<DOC>
[107th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:85608.wais]
ENHANCING BORDER SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 10, 2002
__________
Serial No. 107-171
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
85-608 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
------ ------ (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JIM TURNER, Texas
DOUG OSE, California THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JANICE D. SCHAKOWKY, Illinois
DAVE WELDON, Florida
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Christopher Donesa, Staff Director
Nicholas Coleman, Counsel
Conn Carroll, Clerk
Julian A. Haywood, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 10, 2002................................... 1
Statement of:
Johnson, Larry C., CEO and founder, Berg Associates LLC;
Colleen M. Kelley, national president, National Treasury
Employees Union; T.J. Bonner, president, National Border
Patrol Council, American Federation of Government
Employees; Christopher Koch, president, World Shipping
Council; John Simpson, president, American Association of
Exporters and Importers; and Steve Russell, chairman and
CEO, Celadon Trucking Services, American Trucking
Associations............................................... 33
Tischler, Bonni, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field
Operations, U.S. Customs Service........................... 10
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Bonner, T.J., president, National Border Patrol Council,
American Federation of Government Employees, prepared
statement of............................................... 53
Johnson, Larry C., CEO and founder, Berg Associates LLC,
prepared statement of...................................... 36
Kelley, Colleen M., national president, National Treasury
Employees Union, prepared statement of..................... 42
Koch, Christopher, president, World Shipping Council,
prepared statement of...................................... 62
Russell, Steve, chairman and CEO, Celadon Trucking Services,
American Trucking Associations, prepared statement of...... 85
Simpson, John, president, American Association of Exporters
and Importers, prepared statement of....................... 79
Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana, prepared statement of.................... 4
Tischler, Bonni, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field
Operations, U.S. Customs Service, prepared statement of.... 14
ENHANCING BORDER SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 2002
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and
Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room 2514, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark E. Souder
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Souder, Cummings and Davis.
Staff present: Nicholas Coleman, counsel; Christopher
Donessa, staff director and chief counsel; Conn Carroll, clerk;
Tony Haywood, minority counsel; and Earley Green, minority
assistant clerk.
Mr. Souder. The subcommittee will now come to order. Good
morning. Thank you all for coming. Today our subcommittee will
investigate various proposals to enhance border security and
law enforcement.
Since last summer this subcommittee has been conducting a
comprehensive study of our Nation's borders, considering ways
to improve both security and the efficient flow of
international commerce, travel and tourism.
As policymakers have looked at ways to improve security at
the border, a variety of significant, even sweeping changes
have been suggested. These new proposals have involved both new
technologies and new strategies to be used in inspections, in
new organizational structures for agencies involved in border
law enforcement.
Four of these proposals merit special attention here today.
First, the ramifications of moving our emphasis away from cargo
inspections at the border toward inspections at the point of
origin. In theory this would speed cargo through the ports of
entry and eliminate what could be substantial delays as well as
allow Customs inspectors to focus their inspection efforts on
high risk cargo shipments.
As the sheer volume of cargo shipments increases, it is
clear that dramatically increasing preclearances will be
required. Several issues need to be resolved, however. First,
since these inspections must take place on foreign soil, how
much control over the process can U.S. Customs officials
actually exercise?
Second, how will precleared cargo be protected from
tampering as it is transported to the United States? In
addition, how will the extra cost of inspecting, protecting and
monitoring precleared cargo be allocated? Will the Federal
Government pick up the tab or will the industry be forced to
bear the cost and pass it on to American consumers?
These and other questions must be answered before
undertaking such a fundamental shift in law enforcement
strategy.
Second, we will examine the related issue of expediting the
movement of travelers. The Customs Service and the INS have
already set up so-called Fast Pass systems for commuters on
both the Northern and Southern borders. On the Northern border,
the NEXUS system is a joint project between the United States
and Canada, under which frequent commuters can enroll in a
program that allows them to use dedicated lanes, skip the long
lines faced by other border crossers.
On the Southern border, the SENTRI system allows both the
American and Mexican citizens to use a dedicated commuter lane
after submitting to a background check and paying a user fee.
At each of our field hearings, residents of border
communities have pressed for the expansion of these programs.
Again, several issues need to be addressed before the
decision to expand significant resources on the Fastpass
systems is made. Canada and Mexico do not have equally
efficient mechanisms for background checks. Also, it is not yet
clear that fastpass lanes have had a significant beneficial
impact on the amount of traffic in the general inspection
lanes. Before removing further lanes from use by the general
public, we should be certain that the Fastpass system will help
the overall traffic situation.
Finally, while the SENTRI system is at least partially
funded by user fees on the Southern border, currently no user
fee is collected on the Northern border. One significant
question, therefore, is whether the fastpass systems should be
paid for by all of the taxpayers or by those who use the
systems.
Third. Both Customs and the INS are moving forward with the
modernization of their computer data bases and automated
systems. Customs faces the daunting challenge of replacing the
Automated Commercial System [ACS], which was first developed in
1984, with the Automated Commercial Environment [ACE].
ACS was designed to keep track of commercial shipments into
the United States and to help Customs target which shipments
should be inspected for contraband. The system is antiquated,
however, and it frequently crashes. Planning for ACE began in
1990, but as yet no system has been finalized. It appears it
will take at least another 5 years before it is up and running.
While there is broad agreement that ACS is inadequate and
that ACE must be deployed as soon as is feasible, Congress
needs to know now how much the new system will cost and how
quickly and widely it can be deployed.
Finally, several proposals have been made to consolidate
the various agencies responsible for border management. The
most sweeping proposals have been made in the Senate where one
bill envisions merging Customs, INS, the Department of
Transportation and other agencies into a Department of Homeland
Security.
A less ambitious proposal reportedly under consideration by
the administration would merge Customs, the Border Patrol and
INS's enforcement divisions into a single agency under the
supervision of the Department of Justice.
While consolidation of border enforcement agencies should
be given appropriate consideration, much more information will
be needed before such a step can be confidently taken.
Consolidating even just the INS and Customs would require
significant time and effort and would only be justified if both
agencies would benefit.
Congress needs specific information about what problems
would be solved by the agency merger, what activities would be
enhanced, and what difficulties caused by the merger would have
to be overcome. These issues are all extremely important. And I
look forward to discussing them with all of our witnesses
today.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]
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Mr. Souder. We are pleased to welcome Ms. Bonni Tischler,
Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Field Operations for
the U.S. Customs Service; Mr. Larry Johnson, CEO and Founder of
BERG Associates, LLC, and a former counterterrorism expert at
the CIA and the Department of State; Ms. Colleen Kelley,
National President of the National Treasury Employees Union,
which represents Customs workers; Mr. T. J. Bonner, President
of the National Border Patrol Council of the American
Federation of Government Employees which represents the INS
employees; Mr. Christopher Koch, President of the World
Shipping Council; Mr. John Simpson, President of the American
Association of Exporters and Importers; and Mr. Steve Russell,
Chairman and CEO of Celadon Trucking Services, representing the
American Trucking Associations.
We thank everyone for taking the time this morning to join
us for this important discussion.
Now I would like to recognize Mr. Cummings for an opening
statement.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
commend you for holding this hearing and for taking such a keen
interest in the issue of promoting security and efficiency at
America's border crossings and ports of entry.
The series of field hearings you have held, culminating in
today's hearing, serve an important purpose. Our air, land, and
seaports of entry are literally America's gateways to travel,
tourism and international trade and commerce.
Our desire for openness and cultural exchange and our
dependence on international trade, make it imperative that
these conduits operate efficiently.
But as the persistent illegal narcotics trade and, even
more dramatically, the September 11th attacks have
demonstrated, our insistence upon openness can be manipulated
to inflict tragic consequences upon us all. Because of the
nature of the September 11th attacks, the issue of airport
security and airplane passenger safety has drawn enormous
attention from the public, the media and all levels of
government, and rightly so.
Equally important, however, is our government's
responsibility to ensure that America's land and seaports are
able to operate both safely and efficiently. That is the reason
for today's hearing. The more than 40 Federal agencies that
operate at our Nation's ports of entry have an enormous task on
their collective hands. Among those, the burden of regulating
our borders and ports and providing the first line of defense
in our homeland security efforts.
This falls heaviest upon the U.S. Customs Service, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Coast Guard
and the U.S. Border Patrol. We will hear directly today only
from the Customs Service, but all of our witnesses will have
something to say about the efforts of all of these agencies and
how they can work most effectively and efficiently together to
advance the Nation's interest in securing our borders,
facilitating tourism and trade, and enforcing our laws.
Mr. Chairman, I must say that I do regret that we don't
have the director of the Office of Homeland Security, Tom
Ridge, who is the person who brings all of this together and
could probably provide us with the kind of information we need,
here today with us.
As you all are aware, Mr. Chairman, Customs Service
Chairman Bonner recently said that if terrorists succeeded in
detonating a nuclear device in a commercial shipping container,
the government would shut our container terminals down.
Leaving aside the tragic health and environmental
consequences of such an event, I suspect that many Americans do
not realize the extent to which the American economy is
supported by its seaports. The Port of Baltimore, for example,
contributes mightily to the economic strength of the Mid
Atlantic region in particular. But the goods that arrive there
reach deep into the Midwest and other areas of the country,
just as the goods that leave through it travel all over the
world. Cities like Baltimore, New Orleans, New York and Los
Angeles that have major commercial ports depend on those ports
to support a wide array of related industries that employ
millions of Americans both locally and far beyond their
borders.
The shutting down of just one major U.S. port would have a
substantial national economic impact and ripples would be felt
worldwide. Similarly, the flow of commerce over land between
the United States and our two largest trading partners, Mexico
and Canada, is vital to the economic health of the entire
hemisphere and beyond.
In the new normality that has been thrust upon us, Customs,
INS, Border Patrol and the Coast Guard are all being forced to
evolve quickly to meet the challenge of avoiding the kind of
threat to homeland security and the world economy that
Commissioner Bonner described.
New initiatives in the area of technology, strategy and
interagency cooperation, including a possible reorganization of
so-called border agencies, are being developed, implemented or
considered by Congress and the administration.
Today's hearing provides an important opportunity to
examine both the status and the wisdom of these various
efforts, and I look forward to hearing the valuable testimony
of our witnesses.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back and I thank you.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Before proceeding, I would first
like to have the record show that the director of Homeland
Security, Mr. Ridge, will be giving a briefing to the members
of this full committee this week, and we are looking forward to
that. Mr. Zigler has been in front of us several times. They
have a number of hearings on the Hill, will continue to work
with INS.
Today we will be focusing a little more directly on the
commerce interaction which is more directly related to Customs,
but we will have a number of INS questions, and they have
submitted written testimony and will respond to our questions
as those directly showing to overlap as well.
Mr. Cummings. Will the chairman yield for a question?
Mr. Souder. I yield for a question.
Mr. Cummings. Just one question. On Tom Ridge's appearance
before that committee, that is--before our committee, is that
closed? Is that the entire committee? Is that a closed hearing?
Will the public have access?
Mr. Souder. Yes. My understanding is that it is--double-
check because I assumed it was closed, which it is. But it is
for the full committee.
Mr. Cummings. Very well. Thank you.
Mr. Souder. But that--we formally invited, but did not
pressure Mr. Ridge to come in public because we knew the
briefing was coming. But he is clearly going to need to speak
to the Hill more in response if in fact consolidation goes
ahead. I think both sides agree with that basic point.
Before proceeding, I would like to take care of a couple of
procedural matters. First, I would ask unanimous consent that
all Members have 5 legislative days to submit written
statements and questions for the hearing record and that any
answers to written questions provided by the witnesses also be
included in the record.
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Second, I ask unanimous consent that all exhibits,
documents and other materials referred to by the Members and
the witnesses may be included in the hearing record, and that
all Members be permitted to revise and extend their remarks.
Without objection, it is so ordered.
As is customary, we will begin with the administration
witness who today is Ms. Bonni Tischler, Assistant Commissioner
for the Office of Field Operations for the U.S. Customs
Service.
I would like to note for the record that we also invited
the representatives of INS and the White House, as I just said.
There are a number of other hearings. We know there are
pressures on all of the witnesses and we appreciate it very
much that the Customs has come today, because we have this
focus on commerce. It is a standard in our committee to ask all
witnesses to testify under oath. So, Ms. Tischler, if you would
stand and raise your right hand.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Souder. Let the record show that the witness responded
in the affirmative. I now ask you to give an opening statement.
We ask you to summarize it in 5 minutes. We will insert your
full statement in the record.
STATEMENT OF BONNI TISCHLER, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF
FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE
Ms. Tischler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, for this opportunity to testify on behalf of
Commissioner Bonner and the U.S. Customs Service. Throughout
our 212-year history, the Customs Service has demonstrated its
ability to adapt to the varying challenges our Nation has faced
in its greatest times of peril.
With the tragic events of September 11th, a coordinated
attack on our homeland, the mission of the Customs Service has
evolved yet again. And simply put, our No. 1 priority is now to
protect our Nation from terrorists.
The task at hand is enormous. On a national basis the
Customs Service is responsible for processing over 470 million
people, 129 million cars and over 19 million trucks, railcars
and sea containers that arrive into the United States each
year. Obviously we cannot inspect each and every shipment of
goods that enters the United States. To do so would cripple the
flow of trade.
Customs employs a systematic process based on the
principles of risk management. This process involves data
collection and analysis, combined with years of experience and
old fashioned intuition as our personnel identify trends and
anomalies in data to make informed risk-based decisions on what
to screen, target and, when appropriate, examine.
Since September 11th the Customs Service has been operating
at our highest level of vigilance. Inspectors manning America's
front line have been staffing land border ports of entry around
the clock, performing increased enforcement screenings,
examinations and security operations.
Officers at our ports of entry are working 12 to 16 hours a
day, 6 and 7 days a week, and they have been doing so for over
6 months. Since last September the rules have changed. Customs
can no longer be satisfied with conducting examinations solely
at the port of entry. We must begin to view the border as more
than a mere physical boundary between countries. We must also
understand it in terms of the actions we undertake with our
foreign partners to prescreen people and goods before they
arrive in the United States.
To better address the threat that terrorists could exploit
commercial trade, Customs has developed a Container Security
Initiative. We call it CSI, which is designed to improve our
border security and efficiency by pushing our enforcement
efforts beyond our borders.
CSI will allow U.S. Customs more time to anticipate,
identify and stop threats before they reach our shores and
expedite the flow of low risk commerce across our borders. The
core elements of this initiative include receiving specific
advance electronic manifest information, establishing a common
targeting methodology for identifying high risk containers, and
prescreening these containers at their port of departure before
they are loaded aboard a vessel and transported to the United
States.
CSI is already underway. Customs has personnel detailed to
seaports in Montreal, Halifax and Vancouver, Canada to target
in-transit sea containers destined to the United States. In
order for our efforts to push our border outward under CSI to
be successful, we must enlist the support of industry and the
trade community.
To this end, Customs announced the development of the
Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, CTPAT, and
Operation Shield America. Through CTPAT we are working with
importers, carriers and other industry sectors to secure the
international supply chain by emphasizing a seamless security-
conscious environment throughout the entire commercial process.
Operation Shield America is an industry outreach initiative
dedicated to enlisting the support of manufacturers and
distributors in preventing terrorist organizations from
obtaining weapons or sensitive equipment and technologies.
Furthermore, Customs is leading Operation Green Quest, a
multiagency initiative aimed at interdicting terrorist funding
by identifying, disrupting and dismantling the financial
systems they use to fund their operations.
Through interagency efforts, working with our law
enforcement counterparts and members of industry, we are
developing comprehensive strategies, procedures and plans to
maximize the utilization of existing resources to improve
border security, coordinate enforcement activity and respond to
terrorist acts and collaborate on legislative initiatives.
On the international front, Customs is working with our
counterparts in Canada and Mexico to improve the level and
information exchange and adopt measures to protect our mutual
borders.
Over 25 initiatives aimed at improving cross-border
collaboration and security are already underway under the Smart
Border Accord recently signed with Canada. A similar agreement
was recently negotiated with Mexico and we are in the initial
stages of developing eight joint action plans to address
security issues along the southwest border.
Customs' most important technology initiative to secure our
future was already underway before the events of September
11th. This initiative is the ongoing development of the
automated commercial environment or ACE. ACE will provide the
information technology architecture and infrastructure that
will allow Customs to streamline our commercial data processing
systems and significantly improve our ability to collect
advance commercial information from a variety of automated
sources in order to efficiently perform law enforcement
analysis and targeting.
Technology and information-sharing are absolutely essential
to our counterterrorist mission. Customs must deploy the
technology necessary to rapidly and comprehensively inspect
arriving and departing conveyances and cargo at our ports of
entry in order to detect anomalies and prevent the smuggling of
weapons of mass destruction, narcotics and other contraband.
This must be done without impeding the flow of legitimate
commercial trade. Customs is implementing a strategy to
develop, acquire and deploy non-intrusive INS technology to
systematically increase the smuggler's risk of detection in all
port environments, including all modes of transportation.
So far under this plan Customs has deployed over 80 large
scale inspection systems at our air, land and seaports of
entry. These large-scale fixed sites, relocateable and mobile
X-ray and gamma ray imaging systems are able to rapidly and
efficiently screen commercial trucks, sea containers and
vehicles entering the United States.
In addition to these large-scale systems, Customs has also
deployed personal radiation detectors to allow inspectors to
monitor their ports for radioactive sources. We are also
working on developing new smart technologies capable of
ensuring the integrity of a shipment and those capable of
detecting and identifying chemical, biological and nuclear
materials. For example, U.S. Customs and the Department of
Transportation are in the initial stages of trying to develop a
secure technology, a smart seal, capable of ensuring the
integrity of a sea container or alerting law enforcement
personnel when tampering has occurred.
Additionally, we are also working on the development of
wireless technology like personal data assistants and notebook
computers which can interface with our law enforcement data
bases on the ground. This wireless technology will improve the
flow and exchange of key law enforcement data to ensure our
officers on the front line have the most current tactical
information available to them when they are performing
enforcement operations to target and examine high risk
passengers and cargo shipments.
In closing, allow me to state that we are grateful for this
support we have received from the administration and Congress
to continue the development of ACE. We also appreciate the
support we recently received in the antiterrorism supplemental
budget which will provide additional inspectors, agents and K-9
enforcement officers and more high-tech, nonintrusive INS
technology for deployment at our ports of entry over the next 2
years.
I firmly believe that the U.S. Customs Service has the
expertise and the experience to protect our borders. Thank you
again, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the subcommittee for
this opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Tischler follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you very much for both your leadership
and your willingness to testify today. The challenges that the
Customs Service is facing are overwhelming. Just the daunting
challenges that you faced in commerce and contraband and
illegals before was difficult enough and stressing our system
even before we got into the September 11th.
So far I have been on both the north and south borders. In
Vermont, in addition to looking for Quebec Gold and ecstacy,
they are looking for contraband cheese coming across.
In North Dakota, I went through one of the facilities for
the train inspections that is relatively new. They have a lot
of cargo, wheat, moving across, and other things across the
North Dakota border where we have more crossings, actually,
than any other place in the United States. In Los Angeles, Long
Beach, some of the new technology that Customs has brought in
there at the largest harbors in the world, it is amazing the
different things you have to look for and what the Customs
agents in the field have to look for, and they vary so
dramatically, even from site to site, even in the same State
range.
We are working on this border report. I have a number of
very specific questions. We will probably do two rounds here
and then submit some others for written. One of the--maybe I
will start with the automated computer system. What is the time
table roughly for implementation, and how long before it is
deployed at the seaports and the airports as well as the border
crossings?
Ms. Tischler. Well, our automated commercial environment is
actually just that, an environment. So it is not just a rollout
to the ports. It is going to encompass everything Customs does
commercially. We were on a 5-year timeframe. Our commissioner
is doing everything possible to reduce that to 4 years. It is a
function of the funding stream. We have been very fortunate the
last couple of years, and we look forward to mutually
discussing this with your committee and others that in fact are
interested in it.
What that commercial environment will do, as I stated
before, is really establish an electronic data warehouse. And
so while we will be able to efficiently process commercial
entries, we will also be able to use it, in conjunction with
our targeting system, to identify anomalies in the flow. That
is what it is all about. Because whether you are smuggling
narcotics or smuggling weapons of mass destruction, it is all
about smuggling. And that is the daunting task of how in the
sea environment, for instance, to reduce this 5.9 million
containers a year to a manageable number for us to in fact
effectively look at.
Mr. Souder. Do you--when you say 5 to 4, was that starting
with fiscal 2001?
Ms. Tischler. It is starting fiscal year 2000. But the
money was delayed, so I believe they started it in 2001. I know
that our first entry configuration is due to start rolling out
the end of this year in the beginning of next fiscal year.
Mr. Souder. So under that plan it would probably be 2005 if
we got accelerated to 4?
Ms. Tischler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. Do you believe that as we have looked--because
we have been at Port Huron as well as San Diego and other
places. But particularly where the SENTRI and the NEXUS systems
are, do you believe--and in Blaine, do you believe that they
have--do you have figures that show they--that they are
succeeding in the way that they had hoped?
Ms. Tischler. First, let me state that Commissioner Bonner
supports the idea of having these types of fast lanes. You
know, we are walking a tightrope. I know I do not have to tell
you because you saw it on the Northern and Southern border. Not
only facilitating trade, but an enormous number of people cross
every day for work and for other reasons, to contribute to the
economy, for instance, in Detroit.
Personally I think they should shrink it down to one
manageable system. I think at the end of the day our partners
in Canada are very pro for that, in fact, that NEXUS and
actually the SENTRI environment continue. I think it is part of
the Smart Border Accord. So for the people who are crossing
now, we think it is pretty efficient. For the numbers that
might cross at some point where we would expand the system, it
is a question of logistics at that point, is how to create the
fast lanes that would allow them to come in.
Port Huron, it is a lot easier, for instance, than at the
Port of Detroit.
Mr. Souder. That is one of the--I have got some detailed
other areas I want to get into in the second round. But we are
going to do a little bit of some followup questions, if not
today then in writing, on that very problem. Because where have
you have--like at Blaine, Washington, you can bounce certain
people over to the next port of entry because they are
relatively close. On the North Dakota border, New York and
Vermont even, but when you get into the matter of the traffic
coming through Detroit, it is so jammed that unless we can
figure out alternative ways to put it on the Canadian side--
Buffalo is the same thing. They have environment challenges
about new bridges, and yet Detroit and Buffalo are where the
bulk of where the north border traffic is coming through.
On the south border we have a few similar problems, have
got a couple of ports of entry where there is longer distances
involved. And so we need in Congress to understand, because all
of us agree we have to keep the commerce moving and control the
terrorism, because jobs and security are our two biggest
concerns as Members of Congress. But to do that is going to
require some major infrastructure questions because you cannot
say we are for fastpass and not have enough lanes. And
physically we have rivers in some of these borders and this is
a very costly proposition.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And Ms.
Tischler, thank you very much for being here.
I agree with the chairman that the Customs unquestionably
has a very difficult challenge. And consistent with that, I
guess we have a lot of people who are working overtime now?
Ms. Tischler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And what are we doing about bringing in new
people?
Ms. Tischler. Well, we have been very fortunate this year,
thanks to Congress and the administration for supporting
efforts to increase our rolls. Just in the 2000 arena, that is
all I can speak to, we almost have gone up about 1,000 people.
And it is split between the Customs inspectors, as I pointed
out before, the K-9 officers and our agents. So the total
number of inspectors that we are getting actually as a result
of the 2002 initiatives and the supplemental is 919. And the
total number of agents is 381. And we are quite happy about
that. We have been pretty static for the last number of years.
It was pretty hard to spread people around. In fact in 1999,
when the Rasson incident happened and we had to send people to
the border, then we realized exactly how thin we were on the
Northern border. That is why a lot of these individuals are
going to be reporting to the Northern border ports.
Mr. Cummings. One of the things that was very interesting
during one of our hearings that--we were talking about--the
issue of airline security came up. And it may have actually
been in another committee that I am on. And they were saying
that--how as they had to get more of these folks that ride in
the airplanes, the security.
Ms. Tischler. Sky marshals.
Mr. Cummings. Sky marshals. That--so many new terms here. I
asked them where were these people coming from, the new people.
And they said most of them were coming from the Border Patrol,
which is very interesting. I am just wondering where are your
people coming from? Is there any particular place that you see
a high number of them coming?
Ms. Tischler. We have lost a few to TSA as well in their
endeavor to staff the sky marshal area. When we are recruiting,
we recruit in the widest area possible. And so, frankly, does
INS. So it sort of depends on who actually puts in. But we just
had a team, for instance, in New England looking to staff the
Northern border because we realize it is possible that if you
hire somebody from the southwest border and try to send them to
Beecher Falls, they might not stay there too long. So we try
very diligently to fit the right person with the right job.
And we are recruiting all across the United States right
now. So we do not expect really to pull from the other agencies
except for the special agent position.
Mr. Cummings. Not very long ago I got a call I think from
The New York Times, and they were trying to pull together an
article about how since September 11th there had been an
increase in the amount of drugs that have been found by Customs
and they wanted me to comment.
And is that accurate, first of all? Have we seen an
increase in drug discoveries?
Ms. Tischler. Customs has--we have just recently run a
survey on that, and it appears to us that we have been able to
interdict a lot more drugs coming across the southwest border,
and even coming across the Northern border. Although it is
pretty restricted to certain areas. So we would agree with
that.
Mr. Cummings. And is that because the surveillance is much
stricter?
Ms. Tischler. I would like to think it is a function of the
number of people up there, yeah.
Mr. Cummings. And as far as going back for a moment to the
new peopling coming in, is the training that they receive now
much different than it was say pre-September 11th?
Ms. Tischler. No. Our training has really been pretty
consistent over the years. Like I said, the issue of how to
address smuggling on the border or how to address how to
process commercial traffic pretty well stays the same. What we
have added is a new focus on terrorist activities. How to spot
anomalies that might lead us in that direction. I am not being
facetious, but what a weapon of mass destruction might look
like, how to work the radiation pagers, how to deal with some
of the new technology that we are going to be using to look for
chemicals that are inbound.
So, in general, training really hasn't changed that much in
specific. To deal with the area of terrorism, we pretty well
are cranking up our program to include new areas that will
impact on that.
Mr. Cummings. Just one other question. And I would be more
than remiss if I did not ask you this. I do not think I could
go back to my district. You know, there was a time, and it is a
little unrelated but related, about a year or so ago when
African-Americans were very concerned that the Customs,
particularly airlines, we would be having all kind of problems.
African-American women were disproportionately being checked at
the airports. And I know that--I guess that may have been about
2 years ago. Our colleague, John Lewis, spoke out against it at
the Congressional Black Caucus. And African-American men were
being disproportionately stopped and checked and searched, in
many instances strip-searched. And I was just wondering has a--
I know that back then some new policies were put in place.
And I was just wondering how those policies were working
out? I know this is a little unrelated, but I have to ask you
since I have you here before us.
Ms. Tischler. Even prior to September 11th, the level of
noise, the level of complaints, letters we were getting in had
completely fallen off. So we are very pleased with the policies
that we put into place. Our training on personal search has
proven to be really reliable.
Our search efficiency rate, meaning the numbers of people
searched and what we actually find on them, has actually gone
up. Because, for instance, in one of our ports, I will not tell
you which, they searched like 1,000 people and got very little
return. Well, they have searched a lot fewer people than the
1,000 people within that same timeframe and their search
efficiency rate went way up. They have made seizures where none
existed before.
So Customs has really taken a lot of time, energy, and put
a lot of money behind straightening that perceived problem out.
And we are pleased.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Souder. Our economy in Indiana would die if we were
restricted much with our Canadian trade because it has become a
huge part because of NAFTA, in addition to trade with Mexico.
So we are very concerned how to keep the commerce moving,
particularly if we have additional terrorist incidents, which
we know at some point we will have in the United States, and
how our country is going to a react on the borders. Since
September 11th it has gone down to near manageable levels
again, and we have done that with a lot of stress. We are
bringing in the systems. But we all know that this isn't a
problem that is suddenly over, and therefore we are likely to
see the pressures.
We all know that this expedited clearance process is
critical. So I have some very specific questions related to
this. One pilot program which is a joint venture between
Customs and the State of New Hampshire apparently will involve
a Slovakian factory and a U.S. importer. The goods will be
inspected and sealed at the factory in Slovakia and then
brought into the United States. Who will carry out the
inspections at the point of origin? Will the U.S. Customs do
that? Will they simply supervise them? If it is the latter,
will the private firms that make or carry the goods be
entrusted with the inspections or will the foreign nations'
customs inspectors carry them out?
In other words, how is this process exactly going to work?
Because this is vital in the preclearance questions and in the
security question.
Ms. Tischler. Correct. The Croatian pilot is Operation
Safeguard. It is being sponsored by the Coast Guard. I believe
they are going to be handling the security issues overseas.
But let me say this, that the concept of what Safeguard is
trying to pilot, the issue of a company securing its supply
chain from start to when it gets to American Customs, is an apt
one. That is what that CTPAT concept and CSI, the Container
Security Initiative, is all about, In Canada, however, which is
something I can speak to, we have got inspectors at Vancouver,
Montreal and Halifax. We are cooperating with our Canadian
counterparts. We do the targeting with them. We are showing
them how to do it as well.
By the way, they have got people now at Seattle and Newark
that are doing the same things for cargo going to Canada.
But once we identify an anomaly, we set the container to
the side. They are handling it. The Canadians are handling it,
with us observing. They are running these containers through
NII that they have got, and/or opening the cargo. I guess I
think it is fortunate that we have come up with nothing. But we
have done a number of containers. We just sent our inspectors
into Halifax and Montreal the week before last. So we know what
is going to happen there.
The idea is, I know--I do not think I am speaking out of
turn if I tell you, we have already been to one of the mega
ports and have been negotiating with this country--I really do
not want to say what it is, because I don't want to put them on
the spot. But they seem very receptive of the idea of us
sending inspectors over there again to target.
Now in terms of who is going do the searching and what they
are going to do with the stuff if we do interdict something,
from a law enforcement perspective in the context of narcotics,
will we try to do a controlled delivery? Will they handle it
there? That all remains to be seen. I think as we go to each
country that has one of those mega ports or even beyond that,
it is going to be a function of how we deal with that country
and what law enforcement is available there, what kind of NII
they actually have.
I know we have been talking to the State Department about
the possibility of providing NII to some of these ports that
don't have anything. It just makes sense to do that. But I do
have to say that there are some bills before Congress right now
which would help us out, absent that, and even including that.
And that is a House bill and a Senate bill that speak to
reforming the way we look at the manifests and trying to get
them far in advance.
We would like to see an electronic transfer of manifest
information. We would like more detailed and accurate manifest
information and we would like it 24 hours before a ship, for
instance, would depart from a port overseas. I think some of
the proposals have revolved around 5 days which works pretty
well for Europe and Asia, but for this hemisphere it doesn't
work very well when this stuff is coming in from Grand Bahama
Island which is hours away from Miami. So we are looking for a
little tinkering with the bills.
But back to overseas. So far the countries that we have
talked to have been receptive. And I think, as they say, the
devil is in the details.
Mr. Souder. Will your ACE computer system be able to handle
all of this data?
Ms. Tischler. When ACE finally gets up and running,
absolutely. ACS is going to be a little stretched.
Mr. Souder. Would it be--a little stretched means it might
not be able to handle it?
Ms. Tischler. I think for the short term, within the next
couple of years, it will be able to handle it fine. It is just
that it is not as sophisticated as we would like to do data
analysis and trend analysis. And it is in that area where the
information would come in and then be used to, in fact, target
cargo that will be a little on the lacking side. That is why we
are so anxious to get ACE up and running.
Mr. Souder. I know the president of Mexico has taken
tremendous strides in cleaning up a lot of the corruption in
Mexico but it is a prevalent problem in their police
departments. And one of the problems in the south border is we
are dependent on their local police commanders because there is
no central criminal data base. I would suggest that this
probably presents problems on rail and other things coming in,
not only with Mexico but other countries. Would you agree with
that statement?
Ms. Tischler. I am not knowledgeable enough to actually
agree with you. But I would say that would present a problem,
if true. I know that Mexican Customs is investing pretty
heavily in IT, and they feel that they are going to be very
sophisticated in order to interface with ACE, and our Canadian
partners as well.
Mr. Souder. In your reference to the legislation, I think
it is fair to say, that much like we did on the airline
manifests and have put pressure on the different countries to
provide us with the names of the people heading into this
country, to make the fastpass systems work, whether they are
NEXUS or SENTRI or whatever types of preclearances, we are
going to have to have more data.
Now I know trucking companies and others and shippers are
going to want to add things at the last minute. That is the
nature of the business. But to the degree you do that, we don't
have the same sense of security. One of the things that we have
raised at some of our hearings with some Canadian trucking
companies, at one of the hearings with others, is that probably
there are going to need to be more severe penalties if you
abuse the preclearance system, because the--the integrity of
that system is vital to the movement of commerce. And it is
almost like having a specially vetted unit. When you ask for
special privileges, which we need to do, we need to have
special obligations, clearances to make sure that this doesn't
become a prime target to slip contraband and terrorists
through. And we are certainly going to make sure that these
type of things are there. But we also have to make sure that
you have got the technology and the computers, because it
doesn't do us any good to set up a system if you can't get the
data in.
One last question on that. There have been proposals to put
GPS transponders on cargo. I assume that the current system
wouldn't handle that. Would ACE be able to have the capacity to
handle that?
Ms. Tischler. Yes. But I have to tell you that we were--in
fact, Mr. Koch, who is on your next panel, and I were speaking
about this very thing this morning. There are a number of
vendors out there that are talking to Customs and
Transportation about what would constitute a smart container
and how you would in fact track inventory around. Just
yesterday a vendor came in to talk to us about it and I
actually gave him Mr. Koch's name and phone number because we
would like to pilot something like that soon. And it is just a
function of what it is.
We understand that the Department of Defense might have had
a system they used, and are still using, actually, but they
developed it during the Gulf War to track their ammunition and
munitions around. So if that is true, then it would be
something that would be very helpful. But we could not handle
this unless our partners agreed to some type of test.
Mr. Souder. These are difficult questions. We rode in to
the LA Harbor with some of the sea marshals, which meant
boarding a ship at 4 something in the morning. It was moving a
little faster than I thought it was going to be when--it didn't
look like we were moving until you get ready to step across
that--being a landlubber.
But one of the things that is apparent--and this particular
one, it was a cruise ship. But in these ships that, even if you
have the integrity of the system at the point of origin, in
the--and we are checking it, at least partially as they come
in, we also have to have some assurance in the transshipment
process that something isn't altered or added. And many of
these flags that the ships are coming in under are
questionable.
And that--and that, even in the cruise ship that we
boarded, it was very noticeable as we went through with the
people from INS and Customs and down into the underbelly of the
ship and talked to the people who were actually controlling it,
they were up with the harbor pilot much like the sky marshals
do as they enter the closeness of the harbor, but on top of
that, the--the operating crew not only didn't speak English,
they spoke a multitude of languages. And that is why this
other--these other questions of tracking the cargo inside
become critical.
And it isn't that we have to do every piece, but we need to
make enough uncertainty and enough accountability that the
American public has confidence. Because, like I mentioned
before, September 11th, none of us knew it was coming. Our
level of accountability in Congress and the government and the
potential reaction if we have further problems is going to be
so out of proportion to what the reaction was even in September
11th, that we are preparing over a period of a number of years
in our computer systems, our infrastructure. And I hope you are
looking at all of those interrelationships. Because we want to
make the commerce work. And we need to know from you where the
problems are and what the actual resource costs are that we
have to look at here in Congress when we make these abstract
decisions that sound good, and then tell you to go do it and
don't give you the money.
Ms. Tischler. That is correct. And, in truth, it is an
unknown universe right now. That is why it is so important to
partner with the trade. Because they have got a piece of the
puzzle. Transportation--I don't mean the department, I mean the
trade portion of transportation has in fact used some of this
technology over the years. We put a technology subcommittee
together under CTPAT to explore all of the technology that the
different transportation universes were using, sea, land, air,
rail. It is amazing because they didn't know pretty much about
what each other were using, which meant there is a lot of
duplication of effort.
And so part of CTPAT is trying to avoid the duplication and
turn everybody on to technology. That seems to be the best
practice.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Mr. Cummings, do you have additional
questions?
Mr. Cummings. Just a few other questions.
You briefly mentioned Operation Green Quest. Would you talk
about that a little further, please.
Ms. Tischler. Operation Green Quest is an antiterrorism
money-laundering operation that Customs, Treasury and the
Justice agencies stood up in October, to really get at the soft
underbelly, if you will, of terrorism.
I personally--I have been in law enforcement for almost 31
years now, and I have watched us try to interdict narcotics and
do narcotics investigations. But my background is money-
laundering. And I am a firm believer in taking the money out of
the equation. And so what Green Quest was designed to do
basically was trace and track illicit funds or licit funds that
were in fact being used for terrorist purposes.
Mr. Cummings. It was interesting that--the other day one of
the Cabinet members over there in Afghanistan made a--made a
speech about trying to make sure that, you know, illegal drugs
would be stopped and the growing of various crops leading to
the distribution of illegal drugs. And I was just wondering, if
it is not too confidential, are we looking at Afghanistan?
Ms. Tischler. We have always looked at Afghanistan because
of the heroin trade. Similar to what has happened with Columbia
with the FARC, the cocaine traffic has fueled the FARC down
there. And we know darn well that the heroin trade has been
fueling bin Laden and others who would seek to destroy our way
of life.
So we have been actually dealing with it from a narcotics
illicit proceeds perspective for some time now.
Mr. Cummings. Uh-huh. And are we--does this--has Customs at
all worked with the government of Afghanistan, giving advice or
anything of that nature, to your knowledge?
Ms. Tischler. Up to now? No.
Mr. Cummings. You mentioned that the Customs, Department of
Transportation working group presented a report to the Office
of Homeland Security making recommendations to improve
container security. Is that report available publicly?
Ms. Tischler. I don't know if it has actually gone to the
coordination committee PCC or not. I know that it was due to
go. Then they were going to review it and open it up for
review.
Mr. Cummings. And so the next step is opening it up for
review? It has several recommendations?
Ms. Tischler. It has a number of recommendations. I think
there are 25 recommendations.
Mr. Cummings. And I take it that the Office of Homeland
Security would have a lot to do with making sure that those
recommendations, the ones that they felt appropriate, went into
effect. Is that accurate?
Ms. Tischler. I think that they are submitting it to them
for their thoughts. Some of the recommendations will require
funding. I am sure that we will have to take it to Congress to
discuss these recommendations.
Homeland security, I think, will spearpoint these
recommendations once they finish looking at the report and
digesting the elements.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time
to Congressman Davis, if you had any questions.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Davis will get 5 minutes plus any
additional.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank the gentleman for yielding. I also want to thank you and
commend you, both you and Representative Cummings, for the
diligence with which you have pursued this whole issue and the
diligence that you are taking to look at the whole question of
drug trafficking, the whole business of crime, criminality and
even looking at the whole question of prevention and how we can
really get a handle on drug policy that is effective for our
country.
I also want to thank you for your testimony. I have enjoyed
listening to your responses. The questions that sort of come to
mind in terms of border effectiveness obviously require a great
deal of cooperation between countries. What are our experiences
right now in terms of the level of cooperation that we are
receiving from other countries with whom we have to interact at
the borders?
Ms. Tischler. Well, I would like to talk about Canada. We
have always cooperated with Canadian Customs and vice versa.
And we deal with the RCMP, frankly, on a recurring basis. The
Smart Border Accord that our two countries have struck, I
think, will go a long way to increasing that cooperation.
We have the same focus, how to keep terrorists out of the
United States and possibly out of Canada and still have that
trade go through which is so critical to the border areas.
So I've got nothing but pluses for the Canadians. And we
have recently started the same type of proposed accord with
Mexico. I think President Fox has gone a long way to
straightening things out in Mexico. And we've always dealt the
same thing with Mexican customs on a very positive level.
They've recently within the last couple of years, they have a
whole new cast of managers that are managing Mexican customs.
We have been dealing with them in enforcement and working
groups that have to do with the trade. Things have been coming
along quite well as far as we are concerned.
As far as our counterparts overseas, we deal extremely well
with the British, the French, the Germans. In Asia, our
cooperative efforts extend to Thailand and Singapore. And we
just opened an office actually in India.
I really truly believe in a global trade environment,
Customs has got to be able to maintain positive relationships
with not only our counterparts but their government as well.
And so far over the years, it's worked out quite well. There is
a World Customs Organization, actually, where all the countries
come together with Customs and we deal quite a bit with them as
well as with the Interpol to really establish and keep up these
cooperative efforts.
Mr. Davis. As we increase reliance upon technology, and as
there are continuing advances in technological development, are
we still getting the human person power, I mean, the reliance
obviously upon the expertise of agents, of humans who work in
the process? Are we getting what we need in terms of interest
and in terms of people being interested in entering the
service?
Ms. Tischler. We think so. Customs relies on a tiered-up
process, anyway. We have lines of defense. For instance, in
narcotics we have inspectors, we have our dog handlers with our
canines, of course, and the NII, the technology all working in
concert with each other. And so now that we are expanding, we
are fortunate enough to get a number of personnel resources
committed off the 2002 supplemental and the initiatives, and we
are recruiting for an individual that has--of course, not too
hard with these kids these days because they are much better at
computers than I ever was, that's for sure--but we are looking
for people with specific interests. Language capabilities,
multicultural issues come into play here. So we are trying to
draw from a very broad segment of the population in order to do
the best customer service in law enforcement that we can.
Mr. Davis. Representative Meeks and I spent a great deal of
time working with Commissioner Kelly during the past
administration and we saw some of the new processes and
procedures that were being put into place designed to cut down
on the number of complaints relative to the issue of profiling
and the concerns that Representative Cummings expressed a
little bit about. Are we finding that the new technology, the
screening devices, for example, that were put in, have they
reduced significantly, to your knowledge, the number of
complaints about strip-searching and profiling and that kind of
issue?
Ms. Tischler. I had been explaining previously the level of
our complaints as well is way down. Way down. I couldn't point
specifically to technology. I would like to think it was our
training and our--and in the bicultural areas that we have been
doing and our personal search training and the levels of review
that have to be undertaken before somebody can, in fact, search
someone bodily. That is actually contributing to that. Our body
scan machines have been useful, but they are on a voluntary
basis and most people who are faced with a search actually
decline them. They would rather be hand-searched.
Mr. Davis. And so you are monitoring that aspect of the new
developments closely so that we know that there is, in fact,
adherence to the new policies and procedures? I mean that's a
real part, I would assume.
Ms. Tischler. Yes, sir, it's part of our internal control
system.
Mr. Davis. Well, let me commend you in terms of--I mean, I
think there have indeed been improvements in that arena.
Obviously, we are never out of the water. We've never done as
well as we can do. I think we are always becoming. But I
certainly have not received the number of complaints that I was
getting, you know, coming out of the area where I live and
spent a great deal of my time in Chicago, where there is a
tremendous amount of traffic. And so I certainly want to
commend you and commend the agency for progress in that arena.
I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman. And thank you very
much.
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Davis. And thank you, Ms.
Tischler, for your testimony today. We'll have some additional
written questions, but it was very helpful as we look at some
of these complex matters. And please accept on behalf of the
Customs department our sincere thanks for all the hard work in
the field from the many agents who have worked overtime and who
have been so steadfast.
In Port Angeles, we went over and met with Diana Dean, and
you made a reference earlier to the individual experience and
skill of the customs officer on the ground. So much of this is
instinct, and that with people who see something a little
different on the bottom of one truck and lead to a huge bust.
Even with all the technology, it's also the agents in the
field. And we need to make sure they have the best technology,
but we also need the experience in the training. Thank you very
much for being here today.
Ms. Tischler. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Souder. If the second panel could now come forward. Mr.
Larry Johnson, Ms. Colleen Kelley, Mr. T.J. Bonner, Mr.
Christopher Koch, Mr. John Simpson, and Mr. Steve Russell.
We will wait until you all get seated and then we will ask
you to stand up.
If you could each stand and raise your right hand. It is
our customary procedure as an oversight committee to swear in
each witness.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Souder. Let the record show that all the witnesses
responded in the affirmative. You have now joined in this
distinguished room--this is the committee that has done
everything from the travel office to the China investigations
to Waco and oversight investigations since--for a number of
years since we have taken over. And it's our customary
procedure to do that.
Your testimony today, even though it's for many of you a
long way to travel for 5 minutes, and with the questions, this
is building a systematic hearing record on border security in
particular and the interrelationship of Congress, INS and
security that isn't matched anywhere else in the system.
Because we have been doing field hearings in the North, field
hearings in the South. I have had all the commissioners in from
the different agencies and we want to make sure here in
Washington that we hear from the business side as well. These
are huge questions, as we look at the multiple missions of
these agencies. And if we throw them together, how is that
going to impact our trade and our security efforts?
So I thank each of you for taking this time today and being
part of our efforts to sort this through. We will begin with
Mr. Johnson, a very frequent witness over the years to this
committee, as we have dealt with--this subcommittee in
particular as we have dealt with counterterrorism questions
long before the whole world was focused on counterterrorism. We
appreciate your tremendous insights.
STATEMENTS OF LARRY C. JOHNSON, CEO AND FOUNDER, BERG
ASSOCIATES LLC; COLLEEN M. KELLEY, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION; T.J. BONNER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
BORDER PATROL COUNCIL, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES; CHRISTOPHER KOCH, PRESIDENT, WORLD SHIPPING COUNCIL;
JOHN SIMPSON, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF EXPORTERS AND
IMPORTERS; AND STEVE RUSSELL, CHAIRMAN AND CEO, CELADON
TRUCKING SERVICES, AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Congressman Souder. It's a
privilege to be with you again today. I ask that my full
statement be made a part of the record. Over the last 3 years,
in my company and current business, we spent a lot of time in
Latin America, and specifically in the Colon Free Zone of
Panama, doing undercover operations and tracking product
counterfeiting. In the course of doing that, we have gotten
some insights that address this whole issue of both border
security, port security and some gaps that need to be closed,
and in my statement I outline what I think are five broad areas
that need to be addressed.
One of those in particular is the need for clearinghouse
with the whole security technology R&D. Right now the U.S.
Government is spending a lot of money in a lot of different
arenas in a lot of different agencies trying to develop
technology. But at the end of the day there is no one place
that is helping sort out and establish priorities.
So, for example, a lot of what is now the TSA center up in
New Jersey, there is efforts to develop explosive detection
systems, separate efforts to develop cargo systems. This much I
know: The U.S. Government and the people of the United States
have an enormous talent and scientific ability, and when you
put that together with the talents that are resident in the
national laboratories, it is beyond me why we have not been
able to harness all of that into a concentrated, if you will,
Manhattan effort to develop effective security technology.
Because there is a legitimate question here about you don't
want to stop commerce by unnecessary inspections, but there are
ways to develop that technology. The key for it is money has to
be appropriated. We saw this with the explosive detection
systems. It was recommended back in 1990 after Pan Am 103 to do
it, but Congress and the administrations, both Republican and
Democrat, never appropriated the money to put those machines
and get them out and create a market for it until after
September 11th. And we cannot wait until we have a disaster in
a port to do that.
A second issue--and I endorse the concept of putting INS
and Customs and Coast Guard together in some fashion. And I
think if I had to weigh in on one side, I think it would be
better to bring INS and Coast Guard under Customs as opposed to
subjecting others to the Department of Justice.
But right now when you have three different chiefs
directing things, that means nobody is in charge and at the end
of the day there is a great need for coordination in this
front.
And I outline in my testimony the problem of stovepiping of
information. Not just keeping information within the Federal
agencies, where DEA doesn't talk to Customs and doesn't talk to
FBI, and there is not a flow of information across that
direction, but you also see in my testimony an e-mail I
received from a law enforcement officer in the United States
who worked out in the West Coast near a U.S. military base, and
he recounts his frustrations of making repeated efforts first
to alert the FBI to what he thought was a Middle Eastern cell
operating near this military base that handles nuclear weapons.
And the FBI said--and this was 3 years ago--we're not doing
profiling and we're not going to focus on it.
He has subsequently gone back to them because he has
identified some activities that relate to Hispanics and the FBI
said, no, no, we are focused only on the Middle Eastern side.
What you have here is a law enforcement officer who is
extremely frustrated with what he sees as the inability of
Federal officials to receive the information that State and
local cops have, as well as for the State and local cops to get
that information where they can be a part of the national
security effort.
The last point I'll make--and I intended to bring a Power
Point presentation for you today, and I admit that I did not
know how to properly use zip files so I sent the wrong one--but
it illustrates the problem of visas and making sure that we go
after these overseas in the right way.
Now the picture I was going to show you was one of Walid
Zayed Massis. Mr. Zayed, I ran across in the course of doing an
investigation in product counterfeiting. What made him even
more interesting after we got him on this charge was he was the
first individual convicted in Panama for money-laundering. But
in 1989 he published a book that its English translation is
``Palestine: The Burning Silence.'' He also happens to be the
intelligence chief for the PLO in Central and South America and
is on the record calling for the extinction of Israel. He is
involved and has links to groups and individuals that are
involved in terrorism.
This individual also happens to have a company that is
incorporated in the United States. Now when you look at U.S.
visa law, there is nothing in U.S. visa law, because he has not
been convicted of drug trafficking, and because the only other
category for excluding him on is this vague thing called moral
turpitude, we have made efforts in the course of our business
to get people like Mr. Zayed blocked from getting visas to come
to the United States.
In another instance, we ran across an individual who was
not engaged in terrorism, but was using his trips to the United
States every year to go to U.S. companies' marketplace,
identify the new products, take pictures, go back home, place
an order in China, and then the Chinese would manufacture these
counterfeit items that he would then bring in. He had been
convicted in Venezuela. It has gone all the way to the Supreme
Court. The conviction has been upheld. But despite that
conviction, when we went to the U.S. Embassy and said block
this individual from coming into the United States and using
the United States as a tool for attacking U.S. companies, the
U.S. Embassy said under visa law we cannot stop him. Product
counterfeiting is not moral turpitude.
Now those kinds of gaps I find completely senseless. I
mean, this is a place where we need to have common sense come
into the picture. We don't want to block people who have a
legitimate desire to come to the United States. But the
individuals who are engaged with the criminal activity, the
drug trafficking, the money-laundering, and potentially
terrorism, it is a small group of people. But in my experience,
they have been very effective exploiting the loopholes that
exist in both U.S. ports of entry and in U.S. law.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Well, thank you for that fairly discouraging
testimony.
Mr. Johnson. Sorry about that.
Mr. Souder. And if you would like to submit the other power
points for the record.
Mr. Johnson. I will get that to you and will figure out how
to use it properly.
Mr. Souder. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Kelley,
you are next.
Ms. Kelley. Thank you, Chairman Souder, Ranking Member
Cummings. I appreciate the subcommittee holding this hearing
today and having the opportunity to testify on the enhancement
of border and port-of-entry security. As the president of NTEU,
I have the honor of leading a union which represents over
12,000 Customs employees across the country. Customs inspectors
and canine enforcement officers make up our Nation's first line
of defense in the wars on terrorism, on drugs, and on illegal
contraband.
The U.S. Customs Service continues to be the Nation's
premier border agency by interdicting more drugs than any other
agency. Customs is also a revenue collection agency, collecting
an estimated $25 billion in revenue each year on over 25
million entries involving $1.3 trillion in international trade
every year.
One of the most discussed ideas being debated on the topic
of border and port-of-entry security is the idea of border
agency consolidation. And the most talked about border agency
consolidation proposal, although we have not yet seen one from
the administration, would combine the Customs Service, INS and
the Border Patrol into one agency under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Justice.
I find this proposal to be extremely troubling.
Unfortunately, this type of a border agency consolidation plan
would not improve but, in fact, exacerbate current border
problems. The management of the Justice Department and its
recent highly visible errors indicate that the lack of a sound
organizational structure with regard to the border security
agencies currently under its jurisdiction needs to be looked at
very carefully.
Consolidating these three organizations would take
attention away from critical homeland security priorities. Each
one of these agencies' missions is very unique and it should
remain within their current agency structure. Ignoring each
agency's field of expertise will lead to losing the expertise
that agency currently possesses.
Customs personnel expertise include using advanced manifest
information on goods to improve targeting systems to detect
questionable shipments as well as deploying state-of-the-art
inspection technology and advanced computer systems at land
borders, at airports and at seaports.
Another popular argument in favor of consolidation involves
the perceived lack of intelligence-sharing between border
security agencies. Since September 11th, Customs and INS
receive FBI intelligence briefings. These briefings should have
been happening on a regular basis even before September 11th.
But these briefings demonstrate that consolidation isn't
necessary to improve intelligence-sharing. There are other ways
to do it and there needs to be other ways to do it.
In Customs' case, no one doubts that the level of
conveyances of cargo and of passengers has increased
dramatically, but unfortunately, its resources have not kept
pace. In fact, Customs' internal review of staffing done over a
year ago, which they call the resource allocation model or RAM,
shows that Customs needs over 14,000 additional positions just
to fill its basic mission, and that was before September 11th.
For instance, with increased funding, modern technologies
such as the VACIS, which is the vehicle and cargo inspection
systems, could be acquired. However, adequate and consistent
funding to purchase, to operate, and to maintain these
technologies has not been forthcoming. The President's fiscal
year 2003 budget requests a token increase from last year's
appropriations and is simply inadequate to meet the needs of
the Customs personnel.
The recent deployment of over 700 unarmed National Guard
troops to our borders clearly shows the need for more Customs
personnel. These troops need to be removed from the borders and
quickly replaced with highly trained Customs personnel.
Last year, Congress acknowledged the shortage of staffing
and resources by appropriating $245 million for Customs
staffing and for technology, and these were included in the
Department of Defense appropriations.
We urge the Congress to again increase the funds available
for additional inspectors and equipment in areas around the
country that are experiencing these severe shortages. The 12
and 16-hour shifts and working 6 and 7 days in a row, which Ms.
Tischler testified to, cannot continue without putting the
safety, the health and the effectiveness of the Customs
inspectors who are doing this work at risk.
In addition to appropriations, Customs also receives funds
from the COBRA user fee account. This funds all inspectional
personnel overtime as well as approximately 1,100 Customs
positions across the country. This account is currently at a
point where there is a significant shortfall expected in fiscal
year 2002. To help remedy this problem, the President's fiscal
year 2003 budget proposes to temporarily increase two COBRA
fees to raise an additional $250 million for personnel overtime
and resource needs. Unfortunately, Congress has been extremely
reluctant in the past to raise these fees, so it seems unlikely
that this additional money will ever materialize. The COBRA
fund is currently set to expire on September 30, 2003, unless
it is reauthorized by Congress before then. COBRA must be
reauthorized or Congress must appropriate additional funds to
make up for the loss of these user fees in order for Customs to
continue to be able to effectively deliver its mission.
I thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and
look forward to any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kelley follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you very much. As I said earlier, I hope
both you and Mr. Bonner will communicate to your members the
appreciation on behalf of Members of Congress, and also the
American people, for all the overtime hours, for the hard work
that you have been giving on the border at this critical time
of our Nation's need. You had been doing it before September
11th, but everybody is aware of it now and the overtime
pressure is very much appreciated. And we have met lots of your
members and agents at the different borders. I asked them to
testify at different field hearings, and it has been a great
learning experience for us, too, to see it firsthand what you
do and the challenges.
Ms. Kelley. Thank you very much.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Bonner.
Mr. Bonner. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
on behalf of the National Border Patrol Council, which
represents over 9,000 nonsupervisory Border Patrol employees,
thank you for this opportunity to present our views on steps
that can be taken to improve security and efficiency at our
Nation's borders and ports of entry.
The recent events involving the INS has given new life to
many proposals for organizational change, some beneficial and
some detrimental. Some of these would effectively eliminate the
INS, while others would absorb all or part of it into larger
consolidated agencies. There are other proposals that would
improve border security technologies. One of these would
enhance the ability of the INS to retain its single greatest
asset, experienced personnel, by authorizing an increase in the
pay level of border agents and immigration inspectors.
This brings me to the most important point I wish to make
this morning. The biggest problems facing the INS will not be
solved by moving boxes around on an organizational chart or
enhancing technology. In our view, the solution lies in two
primary areas: one, holding senior managers directly
accountable for their actions and/or inaction; and two,
addressing the staggering attrition rate within the INS.
Accountability of high level managers must be established
quickly in order to restore public confidence and employee
morale. Recent calls for authority to terminate the employment
of rank-and-file employees without regard to due process are
misinformed. Federal managers have always had the ability to
terminate the employment of any employee for misconduct or poor
performance and routinely exercise this power.
Depriving employees of due process protections would do
nothing to enhance accountability, but would certainly
exacerbate an attrition rate that is already unacceptably high.
According to statistics compiled by INS, the attrition rate for
Border Patrol agents is currently about 15 percent and will
probably rise to 20 percent by the end of the fiscal year.
Among immigration inspectors, the current attrition rate is
10 percent and may rise to 15 percent before the fiscal year is
over. In our view, a key element of improving security at our
Nation's borders is addressing the three main causes of
attrition: low pay, limited lateral and promotional transfer
opportunities, and lack of job satisfaction.
The National Border Patrol Council has long supported the
goal of separating immigration enforcement and immigration
service functions. While there will always be a need for
coordination between these two functions, it seems clear that
greater mission clarity for each is likely to improve the
effectiveness of both.
The various consolidation proposals, on the other hand, do
not have our support. While on the surface it might appear that
such measures would enhance coordination and efficiency, a
closer examination shows that they would have the opposite
effect by creating unwieldy bureaucracies. There are over 45
Federal agencies that have some homeland security
responsibility as well as thousands of State and local
agencies.
In retrospect, it is obvious that none of the consolidation
proposals being discussed would have prevented the terrorist
attacks of September 11th. The most important step that can be
taken to safeguard against future attacks is the creation of a
computer data base of all suspected terrorists that can be
easily accessed by all law enforcement personnel in the
country. It is much more likely that a terrorist will be
encountered by a law enforcement officer in the months or years
that he or she is living in our country than in the moments
that he or she crosses our borders. Without the tools to
recognize such terrorists, however, it is doubtful that they
will be detained when they are encountered.
As this subcommittee and Congress seek ways to enhance
border security and find solutions for the frustrating problems
at the INS, we urge you not to lose sight of the thousands of
agents, inspectors and other employees who dedicate themselves
to the difficult, dangerous and often thankless task of
enforcing the law along our Nation's borders. As limited
Federal dollars are being committed to border security
initiatives, some of those funds must be directed toward
keeping these experienced employees on the job.
I again thank you for the opportunity to address this
subcommittee and look forward to answering any questions that
you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bonner follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you very much for your testimony. Mr.
Koch.
Mr. Koch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The World Shipping
Council represents the international liner shipping industry,
and what the members of this industry do is they carry about
two-thirds of the value of all of America's oceanborne
commerce. To give you a perspective, in 2001 that was 4.8
million containers of export cargo going through our ports, 7.8
million containers of import cargo coming through our ports.
Another way to think it, $1.1 billion worth of goods moving in
and out of U.S. ports every single day, which goes back to the
point both of you gentlemen made about the importance of trade
and what is at issue here.
On September 11th we were all faced with the
vulnerabilities of a free society and what America is looking
at here. In the aviation context we saw what happened when four
planes were hijacked, the people who were killed. From just a
transportation perspective, the aviation industry was up and
running--starting to be up and running 3 days after September
11th.
When you look at the ocean shipping industry, the container
industry in this situation, if there were four containers which
had an incident on a single day, the government's response now
is not sufficiently well organized to get trade up and running
in 3 days. The response, as Commissioner Bonner and the
Commandant of the Coast Guard has said, would be we will close
our ports. In essence, our response is we are going to blockade
ourselves.
It is incumbent upon the government to develop the
organizational structure and the measures necessary to put in
place to make sure that we don't do that, because all that does
is make our industry a bigger target for terrorists because of
the economic damage that would result from such an event.
So our position is that this issue is not just about
transportation. This issue is about trade. It's about the
economy, the economic health of our country, jobs. And not just
in our country, but with all of our trading partners as well.
After September 11th, as was stated earlier, when the
Canadian border was shut down for a couple of days, or at least
slowed down for a couple of days, the auto plants in Detroit
almost were forced to close. It is not just auto plants in
Detroit that depend on Canadian commerce, it is all of American
commerce that is hooked into this intermodal international
transportation network. There are many aspects of protecting
this infrastructure from terrorism. There is dealing with the
ships, there is dealing with the ports and the marine
terminals, there is credentialing people, there is the
information process about what information does the government
want, when does it need it? And there is also the container
itself.
Let me talk for a second about the government. I think
there is pretty good understanding being developed for what the
vision ought to be for international containerized shipments,
and the vision is that we ought to have a secure supply chain,
we ought to have an information process where the government
has enough information about a container that if it has reason
to want to inspect it, it can do so at the port of loading
before it is put on a ship and sent to the United States.
Inspecting containers in the U.S. port of discharge is the
wrong time to do it, and it is the wrong place to do it.
So as we go through this, what do we need to do? We need to
define and develop the rules and regulations that will create a
secure supply chain. And at customs the CTPAT initiative that
Bonnie Tischler talked about is an example of doing. We need to
test technology development standards and implement them. We
need to credential people. We need to develop an information
system that allows the government to determine what containers
need this inspection before loading and have those capabilities
both here and abroad.
Now I recognize this is a difficult issue and our
government is struggling with it. Some of the struggle is just
because the issue is a hard one to deal with. But part of the
struggle is also because our government is not sufficiently
well organized to deal with the issue itself. I would say it
has done a fine job on dealing with the issue of ships. The
Coast Guard has shown leadership, both of addressing port
security and vessel security in U.S. ports and at the
International Maritime Organization, because responsibility is
clear, they are focused on it and they are doing it.
We're doing a better job at port security, but that isn't
moving quite as well along. But to undertake the steps
necessary to secure the international container cargo security
issue is where we are really, I think, in need of better focus.
We have the Customs Service who regulates trade. They have come
up with a CSI initiative and the CTPAT initiative. We have the
Coast Guard who deals with ships, but also trying to deal with
ports and other issues at the IMO, and now within DOT we are
standing up the Transportation Security Administration where
this mission has not been terribly well defined.
The U.S. Government needs focus and organizational clarity.
Furthermore, we cannot persuade foreign governments to join us
in doing this unless we have decided clearly within our own
government what we're willing to accomplish and can speak with
one coherent voice. Admiral Loy, Commandant of the Coast Guard,
said 2 weeks ago when he spoke before the Port Association,
we're talking about what we ought to do rather than getting on
with the job of getting it done. We believe the Admiral is
correct.
Some of the questions that I would submit kind of reflect
this: Who is responsible for the information systems that will
support enhanced security analysis? Customs, which the Senate
bill addresses? Is it DOT, which the House bill addresses? What
are the government's informational requirements and who is
going to decide what those requirements are? Who is responsible
for setting cargo security rules? Who is responsible for
determining how we manage cargo security and trade if there is
an incident? How are we going to manage and make sure we don't
have the blockade scenario that I mentioned at the beginning of
my comments?
Finally, to conclude--as our testimony does, which I ask to
be put a part of the record--that four principles be kept in
mind as we do all this.
First, we need to act and get legislation to facilitate
this process. We need a unified strategy. One person speaking
on the issue. We need clearly mandatory rules so that everybody
in the supply chains know what they have to do and are held to
it. We need a security regime that allows for a free and
efficient flow of trade. And finally we must reflect on the
fact that if we're going to effectively extend our borders
beyond U.S. jurisdiction, we need international cooperation. We
need to coordinate with our trading partners, and so we will
need a coherent international effort as well. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Koch follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you very much. Mr. Simpson.
Mr. Simpson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I actually think I
could have gotten a better seat to a Redskins game.
Mr. Souder. If you wanted to see them play.
Mr. Simpson. I'm going to echo some of what my colleagues
have said. Importers and exporters are well aware, and have for
years been concerned about cargo and port security, primarily
because of the potential for merchandise pilferage and also to
support our government's effort to keep illegal drugs out of
cargo containers.
Since September 11th, we've been acutely aware of the
potential for legitimate trade to be used to conceal entry into
the United States of dangerous persons or weapons of mass
destruction. However, we think it's important to emphasize the
contribution that our international trade makes to our national
security.
The United States is the strongest Nation on earth, not
because we are the most populous Nation, not because we're the
best endowed with natural resources or, as we like to think,
because God likes us best, but because we're the richest Nation
on earth. That is what gives us the power to project our
policies militarily and diplomatically around the world. Anyone
who talks about shutting down our trade with other countries in
the interest of national security simply just doesn't
understand the basis for our national security, which is our
wealth. And our international trade makes a significant
contribution to the economy of the United States.
So the critical thing is to balance security at the borders
with maintenance of a robust international trade with other
countries.
We think there are a couple of keys to doing that. One is
information. It's critical that our government get information
and get it in an electronic format. Whenever a piece of
information required by the government has to be delivered on
paper, there's a significant risk that the piece of paper in a
cargo container will not be at the same place at the same time
and that creates the likelihood that a container of potentially
hazardous materials will come to rest at a place where it
wasn't expected to be and it isn't prepared to handle it.
There is also the fact that holographic certifications or
signatures are simply not as easy to authenticate as electronic
signatures, so from a security standpoint alone, having
information in an electronic format is critical.
A second thing, and this was referred to by Mr. Koch, is
that there are 40 agencies of the Federal Government that
regulate trade at the border. A simple shipment of fresh
strawberries from Mexico into the United States involves
information collection by seven different agencies.
Our government needs to have one agency acting as an agent
on behalf of all other parts of the Federal Government as the
information collector. We recommend that be the Customs
Service, but we are agnostic on that. The critical thing is
that there be one window through which information can be
transmitted, and there has to be the potential for that
information to be shared and compared among all of the agencies
that collect it.
A third critical thing about the information is that we
need to go to the best source. It is simply not feasible to
levy more stringent requirements on carriers for the accuracy
of manifest information. Carriers will never be able to
authenticate the description of what's in a sealed cargo
container. They can only do that if they had the opportunity to
open it and examine the contents, and that's simply not
feasible. So it is critical that our government look to the
best source of information and not simply impose a reporting
burden on the party that is nearest at hand, whether that be
the importer or carrier.
A fourth point we would like to make about information is
that the security response to terrorism, the commercial
response, if you will, like the military response, has to be
multilateral. We can't begin the security process at our
borders. There are a couple of things that we think could be
done to improve our security by pushing the perimeter out
beyond our border.
For example, we would recommend that the trading
governments of the world develop unique consignment reference
identifiers for cargo so that a shipment of goods can be
tracked all the way through from the exporter to the
destination in the United States with a single identifying
code.
A second thing we would recommend, and here I'm going to
differ from everyone else who has spoken before, is that our
government look a little bit differently at how we provide for
security for trade coming across the border with Canada. In the
interests of emphasizing a point, Mr. Chairman, I'm going to
exaggerate it. I think any dollar the U.S. Government spends on
personnel or security equipment on our border with Canada is a
dollar that is misspent. As an amateur historian, I will tell
you that one of the things I have learned is that successful
generals often win their battles by selecting intelligently the
place where the battle is fought. A 4,000-mile-long land border
with Canada is not the place to draw a security perimeter.
So I think it is time we sit down with the government of
Canada and look at the functions we perform on our border. That
border has not for years performed a significant revenue
function. It's not a good place to enforce our health and
safety regulations. Hundreds of thousands of Canadians and
Americans across the border every day. They drink the water,
they eat the food, they breathe the air, they ride on public
transportation, they drive on highways 5 feet away from 18-
wheelers with no thought that they have entered a more risky
environment. And yet we spend over $200 million a year here in
the United States to enforce our health and safety regulations
at the border.
So I think one of the things we need to do is to consider
working with the government of Canada to create what I would
call a zone of confidence in which we're satisfied that not
only the health and safety standards on both sides of the
border are comparable, and this is a fact that Canadian and
American citizens de facto already recognize, but also that the
immigration and policing functions on both sides of the border
are effective and able to keep terrorists out of both the
United States and Canada. Because I can tell you this: any
dangerous person who can find a way into Canada will be able to
cross our border. There is simply no way we can prevent that
from happening.
So the critical thing is to spend the scarce resources we
have in those choke points that are the entry points into North
America. The airport in Toronto, the airport at Montreal. The
airports in New York and Atlanta. If we can put our resources
into those choke points and pull them off the land border that
we can't defend anyway, we believe we can do a much more
effective job of not only facilitating trade but guaranteeing
the security of all North Americans. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Simpson follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you very much. And our last witness will
be brought home by a fellow Hoosier. Batting cleanup is Mr.
Steve Russell, representing the trucking industry.
Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Representative
Cummings. My name is Steve Russell. I'm the founder and
chairman and CEO of the Celadon Group, a trucking company based
in Indianapolis. Celadon was established in 1985, and is the
largest transporter of truckload freight between the United
States, Canada and Mexico. We own and operate over 2,700
tractors and 8,000 trailers and employ about 2900 people.
Today I also appear before you as a member of the American
Trucking Association or ATA. I appreciate the opportunity to
speak to the subcommittee today and I want to commend you for
holding these hearings at a very timely point and looking at
ways of possibly further ensuring the security of operations
and the efficiency of our country's land border ports of entry.
Since our inception, Celadon has handled more 1.3 million
truckload crossings between the United States, Canada and
Mexico, with crossing roughly 2,400 trailers per week at the
Southern border and 800 per week on the Northern border.
Trucking plays a critical role in trade between these countries
by moving 71 percent of the value of freight between Canada and
the United States and 81 percent between Mexico and the United
States.
ATA and the trucking industry have been busy working with a
number of government agencies, such as Customs, INS, and DOT to
improve the security of motor carrier operations across our
land borders. A more detailed description of these efforts is
included in my written remarks that I have provided to the
subcommittee. Such joint industry-government efforts will
continue to work well to eradicate the potential use of
legitimate commercial conveyances for moving illegal cargo and
aliens across our Northern and Southern borders.
My comments will focus on two issues before the committee.
One, the potential reorganization and consolidation of U.S.
Government agencies operating at U.S. ports of entry and, two,
the importance of working closely with Canada and Mexico to
further improve the efficiency of operations and security of
our borders.
ATA supports any viable realignment that can improve the
operation of the U.S. border agencies to increase security and
efficiency at our ports of entry. ATA's concerns are not
related to the structure of organizations, however, but more in
the processing of information systems that exist between the
agencies. Therefore, any restructuring effort should focus on
fixing the systems for processing and sharing information among
the agencies.
However, members of the trade community are concerned that
recent energies and efforts focused on improving Customs
clearance and other clearance for cargo and people entering in
and exiting the United States could be derailed. Perhaps more
important, Commissioners Bonner and Ziglar from Customs and INS
have asked for nongovernmental interests to provide feedback
and input into the development of improved systems and
technologies. ATA is actively participating in these efforts.
I would now like to talk about NAFTA and our relations with
our NAFTA partners. Both Canada and Mexico, our largest and
second largest trading partners respectively, play a critical
role in our economic well-being. Bilateral trade with Mexico
has tripled while U.S.-Canada trade has more than doubled since
NAFTA began. The recently announced border security plans
established with Canada and Mexico have launched a new basis
for improving the operation and security of our mutual borders.
These plans compel our respective governments to improve
harmonization of border operations, improve our exchange of
information, and coordinate infrastructure development. ATA
supports the establishment of a Northern American perimeter
zone for security between Canada and the United States and
believes that Mexico should be part of such deliberations as
well. Such an approach would allow for protection of the
external borders of North America, therefore alleviating
security pressures constraining our land border operations.
Any efforts to enhance security of the movement of cargo
across our common borders should not only focus on the trucking
industry, but also include the movement of freight by rail and
railcars or intermodal by rail.
On behalf of the ATA and its members, I urge the
subcommittee, in conjunction with other House committees with
oversight of border agencies, to look at the needs of our ports
of entry. We must establish appropriate levels of resources,
physical infrastructure, investments and technology to improve
security and efficiency. Before a decision is reached to
reorganize and realign border agencies into a single
department, let's make sure that we have exhausted all other
remedies.
Trade with Canada and Mexico is essential to our economic
well-being. Therefore, it is critical that the movement of
cargo across borders be done in an efficient, secure manner
that relies on improved communications and coordination among
our border agencies.
Mr. Chairman, ATA looks forward to continuing our
cooperation with those authorities charged with securing our
Nation against future terrorist threats. ATA understands the
role trucking must play to ensure our national security in this
newly changed landscape. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Russell follows:]
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Mr. Souder. Thank you very much. One of the frustrations
that you have when you plunge in an area, it reminds me of when
I was in high school, my dad found this plaque that he thought
was hilarious and he brought it home from vacation to the band
director. And we all had to sit every time we had band and look
at this plaque, and he thought it was hilarious. None of us got
it. It said, ``Why can't all life's problems come when we are
young and know all the answers?'' .
The older you get, the more you realize the truth of that
statement. And the more you plunge into this, the more
difficult it is. And let me--we will go at least two rounds
here because I have quite a few questions and will submit.
But let me first start with Ms. Kelley and Mr. Bonner. We
are looking in our report that I chaired with Parliamentarian
Susan Wayland of Windsor the U.S.-Canada parliamentary subgroup
on transborder issues. And Windsor-Detroit presents a huge
problem area of how to locate enough facilities to keep the
traffic moving. And one of the discussions, also there are
concerns on the Canadian side about moving over the bridge, if
there are safety concerns. And so they've been, as well as
other locations, pushing for facilities on the Canadian side.
What is the position on either of your unions of having any
of your personnel based in--across the border and what concerns
do you have about that?
Ms. Kelley. NTEU currently represents some Customs
employees who do in fact work in the preclearance areas in
Canada, and so they are there, and there are processes for how
it's determined which employees will go there, for how long,
and other safety concerns. There is an issue over there
concerning their inability to carry weapons, which in the
United States, of course, Customs inspectors are armed.
But on the bigger issue of whether that should be expanded
to more ports, I really cannot give a NTEU position at this
time primarily because we have had, other than your statement,
no briefings from Customs on anything that has even been
considered in this area. It is something that I would like to
seriously consider and needs to be addressed one way or the
other as we hear about all the problems that the Customs as
well as trade and the government are facing. But without a lot
more information, at this point I would have to delay my
response, but I would look forward to the opportunity for the
briefing and for more information actually about your meetings
because I just don't have that information.
Mr. Souder. Particularly as we look at even more complex
questions of if we would move to focus at the origin of seaport
traffic, as opposed to looking at it here, these become big
questions on the involvement of U.S. personnel and what
restrictions we have and the safety and the clearances. Even at
the Ottawa airport, which has been traditional, there are
concerns about safety, about the ability of both, as I
understand, both INS and Customs, even if you spot somebody who
is a potential terrorist, and they get any idea that we are
spotting them, they can move and it may take multiple levels of
the Canadian Government, which is the most cooperative of
governments and the most similar to our system, to respond, and
we quite frankly usually lose them.
RCMP has been cooperative. Other agencies have been less
so, I think it would be fair to say. Mr. Bonner.
Mr. Bonner. As Ms. Kelley says, the biggest concern we have
is the inability of our officers to be armed in Canada, and
that terrorists and other criminals are going to be armed. So
in order to defend ourselves and to defend the public around
us, I think that is critical. So there has to be some way to
overcome that if we are going to have our officers operating in
foreign countries.
Mr. Souder. Would pursuit be a question as well?
Mr. Bonner. Depending on how it's structured. I mean, if
they're going deeper into the foreign country, then obviously
it is their problem and not a problem of ours. If we have the
ability to shut down the lanes at the ports of entry, I don't
think it would be a problem coming into the United States.
Mr. Souder. Because we have had this hot pursuit question
at Port Angeles where we caught the millennium bomber. They
went beyond their bounds and took it into their own hands or we
would have lost the millennium bomber as well. These are tough
questions at the borders that your agents are dealing with:
Doing what they sense is the right thing to do versus doing
what they are told they are supposed to do.
One other question I wanted to ask both of you on upgrading
the data base and automated systems: Do you believe that there
is sufficient progress being made and could you give us any
insights into the ACE system?
Ms. Kelley. The problem with the ACE system, all along in
the very beginning the funding was not provided to get it off
to a jump start. The information that I have to date on the ACE
system is, as Bonnie Tischler testified, it is still
progressing. It is still a funding issue, but it is one that I
believe will address most, if not all, of the issues that we
consistently hear identified that need to be addressed in the
trade area.
I think everyone wishes it could happen in 6 months, not in
4 or 5 years. That has been the interest from the very
beginning because of the stretch and the stress that is being
put on the ACS system, as well as the employees that are trying
to operate in that environment. It would be a big help to them
being able to more effectively doing their jobs. If there was a
way to speed up the funding, assuming that this data base work
and all the technology work could be done, and I think it could
be done faster than 4 years if the funding were provided, that
would be, I think, a help not just to Customs, but to everyone
who is depending on it.
Mr. Souder. Do you have any comments on that, Mr. Bonner?
Mr. Bonner. No, I believe that----
Mr. Souder. We will give you some written questions on the
INS clearance processes on the visas and see if you have any--
or either of you can in the additional days here for testimony
get any input from field agents that they may have about some
concerns about where we have look at how to make the systems
better. We are not looking how to set us back but how to make
them more effective.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you all for your testimony. It has been
very interesting. Mr. Bonner, what is the rationale for
limiting the lateral transfer opportunities for personnel along
the southwest border?
Mr. Bonner. Cost savings. If they hire new people and put
them in the desirable locations, they don't have to pay the
transfer costs of experienced personnel. But in the end, you
end up paying more because your experienced personnel leave
because they can't get out of their initial duty assignment.
Mr. Cummings. Chairman Souder has mentioned offering
incentives for language proficiency, as in Spanish, for
example. Do you have a view on this?
Mr. Bonner. Actually, that has been authorized since the
passage of the Federal Law Enforcement Pay Reform Act of 1990
or 1991. But it's never been paid. It's discretionary with the
agency. They have the ability to pay a 5 percent foreign
language bonus, but have chosen never to pay a penny to their
employees.
Mr. Souder. We also heard at the Quebec border that a
number of--I can't remember if it was INS or Customs person
actually grew up in a French-speaking household and couldn't
meet the standards even though his first language was French,
because it's State Department criteria for very formal French.
And that one of the things when we are looking at languages is
because we focus so much on Spanish, even in the Quebec border,
you would think we would have somebody who could be certified
to speak French.
So one of the things, in addition to hearing here that they
aren't giving the bonuses, is is the standard expectation so
high the agencies don't go after it, in addition to they don't
believe they are going to get the money? This has become huge
in the question of Arabic, Farsi, other languages where we
basically get on a phone and you try to find the service that
can interpret what that package says in a car or a truck, which
probably is not written in English.
Ms. Kelley. If I could add in the Customs Service, NTEU has
been successful in negotiating with Customs over establishing
some criteria for payments of the foreign language awards for
recognition of that. And you are right, it is under the State
Department criteria, but we have been successful in setting up
joint criteria, and there are persons in the Customs Service
receiving these awards, perhaps not to the extent we would like
to see it paid, but Customs is making those payments to
employees today.
Mr. Cummings. There was another part to my question I did
not finish, so we have been answering a partial question. I was
just wondering, with that incentive in mind, do you all see
that as a way of retaining people and attracting folk? I know
the problems that you just stated.
Ms. Kelley. In my experience, it is not anything that
necessarily serves as a huge retention factor. It's not a high
percentage of salary or anything that really, you know, would
be a retention incentive, for example. And for the most part,
we see them existing on the southwest border mostly in the
language of Spanish. I really haven't seen statistics for the
different languages, and in light of this conversation, I am
going to get more information about what languages employees do
have and where they are receiving this. I will also check on
their belief concerning its retention value. I think it
probably needs to be a higher percentage available to them and
more actual funds available in order for that to really be a
factor. But I'll check on that and get back to you, Mr.
Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. I appreciate that. I was getting ready to ask
Mr. Bonner did he know what percentage of the immigration
inspectors on the southwest border speak Spanish. Do you have
any idea?
Mr. Bonner. All Border Patrol agents are required to be
somewhat fluent in Spanish. They undergo a number of weeks of
foreign language training and are tested twice during their
probationary period, and if they are not proficient enough,
their employment is terminated. Similarly, immigration
inspectors all receive foreign language training. So the
percentage along the Southern border is 99 percent who speak
Spanish very well. And obviously on the Northern border, you
have folks who are fluent in French.
I would say that it would be a help if we could get this
mandatory to have this 5 percent bonus in retaining people. But
bear in mind that the differential between the base pay of
these employees, both the Border Patrol agents, immigration
inspectors, and Customs inspectors is far behind that of most
other Federal law enforcement agents.
The journeyman level is GS-9 compared to GS-12 for most
other agencies. When you factor in the differences between both
base pay and the overtime pay, which for the higher-graded
agents is obviously paid at a higher level, you are looking in
the neighborhood of about $25,000 per year.
So it is no surprise that a lot of those agents are looking
for better-paying jobs. The fact that so many Border Patrol
agents are going over to the Air Marshal Program now is only
indicative of this dissatisfaction with the job which has been
simmering under the surface for all of these years. They have
just been waiting for someone else to open up jobs. Now that
they have, fully half of the Border Patrol agents have applied
for those jobs and----
Mr. Cummings. Half?
Mr. Bonner. Fully half. The INS estimates that the
attrition rate will hit 20 percent by the end of the year. We
believe that it will be closer to 25 percent. That is one out
of every four agents will have left, primarily for the Air
Marshal Service.
Mr. Cummings. So what are you doing to replace them? I
mean, do you have an aggressive program?
Mr. Bonner. Yes. It has an aggressive hiring program, but
their biggest problem is hanging on to the people that they
have. And unless that is addressed, we can hire from now until
the end of the beginning of the next millennium, and we are
still going to be having this problem.
Mr. Cummings. What does a GS-9 make?
Mr. Bonner. A GS-9 makes in the neighborhood of mid-30's.
Mr. Cummings. Uh-huh. Just one other question.
Do you know, Mr. Bonner, whether within the INS leadership
there is any kind of support for a single terrorist data base?
Mr. Bonner. I am unaware. I don't know.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Does anybody else?
All right, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Simpson, as to your Canada proposal, do you
have a similar feeling about Mexico?
Mr. Simpson. I think, Mr. Chairman, the logical extension
of my argument is that at some point we would have to consider
the same sort of arrangement with Mexico, because that border
is equally difficult to patrol. And I think the Government of
Mexico, frankly, being aware that the idea of a zone of
confidence between the United States and Canada has been
considered, is interested in not being left out.
What I have learned is that they realize that the potential
for the United States and Canada to enter into that sort of an
arrangement is more advanced. Mexico understands that
arrangement will come first between the United States and
Canada. They just want to be on the same track, even if they
are farther behind on the track. They would like to be sure
that they are on the same track.
Mr. Souder. I think it is--a couple of things are
relatively safe to say, because one is--is that most of us are
aware that there are differences in the north and south border,
but politically to separate the two is almost impossible. It
has been a stumbling block for years, long before September
11th. And with the shifting population mixes in the United
States, it is even more politically difficult, without
enunciating further; that regardless whether it is based on
merit or perceived discrimination, that--a second thing is that
we are trying to move with the Canadians toward more
commonality, but to some degree this threatens Canadian self-
identity as much as it does American self-identity. In other
words, they are proud of their visa differences and their
immigration differences.
They have made some movement, but when we were up in Ottawa
and met with the Attorney General and the parliamentarians,
they have made some movement, but they aren't really interested
in, quote, becoming like the United States and our more
restrictive immigration policies, which is a huge stumbling
block.
Furthermore, in spite of efforts, and we have made some
progress, they have substantially different opinions on
narcotics, particularly on BC Bud, which is going on the
streets of Fort Wayne and New York for more than cocaine right
now because of its potency. And fortunately they haven't taken
the more radical steps they were looking at in some of these
areas.
Almost all of our Ecstacy is coming from Holland via
Canada, and while we are trying to move as far in that
direction as possible, and we need to work with them because I
understand the difficulty at the border, not to mention
localized issues, like I said, like cheese, the problems in the
Vancouver Harbor reception and point of origin of what they are
willing to do as what we might be able to do, Long Beach, Los
Angeles or Seattle, with point of origin, are very difficult
questions.
We are similar, and the goal in NAFTA is to push us more
toward similarities and see the advantage of that cooperation,
but there are some substantial difficulties. But organizations
like yours pushing us in that direction hopefully will help do
that.
Mr. Simpson. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the
things that we need to do to create the zone of confidence
between the United States and Canada can be accomplished
without either nation sacrificing its political sovereignty. I
think it is a really wonderful state of affairs that the United
States and Canada have the luxury of disagreeing over soft wood
lumber and cheese. That is, to me, a delightful situation.
I think the problems that lie between us and the sort of
common security arrangement that we need to create are entirely
manageable both politically and diplomatically and
administratively, and there is no reason not to move forward
quickly.
Mr. Souder. I wanted to also followup with Mr. Russell,
because have you had experiences at both borders. Do you see--
what kind of differences do you see that impact your firm
differently on the north and south borders?
Mr. Russell. We have seen a change over the past 17 years.
In the past 2 years, the Mexican border has advanced in terms
of infrastructure on the Mexican side rapidly. It is--there are
differences in several core areas. Today a U.S. driver can
cross into Canada, and a Canadian driver can cross into the
United States.
But along the lines of the point you were just making, Mr.
Chairman, there are differences. If a U.S. driver has been
indicted on a nonpayment of alimony, as an example, in his
county in Oklahoma, he is not allowed into Canada, whereas the
U.S. laws and the--the immigration permission for Canadians
crossing into the United States is different, and those
differences basically have affected the way the borders have
operated from a trucking standpoint in a relatively meaningful
way.
The flow of freight between the two borders on the Canadian
side after September 11th was quite difficult, for perhaps the
next month or two, with the extensive delays, 20 hours, 15
hours, long lines of traffic. But due to the efforts of Customs
and Immigration over the past several months, that has improved
to almost the way it was before September 11th.
The Mexican border, again tremendous efforts by the Customs
people, increasing the amount of intensity of reviews, and yet
essentially very minor delays compared to prior to September
11th.
So the borders are different in many regards, but I think
the philosophy that Mr. Simpson was talking about of creating a
North American perimeter zone in certain areas makes a
tremendous amount of sense.
Mr. Souder. Mr. Johnson, could you talk a little bit about
the challenges we face on the southern border, because in the
north I would assume that shipping is a little more seasonal;
not completely, but a little more seasonal. The water sides of
Mexico are complex. That is where a lot of our narcotics are
coming in. The immigration question is a lot, because Mexico
also can't control its south border. You referred to Panama and
things moving through there.
Could you talk about your confidence in some of the
security systems and how this would work----
Mr. Johnson. Sure.
Mr. Souder [continuing]. Both from the commerce standpoint
and a potential terrorist?
Mr. Johnson. I think if we use the term ``security
system,'' we are being very generous in describing it as such,
because it is not much of a system nor very secure. And I don't
think there is a quick fix. I mean, it is human nature. We
would like to get the quick fix. If we sit back and look at
this objectively, the Al Qaeda members who tried to come into
the United States came in two ways. They came in through the
visa waiver program in Europe, and they went into Canada and
then came in through Canada. We don't have any evidence of them
coming across the Southern border.
I think, as I have talked to different people both in the
counterterrorism community from State, from Customs, from FBI,
and from some other agencies, I keep hearing the same thing,
which is nobody has really sat down and agreed upon, within the
U.S. Government, what secure border means, and so therefore we
are pursuing a goal without even having it defined.
And I think there are legitimate concerns about how can you
ensure that the commerce can move, because if--if anybody has
sat and watched a container being loaded--I have been in Colon,
Panama, and watched these things being stacked. I guess the
only thing perhaps more exciting than that is sitting at an
airport watching an X-ray machine. They are both very boring
activities. It is repetition. And I think within this we can
get to a point where we can put in place some screening
systems. I mean, the cargo systems are being developed, but to
get those developed technologically where they will process
cargo containers at a very efficient rate is going to require
an investment of resources that the private sector is not going
to match. That is where government is going to have to step in
and help move that along.
I don't think we are going to ever stop the illegal
immigration of people coming across the border, because
particularly in the Texas-New Mexico area and Arizona, it is
too wide open. There are ways that people can get in there. But
the threat that is posed from people trying to take advantage
of the commercial transactions to me is one where we can use a
combination of human behavior and incentives governing human
behavior, making sure that people have an incentive to do a
good job and equipping them with the technology to do it.
That said, getting that done, I think we are looking at a
fairly 5 or 6-year effort at a minimum. That is assuming we
commit the resources and we have a vision of what we are doing.
What I am telling you now, based upon the facts here in
government are telling me, there is no vision, and there is no
consensus, and until you get those two issues addressed, I
don't think you can deal with the others.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Yes. I just have just a few more questions.
Ms. Kelley, you talked about the briefings and joint
operations like intelligence collection and analysis teams. You
talked about how they had improved interagency cooperation. Do
you think more of these briefings would cure some of the
problems that proponents of consolidating agencies are
attempting to achieve?
Ms. Kelley. I think they would definitely help. I think
they are not the only answer. The issue of a data base, a
shared data base, that all law enforcement agencies have access
to is one that I think needs to be followed through on, and it
is one that I hear repeatedly is kind of the missing link for
the front-line employees out in the field who are actually
working the borders and the seaports and the airports, that is
what they need is a single source of information for easy
checking and access. That doesn't exist.
The briefings that I spoke about occur at the much higher
levels here in Washington, DC, between the agencies. And I know
that before September 11th, Customs, for example, was not
included in those briefings, and they are today, and that has
made a big difference in the communication that we see
obviously on this important issue.
Mr. Cummings. So you don't see reorganization as being
necessary at all?
Ms. Kelley. I don't. I think it always makes sense to look
at how agencies are operating, if they are operating
efficiently, but I think to reorganize or to consolidate and
thinking that is the be-all and the end-all is the wrong
answer. I think with everything that the agencies have that
they are faced with today, having to focus their energy instead
on a reorganization about who is in charge and about losing
expertise--I continue to be very worried that each of the
agencies have their very clear areas of expertise which I
believe are undisputed, and to merge those and have them be
diluted, I think, would be a disservice to the taxpayers and
actually go against the goals that those who talk about
consolidation are trying to achieve. It is not about
consolidating, it is about providing the resources to the
agencies to do the areas of expertise that they were formed and
chartered to do many years ago.
Mr. Cummings. These VACIS machines that are sitting and
with nobody trained to use them, are there a lot of instances
of that kind of thing where we have--first of all, is that
pretty widespread, that particular machine?
Ms. Kelly . Yes. There are too many instances where the
equipment is available--either is available and there is not
enough staffing to run it, because you have to be trained to
use it. Is a very intense process, so you need staffing. And so
that is one issue is the staffing. And the second is equipment
that is there, but needs maintenance. It needs to be repaired
in some way. And the resources aren't there to do that, so it
doesn't happen, it doesn't get used.
Mr. Cummings. All right. We have got a vote. But I want to
thank all of you for your testimony, and we will be following
up with some written questions.
Mr. Souder. Thanks. I also want to thank you. I have a
couple of additional questions I want to try to squeeze in
here. Mr. Koch, first I want to thank not only you, but the
others for giving us very specific things to chew on that we
can try to get in the system here.
That in the point of origin, because that was an
interesting concept, I assume that you also--there would be
spot checks in transport, and you are saying the primary should
be at port of origin. To what extent do you think that would be
done by American agents, by--combination with private
companies, and the companies--and representatives of the other
nations at the point of origin?
Mr. Koch. I would agree with Bonni Tischler's comment this
morning. I think it is going to depend on the government and
the port here that the U.S. Government is talking to. It could
very easily be an analogy to the Canadian situation where we
trust Canadian Customs, but would have some U.S. Customs people
there to oversee the job, to look at the advanced data and say,
hey, this one I want to look at; that one is fine, let it go.
I think we have to accept the fact that if we are going to
put people in foreign ports, that they are going to expect
reciprocity, and so we are going to have to be prepared to
offer to foreign governments whatever we expect of them,
because some foreign governments view American exports with
some concern, too. Timothy McVeigh showed you can put something
in a truck or a container and cause a lot of damage with it,
and we cannot be insensitive to the fact that trade is
bilateral, and what is going to be good for us has got to be
good going in both directions.
There may be some countries where there is not effective
cooperation, and then the government will have to figure out,
how do you respond to that? But I think it is going to be a
series of layers. It is going to be things like the TPAT
program, where you find shippers who are willing to secure
their supply chain from the time the container is stuffed
through the transit to the port with the ocean carrier all of
the way through. And for those people who don't participate in
those kinds of programs, there has got to be consequences to
greater risk of being inspected or delayed or whatever. It is
going to be various layers that are going to be the answer to
this. There won't be one single solution.
Mr. Souder. I think the record should show, too, what we
have heard at a couple of the border crossings is that they
actually have, in some cases, more narcotics going across our
direction to Canada than vice versa, as well as money
laundering. Often the BC Bud comes down, and the cocaine goes
back. It isn't just a problem of coming at the United States,
it is what we are putting out. And I think that was well said.
Too often we don't acknowledge that. Everybody else is bad, and
we are not. We have some problems in controlling things here,
too.
I want to briefly--you each made, I believe, some comments
on the mergers. And, I have one other question first. I
believe, Mr. Johnson, you made a reference to the Coast Guard.
What do you think is the single most important issue regarding
maritime security that you believe our government isn't giving
attention to so that as we look at new legislation----
Mr. Johnson. With the Coast Guard you do not have enough
people to do the full inspection of the ships coming into the
ports. That is simply stated. And the reason I favor looking at
some sort of merger and putting these different agencies
together is to harness the resources, to eliminate the
redundancy, and to maximize the efficiency of all of the
personnel.
Mr. Souder. You had a rather interesting alternative,
because, that--that what is unbelievably confusing here is
Coast Guard is under Transportation. Customs is under Treasury.
We heard about the strawberries, which would be Ag, among
others, seven agencies, that--and, of course, INS is Justice.
Part of the reason we have this committee with such broad
oversight, probably the only oversight committee we have pieced
it together. We have all drugs and narcotics because it got
frustrating because it was in 22 different places. But we also
have Commerce in with Justice, in with HHS and Education and
HUD to try to look at different prongs of health and narcotics
policy, but also because when we dealt with Justice issues and
border issues, we can have Commerce underneath it. And this is
just a microcosm of the mess--this is an oversight committee as
well as some authorizing on narcotics. But you propose putting
it all under Commerce where none of it currently is.
Mr. Johnson. I suggested putting it under Treasury, but the
specifics, I think, can be battled over. But I think at the end
of the day, look at it from a military standpoint. Within the
military ultimately when you fight a war, there is a Commander
in Chief. There are other agencies or units that support. And
what you have right now with the U.S. Government in terms of
protecting our borders is there is nobody in charge. There is
no one person who is the CINC with support in command.
Mr. Souder. Would you agree that at a minimum that--your
point in technology is something that just seems stupid, quite
frankly, is that we are having multiple agencies develop
different means to do the same thing; that at the very least
the technology ought to be consolidated.
Mr. Johnson. Absolutely. I mean, immediately.
Mr. Souder. And data collection?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Souder. And if the other parts aren't consolidated,
would you put those under Homeland Security, or would you put
them under Justice?
Mr. Johnson. I think the Homeland Security Agency is a good
concept, but Tom Ridge, unless he has money, he is ineffective.
We watched with the drug czar for years, well-meaning people
who get into that job, but they have no effective control over
DOD, over Department of Justice, etc. So at the end of the day,
the money--you know, the money in this town makes the world go
around. If you get to write the checks, you get to direct the
way the resources go.
So at the end of the day, I think there has to be somebody
who is ultimately accountable to the Congress from a budget
standpoint, because they can also enforce their will with the
money.
Mr. Souder. The functional practicality at the borders,
what we have seen is that INS and Customs agents are sharing
duties; in fact, sometimes flipping who does what at different
points of the day.
But the reason this is going to be so hard--and one of the
things I want to make sure in this committee is that in--it has
actually turned out as we look at terrorism, we are also
following the narcotics question, but that the Coast Guard also
has a search and safety component that historically has been
the biggest. It has a fisheries component. The business
community is going to be very reluctant to have the border
become predominantly oriented toward security as opposed to
trade. Those who are concerned about immigration as opposed to
just terrorists are going to have huge concerns, and that is
another block. Politically I don't really see how--not to
mention just normal institutional committee jurisdiction
problems these things often have. We have massive reports, but
in practicality I just don't see, unless we are under multiple
repeated attacks, that can happen that way.
And to the degree that we can get this scoped in and say,
look, we have to do the technology, we have to do this--this
security background check stuff where agencies--information
floating around everywhere and not consolidated, or the types
of terrible things that you mentioned, not to mention others
that have been in the news media about we have the information,
and it doesn't get into the system. That--we need to do those.
Do any of you have any additional comments you want to make
before we close this down, and then we will also ask additional
written questions. Any additional information that you or
members of your association want to submit, because we are
trying to build the case here, and we know the administration
is debating on some of these things at this time. It is a good
time to weigh in.
Mr. Koch. Fully recognizing, Mr. Chairman, the difficulty
of getting Congress to approve a legislative reorganization
task, I still think there is plenty of issues that where there
is organizational confusion in our government, where you don't
need an act of Congress to get it fixed. The Office of Homeland
Security was created to be a White House staff office. It could
have the power of the White House to say, you have got this,
you have got this, and you got this. And we are glad Governor
Ridge is coming before you, because, I mean, presumably that
office has the authority to make some of the--develop some of
the answers to some of the questions you have heard today,
which is what is the relationship between TSA and the Customs
Service and the Coast Guard? Who owns container security? Who
has got the job of negotiating with the foreign governments?
Who owns the issue?
And while certainly legislation is one way to do it, it is
not the only way to bring some clarity and resolution to the
ambiguity that is holding things up.
Mr. Souder. I will say one of the things that I have
learned in--when we dealt with narcotics overseas, that
automatically takes you into trade and immigration. So we wound
up consolidating things, because whenever we go over, we don't
talk about all three things. We raise one; they raise another.
We go back and forth. The other governments are also aligned
and even often in more bureaucratic systems and overlap and
trying to match up, so we have an international problem.
But I agree that--first off, we all agree we can do a whole
lot better. The question is that hopefully under this
administration we can see some of that.
Does anybody else have any additional comments?
Once again, thank you all for coming, and we will be in
touch over the next few days.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]