraid that I cannot clear it up for you. It
is not a Postal Service committee. I understand it was
organized by the D.C. government.
Ms. Norton. Is anybody from D.C. government here?
Mr. King. And other agencies working on the cleanup, and it
is independent of us, to provide an independent review of what
is going on.
Ms. Norton. All right. If the Postal Service is not
responsible for this, and you say the scientific panel was
organized by the D.C. government.
Mr. King. And the other agencies involved working with
them--but I would be happy to bring this to their attention to
the extent that I can.
Ms. Norton. I wish you would. We will, of course, bring it
to their attention. It seems to me not in the spirit that at
least from the beginning the Postal Service certainly has
operated. And I have absolutely no understanding of why the
union that represents the largest number of employees would not
be on the scientific community.
What concerns me most, of course, is what I indicated from
the beginning, and that is that we need to calm fears before
fears arrive. Is there any chance that the local president of
the APWU is on the committee and is not here perhaps?
Mr. Braunstein. Not that we are aware of, no.
Ms. Norton. There was some suggestion that perhaps--so you
should be aware if in fact somebody from your union had been
invited. We will just straighten that out right away. I mean,
this is the kind of thing we need--an all-inclusive
understanding of everything that is happening. The other unions
do not have anything to do with this. The Postal Service does
not have anything to do with this, and I cannot imagine why
this has happened. We are going to find out why and try to
straighten that out.
Mr. Braunstein. Thank you.
Ms. Norton. Of course, I notice that those who have been
included seem to be less concerned and not to have the same
issues that you who have not been included----
Mr. Braunstein. There is a direct correlation.
Ms. Norton. Direct correlation--that is exactly what we
want to avoid. If everybody is in on the deal, then it is going
to go smoothly, otherwise it certainly is not, and I appreciate
that this has been raised.
I want to ask whether or not the three union
representatives here have seen any effects--psychological or
mental health effects. What I am anticipating is that given the
long closure of Brentwood, there may be some reluctance of
people to go back. I do not know. I thought Mr. Hegarty
testified. I thought that people might have some say on whether
they go back. I am not sure about that.
I mean, this is a big facility and I am sure that could
involve us in some controversy if whole crews of people decide,
a whole lot of people decide they do not want to go back. So
first, I suppose I should clear that up first. Is there an
obligation as far as you know, of workers who were assigned
there at Brentwood in the first place, to go back once the all-
clear sign is up?
Mr. Hegarty. Yes, Madam Congresswoman, I believe there
would be an obligation under the collective bargaining
agreement for the employees to return. What I was referring to
is if there were a limited number of employees who legitimately
were fearful for their lives and would not be able to return to
that facility for psychological reasons, that some
accommodations could be made within the confines of the
collective bargaining agreement for them to be transferred to
other postal facilities.
Ms. Norton. Do you anticipate from what you understand from
your own members that there will be reluctance to go back to
Brentwood?
Mr. Ferranto. Congresswoman, speaking for the National
Association of Letter Carriers and speaking for Joe Henry, and
we are also representing the letter carriers up in New Jersey
that have the same feelings, there is some apprehension with
some of our members of not returning to Brentwood. When that
day comes and the opportunity when they reopen Brentwood, we
will be in discussions with the Postal Service and with our
members that have those apprehensions and we will try to work
all those issues out at that time.
Ms. Norton. Is there counseling or any other mental health
service now available to help prepare employees to go back to
work?
Mr. Ferranto. We have in our collective bargaining
agreements an employee assistance program, and that is
accessible to the employees.
Ms. Norton. Yes, Mr. Hegarty, did you have a comment on
that?
Mr. Hegarty. Yes, Ms. Vines informs me that we are in the
process of trying to set up some type of counseling outside of
the EAP where employees would be able to attend counseling and
receive pay--you know, be on the clock in other words--that
they would not have to seek counseling on their own time, and
possibly get some of these issues put to rest. Again, we are
hoping that with the increase in communication, as I said in my
testimony, we want to eliminate any rumors that if the cleanup
is done properly, if all of the appropriate government and
health agencies along with the Postal Service are satisfied
that the building is safe, I think that we may alleviate some
of the fears.
In my earlier testimony, what I was referring to is if
there is still a limited number of employees who absolutely
will not enter that building, I think we should try to find
some accommodation for them.
Ms. Norton. This is an issue of transition that I think is
very important for labor and management to meet head-on very
early. Anybody can anticipate that the long closure of this
facility will lead to some concerns. I have virtually testified
that I do not have the slightest concern, but I cannot blame
people for wanting some, as I said, nobody died either where I
work.
And again, I believe that most of these fears are
imaginary, but I can understand why they would be imagined. So
I think that this notion of counseling has to be proactively
marketed to people because they have to understand if you are
telling me that under the collective bargaining agreement they
cannot choose where they work, and of course one can understand
that.
Then, of course, people have to be prepared well in advance
so that they will not be in jeopardy of their jobs or in
jeopardy of some sanction if in fact they simply believe they
cannot go there. They have got to get help concerning how to go
there, and I know the union would make every attempt to do so.
And if there is anything this committee can do to
facilitate those services, I wish you would let us know. I
consider that part and parcel of what the Congress appropriated
the money for, to make sure that not only the building got
clean, but that people felt they could go back into the
building.
Mr. Braunstein, did you have something?
Mr. Braunstein. Yes, Congresswoman Norton, in the middle of
this crisis not only in Brentwood, but in Hamilton Township in
New Jersey, and also in Wallingford, the general facility in
Connecticut, the Postal Service has been less than candid in
certain aspects. You asked the question earlier today to Mr.
Day whether or not the facility when it would be reopened,
whether the employees would be relocated back to the facility--
that part of the question remained unanswered when the
testimony of the panel was concluded.
I spent all day yesterday with the New Jersey delegation
with folks from Hamilton Township, from Trenton, who have just
been informed that 66 of their members will not have to worry
about returning to Hamilton Township because the Postal Service
is taking advantage of the situation of further victimizing the
victims by permanently reassigning them away from the facility
when it is reopened.
Ms. Norton. What would be the reason for that, Mr.
Braunstein?
Mr. Braunstein. They claim, at this point, it was an
unanswered question, again, with Senator Torricelli yesterday
that they could provide cost savings and they had not committed
to reopening the facility with the outgoing function in
Hamilton Township.
Ms. Norton. Also, they may close the facility altogether.
Mr. Braunstein. No, they intend to reopen it, but the
outgoing mail, the originating mail from that area, from the
Trenton facility and from Trenton city and suburbs may be
relocated to Kilmer.
Ms. Norton. Do you anticipate that the full complement of
workers may not be called back to Brentwood?
Mr. Braunstein. They have officially notified the union,
both the Mail Handlers Union and APWU of 66 positions to be
relocated. That is one problem.
Ms. Norton. And what would be the reason for that, Mr.
Braunstein?
Mr. Braunstein. Because of cost savings, and the
employees----
Ms. Norton. But the employees would not lose their job, and
they save costs by putting them elsewhere?
Mr. Braunstein. By canvassing all the mail in one
centralized location, yes--part of the transformation plan the
Postal Service has put forward. But for them to be pushing a
transformation plan on a set of employees who are currently
victimized by being out of their facility since the same
timeframe as Brentwood is just irresponsible on the part of the
Postal Service.
Ms. Norton. Do you think there might be employees who might
voluntarily want to be relocated?
Mr. Braunstein. There may be some that would voluntarily
want to leave, but obviously the Postal Service has taken the
position that they will take the junior regular employees and
excess them out. So that is a major concern for our union in
terms of----
Ms. Norton. Is that bargainable?
Mr. Braunstein. Yes.
Ms. Norton. Obviously, there are some communications
problems that need--if they arose in Trenton, and we do not
need to have them in this large-scale here.
Mr. Braunstein. And you have a problem in Wallingford,
where the employees were told for months there were trace
amounts of anthrax, and months later it was revealed that the
trace amounts they had been working on were 3 million spores,
which then were cleaned up. But the employees were given false
information by the Postal Service for a long period of time.
So the attitude of the employees in Wallingford, the
attitude of the employees in Brentwood, and the attitude of the
employees in Hamilton Township are somewhat similar. They are
not necessarily being given all the information at the proper
time.
Ms. Norton. But for those who have been involved, that has
not necessarily been the case here at Brentwood.
Mr. Braunstein. But if I may interrupt, the selective
elimination of APWU from begin on committees of concern so we
can inform our employees just feeds into this same situation.
Ms. Norton. It is stupid and we are going to find out why
that has happened.
[Applause.]
Ms. Norton. I know that there have really been concerns
about this irradiated mail from employees, and as a result I
suppose of the intervention of the unions and the discussions
with management, we understand that an additional ventilation
step was added. I would like to know if since that step was
added, there have been fewer complaints from employees
concerning the irradiated mail or not.
Mr. Thompson. I could address that issue. In fact, I was
over at the V Street facilities just the other day which
handles a lot of this, and there were a couple of different
things that occurred at the time after the V Street employees
were exposed to extremely high levels of carbon monoxide in the
original process. That is when they learned to ventilate the
mail, and that is when they also learned to ventilate the work
area at that time.
Since then, they have also learned that the level of
irradiation that the post office contractors were using was not
necessary, so they reduced that level also. And yes, the
complaints on adverse effects and the severity of the adverse
effects has gone down. But I do draw to your attention that
there are still adverse effects.
There have been studies done--NIOSH has done some. There
has been a review by the Office of Compliance. Each of them has
not stated that there are no adverse effects. What they
basically have stated is that whatever they tested for and
whatever they looked for as a potential cause, they have not
been able to identify as being a cause.
I spoke with the people out at the V Street facility--our
members, a large number of them over different buildings--and
asked the very question, are you still experiencing adverse
effects. And they are. Now, we can go back and say that it was
the dry air in January. Well, we do not have dry air in July in
the facilities, and we are still seeing the same effects.
So we have been very diligent and wanting to find out more
on, is irradiated mail actually causing adverse effects. APWU
members and many postal workers handle this mail before it is
irradiated also. So any hazards that are there, they handle
this mail for prepping it for radiation prior to that, so they
have that exposure also.
Ms. Norton. The people who drive the trucks--is it Mail
Handlers that represents them?
Mr. Braunstein. No. APWU does. Yes.
Ms. Norton. What about the people who drive the trucks with
this irradiated----
Mr. Thompson. At the V Street facility, there were a couple
of the truck drivers who have said that they had the same
issues.
Ms. Norton. I know whereof you speak because employees on
the Hill who obviously do not have the same direct exposure as
your people are having these complaints. We see how much all of
this is a work in progress, and why we have to demand the
highest standards--standards beyond anything anybody would
imagine because we just do not know what we are doing.
We have heard complaints about the distribution of masks
and of gloves and of gloves in the right sizes. Is that still a
problem?
Mr. Thompson. We still do hear from----
[Applause.]
Ms. Norton. Let your union testify for you. [Laughter.]
Mr. Thompson. We still do hear complaints regarding masks
and gloves, both on sizes and types. Some people do not fit
well with one particular type of glove, or the glove that they
are provided rips as they are trying to put it on. So there are
still issues there. That is currently a line of defense for
employees. There is nothing else that is out there to protect
employees from an exposure.
Ms. Norton. Well, I can tell you this, Congress surely
meant the gloves and the masks to be freely available, and that
part of that money was clearly meant for that. People have been
very concerned that their own staffs are feeling this, and they
are several degrees away from this contamination.
Mr. Thompson. One of the things that we have noticed that
is difficult with gloves and masks also is people can be handed
them and provided limited instruction on what their purpose is
and how to wear them and how they should fit properly, but if
they are not taught, really taught, what the purpose of those
protective measures are, they either do not use them or they
use them improperly, and that has not been good.
Ms. Norton. Who would do that teaching?
Mr. Thompson. That is a Postal Service responsibility to do
that.
Ms. Norton. Supervisors?
Mr. Thompson. It would be down to the supervisors.
Ms. Norton. And you do not think that is being done?
Mr. Thompson. Well, I think there are still some issues out
there that it is not being done properly. It is not being
certified as being done. I hear it all the time. I get calls
from the locals all the time that they are not trained. I ask
people when I go out, have you received the training. And as
much as we get response back that yes, we have trained
everybody, when you go out and you ask the people, they have
not.
Ms. Norton. Well, the Postal Service is in the room. I am
simply going to ask that those matters be brought to the
attention of management. I am also going to ask that the notion
of these gloves, it is not a lot of money, these gloves and
masks be brought to the special attention of management.
Mr. King. I will do that. It is my understanding we have
millions of gloves. There is no problem with supply of gloves.
I am hearing today, and I am sorry I do not work in the capital
district, I work at headquarters, but I will make sure that the
capital district has a sufficient supply.
Ms. Norton. This may be a question of sizes, and it sounds
to me only as an issue that requires some attention, not as
something that the Postal Service would have any problem with.
My final question would be, now that employees are
scattered by necessity, how have people adjusted to their
current assignments? Do you feel that they are ready for
transition back in? I would like to know about the adjustment
process, which obviously has to do with the transition process
back to Brentwood.
Mr. Hegarty. With Brentwood and with Trenton, thus far some
employees are happy because they are working in a facility
closer to their home. Other employees are very disadvantaged in
that they have to drive an additional 30 or 40 miles in
addition to a commute that they already had.
Ms. Norton. Thirty or 40 miles?
Mr. Hegarty. Yes, yes. Gaithersburg. In New Jersey, they
have to drive up to South River, Kilmer, etc.
Ms. Norton. Was there any attempt to help locate people a
little closer to home, or was that just done----
Mr. Hegarty. I am not sure what attempts were made. I do
know that in most instances, the employees allegedly were told
that they had to follow the mail.
So in other words if a great deal of the mail that used to
be processed is now going to be processed in Gaithersburg, then
ostensibly a commensurate number of employees would travel to
Gaithersburg to process that mail. The problem that we have had
is that there have been some breakdowns in transportation.
Initially, the Postal Service was providing bus
transportation and also compensating the employees. In other
words, when they arrived at their old facility, they clocked
on. They hit the time clock or they were put on a time clock
and they were on the clock. They would then be transported to
the alternate facility, perform their work there, be
transported back, and then clock out again.
My understanding, and I have the representatives here from
the facilities, is that is no longer the case. In some
instances, the Postal Service is not even providing the
transportation anymore. So the employees are being told that
you will have to find your own way from Washington, DC, to
Gaithersburg and you will not be on the clock until you get to
the facility.
Ms. Norton. Do you have any information on that?
Mr. King. I am sorry. I do not have specific information,
but we would be happy to try to respond for the record.
Ms. Norton. Would you respond to the record within 30 days
on that specific question? If transportation was provided
before, why would transportation not be provided now,
particularly given the long distances apparently some employees
have to travel.
Did you have some further testimony?
Mr. Ferranto. Yes, Congresswoman. Initially, letter
carriers were housed in tents in the parking lots when this
first happened, and then they were relocated to facilities here
in Washington. So all of our members are currently working in
Washington, DC. To further answer your question, President Joe
Henry here has day-to-day interaction with our members and he
can further answer your question.
Mr. Henry. I believe your question, Congresswoman Norton,
is are they ready to make the transition back if that time
comes. Our employees are no different than Mail Handlers and
APWU employees. You have some who probably would welcome
Brentwood opening back up and are ready to go back. You have
others who certainly are anxious about whether or not it will
ever be safe.
As you said when I heard you talk earlier, some people will
never believe that it is going to be safe to go back in. And so
you have, but the majority of them are very practical and if it
opens and if--one of the things I was gratified by today was
the fact that when you came to our food drive breakfast, you
said you were going to have these hearings, and indeed they
have transpired; that the scope of these hearings certainly
should help to alleviate many of the fears, if indeed
everything that you are asking to be done here is done.
Until today, I am sure after this takes place and if
everything transpires that you asked, there will be a lot less
people who will have a lot less fears than they have at the
present time. So yes, you have some people ready to go back,
and others who are not.
Mr. Ferranto. Just as a further comment, hopefully there
will be some hearings before we reenter Brentwood to make sure
that all the----
Ms. Norton. Count on it. [Laughter.]
Mr. Ferranto. OK. And then we will have an opportunity to
come back together and be together on this.
Ms. Norton. I think you deserve at least that.
Mr. Ferranto. That is right. We appreciate that.
Ms. Norton. Nobody is perfect here, but we have got to
strive for perfection.
Mr. Ferranto. And I would just like to add that these have
been unprecedented times for us, and these are impressive
events, and we are doing our best to work through them, and
together we will get there.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Braunstein.
Mr. Braunstein. I also would mirror the previous comments.
Some employees would welcome the return; others would probably
prefer not to. But it is really going to come down to a
question of now much information that the union has also
provided, both at the national and local level, that will
increase the level of satisfaction and comfort that the members
will need to feel for them to make an intelligent and proper
determination.
Ms. Norton. Well, Mr. Braunstein, all men and women are
created equal. When it comes to Brentwood, all unions are going
to be created equal and we are going to see that you are
included.
Mr. Braunstein. Thank you very much.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much to all of these witnesses--
very helpful testimony.
Could I ask the final panel to come forward, and I
apologize that there has been this delay, but I hope you
understand that this has been a matter of some concern to the
community and to the employees, and we want to get it all out
on the table.
Louise Martin, president, Brentwood Civic Association;
James McGee, president, National Alliance of Postal and Federal
Employees. Is Mr. McGee here? Is Ms. Martin here?
Would you stand and raise your right hands?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Ms. Norton. Let the record reflect that each witness
answered the question in the affirmative. You may be seated.
Ms. Martin, the president of the Brentwood Civic
Association, I am glad to receive your testimony.
STATEMENTS OF LOUISE MARTIN, PRESIDENT, BRENTWOOD CIVIC
ASSOCIATION; AND JAMES M. MCGEE, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ALLIANCE
OF POSTAL AND FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
Ms. Martin. Good morning, Congresswoman Norton and other
members of the committee. My name is Louise B. Martin. I am a
resident of the Brentwood Community Association; also a
resident of--I lost my place. My name is Louise B. Martin. I
did not forget that. [Laughter.]
I am a resident of the Brentwood community. My address is
1340 Downing Street, NE, since 1954, and a Washington resident
since 1952. I am president of the Brentwood Community
Association.
In reference to the cleanup of the postal facility, my
concern as is most of the neighborhood is the protection of the
residents--businesses and workers in the post office. I have
attended every meeting held in reference to and regarding to
the decontamination of the Brentwood postal facility, after
which we have discussed this in our own groups as far as our
knowledge of the process would allow. Still, there remain
questions about the safety set-up around the perimeter of the
building during and after fumigation.
We know the smell of chlorine in the event that some of it
escapes. However, what about the other three gases being mixed
with the chlorine? After having read the above, there was less
concern among some residents that read about and listened to
the facts about the cleanup of the Hart Building. We are aware
that the Brentwood facility is much larger, therefore creating
a larger use of chemicals. That is our concern. Our concern is
if some of these gases escape, how are they going to contain
it.
Since I have been here, I have heard the answers to some of
the questions. But the sampling is going to be inside. What
about when they do the full decontamination? I will stop right
here to answer that.
Ms. Norton. What about when they do the----
Ms. Martin. Yes. When they are going to do a sampling on
Monday, and the gases and whatever they are going to put into
the building is going to be contained inside. Am I right?
Ms. Norton. The whole point is to always have the gases
contained inside, even when they do the whole building.
Ms. Martin. No, but I mean, pumping it in--from where would
they pump it in?
Ms. Norton. Your question, Ms. Martin, simply raises the
notion that your councilmember did--that there are still
questions that the community feels it does not have adequate
answers to. So not to worry, we are going to make sure that you
get very specific answers to those questions.
Do you want to continue with your testimony?
Ms. Martin. No, that is my testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Martin follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. That is your testimony.
Ms. Martin. That is our concern.
Ms. Norton. And your concern about the three gases--the
other gases?
Ms. Martin. They are supposed to be mixed to make it,
right?
Ms. Norton. Yes.
Ms. Martin. That is what we are concerned about--if it
escapes and no one knows even when they smell it they do not
know what they are smelling. Is this coming from the post
office? If in the event, and we hope that does not happen, they
would not know. They would not know what it would smell like. I
am not sure that anybody can answer it.
Can they answer, because I have heard a lot of unanswered
questions since I have been sitting here, but I will bet there
are a lot of questions that I can go back and tell some of the
people that I did learn today. I have attended all of the
meetings and read all of the literature, but I did hear some
things today that they have discussed, and that is whether the
gases are going to be--because we were under the illusion that
these gases were going to be missed outside in a tank--you
know, like in a tank on a trailer and then pumped into the
building.
But today, I am hearing something different about the
sampling. So I assume that the sampling is going to be
contained inside, and they would do all the rest of it inside.
That is our concern.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Ms. Martin.
Mr. McGee.
Mr. Mcgee. Thank you.
Good afternoon, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton,
members of the committee. I am James McGee, national president
of the National Alliance of Postal and Federal Employees. I
welcome the opportunity to present the views of the NAPFE on
the unprecedented effort to decontaminate and reenter a
facility the size of Brentwood Processing Center of the
widespread anthrax contamination.
NAPFE is the Nation's oldest and largest independent black-
led labor union. We represent thousands of postal workers
nationwide. Here in the District, we represent hundreds of
workers at the Brentwood facility and I might add that number
is some 700 members across all crafts--mail handlers, clerks
and carriers.
Throughout its 89-year history, NAPFE has worked to ensure
the rights of postal and Federal workers to work free from
discrimination in a safe and secure environment. The challenge
of the Brentwood cleanup is to ensure a safe environment at a
time when the Federal and medical authorities know very little
about the threat involved and are learning as they go along.
When staffers in Senator Daschle's office opened a letter
containing anthrax spores on October 15, 2001, the prevailing
medical wisdom at the time was that postal workers who handled
the letter were not at risk. This proved to be a tragic error
for which postal workers Thomas Morris Jr. and Joseph Curseen
paid with their lives.
Others experienced the serious illness of anthrax
inhalation and still countless others have suffered and
continue to suffer from symptoms that while not recognized as
being directly related to anthrax, developed after exposure. In
addition, there have been negative side effects from the
powerful antibiotics used to protect them from this deadly
illness.
Now, at a time when the Postal Service and Federal agencies
such as the Centers for Disease Control, are suffering from a
crisis of trust and confidence, the Postal Service undertakes
the unprecedented cleanup of anthrax contamination in a
facility the size of Brentwood.
I thank you, Madam Chair and members of the committee for
convening this hearing at this time to hear from the experts
planning and implementing the cleanup, and those of us who
represent workers at Brentwood. It is extremely important that
postal workers and the public and their representatives learn
as much as possible about the cleanup effort and be able to
give their views on the process.
I commend Councilman Vincent Orange for organizing, and the
Postal Service for holding meetings to inform the public about
the procedures. I commend the Postal Service for establishing a
community information line and for its own line, Brentwood
Update. The Postal Service and the various health agencies got
off to a slow start in protecting postal workers from this
threat, unaware of the dangers involved, but have since worked
diligently to meet the threats posed by this unprecedented
danger. I thank them for that.
However, since the Brentwood cleanup is an experiment, one
that is not occurring in a vacuum and is putting at risk
hundreds of lives, the Postal Service and Federal and local
health authorities have an affirmative duty to reach out to
postal workers and the public as often as it is necessary to
address understandable feelings of apprehension at the process.
While chlorine dioxide was successfully used to decontaminate
the Hart Senate Building, its efficacy is unproven for the
cleanup of a building the size of the Brentwood facility and
with the type of equipment installed there.
Postal workers are not only distressed that public health
authorities failed to recognize the risk of anthrax exposure to
their lives in a timely manner, they are also disheartened at
the lack of adequate followup after being given cipro and
doxycycline. Workers were given written advisories at the time
they received treatment, but feel that little has been done
since to address their concerns or to track the effects of the
medications given.
I urge the Postal Service and the health agencies to
establish a systematic process where these concerns can be
addressed. Given the complexity of the cleanup at hand, the
onus should be on those agencies to actively seek out and
reassure workers and to actively address complaints and
concerns. Based on discussions we have had with Brentwood
employees, it appears the current system that the Postal
Service and the CDC have in place is inadequate to monitor the
current health status of employees exposed to anthrax.
Therefore, we recommend that the Postal Service set up a
formal ongoing monitoring system of both the immediate and
long-term consequences of the decontamination of the building
and health status of employees for as long as it takes for
workers and the public to feel safe. Understandably, given the
mistakes of the past, postal workers must feel assured that
this cleanup will be subject to the same standards used at the
Hart Building. I am heartened that the Postal Service is
pursuing a zero-spore standard.
This process requires teamwork, not only for the Postal
Service, but with agencies such as EPA and the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy, but between the Postal
Service, its workers and their representatives. The events
surrounding the anthrax exposure at Brentwood highlighted how
little health officials knew about how to protect postal
workers from such a bioterror threat.
The cleanup of the facility is one of the confidence-
building measures that the Postal Service and health agencies
must perform. We are confident that the Postal Service would
not knowingly put its workers at risk and applaud it for the
actions it has taken thus far. The Postal Service should not
miss the opportunity to learn from past mistakes. We urge them
to set up a formal system of responding to employee concerns
for all of the circumstances surrounding the anthrax exposure,
not only for the cleanup.
We thank you for your attention, and look forward to
working with all involved on this vital process.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McGee follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. McGee.
Let me ask both of you whether you are satisfied with the
level of communication that you have had from the Postal
Service.
Ms. Martin. Well, I think the communication that we have
had has been through the meetings that were called by the
councilmember.
Ms. Norton. Has the Postal Service had meetings themselves?
Ms. Martin. The Postal Service at that time passed out
question and answers and an explanation of what was going on
that was very informative to all the people who got them at
those meetings. These were the meetings that were called by the
councilperson. Also, I think the post office had a meeting, and
some of these forms were passed out at their meeting. Those
were the things that we had discussed.
There is no answer. I am confident that I do not think they
have the answer. I do not think they have the answer. They are
trying to get it. And so, we have to think about what may
happen, not what they think is going to happen. Like, how are
they going to let us know when they are going to start, how
long it is going to take, and will they notify us?
Ms. Norton. Were you pleased that these door-to-door
meetings, or this door-to-door--we are told that people will be
going from door to door during this test. Do you think that is
the appropriate----
Ms. Martin. To pass our information to let us know when
they are going to start?
Ms. Norton. Apparently. And here, I do not have the full
details, but they have mentioned that they will be going from
door to door during the test as a way to communicate to the
people in the immediate area concerning what is going on. Is
that an appropriate way to behave?
Ms. Martin. I think that would be one way--through the
media, through the papers. Everybody does not listen to
television, but I think more people listen to television than
read the papers, so that they will know. But I have heard on
several of the channels that they were going from door to door
prior to this preview.
Ms. Norton. Test, yes.
Ms. Martin. Yes--that they are having--sampling test.
Supposedly, I do not know what it is going to be tomorrow or
Sunday because someone here from that health group said that it
would be done Monday. So are they going out Saturday? Are they
going out Sunday?
Ms. Norton. Mr. McGee.
Mr. Mcgee. Well, Congresswoman Norton, we are not
satisfied. We are not included. We have asked to be included so
that we could provide definitive answers to our members. We
have not been included in updates and what have you.
Ms. Norton. You have a different status, I take it.
Mr. Mcgee. We are not exclusive. We are not exclusive, and
we understand that. But now we are talking about the health and
safety of people's lives, and I think that supersedes being a
part of the collective bargaining. We are recognized by the one
agency that we should be as a labor union in this country, and
that is the U.S. Government. We have to report just like
everybody else.
Ms. Norton. You are not a part of any collective bargaining
agreement.
Mr. Mcgee. No, not in the Postal Service.
Ms. Norton. In the Postal Service.
Mr. Mcgee. In the Postal Service. However, we do have an
exclusive at the one agency responsible for the public health,
and that is the Centers for Disease Control.
Ms. Norton. Well, I want to thank both of you for this
important testimony. We have tried during this hearing to make
sure we spanned the entire array, yes, including your union,
Mr. McGee----
Mr. Mcgee. Thank you.
Ms. Norton [continuing]. Of those who have any involvement
in Brentwood, and your testimony has been valuable to us. As we
hear it, we communicate these matters back to the post office
to get answers concerning them.
I want to thank not only these last two witnesses for
remaining so long and being so patient, but to thank the many
members of the audience who came, including many employees,
many residents who are trying to find out for themselves so
that they can make an independent judgment.
We think that is the intelligent and careful way to try to
evaluate what is happening. I appreciate their interest. I
appreciate the willingness of Gallaudet University and the
Kellogg Center to donate this facility so that we could have a
field hearing on this important matter.
I want to indicate to those who did not testify that the
record will be open for five legislative days, so that is more
than 5 days, in order to receive the testimony of anybody else
who would like to testify. I would like to particularly thank
our sign language interpreters. This is a hard and important
job that they do--Pamela Harrison and Tyrone Harper, who
assisted us during this hearing.
I would also like to thank our staff without whom this
hearing simply would be impossible, who do all of the grunt
work in preparation for hearings like this--Jean Gosa, Denise
Wilson, Jon Bouker, Cheryl Williams, Doxie McCoy from my staff;
from the staff of Congresswoman Morella, Russell Smith, Matthew
Batt, Shalley Kim, Robert White, Heea Vazirani-Fales--all of
whom contributed to this hearing.
And let me finally offer the apologies of the good chair of
the committee who wanted very strongly to be here, and had
congressional business that made it absolutely impossible for
her to attend because she had amendments of her own on the
floor, so that she had absolutely no choice. She does want me
to indicate that she will look at the record and will work
closely with me in followup to this hearing. We do not have
hearings as 1-day shows. We have hearings in order to learn
what the Congress should do.
I want to thank those who provided security and who took
the record for this hearing, and I want to indicate, as I thank
everyone who attended once again, that this hearing on
Brentwood past and future is now concluded.
[Whereupon, at 1:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[The prepared statement of Hon. Constance A. Morella and
additional information submitted for the hearing record
follow:]
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