<DOC>
[107th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:82548.wais]
WHAT REGULATIONS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE AIR SECURITY?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY POLICY, NATURAL
RESOURCES AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 27, 2001
__________
Serial No. 107-127
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
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____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho ------ ------
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
------ ------ (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs
DOUG OSE, California, Chairman
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
------ ------
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Dan Skopec, Staff Director
Barbara F. Kahlow, Deputy Staff Director
Regina McAllister, Clerk
Alexandra Teitz, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on November 27, 2001................................ 1
Statement of:
Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida........................................... 6
O'Brien, John, director of engineering and air safety, Air
Line Pilots Association, International; Patricia Friend,
president, Association of Flight Attendants; Mark Roth,
general counsel, American Federation of Government
Employees; and Paul Hudson, executive director, Aviation
Consumer Action Project.................................... 70
Yeffet, Isaac, former Director of Security, El Al Airline;
Edward A. Merlis, senior vice president, legislative and
international affairs, Air Transport Association of America
Inc.; and Todd Hauptli, senior vice president, legislative
affairs, American Association of Airport Executives........ 16
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Friend, Patricia, president, Association of Flight
Attendants, prepared statement of.......................... 86
Hauptli, Todd, senior vice president, legislative affairs,
American Association of Airport Executives, prepared
statement of............................................... 40
Hudson, Paul, executive director, Aviation Consumer Action
Project, prepared statement of............................. 105
Merlis, Edward A., senior vice president, legislative and
international affairs, Air Transport Association of America
Inc., prepared statement of................................ 35
Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida, prepared statement of.................... 9
O'Brien, John, director of engineering and air safety, Air
Line Pilots Association, International, prepared statement
of......................................................... 73
Ose, Hon. Doug, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, prepared statement of....................... 3
Roth, Mark, general counsel, American Federation of
Government Employees, prepared statement of................ 96
Yeffet, Isaac, former Director of Security, El Al Airline,
prepared statement of...................................... 18
WHAT REGULATIONS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE AIR SECURITY?
----------
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 2001
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources
and Regulatory Affairs,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:07 p.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Ose
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Ose, Shays, Tierney, and Kucinich.
Staff present: Dan Skopec, staff director; Barbara Kahlow,
deputy staff director; Regina McAllister, clerk; Alexandra
Teitz, minority counsel; and Earley Green, minority assistant
clerk.
Mr. Ose. Good afternoon. Welcome to the subcommittee
hearing.
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, have shaken the
confidence of the U.S. Government and its citizens in the
Nation's air security. Immediately after September 11th, the
President and Congress began to examine the existing system,
including the laws, regulations and actual practices governing
air security. Much was found to be lacking. Some changes were
made immediately by the President, such as having more Federal
law enforcement officials on airplanes and in airports. Other
changes were quickly made by the airlines, such as locking all
cockpit doors.
On November 19th, the President signed a comprehensive
Aviation and Transportation Security Act written by this
Congress. This law places responsibility for air security in
the hands of the U.S. Department of Transportation. Within 1
year, DOT is required to primarily use Federal employees for
passenger and baggage screening. In addition, the law addresses
many other areas of air security.
Today, we plan to examine how to make this new system work.
As we are talking about people's lives, there is no room for
error. We will hear from an expert in air security and other
witnesses representing the airlines, airports, pilots, flight
attendants, and consumers about what regulations are needed to
ensure air security.
Federal regulations specify detailed procedures to ensure
uniform implementation of laws. The new law establishes
``emergency procedures'' allowing the DOT to issue interim
final regulations without any public notice or comment. Today's
hearing provides a useful forum for congressional and public
input into the regulatory decisionmaking process that is
currently under way.
Even before the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, there
were minimal Federal protective regulations governing air
security. In 1981 DOT's Federal Aviation Administration issued
minimal regulations on airplane operator security, including
less than one page on ``screening of passengers and property.''
Currently, FAA has only one page of codified rules on this
subject. Also, FAA has noncodified directives and customized
provisions in its contracts with each of the airlines since
airlines to date have been responsible for air security,
including screening of passengers, carry-on baggage and checked
baggage. FAA's approach led to nonuniform and unpredictable
screening practices across airlines.
Following the July 1996 TWA Flight 800 airplane crash
shortly after takeoff from JFK in New York, in October 1996,
Congress passed the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of
1996. This law required FAA to certify companies providing
security screening and to improve the training and testing of
security screeners through development of uniform performance
standards for providing security screening services. Even after
a November 2000 law established a deadline for FAA to issue an
implementing rule for this 1996 law, FAA failed to do so. I am
amazed that, in over 5 years, FAA has failed to issue a final
rule on certification of screening companies.
The new administration has realized there is a problem. In
its April 2001, U.S. Department of Transportation Performance
Report Fiscal Year 2000 and Performance Plan Fiscal Year 2002,
DOT stated it did not meet its 2000 performance target for
aviation security and, ``screener performance has not improved
enough.''
To ensure the most effective approach, the new law provides
for a 2-year pilot program at five airports to test different
screening approaches using private security firms instead of
Federal employees. In addition, the law provides, after a 3-
year period, an option for any airport to meet strict Federal
standards for passenger and baggage screening by using private
security firms instead of Federal employees.
The new law also includes provisions on many other aspects
of air security, such as hiring criteria, identification and
screening of airport employees, employee training, identifying
passengers and the like.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today on
what DOT should include in its air security regulations to
ensure uniformity and maximum protection for airport and
airline employees as well as passengers. Ladies and gentlemen,
I travel every single weekend. This is a critical issue. This
hearing is very timely.
I am pleased now to recognize my colleague from
Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney, for 5 minutes.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Doug Ose follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing on security of air travel. This is, as you
said, a timely and important topic.
I also want to thank our witnesses that are going to share
their expertise with us today and am particularly pleased to
welcome our colleague, Mr. Mica.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act is a major
victory for the American people. This is legislation which, if
done right, will help restore public confidence in the safety
of our airlines. It can also give our economy a needed boost by
encouraging air travel and promoting other hospitality sector
businesses, including travel agencies, hotels, and restaurants.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act establishes a
national system for air security. Security screeners will now
be able and trained professionals working for the Federal
Government who will meet uniform high performance standards.
Federalization of the security system should also promote
efficient sharing of intelligence information, a clear chain of
command and accountability for maintaining security in and
around airplanes and airports. The American people
overwhelmingly supported full Federalization of aviation
security functions, and I am pleased that Congress has
delivered these protections to the public.
The law also requires other important measures to protect
our aviation system. It will expand the Federal Air Marshal
Service, require criminal background checks of all persons with
access to secured areas, and mandate the reinforcement of all
cockpit doors. All checked baggage must be screened by
explosive detection equipment by the end of next year, and
checked baggage must be screened through other means in the
interim.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act establishes a
new Transportation Security Administration within the
Department of Transportation, and it is charged with carrying
out these provisions. The TSA has a lot of work to do under
difficult circumstances.
This hearing could have been a useful forum for us to hear
from the Department of Transportation and give the Department
and TSA guidance on their next steps. It is unfortunate that no
representative of the Department chose to be with us here
today. Nevertheless, there are several points that I urge the
Secretary of Transportation to bear in mind as he implements
this law.
The new Federal security system gives us an excellent
opportunity to help those in the airline industry who have lost
their jobs since September 11th. When hiring Federal security
personnel, we should give first priority to those in the
airline industry who have been laid off. I have cosponsored
legislation, H.R. 3067, to give these workers priority; and a
version of that provision was included in the Aviation security
bill passed by the House. While that provision is not in the
final law, the Secretary of Transportation has the authority to
help those laid-off workers by giving them priority for the new
jobs, and I urge him to do so.
It is also vitally important that we provide Federal
security personnel with appropriate compensation and the
benefits that we provide all other Federal workers. Uniform
Federal benefits are a matter of equity, and they are necessary
to attract and to retain a high caliber of dedicated people to
perform those critical security functions.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act conference
report included an expectation that the Secretary will
establish benefits and conditions of employment for Federal
security screeners. The report also stated that these Federal
workers should have access to Federal health benefits, life
insurance, retirement benefits, and workers' compensation
benefits as well as whistleblower protections. I encourage
Secretary Mineta to comply with the Congress's directive in
this regard, and I thank you for the opportunity to
participate, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Tierney.
We are pleased today to be joined by the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Aviation and Transportation and Infrastructure,
the distinguished gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN L. MICA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also thank you, Mr.
Tierney. I am pleased to join you here today. I think this is a
very important hearing which is focusing on what regulations
are needed to ensure our air safety, and I commend you and the
subcommittee on your important oversight responsibility and
work. I want to again thank you for allowing me to testify
first.
We have just gotten through putting together in a record
timeframe a major overhaul of our Nation's aviation and
transportation security system and I think this hearing
couldn't be more timely, particularly today as you focus on the
important issue of rulemaking in aviation security.
I believe one of the most momentous provisions of the
recently signed Aviation and Transportation Security Act is the
unprecedented provision giving the new transportation security
Under Secretary the authority to pass rules in an expedited
fashion. In fact, if you look at legislation we passed, there
is nothing in that entire legislation that is more significant
than, again, this unprecedented authority that we gave to this
new transportation security czar to put rules in place on an
expedited basis.
On July 11th of this year, my Aviation Subcommittee heard
very disturbing testimony about the Department of
Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration's
inability to pass rules in a timely manner. Let me give you
some examples that we heard in that hearing.
It takes the Department of Transportation an average of 3.8
years to finalize a rule. We also had testimony that with FAA
it takes a median time of 2\1/2\ years again to go through the
process of enacting a rule. And let us face it, our country is
now on a very high state of alert and we can't afford to wait
another 3 years to get aviation security technology or
screening standards in place.
Witnesses at our hearings that we held on the problem of
cutting through the red tape and enacting security rules on an
expedited basis shared some stories with us about the time it
takes for different rules. For example, the emergency exit rule
took 10 years to process; the child safety restraint rule has
taken over 3 years and still isn't finished; and, finally, the
flight simulator rules took 13 years.
Often an agency will place the blame for the time it takes
to pass a rule on the time it takes to study the issue, analyze
the cost/benefit data, publish the rule, gather public comments
and incorporate those comments, and finally send the proposed
rule to the Office of Management and Budget for its approval.
That also often takes a good deal of time. However, the layers
of review and analysis have become impediments that are in fact
hindering our ability to achieve a secure aviation environment,
particularly in a time of national crisis.
Perhaps the rule that has received the very most attention
recently has been the rule requiring screening companies to be
``certified'' to ensure that they were meeting minimum
standards of performance. Sadly, despite the Gore Commission
recommendations--and the Gore Commission after TWA 800 and the
Oklahoma City bombings acted and recommended action--and two
congressional laws, one in 1996 and another in the year 2000,
the FAA in fact dallied for 6 years on the screening rule which
was still not in place, standards again for screeners were
still not in place, a rule was not enacted by September 11th of
this year.
It is absolutely critical the administration get the right
employees to be screeners and also that we set up a rational
personnel system.
Again, we have given unprecedented authority in the
aviation security law for this new transportation czar to have
almost unprecedented hiring/firing discipline authority over
this new class of Federal workers. The major complaint that we
often hear about Federal employees has been the impossibility
of disciplining them.
I chaired for 4 years the Civil Service Subcommittee in the
House of Representatives. We found some interesting things in
looking at the performance of Federal employees. Federal
employees' complaints take, on average, 3.5 years to resolve.
We must be able to enact performance measures--and if this is
done by a rule and it does affect our security performance as
it relates to our most important assets and that is human
workers, but we must be able to enact performance measures in a
meaningful manner, something that has been resisted in the
past.
Twice in the House I passed performance-based management
systems for a Civil Service system and twice they were defeated
or not taken up in the other body. In fact, I let the
employees' groups help draft the provisions of those standards.
We cannot have security tangled in the normal bureaucratic red
tape and employee protections that have been chiseled in stone
over many years.
The new Under Secretary's unprecedented rulemaking
authority should not only provide impetus on getting the right
standards for screeners and these new Federal workers but
should also give them the ability to put the most cutting-edge
technologies in our airports immediately. That was part of the
purpose of the way we crafted the legislation. Again, while
technology exists which could have detected the plastic knives
that we believe were used on September 11th or could detect
other plastic weapons, it has not yet been deployed at our
Nation's airports. To approve new technology can, in fact, take
months. To complete acquisition or deploy the latest security
technology can unfortunately take years.
I know there are other areas which the new Under Secretary
will find this, again, unprecedented rulemaking authority
critical, but I am convinced that just by getting the right
technology in place and the standards set for screeners--again
high standards we have been seeking for many years--will have
made great progress in making our transportation system much
more secure and making the traveling public much more
confident.
I hope today that your subcommittee will examine carefully
the torturous and time-consuming process required to pass
simple rules related to security requirements. On September
11th, above all else, the rulemaking process failed. It failed
to allow new rules for technology approval and deployment. It
failed to identify new security risks and adopt new standards
by expedited rulemaking. We cannot as a matter of normal course
of our conduct of business of government allow red tape and
bureaucratic delays to hinder the rulemaking process,
particularly when it comes to matters of national and aviation
security.
Finally, let me just say one thing, and it is not in this
prepared statement. But the rules and even laws need to be
realistic, and they need to be flexible. We did put provisions
in this law that we just passed, unfortunately, that I believe
are not realistic. The 60-day baggage screening provision which
we put by law is not realistic, and I think today or shortly
the administration will announce that they can't meet that
provision that we, in fact, put in law. So our rules, even if
they are expedited and put into place on an unprecedented, cut-
through-the-red-tape basis as we've provided for, have to be
realistic; and, second, they need to be flexible, flexible
enough that we don't tie the hands of those who are deploying
the latest technology, those who are deploying the most highly
skilled workforce, those that are involved in putting again
these other necessary procedures in place that we give them
flexibility.
With those comments, I will be glad to answer any
questions.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Mica. I appreciate your coming. I
know that you worked hard on this bill.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John L. Mica follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Ose. I have a couple of questions I would like to
followup on. Before I do, I would like to recognize Congressman
Shays. Thank you for joining us. I appreciate your coming.
On the issue of the rulemaking process at DOT, there was a
law that we passed in 2000 mandating the FAA to come forward
with some new requirements, and you have correctly highlighted
that inability to finalize these rules. In the context of what
FAA was required to do, would that have had an effect on
anything that occurred on September 11th?
Mr. Mica. Well, I believe it probably would have. I think
in my testimony I pointed out that you have to adopt rules or
regulations that can identify, for example, in the aviation
security area the most vulnerable risks and then be able to act
on them. We are so bogged down in bureaucratic red tape. It
takes us so long to get in place even standards for a screening
company, that the larger picture is lost in this.
One of the first things I did in February when I took over
the Aviation Subcommittee was bring in the new head of security
for FAA. We tried to talk about the big picture, but FAA spends
most of its time mired in trying to pass these rules in this
torturous process that we have described. And you lose sight of
the big picture. You lose sight of where the risks may be.
Could the events of September 11th been prevented?
Possibly. We have equipment; we have technology that has been
tested that will, in fact, identify plastic weapons, and we
believe knives were used. There was no rule in place to ban box
cutters. If someone had looked at the potential risk, possibly
we could have had an expedited rule that would have banned box
cutters or looked again at the larger picture, but we certainly
could have had equipment in place on September 11th that would
detect the type of weapons that were used. But, again, the
torturous process of getting this deployed, and you get
everybody and their brother involved in this process.
Even a few weeks ago the ACLU was protesting the
possibility of us getting some of this technology deployed that
is very high in its definition and felt it was a personal
intrusion into passengers or citizens.
Mr. Ose. The gentleman from El Al who will testify later,
having reviewed his remarks, indicated that the two questions
that are typically asked of a traveler right now, did you pack
your bag and were they----
Mr. Mica. Totally, totally useless. I just had them asked
of me as I got on a plane on the way here. I think you will
have a representative from El Al, and they testified before our
subcommittee. I don't know who came up with that particular
provision, but it doesn't do the job. They need to ask more
specific questions, probably on a limited basis and maybe on a
profile basis.
My God, little old ladies in a wheelchair I just saw that
are being wanded are not taking down airplanes. We know
specifically the types that are taking down airplanes. So we
spend all this time being politically correct in trying to get
even basic rules in place which have been impossible. It sounds
a little bit like we are self-defeating.
Mr. Ose. In that same testimony there were comments
highlighting the fact that we match baggage to passengers, for
instance, on planes in Europe coming to the United States or,
as El Al does, matching bags to passengers on every flight.
Does that----
Mr. Mica. We have done most of that in the past restricted
to international flights. But the events of September 11th
indicate that we are in a new ball game. When someone is
willing to take down a plane and be on the plane and direct a
plane into a target, whether you match the bag or not is sort
of a moot point. So we may be wasting a lot of money. We tried
to shy away in our legislation from requiring matched baggage,
but some people think that matched baggage is the answer to
security problems. Personally, I don't think it is.
Mr. Ose. One of the themes that I discern from your
comments is that there is a tradeoff here between security and
perhaps some loss of privacy. Does the law that we have just
passed give the Secretary the ability to issue regulations that
implement that tradeoff?
Mr. Mica. Well, we are so accustomed to personal freedoms
and trying to keep government out of our lives and out of our
business or personal affairs and that is appropriate. When it
comes to issues of national security, when you have someone
that is willing, again, to die to take down a plane and
passengers and thousands of people on the ground, we have to
balance that with our security needs. So we have to protect
privacy, and we tried to do that in the legislation that we
passed.
But again this new Under Secretary transportation czar, I
could--the only one I can think of that has the power that
individual has in any provisions of law would be the President
of the United States.
Now, the rulemaking ability of the new transportation czar
is very narrow. It is confined to transportation security and
aviation security. So he or she is not going to be out doing
all these kinds of things that will invade people's privacy. I
hope they will be respected. And we do have a check-off in the
bill that we passed with a panel made up of our chief law
enforcement agencies, one representative from the Attorney
General's Office, the Department of the Treasury and others
involved in law enforcement where a rule could be overridden by
this panel. So we have some protections in there, but it is
something that we always have to be on guard.
Mr. Ose. I thank the gentleman.
Gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. Tierney. I have no questions. Thank you for your
testimony.
Mr. Ose. The gentleman from Connecticut.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing and thank you, ranking member.
Mr. Mica, I have been very impressed as have your other
colleagues with the job you have done in airport security.
I am puzzled by one provision. In the amendment that we put
in the House on checking baggage for explosives, there we had
it at the end of the year 2003 because we knew there would be a
task of getting equipment and also having space for some of the
equipment. And in the House bill I was pleased that it was
moved up to the end of year 2002. I am unclear as to the
provision that says deadline for all checked baggage to be
screened by some method within 60 days. Explain that
provision----
Mr. Mica. Well, again, that provision was put in the
legislation trying to get deployed. As you may know, in the
past after each of these incidents and tragedies, we tried to
cobble together legislative provisions or attack the problem.
After TWA 800 and also Oklahoma City, all the emphasis was
placed on explosive detection devices. We went out and bought
$443 million worth of explosive detection devices. Some of that
equipment was good and worked. Some of it didn't work. Some of
it was deployed. Some of it was not deployed.
In the past, the airlines had the responsibility before the
President signed the law on November 19th of actually
conducting the security procedures. They employed the
personnel, the screeners, and the people who also did the work
with these explosive detection devices.
In fact, the security chief who came in and talked to me
said that some of the airlines told him basically to go take a
hike; they weren't going to use this equipment. It slowed
things down. It cost money. They didn't want to do it. But, we
have no way of enforcing that they used it.
So the provision we put in the law was basically to deploy
any of the equipment that is sitting idle, to put in place by
any means possible. Drug-sniffing dogs could do probably as
good a job as some of the equipment or other equipment or it
may be some spot-checked baggage. So that was a directive to
try to get these things in place.
Can it be done in 60 days? I don't think so. I think----
Mr. Shays. Can I just----
Mr. Mica. The intent was good, but I don't think----
Mr. Shays. See, I am not even understanding the intent. Let
me just be clear. By the end of 2002----
Mr. Mica. Well, 2002 is a different date----
Mr. Shays. Let me ask my question so that I can structure
it. You know so much about this bill, you want to tell me more
than what I want to know. I want to know, by the end of 2002,
they have to be totally complete, all baggage will be screened
for explosives; is that correct?
Mr. Mica. That is right.
Mr. Shays. The 60 days--there is a news account that says
Secretary Mineta said it is unlikely to meet the toughest
deadline in the aviation security law President Bush just
signed that all checked and carry-on baggage should be screened
for explosives in 60 days. We don't require that all baggage be
screened for explosives in 60 days, do we?
Mr. Mica. We do not now, no. And we won't be able to do it
in 60 days. We tried to explain this to some of our colleagues,
too----
Mr. Shays. But are you saying we have a 60-day requirement
that all luggage has to----
Mr. Mica. Yes. Well, the intent was to deploy everything we
have, every means we have possible, technology that we have
possible, dogs, some searches, maybe using the National Guard--
--
Mr. Shays. I just want you to define the 60 days.
Technically, the bill requires it----
Mr. Mica. Technically, the bill requires it. Practically--
and that is part of what I spoke at the end of my testimony--we
need to be realistic, and we need to be flexible. Whether it is
a law or whether it is a rule----
Mr. Shays. I don't mind being realistic. I want us to be
realistic. I just want us to understand, and I want you to put
it in clear terms. You are saying that, basically, the bill has
a contradiction, that we say 60 days all explosives, and we say
2 years all explosives?
Mr. Mica. Well, again, it started out as an intent to try
everything, deploy everything possible within 60 days and take
every provision we could or take every action we could to
ensure that as much baggage that was checked was screened. And
then it turned into more of a mandate without flexibility. The
true mandate in there is the one that you worked on that was
originally 2003 and got moved to December 2002. That is in the
bill. It is achievable. There are some problems even with that
requirement, and you will hear that either from other witnesses
or people who are involved in producing the technology.
Mr. Shays. I will try to track down the language on the 60
days before we have our next panel. I just want to be clear on
this one point.
Mr. Ose. Would the gentleman yield? I have the language.
Mr. Shays. Pardon me?
Mr. Ose. I have the language.
Mr. Shays. OK. Do you want to read it to me?
Mr. Ose. The language on the 60-day requirement is, a
system must be in operation to screen all checked baggage at
all airports in the United States as soon as practicable but
not later than the 60th day following the date of enactment of
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.
Mr. Shays. It doesn't say all explosives there. It just
says check all baggage; correct?
Mr. Ose. Correct. And there is an insert on page 49 that
relates to explosive detection systems that says, explosive
detection systems are deployed as soon as possible to ensure
that all U.S. airports described in Section 44903(c) have
sufficient explosive detection systems to screen all checked
baggage no later than December 31, 2002, and that as soon as
such systems are in place at an airport, all checked baggage at
the airport is screened----
Mr. Shays. So when I am hearing this language, it says,
explosives by the end of 2002, a system that checks for all;
and then in 60 days it says, all baggage will be checked. It
doesn't specifically highlight the issue of explosives;
correct?
Mr. Mica. Well, again, it is a directive. Is it possible to
put systems in place? Yes. Will the systems work to cover 100
percent? No, not in 60 days. No way, Jose.
Mr. Shays. I understand. It does not say explosives in 60
days. That is all I am saying. I mean----
Mr. Mica. The other problem we had in testifying before us,
Mr. Shays and members of the panel, is that even by the time we
deploy some of the technology that can detect explosive
devices, the material that is used for explosives is changing.
So if we gave them 2 years to deploy technology, the material
that can be used as explosive may change and we may not have
available in place the technology that can, in fact, detect
these new explosives by changing the chemical composition or
the makeup of the bomb device or explosive device.
Mr. Shays. I will----
Mr. Mica. That is the scary part about all of this.
Mr. Shays. Well, the bottom line is, if we can't check for
explosives in the belly of an aircraft, we can't say that
airline travel is safe.
Mr. Mica. But again----
Mr. Shays. So it is important that we begin this task
immediately. It will not be foolproof. But I did not read in
the legislation that we are supposed to have in place within 60
days a system to check for all explosive material, but I do
read in the legislation that by the end of the year 2002 we
must do it. Obviously the administration is going to work
overtime to accomplish that task, and it may have to come back
and say we are meeting it or not meeting it. But in the course
of trying to reach that deadline, I make an assumption that 6
months into this a good number of the bags will be screened for
explosive devices, not all. I realize that we don't want to buy
equipment that doesn't work, but I just want to reemphasize the
60 days is not explosive material, as the story seems to imply,
and I am kind of disappointed it has become an issue so quickly
with Mineta saying we can't do it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Shays.
Do you have anything else?
Mr. Mica, thank you for joining us.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wish you well, and we
have staff here who are listening to the proceedings. We
appreciate your conducting complete oversight again on this
most important issue and encourage you to continue this
process, and we will work with your subcommittee.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Mr. Ose. We will have the second panel join us now.
The second panel comprises of Isaac Yeffet, Edward Merlis,
and Todd Hauptli.
Gentleman, in this subcommittee we swear all our witnesses.
So if you would please rise.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Ose. Let the record show the witnesses all answered in
the affirmative.
Our first witness on the second panel is Isaac Yeffet. He
is the former director of security for El Al Airline. Welcome.
I want to caution the witnesses we have your written
statements, and I know that everybody up here has read them. I
have a heavy gavel at 5 minutes. The green light shows you are
in the first 4 minutes, the yellow light shows you are in the
last minute, and the red light means that trap-door underneath
your chair opens and you are finished.
So, for 5 minutes, Mr. Yeffet.
STATEMENTS OF ISAAC YEFFET, FORMER DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, El Al
AIRLINE; EDWARD A. MERLIS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, LEGISLATIVE
AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
INC.; AND TODD HAUPTLI, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES
Mr. Yeffet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I
would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to
testify here about the aviation security of the United States
of America and especially the changes that should be made to
upgrade the level of security to a degree where any enemy who
would try in the future to hijack or to blow up any aircraft of
our country, of American air carriers, will fail. This is in
the air and on the ground. If they will come to attack and to
kill our passengers on the ground at any terminal in the world,
and especially this country, we have to make sure that the
enemy will get the answer from our guys in a second and they
will pay with their life and not any more American people.
For this, changes--there are a few conditions that in my
belief we cannot reach this goal if we don't change the system
and the concept of the FAA. We cannot continue so many years to
rely only on technology, on machinery. This technology failed
so many times, whether by the test that the FAA made, the
enemies, or by mistakes when passengers were carrying guns and
nothing stopped them at the security checkpoint. It is time to
understand that machinery can help the qualified and well-
trained human being and not to replace them.
Since September 11th we are witnesses to so many times that
we fail in our security checkpoints when statement after
statement was made that now we have a very high level of
security and it is safe to fly with American air carriers when,
in reality, nothing has been changed. I flew enough times since
September 11th. I didn't see any changes, and I cannot tell the
American people, yes, we are safe when we are not safe.
This morning I took a flight from Newark airport to Reagan
airport. The ticket agent behind the counter asked me two
questions without looking at my eyes when I am answering the
questions. I decided to talk to her to tell her that I am a
security expert of an airline and why did you ask me these two
silly questions when you didn't even pay attention to my
answers? She said we never were trained what to do. We only
were told to ask questions, and whatever you answer me, you
answer me, sir.
I said, don't you think that you are making a joke out of
security? She looked at me and she said, you know, I was hired
to do my job as a ticket agent, not as security. I'm not an
expert in security.
When we boarded aircraft, we heard an announcement that we
have to remain seated on our seat from gate to gate and we
cannot move during the flight. This is a result of failures
when it comes to the aviation security of our country.
Passengers should not suffer because of the lack of security.
It's in our hands to change this system. The FAA charged
millions of dollars every year to the airline for so many times
the security people at the security checkpoint failed, but they
never said stop here. Money's important. Life is more
important, and, therefore, we want to know why so many times
our system fails time after time and why we still keep this
security company running the security at our airports.
We know about security. A year ago, a huge company hired
security people with criminal records. They were caught, and
they made a settlement. Pay us a fine, $1.6 million, and don't
do it again. Recently, they were caught again----
Mr. Ose. Mr. Yeffet, we're going to come back to your
testimony here because I think you have got such a wealth of
knowledge----
Mr. Yeffet. Can you allow me one more sentence, please?
Mr. Ose. Yes.
Mr. Yeffet. OK. My last sentence is, if we want to succeed
having a high level of security, we must match the passenger
with his luggage at the terminal before he is headed to the
check-in. We must interview every passenger by qualified and
well-trained security people. American people and permanent
residents with green cards, they have to come with the
government ID. All others that are noncitizens and are not
permanent residents, they must come with passports.
Every tourist should come with his passport, and the
security people will check the passport to find out from what
nationality the man is, what kind of visa he has. Is the visa
that he has expired? Is this a fake or real passport that he is
carrying? Based on this, we can build enough security questions
to determine if this passenger is suspicious or bona fide.
But by the fact that I've heard from Mr. Mica that he
doesn't believe that to match the luggage to the passenger will
help us, this will not help us if we will not interview the
passengers, and we need to do it because through the passengers
we come to the explosives and to the weapons inside the
luggage. The luggage cannot talk, cannot tell us what is the
contents inside the luggage. The passenger will give us the
answer, and, if we are professionals and we know how to ask the
right questions and we look at the eyes of the passenger, we
can determine who is bona fide and who is not.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Yeffet.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yeffet follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Ose. Mr. Merlis, 5 minutes.
Mr. Merlis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee.
I am Edward Merlis, senior vice president of the Air
Transport Association of America.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the transition regulations flowing from last week's
enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. We
are very pleased that Congress and the administration have
reached consensus on this legislation that will place the
Federal Government in control of aviation security, a position
we've advocated since at least 1973.
We've long felt that airlines do not belong in the security
and law enforcement business. We move passengers and goods
efficiently, and we should focus on that job. Government, on
the other hand, not only has the authority but also the
societal responsibility to provide security protection for our
customers, our airlines, and the Nation they serve.
Why have we felt that government has absolute preeminence
in aviation security? Simply stated, aviation security and the
fight against terrorism starts with the deployment of our
Nation's intelligence gathering and analysis resources. Once
our intelligence apparatus determines where the threat lies, we
must utilize the proper tools to combat terrorism.
Fundamentally, there are six tools that can be used to
remedy the problems identified by our intelligence assets. The
tools are diplomacy, economic sanctions, military intervention,
covert action, law enforcement and countermeasures.
The first five are exclusively governmental authorities,
functions far beyond this industry or any industry's abilities.
In these areas, we need the full-scale participation of the
FBI, the CIA, and a host of other government agencies which
have the wherewithal to fulfill those obligations.
Unfortunately, for too long the airlines have been
delegated by the government to take charge of aviation
security. The airline industry does not have the expertise,
much less the right, to engage in any of the essential
activities necessary to combat terrorism. Airlines are not law
enforcement or national defense agencies. As a result, too much
of our aviation security effort was devoted to countermeasures,
the last line of defense, an important line of defense, no
less, but in concert only with the preceding five authorities
once they have been deployed. In essence, we have been
essentially ignoring the best lines of defense and relying only
on the last.
Thus, we review last week's enactment of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act as the fulfillment of what should
have been done long ago, putting the government in full control
of aviation security.
Mr. Chairman, the hearing focuses on regulatory
requirements emanating from the enactment of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, and I've enumerated five different
provisions in the act which we feel are particularly important
as they apply to the airline industry.
We're committed to working with the Transportation Security
Administration in implementing these requirements so that the
vision of the Congress can become a reality. In each case we
have some measure of experience and offer that up for the TSA's
consideration. But we recognize that, in the end, the TSA is
the responsible party that must issue the regulations and
implement a comprehensive aviation security program.
One area I'd like to focus on briefly is the use of
intelligence data. Much of the attention in the legislation is
focused on looking for things among the billions of bags,
packages and people we carry. We would hope that, in the
interest of erecting a better aviation security barrier, much
more is done to utilize existing resources of data to, in
effect, look at the people involved and decide on that basis
where to focus our screening efforts. That ``needle in the
haystack'' can be found if the haystack is small enough but not
so long as the haystack stretches beyond the horizon.
We believe that better utilization of intelligence and law
enforcement resources is the key to that goal as well as to the
specific requirements of Section 138, the background check
provision. What we envision is a dynamic process through which
real time communication of our reservations systems and the
government's data bases are put to best use. Airlines do not
need to know who is on the government list, but the government
surely needs to know that people on their hot lists are
planning to travel. Through the efficient use of these data,
security attention can be focused on where it can be of highest
utility.
Aviation security is the process of finding the one person
out of hundreds of millions of passengers who intends to do
harm. Government can best do that, and we are prepared to work
with Government to ensure that it is accomplished.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Merlis.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Merlis follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Ose. Our third witness is Todd Hauptli, who is the
senior vice president for legislative affairs for the American
Association of Airport Executives and the Airports Council
International-North America.
Welcome. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hauptli. Mr. Chairman, thank you. It is good to be with
you again, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Shays.
I have four points that I would like to try to make in my
oral testimony. First is, talk about funding; the second, talk
about the new Transportation Security Administration; the
third, talk about screeners; and then, finally, the use of
technology.
On the issue of the funding, airports in the immediate
aftermath of the events of September 11th were required by the
FAA to deploy additional law enforcement personnel throughout
the airports. That has been something that airports have done.
It has been an extremely expensive requirement, an extremely
expensive Federal mandate. The legislation that Congress
enacted authorizes but does not appropriate funds for
reimbursement for law enforcement officials. That is something
that we will continue to work on.
Mr. Chairman, I picked a very random airport to illustrate
the point. I just grabbed one out of the hat, and it happened
to be Sacramento.
In that instance----
Mr. Ose. Your testimony says Cedar Rapids.
Mr. Hauptli. Well, we modified that for the oral
presentation, Mr. Chairman.
In Sacramento, we spent $3 million on additional law
enforcement officers at the same time that the Sacramento
airport will lose $5 million in revenues from lost concession
revenues, parking revenues, and the like.
Mr. Tierney, another semi-random example, at Boston Logan
Airport they will spend an additional $10 million this year for
law enforcement requirements and lose probably $75 million in
revenues.
Additionally, airports are going to need help with the
capital requirements of terminal redesign, and we are going to
have to look at how we queue passengers in screening lines,
where we are going to put them, where we are going to put these
explosive detection systems. They are heavy pieces of equipment
that need reinforcement in the infrastructure. All of that is
going to cause us to need additional resources.
With the creation of the Transportation Security
Administration, that will require government and industry to
work cooperatively like they have never done before. The
legislation is replete with requirements for the TSA to come up
with new things in 60 days, 90 days, 120 days, 180 days, within
2 years, within 1 year. We need to make sure that government
and industry are working together.
While we recognize the point Mr. Mica made earlier about
the vast authority given the Under Secretary to promulgate
rules without comment from outside groups, we hope that vast
power is used sparingly. We believe it is necessary to work
with the government in the promulgation of those rules.
Third point, on screeners. The airport groups were
relatively agnostic during this debate as to who should sign
the paycheck, whether that be a Federal employee or not. But we
felt very strongly, and do to this day, that there needs to be
improved screening, improved training, improved proficiency for
those screeners. We think that the provision in the law that
allows airports to opt out of the Federal screeners after a 2-
year period, combined with the fact that class of Federal
employees may be removed or fired, gives airports important
leverage that we don't have now, say, with INS or with Customs
or with Agriculture inspectors.
That puts pressure on the TSA and on the screeners to make
sure that they are doing a good job because they may lose their
jobs if they don't, and we think that is an important provision
that Congress put in.
Finally, on the use of technology, the legislation calls
for a pilot program on access control for up to 20 airports. We
believe that is important so that we can experiment with
different biometric models to determine what might be the best
course to take in the future.
Also, I think it is important to explore the possibility of
using smart credentials, smart cards, the possibility of using
passports. There are 65 million passports in the system today.
That may jumpstart us in our ability to, as Mr. Merlis pointed
out, take that haystack and make it smaller. If you have to
find the needle in the haystack, the best way of doing that is
making the haystack smaller.
El Al uses a system, a trusted traveler system, where you
are subjected to interviews and background checks initially if
you are a frequent traveler; and, if you obtain a card, you are
allowed to essentially bypass a portion of the screening
process that takes the security screening time down from
several hours in many instances down to as little as 15 to 20
minutes.
That is something that we should explore in the future,
using technology to help some of the problems that we have
experienced to date.
With that, I will yield back and respond to questions.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Hauptli.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hauptli follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Ose. I want to go through a series of questions here. I
am going to ask each of you for your response. Brevity is
appreciated.
Mr. Yeffet, from your standpoint, from your experience, the
interview process is integral to establishing security. Is that
correct?
Mr. Yeffet. That's correct.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Merlis, does the ATA agree with that?
Mr. Merlis. Absolutely. We want to look for people, not
things.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Hauptli.
Mr. Hauptli. Interviews are very important, yes.
Mr. Ose. Second question. Is there a tradeoff that is
necessary to be made and accepted here in America between
providing an adequate level of security and being able to fly?
In other words, should the American people just come to expect
that one of the consequences of providing security is that they
may be asked a series of questions that some might consider
intrusive? Is that a necessary tradeoff?
Mr. Yeffet. Mr. Chairman, I interviewed, during the last 15
years in this country, so many passengers, and we discussed
together about their convenience, if we can ask them the
question and they will give us the answer for their safety.
The problem is how we approach the passenger, to explain to
him why we have to ask the security questions. This is for your
safety. You take the flight. We stay on the ground. And,
therefore, please cooperate with us so that we will make sure
that you will fly safe and secure.
Not even one told me, I don't care, I don't want to answer
any questions, I don't care about my life or my childrens'
lives. Everybody said, please do it.
No. 2, after September 11th, Mr. Chairman, the world has
been changed, not only United States of America, and everyone
will love to cooperate with the security instead of being
tortured when he goes to a security checkpoint or where he
takes a flight.
I flew to Denver, and I told my colleagues I want to make
sure now that I will make the alarm go off. I want to see what
will happen. I did it.
First step, I was told take off your shoes. I said, why do
you want my shoes? We think we found what you have, what we are
looking for. I said, take my shoes. Like me, other 15
passengers were waiting without shoes for 10 minutes until they
came to us and they gave us back the shoes. But they forgot
from which part of my body the alarm went off. This was not
important. The shoes have to be taken off.
In Newark, announcement of the security people at
checkpoint, they said, everyone that the alarm will go off, he
has to take off his shoes. So help me God, people next to me
with boots were afraid to death. They took off their shoes, and
they placed it on the x-ray machine.
This is not the security that we want. We cannot be
paranoid. We cannot be in panic. We cannot overreact.
After September 11th, the FAA eliminated the skycap. Two
weeks later, they are back.
This is not a system. This is not a concept. The American
people will love to cooperate if they understand, and they are
convinced that we do it for their safety.
Mr. Ose. Does the ATA share that?
Mr. Merlis. Absolutely. As I said, we keep doing what I
call one step removed from harassment, instead of focusing on
people who are potential hazards and dangers to us. We take
knitting needles away from grandmothers when in the history of
terrorism there has never been a female terrorist over a
certain age--and not using those efforts in time and energy to
focus on the potential terrorists and doing a strip search if
necessary of that individual.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Hauptli, how about the airport executives and
the airport operators?
Mr. Hauptli. On the continuum between absolute safety and
absolute convenience, clearly our mark has moved since
September 11th; and I think everyone would agree that
additional questions are just fine at this point.
Mr. Ose. So, if I could synthesize your comments, you are
all in agreement that the regulations that might be adopted on
an interim or emergency basis should provide for the
opportunity to do interviews?
Mr. Merlis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Yeffet. Yes, sir. This is best opportunity for the
security people to check passports of non-American citizens and
permanent residents with green cards to see who is coming to
take the flight with us. What kind of passport does he have? Is
he legal in the country or is he illegal in the country? Is the
passport real or fake? This is the best opportunity for the
country, not only for airline security, to find out if there
are any passengers that are illegal here, that are suspicious,
that gave any suspicious sign from the ticket office and
reservation department of the airlines.
And, I am very sorry to say that I am not happy with the
new law that was signed by the President, because I don't
believe that we have to release the airlines from the
responsibility of their security. They run the flight, every
flight they are responsible for their operation from A to Z.
Mr. Ose. OK. We are going to come back to that question.
Mr. Hauptli.
Mr. Hauptli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to make
one point.
I agreed that, yes, interviews were important. I think it
is also important to remember that in the system of ours with
700 million passengers it is not likely that we are going to be
able to interview every passenger every time and have that work
with the current system that we have in terms of moving people
through in an efficient fashion. So there needs to be some
balance in how we approach that, which is why I earlier
addressed the notion of, for frequent travelers, the idea of
getting a smart card or some kind of traveler card where you
would be subjected to rigorous interviews initially, go through
background checks, and then be able to go through an expedited
process for frequent travelers, and then for the occasional
travelers go through a more involved process.
We need to do something like that to use technology,
because we move in 2 days the number of passengers that El Al
moves in an entire year.
Mr. Ose. We will come back to the level of tolerance that
we might be willing to accept.
Mr. Tierney for 5 minutes.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Let me just start by saying that today's frequent traveler
that is trusted may be tomorrow's compromised traveler. At some
other point we can talk about how you get over that, what
everybody talks about, making somebody special and putting them
to the front of the line. I wonder what makes them special
forever. Because things do change. People get compromised.
But, Mr. Merlis, you indicated that the airline industry
has said that they have always wanted security to be a
government responsibility. But how can you give us an assurance
that the industry is going to abandon what I think has been its
historical reluctance, if not its outright opposition, to
putting security really ahead of the convenience of the
passenger or the customer? Because I really think that that has
been a key to a lot of things whether it is matching the bags,
or whether it is asking the right questions, or whether it is
completing a baggage check--I think that the airlines have had
for a long time historically been reluctant to really do that
to the extent it ought to be done. And, now I see them all
jumping over to have the government take over on that.
But what assurance, if the government takes it over, that
you are not just going to abandon any responsibility or any
efforts on the part of the airline industry itself?
Mr. Merlis. Let me say, first, that the questions are asked
not because we wanted to. The government prescribed them.
Second, if we pursued those questions, we might run severe risk
of violating civil liberties. There have been certain airlines
which have been sued repeatedly when they were suspicious of
people and did not have proper cause because they are not law
enforcement.
Mr. Tierney. Are you aware of any provisions that the
airlines would have implemented but for their fear that the
government would have disallowed their implementation?
Mr. Merlis. Well, going back 8, 10 years, carriers asked
certain questions, treated people sometimes differently, and
got sued, so they said we will just ask what we are asked to.
Mr. Tierney. That was whether or not they won or lost the
suit? Did they win or lose those suits?
Mr. Merlis. I believe they settled. They were human rights
or civil rights suits in New York City after the Gulf war. You
just settle those. You don't go all the way through litigation.
You don't go all the way to trial.
Mr. Tierney. What stopped them from checking baggage? What
stopped them from matching bags? What stopped them from doing
all of the things that make common sense in light of September
11th?
Mr. Merlis. Well, in light of September 11th, we do not
believe that 100 percent bag match is the right way. We think
you should screen 100 percent of the bags. I think that is far
more efficient.
Mr. Tierney. Why wouldn't you also want to match the bags?
You are assuming then that only suicidal people are the ones
that we are concerned about?
Mr. Merlis. No. I think that the way to do security is a
layered approach. You use a lot of different things, not the
same thing on every single person. If you have something that
does the same thing on every single person, sooner or later
your adversary is going to figure it out and figure out a way
to pierce it. What you want to have is a variety of different
kinds of tools that you use so that they never know what you
are up to.
Mr. Tierney. Why didn't the airlines do that before
September 11th?
Mr. Merlis. Airlines did do some of those things.
Mr. Tierney. Well, they didn't do them all, and they didn't
do it well enough, right?
Mr. Merlis. Well, certainly there was nothing about any of
those individuals who got through who violated any security
requirement. Yet, at the same time, we know that many of those
names were in government intelligence files and had never been
provided to the airlines. That gets to Mr. Yeffet's question.
If the government has the information and says, look for Joe,
we will look for him. But we don't know who Joe is.
And I think that is the first step in the process. Once you
identify who the person is, then let's do everything possible
with those people to ensure that they are not a threat.
Maybe what you do with those people, after you search their
bags and do a strip search, then you do a bag match on those
people, or maybe you don't even let them fly on the flight that
they have scheduled, just because they are suspect.
But I think that the question you asked is, will we abandon
anything? We will do what is required under the law, and what
is required under the law is CAPPS and bag match. We are
relieved of screening. We are not supposed to do screening
subsequent to the 90-day provision. But we do whatever we are
asked to do by the Government in this case.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Hauptli, just to clarify one thing. You made mention of
some of the additional personnel that have been placed at
airports.
Mr. Hauptli. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. I guess, as a one-time cost, I can see your
point. But if these are things that should have been done as
security measures for which the airports were responsible at
any rate, am I correct in saying that you are not asking for
the Federal Government to pick up the ongoing cost on a regular
basis, you just want them to pick up the one-time cost for the
fact that it wasn't done and all of a sudden it had to be done,
it wasn't accounted for?
Mr. Hauptli. That is right. We are looking for
reimbursement for the security costs that airports had to
assume as a result of FAA mandates, new security.
Mr. Tierney. I am assuming, though, that you want it for
that one time, that you, on your own right--whether you be an
airport authority, or whether you be a State that runs the
airport, or municipality or whatever--are going to change their
level of security personnel anyway and then be responsible for
that themselves?
Mr. Hauptli. Yes, sir. In the future, we are also looking
to try and figure out how to pay for some of these increased
ongoing costs. That is a story for another day.
Mr. Tierney. OK.
Mr. Yeffet, let me just ask you. I would assume that you
are not happy with the check-in people of the airlines not
looking you in your eye when you are talking, and you have a
rather low opinion of the new computer check-in system, where
you get to punch a number that says the answer to those two
questions, and maybe the money would be better spent just
training those personnel as opposed to computerizing and
putting those computer systems in. Do you see any future use at
all for those computer check-in machines?
Mr. Yeffet. I don't know why we have to use them at all.
Let's assume that I am terrorist, and the computer will ask
me the question when I buy the electronic ticket, and I will
punch that I am terrorist. What would happen? It is a shame
that we still, after so many times that we suffered and we lost
thousands of lives of innocent people, we still are working
with the concept that it is totally wrong and that we don't
stop it.
The FAA eliminated the skycap, but they kept the electronic
ticket to be operated. If the skycaps were dangerous, why pull
them back after 2 weeks? If they are not dangerous, why kick
them out? They need to eat. They need to work. Keep them. Tell
them, do not deal with security. Help the passenger bring the
luggage to the check-in, to the security people, whoever, but
don't eliminate them.
The problem with the FAA, unfortunately, and I see it since
1986, we act and then we think. I remember 1986, U.S. Air
aircraft flew from L.A. to San Diego. At that time the FAA
decided all air crew members and airline employees with
uniforms can bypass the security checkpoint. Why? Because, they
wanted this.
A guy who used to work for U.S. Air stole money from the
company and he was caught; he was fired. No one took from him
the badge and the uniform. He asked for compensation, and he
was ignored. He said in his letter to his boss, I am a drug
user. I am an alcoholic. Help me with the money. He was
ignored.
One day he found out that his boss is taking the flight
from L.A. to San Diego. He took a gun, he put on his uniform
with the badge, he bought a ticket, he bypassed the security
checkpoint. Close to San Diego he wrote a note to his boss, I
left with nothing, you will have nothing, and opened fire. And,
the aircraft was crashed and all of the passengers were killed.
I was hired to do the investigation at the time. I asked
the FAA, what happened? Why? It was a mistake. Now we change
it.
Before September 11th, a knife of 4 inches that you can
kill a cow with it, it was legal to board the aircraft. And
suddenly after September 11th, nail clippers are illegal. Where
we are going to? Let's use our brain and not our emotion.
If people cannot decide traveling when it comes to life of
American people, they should not stay in their position. The
American people trust us. Do not disappoint them. And, don't do
mistake after mistake.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. I don't use this word very often. I don't like
to think that I get frustrated. But I am listening to this
testimony, and I am getting more frustrated than I ever thought
that I would. Because, Mr. Yeffet, you bring your world to
this. It is different than what I think my world is. And, each
of you have your own different perspective.
I don't see how the damn system works. I don't see how the
system works where I would want to fly for a whole host of
reasons. I want safety. I care about cost somewhat, and I don't
want to wait in an airport for 3 hours to go on a 2-hour trip.
I mean, I might as well walk.
So I am thinking to myself, well, I am pretty sure of one
thing. Maybe it is not a bad thing. I don't think that airline
traffic is going to double in the next 10 years like we
thought. So I don't think that we have to worry about
congestion in the airports. Maybe that is a good thing. Maybe
we need to think about using some other mode of transportation.
But of these 19 terrorists, 17 were legal. They got into
the country legally. They were legal. And, I want to know,
would all of the 19 have been interviewed by you, Mr. Yeffet?
Under your system, would all of them have been interviewed?
Mr. Yeffet. Mr. Congressman----
Mr. Shays. I don't want a long answer. I want to know if
you would interview them. Are you advocating that we have a
system where all of those 19 would have been interviewed?
Mr. Yeffet. Yes. Sure.
Mr. Shays. So every passenger is going to be interviewed?
Mr. Yeffet. Every passenger. One passenger will be
interviewed for 2 minutes. One passenger would be interviewed
and be searched for more than 20 minutes. Yes, we would do it
because I don't think that we can allow ourselves----
Mr. Shays. I am not going to disagree, because I don't have
the expertise. I just know, if that happens, I am not flying.
Because I don't want to wait an hour and a half to 2 hours.
I think you bring to this world, you know, mostly
international travel, and so I can see it. But I don't see how
a system works where when people are going from Boston to New
York or New York to Washington they are going to fly. I guess
we take the train.
I mean, is that one of the outcomes of what you think you
are proposing, that basically short flights disappear?
Mr. Yeffet. Sir, today the American people are not flying
not because they don't like the airlines----
Mr. Shays. You are not answering the question, though. You
have so much to share, but I just want you to answer the
question.
I am trying to visualize the world--and maybe you are
right. I mean, I am frustrated, not because I disagree
ultimately with your conclusion. I happen to believe that you
and I agree on one thing. Tell the American people the truth,
whatever the hell the truth is. Whatever it is. And if airline
travel isn't safe, then let's just say it is not safe. If it is
not going to be safe for a while, let's just say it is not
going to be safe for a while.
My view was, I don't want a terrorist or anyone in the
cockpit, so I figure if you lock the darn cockpit up so no one
can go in, that is a good thing. And, if we can make sure that
there aren't bombs on planes and weapons on planes, that is a
good thing.
If a terrorist is in the body of the airplane and he gets
in a fight with someone else and causes harm, that is not a
good thing, but it is not going to bring the plane down. So, in
my own mind, I was thinking, well, at least if we can get
explosives and cockpits--respond to that.
Mr. Yeffet. Mr. Congressman, if I understood you well, you
are looking for your convenience. And, my answer to this is
very simple. You said an hour and a half you are not ready to
wait----
Mr. Shays. Let me interrupt you. Then, you will get your
chance.
The reason why I take an airplane is convenience. If an
airplane is no longer convenient, I am not taking it. That is
all right. I mean, I will drive or I will take a train. When
you say my thing is convenience, I just want to be realistic
about why I take a plane in the first place. And, if what you
do suggests I won't take a plane, then I accept that.
I will let you answer. But do you understand it is not just
convenience? It is understanding why I take a plane in the
first place.
Mr. Yeffet. First of all, you can drive a few hours. But if
you have to go from Washington, DC, to L.A., how many times can
you drive, sir?
Mr. Shays. No, that I agree with.
Mr. Yeffet. This is No. 1. No. 2, you are talking about
your convenience, which I like to fly with maximum convenience.
But the question, very simply today, convenience by knowing
that I am risking my life or inconvenience by knowing that I am
gaining my life? I think, Mr. Congressman, the answer is very
clear. We cannot have the stick from both sides. We love to fly
with no one to bother us. I don't like to be asked any
questions. I don't like to be searched.
I hate--but if I know that we have to pass through this
system for our safety, I want to land alive and not dead, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK. I understand that.
You and I agree. None of us wants to be killed, and we
don't want our passengers to be killed and we don't want our
constituents to be killed. I understand that. I am just trying
to understand the implications of what I think is an
impractical proposal in one way. It is practical for the long
flight, because frankly I will only fly by plane.
But it seems to me, and you are an honest man; I am asking
for an honest answer. Are the short flights basically going to
be impractical because the short flights will take as long to
check as the long flights but you are only going a short
distance?
And do you see under your proposal that the short flights
kind of disappear?
Mr. Yeffet. The answer is very simple. There is no
compromise in security. But if, in the short flight from
LaGuardia to Reagan Airport in Washington, DC, we want to make
it faster, we just have to increase the qualified security
people to do the interview. Instead of four or five people,
let's take 10 or 15 people and then you will have it faster,
only a question of money.
If we are ready to spend the money, we will do it. The
problem in this country is that we never accept that wee need
to spend money on security. This is why the airlines signed a
contract and hired the security company that offered the lowest
bid; and to make the profit, we know whom they hired and what
they paid them and how they trained them. This is why the FAA
failed in their system. We have to change it.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Ose. Will the gentleman yield for a minute? I want to
go to that one point. If I understand correctly, prior to
September 11th and including the day of September 11th, the
people at the screening stations in the terminals did exactly
what the FAA guidelines laid out as their duty.
Am I correct in that? Mr. Merlis.
Mr. Merlis. Yes, at least insofar as we know, there is
nothing that they did that violated any FAA rule.
Mr. Ose. Is that your understanding also, Mr. Hauptli?
Mr. Hauptli. Yes.
Mr. Ose. Now, Mr. Yeffet, I understand what you are saying,
that what they did was inadequate, clearly. But the fact of the
matter is that they are not the ones who screwed up here,
because they did exactly what they were assigned to do by
Federal regulation, which is what Mr. Mica's point was earlier
in terms of updating the regulations accordingly.
I know what you are going to say. I want to be clear that
those folks at those stations did what they were assigned to
do. If we change the assignment, then their success rate will
hopefully change also.
Mr. Yeffet. It is a shame what kind of security system and
level we had in this country.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. My time is up. But let me, with your permission,
just ask this followup.
How many of the 19 terrorists would your interview have
caught?
Mr. Yeffet. I cannot answer the question because I didn't
interview any of them, or my guys. But, for sure, I can tell
you, sir, that the FBI, they had part of the names of these 19
terrorists. And, if we know about these, my question: Why did
these names not go to the airlines? If any of these names
appeared during the screening process, these passengers should
have been stopped immediately and the FBI notified in order to
arrest them.
And then we could avoid even the interviews.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Ose. The gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. Kucinich. I want to thank the panel here. I would like
to followup on some questions that my good friend, Mr. Shays,
was asking of Mr. Yeffet.
Take me through an interview of a prospective passenger on
El Al. I present myself to you. I have my luggage. What do you
do? Just let's go through it.
Mr. Yeffet. I will try to do it in few sentences, because I
can give a speech about it.
Mr. Kucinich. Show me how it would work.
Mr. Yeffet. OK. First of all, qualified people should
interview you. I approach you, and I am telling you that I am
the security man of your flight; and I have to ask you, sir, a
few security questions for your safety.
Mr. Kucinich. OK. Ask me the questions.
Mr. Yeffet. Can I see, first of all, your passport?
Mr. Kucinich. OK. Here is my passport.
Mr. Yeffet. I check your passport. Let's assume now that
you are an American passenger, so I don't have problems with or
questions of your passport. But if you are from Iraq or today
Afghanistan or Syria, then you already turn on the red light to
me as a passenger.
Mr. Kucinich. OK. Let's say we----
Mr. Yeffet. Let's assume that you are not suspicious yet.
All documents are OK. So my question will be the basic
questions that I have to ask the passengers that are not
suspicious, are not foreign; they don't have problems with
them.
The question is: To whom does this luggage belong?
Mr. Kucinich. OK. It is mine.
Mr. Yeffet. I don't want answers that will be Yes or No,
like the FAA. I want words to you to use. Who packed your
luggage, sir?
Mr. Kucinich. I did.
Mr. Yeffet. When did you pack it?
Mr. Kucinich. A week ago.
Mr. Yeffet. Where did you pack it?
Mr. Kucinich. My home.
Mr. Yeffet. How long was the luggage left at your home or
any other place?
Mr. Kucinich. It has been with me all of the time.
Mr. Yeffet. Did you take the luggage with you to work?
Mr. Kucinich. Well, it was in the trunk of my car.
Mr. Yeffet. In your car? Who drove your car except you,
sir?
Mr. Kucinich. Just me.
Mr. Yeffet. Just you.
What is the contents of your luggage, sir?
Mr. Kucinich. Just clothes and some toiletries.
Mr. Yeffet. Can you describe----
Mr. Kucinich. Copies of the Congressional Record.
Mr. Ose. He is very dangerous. You watch him.
Mr. Yeffet. Now, the point is that I have to look at your
eyes close. And, once you answer me, when you lie to me,
physiological changes will be seen in your face, believe me.
And, whenever you lie to me, we can see that something is wrong
with your answer. And, then we will stick on this point until
we will make sure that I have no problem with the lie that you
gave to me.
Mr. Kucinich. So the screeners then are not simply asking
questions; they are studying the people while the people are
giving the answers?
Mr. Yeffet. Sure.
Mr. Kucinich. Have you ever done any research to determine
anyone who is denied boarding, whether they are being denied
boarding with justification based on evidence that was found
subsequently, or do you just deny people boarding and they go
away?
Mr. Yeffet. No. What happens, some cases, were that people
at the last minute had a call, what we call--they decided that
they are not taking the flight. They were afraid. One that
happens to us was at last minute sick, and ambulance had to
take him. But just something--because I decided not to take the
flight and disappeared, didn't happen.
Mr. Kucinich. So your position then is that, if you subject
passengers to greater scrutiny, there will be less of a chance
that someone would slip in who might want to do harm?
Mr. Yeffet. That's correct.
Mr. Kucinich. Your view is, it is not simply a matter of
electronics; it is people to people?
Mr. Yeffet. That's correct.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you.
Mr. Yeffet. Because I like to hear you and not the luggage.
Mr. Kucinich. Did you let me on your plane?
Mr. Yeffet. As a Congressman, with pleasure.
Mr. Ose. Thank you. I have actually flown El Al and been
subjected to the interview. The reason I was subjected to the
interview of the lengthy type was that my connecting-leg plane
was late.
When my wife and I rushed up, a young woman, maybe 23 or
24, came and interviewed us, and it was extensive and it was
exactly the questions Mr. Yeffet just went through.
Obviously we passed the interview, because we went on. But
it was very interesting and it was very professional.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would guess that given
that level of scrutiny, if someone was engaged in something
that was irregular, they would probably be tripped up, you
would imagine. I guess that is what it is about. You obviously
are--your safety record has been very strong.
Mr. Ose. I want to followup on Mr. Kucinich's items. We are
going to have another round here.
For El Al, you have government oversight of a private
company and employees of the private company; if they are
determined to be performing unsatisfactorily, they can be
summarily dismissed. Prior to being employed, they receive
extensive training. It is not 40 hours or 60 hours. How much is
it?
Mr. Yeffet. At least a week in the classroom. And, then on-
the-job training. Now, in the classroom, we have to train them
about the terrorist organizations. Do you want me to repeat
all?
Mr. Ose. I can multitask. I heard your answer.
Mr. Yeffet. No.
Mr. Ose. Keep going.
Mr. Yeffet. We have to train them about the terrorist
organizations. We have to train them about countries that
support terrorists. We have to train them about the acts of the
terrorists against the airlines around the world, why they
succeeded to blow up aircraft, why they succeeded to hijack,
what was wrong with the security system and what should be done
so that this won't happen to us.
And, then to train them how to read a passport, how to
approach the passenger, how to ask the right questions, how to
phrase the question in a way that it should be so clear that I
want the passenger to answer me immediately and not to let him
think and to tell me that I didn't understand you two, three,
four times. In the meantime, he can think of what answer to
give.
I prefer to see an interviewer that is asking the
questions, and, if he can bring the passenger to answer me
spontaneously so I can determine if he is lying.
Mr. Ose. Now, the personnel that I interviewed with, both
on the leg to Israel and the way back, they were young, 25, 30
at the most. Is there some career profile for folks who do this
kind of interviewing? How do you collect people? How long do
you keep them? What characteristics do you look for on the
interviewing site?
Mr. Yeffet. Normally we hire people to be security after
the service in the Israeli army; and they have experience, and
they know how vulnerable is the country and the airlines when
it comes to security.
Now, we train them, as I mentioned, and we test them. When
I was the head of security for El Al, I used to do thousands of
tests every year. When I was a diplomat in this country, I used
to take the people from the FBI from Washington, to and from
New York, Friday night at 10 at night, running an exercise,
when one of my group used to be the terrorists that attack the
passengers and our group was the defender of the airlines. And,
we did so many exercises, in order not to wait for something
real to happen, any test that we used to do, so our people for
them, real or test, should be the same, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ose. Who paid for the training process that includes
these tests?
Mr. Yeffet. Part is the Government of Israel and part the
airline.
Mr. Ose. So there is a passenger charge in part and a
contribution from the Federal Government?
Mr. Yeffet. No. We did not charge the passengers for this,
but they charge the passengers for airport fee; this included,
I think, the security expense.
Mr. Ose. OK. Now, you indicate you have the interviewer.
The reason I am exploring this is, I wanted to make sure that
the people who can't join us today get this stuff into the
record so that they can at least think about it.
You have the interviewer at the terminal. You have a second
layer that checks everything at the gate, too, because I
remember, and when I got there, panting, the guy took me
through another series of questions. That person is part of the
security process.
You also indicate that you have people that are trained on
the plane for situations. That is part of the security process.
These are all interwoven, if you will, as part of an overall
package.
Mr. Yeffet. The security are trained to do everything from
A to Z; if it is to interview passengers, to be in the baggage
room, to search the aircraft, to search unattended luggage, or
to open even an ashtray to look to see if somebody replaced
anything or planted anything there, except the armed people
that we have.
This is when I was testifying in the beginning today, I
emphasized that we have to change the system, even on the
ground, especially out of this country.
When the enemy will find out that you cannot hurt us in the
air, he will try to kill us on ground. In security, in our
aviation security, we have to make sure that we cover every
single point from A to Z, including the catering, the duty
free, the cargo, and so on, and so on.
Now, we cannot allow ourselves to keep the one weak hole in
the system because we are dealing with a sophisticated enemy.
They will definitely do enough studying to find out our true
weak points, so they can have the access to hurt us.
Mr. Ose. You have testified in favor of matching baggage to
passengers. So there is some element to the passenger standing
there with the bag. That is part and parcel of the security
process. Do you think that the DOT should mandate that or put
it in its rules for domestic flights here in the United States?
Mr. Yeffet. Yes, sir.
Mr. Merlis. No, absolutely not. We think it should be part
of the overall screening process, but not 100 percent.
Mr. Ose. So you would use some means of sorting that--put a
portion of the people through a baggage check process?
Mr. Merlis. No. All passengers' checked baggage would be
screened, but only some of the checked bags would be subject to
the 100 percent bag match process.
Mr. Ose. Is that what is done on international flights?
Mr. Merlis. In the international flights right now it is
100 percent bag match. But we are dealing with two totally
different situations. Internationally we have 1,000 and
domestically we have 20,000 flights a day.
Second, we have seen from the nature of the terrorist
threat of September 11th that 100 percent baggage match is not
good enough, so our view is that if you have baggage match as
part of an overall screening process; a 100 percent screening
process, you will be more likely to pick up the terrorist,
suicidal terrorist, which you would not pick up on a 100
percent baggage match.
Mr. Ose. As it relates to September 11th, you are saying
that the baggage match is irrelevant?
Mr. Merlis. Absolutely.
Mr. Hauptli. Basically go with what Mr. Merlis indicated,
and again, until we can get technology to the point where we
can use it to try to slim down some of these times, 100 percent
baggage match in all circumstances would grind the system
pretty well down to a halt.
Mr. Ose. So what level of tolerance, coming back to this
tolerance question, what level of tolerance should Congress be
willing to accept? Mr. Yeffet says zero.
If I am on a plane, I have got to tell you, I am for zero.
If my family is on a plane, I am for zero.
Mr. Hauptli. Again, if you want absolutely total safety in
the system, you just never take off.
I mean--so that is one end of the continuum absolute
safety, and the other end of the continuum is absolute
convenience. Up until September 11th, we as a government, as an
industry, as a people, demanded and selected one point on that
continuum; it was closer to absolute convenience than it should
have been. We have now shifted to a point that is more toward
absolute security, recognizing that, as a practical matter, you
are never going to get all of the way to absolute security.
Where is the right spot, where that is the sweet spot, if you
will.
That is a good question. It is a question that I think is
going to be trial and error to see what the American people
will tolerate in terms of increased security measures, while
still allowing for freedom of movement through the country.
Mr. Ose. I won't ask you to define what trial and error
means.
Mr. Merlis. All I would say, sir, is that there is a role
for 100 percent--for baggage match in this process, if you
focus on the people and you identify and sort out those people
who need additional scrutiny from those who, because they have
got clean NCIC and Customs records, they have Federal security
clearances, they meet a host of criteria.
Let the government pick the criteria. You may have 200
million people out of our citizens who fit it. Maybe for those
200 million, you don't need a bag match. For the other 65
million people, and I am talking only about citizens, but for
the other 65 million people who can't meet that test you do
need bag match for; and one of the reasons, sir, is, as this
statute is written, if you had a 100 percent bag match, and
there was a misconnect, we know from our test in 1997 that 1
out of every 70 people at a hub does not meet his connection.
That means, first of all, you have got to pull that one bag
off every single plane because every plane has more than 70
passengers. How do you ever get the bag to the owner? You can't
put it on a plane unless the passenger is on it, so we are
talking about passenger inconvenience without necessarily the
concomitant increase in security, as proven September 11th. If
the guy is suspicious, bag match for the guy; if he is not
suspicious, then screen his bag.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Yeffet, I know that you have a 4 o'clock
commitment. And I don't want you to miss your flight. One
series of questions, if I might.
In terms of the folks we hire either for interviews or for
the screening or what have you, what level of tolerance should
we accept for their performance? Mr. Yeffet.
Mr. Yeffet. Zero tolerance. There is a difference between
performance of a security man or woman that passed all of the
training, and they have to run the security, and we rely on
them. If they cannot pass the test, and they fail for us, the
terrorists succeed; and, therefore, we cannot replace the life
of anyone and the one who failed has to go home.
During the training, if the students, if I may call them,
that fail in the test, they are still in the responsibility of
the trainers and the security managers.
Maybe something goes wrong with the trainers, and
therefore, we will retrain them to make sure that we did the
maximum. If, after we did the maximum, the one here or one
there will fail, he has to leave and to go home.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Merlis, do you share that opinion?
Mr. Merlis. Well, I think when you do a layered approach,
you don't have to have 100 percent. Your layers add up to 100
percent. So, if you have several requirements in this process--
if one person doesn't ask all of the questions correctly, but
the next one finds whatever the bad stuff is, then you have
accomplished your goal of preventing someone from piercing the
security system.
I think that 100 percent is not for every single person.
Every single time is not accomplishable; it is not going to
happen. So what we have to do is recognize we need a system
with appropriate redundancies. So, if at 98 or 99 percent, you
know you get that 1 or 2 in 100 failure, then there is a backup
there who--just look at the math of it. The likelihood is, the
second one isn't going to have a failure on that same person.
If you had a third layer the likelihood is you aren't going to
have a failure on that same person.
I just don't think it is doable to have 100 percent for
every single person every single time that they ask a question.
Mr. Ose. I understand the redundancies question. If you
have someone who is not performing his particular layer of
inspection, do you keep him or do you replace him?
Mr. Merlis. I think you replace them, but if a person was
diligent, I don't think you fire him. You retrain him and make
sure that he does it the right way. I mean, a person may not
say the 10 words he is supposed to say. He might cut his
sentence off. Now he has violated the rule. The requirement
cannot be so rigid that discretion isn't used, as long as the
totality of the system is 100 percent, which I think is the
goal.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Yeffet, in your experience, how have you dealt
with that? If you have someone out on the line who does not
perform satisfactorily under your management, how do you handle
that?
Mr. Yeffet. I fired the director of security in Paris
when--he had family with children in school. When I found out
that he didn't perform properly in the level that we expect him
to do it, I had to fly over there to make sure that my deputy
was right with his evaluation. Once I was convinced, I fired
him.
Now, what my colleague says here, that if the man was not
trained well and made a mistake, so we have to retrain him. If
he was not trained well, I would fire the trainer and the
director of security that assigned him to do the job.
But, if he were trained well and passed all of the tests,
and I am talking about testing, not this question or other
question, if he failed in tests, he cannot remain in the
security company.
Mr. Merlis. If I can respond, I would agree. The fact is, I
was referring to the practice that is now going on that if
someone misses an object even now, is the person fired? Mr.
Yeffet said questions should not be asked in any given way,
which means yes/no, only if a person asks 10 questions. Under
the theory that we have in place today, if a person asks 10
questions and inadvertently asks one which is a yes/no, has he
failed and therefore is fired?
I am against that. I think that it is the overall
performance, for which if there is a failure then you fire him.
Mr. Ose. The question of redundancy--Todd, we are going to
get to you. The question of redundancy is a very good question,
because we had an incident in Atlanta or Chicago where somebody
got through the first level, and they got caught at the random
screen at the gate.
The system worked. The redundancy worked. My question is,
if that first screen keeps missing, I mean, there is a problem
with either the training or the person, and it has to be fixed.
I don't know how in an issue of this importance, you can even
look past that for a moment. I mean, I have to tell Mr.
Yeffet's perspective on the level of tolerance is a lot closer
to mine than the two of yours.
Mr. Merlis. Just if I may, sir. I am not disagreeing. I
agree with him. I was talking about the context that we have
today wherein if somebody asked a question wrong, he would be
fired. I think that is excessive. One question asked wrong, not
that the person breached security, but he asked the question
wrong.
If his overall performance is deficient, he should be
fired. If his performance means he let things through that
shouldn't be let through, that should be grounds for doing it.
But 100 percent, as it has been explained to me, means you do
nothing, you do not deviate one iota ever. And I think that is
a standard which is not going to be achievable. I mean it may
be achievable for some people most of the time, but under that
standard, you say a question wrong once in an 8-hour day, you
are fired, that is wrong.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Hauptli, from the operator's and the airport's
standpoint?
Mr. Hauptli. I think I forgot the question.
Mr. Ose. The question had to do with to what degree do you
accept less than satisfactory performance by your security
personnel?
Mr. Hauptli. The answer to that is, you don't. The
legislation provides the Under Secretary of the Transportation
Security Administration the ability to fire personnel that are
not performing.
Mr. Ose. I want to thank the panel. Mr. Yeffet, Mr. Merlis,
Mr. Hauptli, your testimony today was compelling and highly
informative. I am sure the next panel is going to be just as
good. I have to tell you that as a Member of Congress, I have a
zero level of tolerance. There is no way to recover from a
fatal mistake here. I mean, I am hoping that the rules and
regulations incorporate that.
I can't quantify for you today what that means in terms of
operations, and I am willing to take that risk. But, I would
rather spend a couple of hours in an airport than what may well
be the alternative.
Mr. Hauptli. Just make sure that you buy things when you
are in the airport, sir.
Mr. Ose. I do regularly. I feel like I live in an airport.
So thank you all for coming.
Mr. Yeffet. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ose. We are back from the recess. I will introduce our
next panel.
John O'Brien is the director of engineering and air safety
for the Airline Pilots Association, International. We have
Patricia Friend, who is the president of the Association of
Flight Attendants. We have Mark Roth, who is the general
counsel for the American Federation of Government Employees,
and joining us shortly will be Paul Hudson, who is the
executive director for the Aviation Consumer Action Project.
Lady and gentlemen, I apologize for the length of time it
has taken to get to this panel. That was, I thought, a
compelling previous panel. I appreciate your patience. We have
read your testimony. To the extent you can summarize, it would
be appreciated.
Mr. O'Brien for 5 minutes.
STATEMENTS OF JOHN O'BRIEN, DIRECTOR OF ENGINEERING AND AIR
SAFETY, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL; PATRICIA
FRIEND, PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS; MARK ROTH,
GENERAL COUNSEL, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES;
AND PAUL HUDSON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AVIATION CONSUMER ACTION
PROJECT
Mr. O'Brien. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I am John
O'Brien, director of the Engineering and Air Safety Department
for the Air Line Pilots Association. ALPA represents 67,000
airline pilots who fly for 47 U.S. and Canadian airlines. We
sincerely appreciate this opportunity to appear before the
subcommittee to present our views on the important subject of
aviation security regulation.
ALPA has been in the forefront of efforts to create a more
secure airline system. We are pleased, therefore, that the
President last week signed into law the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act.
Mr. Ose. Mr. O'Brien, would you halt for a moment? I made a
rookie mistake here. I need to have you all rise and swear you
in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Ose. Let the record show that the witnesses all
answered in the affirmative and now we're going to go back to
Mr. O'Brien.
Mr. O'Brien. This hearing is quite timely because it
concerns the implication of that law's numerous provisions and
other initiatives. Congress' oversight role will be a critical,
important part of any effort to prevent a repeat of some of the
regulatory adventures that have occurred in the past. An
example of such an adventure was the 10-year odyssey that FAA
embarked upon to revise some provisions of security, FAR 107
and 108, which were finally published this summer. We are
hopeful that the new DOT Under Secretary's office will produce
regulatory proposals and final rules in a more expeditious
fashion.
I'd like to emphasize that ALPA strongly promotes one level
of security in the implementation of Federal security
regulations. A terrorist guided missile in the form of a fully
loaded airliner can take off from any commercial airport in the
country and wreak havoc on unsuspecting innocents virtually
anywhere below. The type of operation is also not a
discriminator. There is no difference between a fully loaded
cargo airplane and a fully loaded passenger airplane in terms
of their use as guided missiles. Each of our recommendations is
made in this context.
ALPA has been promoting positive electronic verification of
identity and electronic airport access control systems since
1987. This is primarily as a result of the PSA accident that
was mentioned earlier this afternoon. This accident was caused
by an armed, disgruntled former airline employee and in effect
was a mass murderer of 43 passengers and crew members and bears
striking similarities to the hijackings of September 11th. This
accident was attributable in large measure to the identity
verification inadequacies that are yet to be addressed 14 years
later. On the heels of that tragedy FAA revised airport
security regulations to require that many airports install
computerized access control systems. In the mid-'90's Congress
provided 2 million for testing and implementing a transient
employee security system that came to be known as the Universal
Access System [UAS]. For all practical purposes, those funds
were wasted.
Even though ALPA completed successful UAS tests and
standards were finalized for the system in 1998, there has been
no implementation of the system. This failure came as a result
of the FAA policy to leave UAS implementation to the sole
discretion of the airlines. In the meantime, technology has
moved on and the standards devised for UAS are no longer
current. FAA has now finished a report on smart card systems
for identifying armed law enforcement officers who are using or
supporting our air transportation system. The private sector is
developing proposals based on that and other advanced
technologies such as biometric readers. The new Aviation
Security Act provides for pilot programs in no fewer than 20
airports to test and evaluate new and emerging technology for
access control and other security requirements.
While we wholeheartedly endorse testing new technologies,
there also must be requirements to install them or testing is
for naught. Therefore, we recommend the standards be
immediately developed and made regulatory for the creation of a
UAS that could use the best technologies available. The tests
at the 20-plus airports should be used to validate technologies
designed to meet the new standard, and in addition to providing
positive access control for employees. The UAS must also be
used to facilitate employee screening at checkpoints in order
to reduce delays for passengers, verify the identity of jump
seat riders and it could be used as a media for digital pilot
licensing or certificate information.
ALPA is also very supportive of efforts to perform
voluntary checks on trusted passengers so that the amount of
time spent at screening checkpoints is reduced. The UAS system
could be used for that purpose and perhaps others that have not
yet been considered.
I'd like to turn your attention to a new Security Act
provision to require security screening of all checked bags and
the screening of cargo and mail in cargo aircraft. We agree
with these provisions as far as they go because the potential
for carrying a bomb laden bag onto an aircraft is very real and
needs to be addressed as soon as possible. However, the new
security law provides the DOT Under Secretary with a 1-year
study period for reporting on the screening requirements
applicable to aircraft with 60 or fewer passenger seats used in
scheduled passenger service.
We thought we had rid ourselves of dual regulatory
standards with a successful one level of safety campaign but,
apparently, that isn't so. We recommend that the airline
security regulations be amended to require one level of
security through security screening of all passengers and their
baggage. Such action would be consistent with the precedents
established by DOT and FAA under the 1995 one level of safety
regulatory initiatives.
There are a number of issues surrounding the strengthening
of cockpits that are deserving of congressional attention.
We're encouraged by the rapid move toward full voluntary
passenger fleet compliance with special Federal regulations on
cockpit door hardening that the FAA recently issued. However,
some important debates are now underway on how best to make
longer term aircraft flight deck security improvements.
Everyone understands the basic concept of installing stronger
flight deck doors to keep terrorists out of the cockpit. What
may not be as readily apparent is the need for strengthening of
cockpit floor as well as the bulkhead to which the door is
attached. A strong door offers little protection if it's
connected to a weak frame.
Another question is whether cockpit door hardening and
other related security enhancements should be made for cargo
aircraft. We believe that they should because cargo aircraft
have been the target of security breaches in the past and they
could be used as terrorist guided missiles like a passenger-
carrying aircraft.
FAA has recently enacted special regulations to encourage
cockpit door strengthening, including allocation of Federal
funds for doors for passenger aircraft; however, they did not
specify cargo aircraft; so these aircraft are not being
retrofitted in spite of the fact that DOT's Rapid Response Team
for Aircraft Security recommended retrofits for the entire U.S.
fleet.
Mr. Ose. Mr. O'Brien, are you about finished there?
Mr. O'Brien. I'm just about. I'll skip the last one here
and just say thank you, and I will be pleased to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Brien follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Ose. That is an excellent wrap up. Thank you, Mr.
O'Brien.
Ms. Friend.
Ms. Friend. Thank you, and good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and
members of the subcommittee. My name is Patricia Friend, and
I'm the international president of the Association of Flight
Attendants. We very much appreciate the opportunity to testify
today.
The American people have made it clear that they expect the
government to correct fundamental problems in our air security
system before they will resume normal travel patterns. Our
Nation's flight attendants have not had the luxury of picking
and choosing when we fly. We went right back to work after
September 11th. Flight attendants continue to comfort anxious
passengers while we cope with not only our own concerns and
fears about our personal safety, but our grief for fellow
flight attendants who lost their lives.
I speak to you today from the perspective of the more than
50,000 flight attendants at 26 U.S. airlines represented by the
Association of Flight Attendants. The Aviation and
Transportation Security Act of 2001, signed into law last week
by President Bush, makes crucial improvements in the security
of our aviation system, but there's still more to do.
Federalizing airport security screening and creating a new
Transportation Security Agency separate from the Federal
Aviation Administration was a vital improvement in securing our
skies. We support Secretary Mineta's goal of a new security
agency that focuses solely on security, and we support the
hiring of a qualified candidate from law enforcement or the
military to head that agency.
Just as important, we welcome the increased presence of air
marshals, strengthened cockpit doors and the new training that
we will receive. We welcome the screening of everything and
everyone with access to secure areas of airports and enhanced
identification of airport personnel through the use of new
technologies. Yet, there are gaps still in our aviation
security system and we are counting on you to provide the
flight attendants with the tools that we need to protect our
passengers and ourselves in the event of a future attack.
As we have tragically seen, once a security threat in the
cabin compromises the flight deck, the aircraft and lives on
the ground are in jeopardy. Securing cockpit doors and
providing pilots with a defensive device are key to ensuring
that terrorists will not in the future be able to use our
planes as missiles. But the new law fails to require flight
attendant access to non-lethal devices in the cabin.
The flight attendants have become the first and last line
of defense for passengers. We are responsible for ensuring that
a security threat doesn't reach the cockpit. To effectively
meet that responsibility, we must be given the means to defend
ourselves, our passengers, and the flight deck from intruders.
You can accomplish this by ensuring that flight attendants will
be trained and qualified in the use of an appropriate non-
lethal weapon stored in a sealed or locked compartment
somewhere on the aircraft.
At some level, government licenses automobile drivers,
teachers, contractors, plumbers, nurses, doctors, a variety of
other citizens and professionals. These licenses are issued in
order to control and ascertain a level of proficiency.
Flight attendants are trained in the emergency, safety, and
security operations on board an aircraft, but currently the
Federal Aviation Administration does not license flight
attendants. In virtually every in-flight situation, emergency
or otherwise, flight attendants are the only trained
professionals present to provide first aid to passengers, fight
in-flight cabin fires, provide guidance during a decompression
or turbulence, handle unruly passengers who might endanger the
safety of other passengers on the flight, and even help
passengers out of an airplane after a crash.
Now with the passage of a new law and the additional
security training that will be provided to flight attendants,
it's time for the public and other aviation workers to be given
the assurance that flight attendants have been trained and are
qualified to perform their duties. The best way to accomplish
this is by the FAA's licensing flight attendants.
The size and amount of carry-on baggage directly affects
the job of security screeners and the potential for a weapon to
be brought on board the aircraft. Currently an FAA directive
exists that limits carry-on baggage to one bag plus one
personal item per passenger. The new security law includes a
sense of Congress that the FAA should maintain its current
restrictions on carry-on bags. The government now needs to go a
step further and codify this limitation in its security
regulations in order to avoid the possibility that the current
FAA security directive could be changed or eliminated at any
time.
The new security law states that, where baggage screening
machines are not available, alternatives to screening checked
baggage, such as a bag match program, are required, but
regrettably it does not require 100 percent baggage/passenger
match. Nothing short of 100 percent bag match and 100 percent
evaluation of all passengers will close this loophole in the
aviation security system.
The last issue I'll bring to your attention is currently
one of the most controversial for flight attendants at many of
our U.S. carriers. Recent security directives have required
that each aircraft cabin be thoroughly searched before the
first flight of the day. Secretary Mineta's Rapid Response Team
on Aircraft Security reported that current procedures allow
inadequately trained personnel to conduct these searches for
dangerous items hidden on board the aircraft. The DOT team also
reported that insufficient time is given to assigned personnel
in order to conduct a thorough search. We agree with the Rapid
Response Team, which made specific recommendations that
security searches be assigned to trained experts and not to
cockpit or cabin crew members.
Currently, cabin security searches are being done by
airline staff, including flight attendants, at 14 AFA-
represented carriers. Airline management further compromises
security by forcing flight attendants to complete a review of
their safety equipment and a thorough security search of the
aircraft in as little as 5 minutes, all in order to ensure an
on-time departure. While these policies are within the current
FAA directive, they guarantee that inadequate searches are
performed, making them in effect a sham. Security searches, as
I'm sure you will agree, are important tasks that belong in the
hands of trained security personnel who are part of the new
Transportation Security Administration at the Department of
Transportation.
Overall we are pleased with the new security law and we
believe that many security loopholes will now be closed once
all the provisions of the new law are put into effect. It is
essential, however, to move swiftly on the additional security
enhancements to correct continuing flaws in our aviation
security system. Hundreds of millions of U.S. passengers and
crew fly each year. We deserve a truly safe and a secure
environment.
Thank you for allowing me to testify, and I welcome any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Friend follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Ms. Friend.
Mr. Roth, from the American Federation of Government
Employees, take 5 minutes.
Mr. Roth. On behalf of the 600,000 government workers
represented by AFGE, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this
opportunity to offer our views focused on potential employee
concerns regarding the implementation of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act.
Regardless of the issue of Federalization, I believe we all
can agree that screening will not improve if the job status of
screeners is not improved through better pay, better benefits,
and real job protections. Ultimately, there is no other way to
recruit the best employees and to keep them on the job.
Regarding job protections, the act gives unfettered
discretion to the Secretary to summarily dismiss any Federal
employee screeners regardless of tenure or proven cause. AFGE
firmly believes that such unprecedented discretion is
unnecessary, and we wish to point out that already during the
lengthy 1-year probationary period a Federal employee may be
immediately fired for virtually any or no reason. In the
context of these particular inspection jobs, competent, focused
supervisors should be able to easily weed out the bad actors
within a very short time.
Following the probationary period in a nonsecurity context,
under 5 U.S.C. 4303, a Federal employee can be fired or demoted
with 30 days notice. In accordance with elementary notions of
due process, that employee can then appeal his or her case.
However, according to the Office of Personnel Management, a
very small number of dismissals and demotions are reversed
through such appeals, and it is also important to point out
that the employee is off the Federal payroll. They are off the
Federal payroll while the appeal is pending.
More importantly here, where airport security is now a
national security issue, under 5 U.S.C. 7532 an employee may be
suspended without notice and then removed after such
investigation and review as considered necessary by the agency
in the interest of national security. In that context the
agency need not provide the employee the rationale for
dismissal, and the agency's decision to dismiss that employee
is not subject to appeal.
Thus, in the context of airport screeners and airport
security, we believe these existing Title 5 management
authorities to remove these workers are already extremely broad
and sufficient.
The new law also gives the Secretary unprecedented
discretion to determine the compensation packages and job
protections of the Federal employee screeners,
``notwithstanding any other law.'' AFGE believes here, too,
that such unlimited discretion is unnecessary and actually
counterproductive to maintaining a high quality work force.
There is simply no reason for Federal employee screeners to be
treated differently than other Federal employees with respect
to their pay, benefits, and after the fact job protections.
The report language to the conference report encourages the
Secretary to ensure that screeners have access to Federal
health life insurance, retirement benefits, and whistleblower
protections. We believe, though, that fixing terms and
conditions of employment in statute would ensure that the
lowest bid mentality that so undermined contractor airport
screening will not be repeated after Federalization of the
function. Therefore, AFGE urges the Congress to revisit the
issue to expressly provide Federal employee airport screeners
with the same compensation packages and job protections as
other Federal employees.
It is clearly not in the interest of any American who
values her or his freedom to fly to undermine the Federal
Government's ability to recruit and retain the best airport
screeners by making them second class Federal employees. AFGE
does not believe it is the intention of either law makers or
administration officials to allow such a scenario to unfold.
AFGE looks forward to ensuring that Federal employee
screeners are treated equitably vis-a-vis other Federal
employees with respect to issues like pay, health insurance,
EEO rights, life insurance, retirement benefits, the right to
organize and be represented by unions and whistleblower
protections. The rights of Federal employees to organize and
bargain collectively in particular serve as a check against the
office politics and the pressures not to disclose safety
violations identified by the whistleblower group, Government
Accountability Project, and its argument in favor of
whistleblower protections for airport screeners.
With respect to matters concerning public safety, it often
falls to rank and file Federal employees to alert the Congress.
At will employees like these screeners will not risk coming
forward. Such warnings are most likely to be encouraged when
the employees with the relevant information can go safely, even
anonymously to their union that will protect them from
arbitrary retaliation. Thus, it promotes the interest of the
millions of American air travelers if the screener work force
is free of coercion and free to organize.
Finally, there is no plausible rationale for denying
Federal employee screeners the right to organize. AFGE is proud
to represent tens of thousands of other Federal employees
engaged in public safety, such as Bureau of Prisons
correctional officers, DOD police, law enforcement officers
throughout every agency, INS employees, and firefighters.
Moreover, today airport customs officials are represented by
unions, as are the skilled machinists, the baggage handlers,
the mechanics, the air traffic controllers and those in the
front lines, the flight attendants and pilots. There is no
reason to treat a Federal employee screener's right to organize
any differently. AFGE will work with the administration to
ensure that Federal employee airport screeners have the right,
if the workers so elect, to be represented by a union.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding an important and
timely hearing. I look forward to answering any questions that
you and your colleagues may wish to ask.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roth follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Roth.
Our final witness is Paul Hudson, who is the executive
director of the Aviation Consumer Action Project. Thank you for
joining us today. For 5 minutes.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Congressman Tierney. My
name is Paul Hudson. I'm executive director of the Aviation
Consumer Action Project [ACAP], which is a nonprofit
organization that since 1971 has acted as a voice and ear for
the public on major aviation issues. ACAP has been a national
advocate for strengthened aviation security measures since the
1980's and has been a member representing the public on the
FAA's Aviation Security Advisory Committee and its Aviation
Rulemaking Advisory Committee since 1991. In 1998, I co-chaired
the security group's Working Group for Public Education, and
since 1989 I've testified about a dozen times before Congress
and two Presidential commissions on the subject.
Since September 11th, I served on the FAA's Ad Hoc Aviation
Security Subcommittee, which was evaluating new aviation
security technologies and procedures, and was on the team
evaluating airport screening.
I would like to thank you very much for holding this
hearing today. With the enactment of legislation last week,
this is a very timely and very important next step. What are
the details, what are the regulations going to be? Before
getting into that, though, I need to mention the goals that we
need to keep in mind.
First, obviously is to prevent a repeat of the September
11th attacks or any variation thereof whereby U.S. civilian
aircraft are used as weapons of mass destruction. Second, to
protect airport transportation, which is an important part of
the Nation's infrastructure and our way of life.
As we go through the process of regulation, we also need to
keep in mind a unique feature in this type of regulation; that
is, that the details of security regulations, unlike other
types of regulation, are secret. This means that the level of
congressional oversight must be at a higher level and also you
must have a new aviation--excuse me--a new Transportation
Security Advisory Committee that has highly effective public
members because there is no peer review, there is no public
comment process, there is no public scrutiny that normally
applies in this field. Otherwise, we fear that the egregious
policies of the past, some of which contributed to the success
of September 11th, could potentially even be repeated,
obviously not to the same thing but different ones in the same
vein.
Moreover, the FAA practice of granting largely unrestricted
waiver and exemptions to air carriers, airports, and others
would be also likely to continue, we feel. The first test of
the new system is going to be who the people the administration
appoints to lead the effort. The second test will be what those
people do, particularly in the key areas of security
regulations and standards. The third test will be the
performance of the new agency in the coming months, and the
final test will be whether additional large scale aviation and
transportation terrorism is prevented.
Congress needs to be kept up-to-date and needs to have
appropriate oversight in each of these areas. With regard to
transportation security personnel hiring criteria, in addition
to the things that are mandated in the act, we feel there
should be national security background checks. And with the pay
and benefits having been effectively tripled for screeners,
hiring can and should be on a competitive basis, with only the
best being hired for training, those who meet the high
standards, surviving training and only those who pass a
probationary period being retained.
Concerning employee training, there should be a minimum of
30 days training for all security personnel, or 175 hours. This
is the same or less than what we have in many other areas of
security. Proficiency tests and occasional spot testing are
inadequate. The current system fosters boredom, constant small
talk and a general lack of seriousness.
I've indicated in my testimony we need a universal in-depth
screening system, and I would refer you to my written testimony
for the details of that.
We also feel that cockpits need to be triple sealed and
secured. In my testimony before the House and Senate, our first
point was you must secure the cockpits. That's only been
partially done to this point. There needs to be a reduction in
carry-on luggage to levels that the screening system will be
able to detect reliably at least 95 percent of prohibited
items. We need frequent testing of screening with test objects
as exercises as well as winner take all type gotcha tests we
have now. And, since most screeners will never face a
terrorist, unlike law enforcement officers, we need to utilize
military-type exercises and gaming techniques. Otherwise,
people will not maintain the level of alertness no matter how
in principle they may be motivated.
With regard to where we start, I think a model aviation
security program and training facility needs to be established
at Reagan National Airport. It has all the ingredients needed
for that and, if we're going to have a national uniform
standard, we need to have a center, especially to start out
with.
Regarding employee and passenger identification, the
industry is heavily pushing ``smart cards.'' These things would
have fingerprint aspects to them. Face recognition is another
technology that's being pushed. We feel they have a role to
play, particularly for access of employees to sensitive areas,
but they should not be issued to enable passengers to bypass or
avoid standard security checks. Smart terrorists will be able
to obtain them. And, even trusted employees, there is always a
danger of them going to the dark side. If you look at the
profiles which are outlined in my testimony of smart
terrorists, most of them would be able to obtain these smart
cards.
Now, there's often confusion about reducing the risk of
aviation bombings. The things that need to be done in that area
are not the same for the most part as anti-hijacking measures.
Installing hardened cargo and baggage containers would be a
very important first step. Passenger bag matching still is
valid. None of the historical aviation bombings have involved
suicide bombings and many involve dupes.
Explosive detection equipment for screening of checked
baggage, this needs to be expedited, with regulations if
necessary, to ensure that we have the equipment in the
legislative timeframes. There is presently only one
manufacturer that makes the stuff and we're going to have to do
something to change that if we want to have the congressional
mandates met.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Hudson, the red light went off because I
turned it off, but if you----
Mr. Hudson. I'm not going to go through the rest of it, but
I would just conclude by saying that the challenges and
terrorist threats we now face, especially in aviation security,
are immense, but the resources of this Nation are also
enormous. The Federal Government needs to place its full power
and energies to secure the skies over America, and I look
forward to answering any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hudson follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Hudson. I want to preface my
questions by conveying to Ms. Friend and Mr. O'Brien the
sentiment of the Congress regarding your colleagues who aren't
with us today and to Mr. Hudson for your loss. We're going to
try to do everything we can to prevent that from repeating
itself, and I thank you all for coming here today to talk about
it.
I want to go to a question we dealt with in the last panel
having to do with the level of tolerance to accept, whether in
terms of what gets through or performance in the screening
process. Mr. O'Brien--were all of you here for the previous
panel's testimony so you heard the body of the conversation? Do
you have any thoughts on, as we set this system up, with these
rules and regulations, the issue of zero tolerance, where
should we be on that spectrum as it relates to either the
interview screening process or the performance level of the
folks in that process?
Mr. O'Brien. Obviously, in the interviewing-screening
process, applicants should be held to the highest standards, of
course. This is similar to people or personnel who are involved
in safety critical endeavors as well. However, as far as
disciplinary or firing situations, I would suggest that there
may be some value in looking at the safety programs that are
currently in effect. We have programs now that apply to certain
safety disciplines where, if there is a deliberate violation of
a regulation or a deliberate act that compromises safety or a
criminal act, then there is no recourse for the individual.
However, if the act or situation is not deliberate or
inadvertent and an individual reports on him or herself, then
there is an investigation undertaken jointly by the oversight
responsibility, in this case maybe the FAA or TSA, the employer
and, if the union is involved, a union representative.
Corrective action is identified. FAA has veto power over
whether that corrective action is appropriate or not when
agreed appropriate action is taken.
So, I think something like that might be considered for
compliance with security procedures. No matter how good the
procedures are, there may be faults with the procedure
development itself. If employees recognize those faults through
self use and report on those faults and they're analyzed
properly, then I think disciplinary action in that particular
case is not warranted.
Mr. Ose. Ms. Friend.
Ms. Friend. We believe that aviation security has to be a
series of layers and the first line of defense must be on the
ground. Training today, is to keep the aggression off from the
aircraft. So, to that extent we strongly support the most
comprehensive and inviolate as possible first line of defense
on the ground, but, having said that, we also advocate on
behalf of our members the concept of trained to proficiency. We
believe strongly that a person who interviews and is qualified
for the job deserves the best possible training and that a
failure is most often attributable to a failure in the training
process, not in the individual.
However, we also support Mr. O'Brien's position that
someone who deliberately compromises aviation security clearly
falls outside the realm of a training issue. Part of my oral
testimony that I left out in order to meet the 5-minute limit
really did focus on the projected training for the security
screeners. There's been some talk of a minimum number of hours.
We think it's premature to set a minimum number of hours. We
believe that an expert in aviation security should develop a
comprehensive training program and then tell us how many hours
that will take to offer to the new Federalized security
screening force.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Roth.
Mr. Roth. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to say very
clearly for the record that AFGE is not in the business of
defending poor performers, people who could not do competent
airport screening. The purpose of my testimony was to let you
know that there are current tools in existing law which are
extremely broad that are not used properly by supervisors, such
as probationary periods and such as 7532 of title 5. I don't
know how many of you are familiar with that provision on
national security. It's very broad. If someone is on the lines
and they are deemed a national security problem, they are gone
immediately. They don't even find out why.
The other thing is there's a difference between zero
tolerance and no right of an appeal after the fact. It is
counterproductive if you give these people no rights. Where a
workplace may be very arbitrary, there may be arbitrary conduct
that the workplace--sometimes there are politics, with a small
``p,'' at a small workplace, and a supervisor can be allowed to
run rampant and can be allowed to coerce, terrorize, or
actually, you know, put fear in a workplace so that they will
not come forward with safety violations. They have no union,
they have nowhere to go. They will leave. You know, there are
environments where you have hostile supervisors and you've got
to go along to get along. You must have some balance in the
system, and we think the after-the-fact appeal, because
mistakes are made, although in most cases employees lose, let's
face it, 80 percent, that means that, in 20 percent of the
cases, there was a mistake made, bad supervision, improper
motive on the supervisor. But, to be able to just say that an
employee is not meeting a standard where there's no right of an
appeal to show that you did meet the standard I think goes way
too far.
So, we're not in business to protect a poor performer,
someone who has proven to be a poor performer, but also not to
have a counterproductive set of rules that has people leave the
agencies as soon as they're trained and go off to Customs, INS,
where they are strongly unionized and these types of small
``p'' politics and games are not played.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Hudson.
Mr. Hudson. With respect to this discipline approach, we
would say, for any serious infraction, you should remove the
person first and then have the due process follow. It's a
similar process that's used with air traffic controllers. We
also support, however, having whistleblower protection for
these people. We think that's very important as a preventative
against corruption or other abuses. With regard to minor
things, poor performance, there should be penalties for poor
performance and the approach that has been taken in the
existing system, which, as I see, is in some of the
legislation--I'm not sure whether it got into the final bill--
is that you can fail a proficiency test and you get some
remedial training and you go back. No one who fails proficiency
tests should go back until they pass the proficiency test.
Thank you.
Mr. Ose. We up here have the red lights too. I want to make
sure I just synthesize. None of you has objection to removal of
someone from the front line, so to speak. It's the summary
dismissal issue absent retraining or an appeal process, the
``due process'' I think was the phrase that you used, Mr. Roth.
You think that protection should remain in the rules and
regulations; is that accurate, Mr. O'Brien?
Mr. O'Brien. That is correct.
Mr. Ose. Ms. Friend.
Ms. Friend. Correct.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Roth.
Mr. Roth. That's correct. I would make one more point on
whistleblower protection. It's very rare to have an individual
whistleblower. It's much more common to have a whistleblower go
through a union or another group. So just to say we're going to
give you a whistleblower right, that is not going to get it
done. People--the experience, the studies even from special
counsel, people are too afraid to put themselves forward alone.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Hudson, did I synthesize your remarks
accurately?
Mr. Hudson. Yes.
Mr. Ose. My time has expired. We'll have another round. Mr.
Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Mr. Roth, I think the problem that
some people had, you hit right on the head that with this
legislation some people objected to having the security issue
Federalized because they didn't want it unionized and that was
it, and I think Mr. Mica, without putting words in his mouth,
raised at least part of that reservation when he made the
comment in his testimony that it takes 3\1/2\ years to
discipline a Federal employee. Would you address that for us?
Mr. Roth. I have some problems with that because they throw
out that number and there may be a case and there may be an EEO
process, but in most cases, like I told you, during the first
year they're gone immediately and there are no appeal rights.
After that, you have 30 days and then, you know, you have a
right to respond. Under this law, you don't even have a right
to notice and respond, and it may not even be Constitutional in
that regard. There are some cases on that. However, in most
cases you have 30 days, you have a right to respond, and then
you're gone and you have a case. You have a day of hearing.
Now, it may go on appeal to some other Federal agency for
months and months where you would never hear about it and no
one works on it, but that doesn't mean the employee is not
gone. There's no paycheck, they have to move on. So, on paper,
you may have a case, but that person's gone within about 30
days.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. I think it was helpful to clarify
that. Ms. Friend, you indicated that you thought flight
attendants should have access to non-lethal means of protection
on a flight. Can you give me some specifics of examples of what
you mean by that?
Ms. Friend. I sat on the Secretary's Rapid Response Team
for Aircraft Security, and we specifically recommended a list
and an evaluation of a list of non-lethal devices, including
stun guns, tasers, mace, pepper spray. We have asked for really
four areas of defense in the cabin. Now that we have fortified
the cockpit doors, which we absolutely support, it's important
to change the procedures to say that the pilots will not
compromise the security of the cockpit by coming out to assist
in any disturbance no matter how difficult. We have asked for
additional training, including upgraded security training,
personal defense training. We've asked for an emergency means
of notification to notify the cockpit that a hijacking was in
progress, and we've asked for access to a non-lethal defense
weapon.
None of these things are intended in any way to suggest
that flight attendants could somehow overpower any violent
hijacker, but they are intended to buy us time in the cabin, to
buy our passengers time in order to allow the pilots to get the
aircraft on the ground safely, which is where the only real
help in that situation is.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. I would like each of you to address
the issue of a trusted passenger concept, if you would. I've
heard it mentioned several times, the apparent insinuation
being that there are some people that could be screened once
rigorously and after that they have got some special passage
onto the plane without going through the customary and every
occasion flight review. Share with me your feelings on that
concept, starting with Mr. O'Brien, and we'll work from my left
to my right.
Mr. O'Brien. Conceptually the proposal has some merit. I
have not seen any specific details of how it actually would be
employed, what kind of screening would be required in order to
make you a so-called trusted passenger, or what kind of
identification system would be set up and how the trusted
passengers would actually be handled. In concept, though, it
has been offered as a means of expediting the flow of traffic
through the checkpoints, and for that purpose it has merit.
Until we see some more details on exactly how it would be
employed, we just sort of view it as a potential means of
expediting the flow through checkpoints but with some
reservations.
Ms. Friend. We actually strongly object. We're very
concerned that it creates a section of our aviation security
that could be easily compromised. It's entirely inconceivable
to me that some sort of identification could be created that
could not be forged, that is not subject to fraud. In addition,
you have to ask yourself once this is issued, is this a
lifetime pass or does the person have to subject themselves to
repeated security in order to renew their sort of license to
bypass security? So we have grave reservations and in fact
object to the concept.
Mr. Roth. Well, of course I'm unqualified, let me say it
upfront. I'm just an air traveler. However, when you talk about
something----
Mr. Tierney. Then somebody should gag you and go on----
Mr. Roth [continuing]. And with Mr. Yeffet here before, I
think there are other places I would rather have been, but when
you talk about a system needing zero tolerance, that is a
system that would need zero tolerance. As an air traveler, I
would be concerned that you would have the system and they
would be not inconvenienced but how would you have the zero
tolerance in place. Again that's as a nonprofessional.
Mr. Hudson. We're strongly opposed to this concept as well
as the proposals that I've seen. Not only can smart terrorists
probably and undoubtedly will get these cards, and some
proponents have talked about prescreening as many as 50 million
Americans, but you have to remember that we're dealing with
very smart terrorists today. They are professionals at identity
theft. A number of the September 11th terrorists used that
method, document forgery, creation of fictitious identities,
and when you get one of these smart cards, as they're called,
they're only as good as the initial establishment of identity.
So for instance, the leader of the September 11th attacks
had a graduate degree in city planning, and a number of the
other terrorists have either had pilot's licenses or pilot
training, other master terrorists have had engineering
backgrounds, many of them have frequent flier cards, and they
have the full panoply of ID that we expect of a normal American
traveler. In order to screen out that sort of thing, you would
have to engage in some very legally questionable profiling
involving not only national origin, religion, a whole host of
things that I think would cause serious problems. The airlines
that I've heard their proposals of anyway are not talking about
any kind of negative profiling with respect to this. It would
be nondiscriminatory and probably not restricted even to
Americans.
The other big problem with it is that it's in effect
reverse or positive profiling and instead of saying this is a
group that we need to give extra attention to because there
could be a higher correlation of them being a terrorist, we're
going to say, well, this group are good guys and we don't have
to worry so much about them or we don't have to worry about
them at all.
Profiling historically has been a failure in aviation
security. If we go back to the original anti-hijacking profile
system in the 1960's, before metal detectors, before x-ray
machines, we were up to almost one hijacking a week and we had
a profiling system, essentially an eyeball profiling system at
that time. Profiling has had its successes, but it's also had
dramatic failures. They tried to profile the Unabomber for 6
years. It failed. And, in the case of the CAP system, which is
the current profiling system, that obviously failed to check or
detect any of the 19 hijackers on September 11th, even though
apparently six or seven of them should have been flagged.
So profiling, whether it's negative or positive, has major
problems. It is necessary to do it, but it's not something you
can rely on over a universal system.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Tierney. I want to followup on a
couple specific questions. Mr. O'Brien, you heard Mr. Yeffet's
testimony about the personal interviews. Do you support that as
part and parcel of our security processes?
Mr. O'Brien. Yes, indeed. It is an important element in our
overall systems approach to security.
Mr. Ose. 100 percent or a select portion of the passenger
load?
Mr. O'Brien. I'm not sure that we heard 100 percent
requirement, even though we've vacillated around that. We
talked about a mini set of questions, and depending on how that
mini set of questions went, then you went into more detailed
questioning. So it was sort of a domino-type system depending
on the initial reaction. So if you take it from that
perspective, everybody would get some initial questioning. So
it would be 100 percent from that perspective. The detailed
questioning would entirely depend upon what kind of response
you got from the initial questions.
Mr. Ose. But the initial questions, the 2-minute drill, so
to speak, you would support that?
Mr. O'Brien. Some version of that, and again that would
depend upon the other components of the total systems approach
to doing business.
Mr. Ose. The third and the fourth and the fifth layers, so
to speak?
Mr. O'Brien. Exactly. We spend a lot of time talking about
the events of September 11th and these 19 individuals and what
would and would not have worked. There's no guarantee that
we're going to ever face that scenario again, so that speaks
highly to a systems approach that takes a much broader view of
potential terrorists threats. Some that we've already
experienced, some that we know about but have not experienced
yet. So we really do need a systems approach. Everything from
the 100 percent bag matching to you name it, many of the things
that we haven't talked about today that are included in some of
the testimony I've read.
Mr. Ose. You support something more than the present two
questions?
Mr. O'Brien. Yes.
Mr. Ose. Ms. Friend, how about the flight attendants?
Ms. Friend. We do, and it may be as simple as just changing
the way you ask a question so it's no longer a ``yes or no''
question, but I think the real issue here is who is asking the
question. It's not unlike our testimony on the airlines using
flight attendants to do aircraft security sweeps. We are now
asking overworked airline ticket agents to ask these questions
while they're also trying to check bags and assign seats and
check connections.
It should be a function of a newly created Transportation
Security Agency and those personnel to ask these questions.
Their only job is security.
Mr. Ose. OK. You guys deal with this every day. Mr. Roth
and I are probably occasional travelers. Mr. Roth, your opinion
on the----
Mr. Roth. I will tell you that the last time I traveled,
which was about a month ago, I got asked the questions by the
person at the baggage counter, and I had to keep pushing my
driver's license to them. They were more concerned about
someone not being on the shift, and, therefore, the line piling
up and I was like begging, you know, don't you want to see it.
Mr. Ose. Your point, take that off the guy at the gate or
the counter.
Mr. Roth. I agree with taking it off. They're not paying
attention to it. And it's silly to ask the question if you're
not going to look at the person and take it seriously.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Hudson.
Mr. Hudson. I would agree that we need to take questioning
away from the airline personnel and give it to the new security
personnel. I think a few questions for everyone are
appropriate. And, as I've indicated in my written testimony,
certain people should, in effect, get an interrogation.
Mr. Ose. Let me work backward from my right to the left.
Mr. Hudson, you support a match between the passengers and the
baggage, 100 percent, if I understand your testimony.
Mr. Hudson. Yes. The reason for that and why it's so
important initially is we don't have the screening equipment,
we don't have the bomb detectors in place. If we had 100
percent screening of baggage with bomb detectors as well as
machines to detect weapons for the carry-ons, that would not be
so important.
Mr. Ose. OK.
Mr. Roth.
Mr. Roth. I'm going to have to pass on that one.
Mr. Ose. Ms. Friend.
Ms. Friend. Yes, we support it. Initially it may be the
only means we have to improve the security of our checked
baggage because there aren't enough of the explosive detectors
to do 100 percent screening. But even after we have sufficient
equipment to do 100 percent screening, those machines are not
absolutely guaranteed 100 percent accurate either. And so, the
continued use of passenger baggage match adds another layer of
security.
There was a study done--MIT participated in it--in the past
few years on baggage match in the domestic market. And, it is
not impossible. That has been the position of the industry all
along that it would bring the entire system grinding to a halt.
This study proved that, in fact, that is not true. That it
could be implemented domestically and be integrated into the
system without a great deal of trouble. They simply don't want
to do it.
Mr. Ose. Mr. O'Brien, how do the pilots feel?
Mr. O'Brien. We support 100 percent screening and 100 bag
match. I disagree entirely with the opinions I heard earlier
today that it would grind the system to a halt. We have seen
technology that obviously is in the prototype stage now that
would make passenger bag matching a very simple process. It
could be used far beyond just the matching process. So it's a
matter of time to get all this implemented, but we should have
or continue to have a goal of 100 percent screening and
matching.
Mr. Ose. All right. I just want to summarize. You all
support the initial questioning something more than yes or no.
You support, those who responded, passenger baggage match. My
time has expired.
Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. I just want to ask, I think, Ms.
Friend and Mr. Roth, and maybe Mr. O'Brien has some people that
his organization represents that might be affected. Is there
any reason that any of you see that people that were laid off
as a result of the events of September 11th, a significant
number of people that are associated with the airline industry,
could not be re-employed as part of the security operation with
the proper physicals and training?
Ms. Friend. None that I'm aware of.
Mr. O'Brien. I think that several of the people who have
been laid off could make very valuable contributions to what
we're trying to do in the security sense.
Mr. Roth. AFGE would agree with that.
Mr. Tierney. Ms. Friend, you also agree?
Ms. Friend. Yes.
Mr. Tierney. It's something that a number of us have been
advocating. I assume that you would have some reason if you
didn't agree with us, that's why I asked the question. The last
question I have is basically a throw-away question out of
curiosity. Mr. O'Brien, is there a valid reason why people
flying from New York or Boston to Washington on the shuttle
cannot get out of their seat in the last half hour of the
flight?
Ms. Friend. It's only to National.
Mr. O'Brien. As I understand, as Ms. Friend just said, it's
going into National.
Ms. Friend. It's only into National Airport, and that's
because Reagan National is guaranteed the gold standard of
aviation security, unlike the rest of the airports in this
country, which apparently are only guaranteed second rate
aviation security. I can tell you in case you want to know what
happens if you do get up because----
Mr. Ose. Tell us.
Mr. Tierney. Why is it that you can't get up?
Ms. Friend. I can only assume that they somehow think that
adds to the security. But----
Mr. Tierney. As representative of the flight attendants, do
you think it adds to the security?
Ms. Friend. No, it's window dressing.
Mr. O'Brien. It obviously is a first step in a profile that
has been developed, a scenario of events that leads to a
particular situation. And those who are very anxious from a
security perspective to prevent that sequence of events from
ever occurring----
Mr. Tierney. The sequence of events we have profiled from
September 11th is you get up early in the flight where there's
still a lot of fuel on board, not in the last half hour when
you're drained out.
Mr. O'Brien. Absolutely true. But there are other--without
getting into details, there are other scenarios other than
September 11th. I only remind you that we should not be
concentrating----
Mr. Tierney. I agree with you fully on that. It's a rule
that on its face without some further explanation doesn't seem
to be helpful. But I'm willing to admit that it may well be. We
may just be thinking of all the possibilities.
Ms. Friend. It's also true on takeoff out of Reagan
National, you're not allowed out of your seat during the first
30 minutes after departure, the first 30 minutes inbound.
Theoretically that somehow makes people feel more comfortable
if no one is up moving around.
The fact is, Mr. O'Brien can speak to this better than I
can, but I think the flying distance between Dulles and the
Capitol building, if you will, is maybe 3 minutes as opposed to
1 minute from National. So I'm not sure why National is treated
differently.
Mr. Tierney. What's good for one is good for the others in
that.
Mr. O'Brien. Maybe it has something to do with perception.
Ms. Friend. Window dressing, John.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you all very, very much for your
testimony.
Mr. Ose. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Tierney. Yes.
Mr. Ose. She offered to tell us what happened if you do get
out of your seat.
Ms. Friend. Oh, you don't know.
Mr. Ose. I stay in my seat.
Ms. Friend. We had an incident a couple of weeks ago where
someone got up and ignored the direction to sit down. He was
tackled and handcuffed by two air marshals who held him with
guns drawn while the aircraft diverted to Dulles.
Mr. Ose. The plane diverts to Dulles and you're under
arrest.
Ms. Friend. You're under arrest, right. And, all of your
fellow travelers are greatly inconvenienced and will never
forget your face as long as they live, I'm sure.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Hudson, you had something you were going to
add there when Mr. Tierney was questioning.
Mr. Hudson. I just think that it doesn't take too much
imagination to understand why they have that rule now,
particularly coming in and out of Reagan National Airport.
Mr. Tierney. I guess the imagination would be if you have
secured the cockpit, then it takes a little more imagination to
figure why it is important for the last half hour, the last 45
minutes, the last hour, the first 45 minutes, the first hour.
Mr. Hudson. I would remind you we had another incident of a
plane coming to Chicago where an individual got up and charged
the cockpit door and crashed into the cockpit and was subdued
by passengers. Although we have some more bars on the doors,
we, by no means, have fully secure cockpits at this time.
Having a lot of people standing up at the bathroom next to the
cockpit or other places is viewed by many as a would-be
potential security risk.
Mr. Ose. I have a couple more questions, if I might.
There's no provision in the law addressing the non-medical,
non-firemen, non-EMT person who is asked by a flight attendant
or otherwise assumes a responsibility to act in a situation--
where's that chart? If I understand, under the voluntary
emergency help, there is no liability for police, firemen or
EMTs in terms of providing that assistance to crews in an
emergency. What happens if there are no police, firemen, or
EMTs and a passenger is asked, for instance, as they would be
in an exit row? Is that something that needs to be covered in
rules and regulations in terms of some sort of a buffer from
liability when properly asked?
Mr. O'Brien. I think in our testimony we suggested
expanding the types or numbers of individuals that would be
covered. But certainly it's an issue that needs to be looked
at. I'll just give you an example. There are some organizations
who have people travel quite a bit and are connected with the
aviation industry. And, those people let themselves be
identified to the crew or to the cabin staff as people who will
assist if called upon.
Mr. Ose. PWAs, people like that?
Mr. O'Brien. Many. Right. And that kind of assistance in
today's environment, I think, is appreciated. So those kind of
individuals we would hope would not be exposed to some kind of
liability as a result of being the good samaritan.
Mr. Ose. Ms. Friend, would the flight attendants agree?
Ms. Friend. Exactly. I think it's unrealistic to expect
that after the events of September 11th, any passenger is going
to just sit quietly as told in a situation like that. And
certainly people who are willing to come forward and help and
offer their assistance should not be punished. They should not
be subject to some liability.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Roth, any observations?
Mr. Roth. I couldn't agree more. As a passenger, I've been,
you know, flying and in a row when we've all said to each other
anything happens, you know, we're going for him. So yes, I
think there should be some sort of immunity, some good faith
immunity built into the statute or the regulations.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Hudson.
Mr. Hudson. Yes, we would support good samaritan type laws
in that area.
Mr. Ose. These would be rules and regulations at this
point.
So, the other issue that I was checking into the red eye
flight last night, which I was just fascinated by, was the new
carry-on language. I'll read it to you. It says each passenger
is allowed one carry-on bag. Exception: one personal item, such
as a purse or laptop, a briefcase, a diaper bag, a camera case,
or a small backpack.
In addition, a food item, an assistive device, one duty-
free bag, a child-restraint device, a coat/jacket or an
umbrella. The maximum free bag allowance is three bags. You can
check 2 and carry on 1. You can check 3 and no carry-ons. It
would seem to me that--I mean, it just seems very simple to me
that the less baggage you put through the terminal-based
screening process and into the cabin, the less your challenges
from a carry-on security issue and the quicker you can get the
people seated and the plane out.
Now, this was effective October 9th. Do the regulations
that the Department of Transportation is going to consider need
to look at this again and more clearly define what may be taken
on both in terms of size and number? I mean, I've seen people
they walk down the--what's the thing that goes out to the
plane?
Ms. Friend. Jetway.
Mr. Ose. They walk down the jetway, they have a young
child, they leave the child restraint device, you know they're
carriage or whatever, they take the baby seat inside, they put
the thing down. I understand that one. But beyond that, I don't
understand why--boy, I'm going to get in trouble on this one, I
don't understand why someone needs a suitcase, a clothes carry
bag, a briefcase. Am I missing something here?
Mr. O'Brien. No, you're not missing anything at all. Beyond
security, there are many safety implications associated with
the carry-on baggage. I think that Pat can probably speak more
closely to the problems in the cabin itself with carry-on
baggage. I know that our organization, as many as 15 years ago,
had petitioned the FAA to limit the number of carry-on bags and
the size of the bags for operational safety concerns.
I'm not talking about things flying about the cabin. We're
concerned about weight and balance. There was one major airline
that almost lost a couple of airplanes taking off out of a high
altitude airport in South America, it turned out, when they
weighed the carry-on baggage, they were several thousand pounds
overweight because of the carry-on baggage.
The normal dispatch requirements today give you a basic
number that you allocate to each carry-on bag that you assume
is going to come on. It bears no resemblance to surveys that
have been conducted weighing actual bags in busy terminals.
People have done this; universities have done some studies;
students have done doctorate and masters theses on it.
There are some very good papers written about the situation
from a safety perspective. Couple that to the point you're
making.
Mr. Ose. They didn't need to kill all those trees and write
all those papers to do the common sense thing here.
Ms. Friend. John is right. This is not a problem that was
created by the events of September 11th. In fact, we have a
petition that's been pending for some time with the FAA asking
them to issue a carry on baggage rule, a single bag and with a
specific size so that there isn't all that interpretation. They
have not responded to our petition. However, in response to the
events of September 11th, they did issue a security directive
with this so-called one plus. That security directive could be
amended, eliminated at any time. We absolutely believe that a
carry-on bag limitation and a size limitation on that baggage
must go into the regulations in order to ensure that we don't
go back to business as usual as soon as the FAA gets a chance.
Mr. Ose. I do think this speaks directly to the efficacy by
which we process people who are getting ready to board on
planes. I mean, it just----
Ms. Friend. We don't tell them what they need to know. We
leave them up in the air.
Mr. Ose. Then they argue with the gate agent.
Ms. Friend. That's right. The industry has resisted it as
well because, of course, they don't want to inconvenience or
have disagreements with their passengers. But, we noted in
their testimony today that even they recognize the fact that if
you're looking for a needle in a haystack, if you reduce the
size of the haystack, your chances are better of finding the
needle. We think that supports our carry-on baggage argument
completely.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Hudson, anything?
Mr. Roth.
Mr. Hudson. I think you should know the background for an
issue which predates September 11th. Most surveys have been
done of particularly frequent travelers find that one of the
No. 1 things they want more of is more space for carry-on
luggage. Now, there's a couple reasons for that. One is
convenience and one is security. Not security of the airplanes,
but security of the baggage. Statistic is 1 out of 200 bags is
presently mishandled by the airlines, damaged, lost, delayed,
whatever. Most passengers have gone through that once, don't
want to have it repeated.
So there has been a great increase over the years of use of
carry-ons. The other reason is convenience. It takes generally
at least another 20 minutes if you check your bag, and now, in
the current environment, it's going to take you probably
somewhere between an hour and 2 hours extra if you check your
bag versus go to carry-on.
On the other hand, we have changed our position from
supporting the prior two-bag limit, and we now favor going to
one small bag that can be hand-searched, which is more
stringent than what we have now. And, we also feel that people
should voluntarily reduce their carry-ons. And we suggested
that for a large airport, perhaps you should have a line for no
carry-on luggage that would go faster and would encourage
people further to go to checking luggage.
Mr. Ose. Not like the 10 items or less where you get people
with 12 items but no carry-on?
Mr. Hudson. Yes.
Mr. Ose. Thank you. I have no further questions. We're
going to leave the record open for 10 days. We may have
questions we'd like to direct to you in writing. We would
appreciate your response. Today's hearing did show how much
work we have to do on this issue to ensure smooth
implementation of this new law. I encourage DOT to reflect on
these panels' combined wisdom in terms of implementing these
recommendations. Our witnesses, including the four of you,
truly have given us compelling testimony and you are experts in
your field. We appreciate your coming here.
I just want to repeat what I said in my first remarks, we
are talking about people's lives here. And, from my
perspective, we have no room for error. I may not agree with
some of your comments about how to get to zero tolerance, but
I'm hopeful that, in the course of the testimony today, we were
able to give the agencies that are going to issue these
regulations some sense of what we're doing.
My compliments to your people, Mr. O'Brien, Ms. Friend. Mr.
Roth, thank you for coming. Mr. Hudson, I can't even imagine
what it must be like to do what you do. You have our thoughts
and prayers. Thank you all for coming.
[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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