<DOC>
[107th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:73739.wais]
FORD MOTOR COMPANY'S RECALL OF CERTAIN FIRESTONE TIRES
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEES ON
COMMERCE, TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
and
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 19, 2001
__________
Serial No. 107-45
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-739CC WASHINGTON : 2001
------------------------------
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana, Chairman
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
JOE BARTON, Texas HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
FRED UPTON, Michigan EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida RALPH M. HALL, Texas
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHRISTOPHER COX, California FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma BART GORDON, Tennessee
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
GREG GANSKE, Iowa ANNA G. ESHOO, California
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia BART STUPAK, Michigan
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois TOM SAWYER, Ohio
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona GENE GREEN, Texas
CHARLES ``CHIP'' PICKERING, KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
Mississippi TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
VITO FOSSELLA, New York DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
ROY BLUNT, Missouri THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
TOM DAVIS, Virginia BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
ED BRYANT, Tennessee LOIS CAPPS, California
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
STEVE BUYER, Indiana CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California JANE HARMAN, California
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
MARY BONO, California
GREG WALDEN, Oregon
LEE TERRY, Nebraska
David V. Marventano, Staff Director
James D. Barnette, General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida, Chairman
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
Vice Chairman DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky LOIS CAPPS, California
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona JANE HARMAN, California
ED BRYANT, Tennessee HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
STEVE BUYER, Indiana EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California BART GORDON, Tennessee
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
GREG WALDEN, Oregon ANNA G. ESHOO, California
LEE TERRY, Nebraska JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana (Ex Officio)
(Ex Officio)
______
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania, Chairman
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida BART STUPAK, Michigan
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
Vice Chairman JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire (Ex Officio)
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Testimony of:
Jackson, Hon. Michael P., Deputy Secretary, accompanied by
Robert Shelton, Executive Director, and Kenneth Weinstein,
Associate Administrator for Safety Assurance, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration...................... 314
Lampe, John, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc................................. 99
Nasser, Jacques, President and Chief Executive Officer, Ford
Motor Company.............................................. 26
(iii)
FORD MOTOR COMPANY'S RECALL OF CERTAIN FIRESTONE TIRES
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 2001
House of Representatives,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and
Consumer Protection, Joint with
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m.,
in room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cliff Stearns
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protection) presiding.
Members present Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and
Consumer Protection: Representatives Stearns, Upton, Deal,
Whitfield, Shimkus, Bryant, Pitts, Terry, Tauzin (ex officio),
Towns, Capps, Doyle, Harman, Markey, Gordon, Deutsch, and
Dingell (ex officio).
Members present Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations: Representatives Greenwood, Stearns, Burr,
Whitfield, Tauzin (ex officio), Deutsch, Stupak, Strickland,
and Dingell (ex officio).
Also present: Representative Sawyer.
Staff present: Thomas DiLenge, majority counsel; Kelly
Zerzan, majority counsel; Ann Washington, majority counsel;
Jennifer Safavian, majority counsel; Will Carty, legislative
clerk; Peter Kielty, legislative clerk; Edith Holleman,
micority Counsel; M. Bruce Gwinn, minority professional staff
member; and Christopher H. Knaver, minority investigator.
Mr. Stearns. Good morning. The joint committees will come
to order. Welcome to the joint Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protection Subcommittee and Oversight and Investigations
Subcommittee, hearings to discuss the issue of Ford's recall of
certain Firestone tires.
I welcome all of our distinguished witnesses, including Mr.
Nasser, the President and CEO of Ford Motor Company; and Mr.
Lampe, President and CEO of Bridgestone/Firestone,
Incorporated; and the Honorable Michael Jackson, Deputy
Secretary of the Department of Transportation.
It has only been 8 months since the committee last visited
the issue of tires. Last September, we held hearings on
Firestone's recall of its Wilderness ATX and ATX II and certain
Wilderness tires due to their excessive propensity to detread
in high rates of speed.
This year our committee examines the tire issue again.
Although this hearing does not present such clear cut facts, we
are confronted with a most unusual situation, where one company
is recalling the product of another company. The day after
Firestone rejected Ford's request to recall additional tires
and declared its decision to end its relationship with Ford, a
historic American corporate partnership dating back 100 years,
Ford Motor Company decided to voluntarily recall all Firestone
Wilderness AT tires on all of its vehicles, encompassing a
total of 13 million tires at a cost of nearly $3 billion.
Why a recall? What prompted this replacement program? Ford
tells us that this significant action was warranted based on
increasing tire claim rates for certain Firestone Wilderness AT
tires and on Ford's own laboratory testing. Firestone, on the
other hand, tells us that the Firestone Wilderness AT tire
performed similar to competitors in its own testing, and that
some of the tires being replaced by Ford have little to no tire
claims. Further, Firestone publicly questions the stability of
the Ford Explorer, the vehicle in which most of the tire claims
have taken place.
To prove their case, both companies have conducted tests,
performed experiments and hired experts. Both companies have
loaded us with charts, statistics and diagrams. Unfortunately,
when asked the same questions, the companies respond with two
different answers. The information presented by both Ford
around Firestone is typically contradictory and incompatible.
But the one conclusion that cannot be questioned is that there
is an increase in consumer confusion. The position of Ford and
Firestone necessarily reflects their different vantage points,
influenced by shareholders' profits, motives and litigation
considerations.
My point is this: We cannot rely solely on Ford and
Firestone to provide us with all this information, and we can't
expect the American consumer to do the detailed and lengthy
analysis that is necessary to reach a conclusion.
That is specifically why we have a government agency
dedicated to automobile safety, namely the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, or NHTSA. Pursuant to statute,
NHTSA's mandate is to carry out safety programs under the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1996 and the
Highway Safety Act of 1966. Specifically NHTSA is responsible
for, among other things, reducing deaths, injuries and economic
losses resulting from motor vehicle crashes by setting and
enforcing safety performance standards and investigating safety
defects in motor vehicles.
Therefore, we must look to the agency expert in these
issues for guidance, and we are fortunate to have honorable
Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary of the Department of
Transportation, here to testify, accompanied by NHTSA
personnel. However, it is my understanding that while NHTSA has
been investigating these tire issues since last year, the
agency has not reached any final result and will not be
providing us today with any firm conclusions. In fact, NHTSA's
investigation is not expected to conclude until later this
summer, but meanwhile, there are a number of outstanding safety
issues. What is the proper failure rate for tires? Is there a
baseline upon which all tires should be judged, what are what
other factors should we be relying on to determine whether
tires are strong and stable? In other words, what is safe? And
just as important, is NHTSA prepared to implement the law
passed by this committee in response to the Ford Firestone
problem, the TREAD Act? Under the TREAD Act, truckloads of
information will soon be deposited on NHTSA's doorstep. Is the
agency prepared to utilize this information to effectively
protect the driving public?
All of these questions deserve answers, and I hope NHTSA is
prepared to offer conclusions soon. American citizens pay taxes
for government services. NHTSA provides a service and NHTSA's
customers, the U.S. taxpayers, are not getting the answers they
paid for.
Unfortunately, in the absence of NHTSA's independent
analysis to analyze the Ford and Firestone positions, many
parties will pay a price. The effect of this voluntary recall
has far-reaching ramifications well beyond the parties
involved. Not only does this recall affect Ford and Firestone,
but the recall also affects car manufacturers whose customers
will question the safety of Firestone Wilderness AT tires on
their own vehicles. And the recall affects other tire companies
who must change production patterns to make replacement tires
for Ford's vehicles.
Caught in the middle is the consumer, who is questioning
whether Firestone tires are safe and whether the Ford Explorer
is stable? But in debating this issue, it is all too easy to
focus on the individual parts and miss the big picture. We are
here to protect the American consumer from both detreaded tires
and allegation from unfounded fears arising from conflicting
information. This hearing is designed to produce information
that the customer can use to best educate him or herself.
I thank the chairman of the Oversight Investigation
Subcommittee, Chairman Greenwood, for jointly hosting this
hearing, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. At
this, the ranking member--acting ranking member--for an opening
statement, Mr. Dingell, the ranking member of the full
committee.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your kindness in
recognizing me, and I want to thank you for this important
hearing. This is the second time in a year that the committee
is considering safety problems involving Firestone tires. Last
year, the Ford Motor Company determined from information it
requested and received from Firestone that there were an
unusually high number of claims, fatalities and injuries
resulting from----
Mr. Stearns. Mr. Dingell, is your microphone on?
Mr. Dingell. As best I can determine, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. I am just having a little trouble hearing,
that is all.
Mr. Dingell. Should I get closer?
Mr. Stearns. Yes. There you go.
Mr. Dingell. At Ford's insistence, Firestone then recalled
6.5 million tires, including all ATX tires produced for the
Explorers. In addition, Ford found that the claims were so high
for other Explorer tires that Firestone produced in Decatur,
Illinois that Firestone also had to recall 15-inch Wilderness
AT tires produced for Ford at that plant.
With new information it received from Firestone on May 11
of this year, Ford determined that last year's recall did not
take care of the problem. Instead, there are rapidly growing
number of Firestone claims involving Explorer tires that are
not recalled last year. The data received in May show that
there have been 110 tread separation claims involving
Firestone's Wilderness AT tires compared with only 27 claims in
the data provided to Ford last August. During this same period
of time, crash claims have gone from 0 to 20, moreover, claims
from 0 to 11, injury claims from 0 to 22 and fatality claims
from 0 to 7.
Seeing in this new data the same safety concerns and trends
that caused last year's recall, Ford announced on May 22nd its
Firestone tire replacement program. This is not a recall,
because Ford did not make the tires. Under this replacement
program, Ford will either replace or reimburse vehicle owners
for the replacement of 13 million Firestone tires. Ford
estimates that it will take 9 months, as much as $3 billion to
complete the Firestone tire replacement program.
Ford's action has sparked a lot of finger pointing, but the
public rightly wants to know whether the tires on their
vehicles are safe, and they are entitled to know that. Are the
tread separations Ford has identified unique to Firestone
tires, or do other tires have similar problems?
Is Firestone continuing to produce tires that endanger the
public safety? Are there particular Firestone manufacturing
facilities that are producing bad tires? Should tread
separation be viewed as a foreseeable event, as some have
suggested? Unfortunately, the one best able to answer these and
other important questions has yet to be heard from. The
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration began its
investigation of the 47 million ATX, ATX II and Wilderness
tires manufactured by Firestone more than a year ago. It has
yet to complete its testing and analysis. It is probably months
away from issuing its report and findings.
At this time, NHTSA's task is made more difficult by the
fact that it has no permanent or even acting administrator,
something which must be cured quickly. The administration needs
to give its attention to getting control of this agency and
having it complete its work in an efficient and timely manner.
Both Ford and Firestone have provided huge quantities of
information to the committee and NHTSA. Particularly
instructive is the data on the performance of Firestone and
Goodyear tires when about an equal number of tires from each
manufacturer were put on Explorers in model years 1995, 1996
and 1997.
Through the end of last year, data for these model years
that Ford received from Firestone reveals that there have been
1,183 claims involving tread separations on the Firestone
tires, and only two claims involving tread area problems on
Goodyear tires. Furthermore, the two Goodyear tire claims were
for property damage only. No deaths injuries or lawsuits were
involved. And according to Goodyear, these claims may have
involved nothing more serious than a puncture, rather than
total tread separations that have occurred on Firestone tires.
Goodyear says its tires hold up as well on the Explorer as
on other vehicles. From 1996 through the year 2000, Goodyear
says 87.7 million of its tires have been used on SUVs other
than Explorers, light trucks, minivans and station wagons. And
during that time, Goodyear has had no tread separation claims
involving deaths, injuries or lawsuits.
However, the data tells quite a different story for the
Firestone tire. Tread separation claims involving the Firestone
tire on the Explorer have continued to grow. Ford's analysis of
the data it received from Firestone in May shows that in the
fifth year of use, the 16-inch Wilderness AT tire produced at
Firestone's Wilson, North Carolina plant has an extremely high
tread separation rate of 450 claims per million tires.
So why is there such a big difference in the claims rates
for Goodyear and Firestone tires? It has been suggested that
Ford shipped many more Explorers equipped with Firestone tires
to hot-weather States than did Explorers equipped with Goodyear
tires. Sounds possible, but it doesn't appear to be true. In
model years 1995 through 1997, Ford says it shipped 95,000
Explorers with Firestone tires and 85,000 Explorers with
Goodyear tires to hot weather states, Arizona, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada and Texas. Although most tread
separation claims have come from hot weather States, not a
single one of these claims involve death, injury or a lawsuit
attributable to a Goodyear tire on the Explorer vehicle.
It has also been suggested that there is something unique
about the Explorer that causes tread separation. Again,
Firestone's own claims suggest otherwise. There has been a
substantial number of tread separations that have occurred on
Firestone tires, like those used on the Explorer when these
tires have been installed as aftermarket tires on other non-
Explorer SUVs, including the Toyota Forerunner, the Nissan
Pathfinder and the Mitsubishi Montero, and on the Isuzu Rodeo.
Ford's analysis has raised questions about Firestone's
manufacturing quality control. The peel strength of the rubber
Firestone used to make its tires and the durability of its
tires all were found to vary from plant to plant.
Perhaps most importantly, the amount of rubber in the
critical wedge area of Firestone's 15 and 16 Wilderness tires
was found to vary by plant. Of the plants most recently
producing tires for Ford, the wedge rubber was smallest at
Wilson, North Carolina plants and thickest at the Aiken, South
Carolina plant. Firestone's Joliette, Canada plant ranked
somewhere between the other two. However, all Firestone plants
produce tires with less rubber in the wedge stone area than
Goodyear.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, given the information it had,
I find no problem with Ford having taken the action it did. In
fact, for Ford not to have replaced these tires would have
raised serious questions in the mind, I think, of the public,
that proper safety and other concerns of customers were being
served.
Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing,
and I look forward to hearing the statements of the witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John D. Dingell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Michigan
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this important
hearing.
This is the second time within a year that the Committee is
considering safety problems involving Firestone tires. Last year, Ford
Motor Company determined from information it requested and received
from Firestone that there were an unusually high number of claims,
fatalities, and injuries resulting from tread separations of certain
Firestone tires on the Explorer vehicle. At Ford's insistence,
Firestone then recalled 6.5 million tires, including all ATX tires
Firestone produced for the Explorer. In addition, Ford found that
claims were so high for other Explorer tires Firestone produced at
Decatur, Illinois, that Firestone also had to recall the 15-inch
Wilderness AT tire produced for Ford at that plant.
With new information it received from Firestone on May 11th of this
year, Ford determined that last year's recall did not take care of the
problem. Instead, there are a rapidly growing number of Firestone
claims involving Explorer tires that were not recalled last year. The
new data received in May show there have been 110 tread separation
claims involving Firestone's Wilderness AT tires compared to only 27
claims in the data provided to Ford last August. During this same
period of time, crash claims have gone from zero to 20; rollover claims
from zero to 11; injury claims from zero to 22; and fatality claims
from zero to seven.
Seeing in this new data the same safety concerns and trends that
led to last year's recall, Ford announced on May 22nd its ``Firestone
Tire Replacement Program.'' This is not a recall, because Ford did not
make the tires. Under this replacement program, Ford will either
replace or reimburse vehicle owners for the replacement of 13 million
Firestone tires. Ford estimates it will take nine months and as much as
$3 billion to complete the Firestone tire replacement program.
Ford's action has sparked a lot of finger pointing, but the public
rightly wants to know whether the tires on their vehicles are safe. Are
the tread separations Ford has identified unique to Firestone tires, or
do other tires have similar problems? Is Firestone continuing to
produce tires that endanger the public's safety? Are there particular
Firestone manufacturing facilities that are producing bad tires? Should
tread separation be viewed as a ``foreseeable'' event, as some have
suggested?
Unfortunately, the one best able to answer these and other
important questions has yet to be heard from. The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) began its investigation of about
47 million ATX, ATXII, and Wilderness tires manufactured by Firestone
more than a year ago. It has yet to complete its testing and analysis,
and is probably months away from issuing its report and findings. At
this time, NHTSA's task is made even more difficult by the fact that it
has no permanent, or even acting, administrator. The Administration
needs to give its attention to getting control of this agency and
having it complete its work in an efficient and timely manner.
Both Ford and Firestone have provided huge quantities of
information to the Committee and to NHTSA. Particularly instructive is
data on the performance of the Firestone and Goodyear tires when about
equal numbers of tires from each manufacturer were put on Explorers in
model years 1995, 1996, and 1997. Through the end of last year, data
for these model years that Ford received from Firestone reveals there
have been 1,183 claims involving tread separations on the Firestone
tires and only two claims involving tread area problems on the Goodyear
tires. Furthermore, the two Goodyear claims were for property damage
only. No deaths, injuries, or lawsuits were involved. And according to
Goodyear, these two claims may have involved nothing more serious than
a puncture rather than the total tread separations that have occurred
on Firestone tires.
Goodyear says its tires hold up as well on the Explorer as on other
vehicles. From 1996 through the year 2000, Goodyear says 87.7 million
of its tires have been used on SUV's other than the Explorer, light
trucks, minivans, and station wagons. And during that time, Goodyear
has had no tread separation claims involving deaths, injuries, or
lawsuits.
However, the data tells quite a different story for the Firestone
tire. Tread separation claims involving the Firestone tire on the
Explorer have continued to grow. Ford's analysis of the data it
received from Firestone in May shows that in the fifth year of use, the
16-inch Wilderness AT tire produced at Firestone's Wilson, North
Carolina, plant has an extremely high tread separation claims rate of
about 450 claims per million.
So, why is there such a big difference in the claims rates for
Goodyear and Firestone tires? It has been suggested that Ford shipped
many more Explorers equipped with Firestone tires to hot weather
states, than it did Explorers equipped with Goodyear tires. Sounds
possible, but it appears not to be true.
In model years 1995 through 1997, Ford says it shipped 95,000
Explorers with Firestone tires and 85,000 Explorers with Goodyear tires
to the hot weather states of Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Nevada, and Texas. Although most tread separation claims have come from
hot weather states, not a single one of these claims involving death,
injury, or a lawsuit is attributable to the Goodyear tire on the
Explorer vehicle.
It has also been suggested that there is something unique about the
Explorer that causes tread separations. Again, Firestone's own claims
data would suggest otherwise. There has been a substantial number of
tread separations that have occurred on Firestone tires like those used
on the Explorer, when those tires have been installed as
``aftermarket'' tires on other non-Explorer SUV's, including the Toyota
4 Runner, the Nissan Pathfinder, the Mitsubishi Montero, and the Isuzu
Rodeo.
Ford's analysis has also raised questions about Firestone's
manufacturing quality control. The peel strength of the rubber
Firestone used to make its tires and the durability of its tires all
were found to vary from plant to plant. Perhaps, most importantly, the
amount of rubber in the critical wedge area of Firestone's 15- and 16-
inch Wilderness AT tire was found to vary by plant. Of the plants most
recently producing tires for Ford, the wedge rubber was smallest at the
Wilson, North Carolina, plant and thickest at the Aiken, South
Carolina, plant. Firestone's Joliette, Canada, plant ranked in between
the other two. However, all Firestone plants produced tires with less
rubber in the wedge area than Goodyear.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, given the information it had, I find
no problem with Ford having taken the action it did. In fact, for Ford
not to have replaced these tires, would raise far more serious
questions in my mind about their commitment to public safety and the
customers they serve.
Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing,
and I look forward to hearing the statements of the witnesses.
Mr. Stearns. I thank my colleague. And now for an opening
statement, the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are here today
because 203 people have died in automobile accidents involving
certain Firestone tires, mostly fitted on Ford Explorers. To
date, no one has provided the American people with a definitive
answer as to why those deaths occurred. A number of months ago,
both Ford Motor Company and the Bridgestone Firestone, Inc.
company agreed to a recall of more than 6.5 million tires. And
at that time, both companies told the American public and this
Congress that the first recall was adequate in scope and did
not need to include any additional Wilderness AT tires.
As recently as December of last year, after what both
manufacturers described as extensive testing and analysis, the
companies issued root cause findings, once again concluding
that no further recall of the Wilderness AT was required.
That, of course, was good news for America's consumers, and
these two companies, since they had been replacing many of the
recalled tires with the same product from plant--plants other
than Firestone's Decatur facility, whose products had been
judged to be unsafe.
Now nearly 6 months later, Ford has come forward to say
that it does indeed have a safety concern about additional
Wilderness AT tires, particularly the 15 and 16-inch tires that
were use primarily on the Ford Explorer, and that were used as
replacement tires during last year's recall. It argues that the
new claims data provided by Firestone in May of this year show
an increasing trend in claims, accidents and injuries involving
these two tire lines.
Ford also says that its laboratory testing of these tires
and competitor tire lines reveals significant differences in
durability that further support its recall action.
We are now told that on the strength of these discoveries
and after $30 million in testing, the Ford Motor Company felt
compelled to recall roughly 13 million Firestone Wilderness AT
tires from its vehicles, a $3 billion business decision that
has set off a fire storm of charges and countercharges between
these two companies.
Just last month, Bridgestone/Firestone announced that it
was severing its nearly 100-year-old history with the Ford
Motor Company.
Clearly, the stakes are high for both of these companies.
Industry analysts are already openly suggesting that Ford
replace the name Explorer with a new brand name, even though
this product is the best-selling sport utility vehicle on the
market. Nor is Firestone immune from this kind of treatment.
Some in the industry are busy suggesting that the venerable
brand name of Firestone be retired.
But if the stakes are high for these two companies, they
are even higher for America's consumers. These events have
raised much broader questions about the safety in general,
their safety in general, tire safety in general, the
relationship of tires to their vehicle systems and possible
design flaws in the rollover of compact SUVs.
Even more important, for our purposes, the fallout of these
events has led to increased concern about the role of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NHTSA plays in
ensuring the safety of cars, trucks and automotive products.
Last year, we learned how NHTSA initially failed to
investigate seriously the claims surrounding this issue but
subsequently leaped into the fray by issuing a consumer
advisory last Labor Day weekend, which focused on a long list
of other Firestone tire lines.
NHTSA took this action, we are told, because claims rates
on these products had reached the threshold of 12.6 claims per
million tires produced. Whether this claim rate was about
normal or a clear indication of a safety concern were several
of the factors that NHTSA failed to establish before announcing
this advisory. More disturbing, still, it is our own
understanding that NHTSA is now in possession of data showing
claims rates of a similar or greater value on other tire lines,
including those from both Firestone and other tire
manufacturers, and yet remains silent on the potential or
perceived risk, if any, to consumers of those products.
This inability of the Federal agency charged with
protecting consumers to get the facts and to get them first has
allowed the situation to deteriorate into the public relations
equivalent of a shouting match between these two manufacturers,
and the role of honest broker, which is precisely the mission
of NHTSA, has been surrendered to two very threatened firms,
whose data, even if correct, appears to have been manipulated
in the way that makes their individual conclusions highly
suspect.
The committee's review of the actual Ford tests raises
important questions about whether comparable tests were, in
fact, run. For example, it appears Ford left off its peal
strength chart, the results from some of Firestone's newer
tires, which scored higher than comparable Michelin tires and
much closer to the tested Goodyear tires, and nearly all of the
Firestone tires Ford tested had been used, either on road--on
road or as spares. In hot States, while the Michelin Goodyear
tires tested were either all new or of uncertain prior use.
These differences certainly raise questions about the
methodology and possibly the results as well. Similar questions
arise with respect to the largest testing procedure utilized by
Ford, its rig tests, in which it placed a tire on the
laboratory wheel and ran it at varying speeds, air pressures,
loads and ambient temperatures. The way these rig test results
were presented to the committee could be considered as
misleading, given that Ford disaggregated the Firestone results
by plant, while aggregating three Goodyear plants into one
plotted column, while also aggregating the 16 and 15-inch tire
results, which made the percentage of the overall failure rate
of Goodyear products much smaller, while allowing the
difference between the two sets of tires to appear more stark.
Combined with the differences in how the tests themselves were
conducted, the aggregation issue becomes even more problematic.
Firestone, too, has its own set of findings based on
questionable assumptions and parameters. For example, Firestone
has been very vocal lately in claiming that the Explorer is
more than twice as likely as other SUVs to roll over, following
a tire failure. Yet, when we asked for the actual data
underlying the statistic and the confidence bounds associated
with it, we learn that Firestone included all other SUVs,
regardless of whether they were truly comparable in size to the
Explorer. We also found that the two State data bases that
Firestone relied on to contain a very small sample size of
accidents that fit Firestone's queries, leading to a large--to
large ranges in possible statistical outcomes.
Indeed, the data could just as easily be read to find only
a minimal and questionable increase in rollover associated with
the Explorer, not the dramatic twice as likely Firestone touts
publicly. In making these observations, I am not suggesting
that either company intentionally set out to mislead this
committee or the American public, but we would be derelict in
our duty if we did not keep in mind that in the heat of this
very public and high-stake battle, both companies may be
expected to produce their analyses in ways that strengthen
their own positions.
It is for that reason that until credible tests are done,
the American consumer will not know the full truth of this
matter and this brings us again to NHTSA.
As Chairman Tauzin previously observed, there are serious
questions about whether NHTSA's current testing program will
prove any more fruitful than Ford's or Firestone's in
ultimately answering the many unanswered questions that remain.
And that is totally unacceptable.
Our role here is not to advance the interests of one
company over another or one product over another. Our role is
to protect the interests of America's consumers. NHTSA is our
agent in this enterprise, and they must do the hard work to
help us find honest answers. In that regard, allow me to give
some useful advice to the folks from NHTSA, which also may be
appropriate for the management teams at Ford and Firestone.
``Failure is the opportunity to begin again more
intelligently.'' The man who said that knew something about
success and failure and automobiles. He was Henry Ford. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. I thank my colleague. The ranking member of
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Mr. Deutsch.
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. The tragedy that brings us here today is one of the
worst in auto safety history. As of yesterday, 203 people have
died in the United States because the tread has separated on a
Firestone tire. Most of those tires were on the Ford Explorers.
Dozens more have been--dozens more have died in other countries
and hundreds have sustained permanent injuries.
To put this into perspective, when Firestone recalled the
Firestone 500 tire in 1978, 34 people have died. In my State of
Florida, one of the hot States in which the tire has failed
most often, more than 28 people have died, almost as many as in
the Firestone 500 recall, and more than 130 have been injured.
Who is responsible? Firestone has already admitted
responsibility, but Firestone has said that Ford should share
responsibility, because the Explorer design causes excessive
rollovers. Ford says it is the tire alone. Over the past few
weeks, we have all been subjected to dueling statistics
provided by Ford and Firestone. Unfortunately, we cannot
resolve these disputes here.
However, in Florida, our attorney general is leading an
investigation of both Ford and Firestone for all 50 State
attorney generals. The primary allegation is that Firestone
engineered a bad tire in part because Ford kept demanding
changes in the tire to make the Explorer more stable, while
maintaining the rolling resistance and fuel economy of other
tires.
The tire pressure was lowered and the weight of the tire
was reduced by removing material, but the design of the vehicle
was not changed. As part of its new safety campaign, Ford is
now courting Goodyear tires. It is important to note that the
Explorer was previously equipped with Goodyear tires from 1995
to 1997. In documents submitted for the record, however, Ford
terminated its relationship with Goodyear due to cost concerns.
Florida's attorney general is also concerned that the
companies did not disclose the tire failure problems in other
countries to U.S. regulators and the American public. When the
Firestone tires began to fail in Venezuela and Saudi Arabia in
1997 and 1998, we learned in the earlier hearings, that both
Ford and Firestone kept the American consumer from knowing
about the defective tires which were recalled in those
countries.
Communications documenting these disclosure problems were
included in the record of our hearing last fall, and a few
additional ones have been submitted for the record today. We
will hear a lot of conflicting evidence today, but who are we
and the American people to believe? Last fall, the committee
was told that the defective ATX tire came from only one
Firestone plant in Decatur, Illinois, but that all ATX tires
and Wilderness AT tires made in Decatur would be recalled. We
were told the Wilderness ATs not made in Decatur were safe.
However, in December of 2000 in deposition, Ford's chief
quality control officer stated that none of the Wilderness 15-
inch ATs were robust tires that could be expected to perform
under variations in inflation, pressures, load and speed. At
the same time, both companies issued root cause analysis
suggesting that the defective tires came only from one plant,
despite the fact that all the tires used identical engineering
and materials. But Firestone's experts found belt edge cracks
in tires from all plants, and Ford indicated tire design was a
problem.
By January, auto safety advocates were calling for a broad
recall. Today we are being told the same by Ford, while
Firestone also blames the Explorer's design. And what has the
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration been
doing while this debate is going on? We are still waiting for
its own analysis, which I hope will be completed before the end
of the hot season. Unfortunately, in most cases, excessive
accidents, injuries, lawsuits and consumer's responses have
removed questionable vehicles from the road, not the Federal
agency charged with protecting motorists and passengers.
I want to add a few comments about the stability of sports
utility vehicles, including the Explorer. SUVs, by definition,
have a rollover problem. SUV manufacturers work to engineer
against this propensity, but the consumer should have access to
reliable and objective rollover data. I would like to encourage
NHTSA to move quickly, and with the rollover consumer
information effort we mandated in the TREAD Act, so the public
can make informed vehicle choices.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. I thank my colleague.
Now we will recognize for an opening statement the chairman
of the full committee, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Tauzin.
Chairman Tauzin. Chairman Stearns and Chairman Greenwood, I
want to thank you both and the ranking members for this hearing
today, because it represents one of the most important
hearings, I think, in our Congressional season. It continues
this extraordinary inquiry that our investigators are making
and that hopefully NHTSA will complete soon on the question of
why 203 Americans had to lose their lives on the highways, when
Ford and Firestone, and apparently many people in our Federal
agency, knew for years that there were problems with Firestone
tires on Explorers and very little was done until very recently
to get those tires off the highways.
As you know, we conducted two hearings last year after Ford
and Firestone jointly then announced the recall of more than 6
million of those tires, fitted primarily on the popular Ford
Explorer. It was partly in response to those hearings that
Chairman Upton and this committee held that Congress passed the
TREAD Act last October. That Act requires NHTSA to start
collecting information on claims and lawsuits, and more
importantly, not to wait till the body count accelerates, but
to do extensive testing to ensure that design and preproduction
phases of tire production give us information as to whether
tires should ever be put on the marketplace in the first place.
Now, it is against that backdrop that we are here today,
because we are faced with a most extraordinary circumstance
today. Normally NHTSA issues a mandatory recall on NHTSA's
data, convinces a manufacturer to do a voluntary recall. Today,
Ford has announced essentially a recall, a replacement of
another company's products. That is extraordinary and unusual,
and because it involves 13 million Firestone tires, it again
raises some rather unique questions for this committee and for
our safety agency. First of all, what is the foundation for
Ford's decision for this most unprecedented action? Before Ford
announced the action, we were given a briefing by Mr. Nasser of
Ford Motor Company and a chance to ask several questions
regarding this extraordinary announcement.
As Mr. Greenwood has pointed out, we were told that this
announcement resulted from the fact that Ford, on its own,
essentially, conducted extensive testing in using updated data
from NHTSA to determine that these 13 million tires should be
replaced. But Ford also told us then that the Ford--that Ford
tests were conducted in very comparable tests with other tires.
Our investigators have learned something quite different, and
we need an explanation of that today.
First of all, is the Ford recall or replacement overly
broad? We know that many Wilderness AT tires are being recalled
that have not been tested by Ford at all. It includes
Wilderness AT tires that have fueled any claims casting
suspicion, frankly, on the entire line of tires that other
automobile manufacturers have used and continue to use as
original equipment on their SUVs and light trucks, and that, by
the way, includes GM and Toyota.
If indeed these tires should be recalled by Ford, should
they be replaced by these other auto manufacturers? Second, the
confusion gets even worse when you consider, as our
investigators have discovered, that some of the tires Ford is
recalling have a better claims history than those that Ford has
chosen as replacement tires.
Let me say that again. Ford is going to replace these
recalled tires with tires that have a worse claims history than
some of the tires that are coming off the Explorers. For
example, our investigators have learned that one of the tires
that is going to be used in the replacement has a claims rate
of 124 claims per million tires, well in excess of the five
claims per million that Ford says is a benchmark used in this
recall. Are we going to be replacing worse tires for the tires
that come off these cars?
I want to say here something that is important for this
committee and its work. Our investigators have uncovered a
great deal of information about these claims and the claims
ratios and this particular tire that is going to be used as a
replacement. We are going to turn that information over to
NHTSA following this hearing, and we are going to ask NHTSA to
come back to us within 30 days to tell us whether this data is
significant enough that Americans ought to know that the tires
that they are going to have to replace and be used as
replacement tires do have, in fact, a worse claims data than
others. Is that significant? And does that make a difference
for the safety of American families?
Our problem, of course, is that we don't know yet today,
and so we will give that information to NHTSA and ask NHTSA to
come back with--to us within 30 days that we might be able to
inform the American public. Ford, as a private company, of
course, has the right to replace any parts of their vehicles,
including the tires. But in the absence of an agreement from
either Firestone or NHTSA, the public surely must be confused
today. It is the job of NHTSA to come up with some consistent
standards for when tires pose an unreasonable safety risk to
the consumer, and when one company says that they ought to come
off but they don't come off other company's vehicles and when
replacement tires are called for that may have a different, in
fact, a worse record than the tires that are coming off, that
confusion in the American public is unacceptable.
Firestone, too, has failed to answer some pretty basic
questions about the particular tires in question here. Ford and
NHTSA have both focused their attention on two of the
Wilderness AT tire lines used primarily on the Ford Explorer,
and while the claims rates on these two tire lines are not as
high as the levels of last year's recall, they are still much
higher than most of Firestone's other tire lines, whether they
are Wilderness or otherwise. And as NHTSA's latest claims data
shows, more complaints of accidents and injuries on these
nonrecalled tires are coming in, yet Firestone would tell us to
be content with the fact that the injury totals experienced on
these previously unrecalled tires are not as bad as the first.
I am not sure that is a good standard by which we ought to make
safety judgments here.
Firestone's also attempted to shift the focus from its
tires to the Explorer itself. We have consistently said from
the beginning of this controversy last year that all
potentially relevant issues needed to be explored by NHTSA,
including those related to how vehicles and tires interact as a
system, and NHTSA is committed to doing just that, and we have
asked NHTSA, in fact, to make more headway than they have so
far.
But the review of the vehicle system issue should never
replace the primary focus on the critical event itself, which
is the tire tread separation, without which the vehicle
stability issues wouldn't come up. Firestone can't avoid
legitimate scrutiny of its tires by passing the buck on to the
Explorer. NHTSA needs to fully explore all these relevant
issues and in a much more timely manner. We need some answers
soon, and the public should not have to suffer through
additional weeks or months of dueling charts and flying
accusations and more hearings.
And finally, I want to discuss an issue that I raised with
Mr. Nasser in our conversation several weeks ago. We all know
that Ford used Goodyear tires for the Explorer for several
years in the mid 1990's, in addition to the Firestone tires
that were used and recalled. We also know that these Goodyear
tires have had less than a handful of claims relating to tread
separations on these Explorers. The obvious question is, why
did Ford stop using Goodyear tires on the Explorer in model
1998 and return to sole sourcing Firestone tires that have
since been recalled?
Last year, the committee released Ford documents suggesting
that despite test data that show the Goodyear tire performing
better than the Firestone tire, Ford, nonetheless, dropped
Goodyear as the supplier for the Explorer, because Goodyear may
have been uncompetitive in terms of costs. The committee
recently received additional documentation from Goodyear that
clearly confirms this point that Ford dropped Goodyear because
Goodyear refused to drop its price to be more competitive with
Firestone. And as Ford testifies today about how its recent
test results and claims analysis show superior Goodyear
performance, we should all keep that bit of history in mind.
Mr. Chairman, we won't have all the answers today. Part of
what we do today is shed light on this Ford decision and on
some of the claims made by both Ford and Firestone. NHTSA needs
to ride in to the rescue here and clear up this confusion very
rapidly. In the letter we will send to the agency, we will ask
you to respond in 30 days, Mr. Jackson, and our private
conversations, I know you told me you intend to do that. We
look forward to it. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Hon. W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin, Chairman, Committee
on Energy and Commerce
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank both you and Chairman
Greenwood for holding this joint Subcommittee hearing today, on this
topic of great importance to the American people.
Last year, I co-chaired two hearings on this same topic, after Ford
and Firestone jointly announced a recall of more than six million tires
fitted mostly on the popular Ford Explorer. At those hearings, a lot of
questions were raised about the thoroughness and timeliness of the
internal responses of these two companies, as well as the government's
safety regulators--all of whom had knowledge of potential problems with
these tires for years before taking any action to get them off of U.S.
highways. Those hearings also raised a lot of questions about the
thoroughness of the testing done by Ford and Firestone prior to putting
these tires on these vehicles in the first place, as well as the
quality of Federal tire testing standards that were pathetically weak
and had not been updated since the 1960s.
Partly in response to those hearings, this Committee and the
Congress passed the TREAD Act last October, which required NHTSA to
start collecting information on claims and lawsuits filed against
manufacturers of automobiles and tires in an effort to better identify
problems before they become bigger ones. But the Act also said, in
effect, ``let's not wait for the body count to start to conduct a post-
mortem.'' Let's focus on ensuring adequate testing of tires in the
design and pre-production phase, so as to improve our confidence in
tires before we start driving our families around on them.
Against that backdrop, we are here today to discuss the
extraordinary and costly action recently taken by Ford on its own to
essentially recall as a precaution all Firestone Wilderness AT tires on
Ford vehicles, despite the protests of Firestone and the inaction of
NHTSA. Consistent with the spirit of the TREAD Act, Ford has focused on
updated claims data it and NHTSA received from Firestone, as well as
laboratory tests it has conducted on the tires at issue. Ford's action
certainly is unique in modern business history, in that it involves the
recall of another company's product. By its very nature, then, it
raises a host of questions that warrant fuller exploration by this
Committee.
One of those questions is the foundation for such an unprecedented
action. Before Ford publicly announced its decision several weeks ago,
Mr. Nasser came to speak with several of this Committee's Members,
including me, to discuss his planned action. When he explained the
differences Ford's tests were finding between the Firestone and
Goodyear tires, one of the first things I asked him was whether the
tests were run in a comparable fashion. He said yes, but as Mr.
Greenwood has pointed out in his opening remarks, the findings from the
Committee's review of Ford's test data and methodology certainly call
into doubt whether these tests were run as comparably as both Mr.
Nasser and I would have hoped and expected.
Moreover, taking the Ford test results at face value, they
certainly do not support the breadth of the recall now underway, for
that recall includes many Wilderness AT tires lines that Ford has not
tested at all. The recall also includes Wilderness AT tire lines that
have few, if any, claims--casting suspicion on an entire line of tires
that other automobile manufacturers have used and continue to use as
original equipment on their SUVs and light trucks, including GM and
Toyota. While I certainly understand's Ford interest in making this
recall as easy as possible for its customers, I am concerned that its
inclusion of all these tire lines may actually serve to confuse
consumers even more.
This potential for confusion is even greater, given that consumers
will soon learn--as our investigators have discovered--that some of the
tires Ford is recalling have a better claims history than those Ford
has chosen as replacement tires. Consumers also will soon learn--as our
investigators have discovered--that there are other tires on Ford
vehicles that have higher claims rates than the Wilderness ATs, but are
not being recalled as part of this action.
In short, the question that neither Ford nor NHTSA has been able to
answer to date is, what should the baseline for action be here? We're
going to hear a lot of talk today about claims rates, wedge dimensions,
peel strengths, temperature profiles, and other technical issues. But
the bottom line is that, right now, we are dealing in a world of
subjectivity and relativity, where we might be able to say that one
tire performs better or has different characteristics than another, but
not whether the latter tire is in any way defective.
Ford, as a private company, need not have to prove a tire defective
before deciding it wants to take all of them off its vehicles. But in
the absence of agreement from either Firestone or NHTSA, the public
surely must be confused. It is the job of NHTSA to come up with some
consistent standards for when tires pose an unreasonable safety risk to
consumer. And we must act quickly to reduce the confusion swirling
around this issue before the American public starts to simply tune it
out.
Firestone, too, has failed to answer some pretty basic questions
about the particular tires most in question here. Ford and NHTSA have
both focused their attention on two of the Wilderness AT tire lines
used primarily on the Ford Explorer. While the claims rates on these
two tire lines are not as high as the levels of last year's recall,
they are still much higher than most of Firestone's other tire lines,
whether Wilderness or otherwise. As NHTSA's latest data release shows,
more complaints of accidents and injuries on these non-recalled tires
are coming in.
Yet Firestone would have us be content to know that, in their
opinion, these tires won't reach the claims or injury totals
experienced by the previously recalled tires--as if THAT should be the
benchmark we should all use in judging consumer safety. Well I, for
one, am not willing to take that option either. Surely, there must be
something about these particular tires that warrants closer inspection.
Firestone also has attempted to shift the focus from its tires to
the Explorer itself. I have consistently said from the beginning of
this controversy last year that all potentially relevant issues need to
be explored by NHTSA, including those related to how the vehicle and
the tire interact as a system. And NHTSA committed to doing just that
when it was before the Congress last year--although it has made little
headway in the meantime. But the review of vehicle system issues should
never displace the primary focus on the critical event itself--the tire
tread separation, without which the vehicle stability issues would not
arise. Firestone cannot avoid legitimate scrutiny of its tires by
playing pass the buck to the Explorer.
NHTSA needs to fully explore all of the relevant issues, and in a
much more timely manner. The public should not have to suffer through
additional weeks or months of dueling charts and flying accusations.
Finally, I want to discuss one other issue that I raised with Mr.
Nasser in our conversation several weeks ago. We all know that Ford
used Goodyear for the Explorer tire for several years in the mid-1990s,
in addition to the Firestone tires that have been recalled. We also
know that those Goodyear tires have had less than a handful of claims
relating to tread separation on Explorers. The obvious question is, why
did Ford stop using Goodyear tires on the Explorer in Model Year 1998,
and return to sole-sourcing Firestone tires?
Last year, the Committee released Ford documents suggesting that,
despite test data that showed the Goodyear tire performing better than
the Firestone tire, Ford nonetheless dropped Goodyear as a supplier for
the Explorer because Goodyear may have been uncompetitive in terms of
cost. The Committee recently received additional documentation from
Goodyear that clearly confirms this point--that Ford dropped Goodyear
because Goodyear refused to drop its price to be more competitive with
Firestone. As Ford testifies today about how its recent test results
and claims analyses show superior Goodyear performance, we all should
keep that bit of history in mind.
I want to thank all of our witnesses today, and thank both Chairman
Stearns and Chairman Greenwood for hosting today's hearing.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the distinguished chairman.
On our list, we have Ms. Harman for an opening statement.
And let me remind the members the procedure is for a joint
hearing, for the members other than the ranking and the full
chairman, to limit their opening statements to 3 minutes. So we
would be most appreciative.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I commend you for
holding this hearing, and welcome our witnesses.
I hail from California, where the blame game is in full
frenzy for the energy crisis, and where SUVs are a way of life,
even when they never go off road. 203 people have died because
of tire failures, 203 people have died, and it is critically
important that the heads of the companies who manufacture the
vehicles and the tires involved in their deaths are here
voluntarily and that we are here, too. The blame game won't
bring those people back, and it won't make cars or tires safer.
Actions the executives here take can make people safer.
Actions that NHTSA takes can make people safer. Actions we take
can make people safer. That is our job to protect the health
and welfare of our constituents. The blame game stops here. And
this hearing is about how we are going to go forward with safer
cars and safer tires. I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. Stearns. I thank my colleague.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Deal.
Mr. Deal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with what Ms.
Harman has just said. We find ourselves in multifaceted
positions from time to time as Members of Congress in listening
to the opening statements thus far, certainly a number of very
important issues have been raised. However, I have the feeling
that we are about to engage in a plaintiff's trial lawyer
discovery frenzy today of finger pointing. I am not
particularly interested in that aspect, because I do not view
that necessarily as a role for Congress to engage in.
But as Ms. Harman said, our primary purpose is public
safety. So to that end, all of us will be interested in hearing
what has been done to correct problems if problems did, in
fact, exist, and what, if anything, needs to be done in the
oversight responsibility that Congress has delegated to NHTSA
in carrying out that role, and does anything from a legislative
standpoint need to be done further in keeping with what we have
previously done in the last Congress with the TREAD Act? Those
are the kinds of inquiries that I view as relevant to the
matter that is before this committee today. I yield back the
balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. He yields back the balance of his time. Mrs.
Capps is recognized for an opening statement.
Mrs. Capps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to say
that I am pleased that we are holding this hearing today, but I
am not. I am not, because of the original circumstances that
have brought us here today, tragedy. As we all know, over 200
people have died in car accidents because of faulty tires,
faulty car design or maybe some combination of both. Hundreds
more have been injured. The lives of the families and friends
of these people have been up-ended, and we are here today to
try to sort through the facts that have caused this damage.
But I am also not pleased because today's hearings will
likely be a continuation of the charges and countercharges
between two legendary American companies. Ford has now offered
to replace all of Firestone Wilderness AT tires. The company
says they are doing this out of concern for their customer's
safety. Firestone questions the motives of Ford and produces
studies that claim its tires are not the reason behind the
rollovers that have caused the deaths of so many people.
So Ford produces studies that show its Explorers are safe.
Both sides have experts supporting them, and today's Washington
Post has a story about the lobbying efforts that are going on
so each side can get out its story.
Maybe there is nothing wrong with this, but I don't know if
it is actually getting us much closer to the truth. So today's
hearing will likely be a continuation in this battling of
charges and countercharges, each side producing credible
studies to make its point. Quite frankly, I am not sure who to
believe, and I will not make any statements that call in
question the legitimacy of either side. But I am sure of one
thing. I want us to get to the truth of this matter. I want
American consumers to know that when they get behind the wheel
of their car, they can know that that car and all its parts are
as safe as they can be, that there have been no corners cut, no
edges shaved. That, after all, is one of the jobs of our
government, to make sure that the market works and produces
safe products.
In this case, we clearly need a judge, someone who can look
at the technical claims that companies are making and make some
sense of them. That judge is supposed to be the Federal
Government, specifically the National Highway Traffic and
Safety Administration. So I will be interested to hear from
NHTSA, and I will continue to push them to get to the bottom of
this matter.
American consumers are depending on them and on us. Thank
you. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Stearns. I thank my colleague.
Mr. Shimkus, opening statement?
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be brief.
We want to welcome our two CEOs and the director of NHTSA here,
two great companies that we are in conflict with today. Basic
business MBA says the CEO's job is to maximize shareholder
wealth. We all know that you do that by protecting public
safety, because it is not good business to impinge on public
safety. No one would take that risk. But as everyone agrees on
both sides of the aisle, we are searching for some certainty,
legal certainty. We talk about that in all lines of the
business that we do here on the commerce committee, legal
certainty on who is doing what and how to resolve this. We did
pass the TREAD Act last year in response initially, and
unfortunately, haven't had much time to get the full impact of
the TREAD Act, along with the additional dollars needed to
affect that law, and we're already back in front of this
committee.
My questions will be directed to both the CEOs and to NHTSA
as to what should NHTSA do, Ford Motor Company? What should
NHTSA do, Firestone? And NHTSA, what do you think you should
do, and what resources do you need to get it done? You can tell
there is a lot of frustration up here. We did not want to be
here less than a year after the last hearing, and we hope that
we can get to some conclusions so we are not here again in the
next couple of months. Thank you, Mr. Chairman I thank the
gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey, is recognized
for an opening statement.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. This is an
unprecedented hearing before this committee. We have two
corporations, each of which has leveled a blistering, scalding
indictment of the other company. Obviously we need answers. We
have a corporate schoolyard brawl that has broken out here. We
need an impartial referee to determine who was right and who
was wrong on each one of the allegations. This hearing is not
going to determine that. We need NHTSA, the independent agency,
to play the role of referee, calling each one of the shots on
each one of these issues in a way that ascertains the truth for
the American people.
Now, it is true, and today the President has designated his
nominee to be the head of NHTSA. We haven't had anyone running
NHTSA for the last several months there was a Presidential
designee. This, in the aftermath of this committee and the
Congress passing a law last year which gave a very serious
homework assignment to NHTSA. Now, NHTSA tells us that they are
at least a month away from finishing their information. In
addition, we have to know how much progress they have made in
implementing the TREAD Act, implementing the law which we
passed last year.
After all, that is the only way in which the safety
recommendations and requirements which we passed into law last
year are going to be put on the books, and the public will be
protected and every subsequent year in because of those
additional safety protections. So I wish that there was an
urgency in this administration that would have designated a new
head of highway safety back 5 months ago.
That would help us to know who is right and who is wrong in
every one of these issues. Obviously, the very viability of at
least one of these companies is going to be determined by the
answers to those questions. We know that there is a toxic
cocktail that is created when Ford Explorers and Firestone
tires are put together. That warning is out there now to the
public. Ford is now saying that it is more than the 6 million
tires. Now an additional 13 million Ford--Firestone tires that
put their vehicles at risk.
But we do know this as well: Even as the information has
been made available to Ford over the last several years, they
continue to increase the weight of their SUVs, knowing that
there is a direct correlation between the weight of these
vehicles and their propensity to roll over and to endanger
American families. And so, Mr. Chairman, we couldn't have a
more important hearing, but everything that happens today is
merely preliminary to the ultimate decisions made by NHTSA as
to who is right and who is wrong, and I hope that we can get a
confirmation on the President's appointee and a quick
resolution of these issues for the sake of the public, because
we know these accidents occur on hot summer days on long rides,
and that is where we are in America today, with the American
public at greatest risk for the next several months without the
answers which every one of these families deserve.
Mr. Stearns. I thank my colleague.
The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Terry, is recognized for
an opening statement.
Mr. Terry. Thank you all. I will be succinct, and my focus
here is going to be on my own government agency and their
tardiness in supporting the process and supplying us with data.
The reason why I want to focus on them is because I am going to
work from a basic assumption, that there is self-motivation
involved in both Firestone and Ford's testing. There is a
billion dollars at stake here in lawsuits. There are trials
strategy taking place, and as layman up here in most of the
public, we could read the data, the summaries of the testing
and we can see--well, I won't say it is fairly convincing. The
oversteer of the Ford Explorer that Firestone has provided us,
likewise the peal strength and the other data that Ford has
supplied us about the Firestone--Firestone tires, the data that
they have accumulated.
When you read the summaries, to us they all are convincing,
but keep--what keeps popping in my mind is that there is a lot
of dollars at stake here in lawsuits. Each in a trial strategy
have the ability, and it is pretty typical trial strategy to
try and bring somebody else in as a defendant and share the
blame.
So what we need is reliable independent data that we can
rely on that can shift through the new answers that some of my
colleagues might have brought out in their opening statements
of just the little things that you can tweak, the type of
vehicles that are used, the age of the tires that are used that
can tweak the outcome, can tweak the data to where layman
wouldn't notice. That is why we rely on NHTSA, and so I think
that is where I am going to focus upon today, and the hard
questions will be asked.
It will be good questions for Firestone and Ford as well,
but we need that independent body, the American public needs
that independent body, and we haven't been able to provide
that. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time. Thank you.
Mr. Strickland, is recognized for his opening statement.
Mr. Strickland. Mr. Sawyer is----
Mr. Stearns. Mr. Sawyer is not on either subcommittee, but
we certainly invited him to participate, and we are under the
customary procedure allowing him to do his opening statement
after the members of both subcommittees have spoken first.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. So you are recognized.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, sir. I'll just take a few
moments.
Sitting here, I listened to my colleagues and I've
concluded what I frequently conclude when I attend these kinds
of meetings and that is, where do we as Members of Congress go
for the truth? How can we take the information that is provided
to us, sort through it, determine credibility and reliability,
and then make an informed decision?
And I think that's what we must, at least in part, depend
upon our witnesses today to provide for us and to us. But
ultimately I think we do need this objective judgment from the
Federal agency that's responsible for providing us with these
kinds of data.
I am more than a distant observer, I guess. I drive a Ford
Explorer with Wilderness AT tires, and I have a district where
it takes me about 5 hours to drive from end to end, and I plan
to do that throughout the coming summer months. So I hope we
reach some conclusions today so that I, and my constituents
especially, can face the summer months feeling some degree of
confidence.
I yield back.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from
Tennessee, Mr. Gordon, is recognized for an opening statement.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we're at the
point of opening statements, where there is the cliche,
``Everything's been said, just everyone hasn't said it.'' so I
will just make a quick observation.
When I was practicing law in a small town, Murfreesboro,
Tennessee, I think I discovered what we're going to find out
today. Mr. Tauzin and Mr. Greenwood particularly did a good
job--and Mr. Deutsch--of laying forth a lot of serious
questions that we need to have answers to.
A month of hearings won't bring answers to all those, so as
has been said, we need to move forward and hear from NHTSA,
because I think we are going to find out what I found in
Murfreesboro, that you can take the two or three witnesses
seeing the same accident or a dog bite and they're going to
come back with different views. Whether it was the direction,
or their angle for seeing the accident, whether it is an
internal prejudice, they simply bring back different views. So,
hopefully, NHTSA will get its act together shortly and do a
more thorough investigation.
So what I want to do in my time is really ask the same
questions of all three witnesses, to try to set up a benchmark,
so we can move forward. And thank you again.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time.
Mr. Stupak is recognized for an opening statement.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, more of
a parliamentary inquiry if I may. As I was coming flying out
here today I went through Detroit. I grabbed the Detroit Free
Press because it talks about new tires, new worries. And on the
majority side, we've had some discussion this morning in
opening statements about the replacement tires having a worse
safety record than the Firestones.
My question is directed to the Chair: Are we going to see
that information? Is it going to be part of this hearing? Can
we see it?
My friend, Mr. Strickland, and I both have a Ford Explorer.
After last year's hearing, I replaced my tires, so I want to
make sure if I replaced them, I replaced them with good tires;
and I think we're misleading the American public if we say we
replaced them with worse tires. But we are not getting the
data.
Mr. Stearns. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Stupak. Sure.
Mr. Stearns. I think as we go through this hearing there is
a nuance here between safety and claims reporting and what this
claims reporting means versus actual safety. So I think what
they're alluding to is the claims reporting, which is not
necessarily a clear proportionate with the safety.
But I think your concern is welcome and I think one of the
reasons that we had this hearing is because both members and
the consumers want to understand the nuances between this claim
data and what it means. And so when we move forward, I think
some of the questions that you have might allude to that fact.
Mr. Stupak. I see the chairman is here. Maybe he may have
that information.
Will that be provided to all of us, Mr. Chairman, the
information you brought up about some tires have worse safety
records than the ones that are being----
Mr. Stearns. It's not a safety record. We are talking about
just claims data, which is not a safety record.
Chairman Tauzin. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Stupak. Can we have that data?
Chairman Tauzin. Will the gentleman yield? Some of the data
is apparently NHTSA's data. Some of it has been provided to us
on a confidential basis from other tire manufacturers, and
frankly, we don't know how valid this information is. NHTSA has
not looked at it to see whether this information that's
privately supplied to us is validated yet.
At a meeting right before this hearing I asked Mr. Jackson
if we supplied him with this information immediately following
this hearing, again because it is confidentially supplied to
our investigators--first, supply it to NHTSA, would they within
30 days be able to give us, as quickly as possible, information
as to whether or not that information we received is, No. 1,
valid, and No. 2, whether or not it's consequential information
that consumers need to know immediately, if in fact the Ford
criteria for this recall are valid.
Mr. Dingell. Would the gentleman yield to me?
The question, I think, that has to be answered is, are we
comparing apples and oranges. I would note that some of the
information that shows that the new tires from Firestone are
safer than other manufacturers comes from a plant where there
is no history of manufacturing of those tires at that plant,
and as a result, there is no record of failures of tires coming
from that plant.
Now, is that not so?
Chairman Tauzin. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Stupak. I ask for unanimous consent for 2 additional
minutes with the colloquy going.
Chairman Tauzin. I would say to my friend that there are
several questions we do not know the answer to, and that is,
one, whether, first of all, we think the data we are getting is
valid. But we need to have that verified by NHTSA. If, in fact,
a tire that is going to be replaced by Ford is going to be
replaced with a tire that has a much worse claims record than a
tire being replaced, is that information significant enough for
Ford perhaps to make a different decision or for consumers to
make a different decision? That's a question that we are going
to ask NHTSA at the end of this hearing.
The gentleman is correct, there's a lot of claims data that
goes to NHTSA. Some of it goes to the individual tire
companies; and we need to know whether or not we have duplicate
numbers, how valid is it, and how significant are those numbers
before we ask NHTSA to release them to the public, I think.
Mr. Stupak. I want to reclaim my time here.
Whether it's claims data or safety claims, if we have
information, I hope that it can be shared with all members of
the committee, because I can wait for Ford. Like I said, I
replaced my own tires on my Explorer, and when you have an
accident, it's an accident--they don't call it ``safety data''
or ``claims data,'' it's an accident for the people out there.
And I think the purpose of these hearings is to clarify
this stuff for the American people, and all we are doing is
confusing them by saying we have new tires and new worries, but
yet we are not sharing this information with the American
public.
So I hope by the end of the day we could get that
information, and someone on the majority side--that we have
plaintiff trial lawyers discovery. Well, being a plaintiff
trial lawyer, I certainly hope we do because plaintiff trial
lawyers usually increase public safety and get to the truth of
the matter.
Chairman Tauzin. Will my friend yield again?
Mr. Stupak. Sure.
Chairman Tauzin. I hope you understand that is precisely
the reason why I'm asking that the committee request NHTSA to
clarify this information for us rapidly. I don't want us to be
party to releasing bad information to the American public which
causes them either distress, worry or to make a bad decision.
One of the reasons for this hearing today is to examine
Ford, its decision in that light, as Ford ordered a recall. Has
it recalled tires that other companies should recall? And the
information we've discovered leads us to some new confusing
areas.
I think it's critical that before we confuse the public
with this information that we get it verified by NHTSA, and
more importantly, that they indicate the significance of these
numbers to us so that we can make a proper report to the
American public without further confusion.
Mr. Stupak. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I said before you came
in, someone's already released the information. It's already
confusing the public when you have the headlines ``New Tires,
New Worry.'' so I think we have to get that squared away as
soon as we can.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman Mr. Sawyer, who is not a member of either
subcommittee, but is welcome to provide an opening statement.
Mr. Sawyer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the
hearing and for the chance to take part in this way. I am from
Akron, Ohio, and although we haven't built a passenger car tire
in Akron for 22 years, it remains a center of research and
development, production technology, command and control in this
global industry for more than a century.
It is matter of personal concern that we resolve questions
of continuing safety in this important industry to people all
over my district. In that sense, understanding these tragedies
is rightfully this committee's work; reducing their likelihood
in the future is our purpose. And so while there are many
things that have been said today, I'd like to return to three
fundamental points that I made a year ago.
What I said last year I feel just as strongly about today.
That is this: You cannot evaluate tire performance separately
from the vehicle on which it is equipped. Nor is a vehicle
performance evaluation complete without the tire. In one sense,
a tire may be the single most important component of a vehicle
in translating that vehicle's design characteristics into
actual performance on the road.
The tire and vehicle work together in determining
acceleration, braking, cornering, comfort and, most important,
safety and do it through four very small contact patches with
the road. In that sense, the question that we have to answer is
how the vehicle and its tires function together.
Second, let me just say that I'm deeply troubled by the
underlying notion that tires are never supposed to fail. I
remind all of us that the tire remains the only piece of
equipment on the vehicle that has a backup. This is not by
chance. Tires are complex, they're highly engineered products
that operate in one of the most extraordinarily violent
environments of any product that we use in our daily lives and
they wear out. They are consumable products.
Third, typically tires contain more than scores of
different design elements of rubber, steel, polyester,
chemicals, carbon black, depending upon their application in
design of the tire. Many tires are designed for specific
vehicles, for specific performance; consequently, tires perform
differently depending on the type and design of the vehicle on
which they're mounted and how and where that vehicle is used.
With this in mind, it is clear it would be a serious
mistake, in my judgment, to try to set one standard for tire
performance for the tire industry. Each tire design and
application, it seems to me, must be evaluated in its own
setting. When tires do fail through road use, damage or abuse,
or misapplication to the wrong vehicle, or wearing out at the
end of its useful life, or as the result of a design or
manufacturing flaw, NHTSA's got to have the appropriate data so
that it can evaluate the tire in its appropriate vehicular
environment. That's the best way to protect consumers.
When Congress passed the TREAD Act last year, it took a
major step in making sure this happens by requiring an early
warning system, one that works--actually two that work: one, to
use performance statistics through the reporting of data to
identify problems early in the life of a design.
We heard a number of different dimensions that have
reporting data. Comparability is another one, to make sure that
you're getting the same data from different corporate settings.
The second is an early warning device to warn the vehicle's
operator with accuracy when his vehicle's tires begin to lose
pressure.
I know that NHTSA's working diligently on the regulations
to implement the act in this provision, and I look forward to
hearing them and the witnesses in this process.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for your indulgence.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the gentleman.
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael Bilirakis, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Florida
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing today to examine
the reason and ramifications for the Ford Motor Company's recent recall
of additional Firestone tires.
This issue touches many of our constituents. I have heard from many
individuals in my district who have expressed concerns about tire and
vehicle safety. It is terrible that the increased attention to this
issue comes as a result of tragic accidents and highway fatalities. I
hope that this situation can help improve public awareness of the need
to monitor tire pressure and engage in regular vehicle maintenance.
Many consumers, including Members of Congress, are confused by the
various data coming from both Ford and Bridgestone/Firestone. Are the
Firestone tires the cause of the problem, or is it a result of the
design of the Explorer? Whose data should the public believe? What is
the proper role of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) in making these determinations?
I hope that this hearing gives the respective parties a chance to
highlight their findings and provide answers to these Subcommittees on
issues that greatly impact American consumers. I am particularly
interested to know if there is any documentation or claims for
accidents that have occurred in an Explorer with non-Firestone tires.
Has NHTSA conducted the necessary testing to ascertain whether these
problems are limited to the Firestone Wilderness AT line, or have they
received claims for similar Explorer accidents with competitors' tires?
Mr. Chairman, with the summer in full swing, many families are
piling into sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and heading out for summer
vacations. In order to ensure the greatest protection for the safety of
those families, it is incumbent on us to obtain the most accurate and
comprehensive information possible. We must also increase our efforts
to raise public awareness of tire and vehicle safety issues, so that
every driver realizes the importance of proper vehicle maintenance,
including gauging tire pressure.
I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for holding this important hearing.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara Cubin, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Wyoming
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe it is important today to convene
this hearing to disseminate information to the American consumer--
especially those that own Ford vehicles or any vehicle with Firestone
tires.
Not wanting to speak for other members of the subcommittee, I'd
like to make an initial statement to our witnesses today from Ford and
Firestone: please stop playing this juvenile blame game; please stop
publishing graphs and charts that only support one side of the story;
and by all means please stop sacrificing the safety of American
families at the alter of public relations.
We know that different tires seem to react differently to certain
conditions. We also know that automobiles, especially SUVs, tend to
react differently than passenger vehicles in certain conditions. When
you put those two very uncertain situations together we seem to get a
very tenuous outcome.
In a situation such as this we tend to look to the companies to
resolve the problem to ensure that their customers' safety is
protected. We don't seem to have that in this case. Maybe if the
companies get past pointing fingers at each other they'll begin
concentrating on the safety aspects.
Until then, it is very important that the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) be a leader in answering many of the
outstanding questions surrounding what has become an absolute debacle.
I'm pleased to read in Mr. Jackson's testimony that NHTSA's testing
may be completed as early as next week.
However, I'm concerned that any delay in getting accurate
information out to the public will jeopardize the lives and safety of
our families.
Additionally, many local businesses are dependent on selling these
goods and services. Timely, accurate information is critical to ensure
confidence in both Ford and Firestone products.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. I yield back my time.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ed Bryant, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Tennessee
Chairman Stearns, Chairman Greenwood, I thank you for holding this
joint hearing today on an issue of obviously great importance.
I, like others on the committee, have interests on both sides of
this issue, having constituents that are directly involved with both
Firestone and Ford. As I prepared for this hearing over the last
weekend, I met with Ford dealers in my district, and in Tennessee we
have the headquarters of Firestone as well as a number of Firestone
distributors and dealers.
After the recall of the 15-inch Firestone ATX and Decatur
Wilderness AT tires last year, and now after the discussions
surrounding Ford Motor Company's ``replacement program,'' I think that
the American people frankly aren't real sure what to make of the
situation.
Ford says this is a tire problem and Firestone says it is the
Explorer. Last year we learned that there was indeed something that
went wrong at the Decatur plant to make so many Firestone ATX tires
fail.
Obviously, there is not the same consensus today.
Firestone's studies indicate that the Firestone AT tires on
vehicles other than the Ford Explorer have not had the same problems
with tread separation as the tires on the Ford Explorer.
But, then Ford points out that the reliability of Goodyear tires on
the Explorer is evidence that the Explorer is not to blame.
Ultimately the reason we are here today, and the reason we are not
leaving this to the courts and solely NHTSA (the regulators whose job
it is to do these things) is that we are trying to move quickly and
determine what safety concerns are out there. We need to make sure that
folks in NHTSA are doing their job, but the bottom line is that we are
trying to protect the consumers' interests.
This hearing is a great opportunity for Congress to sift through
the studies and statistics conducted by both parties, and try to
reconcile the information so we can better understand what is going on
here.
It is indeed a shame that such a long working relationship between
these two companies has been severed. I encourage the two parties to
try and work together and be forthright with the American people. The
interests we are looking out for today is that of the consumer, and I
hope that this hearing helps to better inform the consumer of the
safety of both the Firestone Wilderness AT tire and the Ford Explorer.
Again, I thank the two chairmen for having this hearing, and I also
thank the members of the panels for coming today--Mr. Nasser, Mr.
Lampe, Secretary Jackson, Mr. Shelton, and Mr. Weinstein--thank for
bringing your cases before us today.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Edolphus ``Ed'' Towns, a Representative in
Congress from the State of New York
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for convening this timely hearing on Ford's
replacement of Firestone's Wilderness AT tires. I would also like to
thank today's scheduled witnesses for appearing: Jacques Nasser of
Ford, John Lampe of Firestone as well as the representatives from
NHTSA. I do not expect that we will reach any conclusions today, but I
hope that by bringing the parties together we will provide the American
people with the information necessary to make more informed decisions.
We are here because of the more than 2100 tread separations of
Firestone ATX and at tires that have resulted in the deaths of over 200
people. One of the goals of the Consumer Protection Committee--as the
name suggests--is to protect consumers. When over 200 people die as a
result of a similar cause it is time to examine the problem more
closely.
Last year, Firestone recalled 6.5 million tires after confronting
the accident and fatality reports with Ford and NHTSA which indicated
that there was a problem directly linked to Firestone's 15'' inch ATX
tires and Wilderness AT tires produced at its decatur manufacturing
facility. The number of accidents and fatalities linked to the
Firestone tires in question clearly indicated that something needed to
be done to address a worsening situation. Ford and Firestone largely
worked together and took responsibility for the problem. At the time,
all parties committed to continue looking for the root cause of the
tread separation problem. In addition, questions were raised regarding
whether or not the initial recall was broad enough. To date, we have
heard from Ford and Firestone regarding their findings. We have yet to
hear the findings from the National Highway Transportation and Safety
Administration's (NHTSA) study of the recalled tires, Firestone's
Wilderness AT tires and possibly some aspect of the Ford Explorer.
Last year's recalled tires had claim rates of 363 per million to 41
per million. The tires currently in question have claims rates which
have roughly doubled from their previous levels to the most recent
available statistics--from the september 2000 to December 2000
reporting period--of 19.3 and 17.4 per million. While this increase is
significant it is two to twenty times smaller than the claims rates of
the previously recalled tires. Ford maintains that they had to act
because the claims trends suggested increasing tire problems and a
potential increasing risk to consumer safety. Ford should be lauded for
their extraordinary efforts to safeguard consumers. However, it is very
difficult to analyze the basis for Ford's decision without any baseline
standards from NHTSA.
Firestone for their part has been cooperating with NHTSA as well. I
do not believe that anyone is served by the chart wars that we have
seen from both Ford and Firestone over the past several weeks. I would
urge both parties to continue cooperating with NHTSA and allow NHTSA to
do the job that it is supposed to do. In addition, I point out that the
battle of self-serving statistics has only brought into doubt the
creditability of both sides in this dispute. Currently, the biggest
problem facing the American people regarding this matter is the lack of
any information from an independent third party. Again, I urge NHTSA to
release their conclusions as soon as possible. In addition, I would ask
NHTSA to answer the following questions:
It is nearly impossible to judge the value of the information
provided by the two sides of this dispute without any definitive
baseline information to clarify the companies' competing claims from
NHTSA. Does NHTSA have baseline information regarding the number of
claims per million for tires?
What can be done to make NHTSA's information more user friendly?
Does the lack of an Administrator for NHTSA hamper its ability to
serve the American people?
How will NHTSA be able to deal with the vast amounts of additional
data it is scheduled to receive under the Tread Act, if NHTSA has its
hands full with the information that it already receives?
Does NHTSA need additional resources to do its job more
effectively?
Mr. Stearns. Now we'll have the first panel; I think we
have completed our opening statements. But before we do, I
would like to ask unanimous consent of the subcommittee to
place into the record documents that are both from the minority
and the majority side; and without objection, it's so ordered.
We welcome Mr. Jacques Nasser, the President and Chief
Executive Officer of Ford Motor Company. And let me just say
that we appreciate your patience in coming here; and at this
point, it's customary, Mr. Nasser, to swear you in, and I think
we're going to have Mr. Greenwood swear you in.
Mr. Greenwood. Good morning, Mr. Nasser. You're aware that
this committee is holding--this joint committee is holding an
investigative hearing and as is our custom, we take our
testimony--witnesses give their testimony under oath. Do you
have any problem in testifying under oath?
Mr. Nasser. No.
Mr. Greenwood. You are entitled also to have counsel. Do
you wish to be represented by counsel during your testimony?
Mr. Nasser. No, I don't.
Mr. Greenwood. In that case, if you will raise your right
hand, I will swear you in.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Greenwood. You're now under oath and may testify.
Mr. Stearns. As I was saying, Mr. Nasser, we want to thank
you for coming here and to recognize that you came to us early
to speak with us about this controversy. And we appreciate your
willingness to come forward in talking to us, and we give you
the floor.
TESTIMONY OF JACQUES NASSER, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, FORD MOTOR COMPANY
Mr. Nasser. Thank you very much, Chairman Stearns.
Mr. Stearns. You might have to put that a little closer to
you.
That's a little better. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Nasser. Chairman Stearns and Chairman Greenwood,
Congressman Dingell and members of the committee, at the outset
I'd like to express on behalf of the women and men of Ford
Motor Company our sincerest sympathies to those families who
have lost loved ones in these tragic accidents.
Today, as we've already seen, the committee is going to be
battered with competing data and competing analyses, research
and statistics, charts and graphs, experts and opinions, all
striving to settle the disagreements surrounding our decision
to replace 13 million tires on Ford vehicles. I'm here to
explain the reasons behind our decision and to answer any
questions the committee may have about the actions that we have
taken to protect the safety of our customers.
As mentioned earlier, last year Firestone recalled about
6.5 million tires, primarily on Ford vehicles; and at that
time, I pledged to this committee that Ford would implement an
early warning system to help identify potential tire problems.
We promised our customers and all of you that we would use
the lessons learned, combined with the aid of new technology,
to keep our customers safe; and Ford Motor Company supported
passage of the TREAD Act, which in many ways encouraged the
very same vigilence.
Public awareness of tire safety has intensified since last
year, and our expectations within the Ford Motor Company of
tire performance has also changed. In many ways, maybe in all
ways, the bar has been raised.
Without question, detecting the possibilities of a future
tire defect carries much greater weight than it ever did
before. We've also moved from seeking remedies for bad tires to
identifying and eliminating faulty tires before the safety of
customers is compromised.
Last summer, field data and government data revealed highly
elevated tread separation rates on Firestone ATX and certain
Firestone Wilderness AT tires. Those tires were recalled even
before we knew why they were failing.
Clearly, we needed to learn more to be able to prevent this
from happening again, so we started digging deeper and deeper,
and we began the most intensive scientific investigation in
Ford Motor Company's history. Hundreds of engineers and
scientists looked at the tires; then they looked at the tires
together with the vehicle, and they also looked at the vehicle
itself.
Our lab tests and real-world data, including Firestone's
own claims data, indicated that many of the remaining Firestone
Wilderness AT tires will experience elevated failure rates,
particularly as they age. The data convinced us to act now and
to act on behalf of the people who drive our vehicles.
We must admit that we're dealing with very early warning
signals, but they're warnings that we have taken very
seriously, and we could not ignore them. We believe that this
issue will grow into a more serious problem, particularly as
the tires wear and age, and in short, without this action, our
customer safety would have been at risk.
So on May 22, we announced our tire replacement program,
and thanks to the dedication of our dealers and employees and
the cooperation of the other tire companies, we're moving ahead
swiftly. About 2 million tires are now in the pipeline, and we
have replaced about 1 million tires as of this morning.
I'd like to thank the many dealers and thousands of UAW
workers who are in Washington today to show support for their
company and for our actions. It means a great deal to us.
Let me talk about the Explorer, and let's get to the heart
of the issue. The Ford Explorer is and always has been a safe
vehicle. The criticism from Firestone challenging the
Explorer's safety is not based on fact. Real-world data that is
compiled by the Department of Transportation shows that the
Explorer is among the safest SUVs on the market. And let's go
through that data.
The Explorer is 27 percent safer than passenger cars. The
Explorer is safer than comparable SUVs in all crash types,
front, side, rear and roll-over. The Explorer is involved in 19
percent fewer accidents of all types than the typical sports
utility vehicle.
From another angle, the Explorer has scored four or five
stars in government frontal and side-crash tests. Explorer has
also received the second highest ranking from the Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety in its frontal offset crash tests;
and just one other SUV got a better rating, while four received
lower ratings.
When you stand back from it all, in all, no other sport
utility vehicle has such a strong combination of field and
testing performance. Those are the facts, not the headlines.
In addition, we have closely examined the relationship
between sport utility vehicles, as was mentioned earlier, and
tires. We performed hundreds of tests with the Explorer and
competitive sport utility vehicles, and this exhaustive
analysis filled millions of pages of information which we have
shared with NHTSA, we have shared with Firestone and we have
shared with this committee. That book to my left is a summary
of that data and it shows that the Explorer is a superbly
designed vehicle and is a safety leader.
Last month, Chairman Tauzin asked NHTSA to review the
performance of the Explorer compared to other sport utility
vehicles. We agree that there is much misinformation and some
confusion about the safety of these vehicles. So we welcome and
we encourage NHTSA's review and analysis of all the data on
Explorer and peer vehicles, and we will fully cooperate in this
effort.
We're also very confident of the outcome because the
Explorer has 10 years of real-world safety data and that
doesn't mislead.
And there's more, probably the clearest demonstration yet
that this is a problem with the tires and not with the vehicle;
and this is the real-world performance of two groups of
Explorers totaling more than 1 million vehicles manufactured
over a 3-year period. Everything about these two groups of
Explorers was exactly the same except that half the Explorers
used Goodyear tires and the other half used Firestone tires. We
gave both tire manufacturers the same performance criteria and
both sets of tires had the same recommended tire pressure.
This is the only real-world comparison that is truly apples
to apples, and the results are very clear. There were 1,183
tread separations on the Firestone tires; there were two on the
Goodyear tires. The only variable was the tire. Everything else
was the same--the same drivers, the same vehicles, same parts
of the country, same roads, same driving conditions, same loads
and the same tire pressure.
So it bears repeating, this is a tire issue and only a tire
issue.
I've heard some of the comments made earlier this morning,
and I want to make it clear that we do not get any satisfaction
from this dispute with Firestone, but we cannot and we will not
let them decide when or how the Ford Motor Company will act to
protect our customers' safety. Our customers count on Ford to
place their safety and interests above all else, and we do.
One year ago, I came before this committee to discuss the
recall of Firestone tires, and at that time, you asked what we
could do to assure the public that this type of safety calamity
would not happen again. I pledged to you and to our customers
that we would be vigilant in our efforts to identify the
problems and to identify them early and to fix them.
So I'm very proud of the Ford Motor Company's strong
commitment to safety, and I am grateful for the Secretary's
recognition of that commitment. And as I said last year, this
is a tire problem, not a vehicle problem. And the government
confirmed last year that this is a tire problem.
Although we're back before your committee again this year
to discuss an even larger recall, this still remains a tire
problem. Our goal is to make sure that it does not become a
safety problem for the public.
Thank you for your attention, and I'll be pleased to answer
any questions.
[The prepared statement of Jacques Nasser follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jacques Nasser, Ford Motor Company
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Congressman Dingell and members of the
committee. I am Jacques Nasser, President and CEO of Ford Motor
Company. I am here today to explain the reasons behind our decision to
replace 13 million Firestone tires on Ford vehicles. I am also here to
answer any questions the committee may have on the steps we have taken
to protect the safety of our customers.
For nearly 100 years, our Company has thrived because we have been
responsive to our customers and our communities around the world. In
all the actions we have taken, we have been guided first and foremost
by our commitment to safety. We have also been driven by facts--real
world performance data, as well as laboratory analyses. We have shared
all the data and analyses openly, and have worked with NHTSA and with
Firestone to better understand the causes of the tread separation
problem with Firestone ATX and Wilderness AT tires.
Why We Are Replacing the Tires
On May 22nd of this year, Ford announced that we would replace all
Wilderness AT tires used on Ford vehicles because of concerns about the
performance of the tires as they age, creating unnecessary risks for
our customers. While some of the tires being replaced do not show a
substantial failure risk, we are replacing all Wilderness AT tires to
avoid any confusion for our customers and eliminate any doubt about the
quality of their tires.
Last summer, while the data indicated elevated rates of tread
separation on the 6.5 Million ATX and Decatur-built Wilderness AT tires
(Exhibit 1), which resulted in the Firestone recall, we did not have
enough information to understand why the tires were failing.
Immediately after the recall, we assembled a team of technical
experts to find the causes of the tread separation problem. The purpose
of the investigation was simple: we had to be certain that the tires on
our vehicles were as safe as possible for our customers. The ``Tire
Team'', as it became known, spent more than 100,000 person-hours
analyzing real-world data, investigating accidents, testing tires and
vehicles, running computer simulations and studying tire designs. Our
Tire Team worked closely with NHTSA every step of the way. We also
shared our data and analysis with Firestone and Dr. Sanjay Govindjee,
who conducted an independent investigation at Firestone's request.
As part of that intensive work we developed a laboratory test to
duplicate the failure mode experienced in the field. We developed
better statistical analysis of claims data that allowed prediction of
trends in failure rates. We worked with NHTSA to understand failure
rates in competitive tires. And we did detailed engineering analyses of
failed tires to give us an understanding of real-world failure
mechanisms. Our findings proved consistent with the findings of Dr.
Sanjay Govindjee.
We reached the following conclusions based on our data and
analyses:
<bullet> Firestone's Wilderness AT tires experience higher rates of
tread separations than other tires, including the Goodyear
tires used on the Explorer.
<bullet> Firestone's ATX and Wilderness AT tires fitted to Ford
vehicles have temperature characteristics, wedge design
characteristics and rubber properties, including peel strength,
that demonstrate they are more sensitive than other tires to
the stresses caused by ordinary use. This correlates with their
significantly higher failure rates in the field.
<bullet> Firestone's ATX and Wilderness AT tires have different
designs, constructions and performance characteristics
depending upon when and where they were manufactured. The
Goodyear tires used on Explorers do not exhibit this degree of
variability.
<bullet> Firestone's Wilderness AT 16'' tires with a recommended
inflation pressure of 30 psi perform about the same on the
Explorer as the 15'' tires with a recommended inflation
pressure of 26 psi from the same Firestone plant.
Based on our laboratory testing and results, we were able to make
predictions that could be confirmed by real-world data. Then, on May
11th of this year we received the latest claims data from Firestone
which showed a rising trend in failure rates for Wilderness AT tires,
further validating our analyses and predictive model. With these pieces
of the puzzle coming together, we felt we had sufficient information to
take action in the best interest of our customers (Exhibit 2).
Last summer the elevated levels of tire failures on the recalled
tires sent a very strong signal. What we learned since then allowed us
to analyze failure trends more precisely. So, while claims alone today
do not present as strong a signal as last August, our model suggests
that the rate of failures is increasing significantly as the tires age,
a risk that we cannot ask our customers to accept.
We really had only two choices--wait until more failures proved
conclusively there is a growing problem, or act now on the basis of our
analyses and the data available. With hot weather driving conditions
approaching, we knew the risk of tread separations would increase. As a
result, in the interest of the safety of our customers, we could not
wait.
Progress to Date
In the first week of June, after reviewing our proposed customer
letter with NHTSA, we notified millions of customers of our analysis
and the details of our replacement program. At the same time, we were
qualifying tires as fit for replacement through our testing processes.
We have, so far, identified approximately 60 types of replacement
tires. We also reviewed the list with NHTSA to ascertain that there
were no pending concerns with the qualified tires.
To build the pipeline of replacement tires, we entered into
discussion with tire manufacturers. So far, an additional 2 million
tires have been made available, and we have taken 2-3 down weeks at
several of our plants to help fill the supply pipeline and give the
tire manufacturers time to ramp up production. The desire to quickly
increase replacement tire production was another reason we felt we had
to announce the replacement program as soon as possible.
We are qualifying tires based on the new testing procedures
developed by the Tire Team. In addition, the tire manufacturers are
providing claims data from the early warning system developed as a
result of the TREAD Act. These data, together with our predictive
models, give us confidence that the replacement tires will meet the
needs of our customers.
The Explorer is a Safe Vehicle
The data tell us that the problem is with the tires and not the
vehicle. There are about 3 million Goodyear tires that were built to
the exact same Ford specifications and were put on Explorers during
1995-1997 (and as replacements for these vehicles in subsequent years).
These tires are performing almost flawlessly, having generated only 2
tread separation claims. At the same time, a similar number of
Explorers built at the same assembly plants but equipped with Firestone
tires have experienced 1183 tread separations (Exhibit 3), with the
same type of customer and the same geographical/climatic distribution
of vehicles (Exhibit 4). The difference in tire failure rates therefore
cannot be attributed to the Explorer.
It has been alleged that the reason Goodyear tires had few tread
separations is that they are a ``B'' graded tire according to the
Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standards (UTQGS), while the Wilderness AT
has a ``C'' rating. In fact, millions of tires on GM and Toyota
vehicles, for example, are ``C'' rated, but have not had tread
separation problems.
Another charge is that the Explorer had insufficient load reserve--
or margin of safety--for the tires. The field data show, however, that
there is no correlation between load reserve and tread separation
claims on these vehicles. Goodyear tires had the same load reserve at
26 psi yet had no tread separation problem. Furthermore, the Firestone
16'' Wilderness AT tires, which are specified at 30 psi, had elevated
claims even with 300 pounds more load reserve. Lastly, the Explorer's
load reserve is similar to other SUVs.
There have also been allegations that Explorer is causing the tire
``problem'' since Ford Ranger is fitted with the same tire, yet
experienced fewer tread separations. The only time the same size tire
was used on the Ranger and Explorer was as an option on the four-wheel
drive model of the Ranger. The vast majority of these vehicles were
sold in northern climates where four-wheel drive is in high demand.
When Decatur-built Wilderness AT tires (these were recalled by
Firestone last August) were placed on 4x4 Ranger pickup trucks in the
hot states, they failed at statistically similar rates as the tires on
the Explorer.
The Wilderness AT tires used as original equipment on the Explorer
are also installed as aftermarket tires on a wide variety of non-Ford
vehicles and these vehicles have experienced a significant number of
tread separations, some resulting in accidents. There are a total of
167 non-Ford claims of tread separation and 66 of these are on
competitive SUVs. These claims include claims for tread separations on
tires not included in last year's recall. The total number of
Wilderness tires used as aftermarket replacements on competitive
vehicles is not known, but is believed to be relatively small,
suggesting an elevated failure rate, comparable to that experienced by
original equipment Firestone tires on the Explorer (Exhibit 5). In
addition, there are 236 claims on Ford vehicles that are not Explorers
on these same tires, again suggesting that the problem is with the
tires.
In spite of this strong statistical evidence that this is a
Firestone tire problem, we were not satisfied to stop at an
investigation of the tires alone. As a designer and manufacturer of
vehicles for almost 100 years, Ford used its knowledge of vehicle
engineering to do an unblinking review of tire-vehicle interaction. All
through this process we shared our findings with NHTSA and Firestone.
We conducted 4 major analyses in our safety investigation that
focused specifically on the vehicle. We looked at whether the Explorer
design could cause an elevated rate of tread separation claims, and we
found that this was not the case: we were able to reproduce the tire
failure mode in the laboratory, independent of the Explorer, confirming
the field data on Firestone and Goodyear tires.
We looked at whether the Explorer behaved differently, compared to
peer vehicles, during a tread separation. In all, we tested 24
different vehicles in 60 tread separation tests and more than 1000
vehicle dynamics tests and hundreds of computer simulations; the data
we generated confirmed that the Explorer behaves similarly to other
SUVs. We looked at whether Explorer behaved differently after a tread
separation, and the data show that its performance falls within the
range of other vehicles in its class. And we looked at the
crashworthiness of the Explorer, and again found that it was comparable
or better than peer vehicles. Overall, the Explorer performed similarly
to other SUVs before, during and after a tread separation.
Importantly, the results obtained in thousands of hours in the
laboratory and on the test track are confirmed by 10 years of real
world performance.
The analysis of government data show that the Explorer is among the
safest of the comparable SUVs (Exhibit 6):
<bullet> The Explorer is 17% safer than the typical comparable SUV in
all types of fatal crashes (Exhibit 7).
<bullet> The Explorer is 19% safer than the typical comparable SUV in
fatal rollover accidents (Exhibit 7).
<bullet> The Explorer is safer than the typical comparable SUV in all
crash types--front, side, rear and rollover crashes.
<bullet> The Explorer is involved in 19% fewer accidents of all types
(fatal and non-fatal) than the typical comparable SUV (Exhibit
8).
Explorers have successfully traveled enormous distances in the last
11 years. More than 4 million Explorers have been sold, and over 3.5
million of these are still in service. Explorer drivers have
collectively driven the equivalent of more than 13 million years.
Explorers have been driven more than 150 billion miles.
Insurance data also show the Explorer has a strong safety record.
Data published by the Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI) show that the
Explorer in all its derivatives (such as model type--2 door versus 4
door and 2 wheel drive versus 4 wheel drive) has an injury loss claims
record better than the average car, ranging up to 32 percent better.
Explorer has a fine record in government and consumer testing:
<bullet> Explorer has scored 4 or 5 stars (the highest rating) in
government NCAP frontal and side crash tests.
<bullet> Explorer is similar to competitive SUVs in the government's
experimental rollover resistance rating, based on the static
stability factor (SSF).
<bullet> Explorer received the second-highest rating from the Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) in its frontal offset crash
tests. Just one SUV got a better rating, while four received
lower ratings.
All in all, no other SUV has such a strong combination of field and
testing performance.
Analysis of Firestone tire claims data also confirms that the
accident and the rollover risk for the Explorer when a tread separation
occurs is comparable to other SUVs (Exhibit 9). Since tread separation
accidents are still relatively rare events, the sample size of the data
is quite small and the confidence interval is wide. We will continue to
share our analysis with NHTSA and Congress to confirm our
understanding. However, nothing in the data that we have analyzed
supports recent accusations that the Explorer is behaving atypically
among SUVs. The Explorer is as safe as other SUVs before, during and
after a tread separation.
A recent analysis conducted by Dennis Guenther at the request of
Firestone purports to show deficiency in the safety of the Explorer on
the basis that it does not have enough ``understeer margin'' to prevent
oversteer in the linear range when it suffers a tread separation at the
rear. We strongly disagree with the statements made by Firestone
regarding this study. The Firestone test is unreliable because it did
not test enough vehicles or conditions to support their conclusions.
<bullet> It used too few models (only 2 compared to Ford's 15 SUV
tests).
<bullet> It has test repeatability and data reduction issues.
<bullet> It tested only on one road surface.
<bullet> It did not test the actual event of tread separation.
<bullet> It did not test under the demanding circumstances in which
tread separations occur in the real world.
<bullet> Its results are inconsistent with real-world accident data.
Firestone's allegations would imply that not only Explorer, but 12
other vehicles we tested made by the world's leading motor vehicle
manufacturers also do not meet Guenther's understeer criteria (see
table below). This illustrates the absurdity of Firestone's position.
Vehicles That Show Linear Range Oversteer with a Rear Tread Removed
(All vehicles tested fully loaded)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 BMW X5 4x4 2001 Honda Odyssey 1996 Chevrolet
Blazer4x2
1995 Isuzu Rodeo 4x2 2001 Chevrolet 2001 Jeep Liberty
TrailBlazer 4x2 4x4
2001 Dodge Durango 4x4 1995 Nissan 2001 Honda Accord
Pathfinder 4x2
2000 Toyota 4-Runner 4x4 2001 Honda CRV 4x4 1994 Toyota 4-
Runner 4x2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Explorer, like all its peers and every vehicle made, has
handling characteristics which are optimized for safety with four
treaded tires. According to our test results, its handling and steering
characteristics are remarkably close to those chosen by BMW and
Mercedes Benz, as well as the most recent entries from Jeep, Dodge, and
even the new TrailBlazer has less understeer than the Explorer. These
characteristics help the driver to achieve safe operation in all
foreseeable circumstances.
Even the two vehicles that meet Firestone's understeer criteria
have experienced rollover accidents after a tread separation on
Firestone tires in the real world.
Finally, we will not accept that a tread separation is a ``normal
foreseeable event'' that manufacturers must accommodate through vehicle
design as asserted by Firestone. No vehicle we have tested can deal
with a tread separation well enough to avoid a small but significant
risk of loss of control with a treadless rear tire. As indicated in
Exhibits 10 and 11, other tire manufacturers such as Continental and
Goodyear do not accept that tread separation is a normal or common
occurrence that should be part of the vehicle design requirements.
NHTSA's data show that other tire manufacturers have demonstrated
that it is possible with current technology to design tires that do not
separate. We know the best way to prevent accidents caused by tread
separations is to prevent tread separations and that is why we are
replacing the Firestone Wilderness AT tires on our vehicles.
Conclusion
In summary, we have been guided throughout by our number one
priority, the safety of our customers.
Ironically, last summer we were criticized by some for acting too
slowly. Now, we are being criticized for acting too swiftly. In both
cases, we have been driven by the facts and analyses available. We have
shared data continuously with NHTSA, Congress, and Firestone. I assure
the committee that the decision that we took to replace these Firestone
Wilderness AT tires was not taken lightly. The cost of the replacement
program is about 3 billion dollars. We feel this expenditure is
necessary to protect the safety of those who have put their trust in
us. And, we will make that decision any time that the safety of our
customers is at risk.
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Mr. Stearns. Mr. Nasser, thank you very much.
Before we start, I just want to caution the audience that
we have to have an aisle between the different rows of chairs.
So if you can't find a seat, certainly open up that aisle, so
that from the fire marshal's standpoint, we can move about.
Mr. Nasser, we certainly welcome the UAW employees here.
You'll be happy to know that a lot of the Ford dealerships have
also called us, so we're getting a lot of participation from
Ford, and we like to hear from our constituents.
I'm going to open up and when I'm in a similar situation,
like yourself, I always say, I am open for hospitable
questions. So that's where you are today. And I want you to
know that this committee is intent, while some of these
questions might be pointed, that the purpose is with our not
having the knowledge you have, or NHTSA. We are struggling, as
Mr. Strickland said, to understand what these claims data mean.
Is it operator error? Or is it possibly just a case of a
malfunction of--a one-time malfunction? Or is there a
consistency here from an engineering standpoint that we need to
correct?
So if you will bear with us as we go through this, we'll be
asking some questions, hopefully just to try and educate us as
well as the public.
On the issue of Ford's temperature test--I'm from Florida
where there's a lot of heat. After reviewing your data, I
wonder whether these temperature tests were truly a valid
comparison of the Firestone tire. As I understand it, you
tested a total of 40 tires of varying sizes. Out of these 40
tires, 33 were Firestone tires.
Could you explain how these tests, when a majority were
Firestone tires, are a valid comparison of the other tires; and
also, since most of us have a lot of questions here, it would
be very helpful if you could be concise in your answers so that
we could just move quickly through.
Mr. Nasser. We did have exhaustive tests of tires, both old
tires and new tires, and we analyzed field data of 146 cases.
We conducted extensive vehicle on-road testing, including 24
different vehicles, and we tested----
Mr. Stearns. Mr. Nasser, as I understand, those were not,
the 146, temperature tests. The temperature tests you did, at
least from my notes, were on 40 tires, of which 33 were
Firestone tires; is that correct?
Mr. Nasser. That is correct.
Mr. Stearns. Okay. So we are not talking about 146.
Mr. Nasser. Ford's testing was consistent. I heard earlier
that we were testing old tires versus new tires. That is not
true. We tested old Goodyear tires versus old Firestone tires.
And the reason we had to test only Goodyear is because they
were the only tires that were fitted previously on Firestone--
on Explorer, other than Firestone tires.
And we did test new Goodyear versus new Firestone versus
new Michelins, and also new General/Continental tires. So in
our view--and we've shared all this data--we think the testing
was valid, indicative of what we'd expect tires to go through,
and we think it was a fair test between the brands.
Mr. Stearns. The only thing that I first felt when I heard
that out of the 40, 33 were Firestone, you would think that you
would have more Goodyear, or at least there'd be a more
disparate representation.
So--I mean, that's what I'm trying to get at because it's
that decision on your part, on that test dealing with
temperature, which is--I am from Florida--is a very important
test. I am trying to understand how you could make a decision
under that kind of statistic where you had--33 were Firestone
out of 40.
Mr. Nasser. Every test that we did went through data,
statistical analysis, in terms of its significance; and we will
share that data with you. And if you--if you look at it, we
believe is it statistically significant.
Mr. Stearns. Okay. Let me move on to another area that all
of us were a little concerned about, and it's dealing with the
ratings on these tires.
I don't think my wife when she goes to look at a tire knows
whether it's a C-rated or B-rated; and frankly, at this stage
of my life, I am not looking at it either. But you supplied
this committee with charts showing that the Firestone
Wilderness AT 15-inch tire runs hotter than the Goodyear
Wrangler RTS 15-inch tire. The Firestone tires you tested had a
C rating, whereas all the other tires you tested had a B
rating.
Because Ford designed the specifications, you sat there and
said, ``These are the specs that you must abide by,
Subcontractor.''
Was there any real surprise that the Firestone tires tested
hotter than the Goodyear tires, just based upon that rating;
and is that C and B meaningful?
Mr. Nasser. Well, the first thing is, we do not specify a
B- or C-graded tire, and neither does any other manufacturer.
We don't specify a temperature grade. We've got performance
specifications that are the same.
Mr. Stearns. Well, let me ask you this, Mr. Nasser.
Is there a difference between a C and B rating on a tire?
Does it have any meaningful difference?
Mr. Nasser. There may be some difference. We don't believe
is it anything significant in terms of tread separation.
Mr. Stearns. Okay.
Mr. Nasser. And by the way, I should add----
Mr. Stearns. Yes?
Mr. Nasser. [continuing] that many of our competitors,
including Toyota and General Motors, use C-grade tires on sport
utility vehicles.
Mr. Stearns. Well, just the data we had from General
Motors, they indicate it should be a B-rated tire. You know,
that's just one competitor.
Mr. Nasser. They use C-rated tires, and interestingly
enough, Firestone did not mark the tires with a temperature
grade until we believed, sometime in 1999 or the year 2000, and
on at least two occasions, in 1995 and in 1999, we were told by
Firestone that the tires were B-class tires.
Mr. Stearns. We have a couple of charts here that we have
put together, our staff, based upon the information you gave
us. That one the staff is just putting up will show that the
General Grabber AT tire, based upon the information you gave
us, has a higher rating than the Wilderness AT; and that the
Wilderness AT, relative to the General GS 60 and the other
tires, is, you know, a little higher. But it's not so
significantly higher to, in our minds, understand why such a
major recall decision would be made.
And so I am saying, this is a graph we've put together from
your information.
Mr. Nasser. You know, I go back to the initial discussion.
We can peal this data, piece by piece. We can look at
temperature, we can look at peel strength, we can look at all
different types of things. In the end, you've got to look at
field data.
One particular element, an attribute of a tire doesn't tell
the complete story, and that's part of the confusion that we're
getting in the marketplace, and that's part of the reason
Congressman Stupak highlighted that headline in the press.
You cannot take one particular aspect of a tire. You must
look at the overall performance, and that's what we did.
Mr. Stearns. I thank you. My time has expired.
The gentleman, my colleague from Florida, Mr. Deutsch.
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Nasser, for your testimony.
I'd like to focus a little bit on the chairman of the full
committee, and really, I appreciate his effort. And this--
really part of our job in just trying to inform consumers a bit
more, and as has been discussed, by the end of this hearing, I
don't think we'll get to the final answers, but I think we can
provide that function reasonably well.
Obviously, you know, you express the condolences--I think
all of us do--of the deaths that occurred from the Firestone
tire failures. Most of these failures, as you well know, were
also on Ford Explorers. From a consumer perspective, I think
hearing your answer to this question is helpful.
Why is the Explorer so difficult to control when there is
tire--when there is tread separation?
Mr. Nasser. That's your question?
Mr. Deutsch. Yeah.
Mr. Nasser. All vehicles have, the Explorer does not handle
any differently than any other sport utility vehicle. It's in
the middle of the pack, and we have testing that will support
that.
Most vehicles do not handle very well when you lose a
tread. Vehicles are not designed and specified and set up so
that they can handle tread separation easily, although you
would have to say that even with--even from Firestone's own
data, 90 percent of the Explorers do not roll over even when
there is a catastrophic tread separation.
Mr. Deutsch. Let me follow up.
Mr. Nasser. So I'm not sure, what is the thrust of your
question.
Mr. Deutsch. Well, the thrust, I guess, is----
Mr. Nasser. If the thrust of the question is for
manufacturers to design vehicles that would handle tread
separation, I think that would be a losing proposition for our
customers.
Mr. Deutsch. Let me just refer to a memo from Donald Tandy
of Car Engineering, which is in the packet we've submitted for
the record. Mr. Tandy was a frequent expert witness for Ford,
says that the driver of an Explorer died when the tread
separated because the driver did not steer the vehicle in a
controlled way.
Mr. Tandy has given this testimony in numerous lawsuits.
Last year he told the committee staff how simple it was to
handle a tread separation at highway speeds, and we have videos
of Mr. Tandy's demonstrations.
Is it still your position that the average driver is
different from Mr. Tandy, who's testified for Ford, and should
be able to drive safely on the shoulder and stop a vehicle in
this situation?
Mr. Nasser. Our contention is that tread separations should
be a very, very unlikely event; and different--different
drivers will react in a different way. So I am not trying to
predict how drivers will react because they will react in a
very different fashion.
Mr. Deutsch. Well, let me just repeat the question. Is it
the position of Ford Motor Company that an average driver of a
Ford Explorer ought to be able to drive safely to the shoulder
and stop a vehicle without an incident when there's tread
separation?
Mr. Nasser. That is true. But it also--I should say that
the Explorer doesn't handle or behave any differently than a
typical sport utility vehicle in that situation.
Mr. Deutsch. So I guess I am trying to understand if that
is a catastrophic thing that we can't plan for, or deal with;
or is it something that if it occurs, you ought to a be able to
drive to the shoulder of the road and not die.
Mr. Nasser. In most cases, you should be able to drive to
the side of the road and based on all the data that we have,
including the Firestone data, nine times out of ten, that does
happen.
Mr. Deutsch. Okay. And is that the case in the 203 people
who died? There were 2,000 incidents and only 10 percent----
Mr. Nasser. Mr. Deutsch, we feel very sad about those 203
people. That's why we are moving to replace 13 million tires.
That's exactly what we're doing. We don't want to be sitting
here talking about further tragic deaths and accidents and
having esoteric discussions about the behavior of a vehicle
when a tread separation occurs.
Mr. Deutsch. Okay. And again I guess I am just trying to
focus, from a consumer perspective in terms of driving a Ford
Explorer. Is that Mr. Tandy, who my understanding is your lead
expert in terms of the court case that is involved in this,
then his testimony is correct or not correct?
Mr. Nasser. I have to look at his testimony in detail. I
haven't done that. I am answering your question in the spirit
it was asked.
The Explorer handles in a typical fashion, as other SUVs
nine times out of ten, based on the data Firestone provided.
Mr. Deutsch. Let me in the final question in a deposition
on Thomas Bogaman, Ford's quality control officer, taken on
December 21st, Mr. Bogaman testified that it was his opinion
that all Firestone Wilderness AT 15-inch tires were not, and I
will quote, ``robust against variations in inflation pressure
and in operating condition, load and speed'' close quote. If
Mr. Bogaman knew that last December, why didn't Ford recall the
Wilderness tires at that time?
Mr. Nasser. It's Mr. Tom Baughman. He is an engineer with
Ford, and he's a very competent engineer. In that particular
instance, as an example, we don't agree with his conclusion;
and that's not a problem for us. You know, we have a company
where we encourage people to develop theories and knock them
down and look at data; and if you look at the data, it isn't
supported by his----
Mr. Stearns. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The chairman of the Oversight and Investigations Committee,
Mr. Greenwood, is recognized.
Mr. Greenwood. Good morning, Mr. Nasser. I don't envy you.
You have a very difficult challenge on your hands to--I
believed you and took you at your word when you sat with me and
members of the committee 4 weeks ago and told us that you felt
a strong obligation to your consumers to protect their safety;
and they think you're doing that. And I think it's obviously
understandable that you have a obligation to your stockholders
and your employees to do what's right for the company at the
same time. But I do want to get to this comparison.
One of the questions that's plagued us as we looked at this
is this question of which tires one would choose to recall and
which tires one would use to replace them, and the confusing
sets of data that I'm sure you needed to rely on to some extent
and were confronted with.
If you compare the Firestone Wilderness AT and the Goodyear
P235/75R15 tires, the committee's prepared a chart that sets
forth the percentage of tires that had belt leaving belt at
each plant; and that chart is available to your left. So
according to this chart, which was prepared using data supplied
by Ford, the Goodyear Lawton plant has a very similar belt-
leaving-belt percentage, as do the Firestone Wilson and
Joliette plans.
Can you follow that there, sir?
Mr. Nasser. Yes.
Mr. Greenwood. Okay.
However, the Firestone Aiken plant has had no tires tested
with belt leaving belt.
So the question is, how could Ford--how did Ford decide to
replace Firestone tires with no tread separation from its own
tests with a Goodyear Wrangler RTS tire that has tread
separation?
Mr. Nasser. Mr. Chairman, this was one of the toughest
decisions for us, because we're generally data driven. We look
at it and we try and decide strictly on data; and in this case,
we had to go a little bit further. And I'd like to just take
you through the thinking and the rationale behind the
parameters of the tire recall, the 13-million-tires recall; and
they really fall into four categories, and they're different,
and that's why I say this is complex.
The first one is, we looked at field data and we saw the
field data increasing, real-world data, what was going on in
the field. And when we looked at that, it was very clear that
the Wilson plant tires were a risk.
In addition to that, we looked at statistical analysis,
what we call a hazard plot, which looks at the prediction of
aging of these tires over time. And that showed rising trends
for Wilson and Joliette. So at this point we had Wilson because
of field data, we had Wilson and Joliette because of field data
and our statistical prediction of aging.
We then went through our lag tests where we looked at peel
strength, wedge width and also temperature, and that showed
risk of failure for Wilson, Joliette and also Decatur. So now
we had almost all the population of these tires.
We were left with the Aiken plant. Aiken is a new plant.
It's very automated. Its manufacturing and quality variability
is the best of the Firestone plants. Based on everything that
we've seen, is it a world-class plant. But our customers'
confidence in all of these Wilderness AT tires, we knew just
wouldn't be there.
So when we sat back from it all, we didn't want our
customers to be crawling under their vehicles looking for Aiken
manufacturing. We didn't want them to be sitting here a year
from now, because we didn't have a lot of experience on Aiken.
Aiken's a new plant, the tires maybe haven't been out there
long enough.
So we made a judgment call on Aiken, and your data is
probably right there. Aiken would fall within the category of a
pretty good tire.
Mr. Greenwood. Did you do a similar analysis of the
Goodyear tires that would have shown that there are Goodyear
Wrangler RTS tires with tread separation?
Mr. Nasser. We did, we did--all very similar analysis on
Goodyear. But in the final analysis, all of the testing and all
of the hypotheses doesn't really mean anything unless you can
correlate it to real-world data, field data. And in the case of
Goodyear, we went back to the field and, guess what, the tires
performed well with customers.
Mr. Greenwood. Okay. Let me go to another question here.
Ford has emphasized the rig test results, asserting that it
could not fail a Goodyear tire at less than 26 pounds of air
pressure, or anywhere from 40 to 42 percent of Firestone's
Wilderness AT tires, depending on the plant, failed at such
lower pressures. What Ford didn't tell us, however, was that
several of the Goodyear tires failed at exactly 26 psi.
Ford also didn't tell us that it did not test any 16-inch
Goodyear tires at less than 26 psi during its rig tests, yet it
included the 16-inch test results in its various presentations
to this committee. And even though it did test a small number
of 15-inch Goodyear tires at low inflation pressures, without
failure, almost half of those Goodyear tires were new tires as
compared to the Firestone tires tested at those same pressures,
85 percent of which had been designated by Ford as ``old''
because they had been used on vehicles for more than one
summer.
Do you really think that these tests were comparable?
Mr. Nasser. First of all, we always go back to the field
data. Second, we do believe those tests were comparable because
we tested old versus old and new versus new in every case.
Mr. Greenwood. If I can interrupt you, sir, we're trying to
make a separation here between the field testing and the rig
testing because you've presented data from both sources.
If you look at that chart there, you see that when it came
to testing the Firestone tires, 85 percent of the tires you
tested were old tires; then you went over to do similar rig
testing on the Goodyears. Only 54 percent of those were old
tires. So I am not sure how you call that a comparable test.
Mr. Nasser. We can debate the e-percentages all you like.
Those percentages are probably meaningless, frankly, because in
the end you have a sample size that is--statistically gives you
confidence, and we think it does, and doesn't represent an
apples-to-apples comparison, and we think it does. Those
percentages could----
Mr. Greenwood. In all due respect, sir, to some extent
you've got old apples versus new apples, and that is
significant.
Mr. Nasser. I don't know whether that is true or not. We
tested old versus old and new versus new, and if you've got
data that shows we came to conclusions by comparing old to new
and new to old, please show us that data.
Mr. Greenwood. My time has expired.
Mr. Stearns. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Dingell, from
Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Nasser, I think these questions will be susceptible to
yes or no answers. Does Ford tell its tire suppliers, like
Firestone, what materials must be used to build a tire for a
Ford vehicle?
Mr. Nasser. No.
Mr. Dingell. Does Ford specify how wide the wedge rubber
between the belts on the tires should be?
Mr. Nasser. No.
Mr. Dingell. What about the skim stock for the tire does
Ford dictate that this tire compound should be of one kind or
another to its tire suppliers.
Mr. Nasser. No.
Mr. Dingell. Does Ford tell its tire suppliers how many
body plies or steel belts should be in a tire?
Mr. Nasser. No.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Nasser, with regard to the Firestone ATX
and Wilderness AT tires that have been recalled over the last
year, did Firestone make all these decisions regarding
engineering and construction of the tires?
Mr. Nasser. Yes.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Nasser, why doesn't Ford indicate in its
specifications for the construction of tires?
Mr. Nasser. Well, no other manufacturer does that. The tire
manufacturers are the experts on producing the tire, the design
and manufacture of the tire. And the way we specify tires, we
believe is consistent with other automotive companies; and the
way we specify tires for Firestone is the same way we specify
tires for Goodyear and the other companies.
Mr. Dingell. So Ford requirements are performance
specifications, not engineering, construction standards?
Mr. Nasser. That is right.
Mr. Dingell. And you gave the same to all the manufacturers
for the same vehicle; is that correct?
Mr. Nasser. That's true.
Mr. Dingell. Now, Mr. Nasser, what sort of requirements
does Ford identify in its performance specifications?
Mr. Nasser. We look at a whole list of different
specifications which include speed ratings and handling, wet
weather conditions, snow conditions and probably four or five
other characteristics that relate to the tire and the way it
relates to the vehicle.
Mr. Dingell. So the performance specifications Ford gave
Firestone for Wilderness AT tires were essentially identical to
specifications you provided to Goodyear and other manufacturers
when they supply tires for the Explorer; is that correct?
Mr. Nasser. Congressman, I looked at the specification
sheets for Firestone and Goodyear recently, dating all the way
back as many years as we could go, and they are identical.
Mr. Dingell. I would ask unanimous consent that those be
put in the record; and I'll submit them to the committee, Mr.
Chairman.
So both Firestone and Goodyear built these tires for Ford
based on the same information and specifications; is that
correct?
Mr. Nasser. Yes.
Mr. Dingell. And so even though two suppliers built tires
for Ford Explorers based on the same performance standards, we
see that the result was different. Firestone tires had over
1,100 tread separations and Goodyear tires had only two; is
that right?
Mr. Nasser. Yes.
Mr. Dingell. And the number of tires manufactured by both
of these was not startlingly different; they were within a few
percentages of the total number of tires, of equal parts of
the----
Mr. Nasser. Millions of tires on similar vehicles, and
these vehicles operated in very similar geographic conditions.
Mr. Dingell. Now, Mr. Nasser, it's been said that Ford
shifted from Goodyear to Firestone because Firestone would give
you a better price. Did that change the performance
specifications of the tires, the requirements for safety of the
tire on the vehicle?
Mr. Nasser. No, it didn't, and----
Mr. Dingell. Should it have?
Mr. Nasser. Absolutely not.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time; and the distinguished chairman of the full Energy and
Commerce Committee, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Tauzin,
is recognized.
Chairman Tauzin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Nasser, let me first start by frankly thanking you and
Ford Motor Company for doing what the TREAD Act intended, and
that is taking time and money and spending it on extensive
testing, rather than relying upon body counts to make a
decision as to whether a product is safe for the road. And,
frankly, I hope in 30 days to be able to express similar thanks
to NHTSA.
I am going to reserve judgment until I see how good a job
they have done with dollars and the new authority we've
provided under the TREAD Act, so I'll wait and see.
But having said that, let me also acknowledge that Ford has
an absolute right to replace any part of, you know, the product
line that you want to replace, in your opinion, for the safety
of your customers. I think you have every right to do that; and
frankly, I again want to applaud you for making a very
expensive decision to do that, because you believe it's in the
interest of your consumers' safety.
But having said that, we're still left with a great deal of
confusion as to some of the decisions you made, and why, and
what implications it has for the consuming public, particularly
people who are using the same tires on other vehicles made by
other companies. And that's why we're getting into these
questions of how comparable were these tests, and how broad
your recall was, and what implications it has for the consuming
public and for other companies.
You've heard, I think, one of the members make the point
that this massive recall has the potential of severely rocking
the solvency and the future of the Firestone company itself. It
is so massive and implies so much about confidence in the
Firestone product that, obviously, questions arise as to why so
massive a recall; and so I'm going to ask you a few questions
about that.
First of all, is it true that you have recalled some lines
of Wilderness AT tires that Ford never even tested?
Mr. Nasser. I don't know whether that's true, but I--I
wouldn't doubt that because we looked at a broad range of
tires; and as I said, in the end, it became a question of what
is right for our customers.
Chairman Tauzin. Well, here's our problem: You see, we've
identified four other lines that you've recalled, one a
Wilderness tire, P215/72R15, that is not only used on the Ford
Ranger, but it's used on the Isuzu Rodeo and on a Mazda
vehicle; and you have not--according to our information, you
have not run any tests on those tires, on that line of
Wilderness tires.
You've also recalled a tire that is used on--another tire
used on a Mazda on which you've made no tests.
There's a third line of Wilderness tires that is used on
General Motors products--Suburbans, for example, and Blazers,
Sierras, Yukons--that you have recalled and run no test.
Mr. Nasser. Mr. Chairman, they're different tires.
Chairman Tauzin. They're the tire that you recalled; the
P265/75R/16 has been recalled.
Mr. Nasser. They are different tires.
Chairman Tauzin. How--how are they different?
Mr. Nasser. They are different tires. I can tell you that,
and you can believe me or you can have it checked. They are
different tires.
Chairman Tauzin. Well, are the Wilderness tires used on
Isuzu and Mazda different tires?
Mr. Nasser. Mazda is part of the Ford Motor Company, so I'm
not sure about that specific tire.
Chairman Tauzin. You understand that they're the same tire,
and in addition, we have another one, Wilderness AT1/P265/
75R15, that's also used on a Mazda that you've recalled.
Mr. Nasser. Mr. Chairman, we didn't test every single tire
ever made in the history of this world. We didn't. We had to
stop. It was a question of, do we keep testing, do we keep
studying, do we keep reviewing; or do we go out there and act
in the interests of our customers?
And, yes, we are guilty; we decided to go out there and be
nimble and act for our customers. I took----
Chairman Tauzin. But you--Mr. Nasser, I have got a limited
amount of time.
The problem we have, sir, in understanding this recall and
shedding light on it is that tire lines are being recalled, and
your company has provided our committee with no data indicating
the basis upon which these particular lines are being recalled.
Can you----
Mr. Nasser. Mr. Chairman----
Chairman Tauzin. If I ask you for this on the record, would
you agree to supply to us any data you have that indicates why
these tire lines were recalled?
Mr. Nasser. If we have the data, we'll supply it to you. If
we don't have the data, and you want us to test it, we'll go
and test it; but in the absence of that, we acted for the
safety of our customers.
Chairman Tauzin. I am not questioning your motives.
Mr. Nasser. But I am not sure where the question is
heading.
Chairman Tauzin. The question is simply that if these tires
are being used on other vehicles----
Mr. Nasser. They're different tires except for the case of
Mazda.
Chairman Tauzin. Mr. Nasser, in some cases, they're the
same tire; and if they're being recalled only on the Ford
vehicle, but not on the other vehicle, what--what--how much
confusion does that create for the consumers on the other
vehicle?
Mr. Nasser. Mr. Chairman, we are recalling the Mazda
vehicles.
Chairman Tauzin. All right.
Second, you're replacing some of these recalled tires with
tires manufactured by other companies, other than Firestone,
and you have heard some of the conversations we have had
regarding this. We're giving this information to NHTSA, but our
investigators tell us that one of those tires, one of the
replacement tires, has a claims rate of 124 per million, way in
excess of the 5 per million that you indicated to us was the
benchmark for this recall.
How can you justify replacing a tire that fails 5 out of a
million with one that has a claims failure rate of 124 out of a
million; and are we going to be in another cycle of recall
later on?
Mr. Nasser. Well, we can't justify it, and if the facts are
right, the first time we heard about it is when we read about
it in the newspaper this morning. Every tire that we put on the
replacement list was looked at and reviewed by NHTSA. We wanted
to see whether there was any indication of that data.
There is one tire----
Chairman Tauzin. Mr. Nasser, let me stop you there. NHTSA
will testify later today that your company did, in fact, ask if
there was any data on these replacement tires that indicated
that they were the subject of a safety investigation.
Mr. Nasser. Right.
Chairman Tauzin. NHTSA will testify they did not approve
the replacement tire lists that you submitted, and I just want
to put that on the record.
Mr. Nasser. Okay, I agree with that. I didn't say----
Chairman Tauzin. But my question is, if NHTSA determines in
the next 30 days that some of these replacement tires that you
have on your Web site as authorized replacement tires for the
Firestones you're taking off do, in fact, have a safety concern
or a worse safety record than the Firestone tire you're taking
off, what do you plan to do about that?
Mr. Nasser. Mr. Chairman, we shouldn't be waiting 30 days
if that data is accurate; we should be acting in 30 minutes. I
think it's a question of determining, is the data that you
have, that no one else seems to have, if you have it and it's
accurate, we'll act on it; if it isn't, then we'll continue.
Chairman Tauzin. If I can have 1 additional minute, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. Without objection.
Chairman Tauzin. The third question is one I told you I
would ask you on the record, and I need an answer to it. You
said the real-world test, regardless of all these tests--and we
can debate how accurately and comparably they were done, or how
comparably Firestone's test of your vehicle was done--the real-
world test was when Goodyear tires were actually put on Fords,
and they performed better than Firestone tires in the mid-90's.
But the evidence, the evidence you just submitted to us,
was apparently a message to Gary Hagan of Goodyear in 1998, and
I'll read it to you.
``Though Goodyear has previously reviewed the price level,
your quote for 100 percent of the tire volume, which is the
same as the current price, based on today's 68 percent
supply''--apparently you were using 68 percent Goodyear tires
up until this point that--``your quote for 100 percent sole
sourcing is not competitive. As you're aware, we're
investigating a single-sourcing of the tire based on your
uncompetitive price. Goodyear cannot be sourced on this fit.''
The conclusion we reach is that in 1998 you switched back
to sole-sourcing Firestones solely because of price
differentials with Goodyear; is that correct?
Mr. Nasser. I wish we'd stayed with the Goodyear tires, Mr.
Chairman, in retrospect.
But I'd have to say no, because during the same period, the
answer to your direct question--if you look at the same period,
that same year and the year following that--Goodyear's
percentage of Ford tires, tires used on Ford vehicles, actually
went up; and it went up because during that period we wanted to
balance tire sourcing between the companies. Goodyear went from
20 percent, 22 percent of total supply to about 35 percent on
an overall basis.
Now, that doesn't get to your specific question.
Chairman Tauzin. Could you get to it for me? Why did Ford
start buying Goodyear tires in 1996 and stop buying them in
1998 for the Explorer, when you now know that Goodyear was much
better?
Mr. Nasser. Goodyear is much better, and the reason
primarily was driven by--and we did it on many other
components, other than tires, that is, to have a single design
source for major components, because you don't want to go
engineering, validating, testing multiple sources.
I would like to say, however, based on your question, that
decision was made in 1994, I believe. Between 1994 and 1997,
Goodyear reduced the price of their tires greater than
Firestone reduced the price of their tires; and the difference
between Goodyear tire costs and Firestone tire costs by 1997
was 10 cents a tire, and I don't think we would get down to
making major sourcing decisions that would compromise any
vehicle attribute over 10 cents.
Chairman Tauzin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Strickland is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Nasser, we're not talking about a recall, are we? Isn't
this something other than a recall that we're discussing here?
Mr. Nasser. You know, that's a good question, because in
almost every sense this is a recall. We call it a replacement
program for a number of reasons.
The first reason is not all of the tires obviously have a
safety defect. Second, traditionally the tire company would
institute and manage the recall. And I think, third, we wanted
to move quickly. We're handling everything else from a customer
viewpoint as if it were a recall.
Mr. Strickland. Another question. Is it possible that the
recall is as large and massive as it is, not only related to
safety concerns but because as a company, you're concerned
about consumer confidence?
Mr. Nasser. When I described the four steps that we went
through in terms of determining the scope of the recall, the
Aiken tires in particular--and I think one other Firestone
tire--would fall in the realm of a world class tire. So I would
classify that as a customer quality assurance action.
Mr. Strickland. I asked that question based on my own
experience, because I had tires that weren't recalled during
the first recall, and lots of my constituents would walk out,
look at my tires and say, why are you driving on those tires,
you should get those replaced; and I would explain to them that
they weren't a part of the initial recall.
But I assume--and this is--this is an assumption that I am
making, but I have assumed that from a company standpoint, you
want to make sure that your customers have a high level of
confidence in the product that you're getting--that they're
getting from you. I direct that question to you, because there
have been questions raised here this morning about why you're
doing this, and several people have said, you've got a right to
do it, you know----
Mr. Nasser. I'll say to you, we have no doubt about why
we're doing it. We're doing it in the interest of our
customers' safety and peace of mind. It is as simple as that,
and, you know, you hear a lot of reports about how difficult a
decision this is and maybe there are other factors behind it.
It's straightforward, very straightforward. That is the type of
company we are. We are doing it because we believe strongly
that it's what our customers would want the Ford Motor Company
to do.
Mr. Strickland. In one of your answers to Mr. Dingell, you
indicated that you have a performance standard which you
require of the manufacturers of the tires you use. There have
been questions raised about why you went to Firestone as a sole
source, and implications raised that you did that in order to
save money. But if in fact you have the same performance
standards, it seems to me that it just makes sense to go to the
company that can provide a product for the cheapest price, if
the performance standards are identical and have not been
compromised. Is that correct?
Mr. Nasser. It is. And I should say, you know, we're
perhaps painting everything in a very negative sense here.
Firestone and Ford had a very long history, and Firestone
produced incredibly good tires over a long, long period, and
during that period when--in the early nineties when the
sourcing decisions between Firestone and Goodyear were being
undertaken by the company, Firestone ranked as the No. 1
quality tire supply. So there was no question at that point of
Firestone's quality and their commitment to high standards.
Mr. Strickland. This action is costing Ford a great deal of
money.
Mr. Nasser. It is.
Mr. Strickland. And that is a burden that's being borne
directly by Ford Motor Company, without any assistance from
Firestone, the supplier of the tires. Right?
Mr. Nasser. It wasn't even a consideration for us as to who
should pay this, and our primary concern was we needed to move
quickly. And I am sure in hindsight we'll go back and there
will be some little bits and pieces that we didn't do
absolutely perfectly right, but I'd settle for that, because we
wanted to move quickly to safeguard the safety of our
customers. And we didn't really waste a lot of time sitting
back saying, well, I wonder who will pay for all of this.
Mr. Strickland. One final quick question. Are you somewhat
puzzled at the reaction that you're receiving some--from some
of us?
Mr. Nasser. Not anymore, I'm not.
Mr. Strickland. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman and
recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman, Mr. Deal.
Mr. Deal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Nasser, in your opening statement, you made a great
deal about the difference between the Firestone tires'
performance and the Goodyear tire performance and the failure
of Firestones in excess of 1,100 versus 2 failures by Goodyear.
When did that information first become known to Ford?
Mr. Nasser. We started to look at that information during
last year's 6.5 million recall. Up to that point, even the
1183, although it sounds like a high number, you know, when
you're dealing with millions and millions of tires, it really
wasn't very evident to us. So it was during the investigation
of last year's recall.
Mr. Deal. So not until 2000 did these statistics begin to
attract any attention?
Mr. Nasser. I'm sure they were around, both in the company
and in the tire companies as well, but they didn't raise the
awareness to a point where it was alarming to us.
Mr. Deal. And your statement that you have to look at field
data as the best basis for making any decision--now, when these
Firestone tires were selected, you had no field data at that
time, did you?
Mr. Nasser. If you recall, one of the provisions of the
TREAD Act that was passed last year by Congress was that field
data would become readily available on a prompt basis so that
we could look at it and that--it was transparent to everyone,
not only to the tire companies.
Mr. Deal. But you first of all had no field data when the
tires were selected. What field data did you attempt to compile
between the years these tires were first put in place and 2000
of last year when these statistics became available and
knowledgeable on your part?
Mr. Nasser. I don't understand the question. I'm sorry.
Mr. Deal. Did Ford conduct any tests or maintain any
records of field data during the time these tires were first
selected, which had no history, and 2000? Did you maintain any
records?
Mr. Nasser. I don't know the specific answer to that
question. I'll get to you on it.
Mr. Deal. So if the chairman's date of 1998 is correct when
you switched to Firestone as the sole source and dropped the
Goodyear tires which in 2000 you learned had been performing
very, very well, you indicated that it obviously was not on a
price factor, because Goodyear had reduced their prices greater
than Firestone between 1994 and 1997, you said.
Mr. Nasser. Congressman, I should say that the decision to
drop the Goodyear tires on Explorers was actually made before
we fitted the first Goodyear tire on an Explorer. So there
wasn't any field data available anywhere.
Mr. Deal. So it was--so when you say that----
Mr. Nasser. We dropped the tire before it was even sourced
on the Explorer. We made the decision to source Goodyear, and
we made the decision to desource Goodyear on Explorer before
the first Goodyear tire was actually installed on an Explorer.
Mr. Deal. So it appears to me, Mr. Nasser, you've made two
conflicting statements. On the one hand you said that you make
decisions based on field data, which you now say you had none.
Second, you said you did not make a decision based on price,
since you said there was only a 10 cents difference. Then if
you did not make it on field data and you did not make it on
price, on what basis did you make the decision?
Mr. Nasser. Oh, no. I didn't say that at all.
Mr. Deal. Which part did you not say?
Mr. Nasser. Let me go back, because your question came at
me from 10 different questions and I couldn't handle 10
different directions. Let me tell you exactly what we did.
Mr. Deal. Yes, sir.
Mr. Nasser. We were--we made a decision to source Goodyear
tires, because there was a corporate decision to increase the
level of Goodyear tires overall, and Goodyear went from 20-odd
percent to 30-odd percent of our total tire sourcing. That
happened.
At the same time, we were sourcing an added plant for the
Explorer. The Explorer was produced in one plant. It was going
to two plants. So we went out, and we asked Goodyear and
Firestone for sourcing on that tire for that plant. Goodyear
won the contract.
Mr. Deal. On what basis?
Mr. Nasser. They won the--the specifications are the same,
and there wasn't any field data, because we didn't have any
Goodyears on Explorers. So the tire performance specifications
were the same, and Goodyear and Firestone's prices were about
the same at that point. As a matter of fact, the initial
Goodyear quote was actually below Firestone.
Subsequent to that, a decision was made that we would
single source tires on a particular vehicle, because you didn't
want to go through the inefficiency of duplicate engineering
and testing on one vehicle with two different tires. If you
look at most of our vehicles, they have got a single source of
tires. We asked both Goodyear and Firestone to quote on getting
100 percent of the tires. Goodyear wanted a price increase.
Firestone did not. So we sourced it to Firestone. It's as
simple as that.
During the period when Goodyear was still supplying tires,
which was after this decision of desourcing was made, Goodyear
continued to reduce the cost and the price of their tire, to
the point where in 1997 there was only 10 cents difference
between a Goodyear tire and a Firestone tire.
Mr. Deal. But the decision to go with Firestone and drop
Goodyear as a source for the Explorer was made the following
year of 1998.
Mr. Nasser. It was made in December 1994 for a 1998 model.
Mr. Deal. All right, and----
Mr. Nasser. I think that clears it up. It was made in
December 1994.
Mr. Deal. And you had field data at that time, did you not?
Mr. Nasser. We did not. In December 1994, we did not have
any--as far as I'm aware, we didn't have any field data,
because we hadn't even fitted a Goodyear tire.
Mr. Deal. So your best source of field data, you had none
in any of these decisions, then?
Mr. Nasser. It's difficult to have field data when there
are no tires in the field.
Mr. Deal. So you had no field data?
Mr. Nasser. On Goodyear. That's right.
Mr. Deal. What about Firestone?
Mr. Nasser. I don't think we had field data on Firestone
then. I'll get back to you on that particular question. But I'm
not sure where you're heading.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
chairman recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman, Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a quick first
observation after listening to that exchange and some of the
others. First, Mr. Nasser, let me welcome you. I'm sure there
are other places you would like to be.
Mr. Nasser. Oh, I truly love it here every year.
Mr. Gordon. After listening to these last exchanges, it
seemed to me like the easy answer would just be to say that
these last replacements were really image- and market-driven,
not data-driven, and you have a right to put whatever tire,
radio or antenna on your automobile or vehicle that you want,
as long as it is----
Mr. Nasser. That may be the easy way, but it wouldn't be
the truth.
Mr. Gordon. It wouldn't be?
Mr. Nasser. The truth is that it's a mixture of data and
field and predictive analysis and customer assurance. That's--
--
Mr. Gordon. Customer assurance marketing?
Mr. Nasser. Customer assurance is the confidence--it goes
back to the Congressman's question. People have lost confidence
in these tires.
Mr. Gordon. I would like to get on--I mean, again, I think
you can put whatever tire you want on there. I mean, you know,
it's your business. Just don't--as long as safety isn't
compromised. And you spend a lot of money on TV, this is just
another way to do marketing, and, you know, that's your
business.
I think a lot of the discussion that we've had----
Mr. Nasser. Excuse me----
Mr. Gordon. I only have 5 minutes, but I----
Mr. Nasser. You're putting words in my mouth and that's not
what I said.
Mr. Gordon. I don't mean to. That is what I said. I think a
lot of the problem that we have is sort of a--your basic apples
and apples or apples and orange type comparisons. And that's
why I want to ask you and the other witnesses two questions,
and they will be the same questions so that we have a
benchmark.
The first is, it's my understanding that the same Firestone
tires used on the Ford Explorer are also used as original
equipment on the Ford Rangers. These same tires are evidently
used on two other popular SUVs, the Toyota 4-Runner, as well as
the Jeep Grand Cherokee. Claims data shows that the owners of
vehicles other than Explorers have virtually no problems with
tread separation, leading to rollovers. The question, then, is
what does this suggest about the Explorer's design or handling
characteristics and their contribution to the problem?
Mr. Nasser. The competitive tires that you mentioned--you
mentioned Toyota--and what other tire?
Mr. Gordon. The same--the Wilderness AT are designed I
think for General Motors as well as Toyota.
Mr. Nasser. They are different tires.
Mr. Gordon. And the--are they different tires than are on
the Ford Ranger?
Mr. Nasser. No. They're the same tires.
Mr. Gordon. Are they the same tire as the Toyota 4-Runner
and the same tire as the Jeep Grand Cherokee?
Mr. Nasser. No, they are different tires.
Mr. Gordon. How are they different?
Mr. Nasser. The treads are different--you'd have to ask the
tire manufacturers, but they are different tire.
Mr. Gordon. Okay, but is it the same tire as the Ford
Rangers?
Mr. Nasser. Yes.
Mr. Gordon. Yet you're not having problems with Ford
Rangers?
Mr. Nasser. We're recalling the Ford Rangers.
Mr. Gordon. But is that--did you have the problems----
Mr. Nasser. I think the incidence level is about the same
in terms of the tread separation. I don't think there's any
significant difference, but I'd have to get back to you on
that.
Mr. Gordon. So if they--well, let me just--so I'll ask you
this. If these are the same tires on the Ford Rangers, the
Toyota 4-Runner and the Jeep Grand Cherokee, and they're not
having problems and you are having problems, is that a problem?
Mr. Nasser. I just said that they're not the same.
Mr. Gordon. What, they're not--and I----
Mr. Nasser. You want me to answer a hypothetical question?
Mr. Gordon. If they were the same, that would be a problem,
wouldn't it? Would you like to address that, if they were the
same, at a later date?
Mr. Nasser. Absolutely. If they were the same, I'd look at
it, yeah.
Mr. Gordon. I'll get to my second question. One year ago,
Ford initiated an almost identical replacement problem in
Venezuela to replace Firestone----
Mr. Nasser. By the way, Congressman, if I may----
Mr. Gordon. I don't want to lose my time here.
Mr. Nasser. The Ranger/Explorer comparison is very
interesting, and we address it in our written statement.
Mr. Gordon. Sir, I really don't want to be discourteous.
It's just that I won't have a chance to ask my question. If I
can get that in, then I think you should have the full right to
respond what you'd like and I'd like to learn more about that.
One year ago, Ford initiated an almost identical
replacement program in Venezuela to replace Firestone tires
with other brands. Even though Explorers are now using other
brands of tires in Venezuela, it's my understanding that the
Explorer rollovers have continued at a high enough rate to
cause the head of the country's consumer protection agency to
suggest banning sales of Explorers. Why has the replacement of
Firestone tires in Venezuela not brought an end to this
problem, and will the replacement of Firestone tires on
Explorers end the problem in the United States?
Mr. Nasser. The Explorer is not suffering levels of
rollover in Venezuela that are different than other competitive
SUVs. If you look at the percentage of rollovers that the
Explorer has in Venezuela, it's about 8 or 9 percent, which is
Explorers' market share in that market.
Mr. Gordon. Has that changed since you changed the tires?
Has that ratio changed?
Mr. Nasser. I'm referring to the Goodyear tires on
Explorer. If you go through the data--and I lived in Venezuela
for 3 years, so I know--I know a lot about that market and the
data that is in that market. If you go through that data and
look at the statistics that relate to Explorer, you'll find
vehicles there that Fiestas, that are pick-up trucks, that are
cars. You'll find fender bender-type accidents in there. These
are not data that when you go through them and filter them,
clearly that will show an Explorer problem following the
replacement of the Firestone tires----
Mr. Gordon. But with your data, have you determined that
there is a difference in the rollover situation between the
Firestones and the replacement tires in Venezuela?
Mr. Nasser. The Goodyear tires are performing much better,
yes.
Mr. Greenwood. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Gordon. I would like to ask permission for him to
respond to my last question, which was asked before the time
was up.
Mr. Greenwood. Without objection.
Mr. Gordon. Which was, will the replacement of Firestone
tires on the Explorer end the problem in the United States?
Mr. Nasser. Will the----
Mr. Gordon. Will the replacement of Firestone tires on the
Explorer end the problem in the United States?
Mr. Nasser. Oh, man. I mean, last year we were very
confident about all the data that we had, and this year we're
taking all of the tires off the road, so--all of the Wilderness
AT tires off the road. And if anything, as you suggested
earlier, we may have overreached because of the need to instill
some confidence back in the marketplace. So I am hoping we've
done that.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Gordon. Thanks for your patience.
Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Nasser, I would just like to point out
to you from data that Ford supplied to us, a chart that reads
Explorer and Ranger tread separation in rollover comparison
1993 through 2001 model years, the number of claims for Ford
Explorer was 299. The number of claims for the Ranger was
apparently 3. Well, let me compare 1997 to 2001 in those cases.
It's 299 versus 3. So there does seem to be a significant
number. I don't know if that represents the percentage of
vehicles on the road, but it seems to--the claims rate is a 47
rates of claims per million with the Explorer versus only 4.
There seems to be a tenfold difference between the Ranger and
the Explorer, and I would ask unanimous consent for a minute of
time so you might respond to that, since it seems to be quite
different than the answer you responded to Mr. Gordon.
Mr. Nasser. No. It is very much consistent. Ranger is
having a problem. That is why we have recalled and replaced
these tires. The Ranger 4x4 is the vehicle that has the tires
that are also on the Explorer. The--and the Ranger 4x4 with the
Explorer tires is a very small percentage of Ranger. So the
sample size are small. And that in itself isn't the issue.
The other issue is that because they're 4x4 models, they
tend to be in the North, not in the South. And in addition to
that, it has used--it's used Decatur tires on the 4x4. So
you've got a mish-mash of different geographies, low
installation rates on the 4x4 model, and a different plant
because of the heavy use of the----
Mr. Greenwood. I won't--sir, I won't question those facts
as you've just laid them out. I don't believe we need to take
this any further than we need to, but I think you did respond
to Mr. Gordon that the claims rates are similar----
Mr. Nasser. They are similar when you adjust to an apples-
to-apples comparison.
Mr. Greenwood. Well, you may have to. That may be a fairer
answer, that when you adjust out for climate and so forth, that
they're similar. I don't have data on that.
The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One thing that we
need is a historical perspective, which I know we don't have
the ability to do, to check tires and manufacturers of vehicles
in the sixties and the eighties. We all mourn the loss of life
and wrecks and stuff. In comparison to the sixties or the
seventies, are we better off or are we worse? I would submit
we're probably better off. We're just a lot more stringent with
information and getting data out to the public, and that's part
of the frustration.
Well, this is a very serious hearing, but for the sake of
levity, I think most of our constituents would appreciate at
least one time getting dealers to their knees, and because I
want to apologize to the dealers who are sitting on the floor
or kneeling, because we finally brought dealers to their knees,
and it had to be in the Commerce Committee room. Usually they
seem to get the upper hand of----
Mr. Nasser. They will come back. Don't worry.
Mr. Shimkus. That's right. You in your opening statement
mentioned, Mr. Nasser, that the bar has been raised seeking
remedies that are proactive and forward looking, because we're
in a new paradigm of safety and looking at industry and the
people you do business with. Mr. Dingell asked you some
questions which I find very interesting, and talked about the
standards of tires and the width, the skin stock, the body, the
belt, and basically the response was--you set performance specs
up for the industries to compete, and some of the types of
performance specs were speed, handling, wet weather, snow.
My question is, is--do you have a performance spec on ride,
how smooth the ride is?
Mr. Nasser. Yes. Yes, we do.
Mr. Shimkus. And that brings me to my question which deals
with a statement you made just a few minutes ago, and that's
why it's sometimes beneficial to hang around and hear the
questions and answers. For 10 cents a tire, you know, you
mentioned that it's worth 10 cents a tire to move forward on
safety considerations--and my question is, what about $1.40,
$1.40 a tire, which if you remember back to last year when we
were sitting through these hearings, I raised the issue of the
nylon caps are--and the fact on nylon caps help prevent tread
separation. Why Mr. Dingell's questions were good for me,
because they provided me, again, with the challenge between
specifications and actual material, design and requirements to
meet the specifications.
So I would ask, based upon the information that I have,
that it's $1.40 per tire to provide a nylon cap, why in this
new paradigm of the bar being lifted higher, seeking forward
remedies, why not move from specs to some specific requirements
to the people who are providing a major part of your product?
Mr. Nasser. To move from tire performance to actually
specifying the----
Mr. Shimkus. Well, you have a specification that says ride;
why not have a requirement that says nylon caps?
Mr. Nasser. Okay. You'd have to ask the tire experts
specifically on nylon caps. It is interesting that based on
what I know at least, nylon caps would not help tread
separation to any great degree. I think nylon caps are mostly
reserved for very high-speed driving, and you'll find them on
the higher speed rating tires. But you'd have to get the tire
experts on that.
Mr. Shimkus. But did you require nylon caps for the
Explorers used in the Middle East and Venezuela?
Mr. Nasser. I don't know whether we specified it or the
tire company specified it. But you just keep going back to the
U.S. The Goodyear tires didn't have nylon caps. The majority--
and maybe even all, but I certainly know that the majority of
the volume sports utility vehicles in the U.S. have tires
without nylon caps. So I don't think there is one silver bullet
here, and there is a danger of trying to choose one solution or
one improvement, without looking at the total benefit of
handling and ride and stability.
Mr. Shimkus. And, again, I understand and appreciate the
responsibility you have in providing jobs, providing a product
and making sure it is as safe as possible, within the means of
being able for consumers to purchase. This is just a follow-up
to questions that I had asked last year on the nylon caps. We
tried to get it inserted into the TREAD Act. We were
unsuccessful, and we may try again in the future. I thank the
gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
chairman recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman, Mr. Stupak.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nasser, last
September when we were having the hearing, I asked the question
on whether Ford would join with me in calling for a--and
cooperating with a blue ribbon independent panel to perform a
review of the AT, ATX Wilderness tires to determine the cause
and proposed solutions. Is Ford still committed to its blue
ribbon independent committee?
Mr. Nasser. Yes, we are.
Mr. Stupak. Has Ford initiated or had any contact with
NHTSA on trying to put together this committee?
Mr. Nasser. I know we're in contact with them. I don't know
what the status is.
Mr. Stupak. The information that you've testified to about
the 1,083 separation of the Firestone tire, the field data, as
you call it, versus 2 separations of the Goodyear tire, have
you shared that data with Firestone?
Mr. Nasser. Yes, that data was available, as far as I know,
last year, similar data. So it's----
Mr. Stupak. Everybody has it.
Mr. Nasser. Yes.
Mr. Stupak. Firestone had it, NHTSA has it, this committee
has it, we all have it?
Mr. Nasser. Uh-huh.
Mr. Stupak. The chairman in his statement--opening
statement, stated that--there were words to this effect, that
some of the nonFirestone replacement tires have property and
injury claims greater than those nonrecalled Wilderness AT
tires. I take it from the exchange that went on earlier, you
don't have that information?
Mr. Nasser. We don't, but we're clearly, once we finish
with the hearing, we'll get to look at that data and see how it
impacts what we're doing.
Mr. Stupak. You believe you'll get it right after the
hearing, or do you think you're going to have to wait until
after 30 days when NHTSA is done with it?
Mr. Nasser. I think we can get the basic data pretty
quickly if it's available.
Mr. Stupak. If you do, would you share it with the rest of
this committee?
I'm sorry to have to put you through that----
Mr. Dingell. We've had a lot of talk about this information
or data or whatever it might be. I ask unanimous consent at
this time that that data be inserted in the record at this
point. All of it.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair advises the gentleman that that
request will be taken under consideration.
Mr. Dingell. I believe I----
Mr. Greenwood. If I may continue----
Mr. Dingell. I believe I'm entitled to have a----
Mr. Greenwood. Just a moment. I'll recognize the gentleman
in a moment. What needs to be taken into consideration is that
there are differences between the data that--raw data that's
been provided to us by some of the tire manufacturers and NHTSA
versus the computations that were done by our investigative
staff.
Mr. Dingell. Mr.----
Mr. Greenwood. And it is the work product that involves
these computations that has been referenced and we are taking
into consideration whether or not it--such computations should
or should not be entered in the record.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, I have made a unanimous consent
request. I will repeat it for the benefit of the Chair. And
that is that all of the data referred to be inserted into the
record at this particular point so that we can all know what
we're talking about and so that the meaning of which has been
referred to no less than three times this morning, we'll be
able to see what is--what is done.
I would ask that in addition to that, the comments of all
of the three major participants to these proceedings, Ford
Motor, Firestone, and also NHTSA be included as soon as it can
possibly be done. I'm entitled to have that unanimous consent
request ruled upon or objected to.
Mr. Deal. Mr. Chairman, based on the comments made by the
chairman previously that some of the information was
confidentially received, I would object to at this time.
Mr. Dingell. Well, I will make----
Mr. Greenwood. The objection is heard to the gentleman's
unanimous request.
Mr. Dingell. I would request that the gentleman from
Georgia tell us what it is he wants hidden.
Mr. Deal. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Greenwood. I recognize the gentleman from Georgia.
Mr. Deal. As the ranking member heard the chairman state
earlier, some of the information was obtained in confidence. I
think it is the responsibility of this committee to honor the
confidences that the chairman has requested be respected.
Mr. Dingell. Well, then I will----
Mr. Deal. It is on that basis that I make the objection.
Mr. Dingell. Then I will make a further unanimous consent
request, and that is that the press releases and documents
related to the story--an article which appears in Yahoo News on
today's date, June 19, entitled ``House Queries Ford
Replacement Tires,'' be inserted in the record. I believe this
is properly a part of the record, so that we can all know what
we're talking about.
Mr. Deal. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Greenwood. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Tuesday June 19, 2001--The New York Times]
House Queries Ford's Replacement Tires
By Nedra Pickler, Associated Press Writer
WASHINGTON (AP)--Ford Motor Co. may be replacing Firestone tires on
its vehicles with other brands that have higher failure rates,
according to an analysis by congressional investigators.
The House Commerce Committee unveiled the results of its five-month
inquiry into the safety of America's tires at a hearing Tuesday.
Rep. Billy Tauzin, R-La., the committee chairman, said
congressional investigators have analyzed the failure rates of
replacement tires Ford is using--made by Michelin, Continental,
Goodyear, General, BF Goodrich and Uniroyal--and found some fail more
often than the Firestone Wilderness AT tires Ford recalled last month.
``Ford is going to replace these recall tires with tires that have
a worse claims history than some of the tires that are coming off the
Explorers,'' Tauzin said. ``For example, our investigators have learned
that one of the tires that is going to be used in the replacement has a
claims rate of 124 per million tires, well in excess of the five claims
per million that Ford says is the benchmark in this recall.''
``Are we going to be replacing worse tires for the tires that come
off these cars?'' he asked.
Tauzin spokesman Ken Johnson also said the committee found that two
additional Firestone tire models used on Ford vehicles--the Wilderness
HT and the FR480--had higher rates of claims for property damage than
the Wilderness AT.
Ford does not have access to the same information because tire
makers keep their property damage claims rates confidential. The
Commerce Committee has been collecting that information from the tire
makers in the past several months.
Tauzin refused to make his data public yet, saying he wanted
federal safety officials to analyze the information first.
``I don't want us to be a party to releasing bad information to the
American public,'' he said.
But Rep. Bart Stupak, D-Mich., called on Tauzin to release the data
immediately, considering he and other Americans replaced the Firestone
tires on their Ford Explorers.
``I want to make sure if I replaced them, I replaced them with good
tires,'' Stupak said. ``I think we're misleading the American public if
we say we're replacing them with worse tires, but yet we're not getting
the data.''
Ford officials said they asked the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration about the replacement tires they planned to use and the
agency did not raise any safety concerns.
``We feel that the replacement tires are good tires,'' said Sue
Cischke, Ford's vice president for environmental and safety
engineering.
Cischke said Ford was aware of a higher claim rate on the FR480,
but that only a relatively few of those tires are still on the road.
She also said Ford was aware of a few claims involving the Wilderness
HT, but said none involved accidents.
The Wilderness AT has been at the center of a nearly year-long
debate over the safety of Firestone tires. Bridgestone/Firestone Inc.'s
voluntary recall of 6.5 million tires last August included the 15-inch
version of the Wilderness AT, made at its plant in Decatur, Ill.
The company insisted that other sizes of the tire made at other
plants were safe. But last month Ford said it was concerned about
safety and announced it would replace all 13 million Wilderness ATs
still on its vehicles.
A day earlier, aware of the impending announcement, Bridgestone/
Firestone ended its 96-year relationship with Ford.
The Wilderness AT has been standard equipment on the Ford Explorer,
the world's best-selling sport utility vehicle. Many of the 203 fatal
accidents among the thousands of crashes reported to the highway safety
administration in the last year were rollovers of the Explorer that
occurred after the tires failed.
Ford insists the problem is the result of flawed tires, but
Bridgestone/Firestone says the design of the Explorer also is a factor.
Jacques Nasser, chief executive of Ford, blamed the problem on the
tires. He said Bridgestone/Firestone's tests showing the Explorer as
part of the problem were ``unreliable'' and ``not based on facts.''
``The Ford Explorer is and always will be a safe vehicle,'' Nasser
insisted.
John Lampe, chief executive of Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., in turn
said Ford's tests were ``grossly unscientific and must be
disregarded.''
``We have had a growing and ultimately overwhelming conviction that
tire design and manufacturing issues alone simply cannot account for
what has been happening to the Explorer,'' Lampe said in his prepared
statement.
Lawmakers called on NHTSA to quickly finish its investigation so
people can know who to believe. ``We have a corporate schoolyard brawl
breaking out here,'' said Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass. ``We need an
independent referee.''
In announcing its recall last month, Ford officials said they were
particularly concerned with the Wilderness AT tires built at
Bridgestone/Firestone's plant in Wilson, N.C. The automaker said the
15-inch version built at that plant has 19 tread separation claims per
million tires produced and the 16-inch version has 17 claims per
million.
That is much lower than the 300 per million failures on some of the
tires included in Bridgestone/Firestone's original recall.
About 2,000 United Auto Workers planned to drive around the Capitol
and then rally Tuesday to show their confidence in the Explorer.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Greenwood. Is the gentleman, Mr. Stupak, reclaiming his
time?
Mr. Stupak. Yes, I'd like to reclaim my time and get a
moment or two further. But I'd like to expand upon the motion.
I guess I'd ask the unanimous request, then, of the committee
to do this. If it's the data that is so confidential, then the
thing that is not confidential would be the manufacturer name
and the brand name of the tire. Would the majority staff at
least tell us who is the manufacturer and the brand name of the
title? So--I'll do one better than Yahoo News, Mr. Dingell,
I'll do the Detroit Free Press--so we're not getting the
questions, ``New Tires, New Worries.''
Now, we have a notice out from Ford to replace our tires. I
did mine beforehand. My father-in-law for his Expedition just
got his. Now, he's going down to make his replacement tires--to
get them from Ford.
Now, if we have a brand and a manufacturer and a brand tire
that is defective 124 times versus 5 times, as has been claimed
by the majority, then at least tell the American people what
the tire is, and the brand name, my father-in-law and others
are not out replacing their tires with possibly worse tires
which have a worse safety record.
So I'd ask unanimous consent that this committee at least
tell us the manufacturer of the tire and the tire brand, and
that way we don't have to worry about disclosing confidential
data.
Mr. Greenwood. In response to the gentleman's inquiry, I
would object and state my reasons as follows. In the first
place, the gentleman needs to know that the minority staff has
access to all of the same data as the gentleman--the minority
staff has access to all the same data from NHTSA as our staff
does. The majority--minority staff is----
Mr. Stupak. This is not in NHTSA's hands, from all the
testimony thus far. You're going to give it to NHTSA at the end
of this hearing, and then we're going to get 30 days. So can we
get it as part of this record? I mean, if we've got to wait for
NHTSA, that will be 30 days later.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, I ask that under my rights as a
member of this committee, under the rules of the House of
Representatives, that the data compiled by the committee staff
and the analysis of the committee staff be promptly made
available to all members of the committee. The House rules
provide that it is my right to have that made available to me.
I ask that it be made available to me for----
Mr. Greenwood. Pursuant to the gentleman's----
Mr. Dingell. I mean now, Mr. Chairman, not----
Mr. Greenwood. Pursuant to the gentleman's----
Mr. Dingell. Not at the whim of the Chair or at some later
time, but now.
I have requested the data. I ask the staff to come forward
and present it to me.
Mr. Greenwood. Would the gentleman desist for a moment?
Mr. Dingell. The House rules so provide. I speak as a
member of the committee, requesting that the rules----
Mr. Greenwood. The gentleman's request is on the record.
The Chair will consult with the attorneys and respond promptly.
Mr. Dingell. I don't ask for consultation with the
attorneys. I asked that the information be made available----
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair asks for--the Chair is asking for
a consultation with his attorneys, and the Chair will respond
to the gentleman's request promptly.
Mr. Dingell. I will read the rule to the Chair, if that
will be helpful.
Mr. Greenwood. The gentleman has stated the rule correctly,
and the Chair recognizes the rule as stated. We'd ask that the
gentleman politely desist for a moment.
Mr. Dingell. I apologize to my good friend from Michigan
for intruding into his time.
Mr. Greenwood. The gentleman from Michigan correctly states
his rights under the rules of this committee and that he--the
Chair will see to it that the staff presents to the gentleman,
promptly, the----
Mr. Dingell. Promptly?
Mr. Greenwood. Immediately.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair would also ask this of the
gentleman. I believe that the gentleman from Michigan was here
when Mr. Tauzin stated his concerns about the release of this
information and the implications that it might have, and would
simply ask the gentleman from Michigan to make his own decision
based on his own judgment and what the--the concerns expressed
by the full chairman, as to whether or not the chairman chooses
to divulge that information.
Mr. Dingell. Well, I would simply note that the chairman of
the full committee has made this observation and is so quoted
in the press. I don't want to be a party to releasing bad
information to the American public. However, I would note that
that did appear on the news media already, and since we are
going to let this hang out, I suggest it should all hang out.
Mr. Greenwood. I am advised by staff that the gentleman--
gentleman's request will be responded to in the following
fashion: The material, the data submitted to the majority staff
by the tire companies, will be copied promptly and submitted to
the gentleman from Michigan as quickly as that can be
mechanically done, which I would assume would be a matter of
minutes.
Mr. Dingell. And I am requesting that which is alluded to
in the news article referred to by Mr. Stupak.
Mr. Greenwood. That is the data in question.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Chairman, I'll reclaim my time.
Mr. Greenwood. Your time has long since expired.
Mr. Stupak. I realize that, but----
Mr. Deutsch. Mr. Chairman, I ask that you grant the
gentleman an additional 2 minutes.
Mr. Stupak. A point of clarification, if I may. While I
understand that the information would be released to the
gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Dingell, I take it it would be
released to all members of this committee?
Mr. Greenwood. Certainly. Certainly.
Mr. Stupak. And I also understand from the rules of this
committee and also rules of the House, that if the information
is deemed confidential by the committee, then it cannot be
released publicly, whether it is Yahoo News or Detroit Free
Press. Is that the ruling of the Chair?
Mr. Greenwood. That is my understanding of the rules, but
it is also my understanding of the facts that no such data was
released by the committee staff.
Mr. Stupak. So for further clarification, the information
we will be receiving, the data if you will, is that considered
confidential information, not to be released publicly? Or--as
turned over to each committee member, we can do--since it's
part of the record, it then becomes a public record and can be
released?
Mr. Greenwood. The--I am advised by counsel that there is
no committee rule with respect to the release of confidential
information. There are rules with respect to information that
is obtained by subpoena. In some cases it is--requires a vote
of the committee to release data acquired by subpoena. That
does not describe the data in question.
Mr. Dingell. That this data and information and papers did
not fall into the hands of this committee pursuant to the
subpoena process?
Mr. Greenwood. That is correct, which is why in fact no
vote is required.
Mr. Stupak. And, therefore, once released to members, it
can be released publicly as part of this record?
Mr. Dingell. I would call on the Chair, for a prohibition
against this being released, to please inform the gentleman
from Michigan, Mr. Stupak, or the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
Dingell, as to what the prohibitions are under the rules of
members of this committee of discussing this information in
other places, since it has already been discussed by the
chairman of the committee.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair will reiterate and hopefully
summarize so we can get to the next line of inquiry. The data
supplied to the committee by the--from the tire companies will
be made available within minutes to the minority members. The
minority members have the right, of course, to release all of
that information publicly. I have reiterated the admonition--
expression of concern which this member believes is legitimate,
that the use of that information--and would ask that the
members use it responsibly, understanding--and hopefully before
they make any decisions about releasing it, understanding what
the data is and what the data is not.
Mr. Dingell. Now, Mr. Chairman, that unanimous consent
request and my demand for information included the committee
staff analysis of this, which I am sure the Chair agrees is
property of the entire committee and should be available to all
members, including minority members.
Mr. Stearns. Mr. Dingell, does that include all my notes,
too?
Mr. Dingell. Do you have notes? I'll tell you what. I
promise to return your notes to you.
Mr. Stearns. Can I get all your notes, too?
Mr. Dingell. I haven't got any notes on this matter, but if
I generate any, I will assure you that I will make----
Mr. Stearns. Will the Chair allow me just unanimous consent
to speak 1 minute on the subject?
Mr. Dingell. What I requested, Mr. Chairman, just to make
it very clear, is the staff analysis.
Mr. Greenwood. Yeah. I understand.
Mr. Dingell. Staff analysis, not the notes of my dear
friend from Florida, although I'm sure they're probably of
greater merit than the staff.
Mr. Stearns. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair reiterates that the information
that is available to the majority members of the committee will
be made available to the minority members of the committee, and
I would suggest that the gentleman from Michigan and the other
members of the minority review that material when it is
provided to you, which, as I said, will be promptly. If you
have further questions as to whether or not it meets your
demands, I would ask you to raise them at that time.
Mr. Dingell. I will do so. Just to assist the Chair and the
members of the committee, Mr. Tauzin is quoted in the press
this morning as having said as follows: Representative Billy
Tauzin, R., LA, the committee chairman, said congressional
investigators have analyzed the failure rates of replacement
tires Ford is using, including using those made by Michelin,
Continental, Goodyear, General, BFGoodrich, and Uniroyal, and
found some failed more often than the Firestone Wilderness AT
tires Ford recalled last month.
I very specifically need that, because I am sure you can
understand the importance of this information which has today
fallen into the public domain.
Mr. Greenwood. As the gentleman knows, if the gentleman
read it in the newspaper, it must be so.
The Chair recognizes----
Mr. Stearns. Mr. Dingell, the only thing--I'd make two
points. One is that when this information is given to you, as
Mr. Stupak and I talked earlier, that a lot of this
information--you have to understand one of the assumptions that
make up this information. And just to take this information and
suddenly give it to the press without a full understanding--let
me just finish.
Mr. Dingell. I----
Mr. Stearns. So I think the chairman is saying that each
member has a fiduciary responsibility to decide if he's going
to give it out, that he should know all the underlying
assumptions.
My second point is, all the analysis that our staff has
done on this side is revealed in the questions we have. Most of
these questions provide the data, together with the charts. So
the analysis that you're seeing from our staff is transparent
with all these charts that we're bringing here.
So I just reiterate to the distinguished member from
Michigan that what we're trying to do here in a bipartisan way
is to make this information more available to the consumer so
that the consumer can make a decision, and that's--we have no
intent, no agenda, other than trying to make the consumer feel
a certain level of confidence that he or she understands this
information. So, you know, I think here we have a--perhaps a
misunderstanding, if you don't realize that we're trying to
provide you all the analysis, either through our questions or
our charts.
Mr. Dingell. Well, I want to thank the gentleman for that
point, and I want to say that I am mightily reassured. I would
also like to observe that I had not been given a copy of this
analysis before and, as Mr. Stupak had to, I had to read about
it in the press.
Mr. Greenwood. The gentleman from Michigan has made his
request. The Chair has ruled, and the Chair now recognizes for
5 minutes the gentleman, Mr. Bryant----
Mr. Towns. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Greenwood. Does the ranking member of the Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee seek to make a--raise a
parliamentary question for----
Mr. Towns. Yes. I'd like to make a unanimous consent
request. Mr. Stupak's time was really eaten into by other
members. So if we can grant him 1 additional minute.
Mr. Greenwood. Without objections, the gentleman from--the
gentleman, Mr. Stupak, is recognized for 1 minute for purposes
of inquiry toward the--directed toward the witness.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Chairman, if I may use my 1 minute, I am
done with inquiry. We've got what we want.
Mr. Greenwood. Then that is inconsistent with the
gentleman's unanimous request----
Mr. Stupak. But I asked unanimous consent----
Mr. Greenwood. Unanimous consent request.
Mr. Stupak. I asked unanimous consent to keep the record
clear--I told you I'd get back to my plaintiff trial lawyer
days--and I ask that the record be clear that we enter in--
unanimous consent, enter in the Detroit Free Press, June 19th,
2001 edition, Page 1 and Page 6-A.
Mr. Greenwood. Without objection.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Tuesday, June 19, 2001--Detroit Free Press]
Committee Spokesman Says Ford Replaces Firestone Tires with Substandard
Ones
By Jennifer Dixon
Ford Motor Co. has been replacing Firestone tires on its trucks and
sport-utility vehicles with tires that, in some cases, have worse
performance records, a spokesman for the House Energy and Commerce
Committee said Monday.
And, while the Dearborn automaker is taking tires that have not had
problems off its vehicles, it is leaving other poor-performing tires on
some trucks, the spokesman said.
The chiefs of Ford and tire maker Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. are
expected to be confronted with those findings, the work of committee
investigators, when they testify before two Energy and Commerce
subcommittees this morning in Washington, D.C.
The hearing is the second time in a year that Congress has looked
at whether Firestone tires, Ford's popular sport-utility vehicle, the
Explorer, or the combination of the two are responsible for hundreds of
deaths and injuries.
Late Monday, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
announced that it has now linked 203 U.S. deaths--up from 174--and more
than 700 injuries to some of the 50 million Firestone ATX, ATX II and
Wilderness AT tires that it has been investigating since last year.
Many are on Ford vehicles.
Last August, Firestone recalled 14.4 million 15-inch tires, many of
them on the Explorer, prompting the first set of hearings.
In May, Ford announced it would spend $3 billion to replace 13
million additional Firestone Wilderness AT tires on its vehicles.
Ken Johnson, a spokesman for the Energy and Commerce Committee,
called the results of the congressional investigators' analysis of
claims data troubling and puzzling.
He said they found three problems with Ford's replacement program
and the Firestone recall:
Ford in some cases is replacing Firestone tires with brands that
have worse track records.
At least two other Firestone tires, the 16-inch Wilderness HT and
the 15-inch FR480, have much higher claims rates than the ATs that are
being replaced. The 15-inch FR480 was used on the Explorer in the
early- to mid-1990s, while the Wilderness HTs have been used since 1995
on the F150 pickup, the nation's best-selling vehicle.
Some of the Wilderness AT tires being replaced by Ford have never
had a claim against them, yet are being replaced by brands ``that have
a spotty track record.'' Johnson said.
``I suspect this new information will generate a lot of interest
among our members,'' Johnson said. ``It's common sense: You don't
replace a tire with another tire that has a worse track record.''
Ken Zino, a spokesman for Ford, said the company tested replacement
tires from other companies in the lab and on the road. He said NHTSA
looked over its list of replacement tires and had no issue with those
tires.
``We are as confident as anybody can be that this a good set of
replacement tires,'' Zino said.
He said there are few FR480s left on the road, and that there have
been only a handful of claims against the HT.
Jill Bratina, a spokeswoman for Nashville-based Bridgestone/
Firestone, said the tires that Ford is replacing come from a ``universe
of tires performing at world-class levels.''
She also pointed the finger, once again, at the Explorer.
``You can take every Firestone tire off the Explorer, and the
rollovers will continue. We believe that there are serious safety
concerns with the Explorer and you can't look at the tire in
isolation.''
In addition to quizzing Ford on its replacement program, committee
members are expected to ask why it has taken NHTSA more than a year to
conduct its analysis of Firestone tires.
An aide to a Republican member of the Energy and Commerce Committee
said lawmakers would be asking ``where is NHTSA'' during today's
hearings.
``Here we are, 12 months out, and we still don't know definitively
that it's a tire problem,'' the aide said, speaking on condition of
anonymity. ``Where is that investigation?''
Tim Hurd, a NHTSA spokesman, said the investigation is continuing.
Such investigations typically take a year to 18 months.
Perhaps in anticipation of congressional scrutiny, the White House
announced Monday that President George W. Bush will nominate a North
Carolina doctor who specializes in emergency medicine to lead the
safety agency. NHTSA has been without an administrator since January.
Jeffrey Runge is assistant chairman of the department of emergency
medicine at the Carolinas Medical Center in Charlotte and is an expert
in motor vehicle injury care and prevention, according to the White
House.
In a show of support for the vehicle that has been the best-selling
sport-utility since its introduction in 1990, hundreds of Explorers
driven by UAW members, rolled into Washington, D.C., on Monday.
Thousands of UAW members from Ford plants around the country are to
receive up to eight hours a day in pay from Ford to rally behind the
vehicle that has contributed more than any other Ford car or truck to
their profit-sharing checks.
``We want to demonstrate to Congress and the public that we do
build and assemble quality, safe vehicles,'' said UAW Vice President
Ron Gettelfinger. ``There are millions of miles of real world history
to prove that fact.''
Today, they are expected to drive in a convoy of 800 Explorers,
with police escort, around the National Mall. They also plan to rally
at a park near the Senate office buildings at 11:30 a.m.
Staff writer Ruby Bailey and Craig Linder of
States News Service contributed to this report.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair recognizes the gentleman, Mr.
Bryant, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bryant. I thank the Chair, and I thank the witness for
his patience with us, as all witnesses have to endure, it
seems. And I think back, as I prepared for this hearing over
the last weekend and the meeting with constituents, Ford
dealers in my district, two of which are in Washington today, I
think driving around the Capitol as I understand from reading
the newspaper perhaps, but also in Tennessee we have the
headquarters for Firestone as well as a number of Firestone
distributors, dealers that sell the tires.
So, like I suppose everyone on this committee, we have
interests on both sides, constituents that are directly
involved, whether they are Firestone or Ford. And ultimately
the reason we're all here and the reason we're not leaving this
to the lawsuits and the many courts that will be involved in
this at some future date, and that we're not leaving it solely
to NHTSA, the regulators whose job it is to do these things,
the reason we're not in this congressional committee leaving it
to those groups now, is that we're trying to move quickly and
determine what safety concerns there are out there, make sure
that folks in NHTSA are doing their job, but mainly trying to
protect the consumers' interests, I guess, is the bottom line.
And after our first hearing last September, I was here and
heard different people testify on behalf of Ford and Firestone
and NHTSA. We thought maybe this process was moving along
toward cooperation and repairing this problem. I know there was
a problem in the Firestone--I think it was the Decatur,
Illinois plant--and there was a recall of those tires, and we
assumed it was rectified and the American consumers were safe
again.
And then we get into a situation where we start reading
about finger pointing, and it--from an outsider's view, it
doesn't appear that there's very much cooperation between
Firestone and Ford. And every day it seems there's a different
story, accusations being swapped and expert witnesses and
statistics and so forth, charges being made.
And I'm just wondering, Mr. Nasser--I know specifically you
said that you pledged to this Congress to cooperate and--with
Firestone--help get to the bottom of this. And I just wonder,
as I hear from Firestone people, that perhaps that was not--
they couldn't get the information they needed from Ford. You
told Mr. Stupak earlier that you had shared information with
Firestone since that hearing. Where--very quickly, I guess,
because I have a couple of other questions--where are we on
that cooperation, or have we just all backed away and hired
lawyers and hunkered down?
Mr. Nasser. I think that is a good question, and obviously
if you--to read the press, you would believe that we are in a
bitter feud. I don't think that's the case at all. We have a
viewpoint about our customers, and we're trying to protect
their safety. And I think Firestone would basically agree with
that. They have a different viewpoint, and I think they're
entitled to it.
We have had very good cooperation with Firestone since the
last time we met. I think there have been something like 48
different meetings and interactions between the Ford tire team
and technical people and scientists and the Firestone people.
And there have been an incredible--millions and millions of
pages of documents, that have verified the testing and the lab
work and the rig testing and the field data between the two
companies at a very high level in the company.
In addition to that, we set up a Web site where we
basically deposit all of the data that we have. And it was
interesting, before I came along here I said, I wonder how many
times the Firestone company people have accessed that Web site,
and they have accessed it over 40,000 times. So I would say the
face-to-face interaction with Firestone has been great in terms
of data exchange, and the signer interaction obviously has been
very active as well. It is an emotional issue when you're
dealing with customer safety. So we understand the emotion and
passion around it.
Mr. Bryant. And I appreciate your answer. You know, it is a
shame that such a longstanding relationship of probably a
hundred years is in jeopardy, and maybe well beyond that at
this point. But, again, I know both companies are vitally--as
you say, vitally interested in the consumers' safety. And I--I
was struck as I moved about the district talking to my two
dealers this weekend, at different ends of the district, with
the chart that you've used that shows Firestone having 1,183
separations and Goodyear 2. And coming from a practice of law--
and when I've used charts and put together information, you
always have to look at the underlying data. And I bring that up
not to question anyone's ethics or honesty in this, but I see
another chart that conflicts with--I guess just really the
backup chart to that in terms of the climate and where these
Explorers were sent in relation to hot States. And I see Ford's
as this, and I see one from Firestone that shows substantially
different numbers that supposedly are based on information from
Ford.
And now I just wonder, as we look at the first chart again,
the underlying data, is that--is that really a reliable
picture?
Now, we've talked today about context and things of this
nature. I think back to the hearing, and we had, you know,--of
the Decatur tires in there, the situation that Firestone has
rectified, and that is not really at issue here--you know, or
the B grade tires versus the C grade tires issue, has that
taken into consideration apparently the fact that apparently
Goodyear has supplied B grade and Firestone C grade at the
request of Ford? The climate issue, where more of the Firestone
tires in the southern hot areas--which we all understand is
very important in this issue--than the Goodyear tires on the
Explorers? Because, again, there are different charts here, the
recommendation I recall back from the last hearing that Ford
seemed to make that--on psi inflation to the tire that was
lower than what Firestone recommended for their tire and the
tire safety, and these issues--well, I guess my bottom line on
this--and I have some other questions I could ask. You can use
statistics and experts--you know, I've seen it used in courts.
And one says the sky is falling. The other says it is not.
In the end, what we're trying to do in this hearing is
protect the American consumer. It seems to me it would be in
the interest of both companies to come together--you're going
to end up together in a courtroom, against some other folks,
probably, that were injured in this--these--or the heirs of
people that were killed in some of these accidents. So it seems
to be in your interest to come together and work to get to the
bottom of this so that we can be safe and confident that if
we're driving Explorers around with Firestone tires, we're
going to be safe and in other vehicles with those tires and
other SUVs.
And I would just encourage you to do that, and I'm going to
ask the same thing from Mr. Lampe when he comes in next. And I
probably know him a little better than I know you, and I feel
confident that he will do that, and Firestone has that
interest, too. So I would ask that, and since I am being
gaveled now, I will yield back the balance of my time.
Thank you.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Doyle, for 5 minutes
for inquiry.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nasser, welcome.
Mr. Nasser. Thank you.
Mr. Doyle. I'm a new member to the committee, so I wasn't
here last year when you appeared, but it's my understanding
that back then, that obviously it's a fair statement to say
that contrary to some of these statements last year at the
committee hearing, that Firestone and Ford can't seem to agree
on what the root causes of the tire problem is. That's--you
don't agree with that? You don't agree on what, or--or you
haven't been able to agree on what the root causes of this tire
problem is?
Mr. Nasser. I would say generally that's an accurate
statement.
Mr. Doyle. Now, it's my understanding that last year, it
was suggested that an outside consultant take a look at this,
and it's my understanding that Firestone did hire an outside
consultant to study the problem and that your study was done
in-house. Is that correct?
Mr. Nasser. We did a study in-house, but also cooperated
with the--are you talking about the Govindjee study----
Mr. Doyle. Yes----
Mr. Nasser. [continuing] that Firestone undertook?
Mr. Doyle. Yes.
Mr. Nasser. Yes, but there was cooperation between us on
that study as well.
Mr. Doyle. I see. But you also did a study and yours was
done in-house?
Mr. Nasser. Yes.
Mr. Doyle. But I did hear you say to Mr. Stupak that you're
not opposed to this idea of an outside independent group
studying this problem; a blue ribbon panel, as Mr. Stupak
referred to it?
Mr. Nasser. Our preference, obviously--and this is what we
said last time and this is what we concluded with Firestone in
October of last year--is that we provide all the data to NHTSA,
who are in the best position, we believe, and I think the
committee believes, based on what I've heard earlier in the
opening comments, to be able to make an independent review of
all the data of the tires and of the vehicles and comparable
peer SUVs.
Mr. Doyle. So then you'd agree--I mean, the Congress and--
or the American public is not going to be able to resolve your
dispute here. I mean, some of us up here have the expertise to
ask some questions and we know that statistics can be
manipulated to either person's benefit. But we're not engineers
up here. I guess that, you know, a lot of people back in my
district and across America are wondering who's going to give
them the definitive answer as to what the cause of this tire
failure is, so that they can have confidence when they go out
to buy an automobile or a tire and----
Mr. Nasser. We agree with the American public. That's why
we stopped debating and we stopped talking and we stopped
discussions and we acted. And that's what the 13 million
Firestone tire replacement plan is all about.
Because we are sick and tired of debating and fighting on
this issue. Our customers want it resolved and they want those
tires off the road. And that's what we're doing. So I agree
with you. You're absolutely right; let's stop this discussion
and debating and analysis and finger-pointing, if that's what
you want to call it, and act for the benefit of our customers.
And that's what we did.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you. Can you describe the difference for
the committee--I am just--the difference in usage and
engineering between Ford Explorers and Ford Rangers?
Mr. Nasser. Well one is a pick-up truck, and obviously it
has different use than a sport utility vehicle which tends to
be more of a passenger-type vehicle.
Mr. Doyle. Now, do tire companies manufacture tires to
different standards for SUVs and trucks or are they the same?
Mr. Nasser. In some cases they're the same. In some cases
they're different. If where you are going is should we be using
the same tire on a sport utility vehicle and a pick-up truck,
in actual fact the specifications are adequate for both, and
it's not uncommon in the industry to have a similar performance
tire across different derivative fronts.
Mr. Doyle. So it wouldn't have been uncommon to have the
Firestone tire on the Ranger and on the Explorer?
Mr. Nasser. It's been that way for a long time.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you very much. I yield back my time, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Greenwood. Gentleman yields back the time. The Chair
recognizes for 5 minutes for inquiry the gentleman, Mr. Terry.
Mr. Terry. Thank you. I appreciate that opportunity.
Sir, if you could help me just kind of get down to the
lowest common denominator here, I read through inches of
material, and if you could help me in defining if defect--
because we have heard testimony about tire pressure, load, heat
variances, but specifically--and we've also heard a variety of
testing, field testing that shows something is wrong, shows the
belt is coming apart.
Now you have done a variety of advance testing, more field
testing under controlled circumstances, laboratory testings. In
a layman's way that we as laymen can understand, what has Ford
determined to be the specific defect or defects of these
Firestone tires?
Mr. Nasser. You can't summarize it with one defect,
unfortunately.
Mr. Terry. It's multiple.
Mr. Nasser. It is very complicated and it varies, and it
isn't only tire design and temperature and wedge strength and
peel strength but it's also variability in the design process,
because it seems as if the design changed over a period of time
and variability within the manufacturing process of the
Firestone plants.
Mr. Terry. That's interesting, because I was going to ask
you to break it down into whether or not these defects that you
found were part of design or manufacturing, and you're saying
it's combination of both. Could you be specific about what type
of design defects have been found by Ford that they believe
lead to this problem and the manufacturing process as well?
Mr. Nasser. Well, it's difficult to be specific because it
varied depending on the period of tire manufacturer. It really
did vary year by year. In addition to that, what is very
unusual is that when you look at the Firestone tire performance
by plant, by Firestone plant, it varies dramatically. Which
further indicates that the vehicle itself, the Explorer, is the
same vehicle; yet there is tremendous variability depending on
where the tire comes in from, and we know the Explorer is a
superb vehicle and a very intelligent vehicle, but I don't
think it can sit back and say this is a Decatur tire, I don't
want to behave now; this is an Aiken tire, I will behave now.
So there's just so much variability between plant and design
and, we think, manufacturing process.
Mr. Terry. Well, I guess that's what's at the heart of
trying to figure out the scope of the recall, for want of a
better word.
Mr. Nasser. Which is one of the reasons we, in the end,
said, look, we can continue to study this for many, many more
months and face the situation of increasing tragedy on the
roads, or we can act now in the interests and the safety of our
customers. And we decided to act. It wasn't an easy decision,
yet it was easy once we really got down to the priority of
protecting our customer.
Mr. Terry. Thank you. I'll yield back. I yield to you, Mr.
Bryant.
Mr. Greenwood. The gentleman yields time to Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. Yes, Mr. Nasser, while you were mentioning
that, it reminded me of a question I had in terms of what is
being done to improve the tires. As I understand, the year 2001
Explorer is also being redesigned to some extent. Particularly,
would you share with this committee those redesigns, those
improvements to safety as they pertain to the stability of the
vehicle?
Mr. Nasser. Well, it's a 2002 Explore, and many of the
gentlemen in the room today drove them for hundreds of miles
across the country to be here with us this morning. We did take
the opportunity to redesign the Explorer. It's a superb
vehicle, the 2002 model. But it's got big shoes to fill because
the Explorer--the previous Explorer had been around for 10-
years, over 10 years, and it had one of the best safety records
anywhere in the world for a sport utility vehicle. It was the
top selling sport utility vehicle in the U.S.A., the top
selling sport utility vehicle in the world.
But you get to a point after 10 years where you do need to
take the opportunity to upgrade it substantially, and we did,
and we upgraded it primarily to make the interior more
efficient because we wanted to go to three-row seating and
seven-passenger seating with the Explorer. We went to an
independent rear suspension in the rear so that we could get
better ride, but primarily to get better space sufficiency in
the rear. And, you know, things have moved on over the years,
and we've taken the opportunity to upgrade it in almost every
respect.
Mr. Greenwood. Time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I'll begin
by saying that while I know that there's still a dispute as to
whether or not the minority, the Democrats, are going to
receive access to the analysis that's been done by the majority
as to these additional tires that may be endangering the
American public, that the contention that is being made is that
the information is still incomplete, and as a result can't be
shared with us. But if the information is incomplete, then it
shouldn't be used to scare the American public either. I think
that at a point at which you had completed your analysis, you
should have presented it both to us and to the American public,
but to not use incomplete data.
Mr. Greenwood. If the gentleman will yield, it has not been
the statement of the majority, of this Chair, or any other
Members that the data is incomplete.
Mr. Markey. If the data is not incomplete, then we should
receive the analysis. If the analysis is incomplete, then it
should not be commented upon until it is complete. You can't
have it both ways, and releasing it partially in terms of
results that you think may ultimately be proven to be true in a
way that scares the public but also damages companies and then
say that it cannot, that same information cannot be given to
the minority, to the Democrats, that so we can analyze it as
well.
I thought we did a good job last year actually working
together. In fact, the TREAD Act does include two amendments
which I was successful in having the committee adopt. One was
to have NHTSA establish a dynamic rollover consumer information
program so that consumers were better informed about the
likelihood of certain vehicles to roll over in particular
situations, and NHTSA hopefully is in the midst of a very rapid
rulemaking on that issue so that the public can get the
information.
And second, I authored an amendment which requires NHTSA to
develop an early warning system in vehicles to alert drivers
when their tires are significantly underinflated, again more
information for consumers so they can protect their own family.
I hope that they're moving as well, NHTSA, rapidly toward
putting those rules in place.
Mr. Nasser I'd like to discuss with you a little about the
design and development of the Ford Explorer. Most vehicles are
designed with something called understeer. Understeer means
that your wheels turn less than how far you turn your steering
wheel in the car. This is designed for stability reasons.
Firestone's outside expert found that the opposite
phenomenon, oversteer, happens to a greater degree than on
other similar vehicles when one of the tires detreads. In other
words, Firestone says that a driver of a Ford Explorer is at
greater risk because the car will oversteer, the wheels will
turn further than the operator turns the steering wheel. This
creates obvious instability and increases the likelihood of
Explorer rollovers.
Second, Firestone alleges Ford cut safety corners on their
tires by reducing recommended tire pressure for the Explorer.
And third, Firestone notes that one of the key factors in
tire safety and design is the anticipated load placed on those
tires. Firestone notes in its testimony that over time, Ford
actually increased the weight of the Ford Explorer.
I'll quote from Firestone: In fact, through 1996, Ford
continually added weight to the Explorer. In 1990 the 4x4 4000
Explorer increased from about 5,000 pounds to nearly 5,400
pounds in 1993 to well over 600 pounds in 1996. It is no
surprise that a significant majority of claims that Firestone
has received is on the heavier Explorers, unquote.
That's from Firestone. Did you ask for redesign of these
tires when you increased the Explorer's weight? So if you could
deal with those issues, the oversteer issue, the question of
design, and also the question on the load placed upon the
tires?
Mr. Nasser. We have looked at the study that Firestone
commissioned on the handling of sport utility vehicles and we
think that study is seriously flawed. We do not agree with it,
and we think the sample for the testing was inadequate to draw
any meaningful conclusions at all. They used 3 vehicles
compared to 15 that we used. They tested a limited number of
models. They only tested on one road surface. They did not test
under actual event of tread separation. And the data is
inconsistent with real world data.
We then looked at the criteria that they used. By the way--
understeer, oversteer--in the end, you want a vehicle that's
responsive and the Explorer is a very responsive vehicle. But
we used the criteria that Firestone used in terms of vehicle
handling, and we looked at 19 other vehicles. Twelve of the 19
vehicles would fall outside of the criteria that they
established as a good handling vehicle. And the interesting
thing is the more modern vehicles, the vehicles such as the
new--they tested the old Chevy Blazer. You test the new Chevy
Trailblazer, interestingly enough, it's very close to the old
Explorer in terms of understeer or oversteer. So the bottom
line is, from a handling viewpoint, Explorer performs extremely
well and we think well balanced to not only handling but for
accident avoidance.
Mr. Greenwood. Time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Markey. He did not answer my question.
Mr. Nasser. I'll answer.
Mr. Markey. Did you ask for a redesign of the tire when you
increased the load inside of the Explorer that the tire had to
carry? Did you ask Firestone to redesign the tire?
Mr. Greenwood. Would the gentleman request a unanimous
consent for an additional 30 seconds?
Mr. Markey. I ask unanimous consent for an additional 30
seconds.
Mr. Nasser. It is insignificant, all that you're looking at
that there----
Mr. Markey. You're saying the load increase was
insignificant?
Mr. Nasser. The vehicle weight of the Explorer increase was
insignificant. The data that you're looking at there is not
apples to apples. What they did, if you go back and look at the
Explorer, there are optional--there was optional equipment on
the Explorer that was made standard. That optional equipment
was heavily marked as options by our customers. So there wasn't
a very large increase in weight at all insignificant.
Mr. Markey. Five thousand pounds to 5,600 pounds is more
than a 10 percent increase in the weight of the vehicle.
Mr. Nasser. That does not take into account optional
equipment. The 5,000 pounds on the 5,600 hundred pounds is
standard equipment. If you add a typically equipped vehicle the
difference is very small. We can share that data with you.
Mr. Greenwood. Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Michigan, Mr. Upton.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I'm a little
late. I caught a red-eye back from the other side of the
country to come back this morning. And as you know, I was an
author, I was the author of the TREAD Act, an act that looked
at the many problems over the last couple of years,
particularly as it related to the Firestone recall last year.
And I have a little story to relate. Part of it is from my
Chairman, Billy Tauzin, who tells the tale that because of the
hearings that we had last fall, a dear colleague of ours, Jack
Field's wife, checked her tires and in fact there was a
problem. She wouldn't have known about the situation unless she
had checked.
My daughter's a Girl Scout. She just came back from a trip
a couple of weeks ago caving, and we stopped at the house next
door to--a neighbor's house, who was one of the Girl Scout
leaders, and I saw he drives an Explorer, and I saw a pile of
tires in his garage. These tires were not recalled, but they
should have been, could have been; because in fact when you
press down on this one, when they took them into the local gas
station for inspection and wanted them rotated, thank goodness
the mechanic said--and I think it's right here--press down on
them, you can see that they're about ready to separate. These
tires were never on the recall list, but thank God he checked
them out. And the mechanic said, I think you ought to replace
them, and he did.
That to me underscores your statement a little bit earlier
that I heard about increasing--Ford not wanting to increase the
tragedy or act, we would have seen with some of these Firestone
tires on behalf of the consumer, your customer. And in all of
the discussions we've had over the last couple of weeks, I
believe that very strongly; that you in fact did realize that
there were more tires on the road that should have been
replaced, going far beyond what the recall did this last year.
These tires might have taken the life of my daughter, might
have taken the life of our colleague, Mr. Fields.
Thank goodness the work of this committee and the TREAD Act
were able to expose a number of the flaws so that in fact we
could take those tires away from folks who might have had a
real tragedy in their home. And I want to thank you for Ford's
action on replacing those.
This morning getting on the plane in Denver and coming
back, I saw the story in USA Today. This afternoon I read the
Post story about the Explorer probe, but considered some
headline accident data under review, official to say. When did
you find out about these charges that came out in the press
today?
Mr. Nasser. Congressman, the charges relating to the tires
or----
Mr. Upton. The charges that in fact you were replacing
tires with greater flaws than the one you had been--were on the
tires themselves. Were you aware of this before today's
hearing?
Mr. Nasser. We were not, and there's been considerable
discussion on that.
Mr. Upton. I'm sorry that I missed that because I literally
just got off the plane and drove in from Dulles.
Mr. Nasser. Mr. Chairman, I think I'll leave it to you----
Mr. Upton. Is there going to be ample time for you to be
able to respond to that?
Mr. Nasser. Yes. Where we came out, Congressman, is that if
that data is true, then we'd like to see it. And Chairman
Tauzin said let's have 30 days to look at this. I said let's
take 30 minutes, let's look at it, and if it's real we'll--
we'll change the--the recall tires that we've got out there;
and if it isn't, then let's not scare the American public. It's
as simple as that.
Mr. Upton. You know, this last weekend in Michigan, I
chatted with all of my Ford dealers in West Michigan that I
represent, and they felt that Ford was doing the right thing.
They felt that the customers themselves coming in, they thought
that there were adequate material that was being presented.
There wasn't a panic like perhaps there had been before, and we
had worked with a number of my constituents who are very
fearful about driving on the tires that were being recalled
last year. But I want to compliment you on what you have done
and the challenges that you're undertaking.
I see my time has expired, so I would yield back. Thank
you.
Mr. Greenwood. Time of the gentleman has expired. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Sawyer, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Nasser, the good part about this means you're close to
the end. I want to touch on three points that are really more
prospective than retrospective. It goes to the question of how
we deal with this sort of problem in the future.
I agree with you when you say on page 13 of your statement
that we, Ford, will not accept that a tread separation is a
normal foreseeable event that manufacturers must accommodate
through vehicle design, as asserted by Firestone. I agree with
that. But I'm sure you would agree with me that there are many
different causes of tire failure, some of which have nothing to
do with design but have to do with road damage and abuse of
various kinds. I am really concerned about unrealistic
expectations of performance, not only for tires but for
vehicles, anything that can be abused in a practical road
situation. So when Ford went to NHTSA earlier in the year and
in its presentation in March asserted, I quote, Explorers have
a margin of safety, as designed, to accommodate to a reasonable
level component failures including tread separation, I want to
ask you what is a reasonable level?
Mr. Nasser. If you look at the market situation, real world
field data, in 90 percent of examples, Explorers and other SUVs
are very manageable with a tread separation incident, and in 10
percent they are not. And every one of those incidents is
tragic, but that's the way it is. A tread separation is a
catastrophic event and it is virtually impossible to design a
vehicle around such a catastrophic event.
Mr. Sawyer. There are many different circumstances
involving tire failure, however. As Goodyear, as you asserted
in your testimony, wrote: While tire--tread separation is a
rare occurrence for tires, everyone needs to understand that it
is a condition that can occur through misuse, abuse,
overloading, severe underinflation, accidental road hazard, and
so forth.
Is that not a reasonable assumption--and I am trying to get
at--here's what I'm trying to get at. We are going to ask NHTSA
to put some standards on what we see as appropriate levels of
concern that are raised by real world data. And you talk about
what is a reasonable level that a vehicle and a tire together
ought to be designed to in order to deal with component
failures, including tread separation.
And I'm trying to get at a--at a very basic question; and
that is, how do we measure that?
Mr. Nasser. I don't think we know at this point. And as I
recall, NHTSA had until June of next year to work with the
industry to develop these tire standards, and I think it will
take that long to do it. It's complex and it's important.
Mr. Sawyer. I couldn't agree with you more, particularly at
a time when we are seeing tire production techniques change,
not only in this country but European manufacturers as well. I
think we can probably foresee a time when much, much shorter
production runs and much more careful tailoring of a tire to a
vehicle will be the case. That will reduce the base on which
failure rates will be calculated. Do you believe that that
ought to be taken into account, where instead of talking about
a million tire runs, we're talking about 25,000 tire runs?
Mr. Nasser. You'd have to ask a tire expert on that. I
don't think so actually, when you look at some of the new
manufacturing facilities--and we talked about Firestone's Aiken
plant. That's a high-volume plant and it's able to produce what
seems to be at this point at least very good tires.
Mr. Sawyer. In our last hearing--this is the final point,
and then I just have a request to make of you--you talked about
Ford's commitment to doing early warning. What I was talking
about a moment ago is statistical early warning. It seemed to
me that you were talking about direct pressure measurement
early warning systems within the vehicle. It seems to me that
some of your competitors are talking about using ABS-derived
sensory information. That's secondary. I would hope that you
could share information with this committee about what
direction we ought to urge NHTSA to go.
Mr. Nasser. We will share that direction and specification.
More than that, we're absolutely moving on it. We're
incorporating inflation gauges in our vehicles, almost as we
speak, and we'll lay out the plans that we've got in terms of
the other technology that's coming into vehicles across the
board.
Mr. Greenwood. Time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Sawyer. Could I make one request?
Mr. Greenwood. Does the gentleman have a unanimous consent
request?
Mr. Sawyer. I would have a unanimous consent request. It--
this is almost personal. It is personal. I have been driving
your Mustang for the last 15 years and I have really enjoyed
your vehicles. Could you get somebody in your company to tell
me why, from my last Mustang 2 years ago, asking for the same
car, my lease price went up 30 percent?
Thank you. Yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair notes that the--it will now
recognize the chairman of the full committee for a second round
of questioning for this witness. Chair notes that under the
rules of the committee, each member is thus entitled to a
second round of questioning. No member is obligated to take a
second round of questioning. I recognize the chairman for 5
minutes.
Chairman Tauzin. I thank the Chair.
Mr. Nasser, let me get back to the question of replacement
tires because it continues to plague us. Let me first put on
the record that our committee requested by letter information
from other tire manufacturers regarding claims data on their
tires so that when we might do a comparative analysis--and
copies of that letter was--those letters were sent to the
minority. We also informed the minority that data had been
received and it's available upon request. My information is
it's been shared with the minority since that request. And so
that information, the raw data we received, is available. NHTSA
hasn't analyzed some of their claims data and forwarded it to
us, which is available publicly, and that indicated there were
some tires that were going to be used in the replacement
program that had less than--a claims history that was less
favorable than some of the tires that are being replaced.
That's part of the record as well.
Staff analyzed the raw data, and it's the analysis of that
raw data that forms the difference of opinion as to whether it
ought to be made public until NHTSA has reviewed it. I have
taken the view that we ought to at least give NHTSA a chance to
review that analysis to make sure it is correct before we
identify that that information is accurate to the American
public, but we'll continue our discussions on that.
In that regard, Mr. Nasser, Ford did do some tests on the
replacement tires as I understand, but again staff indicates to
me that while Ford ran vehicle handling tests with some of the
replacement tires and rig tests on most of the replacement
tires, that the test parameters are very different from the
test parameters that were set for the earlier tests with all
the Firestone tires. Is that accurate?
Mr. Nasser. I don't know whether that's accurate or not.
Chairman Tauzin. Well, we're told that, for example, that
the rig test runs on the replacement tires were all conducted
at 26 psi with a load of 1,500, with no variation in the test
for speeds--which speed was a very important variation--but
load and pressure were not varied while speed was varied, my
understanding is. The bottom line is that our information is
that the replacement tire tests were conducted under different
parameters than the Firestone tire tests, and if that is so,
how could Ford be sure that the tires you're going to replace
these Firestone tires with are in fact better than the tires
that you're recalling?
Mr. Nasser. We will sit down and discuss the different test
parameters, but in the end we always go back to the field data,
and that's why I was so concerned with your comment; because if
the field data suggests that one of those tires doesn't meet
our standards, then we'll act.
Chairman Tauzin. Well then, the next question obviously is
did Ford request the claims data from the other companies who
manufacture these replacement tires?
Mr. Nasser. We have the claims data and we--and we asked
NHTSA if they had any data that would suggest that any of these
tires were inappropriate.
Chairman Tauzin. Did you actually request them from other
companies? You see, we did, and that is the raw data we're
discussing. It--did you discuss the same data.
Mr. Nasser. I don't know what data you have, but we asked
for data as well.
Chairman Tauzin. From the other companies?
Mr. Nasser. Yes.
Chairman Tauzin. All right. And then you also asked NHTSA,
as I understand it, for whatever claims data they had on these
replacement tires. Is that correct?
Mr. Nasser. No. We asked them whether they had any safety
defect review on any of the tires that we selected.
Chairman Tauzin. Okay. In regards to the claims data that
you had on the replacement tires, can you share with us what
your analysis told you?
Mr. Nasser. I don't have that with me, but we can share it
with you. I'll file it after the meeting if you wish to see
that.
Chairman Tauzin. It would be very important if we could
have that on the record. Let me explain what is going on here
so everyone can know. We just went through a recall of
Firestone tires last year. In many cases I was one of those
Explorer owners who had to go through recall. I got Goodyear
tires, but a lot of other owners got other Firestone tires. And
now those Firestone tires are being replaced in this new Ford
recall or replacement program. And the concern expressed is are
these owners going to be putting on another tire that they have
to replace later on, because we find out later on that this new
replacement tire turns out to have been maybe even worse than
the tire that they're replacing. And so far at least, NHTSA
tells us that may be true with some of the replacement tires.
The raw data we received under our analysis tells us that
also may be true. That's why I'd like to get this verified by
NHTSA, and if that's true and we present that to Ford, I'm
asking in advance what will Ford's obligation be with that
information?
Mr. Nasser. Well, if the information is valid and it's
true, we would obviously react very quickly. While you were out
of the room, I said we wouldn't wait for 30 days; if the data
is accurate, we would revise the tires that we're replacing.
That's a very serious situation, in fact, that is the--if that
is the case.
Chairman Tauzin. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Greenwood. Chairman yields back. Chair recognizes the
gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. Dingell. I would seek recognition at this time for
purposes of a colloquy with my friend, the chairman of the full
committee.
Mr. Greenwood. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dingell. I'll be as brief as I possibly can. Mr.
Chairman, I understand your concerns about hurting some of the
tire manufacturers, and I have no desire to do that, by
untimely release of the raw data. I am troubled about two items
which appeared in the paper this morning. And I'm referring--by
error I said Yahoo--but in point of fact it is AP-U.S.
It says as follows: Representative Billy Tauzin, our
Louisiana committee chairman, said congressional investigators
have analyzed the failure rates of replacement tires Ford is
using made by Michelin, Continental, Goodyear, General, B.F.
Goodrich, and Uniroyal, and found that some fail more often
than Firestone Wilderness AP tires Ford recalled last month.
It goes on to say: Ford is going to replace these recalled
tires with tires that have a worse claims history than some of
the tires that are coming off the Explorers, Tauzin said. For
example, our investigators have learned that one of the tires
that is going to be used in replacement has claims of 124 per
million tires, well in excess of the 5 claims per million that
Ford say is the benchmark in this recall.
It goes on then to say as follows: Tauzin spokesman Ken
Johnson said the committee found two additional Firestone tire
models used on Ford vehicles. The Wilderness HT and FR-480 had
higher rates of claims for property damage than the Wilderness
AT.
Then it goes on, skipping a paragraph, says--it says as
follows: Tauzin refused to make his data public yet, saying he
wanted Federal safety officials to analyze the information
first.
Now, Mr. Chairman, with great respect and affection for
you, I am not quite sure whether you are telling the committee
here that these tires have, on the basis of careful analysis by
the committee staff, a worse record of safety than those
which--than the Firestone which they're replacing, or that you
are not sure as to whether this data has been properly analyzed
and we have the information.
I am very much troubled about this. I am willing, if we are
making charges about this, of this character, to have the whole
business made public and let the necessary Federal agencies,
the Ford people, the Firestone people, or the manufacturers of
the other tires to make whatever comments, so that this
committee and the public at large may arrive at the necessary
conclusions.
I think my major concern here, Mr. Chairman, is has there
been a good-hearted analysis by the committee staff which
relates to the comments that you have made earlier, or do we
need further work by the committee staff?
Mr. Greenwood. Does the chairman wish to respond?
Chairman Tauzin. If the gentleman would yield, first of
all, I have no doubts about the numerical analysis done by the
subcommittee staff. I think it's accurate and the numbers cited
in that news story, although I didn't write the news story, I
think are equally accurate.
If the gentleman would continue to yield, what we're
concerned about is the significance of claims data as it
relates to the safety of the replacement tires. And it is the
significance of that claims data that I would very much
appreciate a chance for NHTSA to comment on before we--before
we claim or make the claim that this replacement tire is in
fact a worse safety tire than the Firestone tire it will
replace.
If I can continue for just a second?
Mr. Dingell. I will be happy to continue yielding to my
friend.
Chairman Tauzin. The fact is that claims data is not the
only data, as I understand it, that Mr. Nasser has used in the
Ford analysis, and I don't believe it's the only data that
NHTSA uses in its analysis. And while it's important data, its
significance in relation to other data may be large or small, I
don't know. And it's not out of concern so much for the
companies and their tires as it is with putting out information
that may or may not be significantly valuable in terms of
saying don't put that tire on your car yet. And the reason we
have raised the issue with Mr. Nasser and the reason I'd like
NHTSA to further evaluate our own staff's analysis of this raw
data is that, if in fact these numbers are significant, that
NHTSA and our committee can properly advise the Ford Motor
Company, so as Mr. Nasser has said, he would take immediate
steps to make sure that in fact a tire that is in fact better
is replacing a tire that's worse, rather than the reverse.
Mr. Dingell. Well, I would simply observe what my good
friend says is significant; if these data are insignificant,
why are we making public statements? I would note here that the
chairman of the committee said this morning. He said, ``and
found some to fail more often than the Firestone wilderness AT
tires Ford recalled last month,'' referring to the analysis by
committee investigators. And what I'm trying to establish is,
everybody who's looking at a Ford vehicle, thinking about
buying them, they're wondering whether this recall is in fact
going to work. Ford is going to spend $3 billion to recall, and
yet here our investigators are saying that these tires that are
being replaced are less safe than those that are being pulled
off the tire.
Chairman Tauzin. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Stearns [presiding]. The gentleman's time--time of the
gentleman has expired.
Mr. Dingell. I didn't know I was limited. I thought I was
having a colloquy with my chairman.
Mr. Stearns. Well, I'd like to----
Chairman Tauzin. I would ask that the gentleman have an
additional several minutes so we might finish.
Mr. Dingell. With respect to my two very dear friends, the
presiding officer of the committee, and my dear friend, the
chairman of the committee, I have got to decide what I am going
to do about the release of the documents which have been
discussed by the staff of the committee and by my dear friend,
the chairman of the committee.
Chairman Tauzin. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Dingell. Yes.
Chairman Tauzin. Let me try again. The Chair has not said
and cannot say whether these replacement tires are less safe or
more safe than the Firestone tires that were replaced. What the
Chair is concerned about is that Ford, in its evaluation of the
Firestone tires that are the subject of the recall, indicated
to us that a 5 claims rate per million tires was the benchmark
upon which a decision was made to consider replacing the
Firestone tires. It was one of the benchmark considerations.
What we have pointed out is that our information is that
some of the replacement tires far exceed this benchmark. NHTSA
has similarly pointed that out to this committee and the
inquiry that if there are tires with higher than 5 per million
failure rate claims records, is that a significant variation,
so that in fact Ford may wish to consider using a different
replacement tire if other indications are that that tire may
not be safe.
Mr. Dingell. Well, you know--and to reclaim my time, and
again with great respect for you, Mr. Chairman, let me--let me
just read that--it's remarkable what a fellow can learn by
reading in the newspapers.
I note here and it says--I'm quoting this--and I give
credit to AP-U.S., said--House Commerce Committee spokesman Ken
Johnson said the congressional investigators will reveal the
results of their analysis into failure rates of several tire
brands during a hearing Tuesday. Johnson said the analysis
would show that some of the replacement tires Ford is using
fail more often than some of Firestone's Wilderness AT tires.
It goes on to say, and I'm skipping a paragraph or two
here: Ford is working with Goodyear, Continental, and Michelin
to get replacements. Johnson would not specify which of these
tires had higher failure rates than the Wilderness AT, but said
that it would be disclosed at the hearing.
And all I am trying to do is get disclosure and find this
out. I know the Ford folks want to know it, and I am sure all
the other replacement tire manufacturers want to know about it,
too. And so either we have a staff analysis that says this,
that's reliable; or we have a staff analysis which doesn't say
this or is not reliable. I am trying to find out do we have a
staff analysis which is reliable, do we have a staff analysis
that tells the truth or do we not?
Mr. Stearns. Time of the gentleman has expired.
Chairman Tauzin. Could the gentleman have an additional 2
minutes? I think we need to clarify this, if you don't mind.
Mr. Stearns. The Chair will give an additional 2 minutes to
the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. Dingell. I thank the Chair, but I didn't know I was
time limited. Now I'll be glad to yield to my friend, if he can
clarify what I just read out of the daily press.
Chairman Tauzin. Well--well, first of all, let me inform
the gentleman that the staff analysis is on the claims data
only, and the gentleman from Michigan can look at the raw data
that has been supplied to him.
Mr. Dingell. Well, I have requested both the data and the
analysis, and I'm trying to find out what the worth of the
analysis is.
Chairman Tauzin. Would the gentleman yield? The gentleman
has the raw data and can draw his own conclusions from it. Our
staff has drawn the conclusion that the raw data indicates that
some of these replacement tires have a claims history that is
not as good as the tires that are being replaced.
Now, what I'm suggesting to the gentleman, however, is that
that criteria alone may not mean that these are not good
replacement tires. We don't know. And until NHTSA has a chance
to review this data and comment to us, it is my view that this
analysis by the staff identifying the particular tires would be
premature, and if the gentleman wants to do an analysis and
release his own analysis, he's perfectly all right to do so. He
can do so on his own, without asking me to release data they
would first like to have NHTSA review.
Mr. Dingell. Under the rules, Mr. Chairman, I would note,
first of all, every member of this committee is entitled to
every paper in possession of the committee. I will be happy to
cite the rule if the Chair wishes.
Chairman Tauzin. If the gentleman would yield, we've
satisfied that rule. We have, I think, accorded you all the raw
data that was sent to the committee.
Mr. Dingell. No, you've not satisfied that. I am asking for
the analysis which has been widely discussed here in at least
two instances in the press, and I am not going to waive that
right. So I'm asking that the analysis be made available to us,
and I hope that anybody who is listening to this colloquy
between my two dear friends, the presiding officer of the
subcommittee and my distinguished friend, the chairman of the
full committee, will arrive at the rather unfortunate
conclusion that the staff here has been pulling a long bow, and
that in point of fact the information doesn't show these
things, or that the chairman of the committee doesn't have
confidence in it because he won't make it available to me and
others so we can know in fact what this says.
Now, I'm going to insist on my rights to have this
information made available to me, and I'm going to insist on my
rights to have it made available in an unexpurgated fashion. I
will assure the chairman of the committee that we will not
release the data without appropriate notice to him and
opportunity for him to discuss with me. But in the meantime it
appears that perhaps what the chairman said should be read by
the staff, so that the staff will understand that this data is,
if such exists, is of rather limited value and doesn't prove--
--
Mr. Stearns. Time of the gentleman has expired. I would say
to the two distinguished gentlemen, we have talked about this
earlier. We're talking about it again. What I suggest, the two
gentlemen get together, and I think we have an interpretation
of what the analysis has to--in other words, the analysis of
the staff.
Chairman Tauzin. Would the chairman recognize me briefly
for a half minute?
Mr. Stearns. Let me just finish to say that our analysis
that our staff has done is the key of whether the chairman
wants to, you know, whether that extends--to what extent, I
don't know. And I don't know what the ruling is, but I would--
--
Chairman Tauzin. Would the gentleman recognize me for 30
seconds?
Mr. Stearns. Absolutely.
Chairman Tauzin. I thank the chairman.
Mr. Dingell, with the understanding that you have just
given me that we will discuss and there will be no release of
this data until we've agreed, then I will be happy to share the
analysis with the gentleman.
Mr. Dingell. I told my beloved friend, I want the record
clear, I told my beloved friend, the chairman of the committee,
that I will not release it until I have discussed it with the
chairman of the committee.
Chairman Tauzin. That's fair. I'll accept that.
Mr. Dingell. Very well. And I thank my good friend and I
thank the presiding officer of the committee for his kindness
to me, too, and I note that I'm not limited on time.
Mr. Stearns. Mr. Nasser, what we have decided to do, so we
are going to continue on ahead here, I think we are going to
take another round. The chairman has offered this. I'm going to
ask a short question. I ask members to keep it within 3
minutes.
Mr. Nasser has been very cordial and hospitable to stay
here, so we're going to make a quick round here, and one
question I have deals with a field experience chart. In the
field experience chart that's prepared by NHTSA, not our
staff--this is nothing to do with raw data, but NHTSA itself--
the 1991-'94 model year Explorer is compared to the 1995-1999
model year Explorer. So you have two comparisons and two
segmented years. It appears from this chart that the 1991-'94
model year Explorer had 50 rollovers. The rollover number
jumped to 87 for 1995 to 1999.
I guess an obvious question is--this is NHTSA's
information. They're saying that maybe there was a change of
the suspension and things like this. But could you explain why
the rollover number jumped to 87 for the 1995 to 1999 model
year Explorer?
Mr. Nasser. If you look at the total sport utility vehicle
population, the trend for the two periods that you mentioned
there does show an increase in both periods. However, the Ford
Explorer is one of the best sport utility vehicles. It was
clearly superior in the earlier period than in the second
period, and it became pretty much average, and we think there
are many different reasons there. One of them is demographics.
The number of younger people driving Explorers in that second
period we think increased because of the sports model and the
two-door model.
Mr. Stearns. NHTSA seems to indicate--well, their data
shows that. And is it possible that if you changed the
suspension for the 1995 to 1999 year Explorer, would that have
any impact?
Mr. Nasser. We did change the suspension.
Mr. Stearns. You did.
Mr. Nasser. We went to a more modern suspension system.
Mr. Stearns. Okay.
Mr. Nasser. One that is much more in line with today's
driving conditions.
Mr. Stearns. Okay.
Mr. Nasser. Both are good; one's better. We don't see any
correlation between those changes and the data that's
represented here.
Mr. Stearns. Okay. I am not going to go on with any more
questions. I would just point out to you that the answer to the
question being demographics might not be all there is, and I
suggest that if you want to follow up with a written answer, I
want to give you every opportunity to do that; because I think
all of us that looked at this, including the staff, were trying
to understand and extrapolate what that meant.
Mr. Nasser. We will do that.
Mr. Stearns. Okay. I'm going to complete my time, and the
gentleman from New York, Mr. Towns, is recognized.
Mr. Towns. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Nasser, some, including Firestone, have said Ford
shipped more explorers with Firestone tires than with Goodyear
tires to the hot weather States of Arizona, Nevada, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Texas and Florida during moderate years 1995,
1996, and 1997. Furthermore, they have claimed that this is an
explanation for the higher tread separation claim rates
Firestone had than Goodyear had during this period.
Can you tell us how many Firestone-equipped Explorers
versus how many Goodyear-equipped Explorers Ford shipped to
these hot weather States during the three model years?
Mr. Nasser. Okay. If you include Arizona, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada and Texas, for the 1995 through
1997 model year, there were 95,000 Explorers with Firestone
tires and there were 85,000 explorers with Goodyear tires. So,
a fairly similar number of explorers in that geographic area.
Mr. Towns. And for the Goodyear-equipped Explorers, there
were no tread separation claims at all involving injuries,
deaths, or lawsuits during this time; is that correct?
Mr. Nasser. That's what we believe, yes.
Mr. Towns. But most of the tread separation claims have
come from hot weather States; is that correct?
Mr. Nasser. The majority, yes.
Mr. Towns. We know there were 1,183 Firestone tread
separation claims during this period. So a large share of these
claims must have come from the hot weather States. What
percentage of these Firestone claims would you estimate to have
come from the hot weather States.
Mr. Nasser. I don't have that data with me, but we will
provide to it you.
Mr. Towns. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask that the record
stay open until we can receive that information.
Mr. Stearns. By unanimous consent, so ordered.
Mr. Towns. And before I yield back, Mr. Chairman, I'd also
like to request that we put a statement in the record from
Congresswoman Eva Clayton from the State of North Carolina.
Mr. Stearns. By unanimous consent.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Eva M. Clayton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Eva M. Clayton, a Representative in Congress
from the State of North Carolina
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity you have afforded me to
share with you and your Committee my views on the issues of this
important investigation. Ford and Firestone have suggested different
causes of the high incidences of tread separations and vehicle
rollovers. These causes have ranged from allegations of defective
tires, to defective steering mechanisms to negligent consumer
practices. Under these circumstances, it is impossible for the average
consumer to ascertain the actual facts.
In the complex interplay between competing, often powerful forces
in our society, disputes sometimes arise that require the mediating and
ameliorating hand of the government to sort out in an independent
manner the conflicting contentions, to evaluate inconsistent scientific
supporting data, and to ascertain responsibility for unsafe products.
The public depends on the government to serve this role fairly, fully
and promptly. In the matter of the Ford-Firestone dispute, you have
accepted this task.
The outcome of your investigation, and the similar investigation
being conducted by the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration, will help to clarify for the public the actual facts in
this controversy. Also, your investigation very likely will have a
significant impact on consumer confidence, individual and corporate
reputations and, most importantly, on consumer safety. Our citizens
should be able to use cars and tires without fear of losing their lives
or suffering injuries on our highways because these products are not
made safely.
Firestone has a tire manufacturing plant in Wilson, NC, a small
town in my district in eastern North Carolina. I have toured this plant
and met some of the workers there. This plant employs more than 2,000
workers. These workers strive to produce tires that are safe and
without defects. Many of them are involved in civic and community
affairs in their communities. These workers, their families and several
communities which depend upon their financial support, may be severely
affected by the outcome of your investigation. Similarly, numerous
other families and communities of workers of both Ford and Firestone in
other parts of the country will anxiously await the outcome of your
deliberations. We trust that your investigation will include a fair and
comprehensive analysis of all relevant tire and vehicle safety issues.
This is an important task and I am confident that you and your
Committee will render a valuable and honorable service to the nation.
Thank you.
Mr. Towns. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for
3 minutes.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Again I apologize for being a little
bit late for the hearing. I just have a couple of questions as
we examine this issue on the newspaper reports today. Did you
ask NHTSA if other tires had a higher failure rate than the
ones you were replacing with the Firestone?
Mr. Nasser. We asked NHTSA to review the proposed list of
replacement tires to see if the Agency had any concerns in the
past or any potential concerns in the future. And the list we
gave NHTSA, they did not have any concerns.
Mr. Upton. So NHTSA has, at least as of this moment, has
not come back to you and said brand X has got a higher tire
failure rate than the ones you replaced; is that correct?
Mr. Nasser. That's correct. The first we heard about it was
in the press this morning.
Mr. Upton. And have any of the tire companies whose tires
you used to replace the bad Firestone--or the Firestone tires--
have any of those companies come, shared with you evidence that
in fact they have a higher failure rate than the ones that--
Firestone tires that you were replacing?
Mr. Nasser. Not that I am aware of, and we certainly
wouldn't include those tires if that was the case.
Mr. Upton. Right, right. So until this morning you had--
these newspaper reports came out--there was no evidence that
the replacement tires that you were replacing on Ford
customers' cars had a higher failure rate than the Firestone
tires; is that right?
Mr. Nasser. That's correct.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. Yield back.
Chairman Tauzin. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Upton. I'd be glad to yield.
Chairman Tauzin. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I'd
simply like to put in the record something I received today Mr.
Nasser, which is my notice from the Ford Motor Company
requesting information on my Explorer. And this, as I
understand it, this is what is being sent out to customers
across America.
Mr. Nasser. That's right.
Chairman Tauzin. Which indicates not only the tires to be
replaced but acceptable replacement tires; is that correct?
Mr. Nasser. Yes.
Chairman Tauzin. And it's a fairly long document, but I
thought it would be important to have it in the record.
Mr. Stearns. By unanimous consent, so ordered a part of the
record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3739.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3739.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3739.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T3739.015
Mr. Stearns. Gentleman yields back the balance of his time,
and at this point the gentleman, Mr. Strickland, is not here.
Mr. Gordon from Tennessee is recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. Gordon. Mr. Nasser, I want to salute your patience and
bladder. You've done a very good job of putting up with all of
us today. I had to be short with you because I wanted to get my
two questions in earlier. I just want to give you the
opportunity, if you want to clarify or follow up on anything
they might have asked you earlier.
Mr. Nasser. I'd just like to go back to the issue that was
raised earlier on the replacement program. We clearly are very
concerned. Our strategy isn't to replace bad tires with bad
tires. That doesn't make any sense at all, and we would
appreciate that information as quickly as possible. The worst
thing that can happen here is that our customers are confused
and don't know what to do.
And if we're not helping that situation, then we are not
doing our jobs, and I take that responsibility very seriously.
So we'd like to clear that up as quickly as we can, as soon as
this hearing is finished.
Mr. Gordon. I guess if I have another moment, I'll just ask
once again, just to be sure; you're saying that the tires on
the Toyota 4-Runner and the Jeep Grand Cherokee are different
ones than----
Mr. Nasser. They are different tires. We have had examples
where the same tires have been placed on Toyotas and other
vehicles as replacement tires, where the customer replaces the
original equipment tire, once it's been worn, with one of these
Wilderness tires. And the interesting thing is that the tread
separation rate on those competitive vehicles is about the same
as we're seeing on our vehicles.
Mr. Gordon. But it is the same tire on the Ford Ranger?
Mr. Nasser. On the Ford Ranger 4x4 model, it is the same
tire.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you. And again, thank you for your
patience.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time. The gentleman, Mr. Stupak, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Chairman. I don't mean to belabor
this point more than we already have today, but I've sort of
started. So I'd like to ask the Chair of the full committee, if
you could give us some kind of inference of the statements that
have been appeared in the press. I take it one of three ways.
The tires that Ford's about to replace, the Firestone tires,
are either more dangerous or they're less dangerous, or the
majority doesn't have enough data to make that judgment. Could
you help us clarify that a little bit?
Chairman Tauzin. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Stupak. Yes.
Chairman Tauzin. We know at least in one category, one
parameter, the question of claims data against the tire, that
some of the replacement tires, according to NHTSA's
information, have higher claims data rates than the tires that
are being replaced. Do you.
Mr. Stupak. Then is that claims data enough to make a
judgment, or do you need more information?
Chairman Tauzin. We need more information. Second--if the
gentleman would yield?
Mr. Stupak. Sure.
Chairman Tauzin. According to the raw data we received from
other tire companies who are on this list that I just put into
the record, there are several tires that have claims data rates
as high as 124 per million, which is a rather significant
number if 5 per million is one of the benchmarks used in this
replacement program. And, therefore, finding out how
significant that claims data is, is fairly critical to the
question you asked about safety.
Mr. Stupak. So to answer the question, you need more
information, because the claims data rate is not enough to make
an analysis whether or not the tires being replaced are more
dangerous or less dangerous?
Chairman Tauzin. That is my opinion, and that is why I have
asked NHTSA to immediately review this, to let us know that--
and to let Ford Motor Company know so that they might have the
benefit of that analysis.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. But as I'm trying to clarify this here--
because I agree with Mr. Nasser; I think we're all pretty much
confused on what to do now. For those of us, like yourself, who
own the Explorers or the Expedition, whatever it may be--again,
I mean, what message are we trying to communicate here to the
general public, to the American people? That we need more
information, or what?
Chairman Tauzin. What I'm trying to do is to make sure that
since this is not a government recall--this is a corporate-
sponsored replacement program--that we don't end up having a
government recall that follows it to replace the tires all over
again----
Mr. Stupak. I agree.
Chairman Tauzin. [continuing] because we've used the wrong
replacement tires. So the message I'm trying to say--and
hopefully NHTSA got it, and I think they did because we had
some serious conversations before this hearing today--is that
we need NHTSA immediately to assist both this committee and Mr.
Nasser's company with this analysis of--so they can announce
publicly whether any of the tires on the replacement list
should be taken off the replacement list.
Mr. Stupak. And if it's not a recall and if Ford is doing
this replacement program, then I think it's only fair to give
Ford, before they even leave here today, all your data and your
data analysis, because this is not a recall, this is a
replacement. They should have it so they're not back here doing
another replacement.
Also, I guess if you're asking NHTSA to do it, what other
information does NHTSA need to make a sound, total judgment on
this incomplete information that's being publicly released?
Chairman Tauzin. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Stupak. Yes.
Chairman Tauzin. That's the reason why I asked Mr. Nasser
extensively, rather, what was requested by his own company and
what testing was done on these replacement tires. But if he
does not have the information, the raw data we have, we are
more than happy to share it with him. And you have copies of
it. We have copies of it. We'll make sure he has copies of it.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. So the information we've seen in the
media today, whether it's the Detroit Free Press or the----
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Stupak. If I can just finish. The message--we want to
clarify or correct the information that these tires may not be
more dangerous, that we need more information. So we should
really correct that information; correct, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Tauzin. I'm looking at the AP report. The only
quote contained in there that came from our committee spokesman
was that there are brands that have actually higher claims
rates. That's all we know. There is no--if the AP story went on
to draw the conclusions--that's the AP writer. The only thing
we know at this point, the only thing that was reported and
that has come out in this hearing, is that there are tires that
NHTSA has identified, and now that our own staff have
identified, that have higher claims rate than 5 per million,
and that obviously before those tires are replaced, put on cars
as replacement for other tires, somebody, NHTSA, ought to give
us some good information as to whether or not that claims data
is significant enough to make a difference.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Sawyer
is recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of
questions, and they go to the question that--to the assertion
that you made earlier, Mr. Nasser, to the effect that you
cannot go out and test every tire on every vehicle. And I agree
with that. That doesn't make any sense.
At the same time, in the letter that you've cited from
Goodyear, they suggest that there's no desire, nor have
manufacturers even raised the question of tire manufacturers
doing similar kinds of testing of every tire on every vehicle.
Should that be done? Or is generic testing to different
protocols by different tire manufacturers sufficient to give
you comfort into the future that the tires will perform as
expected?
Mr. Nasser. I think it's a combination of both, and there
does need to be much more communication, not only between the
tire manufacturer and the automotive manufacturer, but also
information that comes from the field. And I think that's what
really drove the TREAD Act of last year. We support it. We
welcome it. And--but whatever we do, it must be based on tires
that have high quality levels and that have the technology that
is appropriate for today's driving conditions.
Mr. Sawyer. That brings me to my second question. You've
hit it squarely on the button. Earlier you had said that the
exchange of information with regard to the changing weight of
the vehicle and the suspension of the vehicle was not
significant. It may have been; it may not have been. I'm not
going to argue that today. But you also talked about the fact
that a number of the tires that have exactly the same
designation may not be the same tire, and the truth of the
matter is that tires evolve over the life of a product as well.
Should there be requirements, protocols under NHTSA, for
the exchange of information as products evolve in their design
throughout their useful life?
Mr. Nasser. I strongly believe that if tire manufacturers
change the design of a tire, then they should inform the
vehicle manufacturer. As a matter of fact, with our purchase
order we make it very clear that any changes to the design of a
tire should be communicated to the vehicle manufacturer.
Mr. Sawyer. Should the same thing apply to you in the other
direction?
Mr. Nasser. I think it does, but I certainly think it
should be in both ways. It should be a dialog, not one way.
Mr. Sawyer. Thank you.
Mr. Stearns. My colleagues, I believe we have expired all
the second round. So, Mr. Nasser, sincerely and on behalf of
the full committee--subcommittee--both myself and Mr.
Greenwood, we thank you sincerely for staying with us and your
forthright answers. And now we'll move to panel No. 2. Thank
you.
Mr. Nasser. Thank you very much.
Mr. Stearns. Panel No. 2 is Mr. John Lampe, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Bridgestone/Firestone. Mr. Lampe,
you're welcome. Let me just say to my colleagues that--so we
can continue to go on, I urge them to ask the questions. If
perhaps you have desire for colloquy, that we could perhaps
move that member to member, and we can continue on with the
questions here so that we can get through to our third panel,
which is also patiently waiting.
And so with that, Mr. Lampe, at your convenience, we'll
welcome your opening statement.
You are aware that the committee is holding an
investigative hearing, and in doing so has had the practice of
taking testimony under oath. Do you have any objections to
testifying under oath?
Mr. Lampe. No, sir.
Mr. Stearns. The Chair then advises you that under the
rules of the House and the rules of the committee, you are
entitled to be advised by counsel. Do you desire to be advised
by counsel during your testimony today?
Mr. Lampe. No, sir.
Mr. Stearns. In that case, if you'd please raise your right
hand, I'll swear you in.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Stearns. You are now under oath. You may now give a 5-
minute summary of your opening statement.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN LAMPE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC.
Mr. Lampe. Chairman Stearns, Chairman Tauzin, and
distinguished committee members, I am John Lampe, and I am the
CEO of Bridgestone/Firestone. First I'd like to thank you for
holding this hearing and inviting me to testify, and I
appreciate the very hard work on all these issues by the
members of this committee, by the other members, and by their
staffs.
Mr. Chairman, it's no secret that this year has been a
struggle for us. We've learned a lot since we were here the
last time, and some of it we've learned the hard way. But as a
result, we're more responsive now to the American public, to
our customers, to Congress, and to NHTSA. We're doing what's
right. And our 45,000 employees are a great team. They're fully
committed to making safe quality tires and to regaining the
public's trust. Yes, we've been hit hard, very hard, but I
believe with all my heart we will make it.
But let's talk about our tires, and first let me assure you
that the Firestone tires that are on the road today are
completely safe, and our real world data proves that.
The 13 million tires that Ford is replacing have a claims
rate of .0009 percent. That's 9 out of every 1 million tires.
And most of these claims are on the Ford Explorer. The
identical tire on the Ford--is on the Ford Ranger, and yet the
tread separation claims on the Ranger, exact tire, is 8 times
less than that of the same tire on the Explorer. And if that
weren't enough, Wilderness AT tires on General Motor's vehicles
have only 2 tread separation claims on 3.1 million tires that
we've supplied General Motors. And these 2 claims were minor,
minor property damage claims, did not result in accidents.
Also, several million of these tires that Ford is replacing
under their program have never, ever had a claim. And the
bottom line, replacing good tires with other tires, is a
diversionary tactic and it won't increase or improve customer
safety.
We've also conducted an extensive array of scientific tests
comparing our tires to our competitor tires. And this testing
supports the data we see from the real world. We perform peal
tests to measure the amount of force it takes to tear apart the
two steel belts. We conducted Society of Automotive Engineer
high-speed tests, and we performed belt-edge temperature tests
to see if the internal temperature of the tires are the same as
those other tires in the marketplace. And these are just some
of the tests we've performed. But in every test, the Wilderness
AT tires performed within industry norms, oftentimes
outperforming our rivals. Our testing confirms what we've been
saying all along: Our tires are safe, and we have the tests. We
have the real world data to prove it.
But now let's compare our testing to Ford's testing of the
tires. We use standard industry testing procedures. Ford, on
the other hand, did not; and what little they've shared with us
reveals that Ford's testing of tires and our tires was, at
best, unscientific; and, at worst, misleading. Ford took new
Goodyear tires and compared them with old Firestone tires, some
of which were 9 years old. But when you take and compare the
same age of tires--Firestone tires versus the Goodyear tires
from Ford's own data--we are as good as our competition, and in
many cases better.
Ford talked about tire temperatures, and Ford ignored,
though, the internal temperature of a tire, the temperature
that is very important when looking at such things as tread
separations. Ford chose to use surface temperatures. We don't
know why. It has no correlation to internal temperature. And as
the Wall Street Journal reported, Ford did not use the same
inflation pressure and loads when testing Firestone tires
against Goodyear tires. We heard two or three times this
morning about apples to apples. I think we need an apples-to-
apples comparison here as well.
And finally, Ford's protections of future Firestone tire
failures are purely speculative. They're not based on real
world data. Yes, with these hazard plots, you can make those
lines go anywhere you want, based on the assumptions you use.
And next, Mr. Chairman, I must say--and this is not easy
for me to say as well--but there is something wrong with the
Ford Explorer. The testing and accident data we have submitted
prove it. When I was here last year, I said to all of you that
you could take all our tires off the Ford Explorer and the Ford
Explorer would continue to roll over. And unfortunately, that's
exactly what's happening.
But it didn't have to be this way. We at Firestone asked
Ford to work with us so that we together could look at the
tire--and we looked at the tire a lot, but at the vehicle as
well, and the tire vehicle interaction. But Ford refused, and
we had no choice. We had to go it alone. Ford left us no other
option.
Mr. Chairman, these are the facts. The loss of a tread or
air in a tire shouldn't cause a driver to lose control of his
vehicle. The driver should be able to pull over, not roll over.
Even Ford's own export--expert car engineering agrees with
that. Dr. Dennis Gunther is considered to be one of the most
highly regarded, renowned experts in vehicle dynamics, and he's
worked with NHTSA before, and he's worked for some of the
automobile companies. And he found that when a rear tire
separates on some models of the Ford Explorer, the vehicle goes
from a slight understeer--and you talked briefly about
understeer, oversteer this morning--from a slight understeer to
an oversteer condition, where the rear tires can spin out, just
like you've experienced sometimes on ice. But the important
thing, according to Dr. Gunther, it's both the transition,
transition from understeer to oversteer, and the oversteer
itself that often make it a dangerous situation for the average
driver to be able to maintain directional control on the
Explorer at normal highway speeds after a tire separation.
And the real world data supports Dr. Gunther's finding. The
Florida traffic crash data base shows that for the 1994 through
2000 model year vehicles registered in Florida, the Explorer
rolls over twice as much as all other SUVs in single-vehicle,
nontire-related accidents.
Mr. Chairman, last year this committee asked us why we
didn't do more when we had reports of tread separations coming
out of Venezuela. Well, now there are new reports from the
Venezuela Consumer Protection Agency that the Explorer
continues to roll over with other brands of tires. In fact,
since May of 2000, there have been 43 judicially--judicially
confirmed, certified Explorer rollover crashes in Venezuela,
and they've been on competitor tires. In the last 10 days
alone, there have been four people that have been fatally
injured in two separate Ford Explorer accidents in Venezuela on
different brands of tires, not ours.
Surely these warning signs can't be ignored. As I've said
before, I said it last year, Ford can replace all the
Wilderness AT tires on our vehicle, but the Explorer will
continue to roll over. We need to understand why. And I know
you want to understand why. We owe it, I owe it, to the men and
women who make our tires, to the stores and dealers who sell
our tires, and we all owe it to the people on the roads and the
highways that drive on our tires. No one cares more about
safety than we do, and we're doing our part. We're taking
responsibility for our tires. We did a massive recall, and now
we're doing what's right by asking the tough questions on the
Ford Explorer.
One of our Nation's greatest industrial pioneers once said,
don't find fault; find a remedy. Since the very beginning, Ford
has only wanted to find fault, blaming our tires. We, on the
other hand, have said that the vehicle tire interaction needs
to be examined in order to find a remedy. And, by the way, that
great man that said don't find fault, find a remedy, was also
Henry Ford.
I truly wish I could say with pride that Ford is still one
of our best customers, and I sincerely hope there comes a day
when Bridgestone/Firestone can do business with Ford again, but
that day won't come until we answer the tough questions on the
Explorer.
I would like to commend Chairman Tauzin for urging NHTSA to
examine the vehicle and the tire in a balanced way, because
there are very hard questions to be answered. Why is the
Explorer so much more likely to roll over in related crashes?
If it's just a tire issue, why are Explorers continuing to roll
over in Venezuela at high numbers, even after Ford replaced all
the Firestone tires? Why is the Explorer harder to control than
other SUVs after a rear-tire separation? And why do our tires
perform so well on other vehicles?
Firestone will continue to work with the government to get
the answers the American public deserves to these and the other
tough questions. And I am glad to hear Mr. Nasser this morning
and Ford agree in the same spirit to support NHTSA's
investigation of their vehicles.
Thank you again for inviting me here to testify, and
Chairman Stearns, using your words, I welcome the opportunity
to answer reasonable questions.
[The prepared statement of John Lampe follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Lampe, Chief Executive Officer, Bridgestone/
Firestone, Inc.
i. introduction
Chairman Stearns, Chairman Greenwood, Chairman Tauzin, and
distinguished Committee Members, I am John Lampe, CEO and President of
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Thank you for inviting me to testify today.
Since I appeared before this Committee on September 21, 2000, much has
happened. Our team at Bridgestone/Firestone has been working vigorously
to protect the safety and restore the trust of our customers by
assuring and enhancing the quality and performance of our products. We
have accomplished a great deal, and we have learned a great deal.
In my statement today, I would like to address the following four
topics:
First, Firestone takes responsibility for the safety of its
customers. We have devoted all available resources and energy to the
August 9, 2000 recall. We conducted extensive research to determine the
causes of tread separations and rollover crashes involving the Ford
Explorer. We instituted targeted changes to improve our products and we
have enhanced our ability to monitor the performance of our tires in
the field.
Second, Firestone tires on the road today are safe. The recall of
more of our tires is not necessary and will not increase customer
safety. I will present data that prove our tires on the road today are
every bit as safe as the comparable competitors' tires on the roads
today.
Third, to find the whole truth regarding Ford Explorer rollover
crashes, it is imperative that the Congress, the NHTSA, and the public
examine the vehicle issues as well as tire issues. I have said from the
outset that no research, analysis or remedy for tire-related Explorer
rollover crashes can be complete without carefully addressing the
contribution of vehicle characteristics. Today, I will present claims
data that show that the same tire on vehicles other than the Explorer
performs quite well and that the tread separation rate, while still
low, is elevated when that tire is on the Explorer. I will also present
test data that precisely identifies that characteristic of the Explorer
which makes it extraordinarily prone to rollover crashes in the event
of a tread separation, an event that can happen with any tire.
Finally, I want to take this public opportunity to make Firestone's
recommendations as to how drivers can help protect themselves against
the possibility of serious crashes like those that prompted the
Committee to investigate this matter.
ii. the recall
Beginning on August 9, 2000, Firestone voluntarily recalled
approximately 6.5 million P235/75R15 ATX and Decatur Wilderness AT
tires fitted primarily on the Ford Explorer family of vehicles. Our
concern for the safety of our customers was paramount, so we took this
action before we knew what caused the increased rate of tread
separation claims. I am proud of the fact that our recall campaign was
carried out very rapidly. From the date we announced the recall through
January 2, 2001, we replaced 92 percent of the tires. As of today, more
than 6.3 million tires have been replaced, approximately 97 percent of
the total number recalled. By any measure, this is an outstanding
performance, and one which reflects well on every member of the
Firestone team.
iii. firestone tires on the road today are safe
On Monday, May 21, Firestone informed Ford Motor Company that it
had no choice but to terminate its almost 100-year relationship and
stop supplying tires to Ford. Firestone took this action because Ford
simply refused to examine with Firestone what, if any, role the Ford
Explorer had in the increased rate of tread separation claims and the
subsequent rollovers that led to the catastrophic accidents. In fact,
in October 2000 I sent a letter to Mr. Nasser asking his cooperation
into an investigation of both the vehicle and the tire. Regrettably,
Ford refused to jointly investigate the vehicle.
On May 22, Ford announced it would unilaterally recall all
Wilderness AT tires fitted on Ford vehicles. We believe strongly that
Ford's action is motivated by a desire to divert attention from safety
concerns of the Explorer. The data from both testing and actual
experience on the highways simply do not support Ford's decision. Our
tires on the road today are safe, and we do not intend to participate
in Ford's unnecessary and deceptively motivated action.
Ford has claimed that Wilderness AT tires have higher rates of
tread separation than competitive tires. Ford would not share with us
complete test data or actual claims data on competitors' tires. The
data Ford did share with us shows that Ford used grossly unscientific
procedures in its testing. As a result, we have done our own testing
that I will summarize for you.
First, we tested ``peel force,'' the amount of force needed to tear
the two steel belts from a tire. We compared our tire with three major
competitors' tires that have also been fitted to the Ford Explorer
either as original equipment or a replacement tire. As this chart (#1)
shows, our tires out-performed two of the three competitors' tires in
this test. The results were similar when we subjected the tires to high
temperatures to simulate hot climate driving. (Chart #2)
Second, we conducted SAE high speed tests in which tires are
intentionally run to the point of failure on a machine that pushes
tires beyond their limits. Once again, the Wilderness AT outperformed
several rivals and performed well within industry norms. (Chart #3)
Third, we performed vehicle tests where our tires were run on a
test track mounted on a range of compact SUVs. With this test we
measured the belt-edge temperature of each tire on each vehicle after
identical test cycles. (Chart #4) This test clearly shows that our
tires were most heavily loaded on the Explorer. Additionally, other
tests were performed on the 1997 Ford Explorer with a variety of
competitor tires. The belt edge temperatures were measured and clearly
show that damaging temperature increases at lower inflation pressures
were greatest on the Explorer (Chart #5). These tests again revealed
that the Wilderness AT is an excellent performer, better than many
rival products, and well within industry norms. But these tests also
further suggest an Explorer issue.
In contrast, Ford's ``rig'' testing is grossly unscientific and
must be disregarded. First, to test our tires, Ford used aged spare
tires compared with new tires from our competitors. Indeed, some of the
Firestone tires tested were nine years old. It is well known that tires
naturally degrade over time, regardless of whether they are used on
vehicles. The rubber in tires begins to degrade as soon as it leaves
the plant. When you factor out the old Firestone tires that Ford
tested, and just compare our new tires with the competitors' new tires,
even Ford's results show that our tires are as good as the competition!
Second, Ford used surface temperature testing as opposed to internal
temperature testing, the latter of which is needed to detect thermal
conditions related to belt separation. No respected organization
measures the surface temperature of tires to determine the likelihood
of belt separation. Given these examples, it is no surprise that Ford
refused to share all of its data with Firestone.
Now let's look at real world performance. A comparison of
Wilderness AT performance tires fitted on the Explorer and other
vehicles shows that tread separations with our tire happen
disproportionately on the Explorer. We sold the same tires to Ford,
designed and built to the identical specifications, for both the
Explorer and the Ranger pickup truck. Claims for tread separation on
the Explorer were as much as eight times greater in number than on the
Ranger. (Chart #6)
These results are for the same tires on two different Ford
vehicles. In fact, at the time of shipment, we do not know which of our
individual tires sent to Ford are to be mounted on which vehicle. The
fact that the very same tire performs so differently on these two
vehicles is proof positive that there is something at work here other
than a tire issue. Again, it is no wonder why Ford refused to give us
production data for the Ranger for nearly six months. As soon as we
received the required data from Ford this spring, the data convinced us
that something about the Explorer must account for the high number of
tire failures and subsequent rollover accidents.
Real world claims data provide further evidence of the Explorer's
extraordinary history of tread separation claims. For example, our ATX
tires sold as original equipment on the Explorer were also sold as
replacement tires for a broad range of similar vehicles from other
manufacturers. Over seven years, there were six times as many tread
separation claims for the Ford Explorer, within the replacement tire
population that included other vehicles, than there were for other
vehicles (claims per 100,000 tires). (Chart #7) Again, the very same
tire failed at a greatly higher rate on the Explorer.
Ford also claims that its successful experience with Goodyear tires
on the Explorer proves the need for its further recall of Wilderness
tires. Once again, Ford has misused data to produce a conclusion that
supports its false statements. For example, it directly compares
Firestone and Goodyear claims without mentioning that a greater number
of Firestone-equipped Explorers were shipped to hot weather states
where the tires were pushed to extremes and tread separation occurred.
(Chart #8) Ford states that there were only two claims for tread
separation on Goodyear tires. News reports alone tell us there have
been at least 13 incidents involving tread separations of Goodyear and
other manufacturers' tires followed by Explorer rollover crashes. But
we don't have to rely on news reports alone. Ford's own internal
document--identified as Document 54 in last fall's hearing--states that
Ford knew of the possibility of at least 10 tread separations on
Goodyear tires (Attachment 1) and physical evidence of these
separations is readily available (Attachment 2). In fact, while Ford
would have you believe that tread separations are proof of defect, and
that only Firestone tires experience tread separations, the reality is
quite different. (Attachments 3 and 3A) All tire manufacturers,
including Goodyear, acknowledge that tires are not indestructible, that
tread separations are the most common form of a tire disablement and
that a tread separation is not evidence of a defect.
Ford has also attempted to cloud the issue of the durability of our
tires by making unsubstantiated allegations regarding construction. But
again, whether is the thickness of the wedge material at the belt edge
(Chart #9) or claims about our materials, the data shows our tires are
as good or better than the competition.
Ford's comparison of Firestone to Goodyear is further flawed by the
inclusion of claims associated with the 6.5 million tires recalled by
Firestone last year. Ford's use of claims on those tires to
characterize tires on the road today is patently false and misleading.
The rationale and data put forward by Ford to explain its current
recall of Wilderness AT tires is unsupported by test data, by real
world experience, and by Ford's own statements about the tires. Ford's
selective use of data, biased test procedures and contradictory
statements show that its recall is at best a poorly documented public
relations exercise designed to protect the image of a profitable
product that represents approximately \1/3\ of every profit dollar--the
Explorer. I am deeply concerned that this campaign at Ford is also an
attempt to scapegoat our tires by falsely alarming consumers about
their safety. In the process, Ford may be hiding from consumers,
regulators, and Congress some very real safety problems of their
vehicle which should be addressed honestly and seriously.
Mr. Chairman, the extensive testing data and the voluminous record
of real world performance of our tires shows that they are safe. There
is no need for a recall of those tires. However, there is a need for
industry and government to work together honestly to continue to
improve safety for the motoring public.
iv. the vehicle
The tire and the vehicle must be regarded as a system. We have
consistently urged Congress, the NHTSA, and Ford to look at this
phenomenon in a balanced way--that is, to look at both the tire and the
vehicle. Indeed, on October 23, 2000, I wrote Mr. Nasser a letter
asking his support for a joint investigation into both the tire and the
vehicle. However, Ford has refused to work with us to examine the
vehicle and tire as a system. They have steadfastly urged Congress, the
NHTSA, and the American public to consider this strictly a tire issue
and not a vehicle issue.
We have had a growing and ultimately overwhelming conviction that
tire design and manufacturing issues alone simply cannot account for
what has been happening with the Explorer. There is no doubt that tire
failures have become relatively rare in the past few decades. Still,
cars and trucks are equipped with spare tires, jacks and lug wrenches
precisely because when a tire fails, for whatever reason, auto
manufacturers contemplate you will be alive to change your tire when
you need to. We must ask ourselves why are tire failures on the Ford
Explorer all too often not a benign event, but often a catastrophic
one? Why is it that, if a rear tire separates on an Explorer, the
driver often loses control and crashes? We couldn't help but think that
this should not be happening; a driver should be able to pull over, not
roll over.
Since Ford was unwilling to participate in a joint analysis of its
product, we were forced to conduct our own research into the role of
the vehicle. A survey of what we have learned about the vehicle is
found at Attachment 4 (Analysis of the Ford Explorer). Our root cause
analysis made clear that vehicle weight and low inflation pressure are
very significant factors that can lead to tread separations. The
Explorer is a heavy vehicle and Ford recommended the bare minimum
inflation pressure of 26 PSI. In short, Ford designed the Explorer with
minimal reserve load.
As part of our root cause analysis, we learned that, in fact, in
1995, Ford increased the weight of some models of the Model Year 1996
Explorer by over 600 pounds from the initial weight when the Explorer
was first introduced. (Charts #10 and #11) In this respect, it is no
surprise that the 1996 Explorer is the vehicle that appears most often
in the claims and lawsuits alleging a tread separation. As everyone now
knows, tires can lose as much as 1 psi per month. Ford's recommendation
of a 26 PSI inflation pressure diminished the load reserve of the
Explorer and its tires to an unacceptable level (Chart #12). Our
analysis shows that the tire inflation safety factor for the Explorer
is far below that of other popular SUVs we examined.
Given the combination of a heavy vehicle with minimal inflation
pressure, it stands to reason that the tire failure rate on the
Explorer would be higher than other SUVs. This is exactly what the data
shows. As I stated above, the Wilderness AT tires that Ford is
replacing are performing well. The relatively few claims that exist
stem almost exclusively from tires fitted on Ford Explorers. Based on
these facts, it is apparent that there are vehicle issues at work here.
Moreover, when a tread does separate from a tire, the separation
itself ordinarily does not have a catastrophic effect on the vehicle.
There is no explosion or impact that radically upsets the attitude or
direction of the vehicle. Engineers think of tread separation in three
phases, pre-separation, separation, and post-separation. In pre-
separation, the tire becomes out-of-round due to the tread beginning to
detach. The irregular shape of the tire creates a vibration in the
vehicle, warning the driver that a tire failure is occurring. This
ordinarily signals a driver to reduce power and beginning pulling off
the road.
The separation event itself often creates a loud noise, as the
tread flaps against the vehicle's bodywork before becoming entirely
detached. Despite the noise, forces imparted to the vehicle are
minimal. The tire casing is normally intact and remains inflated. The
driver should be able to maintain control of the vehicle with very
slight steering inputs. Carr Engineering, who performed tread
separation tests for Ford, compared these steering inputs to those made
to correct for wind gusts or when encountering water puddles on the
highway. The overwhelming scientific literature agrees with Carr
Engineering on this point.
In the post-separation phase, the vehicle is continuing on the
roadway with three intact tires and one tire, which, while still
inflated and supporting the vehicle's weight, lacks its tread.
Normally, nothing catastrophic occurs here, and the driver is easily
able to maintain control.
The real world data shows that with the Explorer, the occupants are
at much greater risk than in comparable SUVs. An analysis of the
Florida Traffic Crash Database for Explorer Model Years 1994-2000 shows
that in a single-vehicle, tire-related highway accident, the Explorer
rolls over at nearly four times the rate of other comparable SUVs. The
rate of fatalities in single vehicle highway incidents is nearly twice
that of other comparable SUVs. (Charts #13 and #14) Still additional
analysis of the Florida data shows that the Explorer rolls over at
nearly twice the rate of all other mid-size SUVs in a single-vehicle,
non-tire-related highway accidents (Chart #15). A summary of this
information is contained in ``Florida Crash, Rollover, and Fatal
Accident Rates Based on Vehicle Registrations'' at Attachment 5. These
analyses clearly suggest that there is a vehicle issue at work here.
Ford's own engineering documents show that Ford was acutely aware,
as early as 1981, of the critical handling requirements for sport
utility vehicles such as the Explorer. Ford's experience with the
rollover-prone Bronco II, the Explorer's predecessor, proved that
special attention must be given to SUV handling to avoid rollovers.
Ford recognized that keeping the vehicle axis parallel to the direction
of travel is essential to reducing rollover accidents. Any design that
allows an SUV to turn sideways to the direction of travel would greatly
increase the chance for a rollover. This could be avoided by giving the
driver safe handling qualities that maximize the chances of maintaining
directional control.
Automotive engineers, including Ford's, intentionally incorporate a
handling property called ``understeer'' in their vehicle design to help
drivers maintain directional control. Understeer is a forgiving,
predictable, handling characteristic and its effect is to provide
predictable, progressive response to steering inputs. To turn the
vehicle harder, or at a higher rate of lateral acceleration, the driver
need only turn the wheel farther.
The opposite of understeer is oversteer. When engineers say a
vehicle is oversteering they are talking about a circumstance where the
rear wheels are not tracking the front wheels and the back end of the
vehicle swings around. Engineers describe an oversteer vehicle as
directionally unstable. Trying to steer a directionally unstable
vehicle characteristically causes it to spinout. That is a perilous
position for a vehicle with a rollover tendency.
We have studied internal Ford engineering analyses of Explorer
handling made throughout the vehicle's design and development.
(Attachment 6) Many compromises were made to give the truck-based
Explorer a softer, car-like ride, and these compromises may have also
had the undesirable effect of reducing understeer and increasing
significantly the amount of oversteer in the Explorer after a tire
problem. The shift from understeer to a significant oversteer could
cause drivers to lose control of Explorers following tread separations.
The analysis of Dr. Dennis Guenther, a renowned vehicle dynamics
engineer at Ohio State University who was hired by Firestone's defense
counsel in October 2000, proves that this is often what happens to
Explorers.
In the course of Dr. Guenther's work, it became clear that an
analysis of the Explorer's handling dynamics in tread separations would
help us understand why all of these accidents were occurring. In May
2001, at Firestone's request, Dr. Guenther began a series of tests of
SUV handling at the Transportation Research Center (TRC) in East
Liberty, Ohio. The tests were designed to examine the controllability
of the Explorer and that of comparable SUVs, following a tread
separation. The tests conducted to date evaluated 1996 4x2, four-door
Explorer handling compared with that of the popular Jeep Cherokee and
the Chevrolet Blazer. The tests that were conducted are universally
recognized, standard tests used by automobile manufacturers, including
Ford. A detailed description of the tests and their results is found at
Attachment 7.
The results of these tests were both enlightening and deeply
disturbing. Dr. Guenther determined that with a tread separation of a
rear tire, the Explorer becomes an oversteering vehicle in most
situations, while the other tested SUV's maintain a safe reserve of
understeer. The driver of an Explorer with four intact tires has the
benefit of a small margin of understeer to provide predictable
handling. When that same driver experiences an otherwise benign tread
separation event, he must maintain control of a vehicle whose handling
characteristics have suddenly and profoundly changed. As noted
previously, the rear end of the now-oversteering vehicle has a tendency
to swing toward the outside of a turn, and the driver may be completely
unprepared to react appropriately. This chain-of-events typically
results in a spinout, which is a perilous position for a vehicle, like
the Explorer, with a rollover tendency.
The other SUVs tested by Dr. Guenther never became oversteer
vehicles. Tread separation reduced the understeer of these vehicles
somewhat, but there was still a significant reserve to maintain
predictable handling. The differences measured are substantial. For
example, the Cherokee with a separated rear tire still has more
understeer than an Explorer with four good tires. (Charts #16 and #17)
As I explained, the findings of Dr. Guenther concerning the
handling deficiencies of the Explorer are supported by the real world
data. If we need any further proof that the Explorer's handling should
be evaluated, we need look no further than Venezuela. Plagued with
reports of rollover crashes in that country, Ford engineers in 1999
questioned why only their vehicles ``suffer accidents'' while other
Firestone-shod SUVs did not. Ford, in an effort to stem the accidents,
offered to sell consumers suspension upgrades to improve stability, and
later replaced all Firestone tires with other brands. Even so, since
May 2000, there have been 43 judicially confirmed Explorer rollover
crashes in Venezuela--all of them on competitor's tires. (Chart #18) In
the last 10 days alone, four people in Venezuela have died in Ford
Explorer rollover accidents. The two vehicles involved in these
accidents were equipped with competing tire brands. The Venezuelan
Consumer protection agency has contemplated having the Explorer banned
from the country.
Last fall Firestone was roundly criticized by this Committee for
not acting when faced with data coming out of Venezuela and other
countries. Indeed, at this Committee's urging, Congress passed the
TREAD Act largely in response to that very situation. Shame on us now
if, just a few months later, we ignore new data coming out of Venezuela
and do not adequately investigate the Explorer. Perhaps Ford will be
more responsive to requests from this Committee for accident and claims
data relating to the Venezuelan Explorer rollovers . . . they have
steadfastly refused to give that information to Bridgestone/Firestone.
As the Committee is aware, we took the initial findings of Dr.
Guenther's research to the NHTSA as soon as the tests were complete. On
May 31, 2001, I met with Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta and
Acting NHTSA Administrator Robert Shelton to discuss these findings. I
discussed with the NHTSA the need for a thorough investigation of the
Ford Explorer. We did this, not because we are having a feud with Ford
Motor Company. We acted because of our overriding concern for safety.
We believe that to truly protect the public, safety investigations must
identify and evaluate all of the factors that contribute to accidents.
v. conclusion
To date, the Federal Government has focused almost solely on the
tire, and we accept that scrutiny of our products. But the data and Dr.
Guenther's report show that the problem is not nearly so simple. There
are critical aspects of vehicle handling that contribute powerfully to
the risk of rollover crashes following tread separations.
For the Committee's consideration in reviewing this matter, we have
attached additional relevant data and information at Attachment 8.
We are not asking the NHTSA or Congress to make a conclusive
judgement based on our ongoing study. We are asking that the NHTSA view
this study as proof that there are vehicle issues at work here. These
vehicle issues call out for scrutiny.
I want to again commend the Committee and staff for its hard work
and persistence in investigating the causes of these rollover
accidents. The public has a right to a thorough analysis of this
problem with the full cooperation of affected companies. We have an
obligation to provide that cooperation even when, and especially when,
it might disclose problems with our products. Your oversight will help
to assure that this occurs.
The timing of today's hearing, at the beginning of the summer
driving season, provides us with an important opportunity to educate
the driving public about how they can assure safe highway travel. Let
me conclude by providing two recommendations from Firestone:
First, do think about your tires, whatever brand they are. Make sure
they are always properly inflated. And ask your tire dealer to
examine them for damage if you have any doubts.
Second, avoid overloading your vehicle, as this can both upset its
handling and exceed the capacity of its tires. Again, the
vehicle manufacturer's recommendations should be followed
carefully.
Thank you again for inviting me to appear. I look forward to
answering your questions.
______
Analysis of the Ford Explorer
i. executive summary and introduction
The purpose of this analysis is to address the myth with respect to
the Ford Explorer that rollover crashes that occur following a tread
separation are attributable in any way to tire design or tire
manufacturing. In fact, as the data presented in this analysis
conclusively demonstrate, tire issues can not account for the high risk
and rate of Ford Explorer rollover crashes. This analysis concludes
that, based on the design and development of the Explorer, real world
data on Explorer control problems, an engineering analysis of the
Explorer, and the substance of Ford's own presentation to NHTSA
concerning Explorer vehicle dynamics, the rollover problem is rooted in
the Explorer, not tires.
A. Design and Development
For 20 years Ford engineers have known that so-called
``understeer'' is the primary vehicle design factor that prevents
vehicle rollover and that an ``oversteering'' vehicle can and likely
will result in loss of control that foreseeably could lead to a
rollover and other accidents. In fact, Ford engineers recommended to
management major changes to the suspension, engine height and track
width of the Explorer to increase understeer in all conditions and to
increased Explorer rollover resistance. Ford management ignored or
rejected these recommendations.
Instead, Ford decided to create a public relations ``image'' for
the Explorer as a safe vehicle. The Company manipulated the rollout of
the Explorer, including its design and testing, solely to get the new
vehicle to ``look'' or ``seem'' like it was stable, and regardless of
the effect such manipulations might have on controllability. By putting
profits and public relations image in front of sound engineering
principles, Ford caused two catastrophic consequences. First, Ford
reduced the margin of safety for tires that it specified to Firestone,
causing the rare but now highly publicized phenomenon of tread
separations on Explorers. Second, because of the vehicle's design, the
Explorer, following a tread separation, immediately transitions to an
oversteer truck that is likely to go out of control and roll over.
Ford's flawed decisions are confirmed by real world data.
B. Real World Data
As the following data suggest, the Explorer rollover problem is not
a case of a ``bad tire,'' but of a vehicle control problem:
1) Wilderness AT 15'' tires provided to General Motors and not recalled
last year have only 2 tread separation claims on 3.1 million
tires.
2) The non-recalled Wilderness AT 15'' tires have a tread separation
claims rate eight times higher on the Explorer than on the Ford
Ranger. The tires on each are exactly the same.
3) The total number of tread separation claims and lawsuits for the 13
million tires Ford is replacing is 118, less than 10 parts per
million or 0.0009%, which provides no rationale, other than a
suspect one, for Ford's $3 billion replacement campaign.
4) Based on the Florida Traffic Crash Database, the odds of an Explorer
rolling over in a single-vehicle highway tire-related incident
are 4.35 compared to 1.92 odds for comparable SUVs. The odds
ratio of a fatality occurring in such an accident is nearly
three times greater with the Explorer according to Florida
data, and four times greater according to Texas data.
This data proves that the Explorer, in single vehicle, tire related
highway incidents simply does not perform as safely as its competitors,
which is confirmed and explained by the recent engineering analysis
conducted by Dr. Dennis A. Guenther.
C. Engineering Analysis
According to a recent engineering analysis conducted by Dr. Dennis
A. Guenther, a Professor of Mechanical Engineering at Ohio State
University, the Explorer is often an oversteer vehicle after it
experiences tread separation, which makes the Explorer vehicle
directionally unstable and subject to loss of control in the hands of
most drivers. Dr. Guenther's analysis found that:
1) Explorer models he has tested, as designed, have a significantly
lower amount of understeer--less than half as much--than the
other SUVs he evaluated.
2) The Explorer loses much of its small margin of understeer when it is
loaded to gross vehicle weight rating--the other SUVs do not.
3) The Explorer models tested, unlike other SUVs tested, lose all of
their understeer and become oversteer vehicles in most
circumstances following tread separation on a left rear tire,
the predominant tire position in Explorer tread separation
crashes the other SUVs do not.
4) An oversteer vehicle is extremely difficult for most drivers to
control, particularly at interstate highway speeds where it can
become directionally unstable.
Dr. Guenther concludes that the oversteer problem in the Explorer
should be reported as a safety defect within the meaning of the
National Highway Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Ford Explorer
rollover phenomenon is the result of a vehicle problem not a tire
problem, and should be regarded as a safety defect within the meaning
of the National Highway Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.
D. Misleading Ford Filing to NHTSA
Ford's March 2001 filing with the NHTSA concerning the Explorer's
loss of control following a tread separation contains inaccuracies and
misinformation that reinforces Ford's irresponsible reaction to the
rollover problem, as the following component of that filing suggests.
Ford suggested in its filing to the NHTSA that tread separation is
a ``fundamental cause'' of loss of vehicle control that ``overwhelms
differences in design among vehicle claims or within vehicle classes,''
and that, in this setting, ``Explorers perform like all other
vehicles.'' Ford based that statement, however, on a so-called high
lateral acceleration maneuver, where most drivers do not operate their
vehicles. In fact, the maneuver most often used to correct for the
small event of drag following a tread separation or in bringing a
vehicle to the shoulder is a very small steer input resulting in a so-
called low lateral acceleration maneuver, even at highway speeds. In
such a normal driving maneuver, Explorers do not perform like other
vehicles, since they lack the necessary margin of understeer to remain
directionally controllable in highway maneuvers involved in normal
driving.
E. Conclusion
Taken together, these factors provide disturbing evidence that
Ford, when given the opportunity to act responsibly to ensure the
safety and stability of the Explorer, has acted instead to shift blame
and obfuscate the facts concerning the safety of its best selling
vehicle. As the following analysis confirms, the rollover phenomenon is
a vehicle problem that requires forthright and responsible
investigation.
ii. design and development of the explorer
A. Introduction
Ford engineers have known for over 20 years that the most important
vehicle characteristic in maintaining control and reducing SUV
propensity for rollover is understeer. The company's engineering
documents identify understeer as a ``first order effect'' and the
``primary factor influencing roll-over propensity.'' <SUP>1</SUP> The
problem with an oversteering vehicle, in terms of rollover propensity,
is that it can and likely will result in the back end of the vehicle
coming around--a loss of control--with the vehicle ending up sideways
to its path of travel. The resultant side forces (``lateral
acceleration'' in engineering terms) are what bring about
rollover.<SUP>2</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Ford Program Report 000000393-98, ``Roll Over Stability,''
February 3, 1981.
\2\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ford also recognized that the rollover stability of a vehicle is
affected by its stability index, the relationship of center of gravity
height and the track width of the vehicle. In light of these vehicle
control and stability principles, Ford engineers adopted a ``handling
strategy'' with respect to the Explorer to ``increase understeer in all
conditions'', <SUP>3</SUP> and they recommended to Ford management
major changes to the suspension, reduction in the engine height to
lower center of gravity, and increase in the track width of the vehicle
to make the Explorer more resistant to rollover than the Bronco
II.<SUP>4</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ford engineering document EXP3 1107, ``Subject: UN46 Handling/
Stability Status.''
\4\ Ford engineering document EXP4 1581-84, ``Proposed UN-46
Chassis Design Modifications.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ford's knowledge of the critical importance of understeer was not
acted upon, however, and Ford management rejected the center of gravity
and track width recommendations of its engineers that would have made
the Explorer more resistant to rollover.
Rather than doing what good engineering required to make the
Explorer safe, with an acceptable margin of control Ford decided on a
course of creating a public relations ``image'' for the Explorer as a
safe vehicle. It did this by making a vehicle that could pass so-called
``J-Turn'' and ``Consumer Union'' lane change tests, even though it
knew and took the position internally that the maneuvers in those tests
were ``not representative of what is happening in the real world.''
<SUP>5</SUP> It also decided to rely on the less aggressive driving
habits of members of the family car market into which it sold the
Explorer to give the vehicle a statistics-based ``image'' of rollover
safety in spite of the stability shortcomings of the
vehicle.<SUP>6</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Ford document EXPI 0622, email from White to Houston, September
11, 1989.
\6\ Ford engineering document EXP3 1108, ``Subject: 1990 Explorer
Handling Stability.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately for Firestone's reputation, Ford carried out the
design tradeoffs and manipulations required for the public relations
image it sought primarily by letting air out of the Explorer's tires.
In a 1989 Development Report on ``Suspension Development Status,''
after noting that they had investigated variations in tire pressure
``as means to achieving the UN46 [Explorer] ride and handling
objective,'' Ford engineers recommended use of ``reductions in tire
pressure to meet the program objectives'' for both ride and
handling.<SUP>7</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Ford engineering document EXPU 1458-60, ``Development Report.''
See also, Ford engineering document EXPT 1497-1503, ``Development
Report.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, in addressing rollover stability, Ford engineers adopted
a ``strategy'' of limiting cornering capacity of the large tires
demanded by the Ford marketing department by, again, reducing air
pressure.<SUP>8</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See, e.g., Ford engineering document EXP4 1273-74, ``Subject:
UN46 status.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When it came to creating understeer, the Ford engineers again
turned to lower tire pressure.<SUP>9</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See, e.g., Ford engineering document EXP4 0193, ``UN46
Analysis.'' See also Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By putting profits and public relations image in front of sound
engineering principles, Ford caused two catastrophic consequences.
First, Ford reduced the margin of safety for the tires that it
specified to Firestone, contributing to the rare but now highly
publicized phenomenon of tread separations on Explorers. Second,
because of the vehicle's design, the Explorer, following a rear tire
tread separation, immediately transitions to an oversteer truck that is
likely to go out of control and roll over in the hands of the ordinary
driver.
B. Development of the Explorer
1. Initial Design Flaws Based on Bronco II and Tire Manipulations--
Ford's internal documents describe the Explorer as a new and freshened
Bronco II. Ford initially intended to continue using the Bronco II
name, but decided to change the name to Explorer when the Bronco II
came under fire for rollover problems and Ford sought to distance
itself from criticisms of the Bronco II.<SUP>10</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See, e.g., Ford media relations document EXP4 1280-84,
``Explorer Q&A.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As early as 1986, Ford engineers started playing with tire sizes to
address rollover stability, rather than making more fundamental changes
in their vehicles. Ford engineers labeled the P195 tires as the ``base
tire'' on the Bronco II to achieve a satisfactory ``stability index''
because the Bronco II with P215 tires, which it sold as an option tire
on the Bronco II, could not pass Ford's rollover stability
tests.<SUP>11</SUP> One Ford engineer questioned this approach:
``Shouldn't we be looking at more permanent ways of improving the
stability index of Bronco II other than small tires?'' <SUP>12</SUP>
Another Ford engineering document explained that the company chose to
play with tire size rather than spend the time and money to create a
truly safer vehicle:
\11\ See Ford document 000012766-67, memorandum from Snodgrass to
Bacigalupi and Vought, September 3, 1986. See also note 5.
\12\ See Ford document 000012765, memorandum from Bacigalupi to
Snodgrass, September 5, 1986.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stability index requirements are always tied to base vehicle
(this decision was reached with help of OGC [Office of the
General Counsel]). Since the P215 pushes the stability index
below the accepted minimum of 2.1, the suspension guys felt
they need to retain a tire that has the minimum S.I. Better
alternatives to tire size are for example
--lowering vehicle
--lowering CG by adding weight low in vehicle
Cost and timing implications of these kind of actions have
always stalled them in their tracks to White.<SUP>13</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Ford document 000008940, memorandum from Bacigalupi to White,
October 6, 1986.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In designing the Explorer, Ford stuck with the basic Bronco II
frame and suspension, and utilized the same philosophy of playing with
tires to address rollover stability concerns. As a result, the Explorer
shared virtually the same track width, high engine mount, obsolete
suspension, and elevated center of gravity as its parent vehicle, the
Bronco II. ``[G]iven the fundamental constraints imposed by the vehicle
package and suspension `type' '' carried over from the Bronco II, Ford
struggled to reduce the Explorer's rollover propensity; <SUP>14</SUP>
most of Ford's struggles involved specifying the tires rather than
changing the vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See note 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Explorer Testing--Unrealistic Measure of Vehicle Safety--Ford
required that the Explorer pass ``J-Turn tests,'' an unrealistic
maneuver invented by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety in the
early 1980s, before being released for production.<SUP>15</SUP> A ``J-
Turn test'' is an extreme turn at a given rate speed (usually 45 or 60
mph), and an evaluation of whether the vehicle's tires lift off the
ground. In addition, while not a formal requirement, the Consumer
Union's lane-change rollover stability test ``became an implicit
requirement for the Explorer due to the potential for adverse
publicity'' if it failed.<SUP>16</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Id.
\16\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because of these image and litigation-driven requirements, the
development of the Explorer turned into a story of tweaking the vehicle
and the tires in an attempt to pass these tests, while at the same time
providing a softer rider acceptable to Ford's target marketing group--
families. Even though Ford's internal documents had identified
understeer as the most important vehicle handling characteristic in
maintaining directional control and reducing rollover exposure,
<SUP>17</SUP> the design tradeoffs made by Ford to pass J-Turn and
Consumer Union tests did not address or seek to increase understeer and
the degradation they caused in the vehicles control charicteristics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ See note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In late 1988, more than a year before the Explorer's spring 1990
introduction, computer modeling showed that ``the vehicle still has 2
wheel lift no matter what tire is on it, 225/70, 215/75 or 205/75.''
<SUP>18</SUP> In February 1989, the computer simulation continued to
show unacceptable rollover performance with certain P245 and P225
tires.<SUP>19</SUP> The result remained poor in computer simulations
after lowering the rear of the vehicle by one-half inch with 26 psi in
the tires.<SUP>20</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Ford document EXPT 1047-49, memorandum from Figliomeni to
Avouris, November 29, 1988.
\19\ Ford document EXPU 1959, memorandum from Figliomeni to
Avouris, February 3, 1989.
\20\ Ford document EXP7 2273, memorandum from Figliomeni to Avouris
[undated].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Undeterred by these results, Ford management concluded in late
February 1989 that with 26 psi in the P235 and P245 tires, and tweaks
to the suspension, stabilizer bar and a one-half inch reduction in rear
ride height, the Explorer would meet its handling
objectives.<SUP>21</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Ford document EXPU 9476-78, ``Development Report.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ford then tried every trick in the book to get the vehicle to pass
the J-turn test, including in one March 1989 simulation placing all
four test dummies on the vehicle's floor to lower the vehicle's center
of gravity. The Explorer still failed the test.<SUP>22</SUP> Later in
March 1989, the Explorer failed J-Turn tests with a variety of tire
pressure and suspension configurations.<SUP>23</SUP> At one point, it
was proposed that if the marketing implications were not too great, the
P225 tire be the largest tire allowed on the vehicle and that the
maximum load allowed for the vehicle be reduced.<SUP>24</SUP> Even in
August 1989, the Explorer failed J-Turn tests at its Arizona proving
grounds with 35 psi in the P235 tires.<SUP>25</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See Ford document EXPT 1168, email from Avouris to Campbell,
March 8, 1989.
\23\ Ford document EXP4 1276, memorandum from Starr to Avouris and
Campbell, May 10, 1989.
\24\ See Ford document EXPT 0785-86, ``UN46 Development Status.'';
see also Ford document EXPT 0569, ``Subject: 1990+ UN-46 Chassis
Revisions and Tire Availability,'' July 6, 1989.
\25\ See deposition of Thomas B. Baughman in Bailey v. Ford Motor
Company, at 78-81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Concerned over the Explorer's struggling performance in rollover
stability tests, in June 1989 Ford management actively considered
releasing the 4-door Explorer on P225 tires as a ``strawman'' because
it would pass the Consumer Union test with those tires, though not with
P235 tires. Six months later, after the ``strawman'' passed the test,
Ford could quietly release the 2-door and 4-door on P235
tires.<SUP>26</SUP> Thus, Ford cynically manipulated not only the
design of the Explorer, but also the testing, solely to get the new
Explorer to ``look'' or ``seem'' like it was stable, regardless of
whether it really was or not and regardless of the effect such
manipulations might have the margin of safe controllability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ See Ford document EXPT 0570-71, email from Stornant to
Campbell, June 23, 1989.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Manipulative Marketing--Ford not only manipulated the design of
the Explorer to make the vehicle seem like it was rollover resistant
but also to make it seem to the consumer something it was not--a
passenger car.<SUP>27</SUP> The Explorer is in fact a ``Light Truck''
derived from the Bronco II and Ranger trucks, not a passenger car.
Nevertheless, driven by its intense marketing determination to get
suburban ``soccer moms'' to buy and drive the vehicle, Ford imposed
upon the vehicle design a passenger-car-like ride.<SUP>28</SUP> Ford
accomplished this by, among other things, softening the suspension,
using a P-metric (passenger car) tire, and taking air out of the
tires.<SUP>29</SUP> Knowing that this passenger-car-like vehicle would
be just as likely to roll over as the Bronco II, Ford intentionally
designed excessive body roll into it to act as a deterrent to the
driver against making sharp turns that might result in
rollover.<SUP>30</SUP> This change was made even though the relatively
low damping of body roll adversely affects controllability of the
Explorer. This change, coupled with Ford's other design tradeoffs
intended to provide a vehicle more resistant to rollover allegations
rather than to improve safety, ultimately resulted in the sacrifice of
the amount of understeer and other contributions to a proper formation
of controllability necessary to provide reasonable consumer safety in
foreseeable tire failure circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ See, e.g., Ford document EXP2 1578, ``Inter-office
Memorandum,'' June 9, 1987.
\28\ See, e.g., Ford document EXPN 0175, at 0180-81, ``Dealer
Launch and Resource Guide.''; Ford document 000057450-52, Ford press
release.
\29\ See, e.g.,note 24.
\30\ See, e.g., note 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Flawed Tire Decisions--In the fall of 1989, an engineer warned
that the Office of the General Counsel of Ford was ``arming themselves
for one more attempt to . . . restrict [the Explorer] to P225 tires.''
<SUP>31</SUP> Obviously, the attempt by the lawyers to address a safety
issue failed. Ford sold the Explorer with optional P235 tires.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Ford document EXP 0625, email from Stornant to White,
September 11, 1989.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ford engineering documents summarize the Explorer's twisted
development history by conceding failure:
The 1990 Explorer has been designed to achieve the best
possible handling stability given the fundamental constraints
imposed by the vehicle package and suspension ``type'' . . . To
achieve the stated [stability] values, the Explorer has been
lowered to the maximum extent possible. The relatively high
engine position of the Explorer, unchanged from Bronco II,
prevents further significant improvement in Stability Index
without extensive suspension, frame and sheetmetal
revisions.<SUP>32</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Ford engineering document EXP3 1108, ``Subject: 1990 Explorer
Handling Stability.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ford recognized that the Explorer, particularly the 2-door with
P235 tires likely would fail the Consumer Union test.<SUP>33</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With all of Ford's design manipulations to achieve the appearance
of rollover stability, the Explorer nevertheless remained an unstable
vehicle when it was sold to the public beginning in 1990. Both computer
simulations and Ford's actual testing in 1989 showed that the 2-door
Explorer with P235 tires was as unstable as the highly criticized
Bronco II, and the 4-door was only slightly better.<SUP>34</SUP> When
Ford engineers recommended major changes to the front suspension,
steering system, and rollover stability dimensions in order to make the
vehicle as resistant to rollover as they knew it needed to be,
management rejected the proposals because they would interfere with
``Job 1.'' Internally, ``Job 1'' at Ford meant meeting the March 1990
initial production date.<SUP>35</SUP> Ford reasoned that even though it
did not make needed fundamental changes to the Explorer in development,
it would still perform better than the Bronco II in rollover statistics
because of the longer wheelbase and increased understeer (largely from
reduced tire pressure) and more conservative drivers. ``With the high
(80/20) mix of 4dr vehicles, we can expect a less aggressive driver
profile with a corresponding reduction in all accident statistics.''
<SUP>36</SUP> Ford internal documents show that Ford management
blithely ``accepted [the] risk'' that the Explorer would have a higher
rollover risk with the larger P235 tire.<SUP>37</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ See, e.g., Ford email EXPI 0619-20, email from Stornant to
White, September 12, 1989.
\35\ See note 4.
\36\ Ford engineering document EXP3 1108, ``Subject: 1990 Explorer
Handling Stability.''
\37\ See note 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ford also blithely ``accepted the risk'' that the vehicle would
become uncontrollable in foreseeable circumstances, such as tire
failures. As Ford recently admitted to NHTSA, <SUP>38</SUP> it simply
chose not to test to determine how much tire tread/belt separation,
which it admitted to be foreseeable, would reduce understeer and
controllability and thus lead to unnecessary accidents. Ford failed to
do such testing even though it knew from tire testing it had done and
decades of use of numerous tire brands on the cars it manufactured that
tire tread/belt separations could occur with the tires to be used on
the Explorer. Contrary to Ford's assertions in the March NHTSA
presentation, there was nothing about the Explorer design that was
intended to or did ensure vehicle controllability in the event of tread
separation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Ford document, ``Firestone Tire Root Cause Update and Explorer
Vehicle Dynamics Presentation,'' March 28-29, 2001, at page TH-3 132.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. The Weight of the Explorer Further Stresses the Tires
That Ford took air out of the tires to increase the Explorer's
rollover stability cannot be reasonably disputed. Nor can it be
disputed that weight--i.e., the load placed on tires--is a factor in
tire life. Dr. Sanjay Govindjee from the University of California at
Berkeley established that vehicle loading is a very significant factor
leading to tread belt separations.<SUP>39</SUP> It also cannot be
disputed that at 26 psi, Ford left a very small leading margin for
safety in the tires.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ See Firestone Tire Failure Analysis, Dr. Sanjay Govindjee,
January 30, 2001, at 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The P235 tire at 26 psi on the Explorer has a margin for safety in
terms of weight of about 150 pounds. At 23 psi, that tire on several
versions of the Explorer has reached its maximum load at the GAWR of
the vehicle.<SUP>40</SUP> Below 23 psi, the tire would be overloaded.
In fact, through 1996, Ford continually added weight to the Explorer.
The 1990 4x4 4-door increased from about 5,000 pounds to nearly 5,400
pounds in 1993 to well over 5,600 pounds in 1996. It is no surprise
that a significant majority of the claims that Firestone has received
is on the heavier Explorers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ See attached chart.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, the Explorer has an extremely low tire inflation safety
factor relative to other popular SUVs.<SUP>41</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ See attached chart.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The bottom line is that Ford placed too much on the tires. It set
the specifications for the tires and Firestone met those
specifications. But Ford also reduced the tire pressure to the minimum
so the inherently unstable Explorer could pass, just barely, internal
J-Turn tests, and so the light truck would ride more like a car to
attract family drivers. At the same time, Ford designed a heavy (and
for that matter, top heavy) vehicle, and then continued to make the
vehicle heavier. No wonder that the combination of low or in many cases
under inflated tires with heavy loaded vehicles in the hot summer lead
to an increase in tread separations.
Not surprisingly, the real world data shows that this is more than
just theory.
iii. the real world data show the explorer has a control problem
Not only do Ford's internal documents show that the Explorer's
designers ignored what they knew about the relationship of understeer
and vehicle control, the real world facts support the conclusion that
this is not a case of a ``bad tire,'' as Ford's Chairman Nasser has
asserted, but a vehicle with a control problem:
1. Of the 2.6 million Wilderness AT 15'' tires not supplied last year
and recalled to General Motors, there are only 2 tread
separation claims--less than 1 ppm!.
2. The non-recalled Wilderness AT 15'' tires supplied to Ford have a
tread separation claims rate 8 times higher on the Explorer
than on the Ford Ranger. The tires on each vehicle are exactly
the same.
3. As of the end of 2000, the total number of tread separation claims
and lawsuits for the 13 million tires that Ford is replacing is
118. That is, less than 10 parts per million or 0.0009%. This
is incredibly low. Ford's announcement to replace these tires
is itself suspect. No rational automobile company in the world
would spend $3 billion to address a ``problem'' that doesn't
exist.
4. Just a few weeks ago, there was a report of a Ford Explorer accident
in Ft. Myers, Fla. According to the report, a BF Goodrich tire
on the left rear separated, the driver then lost control, and
the vehicle ultimately rolled over, killing the driver. In the
newspaper report, the state trooper on the scene stated that a
tread separation does not ordinarily mean that you lose control
of the vehicle.
5. In Venezuela, there are reports of 43 rollover accidents on
Explorers between May 2000 and June of this year. All are
Goodyear or other competitor tires. This rate of rollovers has
prompted the Venezuelan Consumer Protection Agency to consider
that Explorers be banned from the country. In fact, in the last
10 days alone, four people have died in 2 separate Ford
Explorer rollovers; both of the accidents were on competitor
tires.
6. Finally, the crash data itself shows the stability problems in the
Explorer. Based on the Florida Traffic Crash Database, the odds
of an Explorer rolling over in a single vehicle highway tire-
related incident are 4.35 while the odds of comparable SUVs
rolling over in the same accidents are 1.92.<SUP>42</SUP> The
odds ratio of a fatality occurring in such an accident is
nearly three times greater with the Explorer. The Explorer did
not fair much better in Texas. In such incidents based on the
Texas database, the odds ratio of an Explorer rolling over is
1.58 times that of comparable SUVs.<SUP>43</SUP> The odds ratio
of being killed if an individual is in such incident in Texas
while in an Explorer is nearly four times that of other
comparable SUVs.<SUP>44</SUP> This data proves that the
Explorer in single vehicle, tire related highway incidents
simply does not perform up to par with its competitors. The
testing performed by Dr. Dennis Guenther show why.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ See attached chart.
\43\ See id.
\44\ See attached chart.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iv. dr. dennis a. guenther's engineering analysis of the ford explorer
A. Summary
This analysis is focused on the loss of control experienced by the
Explorer in normal highway driving following a rear tire tread/belt
separation (hereinafter ``tread separation'').
Loss of control in this circumstance often results in the Explorer
leaving the highway and rolling over or spinning into an angle relative
to its path of travel on the roadway sufficient to cause rollover, with
or without tripping, or other serious accidents. Because loss of
control is a precursor to rollovers and other serious accidents, the
hypothesis is suggested by common Explorer accident scenarios that the
Explorer has a control problem leading to rollover and other crashes in
the event of tread separation.
Dr. Guenther has tested that hypothesis and found that:
<bullet> the Explorer models he has tested, as designed, have a
significantly lower amount of understeer than the other SUVs he
has evaluated, less than half as much as the Jeep Cherokee and
Chevrolet Blazer;
<bullet> the Explorer loses much of its small margin of understeer when
it is loaded to gross vehicle weight rating; the Cherokee and
the Blazer do not;
<bullet> the Explorer models tested, unlike the Cherokee and the
Blazer, lose all of their understeer and become oversteer
vehicles in most circumstances following tread separation on a
left rear tire, <SUP>45</SUP> the predominant tire position in
Explorer tread separation crashes; the only exception in Dr.
Guenther's investigation is a light load configuration in a
counter-clockwise turn, with the separated tire mounted on the
left rear, a circumstance where the vehicle retains a very
small amount of understeer;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Left rear tread separation is the most common finding in
Explorer accidents involving tread separation and is the condition
examined to date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
<bullet> an oversteer vehicle is extremely difficult for most ordinary
drivers to control, particularly at interstate highway speeds
where it can become directionally unstable;
His conclusion based on these findings is that the Explorer is
defectively designed in that it has an inadequate margin of control in
the foreseeable circumstance of tread separation during normal highway
driving in most load and turning circumstances.
B. Relevant Engineering / Accident Reconstruction Concepts
1. Understeer/Oversteer--The terms ``understeer'' and
``oversteer'', while not particularly descriptive in themselves, are
engineering terms that are used to characterize what is one of the most
significant control relationships in driving an automobile in the
linear range <SUP>46</SUP>--the amount of steering input necessary to
produce an amount of G's of lateral acceleration, which produces the
side force that accomplishes turning of an automobile. It is measured
and expressed in degrees of steering wheel input per G of lateral
acceleration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Linear range in this context refers to normal everyday driving
by average drivers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The amount of understeer or oversteer in a vehicle is measured by
driving the vehicle in a constant radius circle at an increasing speed
and recording the degrees of steer input per G of lateral acceleration.
In an understeer vehicle a test driver, in terms of what he perceives
and does in that circumstance, must steer toward the center of the
circle, with increasing steer input as he increases speed, in order to
stay on the path of the constant radius circle; that is the same thing
the average driver experiences as he drives around a curve--he must
steer to the inside of the curve in order to generate the side force
necessary to turn the vehicle and stay on the curving path, and the
rear of the vehicle follows the front around the circle.
An oversteer vehicle behaves just the opposite. The test driver
would have to steer away from the center of the circle in order to stay
on the constant radius circle as his speed increases' he would have to
``take steer out'' or ``reverse steer'' in order to keep the car on the
path of the circle as he increases speed.<SUP>47</SUP> ``Because of
this need for steering reversal, final oversteer is generally
considered bad.'' <SUP>48</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ See Gillespie, ``Fundamentals of Vehicle Dynamics,'' for a
technical definition of ``understeer'' and ``oversteer.''
\48\ Dixon, ``Limit Steady State Vehicle Handling,'' at page 283,
col. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Automobile manufacturers do not intentionally design an oversteer
characteristic into cars intended for ordinary drivers because ``a
vehicle that oversteers, by design or circumstance, is highly
undesirable.'' <SUP>49</SUP> The vehicle dynamics literature is clear
that an oversteering vehicle is directionally unstable--generally
speaking, ``an understeering vehicle is a directionally stable
vehicle'' and ``an oversteering vehicle is directionally an unstable
vehicle.'' <SUP>50</SUP> A vehicle is directionally unstable if
steering or disturbances, such as wind, generate forces that cause an
ever-increasing vehicle response until it spins out.<SUP>51</SUP>
Oversteer characteristically results in spinout.<SUP>52</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Dickerson, et al., ``Vehicle Handling with Tire Tread
Separation,'' at 2 (1999).
\50\ Bergman, ``The Basic Nature of Vehicle Understeer-Oversteer''
at page 11, col. 1 (1965).
\51\ Id.
\52\ See ``NHTSA: An Experimental Examination of Selected Maneuvers
That May Induce On-Road Untripped, Light Vehicle Rollover--Phase II of
NHTSA's 1997-1998 Vehicle Rollover Research Program'' at page 29
(1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Generally, it is ``desirable to have understeer to avoid
directional instability.'' <SUP>53</SUP> Ford, like any other
automobile manufacturer, tries to build understeer into its
cars.<SUP>54</SUP> They do this because understeer is essential to
safely control an automobile.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Allen, et al., ``Characteristics Influencing Ground Vehicle
Lateral/Directional Dynamic Stability'' at page 27, col. 1 (1991).
\54\ See, e.g., note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Car designers can increase or decrease the amount of understeer in
a vehicle by many different means--by adjusting spring rates,
suspension geometry, frame stiffness, roll damping, tire properties,
tire pressure, weight distribution, and other vehicle and component
characteristics. They adjust these and other elements which result in
the amount and character of control available. Automobile designers, of
course, may adjust these elements for reasons other than achieving or
influencing controllability; they may, for example, make such
adjustments to seek ride comfort, to achieve a ``flat'' European
cornering feel, to improve rollover resistance, or for other reasons.
Each of those trade-offs for such reasons, however, potentially affects
the amount of understeer and the amount of control safety margin, and
the result is exacerbated by the potentially greater understeer needs
of SUVs.
Cars differ from each other in how much control margin, or
understeer, they have. How much understeer is necessary to provide a
safe margin of control? The answer from an engineering perspective is:
The amount necessary to provide predictable vehicle control in
foreseeable driving circumstances for the drivers intended for that
vehicle.
The foreseeable circumstances of driving include many things--the
coefficient of friction of the roadway surface, wind gusts, ice and
snow, vehicle load, component wear and failure, the effect of heat and
use on the fit and flexibility of suspension system components, and
many others. One foreseeable circumstance, of course, is tires wearing
out and eventually failing, including tread separation, the most common
mode of wearout failure for steel belted radial tires. All of these
circumstances can cause an increase in the need for understeer or
directly decrease the amount of understeer available in the vehicle.
For example, tread separation will change tire properties related to
understeer, decreasing cornering stiffness and traction provided by
belt and tread.
These are not new considerations for Ford automobile designers. For
more than 30 years, the technical literature relating to tire influence
on vehicle dynamics has pointed out that in order to avoid oversteer
following rear tire failure, ``it is desirable to make the car strongly
understeer in the original condition.'' <SUP>55</SUP> Tests on the
predecessor to the Explorer, the Bronco II, demonstrated that following
rear tire tread separation that ``vehicle exhibited dramatic oversteer
characteristics and was unstable.'' <SUP>56</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ Kondo, et al., ``Dynamical Behaviors Of A Car When One Tire Is
Punctured Simulatively'' at pages 2, 43 (1968).
\56\ See note 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not only is oversteer an unacceptable vehicle characteristic, but
the transition from understeer to oversteer that might occur in the
event of loss of tread and tire cornering properties, if sufficient
understeer is not originally built into the car, is particularly
dangerous. The unexpected reversal of the handling characteristics of
the car in that circumstance is just the sort of unexpected event that
leads to driving accidents; it is particularly unexpected because
``none of the currently manufactured passenger cars show such behavior
in ordinary driving.'' <SUP>57</SUP> The ordinary driver has not
experienced and cannot anticipate the catastrophic results of this
reversal
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Bergman, ``Considerations in Determining Vehicle Handling
Requirements'' at page 7, col. 1 (1969).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the car designer's engineering obligations is to quantify
the amount of understeer and other vehicle control characteristics
required to account and compensate for such varying and foreseeable
events, the inevitable changes in driving circumstances. By that
quantification he determines the amount of understeer, the margin of
control, that must be designed into the car.
2. Tread Separation
Tread separation is a failure mode usual in steel belted radial
tires.<SUP>58</SUP> The majority of Firestone tires incurring a tread
separation, without some causally related damage to the tire, are high
mileage tires with long use. The causes of this form of failure are
heat, loading, oxidation and cyclic stressing, all of which can weaken
and result in shearing of the rubber bond between the layers of steel
belts, which centrifugal force can then pull apart. This breakdown is
an inevitable result of the chemical and physical properties of rubber
tires and how they are commonly used.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ See, e.g. Robinette, et al., ``Drag and Steering Effects of
Under Inflated and Deflated Tires'' (1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Those who are unfamiliar with tires or with accident reconstruction
tend to describe tread separations or accidents associated with tread
separations as if they are explosive events in which the vehicle is
thrown out of control by the force of the separation. The scientific
literature and testing commissioned by automobile manufacturers and
others, however, has repeatedly demonstrated that this is not correct.
For example, Carr Engineering, vehicle dynamics experts regularly
retained by Ford to testify in automotive litigation, carried out
testing on behalf of Ford relating to, among other things, the forces
involved in tread separation. Their findings in those tests led them to
conclude:
During the tread separation event, the tire did pull the
vehicle slightly to one side but the driver kept a straight
line path with a small steering correction. This amplitude of
steer angle is small and on the order required to keep a
vehicle in the lane on curved highways or in a straight path
during other events such as wind gusts or driving through water
puddles at highway speeds.<SUP>59</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Document BGC 0016305-311, memorandum from Tandy to Mickus,
January 23, 1999, at pages 2-3.. [Test vehicles included a 1993 Ford
Explorer, 1986 Ford Bronco II, 1986 Ford Bronco II XLT, 1994 Dodge
Intrepid, 1987 Ford Club Wagon van, 1990 Ford Bronco, 1990 Ford
Aerostar van, 1987 Toyota van].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other automotive researchers, including plaintiff experts pursuing
forensic inquiries, academic researchers, and Firestone, have arrived
at the same conclusion based on numerous tests, including tests
involving the Explorer and the Firestone tires mounted on it as
original equipment. For example:
<bullet> ``[S]eparation by itself was not sufficient to cause loss of
control.'' ``No induced steering was felt as a result of tread
separation.'' ``Test results by this author corroborate work by
Gardner who measured that steering wheel inputs during tread
separation are of the order of magnitude of lane change
maneuvers during high speed travel.'' <SUP>60</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Klein, et al. ``Anatomy of Accidents Following Tire
Disablements,'' at page 6 (1999). [Test vehicles were 1989 Pathfinder
and 1982 Chevrolet pickup].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
<bullet> ``Maintaining control of the vehicle after tread/belt
separation requires a steering torque similar to that required
for a lane change maneuver.'' ``The results of the testing show
that the forces developed during a tread/belt detachment are
well within the range of a driver's ability to control a
vehicle.'' <SUP>61</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Gardner, ``The Role of Tread/Belt Detachment In Accident
Causation,'' at pages 7-8, 10 (1998). [Test vehicles were Ford
Explorer, Camry Station Wagon, and Chevy Truck C2500].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
<bullet> ``Little or no corrective steering action was needed to
maintain control of the vehicle during the tread separation
events.'' <SUP>62</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Fay, et al., ``Drag and Steering Effect from Tire Tread Belt
Separation and Loss,'' at page 13 (1999). [Test vehicle was 1993 Ford
Taurus].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Descriptions of tread separation related accidents also sometimes
fail to accurately capture the sequential nature of those accidents.
Engineering analysis and accident reconstruction require that tread
separation and accidents associated with them be broken down into their
separate parts. For those purposes, the accident events should be
viewed as three separate and sequential elements:
a. Pre-separation--This is characterized by vibration felt
generally in the vehicle, (see notes 58 and 60) as the tire is deformed
from a smooth circle to an irregular ``circle'' by movement of the
tread and belt. This vibration is something most drivers have
experienced in connection with a failed tire, whether a puncture
blowout or a tread separation or some other mode of tire failure.
The vibration serves as notice that something is wrong with a tire,
a message that most drivers understand as requiring them to take their
foot off the gas, check the traffic around them, and begin to move to
the shoulder of the highway to change the tire.
b. Separation--Testing, (see notes 58,59,60 & 61) establishes that
the actual tread separation is a benign event in terms of the amount
and duration of forces exerted on the automobile laterally,
longitudinally and vertically.
c. Post-separation--In the period immediately following tread
separation on a rear tire any SUV will lose some understeer because the
tire properties contributing to control of the vehicle--cornering
stiffness, traction, etc.--will have been reduced because of removal of
the tread and one of the steel belts. It is the controllability of the
Explorer in this circumstance that Dr. Guenther is investigating.
C. Engineering Evaluation Of Explorer Directional Control
Dr. Guenther was retained by counsel to assist them in the
preparation of Firestone's defense in the personal injury litigation
arising out of Explorer crash and rollover accidents. While he made
measurements of and inspected various Explorers and engaged in some
accident reconstruction at the direction of counsel, he did not
undertake the dynamics testing and data analysis underlying his
conclusions concerning the controllability of the Explorer until last
month.
Firestone had expected that Ford, as part of a root cause analysis,
would focus on the vehicle and provide Firestone, NHTSA and the
Congress information about the vehicle's handling in a tread separation
event. Ford has 15 years of experience in the design and development of
and litigation about the Explorer. They have that information.
Firestone requested Ford participation in investigation of the vehicle
in October of last year. In spite of repeated follow up requests, Ford
made no response to Firestone. It became clear that Dr. Guenther's
engineering evaluation of the Explorer would be important not only in
defense of the litigation but in addressing congressional, regulatory
and public concerns about automotive safety relating to loss of control
and rollover of the Explorer when it experienced tread separation.
1. Testing Conducted--a. Site--The tests were carried out at the
Transportation Research Center, Inc. (TRC) test facility near East
Liberty, Ohio. The facility is used on a contract basis by numerous
automobile manufacturers, component suppliers, and state and national
regulatory authorities to conduct automotive safety testing. It was
used by NHTSA, for example, in 1997-98 to conduct extensive tests of
maneuvers that may induce on-road untripped rollover in various
vehicles, including the Ford Explorer.<SUP>63</SUP> Ford used TRC in
development testing of the UN-105, the version of the Explorer offered
in 1995 and subsequent years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ See note 52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Study Objectives--The purpose of the testing program, which is
ongoing, is to examine the margin of control in the Explorer as
designed and, comparatively, in peer SUVs in the circumstance following
rear tire tread separation. Due to the complexities and non-linearity
of vehicles and the nature of the Explorer accidents, Dr. Guenther
chose to explore the linear range as a preliminary investigation. In
the linear range, a principal parameter of control is the understeer/
oversteer gradient (other parameters such as steering response time and
gain, and steering frequency response are also being examined as they
may relate to loss of control in the event of tire tread separation).
c. Test Vehicles--The vehicles evaluated are the following:
1996......................... Ford Explorer.. 4 dr 4 x 2
1996......................... Chevy Blazer... 4 dr 4 x 2
2001......................... Jeep Cherokee.. 4 dr 4 x 2
2000......................... Ford Explorer.. 4 dr 4 x 2
Each vehicle was tested with its original equipment (OE) tires at
OEM recommended tire pressure. The 1996 Explorer was tested with both
OE Firestone tires and OE Goodyear tires recommended by Ford.
d. Vehicle Instrumentation and Measurement--The data acquired for
purposes of this analysis was the following: <SUP>64</SUP>
\64\ See attached exhibit 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vehicle Input
Steering Wheel Angle
Vehicle Speed
Vehicle Response
Lateral Acceleration
Yaw Rate
Body Roll Angle
e. Test Maneuvers--The tests conducted are universally recognized
standard tests used by automobile manufacturers, including Ford, and
other researchers in vehicle dynamics for establishing the values
investigated. The tests are as follows:
Step Steer--The vehicle is driven on the test pad area in a
straight line at a constant speed. The driver then rapidly turns the
steering wheel until it hits a mechanical stop. Steering wheel stops
are set to attain a desired lateral acceleration at the test speeds.
This steer angle is held until steady-state response is established.
Tests were run in both directions (right turn/left turn) and at two
speeds (60 mph and 40 mph). The test was run both with four good tires
and with the left rear tire detreaded by cutting between the steel
belts; test runs with the detreaded tire were done only at the slower
40 mph speed. Test runs were done at both light load (curb plus driver
and instrumentation) and heavy load (gross vehicle weight rating).
The test is used to measure vehicle response times as related to
lateral acceleration and yaw velocity response, and to measure the gain
of these responses in relation to steering wheel input (output divided
by input).
Constant Radius Circle--The vehicle is driven around a 200 foot
constant radius circle with increasing speed. The driver adjusts the
steering angle (by turning the steering wheel) as necessary to keep the
vehicle on the path of the circle.
Test runs were done in both directions, clockwise and counter-
clockwise, with four good tires and with the left rear tire detreaded.
Test runs were done at light load (curb plus driver and
instrumentation) and heavy load (gross vehicle weight rating).
The test is used to measure understeer and oversteer (degrees of
road wheel steer per Gs of lateral acceleration).
Frequency Response--Sinusoidal sweep steering tests are frequently
used to determine the linear response of vehicles. The vehicles in
these tests were driven on a long straightaway with the driver steering
with slowly increasing frequency up to approximately 3 to 4 hz followed
by decreasing frequency. The test was run at a nominal speed of 66 mph.
The test measures lateral acceleration gain, yaw velocity gain, and
phase angles at the frequencies tested (up to 3 to 4 hz).
f. Results of Directional Control Tests--The results of the
constant radius circle tests are set forth in data sheets and charts
attached hereto as Exhibit 6. Data reduction and analysis continues
with respect to the step steer and frequency response tests.
In summary, the findings in the tests are as follows:
Constant Radius Circle--This standard method of measuring
understeer/oversteer gradient establishes that the Explorer, with four
good tires, has a relatively small amount of understeer compared to
other SUVs tested--less than half the amount found in the Blazer and
the Cherokee. In fact, the Cherokee has about the same understeer with
a detreaded tire as the Explorer with four good tires. These findings
are consistent with NHTSA vehicle characterization tests that found
that the Explorer had the lowest amount of understeer of the 12
vehicles on which it conducted rollover-inducing maneuver
tests.<SUP>65</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ See note 42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The test results show that, unlike the other SUVs tested, the
Explorer loses its small margin of understeer when it experiences a
tread separation and becomes an oversteer vehicle.
This is true whether the Explorer is operated on Goodyear OE tires
recommended by Ford or on Firestone OE tires.
The Explorer's oversteer characteristic is worse in the loaded
condition. The only circumstance in which it does not become oversteer
with a detreaded tire is when it is lightly loaded (curb plus driver
and instrumentation) and the detreaded tire is on the inside rear
position (left rear in a counter-clockwise turn); in test runs in that
configuration the Explorer is almost neutral steer with respect to the
understeer/oversteer gradient.
An oversteer vehicle is not safe at highway speeds in the hands of
an average driver. Sometimes a driver may achieve directional control,
sometimes he may not.
In addition to his dynamic testing, Dr. Guenther has carried out
several accident reconstructions involving Explorer crashes and
reviewed numerous police accident reports concerning such accidents.
Explorer rollover accidents, as reflected in those reconstructions and
police accident reports, frequently occur
<bullet> on interstate or similar high-quality, high-speed roadways,
without environmental interference;
<bullet> in straight line travel;
<bullet> at highway speed
<bullet> with no driver impairment
<bullet> with no risky behavior
<bullet> with rear tire tread separation
<bullet> with some apparent effort at driver steering control reflected
in change(s) of vehicle heading and path of travel.
2. Conclusion
The Explorer is an oversteer vehicle in most circumstances after it
experiences tread separation. Oversteer can make a vehicle
directionally unstable and subject to loss of control in the hands of
most drivers. This is a vehicle problem, not a tire problem. The
vehicle performs the same following tread separation on the Goodyear
tire as it does the Firestone tire. This must be regarded as a highway
safety defect within the meaning of the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act.
v. the ford ``explorer vehicle dynamics presentation'' to nhtsa of
march 28-29, 2001 concerning explorer loss of control following tread
separation is misleading and irrelevant
The following statements and charts are examples of the many
inaccuracies and irrelevancies contained in the Ford vehicle dynamics
presentation to NHTSA:
<bullet> Statement at page TH-3 18. Exhibit 7--The statement about
tread separation, ``This fundamental cause [of loss of control, i.e.,
decreased tire traction] overwhelms differences in design among vehicle
classes or within vehicle classes. Explorers perform like all other
vehicles'', is true only with respect to limit maneuvers, that is, at
high lateral acceleration where most of us never operate a vehicle,
even in most emergency maneuvers. The statement is not relevant or
accurate in the linear range of maneuvering, that is, at low lateral
accelerations experienced in normal driving (e.g., 0.3 Gs or less). The
maneuver involved in correcting for the small amount of drag following
a belt separation (similar to a normal lane change steer, according to
SAE test literature),<SUP>66</SUP> or the maneuver involved in bringing
the car to the shoulder so that you can change the tire is just such a
low lateral acceleration maneuver, even at highway speeds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ See, e.g., Klein, et al., ``Anatomy of Accidents Following
Tire Disablements'' (1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In normal everyday driving maneuvers following a tread separation
the Explorer does not perform like all other vehicles. In this
circumstance, it has a higher likelihood of loss of control because it
lacks the necessary margin of understeer to remain directionally
controllable in highway maneuvers involved in normal driving. Peer
SUVs, such as the Cherokee and Blazer, remain understeer and more
controllable in a wider range of maneuvers following tread separation
than the Explorer.
<bullet> Statement at page TH-3 76. Exhibit 7--This chart purports
to show results of various SUV vehicles in a constant radius circle
test following a tread separation. It shows all vehicles including the
Explorer maneuvering at more than 0.5 G lateral acceleration with a
separated tire on the outside rear. That is a physical impossibility in
normal highway travel; these vehicles in general and the Explorer in
particular cannot generate that much lateral acceleration with a
detreaded tire in the outside rear position in normal highway travel.
The Explorer will spin out of control before it reaches 0.5 G lateral
acceleration in this circumstance. Ford can do it only as a trick on a
low speed 100 foot radius circle. It indicates the irrelevant nature of
the information presented to NHTSA in its vehicle dynamics
presentation.
The suggestion accompanying the chart that ``Explorers and peer
vehicles oversteer above approximately 0.4G, with tread off of outside
rear tire'' is not accurate or relevant. The Explorer with a detreaded
tire is oversteer in that circumstance at all lower lateral
acceleration levels while the Blazer and Cherokee are not. Moreover, it
is not relevant to an analysis of highway safety in normal driving
because motorists generally do not operate their vehicles at the higher
level of lateral acceleration examined by Ford. The assertion is made
that ``tread separation on O/S rear tire narrows differences among all
vehicles (overwhelms design differences)'' is, again, not accurate in
the linear range; it only applies to limit maneuvers. Following tread
separation, the Blazer and Cherokee maintain understeer in the linear
range while the Explorer has none and changes completely to oversteer;
the Cherokee, in fact, has about as much understeer with a detreaded
outside rear tire as the Explorer does with four good tires. Similarly,
the statement that ``Explorer performance is typical of peer vehicles''
is not accurate for linear range operations for the same reason. The
Explorer is oversteer in the linear range of lateral acceleration
following outside rear tread separation (about 0.3G or less); other
SUVs remain understeer in the linear range.
<bullet> Statement at page TH-3 87. Exhibit 7--This simulation
chart depicts all vehicles as having the same maneuvering limits
following a tread separation. Dr. Guenther's testing at TRC
demonstrates the contrary in the linear range and the computer-
generated simulation has no basis in fact.
<bullet> Statement at page TH-3 132. Exhibit 7--The first and
fourth statements on this page are presented without any supporting
data of any sort. The Explorer does not ``perform similar to others in
its class in the event of a tire tread separation'', rather, it becomes
oversteer, an unpredictable, unfamiliar, unsafe handling condition. For
that reason, the Explorer does not ``have a margin of safety `as
designed' to accommodate, to a reasonable level, component failures
including tread separations.''
<bullet> Statement at page TH-3 134. Exhibit 7--The fourth
statement on this page is false. The designers of the Blazer and the
Cherokee have in fact provided a margin of control safety following
tread separation in the design of those vehicles. They did it more than
a decade ago, when the Blazer and the Cherokee were the primary SUV
examples available to Ford engineers for comparative analysis when they
designed and developed the Explorer.
vi. conclusion
Ford has had over twenty years to adjust the design of the Ford
Explorer and to work cooperatively and responsibly with its tire
suppliers to ensure the safety and stability of its vehicle. To date,
it has failed to do so. The design of the Explorer is an oversteer
vehicle in the event of a tread separation. A tread separation is
normally a benign event that a driver can control by pulling to the
shoulder of any roadway. The flawed design of the Explorer, however,
renders the vehicle in a tread separation event susceptible to rollover
and therefore potentially lethal. While real world data and an
engineering analysis of the vehicle confirm this phenomenon, Ford
refuses to accept the facts and take responsibility. The purpose of
this analysis is to ensure that these facts are publicly known, and, in
the best case, to compel Ford to take responsibility for its flawed
attempts to protect its defective product.
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Mr. Stearns. Okay. Hospitable questions.
Mr. Lampe, you know, you have a disadvantage that you have
to sit here for 4 hours before you become the second panel; but
you have the advantage, because you've heard Mr. Nasser, and
now he is not in a position to answer, but you've made a pretty
strong statement here in your opening statement about the Ford
vehicle, the SUV.
Just a rather quick observation. We had two hearings with
your corporation last year, and yet the allegation or the
statement against the Ford SUV was not as strong back then. Is
the information that you've received subsequent to those--to
your hearings, is why you're making your claims so much
stronger?
Mr. Lampe. Yes, Chairman Stearns. We, as you remember last
year, did say you can take our tires off and the Ford Explorer
is going to continue to roll over. We've said many times this
is a tire/vehicle issue. We have to look at the tire and the
vehicle. But since that time, I think you're aware of Dr.
Gunther's study on the Ford Explorer as compared to the Jeep
Cherokee, the Blazer. And it's very compelling, the evidence
that was found in the study, that the understeer to oversteer
transition and the oversteer itself in the Ford Explorer makes
it a very difficult drive for the normal driver to control.
Mr. Stearns. Well, you know, he did that study in May, as I
understand, recently, didn't he?
Mr. Lampe. Yes, he did.
Mr. Stearns. So you didn't have that information back
there, and when you talked about the Ford SUV, I think you were
talking in terms of vehicle application. It wasn't such a
strong statement as you're making this morning--this afternoon.
Well, how do you explain the high rates of tread separation on
these Wilderness AT tires? I mean, shouldn't consumers be
concerned about it? Are you just saying it's all Ford's fault?
And some of these rates are high, and so I think you have to
say that there's some culpability on your part.
Mr. Lampe. And, Chairman Stearns, we did a recall--safety
recall last August. It wasn't mandated. NHTSA had not finished
their investigation. I think they will tell you they were
months and months away from completing any investigation. We
announced that recall on a voluntary basis because we felt
there were issues, and we wanted to get some of those tires off
the road. But our tires are safe. Our tires are safe that are
on the road today.
Mr. Stearns. You probably heard when I talked to Mr. Nasser
about this B rating versus a C rating, and I understand the
Firestone tires on the Ford Explorer have a temperature
resistant rating of a C, and that these tires meet the minimum
performance required by Federal safety standards as well as
Ford's own specification.
Can you tell me, like Goodyear has a B, I mean, can you
tell me what that C rating means and--versus a B rating? After
all, I know that Firestone supplies General Motors with tires
as original equipment and that General Motors will not allow
any tire with less than a B rating on their SUVs. So why is
there inconsistency between what General Motors does and what
you do for them and what you did for Ford Motor Company?
Mr. Lampe. First, Mr. Chairman, we supplied Ford with the
tire they asked for, designed to their specifications. C--there
are millions and millions of tires with a C temperature range
that operate in all parts of the country. C temperature is not
an indication of area--works in one area better than another
area. It's one of the three ranges that is established by the
Uniform Tire Quality Grading System. It's a high-speed test,
and you must remember that the UTQG test that determines not
only speed rating but temperature is a high-speed test.
Mr. Stearns. So when Ford specifies a C and you----
Mr. Lampe. I'll correct that, Congressman.
Mr. Stearns. General Motors, you provide a B; and C you
provided to Ford, and you decided that?
Mr. Lampe. Chairman Stearns. And the one kind of
misstatement was Ford did not specify----
Mr. Stearns. I understand that.
Mr. Lampe. [continuing] a C. They did not specify----
Mr. Stearns. So you decided that?
Mr. Lampe. That's the tire we gave them that met the C
requirements. I'll point out from our standpoint that we try to
make sure that an entire line of tires has the same grade to
make it less confusing for the consumer. Many, many of those
sizes and types in the Wilderness line actually met the B
temperature grade requirement. But to be consistent and to
avoid confusion, we mark them all at the minimum.
Mr. Stearns. But if you're--are you saying that we should
have--the consumer should have no concern about a C versus a B?
It just is something the consumer shouldn't be concerned about?
Are you saying your C-rated tires would perform just as well as
a B-rated tire for General Motors?
Mr. Lampe. I'm saying, sir, that the C-rated tires are
perfectly acceptable for any geographic region for any
application in the United States. There's literally tens of--
15, 20 million C-rated tires, more than that operating today.
Mr. Stearns. Well, the obvious question is, why do we have
a B-rated tire on General Motors and a C-rated on Ford?
Mr. Lampe. I was not--I was not aware of the General
Motors, but I will obviously assume that's correct. And if they
ask for a specification and a specified B rating, that's
certainly what we would strive to provide for them.
Mr. Stearns. Okay. In the Ford testimony today, was there
anything that he said that you object to very strongly in terms
of his understanding of your product that you would like to go
on record, other than saying his vehicle is bad? To use the
words of don't feel--don't find fault, but find a remedy. I
mean, are there things that he said, instead of attacking Ford,
that you feel about your product that you would like to defend?
Mr. Lampe. Sir, I don't mean to be perceived as attacking
Ford. I think there are some issues that need to get out and
need to be answered. Yes, testing of the tires; we did testing
of tires. We did testing against a number of tires, but the
tests we did were significantly more scientific and more fair,
just basically fair. I mentioned that Goodyear, on their rig
testing, took our tires, and some of which were 9 years old,
and compared them and tested them to the Goodyear tires, which
were less than a year old.
When you take their data and you take out our 9-year-old
tires and you take apples to apples, our new tires compared to
the Goodyear new tires were equal.
The same thing on this temperature test. I'll tell you a
statement that was made by one Ford engineer when we asked, why
didn't you use internal temperature rather than surface
temperature? You know. You're an engineer. It's much more
reflective of internal tire heat buildup. He said, we didn't
use internal temperature because there wasn't much difference
between all the brands.
Those are the things that really bother me, the nonapples
to apples comparison. There were a number of other, obviously,
areas in Mr. Nasser's testimony that I don't agree to, but you
asked me to stick--focus on the tires, and that's what I'll do.
Mr. Stearns. Thank you. My time has expired.
The gentleman who is the ranking member of the Commerce,
Trade, and Consumer Protection Subcommittee, Mr. Towns.
Mr. Towns. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lampe, I would like to understand a little more about
Firestone's criticism of the Explorer. I see in your material a
lot of discussion about concepts like oversteer and understeer.
Am I correct?
Mr. Lampe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Towns. At the end of the day, aren't we really talking
about steering responsiveness?
Mr. Lampe. Sir, it's, again, my understanding that Dr.
Gunther's concern is more the ability--the ability to the--of
the driver to maintain correctional--directional control at
normal highway speeds if that vehicle goes from an understeer
to an oversteer. If the driver is not able to maintain control,
the back end starts to roll out on him, and then the car is
going sideways to its intended direction of travel and starts
to roll over. But it's the driver's inability to maintain
control, is my understanding.
Mr. Towns. Aren't the manufacturers generally moving in the
direction of designing their vehicles to have more responsive
steering? Is that correct?
Mr. Lampe. All automobile manufacturers strive to design
into their vehicle a certain amount of understeer, because we
can all deal with understeer. You and I, the normal driving
public, can deal with understeer, and that's preferable. What
we don't want to experience and what the automobile
manufacturers don't want to put their customers into that
situation, is that oversteer position.
Mr. Towns. Let me sort of get one thing clear. Could you
sort of give me quickly the difference in terms of your testing
and the difference between Ford's testing of the tires? What's
the difference? I mean, just briefly.
Mr. Lampe. Okay. Very briefly, first of all, we tested--
when we tested temperature of the tire, we stick a pyrometer
down inside the tire into the belt edge to measure the heat
buildup at the belt edge where separations start. We don't
measure the surface at the tire. When we measured--we make a
test called high-speed SAE test, run-to-fail. You purposely run
the tires at a higher speed, and then you step up the speed and
you step up the speed until the tires fail. That's what it's
designed to do, to make the tire fail.
We did 2 of our tires, 10 of our competitor tires,
gentlemen; the most common failure, most common--and especially
Goodyear has said many times, the most common failure of a tire
is tread separation, and when we ran those tests, sure enough,
8 out of the 10 tires that we ran on the high-speed test
experienced belt-leaving-belt separation. We tested them to
fail. Don't--I'm not saying they were bad tires. We ran them
till they failed, but the failure mode is belt leaving belt.
That's very common.
Goodyear has said it a number of tires. For anybody to say
that a separation is not a foreseeable event or not an event
that a car manufacturer should make sure that he gives his
consumer adequate control over is wrong.
Mr. Towns. Let me just run back to the Dr. Gunther test
again. Dr.--it's indicated Dr. Gunther really tested access to
steering responsiveness. You didn't tell him to test any of
those new design vehicles with more responsive steering, did
you?
Mr. Lampe. No, Congressman Towns. We--we left it up
completely to Dr. Gunther. He's the expert. Again, he's an
expert in vehicle dynamics. He performed standard routine
tests, and they're very reputable. You can repeat them and
repeat them, standard recognized tests on the three best-
selling SUVs in the marketplace: The Explorer, the Jeep
Cherokee, and the Blazer.
Mr. Towns. Well, you know, that's the thing. They're saying
that he did it on a 1996 Chevy Blazer and a Jeep Cherokee,
right, both of which had older designs with less responsive
steering. And of course, for example, you did not ask him to
test the new BMW-X5 or the Mercedes ML 320, both of which have
more responsive steering than all of those that you mentioned.
Am I correct?
Mr. Lampe. Yes, sir. And I understand both of those
vehicles that you mentioned also have a traction control--a
very sophisticated traction control device to help that vehicle
not go into an oversteer position. But, no, we did not test
them. The Jeep Cherokee was the year 2000. The Explorer was the
1996, and the Blazer was a 1996. And we also tested another
Explorer with Goodyear tires.
Mr. Towns. At this time I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you very much.
Mr. Lampe. Thank you.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from
Pennsylvania, the chairman of the Oversight and Investigations
Committee, Mr. Greenwood.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Mr.
Lampe.
Mr. Lampe. Thank you very much.
Mr. Greenwood. I want to go back to a question I think Mr.
Stearns started to focus on, and try to get a little bit more
clarification. We've got three of your plants with very, very
different rates of tire tread separation: Wilson, 19; Joliette
at 2.8; and Aiken at zero. Are those numbers correct?
Mr. Lampe. I believe so, yes, sir.
Mr. Greenwood. Now, it's a simple question. I assume that
if the Ford Explorers that were put on are a random selection
of Ford Explorers, and they're not--you can't say that the
Wilson plant went on a certain kind of Explorer or a certain
run of Explorers, and then the Joliette plant tires went on a
different run of Explorers. It seems the common denominator is
the Explorer, and the variable is the plant. And so the
question is: How can you attribute the significant variation in
the tire tread separation rates, when the only thing that seems
to be at variance here is the plant and not the vehicle?
Mr. Lampe. First of all, a number of our plants make sizes
for the Explorer. Some are the same sizes, some are different.
The other thing you have to remember, Congressman, is that
Wilson tire plant has hundreds of lines of tires, hundreds,
that have never had a claim. And if you take the Explorer-
produced claims or the Explorer-responsible claims out of our
data base, our claims statistics fall dramatically. And
certainly the number of injuries and fatalities falls
dramatically. Our Wilson plant is a fairly new plant. I think
it's about 25 years old. The Aiken plant is brand new. It's
only 4 or 5 years old. They use similar manufacturing
techniques in a lot of cases. There are some differences in
equipment, but the performance rate and the claims rate in
Wilson on their overall production is excellent and very good.
Mr. Greenwood. What do you think is the cause of that very
statistically significant, I assume, range in claims rates
based on tire tread separation for these plants?
Mr. Lampe. Again, Congressman, it can be the application of
vehicle that goes on. One of the variables, too; take the Ford
Explorer. Wilson tires going into their assembly plants, their
manufacturing plants, St. Louis and Louisville, versus Joliette
tires, the distribution of the Wilson-made production might end
up going a lot more further south to the warmer States and the
hotter States, when the Joliette production stays more up in
the north and Canada.
Mr. Greenwood. You're saying ``might,'' or the data
indicates that?
Mr. Lampe. It might. I'd have to see the distribution data
from Ford. They had that information. I'd have to see that, but
it very well could influence the rate.
Mr. Greenwood. Have you asked Ford for that data? I would
think that would be fairly significant information for your
company to have.
Mr. Lampe. We asked for that data. We asked for--from Ford,
the Ranger distribution data, because we wanted to see that
comparison between the Explorer and the Ranger. Sir, we asked
for it. We asked for it and we asked for it. And it wasn't
until May 11, after I refused to hand over some information to
Ford, until they handed over the information to me, so I
could----
Mr. Greenwood. Have you had a chance to analyze it so we
know whether, in fact, these different claims rates reflect
geography as opposed to something in a tire?
Mr. Lampe. I do not--I cannot say that with all certainty.
Congressman, I would--one other thing I would like to point
out. We talk a lot about claims. Claims is a word, is a
classification, that didn't even exist 8 months ago. There is
no standard definition of claims in the industry. What Goodyear
says a claim is, could be completely different than what we
said it is. There is no standard established by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration as to what a claim is, or
what an acceptable rate is. But the important thing is that
what happens after the separation, after the separation. Again,
a driver should not lose control of his vehicle. It's a rare
event, but it is a foreseeable event, and it is one that
happens.
Mr. Greenwood. I agree with you. This whole business of
claims rate is not good science. This is about how many calls
are made to NHTSA, and as we all know, those calls can be
inspired by what happens in the news, they can be inspired by
what's happening in the courtrooms. And there's nothing final
about this information that we learn from claims rates. Let
me----
Mr. Lampe. And the Congressman is really referring to even
another measure that is different from claims rate, the Vehicle
Owner's Questionnaire reports that NHTSA gets. You get the
VOQs, you get claims, you get adjustments. It is a confusing
subject.
Mr. Greenwood. Let me go to another subject. You rely to a
great extent on the research of Dr. Gunther who ran experiments
detailing the amount of understeer and oversteer of the Ford
Explorer. Dr. Gunther compared the 1996 and the 2000 Ford
Explorer to the 1996 Blazer and the 2001 Jeep Cherokee. Dr.
Carr, hired by Ford, argues that these vehicles are not
comparable to the Explorer, and that neither have similar
steering mechanisms, which creates a situation where the
Explorer will necessarily look far worse. How do you respond to
that comment?
Mr. Lampe. Dr. Gunther is an expert, sir. He's a full
professor at the Ohio State University. He has done a
tremendous amount of work for NHTSA. He's done work for the
automobile companies. He is the expert. He selected the
vehicles to get the best comparison, the best comparative test
that he could do. The tests that he ran are standard,
repetitive-type tests, recognized in the industry.
Mr. Greenwood. But you do acknowledge that there are
different configurations in these vehicles in terms of their
steering mechanisms.
Mr. Lampe. I do not know that for a fact. No, I cannot say
that.
Mr. Greenwood. My time has expired.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired. The chairman
of the full committee, Mr. Dingell, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lampe.
Mr. Lampe. Morning, Congressman.
Mr. Dingell. I have a series of questions. But first, it
was 1992 when Bridgestone/Firestone began its turnaround. I'm
reading now from the Akron Beacon Journal. It opted to move its
headquarters from Akron, Ohio to Nashville, Tennessee to get a
new lease on its corporate life. ``Ono,'' Bridgestone/Firestone
CEO at the time said, ``last year's results,'' that is, 1997,
``showed the improvement of cost-cutting and increased sales in
the 5-year period.''
Did Bridgestone/Firestone launch some sort of cost-cutting
effort in the early and mid-1990's to deal with its profit and
loss and debt situation?
Mr. Lampe. Congressman Dingell, I'm not--could you be a
little bit more specific? We're always--certainly we're always
trying to improve our productivity and keep our expenses under
control.
Mr. Dingell. The journal quotes Mr. Ono, who is a man I
gather of some importance in the company, who said that last
year's results show the improvement of cost-cutting in the 5-
year period. My question: Was there a cost-cutting program
which went on at Firestone or not?
Mr. Lampe. Congressman Dingell, there are always measures
in our company to keep our expenses under control.
Mr. Dingell. Was there a name for this cost-cutting
program?
Mr. Lampe. I'm not sure what the Congressman is referring
to.
Mr. Dingell. Well, all I know is that you had a cost-
cutting program going on according to Mr. Ono. Have you ever
talked to him about this?
Mr. Lampe. Mr. Ono has returned to Japan, sir. Again, if
you could be more specific, I'll certainly try to address it.
Mr. Dingell. Now, he actually said that it was a company-
wide program.
Mr. Lampe. Again, sir, we had many programs that we put in
place to improve our productivity, to make us a better company,
to improve our expense to sales ratios. That's a continuous
practice.
Mr. Dingell. As a result of this cost-cutting program, did
Firestone change the Explorer tires that it was selling to Ford
in any way?
Mr. Lampe. I don't know that any change was made to the
Ford Explorer tire because of any cost-cutting program,
Congressman Dingell.
Mr. Dingell. Are you telling me that there were no changes
in the tires that Firestone was selling to Ford for Explorers?
Mr. Lampe. We make continuous changes in the tires. I did
not say that, Congressman. We make continuous changes in our
tires, to improve our tires.
Mr. Dingell. Were any of these changes made for cost-
cutting reasons?
Mr. Lampe. Not that I know of, Congressman. I don't know of
any--again, we make a number of changes. We try to improve our
tires. We try to make our tires better all the time. I was not
in manufacturing at the time, so I know of--I know of none----
Mr. Dingell. Does any of these result in the use of less
expensive materials and compounds and production processes?
Mr. Lampe. Again, Congressman, I cannot--I cannot state to
that. I will tell you that we're always looking to be able to
use better materials at a better price if we can improve the
quality of our tires.
Mr. Dingell. Would you please submit to this committee a
list of all changes in materials, compounds, in production
processes, and in structure of the tires made during this
period?
Mr. Lampe. Of course we will, Congressman.
Mr. Dingell. Now, did Firestone tell Ford of any of the
changes that they were making in the tires during this period
of time and the reasons why these changes were being made?
Mr. Lampe. We have a lot of dialog back and forth with the
Ford Motor Company, as Mr. Nasser stated. He stated that he's--
Ford Motor Company shares information when they change the
vehicles. We share a lot of information back with our OEM
customers when we change the tires, especially if it affects
the performance--performance parameters of what they've asked
for.
Mr. Dingell. Did Firestone monitor the field performance of
the tires that were modified during this period of time as a
part of the cost-cutting program of that company?
Mr. Lampe. Again, Congressman Dingell, you're referring to
changes made in tires versus cost-cutting, and I don't think
that's a fair characterization at all. We always monitor. We
always monitor the performance of our tires in the field. We do
tests. We do run tire analysis. We do many tests to make sure
our tires perform well.
Mr. Dingell. Are you telling me that none of these changes
in tire structures were cost cutting?
Mr. Lampe. I've said I can't say that, sir, but I don't--I
don't believe you're in a position to be able to say that
either. I don't think any one of us know.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Lampe, you're the witness, not I.
Mr. Lampe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Now, at some point, did Firestone decide to
reverse some of the cost-cutting actions it had taken with
regard to Explorer tires, because field performance data
indicated problems?
Mr. Lampe. I don't know that to be the case, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Would you submit a list of materials,
structure, and changes in manufacturing processes, please, to
this committee that occurred during that period of time?
Mr. Lampe. I said I would, sir, yes, sir.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired, and the--Mr.
Lampe, just answer his request, if you would.
Mr. Tauzin, the chairman of the full committee.
Chairman Tauzin. Thank you very much. Mr. Lampe, welcome
again.
Mr. Lampe. Thank you, Chairman Tauzin.
Chairman Tauzin. Let me put something on the record. Claims
data, as we understand it, is data that refers to a tire
failure that leads to injury or property damage. Is that
correct?
Mr. Lampe. Yes, sir. Let me explain. Again, this didn't
even come up in vocabulary until August of last year. A claims
is made up--the way we define it--and, again, the real problem
is there is no industry definition. We define a claim. Every
time you see information we give you, it's defined as a minor
property damage claim, and it could be so much as replacing a
wheel on somebody's car. No----
Chairman Tauzin. Nevertheless, we have property damage and/
or injury----
Mr. Lampe. No, no.
Chairman Tauzin. [continuing] connected to the tire
failure.
Mr. Lampe. Property damage, as much as less--as little as
$5.
Chairman Tauzin. I understand.
Mr. Lampe. It includes personal injuries and it includes
lawsuits, three different things.
Chairman Tauzin. I just wanted that on the record. Second,
you mention that Firestone did a voluntary recall of tires last
year, but to set the record straight again, it was the story
done by KHOU in Houston, Texas, that really started this ball
rolling and got the NHTSA to do an investigation, because KHOU
actually used data at NHTSA to describe a situation where too
many Ford Explorers were rolling over with tire separations on
their tires, on the Firestone tires, and that prompted the
whole business, did it not?
Mr. Lampe. Congressman Tauzin, my understanding is I
believe the KHOU television program you're referring to was
sometime back in February----
Chairman Tauzin. That was months before the recall.
Mr. Lampe. February of 2000. I believe NHTSA opened up a
preliminary evaluation in May of 2000. We announced our safety
recall in August. My point being only that the preliminary
evaluation of our tires was still underway, and it was still--
--
Chairman Tauzin. Well, I want to talk to you about that,
though. You just talked to Mr. Dingell about changes that are
made in Firestone tires. I asked--you were in the room when I
asked Mr. Nasser about the decision by Ford to purchase
Goodyear tires in 1996, and then to return exclusively to
Firestone tires again in 1998. Now, Ford and Firestone had an
amazingly close relationship for all those years, and it has
intrigued me for a long time--I have not yet gotten a good
answer to it--why did Ford decide to start buying Goodyear
tires in 1996?
Mr. Lampe. Sir, that's very explainable. During the--and I
believe it was actually in 1995 that they started using some
Goodyear tires. They used them in 1996 and a little bit in
1997, I believe, and then that's when they went back to 100
percent Firestone. At that same time period, we were having a
labor disruption, labor problems in our union plants. Our
production had been reduced, and I believe Ford switched some
of the business back--over to Goodyear in order to take off
some of the pressure on us, to assure supply. And then once our
labor problems were concluded, they went back to us 100
percent. That's my understanding.
Chairman Tauzin. What's intriguing about all that, is that
in 1995, I think it was, you ran some tests on the tires
indicator and had an amazing, I think, 4 out of 10 failure
rate. And--it was some amazing results we had at the last
hearing. Is that correct?
Mr. Lampe. Congressman, you and I got into this in the last
hearing about this testing and the results, and I think--I
believe that we agreed that a lot of this testing that you were
referring to was testing that we were doing on prototype tires
and testing where we actually--what we call test to failure,
where you----
Chairman Tauzin. But you found it wrong. You found an
unevenness in the sidewalls, and you changed that to an even
sidewall treatment, and you found also in 1998, I believe it
was, that you needed to strengthen or add amendments to the
wedge. Is that correct?
Mr. Lampe. I don't believe it was a matter, Congressman, of
finding something that made us do something. We always try to--
--
Chairman Tauzin. How do you----
Mr. Lampe. We always try to improve our products. The wedge
change you're referring to that we did in 1998, we talked about
at the last hearing, and it covered over a 104 different sizes.
It wasn't a change we made to the Explorer tire. It was over
104 different sizes.
Chairman Tauzin. It was many different----
Mr. Lampe. As an improvement.
Chairman Tauzin. You and Ford now conducted the very same
tests on the Ford Explorer, the radius circle test, and you did
it in conformity with the Society of Automotive Engineers'
guidelines. Now you used different peer vehicles than Ford did,
apparently. You used a different size track, I think. I don't
know if that makes a difference. But your results are exactly
the opposite of Ford's. You found an oversteering problem, and
they found none, using the same apparent engineers' guidelines.
You came out with totally different results. Now, who are we to
believe, and how are we to know what's correct in these
results?
Mr. Lampe. Congressman Tauzin, that's why from the very
start we asked Ford to work with us, do this together with us,
be a part of this. It goes back to, Congressman----
Chairman Tauzin. But that hasn't happened. You've done
separate tests.
Mr. Lampe. No. It's not----
Chairman Tauzin. We're stuck with the fact that each of you
did a separate test, using the same guidelines, and you got an
expert that says one thing, and they've got an expert that says
another. You've got one result, and they've got another result.
Who's going to settle this for us?
Mr. Lampe. That's a very--and I'm glad you pointed out that
it was a--it was Dr. Gunther that did the tests. We did not do
them ourselves. This test is a very standard, recognizable test
in the industry, and it's very repeatable. It's not something
you do once and you can never replicate. You can. I'm
suggesting we are not the vehicle experts. We shouldn't have
had to do this in the first place, Congressman. We should not
have had to do it. But it can be replicated, and I would----
Chairman Tauzin. I'm told that Ford did it on both the 100-
and the 200-meter track and again came up with opposite results
from you. So what you're saying is somebody who doesn't work
for Ford, who is not hired by Ford, somebody who doesn't work
for Firestone, is not hired by Firestone, somebody ought to
replicate this test?
Mr. Lampe. I think it would be a very, very good idea. I
will point out one difference in Ford's test, to my
understanding, is they tested vehicles at what they call .5
lateral G's, which is an extremely, extremely violent kind of
acceleration that nobody ever gets to in normal driving. Dr.
Gunther's was done between .1 and .3, which is under the normal
driving conditions. But I'd be more than willing to----
Chairman Tauzin. But they were both done under the same
engineering guidelines.
Mr. Lampe. That would be great.
Chairman Tauzin. You're telling me they weren't.
Mr. Lampe. No, they were not.
Chairman Tauzin. So we really need someone, some
independent analyst to tell us who's right and who's wrong
here. Right?
Mr. Lampe. I think that would be a great idea. We have--
we've done something that we shouldn't have had to do in the
first place, and if NHTSA or a third party wanted to do this,
we would be most willing to cooperate, yes, 100 percent.
Chairman Tauzin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lampe. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Stearns. I thank the chairman.
Mr. Gordon is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gordon. Welcome, Mr. Lampe. A quick lead to--at the
request of the committee staff and to complete our record, you
had mentioned in your testimony that there were 4 deaths in the
last 10 days in Venezuela based on tread separation on
nonFirestone tires. We have no record of that. If you could
provide us with some documentation.
Mr. Lampe. Yes, sir. I did not--I was not aware that you
don't. We have--we will provide you--we have 43 individually
documented judicial cases, which means they're either certified
or registered by a judge or----
Mr. Gordon. If you could just provide that----
Mr. Lampe. We'll do that.
Mr. Gordon. [continuing] to the committee.
I'd like to get on to the two questions I had asked Mr.
Nasser earlier. To my understanding, the same Firestone tires
used on the Ford Explorer are also used as original equipment
on the Ford rangers. These same tires are evidently used on two
other popular SUVs, the Toyota 4-Runner and the Jeep Grand
Cherokee. Claims data shows that owners of vehicles other than
the Explorer have virtually no problems with tread separation
leading to rollovers. What does this suggest about the
Explorer's design or handling characteristics and their
contribution to the problems?
Mr. Lampe. You're exactly right, Congressman, and I heard
the question when you asked it of Mr. Nasser. The exact----
Mr. Gordon. That's an addendum, and a quick addendum. There
appears to be a major difference between--or Mr. Nasser just
clearly said that the Toyota and the Jeep Cherokee were not the
same tires. If you can correct that, too, or give us your view?
Mr. Lampe. Very brief, the exact same tire that we supply
the Ford Explorer is the exact same tire that goes on the Ford
Ranger, and already we've said that the Ford Explorer has 8
times as more claims than the Ranger does. We supplied 3.1
million tires, of our Wilderness tires, to General Motors, and
we had 2 claims. We supplied over 1.2 million Wilderness tires
to the Toyota 4-Runner, and we had zero claims.
And the question that calls into being is why do we supply
tires, Wilderness AT to Ford, that appear on vehicles that have
accidents and rollovers, and why do we supply tires to others
that it doesn't? Mr. Nasser said the tires were not the same
tires, and I'll agree to that. They have slight differences, as
established by the OEM, for such things as fuel economy or road
noise or something; but the basic Wilderness AT tire, 85
percent, 90 percent, of that tire is the same whether it goes
to Ford, whether it goes to General Motors, or whether it goes
to Toyota. There are some tweaks for the OEMs.
Mr. Gordon. My second question was, 1 year ago, Ford
initiated an almost identical replacement program in Venezuela
to replace Firestone tires with other brands. Even though
Explorers are now using other brands of tires in Venezuela,
it's my understanding that the Explorer rollovers have
continued at a high enough rate to cause the head of the
country's consumer protection agency to suggest banning sales
of Explorers.
Why has replacement of Firestone tires in Venezuela not
brought an end to the problem, and will the replacement of
Firestone tires on the Explorer end the problem in the United
States?
Mr. Lampe. And that's our big dilemma, Congressman. We've
seen what happened in Venezuela. Ford has said it was a tire
issue. They replaced the tires. We didn't replace them. They
did. But the problems continue. The rollovers continue. You're
right. The head of the Consumer Protection Agency came out and
requested the Attorney General to ban the sale of Ford
Explorers, and just this morning, there was an article in a
Venezuela newspaper that quoted the president of the Explorer
Owners Association, stating that this is a vehicle problem,
this is not a tire problem. We don't have tires left on Ford
Explorers. And I'm not saying the tires that are on the
Explorers today in Venezuela are failing. They're not.
Unfortunately, the vehicle continues to roll over.
Mr. Gordon. Could you also provide us documentation of
that----
Mr. Lampe. Yes, I will.
Mr. Gordon. [continuing] news article?
Mr. Lampe. I certainly will. Thank you.
Mr. Gordon. I guess if there is any time left, I will offer
this to you to clear up any kind of differences of opinion from
the earlier witness.
Mr. Lampe. No, I'm not going to use my time to do that. I'm
just going to reaffirm one thing that Mr. Nasser said. The
decision that I had to make and my company had to make a couple
weeks ago to terminate our relationship with the Ford Motor
Company was the most difficult, most painful decision I've ever
made. Ninety-six years of heritage. Harvey Firestone, Henry
Ford were great friends. We did not take that decision lightly.
As I said, it's a very difficult decision, but it was the only
decision that we could take. It was the right decision to take
at the time.
Mr. Gordon. Thank you.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Deal, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Deal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being
here.
Mr. Lampe. Thank you.
Mr. Deal. You have stated that the important thing is what
happens after the tire separation. I would submit to you that
we are basically talking about two events, both of which may be
calamitous here. The first is the tire separation. The second
is possibly a rollover following a tire separation. You've
indicated that you think it is a combination vehicle/tire
problem that we're addressing.
So my first question to you, then, is based on the fact
that you're saying that relatively the same tire does not have
the same potential problems 8 times, I believe you said, less
with a Ranger versus an Explorer. Are you contending that there
is something in the design of the Ranger that causes the tire
separation?
Mr. Lampe. Congressman Deal, my comment was--and I'm sorry
if I confused this. The----
Mr. Deal. I understand your comment. I'm simply asking----
Mr. Lampe. No. No. But I've got to clarify one thing you
said real fast. The incident of claims for tread separations on
the Ranger is 8 times less than the Ford Explorer.
Mr. Deal. But, now, is that a claim that is followed by a
rollover that precipitates the definition of claim?
Mr. Lampe. The rollover event on a Ford Ranger is
practically nonexistent. It's practically nonexistent.
Mr. Deal. The separation is 8 times less on the Ranger?
Mr. Lampe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Deal. Are you then contending that there is something
about the design of the Explorer that causes the tire
separation?
Mr. Lampe. We keep looking at that. We talked about that
last fall. We talked about why so many rear-tire failures, why
so many left-rear-tire failures. We have not had any scientific
findings that would suggest that, to date, that would suggest
that there is something on the Ford Explorer, other than the
inflation pressure and the weight, which is extremely
important, but nothing mechanical on the Explorer causing a
tread separation.
But we still believe when we go back to the Ford chart on
the weight of the Explorer, that one of the Congressman brought
up, that that inflation pressure is extremely important. And
Congressman--or, Chairman Tauzin, you'll remember last year we
talked about 26 pounds, and we asked Ford to let us move our
tire to 30. They agreed on a range from 26 to 30. We then went
back and said, please, Ford, we want you to recognize 30 pounds
for our tire. They did that, and 2 weeks ago I was meeting with
Ford, and their top engineer for passenger cars and SUVs told
me they have now gone to 30 pounds for all manufacturers.
Mr. Deal. So the only thing----
Mr. Lampe. So they probably recognized that 26 was not
sufficient as well.
Mr. Deal. So the only thing you can account for in that
regard may be the tire pressure might attribute to that fact?
Mr. Lampe. Air pressure and load; yes, sir.
Mr. Deal. Now, the second thing you indicated was that in
the tests that you had performed, your tire compared favorably
with all of its competitors, and I assume these were tests on
your tire that has now been recalled?
Mr. Lampe. No, sir, this is just the latest testing that
we've done, testing that we've done within the last 90 days,
120 days on our tires, which would not include the recalled
tires. They're already, for the most part, off the road.
Mr. Deal. Are you contending that your initial recall was
not necessary?
Mr. Lampe. The additional action taken by Ford?
Mr. Deal. The initial recall that you made.
Mr. Lampe. No, I never suggested that, sir. You asked me if
we did testing, if this testing reflects tires that we recall;
and I'm saying, no, it does not.
Mr. Deal. All right.
Mr. Lampe. Those tires are off the road. This is current
production tires.
Mr. Deal. All right. So you're not insisting that the tires
that were initially recalled by your action didn't have
problems?
Mr. Lampe. No, sir, I am not.
Mr. Deal. All right.
Now, you were generally asked a question about the
difference in performance of your tires based on their location
of manufacture, and I believe you indicated that it may have
something to do with which vehicles the tires go on; and I
think we are talking here exclusively about all explorers and
that it may have some something do with some going to Southern
States.
I couldn't help being a little paranoid, as a Southerner,
recognizing that all the tires made in the South seem to
perform pretty good, everybody; it's only the tires made in the
North and sent to the South that have problems. That gives me a
little bit of pause here.
Mr. Lampe. You said that. I didn't.
Mr. Deal. Is there any other explanation that you can offer
with regard to the differentiation between point of manufacture
and performance?
Mr. Lampe. It is also the type of tire that is produced.
You might have a commercial light truck tire being produced in
one plant, versus an over-the-road passenger tire in another.
You would expect to see a higher separation rate, claim rate,
if you will, on the commercial light truck tire because of its
application.
So application has a lot to do with it as well, Mr. Deal.
Mr. Deal. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Lampe. Thank you.
Mr. Greenwood. The chair recognizes the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Deutsch, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lampe, there have been allegations that Ford basically
pushed Firestone with its demands to improve the Explorer's
stability and gas mileage, and that Firestone ended up going
along with those demands, but didn't tell Ford that the tire
would not be as robust if that were to occur.
Looking back on that sort of period, first of all, if you
can talk about the veracity of those allegations; but also,
knowing what you know now, would you be doing things
differently in terms of changes that you made.
Mr. Lampe. I am not aware of any changes that were done for
the reasons you stated, Congressman. Yes, frankly, looking
back--you've asked me that; I have been asked that before.
Looking back, the air pressure of 26 pounds was a bigger factor
than we originally thought.
Mr. Deutsch. Okay. Did Ford specifically ask you to lighten
the tire at any point?
Mr. Lampe. We did lighten the tire. I have also seen that
information. We lightened the tire, and I can't remember which
model year it was. I don't know if this was the result of an
innovation, an improvement that we could make on our tires, or
if it was at Ford's request; but I will get that information
for the record.
I do not know if that was at Ford's request.
Mr. Deutsch. I appreciate if you can provide that.
We have placed into the record a June 16 article from the
St. Petersburg Times reporting that a Fort Myers man died in
March after a Cooper tire tore apart and his Explorer flipped
over.
Another person was killed in Florida on May 16 of this year
when an unidentified non-Firestone rear tire fell apart.
An April 30 article from the Peoria General Star reported
on the death of an Illinois man who had replaced his Firestone
tires with Cooper tires.
Now, Cooper tires were not approved replacements for the
Firestone tires. Do you have any evidence of Explorers rolling
over on non-Firestone, but approved, replacement tires after
last year's recalls.
Mr. Lampe. Sir, I have got reports that have been sent to
me from media reports that--of a number of cases of Explorer
rollovers on competitor tires other than--in addition to those
that you have mentioned. There were two or three in California;
there was one in Georgia. There have been a number, but I do
not--I do not have an adjudication, I do not have a
certification, of these. They have just been reported on
competitor tires.
Mr. Deutsch. I think that's an issue again where whatever
information you have, if you can provide the committee and
committee staff with that obviously very helpful information.
Mr. Lampe. I believe we've provided that, but I'll double-
check and make sure you get that.
Mr. Deutsch. We have the performance specifications that
Ford provided to both Firestone and Goodyear for the Explorer
tires. What changes need to be made in these specifications to
avoid another disaster? Or is it possible? I mean, do you have
any suggestions about that?
Mr. Lampe. I think we need to continue to improve our
ability to exchange information with the automobile
manufacturer.
Congressman, last fall I said that we've got to know a lot
more about the vehicle, that we've got to know a lot more about
our tires, and we've got to talk a lot more about what, if they
increase the weight from 5,000 pounds to 5,600 pounds, we need
to know.
If we change something in our tire that is going to affect
the performance of that vehicle, they need to know. And I said
back then that I am firmly convinced, that is the best thing we
can do is, share more information, be open with each other and
make sure we understand how the tire and the vehicle interact.
Mr. Deutsch. Now, you have just emphasized the importance
of vehicle weight to tire performance. When did you first learn
that Ford had increased the Explorer's weight by 600 pounds in
the model year 1996?
Mr. Lampe. And I can't speak for the 45,000 people in my
company. That would be kind of an unfair statement. We did not
become aware at the management level until we got into this
whole issue about weight and inflation, which was last year.
That is the first time we became aware that Ford had increased
the weight from 1990 to 1996, and then they decreased it, back
down.
And what's interesting about that is our highest rate of
claims on the Ford Explorer are those 2 years where the weight
was the highest. Our claims were less before, and they've come
down since the weight came down. Whether that is a strong
correlation or not, I would suggest it is.
Mr. Deutsch. Were you surprised that Firestone was not
informed of the change in the weight?
Mr. Lampe. I am surprised, in looking back at it. I wasn't
involved in the Ford-Firestone relationship back in 1996. I
would have had no reason to be involved, but I am surprised
that we weren't informed.
Mr. Deutsch. And as you've testified at this point, then
how important is the vehicle's weight to tire performance?
Mr. Lampe. It is very important. It's very important.
Weight and inflation are the two most important things to tire
performance. If a tire becomes underinflated, or if it becomes
overloaded, that tire is going to run the risk of being
damaged.
Mr. Deutsch. Let me just ask one last question.
I asked Mr. Nasser about testimony that Ford experts have
given at trial regarding the ability to drive, or the average
driver to drive, in a situation where the treads basically come
apart. What would your position be in terms of the ability of a
driver to drive in that situation?
Mr. Lampe. As Goodyear stated on four different occasions,
tread separation is not an unusual tire failure. All tires will
fail, all tires can fail if they're not taken care of, if
they're abused. But probably the most compelling thing is a
presentation that Goodyear made to NHTSA back in--I believe in
March; and I am sure NHTSA can provide you a copy. And there
are two things I'd like to read from their presentation. I
mean, I--it is here--this is Ford's presentation to NHTSA back
in March, Ford's presentation:
``Like other SUVs, Explorer's handling capacity, even with
a separated tire, is sufficient to allow a safe stop.'' that's
one statement by Ford.
The other one:
``Explorers have a margin of safety, as designed, to
accommodate a reasonable level of component failures, including
tread separations.'' they said this in March.
Dr. Guenther comes out in May and says, there's a problem
because it is a foreseeable event; and now Ford is saying,
well, they don't design their cars for that after all--very
important.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman, Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you.
I'd like to welcome and thank you for your patience also.
Let me ask you some questions, some of which may be answered
briefly, maybe even yes or no; but I have got about five
questions I'd like to cover with you.
Referring back to last year, how long did it take Firestone
to complete the original tire recall which was ordered by NHTSA
last summer, and how many tires were recalled and were they all
replaced?
Mr. Lampe. We virtually completed the recall in about 5
months, 4\1/2\ months. We replaced about--it is a little over 6
million tires. We have continued to replace those tires; we've
got up to about 6.3 million; we estimated there were about 6.5.
I am not sure, but if you ask NHTSA, I think they would
probably tell you this is the highest percentage of reclaimed
product on a replacement program like this that's ever been.
They're virtually all off the road, Congressman.
Mr. Bryant. Given your successful completion of this tire
recall last year, is the current tire recall being conducted by
Ford necessary?
Mr. Lampe. No, sir, it's not. The tires they're replacing
are perfectly safe tires.
Mr. Bryant. What, if any, quality control measures has
Firestone undertaken to prevent situations like the tire recall
last summer from occurring again?
Mr. Lampe. We've done a number of things, Congressman. We,
first of all, instituted an improved early warning system to
make sure that we can catch an issue when it's an issue and
before it becomes a problem, and that is working. We have done
some manufacturing changes in our product, in our plants, not
only to--as matter of continuous improvement.
But we understand that there will be tougher standards out
there in the future and tougher testing requirements by the
TREAD Act, and we want to make sure we are in full compliance
and ahead of the program on that.
We've also done some standardization in our plants, but
we've done a number of things as a result of lessons learned.
Mr. Bryant. You mentioned the TREAD Act. Of course, Mr.
Upton's here as the sponsor of that bill last year; and in
response to that bill, what changes, if any, has Firestone
undertaken, anticipating the new defect reporting obligations
under this act?
Mr. Lampe. First of all, Congressman Upton, we're fully
supportive of your bill. RMA, the Rubber Manufacturers
Association, which includes all the major tire manufacturers,
including Goodyear, Michelin, Cooper, we have been very
supportive. And we will continue to support NHTSA and work for
a successful implementation of that act.
One of things we've changed, Congressman Bryant, is the
reporting system on our quality control procedures. We have a
quality control committee that reports directly to me and is
accountable directly to me. They bring any issues that have
come up through our early warning system, identifying when
there are still issues.
It's my decision, my responsibility to make the decision to
either go out and get those tires, or some other recourse, but
we have changed completely our reporting requirements.
Mr. Bryant. I have got one final question.
I was in and out, visiting with constituents, and I don't
know if you have been asked this question. But concerning the
Wall Street Journal article that talked about different ratings
or classifications, if you will, A, B, C of tires; and there's
been testimony that Mr. Nasser addressed about perhaps their
requirement that they use a C-rated tire on the Explorer, and
also that maybe they've gone to a B-rated.
Could you distinguish in layman's terms for us those
ratings and in terms of heat resistance and usage on an
Explorer-type vehicle?
Mr. Lampe. Yes. There are three ratings, basically A, B and
C.
Ford did not--and I'd like to correct the Congressman's
statement a little bit. Ford did not specify a temperature
grade, and that I believe was Mr. Nasser's testimony as well--
just confirming that. The C temperature grade is a perfectly
acceptable temperature grade on passenger and light truck
vehicles in the United States. It is not a reflection of
geographic suitability. It's a grade that's assigned during a
high-speed, high-speed SAE test; and again there are many
vehicles--as Mr. Nasser said, there are millions of vehicles in
the United States and all locations in all parts of the country
that have temperature grade C tires, temperature grade B and a
lesser population of temperature grade A.
Mr. Bryant. So I think he mentioned that you did not
necessarily make that distinction on the tires that you
provided to Ford, the Explorer vehicle, initially.
Mr. Lampe. That is up until 1999. I believe it was 1999. As
we interpreted the regulations, we were not required to mark
light truck tires or tires that were used on light trucks, like
SUVs, with a UTQG designation. There were other manufacturers
that didn't do it either, that interpreted the regulation the
same way. NHTSA had asked us in 1999 to begin marking those
tires, and we did at that time.
Mr. Bryant. Very quickly, the last question on this, how in
terms of performance would a C-rated tire compare to a B-rated
tire.
Mr. Lampe. Again, there are many, many factors of
performance, handling, maneuverability and so forth. Again,
this is more of a speed--it's a speed-rated, high-speed test to
see what tires can resist heat at high speeds; it is about 80
resistance, which is the top B or a C.
The only performance--in my opinion, Congressman Bryant,
the only performance distinction would be the temperature
generation and resistance at high speeds.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Markey.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
A few weeks ago Firestone gave the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration a preliminary report regarding handling
and oversteer problems in the Ford Explorer. Yet Firestone had
known from litigation in the mid-1990's about the handling
issues with the Explorer.
Why didn't Firestone approach NHTSA back in the mid-90's or
late 1990's about this issue, so that it could have been dealt
with as the safety issue which had already been identified in
that earlier time period before additional death and injury was
caused by the vehicle?
Mr. Lampe. Congressman Markey, it's very difficult for me
to answer that. I was not--as you know, I think, I just took
over to be CEO last October, and I was not in our technical or
manufacturing area. I don't know that people at Firestone felt
that there was a vehicle problem, or not, back in the early
1990's. Certainly there were a few lawsuits that existed at
that time on the Ford Explorer that would suggest--that existed
for rollovers, but I can't tell you if anybody in our company
approached NHTSA or not.
I don't believe they did.
Mr. Markey. No, I don't think they did. The question is,
why didn't they?
What we're all interested in here is clearly the
dysfunctional relationship that exists not only between Ford
and NHTSA, but between Firestone and NHTSA. And I think we're
concluding pretty much between both industries and NHTSA in
terms of the responsibility, which each company feels that it
has to bring information to NHTSA, that could help provide
additional safety for the American family?
Mr. Lampe. I agree with you completely. I don't consider
our relationship with NHTSA dysfunctional. We have a tremendous
amount of cooperation, but----
Mr. Markey. I don't mean now. I know it's improved a lot.
Mr. Lampe. Congressman, I can only assume and I can only
say that I guess if there was an issue we felt we would, Ford
would bring it to the forefront. They're the experts. They know
the stability of their vehicles; and other than that, it's
really hard for me to comment because I wasn't in the position
back then.
Mr. Markey. No, I appreciate your passing the buck there
over to Ford; and you, as well--because of the litigation, you
as well knew there was a huge issue here--again, not you sir,
you weren't in the position at that point in time. But it's a
real issue.
Let me ask you a question. I would just like to get your
view on it. The roof crush standard is 30 years old. Would you
support a new roof crush standard to be developed to reflect a
rise of SUVs on our roadways and the higher probability of
rollovers in these vehicles?
Mr. Lampe. I support Congressman Upton's TREAD Act that
will increase the testing on tires.
Mr. Markey. I'm not talking testing. I am talking about an
actual roof crush standard, so that families aren't, as the
vehicle rolls over, crushed to death inside of the vehicle.
Mr. Lampe. Congressman Markey, I am not the vehicle expert,
but I would support anything that would improve public safety
as long as there was a risk/benefit analysis associated with it
to see the practicability of it.
Mr. Markey. Well, obviously, from your own testimony, Ford
has increased from 5,000 to 5,600 pounds the weight of the
vehicle; and this pretty much becomes a weight issue, how much
weight do you want to now build into this roof protection so
that the consumer is--the American driver or passenger is not
crushed.
Mr. Lampe. And I'm certainly not trying to be flippant at
all in a subject like this, but yes, you could design a
people--you could put people in tanks, and they wouldn't be
hurt on rollovers. The only matter is, is that practical; and I
am not qualified to say that. But I am for anything that
improves public safety.
Mr. Markey. How about the use of advanced window glazing
inside of the window to prevent glass from falling out in
crashes? Do you think that makes sense?
Mr. Lampe. Congressman, you're asking me to comment on
something that's way out of my realm of expertise. Excuse me.
Mr. Markey. Okay. Okay.
I would like it if you could to give us, for the record,
any information that Firestone has, any memos that deal with
what you knew about the handling and oversteer problems back in
the mid- and late-90's from these lawsuits, and what you knew
about what Ford knew on these issues at that time, so that we
can get a handle on how long ago it was that it was clear that
there was a big issue here.
Would you provide for the committee memos, any memos that
Firestone has developed or has access to that came from other
companies relating to that, those issues during that time
period?
Mr. Lampe. If that information has not already been
provided, certainly we will provide that, Congressman.
Mr. Markey. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman, Mr.
Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask, on the
information you provided us, Mr. Lampe, the chart here, it says
Florida Single Vehicle Highway Fatal Incident Crash Rates by
Model Year. I think it's in section one, the third or fourth
chart. The charts were Florida and Texas accident data limited
to a single vehicle highway accident where a tire was a
contributing factor of the accident. The question, again, is
trying to clear up data and data supplied to us.
Why didn't you include the Mercury Mountaineer in your
definition of a Ford Explorer? You did include the Mazda
Navajo, correct?
Mr. Lampe. I asked that same question, Congressman, because
I was mystified as to why. It's the same tire, we supply the
same tire to the Mountaineer. It is my understanding that the
Mountaineer has a different suspension than the Explorer and
the Navajo do. That's my understanding.
I am sure somebody from Ford could answer that, but that's
why they were not included, because they were not an apples-to-
apples comparison.
Mr. Shimkus. I am sure we'll be able to get a response from
Ford. We'll follow up on that and we've got staff shaking their
heads yes.
Let me go to another issue that I raised in other
questions, and it deals with this whole standards requirement;
and again I will go back to an issue--again, you were not CEO
at the time we worked through the TREAD Act. I did raise the
nylon cap issue then and I just raise it now, really as a point
of discussion.
In a Time magazine article of September 2000 they--their
basic premise of the article stated that with the advent of
increased highway speeds, it may now be time to revisit nylon
caps as vehicles get heavier, as heat and aspects--what is your
position on the nylon cap, and is it or is it not needed. And
why--do you produce tires with a nylon cap and why do you
produce some for one type of vehicle and not for other types of
vehicles?
Mr. Lampe. Again, at the risk that I'm not a tire expert or
engineer; but I've worked with the company for 27 years, so let
me try to answer that to the best of my ability.
We do make some tires with nylon caps. Nylon cap ply strips
are used for high-speed applications. They were originally, to
my understanding, developed in Europe for the autobahn. We have
done a lot of tests, and they do improve the high-speed
capability of tires. And the higher speed that you go, the
higher speed rating you go on a tire, the more likely you are
to find cap strips and cap plies.
We have also done tests that would indicate that cap strips
and cap plies have no noticeable effect on a tire, with a tire
separation, getting a separation or having a separation occur.
They're more to hold the tread in place at very, very high
speeds.
I think there are millions and millions and millions of
tires on the American road today, hundreds of millions that
don't have nylon strips, nylon cap plies, and they function and
operate just fine. If we were ever to go to a system, perhaps,
God forbid, like in Germany with no speed limit, then certainly
they would be required much, much more than today.
Mr. Shimkus. In a follow-up to comments and questions with
Mr. Nasser--and I am sure we'll get better information after
everybody's sorted through the transcript--it was our
understanding that Ford did move to push nylon caps for
Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, on their tires being sold in those
locations. We didn't get a definitive answer from Ford whether
that was true.
Do you have any information on that?
Mr. Lampe. I believe, sir, that today the competitive tire
they're using in Venezuela does have a nylon cap ply or a nylon
cap strip. It is also my understanding that the speeds in Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela, both, are extremely high. People
routinely drive 100 miles an hour. So those two areas might
very well justify cap plies or cap strips.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman and
recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman, Mr. Stupak.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lampe, at the September 5th hearing, I asked Mr. Ono,
who was then representing Firestone, whether they would join us
in calling for and cooperating in a blue ribbon, independent
panel to perform review on all the AT, ATX Wilderness tires,
and determine the cause, and propose solutions.
Is Firestone still committed to a blue ribbon, independent
committee?
Mr. Lampe. We were committed then, Congressman. As long as
it looks at both the vehicle and the tire interaction with the
vehicle, we would certainly join with that committee.
Mr. Stupak. I think that's a problem. Shouldn't we let the
committee decide what it should look at if it's truly going to
be independent?
Mr. Lampe. Mr. Stupak, we strongly believe that you've got
to look at the tire-vehicle interaction, because one doesn't
make sense of the study itself.
Mr. Stupak. But then we get results like you have with the
Guenther report, where you have completely the same results
based on scientific study, but we get two different
organizations here advocating two different results of the same
scientific study.
So shouldn't you really let an independent panel determine
what it should look at and what it should not look at?
Mr. Lampe. Congressman, I would agree that an independent
panel certainly gives a he-said/she-said, removed type of
report; but again, I would strongly encourage that panel, if
they want to understand what is happening in the field today,
to look at the tire and the vehicle and the interaction between
those two.
Mr. Stupak. In the earlier testimony, they talked about--I
guess they called it the field data tests that Ford did about
the--they put the hundred, I am sorry, 1,083 separations with
the Firestone and two separations with Goodyear tires on their
vehicles. Roughly 3 million Goodyear tires were tested and 3
million Firestone tires were tested.
Do you remember that testimony?
Mr. Lampe. Yes, I do.
Mr. Stupak. And you got a copy of that report?
Mr. Lampe. I don't know if we did or not, Congressman.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. According to Mr. Nasser, you received it,
the committee received it, and NHTSA received it.
Mr. Lampe. That's fine.
Mr. Stupak. How do you explain that, when you do 3 million
Goodyear and 3 million Firestones?
Mr. Lampe. It's very interesting. You say that this same
committee back last year got a document, you refer to it as
Document 54.
Mr. Stupak. No, no, let's stick with this document.
Mr. Lampe. What I am trying to explain is, Document 54
showed that Ford had received 10 complaints about Goodyear
separation----
Mr. Stupak. See, that's not my question.
Mr. Lampe. [continuing] and now they're saying two.
Mr. Stupak. I want to ask the questions.
Mr. Lampe. I am sorry. I misunderstood.
Mr. Stupak. You are only going to interpret what you want
to interpret.
I'm asking specifically about this one, not Document 54,
but this study here about the 3 million Goodyear tires and 3
million Firestone; any idea how you get the differences? If you
don't, you don't.
Mr. Lampe. I don't know how Goodyear classifies claims,
Congressman, and I can't explain the number ``2'' that is shown
for Goodyear, when we talked about 10 already last year.
No, I cannot explain it.
Mr. Stupak. All right. But you would agree with me would
you not, that without tire separation, we don't have to worry
about understeering and oversteering on the vehicle?
Mr. Lampe. No. I would not agree with you, Congressman, on
that.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Well, what else? Do you have to worry
about understeering and oversteering without losing control?
Mr. Lampe. It's my understanding that any type of ride
disturbance, such as a tread separation, could possibly induce
the same characteristic and same need for understeer versus
oversteer in a vehicle.
Mr. Stupak. Okay, other than tread separation, what else do
you get in an oversteer or understeer situation?
Mr. Lampe. I don't know, Congressman. I would think there
are a number of things that could happen to the rear of the
vehicle that would induce the same sort of situation, but
again, I am not a vehicle dynamics expert.
Mr. Stupak. In this whole situation here on some of the
charts that have been up here, I think there was a yellow chart
your assistant there has been putting up there. I think it is
Attachment No. 3 in your testimony.
You talk about tread separations as sort of a common
occurrence with vehicles; is that correct?
Mr. Lampe. No, I wouldn't characterize it, and I think I
previously said I would not characterize it as a common
occurrence. Tread separation is a very rare event considering
the millions and millions and millions of tires that are made.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Very rare event?
Mr. Lampe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. We have more blowouts than we do of tire
separations?
Mr. Lampe. No. Again, in my opinion, Congressman, and
Goodyear backs that up, tire separations are the most common-
type tire failure.
Mr. Stupak. How many tire separations do we have each year
in this country; do you have any idea?
Mr. Lampe. No idea, Congressman.
Mr. Stupak. Of all these rollovers, do you know how many
are not tire separations?
Mr. Lampe. All I can tell the Congressman is that the FARS
data, Federal Fatal Accident Reporting Systems data, from 1990
to 1999 on the Ford Explorer single vehicle rollover accidents,
6 percent of those accidents alleged a tire involvement. There
were 94 percent of those rollover accidents that did not have
any tire-related factor to them.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. The Explorer--and you have a chart up
there about the gross vehicle weight and the changes by year
and tire pressure and load, you said, are--well, weight are
very critical. When you have a tire separation, your vehicle
weight will shift, will it not; the critical mass of a vehicle
will then change?
Mr. Lampe. I don't know that to be a fact, sir. And I did
not see that in Dr. Guenther's report. I can't say that it does
or doesn't. I am sorry. I can find out for you.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Lampe. Would you like for me to find out about that,
Congressman Stupak.
Mr. Stupak. Sure. I'd appreciate it. Thank you.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman and
recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Upton, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Lampe, I appreciate your remarks in support of the
TREAD Act, which was signed by the President last year. Again,
I was sorry that I was late coming back; and I was not here for
Mr. Nasser's testimony.
But in reading it, he said this and I quote from page 2:
``our tire team worked closely with NHTSA every step of the
way. We also shared our data and analysis with Firestone--Dr.
Sanjay Govindjee, who conducted an independent investigation at
Firestone's request.''
He goes on to say, ``And we did detailed engineering
analysis of failed tires to give us an understanding of real-
world failure mechanisms. Our findings prove consistent with
the findings of Dr. Govindjee,'' and goes on to say,
``Firestone's Wilderness reached the following conclusions,
Firestone Wilderness AT tires experience higher rates of tread
separations than other tires, including the Goodyear tires used
on the Explorer.''
Now what is interesting to me as I read that testimony is
then to look at today's Wall Street Journal when it says
``Sanjay Govindjee,'' the same individual, ``an expert hired by
Bridgestone/Firestone,'' then it goes on here to say, ``a unit
of Japan's Bridgestone/Firestone Corp. last year to report on
the root cause of more than 2,100 tread tires used on previous-
generation Ford Explorers, said yesterday that the tire company
officials didn't provide him with certain data that he
requested during his inquiry. Dr. Govindjee, a professor of
civil engineering at University of California, Berkeley, said
he wasn't shown criteria information last year about changes
made to a critical component of Wilderness AT and ATX tires.''
Further, it goes on to say, ``I am a little perplexed as to
why I wasn't shown certain data about the wedge change.
Clearly, the wedge is important in tread separations. The thing
that's unanswered is how important is that change that they
made.''
Comment.
Mr. Lampe. Not exactly sure what information Dr.
Govindjee's referring to. We gave him tons of information. We
talked about the wedge change here.
Mr. Upton. He was your guy, right?
Mr. Lampe. We hired him as an independent third party
investigator, Congressman, to be exactly that, completely
independent. We gave him tons of data. If there is something we
didn't give him?
Mr. Upton. Because Ford says, Nasser said in his statement,
their conclusion was with him, the guy you hired.
Mr. Lampe. And Dr. Govindjee's conclusion was consistent
with ours, our root cause analysis. We have no difference
with--differences with Dr. Govindjee; his findings confirmed
our root cause analysis on the recalled population of tires.
That's what his mission was.
But if there is anything that Dr. Govindjee didn't get that
he feels he needs, we'll be sure he gets that.
Mr. Upton. One of the frustrations I think Chairman Tauzin
mentioned in his question, is, we do want to get to the bottom
of this. We want an independent party who can tell us who's
right and who's wrong, and get the bad tires off if, in fact,
they are.
I'll bet you have seen this Ford document they think they
provided to all of their dealers of the tire replacement
program. In it, it says, ``Once the Wilderness AT tires reach 3
years old, the failure rate increases considerably''--the tires
they brought up on the dias a little bit earlier were 3 years
old, by the way--laboratory and vehicle testing by Ford shows
that tire design variations and physical characteristics of the
Wilderness AT tires makes them less durable than comparable
tires from other manufacturers. Information shared by NHTSA
shows that failure rates for actual road performance for many
of the Wilderness AT tires were measurably worse than
comparable tires from other manufacturers, and data recently
received from Firestone shows that failure tests had increased
significantly for some of the Wilderness AT tires. Because Ford
does not have sufficient confidence in the future performance
of these tires as they age, we're acting now.''
That's their document that they have provided to all their
dealers.
Now, one of the arguments in support of the TREAD Act,
which passed without dissent last year, was the provision that
we included involving criminal sanctions, and the whole idea
was to say that when a manufacturer or someone involved in the
sale of automotive product was aware that that product was
going to lead to serious injury or death that they would come
forward to NHTSA and act before those deaths and injuries
happen.
Tires that I have here I think perhaps would have led to
serious death or injury a little bit earlier and it shows that
the sanctions we put in there work, the idea worked. Rather
than going back after the fact, after the accident, we had it
before. And based on the evidence that Ford is showing us with
this and the comments made earlier, I think that they knew
that, in fact, those tires were going be unsafe, they were
going to lead to serious injury; and to make sure that they
were not only protecting their customers, but they knew that
they would probably be subject to criminal prosecution, they
decided to submit that data and make that decision before NHTSA
came up with their final conclusion.
Mr. Lampe. And I don't agree with their conclusion at all.
Our tires are safe. Our tires are performing well on the
roads.
Mr. Upton. I don't know all that many people personally
that have an Explorer. The ones that I do have had trouble with
their tires, all of them, 100 percent.
Mr. Lampe. I would very much like to have our engineers
look at the tires that you brought in today, Congressman. I'd
like to see what is----
Mr. Upton. And three--by the way, three of the four tires
that that individual had had that same type of early tread
separation.
Mr. Lampe. I'd certainly like to have those tires examined
and if you would work with us on that, I'll get you the
findings back.
Mr. Upton. Last--I know my time is expiring--if we can get
as part of the record, I don't know or not, Dr. Sanjay's report
to you all, in terms of what he submitted, we'd appreciate that
for the record.
Mr. Lampe. I believe that Dr. Govindjee's report has been
provided to the committee. If not, Congressman Upton, we'll
certainly do that.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Greenwood. The staff informs me that we have that
document, and we will make it available to the gentleman from
Michigan.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Doyle.
Mr. Doyle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one
question, and it's really a follow-up to something Mr. Stupak
was talking to, too, because it's very, very frustrating, the
issue of trying to sort through all the claims and
counterclaims.
But as I was reading through Ford testimony, they point to
this one example of what they claim is the only apples-to-
apples comparison, and I think you alluded to it earlier, Mr.
Lampe, in your testimony when you said, in the period 1995 to
1997, because of some labor unrest or something, that Ford had
taken some of the pressure off of Firestone by introducing some
Goodyear tires into their line; but that it was sort of a way
of taking the pressure off of supply. So that during those 3
years, 1995 to 1997, ``we were equipping the Ford Explorer with
Goodyear and Firestone tires.''
And their claim is that roughly 3 million Firestone tires
were equipped on about 500,000 Explorers; and that your own
claims data base shows that there were 1,183 claims of tread
separation and that there were also about 3 million Goodyear
tires on another 500,000 Explorers that traveled more than 25
billion miles and that their data base shows only two minor
claims of tread separation. And I guess the question, or the
point they're making, is that if the car was the issue, if the
Explorer was the cause of the tread separation, or at least a
contributing factor to it, wouldn't there be more of--you know,
wouldn't these two be more in the same ball park.
The Firestone AT tires on the Explorers had 600 times more
tread separation claims than the Goodyear, and you would think,
if the car was the culprit, that they'd be a little bit more in
the ball park, the Goodyear and the Firestone tires; and I'm
just wondering how you square that, because it seems to me to
be the only apples-to-apples data we have here.
Mr. Lampe. And just two comments, Congressman. Once again,
that information is based on claims data, and I really don't--I
don't have access to the Goodyear data and I don't know how
they identify, how they, what their definition of ``claims''
is, if it's the same definition that we've got. Because nobody
ever used ``claims'' up until 8 months ago. So I don't know
that it is an apples-to-apples comparison.
But if you look at our tire, that tire you were talking
about that had those separations--which, by the way, the vast
majority of those separations you're talking to are tires that
we've replaced, that we've recalled.
But if you look at that exact same tire we make today and
put it on the Ranger, you have 800 percent less amount of
claims than you do on the Explorer.
Mr. Doyle. So what you're saying is that Goodyear doesn't
report tire separations the same way you do, or there's no
standard way of reporting?
Mr. Lampe. I'm saying I don't know how they report.
Claims--we have never used claims as a performance indicator up
until August of last year, July and August. We always used
adjustments, warning adjustments. So this claim is a whole new
classification, if you will, of tires. We had to define the
classification for us in order to give the information to
NHTSA.
I do not know if Goodyear has the same definition of
``claims.'' I don't know, maybe they say anything over $500 is
a ``claim,'' anything less is just an ``adjustment.''
So I don't know that we can compare those unless I can see
exactly the Goodyear information.
Mr. Doyle. So you're saying that it's conceivable that
there could have been 1,000 tread separations with Goodyear
tires, and if the damage was under $500, they may not have
reported it?
Mr. Lampe. I think that's kind of stretching it. I'm not
trying to get you to believe that. I am just saying that I
don't know what an accurate number would be for Goodyear unless
I knew for sure that it was defined exactly the same,
Congressman.
Mr. Doyle. Let me ask you one final question. If the car
was the culprit, would you expect that the tire separation
rates would be roughly equal between the two tires?
Mr. Lampe. If the Explorer inflation and load factors were
the same, I would--I would think that the--the effect would be
the same on the tires.
Mr. Doyle. It would be interesting to see how Goodyear does
their claims. Thank you.
Mr. Dingell. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Doyle. Yes, I would.
Mr. Dingell. When Ford orders, or rather commences,
negotiation with you about purchasing tires to be put on its
Explorer, it gives you essentially a series of performance
specifications; does it not?
Mr. Lampe. Yes, I believe that's a term I used.
Mr. Dingell. It says the tires are supposed to do these
things and these are the characteristics of the vehicle; isn't
that right?
Mr. Lampe. Yes.
Mr. Dingell. And this is how the vehicle will be used. So
Ford has given you then performance specifications on both the
Explorer and on the Ranger; is that right?
Mr. Lampe. That's not entirely true, sir. They specify--
they specified exactly the same tire to be used on the Explorer
and the Ranger; the exact, exact same tire is put on the
Ranger. We ship them to Ford they put some on Ranger, some on
Explorer.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Dingell. Could I ask unanimous consent, because I think
it is a very important point.
Mr. Greenwood. Does the gentleman ask unanimous consent
that the gentleman from Pennsylvania be given an additional 1
minute?
Mr. Doyle. Yes.
Mr. Greenwood. Without objection.
Mr. Doyle. And I yield to my chairman.
Mr. Dingell. Doesn't Ford give you specification for both
the Ranger and the Explorer, and you then manufacture a tire to
suit those?
Mr. Lampe. Congressman Dingell, it's my understanding that
Ford gave us one specification.
Mr. Dingell. For the two?
Mr. Lampe. To be used for the Ranger and the Ford Explorer;
it's exactly the same tire.
Mr. Dingell. Don't the specifications design the weight,
speed, the carrying capacity, turning torque?
Mr. Lampe. Ford designs the specifications. They gave us
one specification for the same tire to be used on the Ranger as
is used on the Explorer. They--in fact, that tire, when we ship
it to Ford, it doesn't know what vehicle it is going to go on.
It arrives at Ford and they put some on Rangers and some on the
Explorers--doesn't make any difference.
Mr. Dingell. Why are they failing then on Explorers and not
failing on Rangers?
Mr. Lampe. Thank you, Congressman. That was my point
exactly.
Mr. Dingell. But why?
Mr. Lampe. I think you have to look at the vehicle. The
difference is the vehicle. The tire's exactly the same; the
difference is the vehicle.
Mr. Dingell. Well, are you telling me you're not making a
tire that suits the Ford Explorer and does suit the Ranger.
Mr. Lampe. I am telling you I--we're making the tire that
was requested by Ford, that was specified by Ford.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Dingell. The Ranger's a pick-up truck; is it not?
Mr. Lampe. The Ranger is a pick-up truck.
Mr. Dingell. And the Explorer is an SUV?
Mr. Lampe. Ford Explorer is an SUV, yes.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Bilirakis, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to apologize
to you and the committee; I have a great big, bad Superfund
site not only in my District, but in my hometown; and we had
public meetings last night and this morning, and I had to be
down there for those because they were planned long in advance
of this hearing.
Mr. Lampe, even before I heard some of the questions that
were asked of you--and I obviously did not hear your opening
testimony--I felt that before we could ever get to the bottom,
if we ever will, of what has happened here, that certainly the
interaction of the tire and the vehicle has to be considered.
And I think that we're just barking up the wrong tree if we
don't do that.
This is not to insinuate anything at all, but it's just
that we've got to look at both of those, I think.
I did note in your testimony--pretty profound statement,
your written statement--and you said the odds of having a fatal
accident in a Ford Explorer are three times greater than in any
other midsize SUVs.
Mr. Lampe. And I believe you referring to Florida, we
looked at two different data bases Congressman. We looked at
the Florida test crash or the Florida crash data base and the
Texas crash data base and that statement came from one of those
data bases yes, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. Well, now, how did you come to the belief
that the odds are three times greater?
Mr. Lampe. The data base will show you single vehicle
accidents, single vehicle rollovers of the Explorer, and then
it will show you all the other SUVs and it will show you if it
was tire-related or not tire-related. That all comes from
Florida's data base, and we simply then had statistical methods
applied to that data base to determine the odds of one versus
the other.
Mr. Bilirakis. Well, you say it would tell you whether it
was tire-related or not. In other words, I mean, is the fact
that there are three times more fatal accidents in a Ford
Explorer than in other midsize SUV--is that a fact regardless
of whether it involves tires, regardless of whether it involves
seatbelts, regardless of any other factor? Is that right; is
that what your testimony is?
Mr. Lampe. In the written, that comes directly from the
Florida data base, yes.
Mr. Bilirakis. So that's a black and white figure?
Mr. Lampe. Straight from the data, sir, it's my
understanding.
Mr. Bilirakis. Straight from the data.
Well, a general question, sir. It seems that there's, there
were a large number of claims in this country, problems
overseas, with these tires, your tires, dating back to 1997.
And this is certainly a question that I think has to be asked
of the next panel, Mr. Jackson, but I would ask you, why is it
that something more was not done prior to, let's say, last
summer, July, the middle of last year in terms of examining
relevant data base bases?
What I'm trying to get to here is, you know, after the
fact, which is what we're doing here, after the fact, I realize
there might still be some accidents--isolated accidents taking
place after out there. But after the fact, I mean, does it--
maybe you get to the problem, you try to solve the problem, but
in the meantime, an awful lot of terrible things have happened.
So could you, could Ford, could or should the government
have gotten more involved in trying to prevent all of these
things that took place after--once--you know, it's been a year-
and-a-half now that we have known the problems were developing,
claims have been--were being filed.
Mr. Lampe. And you're referring, Congressman, to the events
leading up to last August recall announcement?
Mr. Bilirakis. I'm referring to--I'm referring to claims
regarding these tires that went back to 1997.
Mr. Lampe. Leading up to August?
Mr. Bilirakis. Yeah, leading up to it exactly.
Mr. Lampe. And we did an awful lot of work, and we did a
lot together with Ford. Ford alerted us of a situation in Saudi
Arabia. We went over there with a team of engineers and,
together with Ford, went out and examined a lot of tires.
The conditions in Saudi Arabia are very extreme,
Congressman. We covered those last year when we talked. Already
very, very flat loads, very high speeds. In many cases they
will go off the highways onto the sand, deflate their tires
because it gives them more flotation. Then they come back on
the highways and there isn't any place to reinflate their tires
so they travel long distances with very severely underloaded
tires.
We looked at the tire. There was not a tire problem. Ford
agreed with us it wasn't a tire problem. And the same situation
happened in Venezuela.
We have talked a lot about claims today. And it wasn't
until we actually started looking at the claims data that we
had never looked at before as an performance indicator, and
NHTSA and other tire companies had not looked at it, that we
saw an overrepresentation of tires that were produced in one
design called the ATX, and in one size; and then another one
size in the Wilderness tire that was produced in Decatur. And
then that drove us to take our action.
But we took very, very prompt action. When we had this
claims data and could see this overrepresentation, we didn't
mess around at all. We--it was within a week that we were up
here and announced a voluntary recall.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Mr. Greenwood. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Sawyer, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a couple of observations with the questions.
``oversteer'' and ``understeer'' are measures of vehicle
dynamics, and they represent the loss of adhesion at the front
or the rear of the car, and they occur all the time. It occurs
in the rain, it occurs on ice, and it really represents simply
a loss of the full measure of adhesion.
The point is that the whole question of testing protocols,
it seems to me, needs to be revisited. It's the sort of thing I
want to ask NHTSA, but Dr. Guenther's dynamic vehicle testing,
if there was as much of a difference in the G forces that were
applied to the tire between the tests that were done by Ford
and the ones that were done by Firestone, that's not a
consistent testing. That's not scientifically consistent.
That's huge difference. Would you agree?
Mr. Lampe. Again, Dr. Guenther's testing, Congressman
Sawyer, was done at what he calls the linear range, which is at
the speeds that we drive at. His analysis of the Ford testing
was done at a range that nobody ever achieves. You can't
achieve it; therefore, nobody's going to do well at that range.
I think they need to be consistent, yes.
Mr. Sawyer. Who needs to put those kinds of testing
protocols in place? Is SAE an appropriate body to turn to?
Mr. Lampe. I don't know if it's SAE or NHTSA. It's
certainly a--I agree with you, it should be a third party, an
independent third party, Congressman.
You have brought up an excellent point, the oversteer--
understeer to oversteer that's caused by tread separation. Even
Ford's own expert said that at normal highway speeds, the
effect of a tread separation on the vehicle is nothing more
than a gust of wind or running through a puddle of water. So we
are not talking about a catastrophic loss of adhesion.
Mr. Sawyer. That's my point exactly. You spoke of a
product, of the lasting effect of overheating as being damage
to a tire, so that the internal temperature of a tire didn't
cause a risk of separation. You used the term ``damage.'' is
that damage abiding; even once the tire temperature is returned
to normal, has damage been done that lives on in the life of
that tire for the rest of its life?
Mr. Lampe. Any type of high generation of heat, such as
underinflation, overload, tremendously high speeds, anything
that creates excessive heat can do lasting damage to a tire.
Mr. Sawyer. In that sense, when we talk about warning
systems on pressure that we've been talking about for a year
now, how critical is the margin of error? That is to say, if,
in fact, 26 pounds per square inch were specified and there was
a 20 percent margin for error, you're actually talking about
potentially being down below 21 pounds. How critical does that
become in terms of the overall life of the tire and the risk of
separation at a later date?
Mr. Lampe. Twenty percent underinflation is very, very
critical, and it's not something that you can--you can't run a
tire 20 percent underinflated for 2 months and air it back up
and think that you have corrected the problem, because the
damage exists and it's going to stay there.
Mr. Sawyer. Let me ask you then about a second point of
early warning. We're beginning to talk about claims data. My
understanding is that you have recently returned to a standard
for what is--what are claims data grounded in virtually any
loss above the cost of the tire itself.
Am I correct about that?
Mr. Lampe. I am not sure. I did hear that just the other
day. I don't know if that's something new to meet the
requirements of the TREAD Act, but I can't disagree with that.
Mr. Sawyer. My understanding is that Goodyear does
essentially the same thing.
Mr. Lampe. Okay.
Mr. Sawyer. How critical is that kind of comparability and
should we ask NHTSA to build that kind of comparability into
the standards that we ask them to promulgate?
Mr. Lampe. Yes, any time we are going to be in the future
using comparisons and this type of data, we should have
comparability in how we classify adjustments, how we classify
and claims. It should be consistent.
Mr. Sawyer. You mentioned earlier, but I would just like to
reemphasize that you talked about continuous improvement and
the effect that reporting protocols back and forth among
companies ought to have. That 400 to 600 pounds is significant
from your point of view, that a suspension change can be
significant. Would you agree that tire design could be equally
as significant?
Mr. Lampe. Yes, a significant change in tire design that
could affect the performance of the tire, I would consider that
significant.
Mr. Sawyer. One final question. Should we ask NHTSA to be
the clearinghouse for that exchange of information, or should
we simply require the companies to share that back and forth?
Mr. Lampe. No, I believe we should require the companies to
share it back and forth because I think it is in our own best
mutual interest.
Mr. Sawyer. Should NHTSA have a role in that?
Mr. Lampe. I wouldn't be against NHTSA having a role,
Congressman Sawyer, but I don't know that that role would be
necessary, but I certainly wouldn't be against it. If it would
help the situation, then yes, I am all for it. Anything that
makes it better.
Mr. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman. Mr. Lampe, I
think all of the members of the panel have queried you, which
means you are excused. We thank you very much for your patience
and for your testimony for being with us this afternoon.
Mr. Lampe. Thank you very much for the questions and the
very courteous treatment that I received today.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Chairman, may we be allowed to follow up
with written questions?
Mr. Greenwood. Certainly.
Mr. Stupak. I thought we were going to go a second round.
Mr. Greenwood. If the gentleman has questions that he would
like the committee to officially pose in writing, we can do
that.
Mr. Lampe. Congressman, could I make one change? I believe
Congressman Bilirakis was talking about some test data, and
maybe I misspoke, and I want to just get the record correct.
I believe he was looking at the Florida tire-related data
base. If I misspoke and said Texas, I would like to change that
to Florida.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman for
clarification and again for his testimony----
Mr. Lampe. Thank you very much.
Mr. Greenwood. [continuing] and calls forward our third and
final panel consisting of the Honorable Michael Jackson, Deputy
Secretary, accompanied by Mr. Robert Shelton, Executive
Director and Mr. Kenneth Weinstein associate administrator for
safety assurance for the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Department of Transportation.
Gentlemen, thank you for waiting so patiently to be with us
You are aware that the committee is holding an investigative
hearing, and when doing so, we've had the practice in the past
of taking testimony under oath. Do any of you have any
objections to giving testimony under oath?
The Chair then advises you that under the rules of the
House and rules of the committee, you are entitled to be
advised by counsel. Do you desire to be advised by counsel
during your testimony today?
In that case, if you will raise your right hand, I will
give you the oath. Do you swear that the testimony you are
about to give is the truth the whole truth and nothing but the
truth? So saying, you are under oath. And please be seated.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Jackson, you are going to present the
opening statement, are you?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir, I am, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Greenwood. Welcome again and please proceed.
TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL P. JACKSON, DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT SHELTON,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AND KENNETH WEINSTEIN, ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR FOR SAFETY ASSURANCE, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Jackson. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, and members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you this afternoon
and wish to thank the subcommittee. Thank you, Chairman Stearns
and Greenwood, subcommittee ranking members Towns and Deutsch,
full committee Chairman Tauzin and Ranking Member Dingell.
With me I have NHTSA's executive director Robert Shelton on
my left and Associate Administrator for Safety Assurance, Ken
Weinstein on my right.
Mr. Chairman, this hearing addresses a series of safety
issues that are of the very highest concern. Everyone who has
spoken today has underscored that, but I would be remiss by not
observing the same point and telling you how seriously we take
this inquiry and this responsibility NHTSA has.
The Department of Transportation's investigation of
Firestone tires was set in motion by tragic events, and loss of
life. All the parties appearing before you here today honor the
memory of those individuals by doing our best to take
responsible action.
On behalf of Secretary Mineta and myself, and the
Department, I want to assure you that DOT is pursuing these
matters systematically, objectively, and thoroughly.
Like you, we are also animated by a focused sense of
urgency and a vigorous resolve to protect the public interest,
to protect the consumers's rights. We have heard today about
the consumers being trapped in the middle, and, Mr. Chairman,
we wish to be bound right to that interest--right in the
middle--to provide you objective, impartial assessments. That
is what this committee needs, that is what the American public
needs, and that is what this agency was commissioned to do.
We worked closely with both Ford and Firestone to share
information to gather facts about these complex matters. We
have also consulted with experts throughout the field. We have
in our testing commissioned independent scientific labs to do
work for us, which I will describe later. So we have brought
into our own analysis a substantial amount of the type of blue
ribbon expertise that you could find in the country to examine
these issues.
As we gain additional information and are able to draw firm
conclusions from our ongoing research, we are going to follow
this where the facts lead us. We are going to let all the chips
fall where they may.
We want to thank the committee, particularly, for your
strong support and counsel as we progress. In particular, I
want to express our gratitude for the tools, the assistance,
and the resources that you have given us in the TREAD Act.
Frankly, this is a significant enhancement of the tools that we
have to work in this arena, and we are very grateful for the
improvements you have given us to work in this area.
After my confirmation by the Senate last month, I read the
TREAD Act in its entirety. I have studied it. We have had good
conversations to try to get this new Deputy Secretary up to
speed on it. But I confess, I often have been impatient at the
Department of Transportation about the pace of our regulatory
work. We move too slowly too often. But I am pleased to report
to you today that we are moving in an area where we have some
very tough deadlines for TREAD Act regulatory work. We are on
deadline. We are doing the job that we had set out before us
and I am pleased to report that things are moving just as
planned by the Congress.
And we will keep you advised about our progress in a
detailed way as we move forward. This includes regulations
regarding tire performance standards, tire pressure warning,
early warning reporting requirements, rollover testing and
child restraint improvements. We will continue to monitor this
carefully and, as I said, I will keep you advised about our
progress.
I am pleased to also tell you that yesterday, President
Bush announced his intention to nominate an outstanding
physician, Dr. Jeff Runge, to head this agency. While Secretary
Mineta and myself will continue to be actively involved, Dr.
Runge, if confirmed by the Senate, will have primary
responsibility for running the agency. I want to tell you that,
in the absence of a new administrator, we have a tremendous
amount of confidence in the NHTSA professional team, two of
whom are represented here with me today, to move this forward.
We have not been sitting on our hands at this department
waiting for a new administrator. We have been moving fast.
The remainder of my testimony will address two topics.
First, NHTSA's ongoing investigation into certain Firestone
tires; and second, the question of whether and to what extent
NHTSA should review tire-vehicle interface issues, including
the data commissioned by Firestone regarding understeer and
oversteer characteristics of the Ford Explorer.
Sir, if I may, the first topic will be our investigation of
Firestone tires. As this committee is aware, NHTSA opened its
formal defect investigation of over 50 million Firestone ATX,
ATX II, and Wilderness tires in May 2000, after the receipt of
a series of complaints concerning those tires.
With implementation of the TREAD Act, we have a far better
early warning system to identify these defects. NHTSA now
anticipates that we will complete the current testing program
for these tires at the end of next week. And by roughly this
time next month, we will be able to report publicly on our
conclusions about this important assessment.
Since NHTSA's investigation was launched, there have been
two separate actions which will lead to replacement of more
than half of the tires we have discussed here today, the
original recall last summer and the May announcement by Ford of
its tire replacement program.
I want to say that the Department applauds Ford for its
strong commitment to safety and its efforts to retain the
confidence of its customers. But I want to be clear too that
NHTSA has not yet completed its investigation, nor have we made
formal recommendations or a determination of the necessity for
further recall.
Ford's decision does not, in other words, render our
ongoing investigation moot. NHTSA's role under the Vehicle
Safety Act is to decide whether any of the tires under
investigation contain a defect that relates to motor vehicle
safety. Some of the tires were installed as original equipment
on non-Ford vehicles and are beyond the scope of Ford's
replacement program. Other tires have been used as a
replacement tire on non-Ford vehicles. It is thus important
that NHTSA complete its review, its investigation.
NHTSA's Firestone investigation is unprecedented in its
scope and in the tools that we are using in the conduct of this
analysis. The agency has examined literally hundreds of tires
from the field and is employing numerous state-of-the-art
techniques to analyze them. I have outlined in my formal
presentation the types and techniques and tools that we are
using: Shearography, sectioning, adhesion testing, rig testing
on drums, chemical analysis and other internal testing. And to
do this we have recruited the best experts we can find and are
using some of the Nation's most complex laboratory assets to do
this work.
NHTSA has requested and received information in addition
from six other tire companies to allow the agency to perform
peer comparisons. Throughout the investigation, NHTSA has
continued to receive extensive information from both Ford and
Firestone, and we have periodically provided both companies
with summaries of data collected in our testing effort. We are
grateful that both parties have cooperated so closely with this
investigation. However, I want to emphasize that NHTSA has not
provided either Ford or Firestone with conclusions or
recommendations about whether a further recall will be
necessary. When we have boxed that all up, we will provide it
all at once and announce it publicly.
Finally, I know that some members of this committee may be
concerned that the NHTSA Firestone tire investigation may not
yet have gone far enough. It is true that NHTSA's testing is
focused primarily on a subset of the tires that are covered by
Ford's recent replacement program. However, this is because
NHTSA's analysis of field data has demonstrated that those
tires have been associated with the greatest number of claims,
crashes, injuries and fatalities compared to other tires not
covered by Firestone's 2000 recall. This touchstone about what
is happening in the real work that Mr. Nasser refers to is our
touchstone in launching an investigation of this sort.
To put this in context, and based on NHTSA's June 18th,
2001, update of this data, the 14.4 million ATX and Wilderness
AT tires recalled last year have been associated with 285
crashes and 123 fatalities. The 13 million tires in Ford's
recently announced replacement program have been associated
with 37 crashes and 10 fatalities. The tires covered by NHTSA's
September 1, 2001 consumer advisory have been associated with
15 crashes and 5 fatalities, and the approximately 23 million
remaining tires within this universe of tires has been
associated, to date, with 8 crashes and 12 fatalities. So this
gives you some sense of the universe of this data that we are
looking at from the real world.
Ford has now also provided data to NHTSA and to this
committee about tires that are not currently being subjected to
extensive testing by NHTSA. Again, NHTSA expects to conclude
its testing next week. If after assessing all available data,
NHTSA concludes that an expanded testing program is recommended
for other Wilderness tires, it will expand the investigation of
other tires and focus more scrutiny on those tires that such
results might point toward.
If I may, just at this juncture, say a word too about the
data that has been discussed this morning about claims and of
the replacement tires that Ford is using in its program. Mr.
Chairman, I would commit to you that while we may not be able
to act as expeditiously as Mr. Nasser, we too expect to be
nimble here.
If upon receiving this data this evening, we could look at
it tonight and look at it a little bit in the morning, we will
come back to you with a preliminary assessment of what we think
we are looking at, what data we might need. If we need to have
some conversation with other manufacturers, we will try to
start that first thing in the morning and tell you how long we
think it's going to take, and we will give you a quick take on
that data and what we think it looks like.
We would like to involve Ford and Firestone in that quick
look as well. But we promise to be responsive to you tomorrow
and let you know what we think the need is and how long it's
going to take us to fill it. So we will work with you very
quickly on that.
Last, I would like to address the question of Firestone's
assertions regarding the handling of Ford Explorers. In
Chairman Tauzin's letter of June 6th to NHTSA, he urged us to
consider whether the safety problem being investigated is
solely a tire issue or whether it is a tire-vehicle application
issue. I would like to offer two sets of observations about
this very important question.
First, NHTSA's inquiry is focused on tires because it's the
tires that have been failing. As the committee is aware, by
law, tires are treated differently from other items of original
equipment. Defects in tires are to be remedied by the tire
manufacturer rather than the vehicle manufacturer. If tires
were treated statutorily as part of the vehicle itself, as are
headlights or seat belts for example, the proper course of
action would be to launch an investigation of one or more
vehicle models and any tires that might be used as
replacements.
Moreover, and to be more specific, NHTSA has, to date, had
no credible evidence that the Ford Explorer's design is in any
way responsible for causing tread separation or other such
catastrophic tire failure. Firestone has not, as I understood
it, asserted this causal relationship either, and Mr. Lampe's
testimony addressed that issue as well.
So NHTSA has to date, therefore, conducted our
investigation as, first and foremost, a tire investigation. If
it appears that the safety problem is limited primarily to
crashes involving vehicles equipped with certain Firestone
tires, then the most immediate and the most effective remedy is
to recall those tires.
Second, I would like to talk just for a moment about
NHTSA's examination of the handling characteristics of the Ford
Explorer. As the committee is aware, Firestone commissioned a
study to look at the handling characteristics and rollover
propensity of Ford Explorers, and that has been discussed
today. Firestone recently informed the Department of this and
released the initial results from that study. Like other SUVs,
the Ford Explorer experiences a higher rollover rate than other
passenger cars.
In asking NHTSA to investigate the safety of the Explorer,
Firestone specifically said that they had not intended to
launch a formal investigation--a formal defect petition at
NHTSA. However, because the content of it has been structured
in this way--as a petition--we have, at the Department,
Secretary Mineta and myself, asked NHTSA to treat the Firestone
petition as a formal petition and we are behaving as law and
regulation require us to behave upon receipt of a petition
asking us to launch a defect investigation. That is where we
are right now.
Consequently, at this stage, NHTSA is conducting an
analysis to determine if a formal investigation is merited. The
Department and NHTSA are giving this matter full consideration.
Again, a sense of the urgency that I was trying to speak to you
about earlier today certainly pervades our approach to this
issue. NHTSA is reviewing the Firestone information. Already,
we have met both with Firestone and Ford. Moreover, we met last
week with the individual who conducted this research on behalf
of Firestone and have had useful conversations with all of
those parties.
Firestone's consultant recently advised NHTSA that he would
not be finished with the full testing regime that he is
conducting for Firestone until the end of July. Even before
receiving Firestone's request, the Agency had been reviewing
field data from a variety of sources, including NHTSA's own
data collection systems for the purposes of evaluating the
likelihood of rollover given a tire failure for both the
Explorer and for peer vehicles.
Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Jackson, we turned the clock off 10
minutes ago. If you would wrap up.
Mr. Jackson. I'm in my last page, sir. Our goal is to
complete this analysis of the data as quickly as possible this
summer. We realize it is an area of enormous importance to all
the parties involved. So I have provided now, in sum, an
overview of what we are doing on the tire investigation as well
as on this petition that we have received on the vehicle.
Portions of what I said have, I know, disappointed probably
both Firestone and Ford. We are very comfortable being in
exactly the position that we are. We are going to do this
professionally, systematically, but with urgency. And when we
finish, and it won't be long, we will be back here to tell you
exactly what we found. I'm now happy to answer any questions
that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Michael P. Jackson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael P. Jackson, Deputy Secretary of
Transportation
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittees: I am pleased to
appear before you today and wish to thank Subcommittee Chairmen Stearns
and Greenwood, Subcommittee Ranking Members Towns and Deutsch, Full
Committee Chairman Tauzin and Ranking Member Dingell for the invitation
to appear at this hearing.
With me are NHTSA's Executive Director, L. Robert Shelton, and
Associate Administrator for Safety Assurance, Kenneth N. Weinstein.
1. introduction
Mr. Chairman, this hearing addresses a series of safety issues that
are of the very highest importance. The Department of Transportation's
investigation of Firestone tires was set in motion by tragic events and
loss of life. All of the parties appearing before you today must honor
the memory of those individuals by our responsible actions.
On behalf of Secretary Mineta, I want to assure you that the
Department of Transportation is pursuing these matters systematically,
objectively, and thoroughly. Like you, we are animated by a focused
urgency, and a vigorous resolve to protect the public. We have worked
closely with Ford and Firestone to share information and gather facts
about these complex technical matters. Our work on these matters
continues to evolve. As we gain additional information and are able to
draw firm conclusions from our ongoing research, NHTSA will follow
these matters wherever the facts lead.
I want to thank the Committee on Energy and Commerce for your
strong support and your counsel as we progress. In particular, I want
to express our gratitude for the tools and resources that this
Committee helped make available to the Department with last November's
enactment of the TREAD Act. After my confirmation by the Senate last
month, I studied the Act in its entirety. In the TREAD Act, Congress
set aggressive deadlines for completing the required rulemakings. While
I confess to having often been impatient with the pace of regulatory
work at the Department, Secretary Mineta and I are pleased to inform
the Subcommittees that NHTSA is on schedule to implement the Act's
landmark safety enhancements. This includes the regulations regarding
tire performance standards, tire pressure warning, early warning
reporting requirements, rollover testing and child restraint
improvements.
We will continue to monitor implementation carefully. I personally
pledge that the Department will work closely and candidly with these
Subcommittees to keep you apprised of our progress both on TREAD Act
implementation, and on the Firestone Tire and Ford Explorer matters.
The remainder of my testimony will address two topics: first,
NHTSA's ongoing investigation into certain Firestone tires; and second,
the question of whether and to what extent NHTSA should review tire-
vehicle interface issues, including data commissioned by Firestone
regarding understeer/oversteer characteristics of the Ford Explorer.
2. nhtsa's investigation into firestone tires
As the Committee is aware, NHTSA opened its formal defect
investigation of over 50 million Firestone ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness
tires in May 2000, after the number of complaints concerning these
tires increased significantly that year. With implementation of the
TREAD Act, we will have a far better early warning system to identify
potential tire defects.
NHTSA now anticipates its current testing of tires will be
completed by the end of next week. By roughly this time next month,
NHTSA expects to finish its analysis and announce the results.
Since NHTSA's investigation was launched, there have been two
separate actions that will lead to replacement of more than half of the
tires covered by the investigation:
<bullet> On August 9, 2000, Firestone recalled all of its ATX and ATX
II tires of the P235/75R15 size manufactured since 1991. It
also recalled Wilderness AT tires of that size made at its
Decatur plant, for a total of 14.4 million tires.
<bullet> On May 22, 2001, Ford announced a tire replacement program
that includes all other Firestone Wilderness tires on certain
Ford, Mercury and Mazda SUVs and light trucks. This replacement
action totals approximately 13 million tires.
The Department applauds Ford for its strong commitment to safety
and its efforts to retain the confidence of its customers. It is
necessary to reiterate that NHTSA has not yet completed its
investigation nor has NHTSA made a formal determination about the
necessity of a further recall. Ford's decision does not render NHTSA's
investigation moot.
NHTSA's role under the Vehicle Safety Act is to decide whether any
of the tires under investigation contain a defect that relates to motor
vehicle safety. Some of these tires were installed as original
equipment on non-Ford vehicles and are beyond the scope of Ford's
replacement program. Other tires have been used as replacement tires on
non-Ford vehicles. It is thus important that NHTSA complete its
investigation and reach a decision consistent with its statutory and
regulatory mandate.
NHTSA's Firestone investigation is unprecedented in its technical
complexity. The investigation includes both a review of field
experience and an extensive series of laboratory analyses. The agency
has examined hundreds of tires from the field and is employing numerous
state-of-the-art techniques to analyze the performance and
characteristics of these tires. These techniques include:
<bullet> shearography--a non-destructive technique that can detect
separations within a tire;
<bullet> sectioning--cutting a tire to measure the dimensions of
interior features, including cracks;
<bullet> adhesion testing--measuring the resistance of the belts to
being peeled apart;
<bullet> rig testing on drums--to assess durability;
<bullet> chemical analyses--evaluating the effects of oxidation and
other chemical processes that can degrade a tire; and
<bullet> other internal physical measurements.
NHTSA has requested and received information from six other tire
companies to allow the agency to perform peer comparisons. Throughout
the investigation, NHTSA has continued to receive extensive information
from both Ford and Firestone, and we have periodically provided both
companies with summaries of data collected in our testing effort. We
are grateful for the cooperation of both parties. However, I want to
emphasize that NHTSA has not yet provided either Firestone or Ford with
its conclusions or recommendations about whether a further recall is
necessary.
Finally, I know that some members of the Committee may be concerned
that the NHTSA Firestone investigation may not yet have gone far
enough. It is true that NHTSA's testing is focused primarily on a
subset of the tires that are covered by Ford's recent replacement
program. However, this is because NHTSA's analysis of field data has
demonstrated that those tires have been associated with the greatest
number of claims, crashes, injuries and fatalities compared to other
tires not covered by Firestone's August 2000 recall. To put this in
context, based on NHTSA's June 18, 2001 update of the database of
reports to the agency, the 14.4 million ATX and Wilderness AT tires
recalled last year have been associated with some 285 crashes and 123
fatalities. The 13 million tires in Ford's recently announced
replacement program have been associated with 37 crashes and 10
fatalities. The tires covered by NHTSA's September 1, 2001 Consumer
Advisory have been associated with a reported 15 crashes and five
fatalities. The approximately 23 million remaining tires within the
universe of tires covered by this investigation have, to date, been
associated with eight crashes and 12 fatalities.<SUP>1</SUP>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The eight crashes represent eight different tire models. In
addition, NHTSA has data on an additional 53 total fatalities where the
vehicle involved was an Explorer and/or there is enough tire
information known to assume the tire involved is among those under
investigation. Because the crashes are old or the tire was not saved,
additional information is not available to categorize them properly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ford has now also provided data to NHTSA and to this Committee
about tires that are not currently being subjected to extensive testing
by NHTSA. Again, NHTSA expects to conclude its ongoing tire testing for
this investigation next week. If, after assessing all available data,
NHTSA concludes that an expanded testing program for other Wilderness
tires is indicated, it will expand its investigative work to focus more
scrutiny on those tires.
3. firestone's assertions regarding handling of ford explorers
In Chairman Tauzin's June 6 letter to NHTSA, he urged NHTSA to
consider whether the safety problem now being investigated is ``solely
a tire issue, or whether it is a tire-vehicle application issue.'' I
would like to offer two sets of observations about this important
question.
First, NHTSA's inquiry has focused on tires because it is the tires
that have been failing. As the Committee is aware, by law tires are
treated differently from all other items of original equipment on
vehicles. Defects in tires are to be remedied by the tire manufacturer
rather than the vehicle manufacturer.
If tires were treated statutorily as part of the vehicle itself--as
are headlights or seat belts, for example--the proper course of action
would have been to launch an investigation of one or more vehicle
models and any tires used as replacements. Moreover, and to be
specific, NHTSA has had no credible evidence that the Ford Explorer's
design is in any way responsible for causing tread separation or other
such catastrophic tire failure. Firestone has not, as I understand it,
asserted this causal relationship.
NHTSA has to date therefore conducted this investigation as first
and foremost a tire investigation. If it appears that the safety
problem is limited primarily to crashes involving vehicles equipped
with certain Firestone tires, then the most immediate and effective
remedy under the law is to recall the tires.
Second, I would now like to turn to NHTSA's examination of the
handling characteristics of the Ford Explorer. As the Committee is
aware, Firestone commissioned a study to look at the handling
characteristics and rollover propensity of Ford Explorers after tire
tread separation. Firestone recently informed the Department that it is
conducting a study and simultaneously made public the results of the
first set of its handling tests. Firestone has asked the Department to
investigate its claims that the Ford Explorer is deficient in its
handling under this situation.
Like other SUVs, the Ford Explorer experiences a higher overall
rollover rate than passenger cars. In asking NHTSA to investigate the
safety of the Explorer, Firestone has alleged that Explorers are more
likely than other SUVs to experience an oversteer condition following a
tread separation on a left rear tire and that an oversteer condition is
likely to make a vehicle less stable.
Although Firestone has verbally stated to the Department that it
did not intend to take the formal legal step of petitioning NHTSA to
conduct an investigation, their written communication to NHTSA
virtually constitutes such a request. Secretary Mineta and I therefore
asked NHTSA to treat the Firestone request as if it were a formal
petition. Consequently, at this stage NHTSA is conducting an analysis
to determine if a formal investigation is merited.
The Department and NHTSA are giving this matter full consideration.
NHTSA is reviewing Firestone's information and has met with both
Firestone and Ford to discuss in detail Firestone's allegations. Last
week, the agency met with the consultant hired by Firestone to conduct
its tests. Firestone's consultant recently advised NHTSA that he does
not expect to complete his testing until the end of July.
Even before receiving Firestone's request, the agency already had
been reviewing field data from a variety of sources, including NHTSA's
own data collection systems, for the purpose of evaluating the
likelihood of a rollover, given a tire failure, for both the Explorer
and for peer vehicles. NHTSA has recently collected and is currently
evaluating accident data regarding various model years of the Explorer.
NHTSA has not yet formed a view as to the validity of Firestone's
claims about the performance of the Explorer. NHTSA will assess the
additional test data promised by Firestone in conjunction with other
relevant available data. The agency's goal is to complete its initial
analysis of this data as quickly as possible this Summer. It will then
decide whether to open a formal investigation.
We realize that this is an issue of great interest to the
Subcommittees, to the manufacturers and the public. We will keep these
Subcommittees informed as NHTSA brings this review to closure.
Mr. Chairman, I have now provided an overview of our ongoing
Firestone investigation, the Explorer vehicle handling analysis, and
the principles animating each. Portions of my testimony today may
alternatively leave both Ford and Firestone disappointed that we do not
have immediate closure on important issues. I know that we can, in both
cases, count on their continued cooperation with NHTSA. As we continue
to do our job in assessing these difficult issues, I hope we will earn
the Committee's confidence and that of the public who rely on the
Department's vital safety work.
Speaking for Secretary Mineta, you have our pledge that we will
continue to conduct this work in a fair, impartial and thoroughly
professional manner, always mindful of the urgency and importance of
this effort. This concludes my statement. My colleagues and I will be
glad to answer any questions.
Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Jackson, I know it is a heck of a thing
to have you sit around for 6\1/2\ hours and ask you to wrap it
up after 10 minutes.
Mr. Jackson. I learned a lot.
Mr. Greenwood. But that's the way it works.
Last year, NHTSA recommended a recall on several Firestone
tires based on an overall claims rate of 12.6 claims per
million tires produced. Some of the suggested tires had less
than 3 claims, but the low production universe elevated the
claims rate. This year, Ford is removing Firestone Wilderness
AT tires from all of its vehicles based partially on
identifying tires with a claims rate of more than five claims
per million produced, a figure they say is an industry
standard.
Do you agree that there is any such industry standards, and
if so, is it 5 or 12.6 or some other number?
Mr. Jackson. I don't believe that we have exactly reached
an understanding of a number, a single number that would be
appropriate to use as an indicator of when to trigger a defect
investigation. It is a variable, an important variable. But a
single one such as that is not definitively established as
sufficient for this purpose.
Mr. Greenwood. Mr. Jackson, you said that in your opening
statement that NHTSA was considering whether to look into the
combination of this tire on this particular vehicle. Last year
in a Senate hearing, Senator Snowe asked Dr. Bailey, quote:
``have you decided that it is a tire problem or a Ford Explorer
problem or both?'' and Dr. Bailey responded: ``At this time, I
think we are dealing with a tire problem, but as part of our
investigation, we will also explore the possibility of a
combination.''
Has that study not been conducted by NHTSA?
Mr. Jackson. NHTSA has gathered some preliminary evidence
on this, and the Firestone data is a part of that--a part of
that work.
Mr. Greenwood. The companies are making use of their
respective understeer and oversteer experiments. The question
is, is there a baseline amount understeer that a car or SUV
should have?
Mr. Jackson. No, sir, we have not established as a
recommendation of NHTSA such a standard.
Mr. Greenwood. I'm sorry, I was interrupted there. You have
not yet decided whether there should be such a standard?
Mr. Jackson. That's correct.
Mr. Greenwood. Are you working on--where do you stand on
that? Are you probing that question?
Mr. Jackson. That question is embedded in the question of
whether we should launch a formal investigation in the case of
the Explorer, and will be part of the preliminary conversation
that takes place as we do our review. We are not conducting an
investigation now. We are conducting a review. And part of that
review would address this question inside the Department.
Mr. Greenwood. Well, understand, my question is not does
the Explorer have an understeer or oversteer problem. My
question is should there be a national standard set for
steering?
Mr. Jackson. We would like to be able to answer that
question more straightforwardly as a result of concluding our
preliminary review and report back to your our thoughts on that
matter. It is definitely a new step that we believe Firestone
is asking us to take, to regulate an area or to look at and
evaluate an area where we have not historically had a role.
Mr. Greenwood. How much would the steering mechanism of the
vehicle play a role in the vehicle's understeer or oversteer?
Mr. Jackson. I would like to defer to one of my expert
colleagues to answer that question.
Mr. Weinstein. Well, I am not an expert vehicle dynamicist,
a dynamics expert, but I would say it is possible that it could
have an effect under various different circumstances. Whether
it be in a tread separation, I don't know. And we will be
working and looking at the data and seeing what Dr. Guenther
comes up with and see whether or not steering inputs have any
effect.
Mr. Greenwood. Much has been made throughout the hearing
about this issue of claims rates. And I think most of us have
come to the conclusion that claims rate is an only somewhat
reliable piece of information. As I understand it, the claims
rate is simply a function of how many people call NHTSA and
supply information with regard to property and/or personal
damage that result in a motor vehicle accident, and that rate
could be affected by what happens in the media today. I
wouldn't be surprised if our hearing results in additional
claims.
Could you describe how NHTSA handles these claims and what
you make of the information gathered from it?
Mr. Jackson. Let me take a first cut at that. The claims
rate definition is something that we are addressing in the
TREAD Act regulatory work that we are doing right now. But the
differences in the definitions, which really are those of the
manufacturers, the tire manufacturers--and this data, by the
way, is reported not to us initially, but to the manufacturers.
They share data with us. This data has coalesced around a
common understanding at least in the data that we are sharing
with tire manufacturers that it is essentially a claim that we
are looking at here for more than the value of the tire itself.
So in the Goodyear and Firestone data, there is, we
believe, comparability at this juncture. We will address that
more systematically in our regulatory work.
Mr. Greenwood. My time has expired. The gentleman--the
Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Dingell.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman. I thank you. Gentlemen, is tread
separation a common form of tire failure?
Mr. Jackson. No, sir.
Mr. Dingell. It is not. Is it regarded as catastrophic?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Can it be reasonably anticipated that if it's
an SUV, it will roll over after tread separation?
Mr. Jackson. No, sir.
Mr. Dingell. In other words, you would assume that after
tread separation, the vehicle is not going to roll?
Mr. Jackson. The data that Mr. Nasser discussed this
morning says that approximately 10 percent result in a rollover
in the event of a----
Mr. Dingell. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Shelton. Mr. Dingell, our data say that it is 10
percent I believe at the highest. In many cases it is less than
that.
Mr. Dingell. There was a period of three model years, 1995
through 1997, when virtual equal numbers of Goodyear and
Firestone tires were put on the Explorer. I understand there
has been 1,183 tread separation claims for Firestone tires used
in those model years, and only two tread separation claims for
Goodyear tires were used in those same 2 years. Is that so?
Mr. Shelton. Yes, that's correct.
Mr. Dingell. That conforms with your records. Did either of
the two claims on Goodyear tires involve loss of life?
Mr. Shelton. No, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Is there greater likelihood that tread
separations will occur at low or high speeds?
Mr. Shelton. High speeds, sir.
Mr. Dingell. It is uncommon for them to occur below 35
miles an hour?
Mr. Shelton. Yes, it is typically a high speed phenomenon.
Mr. Dingell. So if somebody tested a tire at 35 miles an
hour, they wouldn't get a good result, would they, if they
showed up with a lot of tread separation?
Mr. Shelton. It is unlikely they would find tread
separation at 35 miles an hour.
Mr. Dingell. You'd look kind of fishy-eyed at that
particular kind of test, would you not?
Mr. Shelton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Now, is there threshold level for tread
separations that NHTSA recognizes as standard for judging when
to recommend a recall?
Mr. Shelton. No, sir, we do not have such a threshold.
Mr. Dingell. The Wilderness AT tires recalled last year
were all from Firestone's plant in Decatur, Illinois; is that
correct?
Mr. Shelton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. The Wilderness AT tires were also made at
Firestone plants at Wilson, North Carolina; is that also true?
Mr. Shelton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. I understand that the latest reports reveal
that tread separation claims for the Wilderness AT tires
produced in Wilson, North Carolina, in 1996 have been extremely
high, 100 parts per million. Is that information correct?
Mr. Weinstein. I wouldn't say that it is necessarily 100
parts per million. We have looked at trends in the Wilson plant
and----
Mr. Dingell. Well, it's either true or not true or you
don't know.
Mr. Weinstein. I'll check it out----
Mr. Dingell. Please give us the answer. I also understand
that 16-inch Wilderness AT tires made at Wilson has a tread
separation claims rate of 450 parts per million when used on
the vehicle up to 5 years; is that correct?
Mr. Shelton. We will have to check.
Mr. Jackson. We will have to get those numbers.
Mr. Dingell. That is correct?
Mr. Shelton. We are checking that.
Mr. Dingell. Okay. You will check that out. NHTSA also
asked Firestone to recall its 16-inch Wilderness AT tire made
at Wilson last year, did it not?
Mr. Weinstein. 16-inch tire?
Mr. Dingell. Yes, you asked them to recall the 16-inch
tire.
Mr. Shelton. No, sir.
Mr. Dingell. You did not? Are you now prepared to say that
NHTSA does not believe that the Wilderness AT tires produced at
Wilson pose any safety risks for drivers and passengers who
have these tires on their vehicles?
Mr. Weinstein. We are in the process of completing our
investigation and will be able to address that by this time
next month.
Mr. Dingell. All right. The rate of 100 parts per million
is higher than the average rate for tires that have been
recalled in the past year, is that not so?
Mr. Shelton. Yes, sir. As I understand the rates of the
tires that have been recalled are higher than that.
Mr. Stearns. [Presiding] Excuse me, Mr. Dingell. There's
two mikes. If you could spread the mikes and when you speak,
make sure you speak into them.
Mr. Dingell. Tread separations tend to occur in hot climate
regions in warm weather periods of the year; isn't that so?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. When will NHTSA have the work done to make a
decision about recalling tires produced at Wilson?
Mr. Shelton. We plan to complete our analysis for the
entire investigation approximately 1 month from today.
Mr. Dingell. Is that delay related to the fact that NHTSA
does not have an administrator, acting or permanent, at this
time?
Mr. Shelton. No, sir.
Mr. Dingell. It is not?
Mr. Shelton. No, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Currently NHTSA rates vehicles on the basis of
their static stability; is that correct?
Mr. Shelton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. And no SUV that NHTSA has tested received
higher than a 3- out of a possible 5-star rating; is that
correct?
Mr. Shelton. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Dingell. It is my understanding that the 2002 model
year Explorer will receive a 3-star rating from NHTSA. That is
as high as any other SUV; is that correct?
Mr. Shelton. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Dingell. In prior model years, NHTSA gave the Explorer
a 2-star rating; is that correct?
Mr. Shelton. The earlier model Explorer was tested and got
a 2-star rating, yes. Not prior model years, because we just
started the program a few month ago.
Mr. Dingell. Would you call a 2-star rating during those
year good or bad?
Mr. Shelton. It would be typical for an SUV. They range
from 1 to 3.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Weinstein. Mr. Chairman, could I clarify one of my
prior answers? I misunderstood because of the way the prior
conversation had been going with respect to tires on Explorers
and Rangers, et cetera, when you asked me about had we
recommended recalling a 16-inch tire from Wilson, I was
focusing on that. On our consumer advisory list, the one that
we issued last September 1st, we did include a 16-inch
Wilderness AT tire that is used on a relatively small number of
Ford 150 vehicles. It is a different size and different tire
from the one that is used on Explorers. I apologize for that
confusion.
Mr. Dingell. What about the Explorer tire to which I was
referring? Did you suggest that it should be recalled or not?
Mr. Weinstein. We did not, and that's certainly a part of
our current investigation. The ones--the 16-inch tires used on
Explorers made at Wilson or any place else were not included.
Mr. Dingell. Could that investigation now ongoing result in
a recall of that tire?
Mr. Weinstein. It could lead to a request for that.
Mr. Stearns. Let me offer my questions here. Just as a
general, do we have enough resources at NHTSA to analyze and
provide, in a timely fashion, information on this area and
others?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir, I think we do. And if we find that
as these examinations increase that we don't, I will come back
and tell you.
Mr. Stearns. So right now we have all the resources at
NHTSA to do the job in your opinion?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stearns. And that is the opinion of your boss?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir, I have not asked that question of
him directly, but we have no conversations on the table about
that issue right now.
Mr. Stearns. Have you heard the discussion that we have had
on this raw data that we've had here?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir, I have.
Mr. Stearns. If we give you this raw data, can you come
back within 30 days and give us your analysis, or 2 weeks or 1
week or 1 day?
Mr. Jackson. Mr. Chairman, in my prepared remarks, I
volunteered that we could come back tomorrow and give you our
preliminary analysis of that data and what we think it might
take to give you a definitive answer to the questions that you
are asking us.
Mr. Stearns. In terms of the TREAD Act, do you think we
should do anything more than that at this time?
Mr. Jackson. No, sir, I do not have a recommendation for
more right now. We have a pretty steep regulatory agenda ahead
of us. We have many new and complex issues to work through with
the industry. We will be keeping you and the members of this
committee apprised, but I do not think anything more is needed
at this point.
Mr. Stearns. Were you here when Mr. Stupak was talking
about claims versus safety and the nuance that once you talk
about claims, it does not imply safety? Were you here?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir, I was.
Mr. Stearns. Do you think we need to have in Congress a
better understanding, either legislatively, in your office,
what claims mean in terms relative to safety or are they
totally diverse, separated?
Mr. Jackson. I think that we obviously have a little
confusion here in the room and it seems natural that we should
clarify this a little bit more. As part of our regulation, we
are specifying a definition that would provide common data to
us from the tire manufacturers. And so that is exactly what we
are doing.
In the meantime, frankly, we have had these conversations
with the tire manufacturers that we have been talking with as
part of this investigation. And we believe we have a pretty
common sense agreement about what that definition of claims
would be.
Mr. Stearns. Not only a definition, but once you give a
claims quantitative answer, don't you have to list the
contingencies that make up that claim?
Mr. Jackson. Mr. Chairman, you are exactly right to
understand that claims alone is not a single metric answer to
the question of whether we have a problem. There are a
multiplicity of factors that we have to look at to be able to
dig into the question of whether a possible defect exists.
Mr. Stearns. In the field experience chart prepared by
NHTSA, by you folks--this is not our raw data, but which you
prepared--you compare the Explorer model years 1991 to 1994 to
the model years 1995 to 1999. Can you see it okay? Do you need
a copy?
Mr. Jackson. I am familiar with that chart, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. It would appear from this chart--and you heard
me ask Ford Motor company--that the 1991-94 model had 50
rollovers. The following number jumped to 87 for the 1995-1999
model year Explorer. Is this important statistics? You probably
heard Mr. Nasser indicate it was just demographics. He didn't
give an answer to it.
I guess the No. 1 question is, are you investigating this
and what leads to this increase rollover number?
Mr. Jackson. We are reviewing this data more thoroughly.
And it is a statistically significant difference between those
two numbers. And we are discussing this with Ford and among our
own experts, to assess this data more carefully.
We generated this data, we looked at it and discovered that
it is an issue that we want to dig into more.
Mr. Stearns. How long have you known about it?
Mr. Jackson. Since April.
Mr. Stearns. Are you aware that Ford has changed the
suspension on different model years?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, we are.
Mr. Stearns. Tell me briefly what that means.
Mr. Weinstein. In fact, Mr. Chairman, that is why we
separated out those. We knew that they had made a change. In
model year 1995, they switched from what is called a twin I-
beam suspension to what Mr. Nasser characterized a more modern
type of suspension, an A-arm suspension. And they made other
changes to the vehicle as well for model year 1995. So it is a
somewhat different vehicle.
I am not here to tell you that an A-arm suspension
automatically leads to more rollovers. I am not saying that at
all. But that is why we broke out the two models.
Mr. Stearns. But didn't the suspension occur at the same
time as this chart? I mean, wouldn't it fall into those years,
the 1995 to 1999 model year Explorer?
Mr. Weinstein. That's correct. We did the data runs for the
two separate categories. That is why we split the total
Explorer population into those two groups, just to see whether
or not there was any difference in consequence. What these are,
by the way, sir, is the rollovers that occurred following a
tread separation. So we wanted to see what the consequences of
a tread separation would be on Explorers, on pickup trucks, on
other SUVs, and that was why this chart was developed. And that
is why we used different groups of Explorers as well.
Mr. Stearns. You know, fellows, the taxpayers are hiring
you to make some difficult decisions. And this is not a case
where you are going to give an oblique or ambiguous answer. You
are going to have to come up and risk and give some answers
here so that the American consumer is safe. Do you think, based
upon this chart, that it is worthwhile to investigate beyond
tires, perhaps look at the role of other vehicles in rollover
incidences?
Mr. Weinstein. Not specific----
Mr. Stearns. Does that warrant, in your opinion, that kind
of investigation?
Mr. Weinstein. Mr. Chairman not just from this chart but
both the information in this chart, the information that Dr.
Guenther has prepared, and all the information that is
available to us. We will look at all of that and make that
decision later this summer.
Mr. Stearns. Okay. My time has expired. Mr. Stupak is
recognized.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's your testimony
that this vehicle field experience, that relates to tread
separations; right?
Mr. Weinstein. It's what occurs after a claim--claims of
tread separation provided by Firestone to us.
Mr. Stupak. So Ford should have more crashes because it has
the Firestone tires, which is alleged to separate, and that is
what this chart reflects.
Mr. Weinstein. Well, what we were attempting to do was to
say if there is a tread separation, what is the likelihood of a
catastrophic event, of a crash or a rollover. Only when you
have a lot of tread separations do you have enough data to have
statistically significant results.
Mr. Stupak. These other vehicles, other compact SUVs and
other compact SUVs without Bronco II, did they have the
Firestone Wilderness tires?
Mr. Weinstein. Yes, these are--everything on that chart
reflects tires that are the subject of our investigation.
Mr. Stupak. Very good. In--before Ford came out with their
recall or replacement notice, did NHTSA have a chance to look
at the tires that they were going to use as replacement tires?
By that I mean you saw the list.
Mr. Weinstein. They gave us the list after they advised us
that they were going to do what they did. But we subsequently
had the opportunity to look at the list.
Mr. Stupak. Did you have an opportunity to discuss it with
them? Did you voice any concerns about any of these vehicles--
excuse me, replacement tires?
Mr. Weinstein. They asked us whether we were investigating
any of those tires. They subsequently asked us how many
consumer complaints we had gotten about these tires. And I'm
distinguishing from claims. This is like to our hotline. And we
gave them that data. And then they went forward and did what
they did.
Mr. Stupak. Does NHTSA have any concerns about these
replacement tires? That they may have a worse safety record
than the ones that are being replaced?
Mr. Weinstein. Well, sir, we will keep looking at that. At
the moment, we don't have any such concern. We are not
investigating them. But if we see anything--and we look forward
to seeing the data that the committee was discussing before--we
will certainly promptly advise the committee as well as Ford.
Mr. Stupak. So the data that you may receive from the
committee, you don't have any idea if these tires are more
dangerous, less dangerous, or insufficient information to make
a judgment call?
Mr. Weinstein. At this point, we have no evidence that
would indicate that they are dangerous.
Mr. Jackson. Congressman, I would like to give a gloss on
that point. Mr. Nasser earlier said that he made the full
portfolio of customer service actions, in effect, covering a
wide variety of performance data for the tires that are in that
customer service action. Necessarily, some of those tires, as
he admitted, were not tires that indicated substantial failure.
So if we find that some in that pool of Ford actions are
comparable to other tires out there in the replacement, it's
not prima facie a surprise to us because of the nature of the
way they made their decision and the data that was available to
them on some of the newer tires.
Mr. Stupak. Did they--did Ford give you the data that they
had on these replacement tires or they just asked you about----
Mr. Jackson. I don't believe we exchanged that data. They
just asked us for some of the information we have described to
you, sir.
Mr. Stupak. So it's your testimony today that there are no
other tires that you are looking at for tread separations other
than the Firestone tires.
Mr. Weinstein. No other tires that are on that list. We do
have two pending investigations about tires called light truck
tires, a Firestone tire and a Goodyear tire.
Mr. Stupak. So no other on that list, then.
Mr. Weinstein. Right. Right.
Mr. Stupak. All right. In answer to some questions by
somebody, tread separation or a tread failure, very seldom does
that happen; right?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stupak. Would a blowout occur more often on tires than
tread separations? If you know?
Mr. Weinstein. Mr. Lampe says no, and we don't dispute
that. We don't keep track of that. We couldn't tell you how
many blowouts there are.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Lampe also said that tread separations are
common occurrence. And he cited some quotes from Goodyear.
Mr. Shelton. Yes, Congressman, consumers normally wouldn't
report a blowout to NHTSA. All of us have had flat tires in our
lives and I don't call NHTSA when I have a flat tire.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Shelton. I suspect you wouldn't either.
Mr. Stupak. Correct. Thank you.
Mr. Stearns. Mr. Shimkus is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have defined or
used the terminology, ``parts per million,'' which I think
refers to claims per million, connected with last year's
original recall where we also asked how come insurance data
wasn't getting to NHTSA. Part of the Tire Act was to get
information. And I think that is what we are kind of wrestling
with too is new fountains of information, some coming from the
insurance industry, some coming from individual testing, either
by you all or by the industry.
I was intrigued with the debate or the discussion on the
tires on the SUVs and the Ranger pickups with Mr. Dingell with
Mr. Lampe. And the basic premise was: same tire. It goes into
the debate of standards and specifications.
Do we want to micromanage tire standards through Federal
regulation?
Mr. Jackson. We, as part of the TREAD Act, we were asked to
look at the tire standard that we have out there, and we
believe that we should look at that and that it can benefit
from another look. We are not trying to design tires--to
provide a ``performance spec'' for a tire to be made for a
given vehicle.
So there is a degree of appropriate work that we have to do
here, but we are not in the business of designing tires nor of
specifying the requirements for a given tire-vehicle
combination.
Mr. Shimkus. So what do we expect to receive from your
evaluation? Or what do you think you might present to us? If
you are the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, an
element of the Department of Transportation, we have
independent corporations send us--establishing specifications
to tire industry individuals who establish the exact standards
for a multitude of different vehicles. What do you think you
are going to accomplish?
Mr. Jackson. We currently have a tire standard, and perhaps
I could ask my colleague to give you an overview of that
standard and exactly what we are looking at for changes in it.
Mr. Shelton. Yes, Congressman, as part of the TREAD Act, we
are going to upgrade our tire standard. As it was discussed in
this committee's hearing last year, the existing NHTSA tire
standard has been essentially unchanged since 1968. And as one
of the provisions of the TREAD Act we are upgrading that
standard. And we will issue a proposal this summer, I think
late this summer to actually upgrade that tire standard,
because under TREAD, we have to get that rulemaking completed
by next June.
So that right now, under the NHTSA tire standard, there are
high-speed tests, there are endurance tests, there is a
debeading test. There is another test that is escaping me right
now. But all of those tests will be upgraded as part of our
proposal this summer.
Mr. Shimkus. But that will be a floor, in essence.
Mr. Shelton. Yes that, will be a floor, sir.
Mr. Shimkus. So if the automobile industry wants more bells
and whistles on their tires, they at least have to meet the
floor of the basic standards for all their tires.
Mr. Shelton. Yes, sir, for all the their tires.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. You know, this is the whole
chicken-and-the-egg debate on the tread separation and then
steering problems, oversteering problems, maybe crashes,
deaths, injuries, at least. So we are talking tires, but we are
also talking, you know, the Ford Explorer and some of the
engineering there.
Both companies conducted the same tests, which is the
radius circle test in conformance with the Society of
Automotive Engineers guidelines. However looking at the charts
presented by both companies, they reached opposite results. How
can we discern--how can we, as Members of Congress, discern
which is correct? And then the follow-up question: Will you be
able to discern which is correct?
Mr. Weinstein. Well, I don't think it is a question of
which is correct. We will look at all of that information and
maybe all of it is persuasive to some degree or less degree
than the other. Plus there will be a lot of other additional
information and we plan to doing that expeditiously and having
an answer as to whether we should open an investigation. We are
not going to simply be choosing between two different tests
used by Ford or Dr. Guenther.
Mr. Shimkus. And that is why we are having a hearing to
help us clear the smoke. And I thought the whole hearing today
would do that. For a while it got a little smokier. Maybe we
are clearing it up at the end of the day, but we appreciate
your work and look forward to your report.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired. The
gentleman from Florida, Mr. Deutsch.
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The other two panels,
I asked this question. I want to ask it to you as well. What
should the experience of a driver be in a situation of tread
separation? I mean, should the driver be able to handle the
vehicle to get to the shoulder of the road or what should the
experience of a driver be?
Mr. Weinstein. I don't know that you can say what it should
be. The data seems to indicate that in most occasions, the
driver is able to get to the side of the road without a
catastrophic crash. Unfortunately that is not always the case.
It probably depends what the driver does. It might depend on
the speed. It might depend if he is in a curve at the time. It
might depend on the other traffic. There are a lot of factors
that go into it. But it does not automatically lead to a
rollover in any vehicle, the Explorer or anything else.
Mr. Deutsch. Do we have information--I mean, you mentioned
a bunch of factors. Do we have empirical data to support that?
Have we looked at ones that are not catastrophic versus the
ones that are catastrophic and how does the driver reaction
differ?
Mr. Weinstein. Well, we don't have--I can't quantitatively
discuss that. We are going to be doing some analysis in our
simulator as to how a driver reacts under certain
circumstances, including a tread separation. That work is
supposed to start, I believe, later this month or next month.
We have expedited that and put it at the head of the line.
Mr. Deutsch. Mr. Shelton, did you want to add something to
that?
Mr. Shelton. Yes, I think this chart that the committee put
up illustrates that. When you look at claims per rollover, that
is how many claims it takes to generate a rollover. So higher
is better. That is, you are less likely to have a rollover
given a claim. But even for some of the lower numbers, claims
per rollover, 11.9. That means 11.9--it takes 11.9 incidents
before you have a rollover. That, I think, alludes back to Mr.
Nasser's testimony where he said less than 1 out of 10 results
in the vehicle actually rolling over.
Mr. Weinstein. If I could just expand on that, those are
only claims. There are probably a number of tread separations
that don't result in a claim as we defined it before. So the
numbers are probably even somewhat smaller.
Mr. Deutsch. One of the things that seems clear is that
there are other countries that we could have gained information
from their data. Is there any attempt at all in a formalized
mechanism to coordinate with other countries their claims data?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir, that is one of the improvements of
the TREAD Act, to be able to get us relevant data from tire
manufacturers and from vehicle manufacturers as soon as they,
themselves, have such relevant data.
Mr. Deutsch. Now, at this point, again, have we gotten any
overseas claims data since the TREAD Act went into effect?
Mr. Weinstein. Yes--not claims data. We have gotten recalls
and service actions that occurred in foreign countries. That is
in effect right now, and manufacturers have been notifying us
if they do a recall, say, in Europe that affects vehicles that
are for sale in the U.S.
Mr. Deutsch. Would it make any sense at all--again, so we
are putting the onus on the manufacturer as opposed to you
folks from a country-to-country basis. Is there any reason to
do it on a country-by-country basis, or is it not practical or
not necessary?
Mr. Weinstein. Well, it would be helpful, and we have made
some inquiries in that regard. However, most other countries do
not have the same kind of defect system that we do and the same
governmental oversight over their manufacturers in terms of
directing them to do recalls. They have different types of
systems. And the data just isn't necessarily collected by
governmental agencies.
Mr. Deutsch. As we are sort of ending this hearing--and I
appreciate you sitting through the many hours that we have been
here today--part of the hearing is, as the chairman mentioned,
at the start of this hearing is to try to inform the American
people. Is there any parting words that you would want to give
consumers at this point in time in terms of safety issues on
existing Ford cars, or for that matter, existing Firestone
tires?
Mr. Jackson. We appreciate very much, Congressman, the
focus that this committee has on the consumer. That is our
focus. We are working for you as well to give the consumers
clear, concise, responsible scientific data. We can't rush to
judgment, but we are close to judgment and we will speak
comprehensively, and I believe authoritatively, soon.
Mr. Deutsch. Let me add one final question. I see my time
is running out. In January, NHTSA issued an advanced notice of
proposed rulemaking establishing a preliminary plan for
gathering information on deaths, injuries, crashes, lawsuits,
consumer complaints, et cetera, by make and model of vehicle
and by potential defects. This is a critically important rule
for the consumer. What is the status of that rule at this
point?
Mr. Weinstein. Congressman, we have received comments. We
have a 60-day comment period. We have analyzed the comments and
summarized them. We are preparing now to put out a notice of
proposed rulemaking, now that we have a little more focus on
the issues. That should be later this fall.
Mr. Deutsch. All right. So the final rule should be this
fall?
Mr. Weinstein. No, that would be the notice of proposed
rulemaking. Under the TREAD Act, the final rule must be out by
the end of June of 2002, and we will make that deadline,
hopefully earlier. But it is a very complex issue as the
summary that you just read indicates.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired. The
gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Upton, is recognized.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you all for the
kinds words about the TREAD Act. And as you go back and in
particular, in your responsible job now, one of the actions
that was responsible for us moving on this action was the
history of the recall of Firestone 500 tire back in the 1970's.
This committee held hearings back then, and yet nothing was
done in terms of legislation.
There has been reference made to the 68 tire standard. I
was trying to think where I was in 1968, I didn't even worry
about having a draft number back then as I was still in junior
high school. And the tire standards, obviously tires have
changed quite a bit from 1968 to where they are today. And our
focus last year was to identify whether we did have a problem.
We did. And now new data, more than 200 deaths because of the
Firestone tire, and to implement legislation to correct the
problem so that it would not happen again.
And I think every member on this panel, Republican and
Democrat worked so hard to pass that in a very strong
bipartisan way in both the House and the Senate without dissent
at all. As we look back, look at the situation today, we know
that it's working.
It was important to give you all the resources so that you
could develop the new standards that have to be met. And I know
as we think about some of the questions today, I wanted to
clarify one of the answers that you gave earlier, I think it
was to Mr. Dingell that in the years 1995 to 1997, were there
1,183 Firestone tire separations--tread separations versus two
by Goodyear?
Mr. Jackson. Claims.
Mr. Weinstein. Claims.
Mr. Upton. Claims, I'm sorry. The report that was in some
of today's papers--and you all have indicated that you are
going to be starting to work on that tomorrow and give us
answers as soon as you can with regard to information on the
tires that Ford is replacing, the Firestone tires. Have any of
you ever heard of--have you heard of any of those questions
before today, before opening the paper at your doorstep this
morning? I mean, I woke up in Denver at 5:30 and saw it in USA
Today.
Mr. Weinstein. I think last night, I heard that there was a
question about it. But, I mean, I am talking about 6 at night,
a reporter called and said it was going to be in the paper. But
so I guess that is before this morning.
Mr. Upton. Did you all comment on this story at all?
Again----
Mr. Jackson. No.
Mr. Weinstein. No, we don't have enough information.
Mr. Upton. Well, I certainly look forward to getting your
response to the information that may be shared with you, the
evidence and take us where the facts take it because it is
important that you have the resources so that every American
knows that whether it is a Ford or a Chrysler or a GM or Honda,
that, in fact, the tires that they have are safe and they are
not going to have to fear for their lives or their family's
lives when they go to a soccer game or little league game or to
and from work.
I appreciate your work. I look forward to working with
Chairman Stearns as a member of this subcommittee as we
continue to oversee the actions of the TREAD Act. I believe
that NHTSA has to be reauthorized this year, so we will look at
pros and cons of where we have to go and make sure that the
bottom line is that you have the resources to give the American
public the confidence that they must have in your jobs as
overseers of this important agency. I yield back the balance of
my time.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time. I would also point out that he was one of the authors of
the TREAD Act. We in Congress appreciate all his efforts and
are glad to see that it is working.
In the procedure of the House, this committee, members who
serve on the subcommittee go before the ones who don't. So in
this case, Mr. Bilirakis would go and then Mr. Sawyer, if he
would be patient, he will finish up. Mr. Bilirakis from
Florida.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me,
in the process of your continuing analysis, your study of this
problem, are you intending to look at the vehicle as well as
the tire, the interaction, in other words, of the two?
Mr. Jackson. Congressman, as part of our ongoing Firestone
investigation, the vehicle is not, per se, part of that
investigation. We are going to complete the tire investigation
and announce that in approximately 1 month.
The other issue, about understeer/oversteer in the Explorer
vehicle, is at a much more preliminary stage. We have received,
in effect, a petition from Firestone asking us to look into
this question, so we are in a preliminary review stage to
decide whether an investigation is merited or not. So in that
regard and in a less formal mode at this juncture, we are
looking at those issues.
Mr. Bilirakis. But it seems I--and, again, first of all, I
probably--I chair the Health Committee, and I have got my plate
full and then some with so many other areas, prescription drugs
and managed care reform, et cetera, et cetera, so I haven't
spent the time on this issue that so many other members of this
committee have, and I am the first one to admit that. But it
just seems to me that logically, where there is a chance that
there is some sort of--that maybe there might be a design flaw
of some sort in the vehicle, and the interaction with the tire
causes this would basically almost follow that you would, in
the process here, take a look at that also.
Mr. Jackson. Prior to this point, Congressman----
Mr. Bilirakis. I don't represent either one of these
companies in my district.
Mr. Jackson. No, sir, neither do we. We are with you. We
have the same intention. And honestly, I believe both parties
have the intention of protecting the safety of the public. I do
think that is important.
We have not to this point thought that there is evidence
that directs us toward a vehicle defect investigation. We are
now looking carefully, responsibly, quickly, at a series of
data that has been presented to us, and also some data that we
have reviewed ourselves as has been shown on your display. And
if we believe that a defect investigation is called for, we
will launch that formally and expeditiously. But there has not
been a conviction at NHTSA up to this point that such an action
was appropriate.
Mr. Bilirakis. Well, there are people out there who feel
that that ought to be done. And I am not just referring to
Firestone necessarily. I have had--I have had tire retailers
who are not in the business now, so they have no axe to grind,
but who have sold all of these tires at one time or another
over a period of time who basically said to me, hey, there may
be a problem with the vehicle.
So I would suggest that. Well, very quickly, take a look at
that chart, and I see the claims 1201 and then 1031 for those
two different periods of time. Is that an unusual number of
claims?
Mr. Weinstein. It's a very high number of claims.
Mr. Bilirakis. Very high number of claims. Well, you know,
I raise the question with all due respect. You know, it's
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and then, you
know, there are State Farms referrals in July 1998. We've had
the history going back for a few years, all the way back to
that period of time at least. It seems to me that--my two
sons--I have two sons--both bought Explorers a few years ago at
the same time thinking they could probably get a deal with a
Ford dealer and they didn't get a deal at all, it turned out,
but they have had a lot of problems with that car--those cars.
And when I think of my four grandchildren riding in those
vehicles and something like this potentially happening, so I
guess, you know, I often times ask myself what is the role of
government or what should be the role of government? I'm
certainly against too much government and that sort of thing,
but it seems to me with this kind of history, that we as a
Federal Government have a role here to get involved a heck of a
lot earlier, and to at least communicate to the public. I know
that you use the term, Mr. Jackson, we can't rush to judgment.
And you're right. But I'm disappointed, frankly, that maybe we
didn't take an earlier role in this regard. I think that really
calls for it----
Mr. Weinstein. We, of course----
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired.
We recognize the full Chairman of the committee, Mr.
Tauzin, the gentleman from Louisiana.
Chairman Tauzin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Jackson,
welcome sir. And, again, I was not here for your statement. I
apologize. I had to go out to a leadership meeting this
afternoon, but I do want to thank you, first of all, for
private comments you made to me about your appreciation of the
TREAD Act and the new authorities and the new, not only
responsibilities, but dollars and all of those efforts we've
tried to make to give your agency the power and the authority
to take charge of some of these issues.
You've sat here and you've heard how frustrated we are with
the fact that these two mighty companies that are trading
information that sometimes differs, and it is sometimes based
upon supposedly the same testing criteria. And I think you
understand how deeply we will depend upon your agency to settle
some of these questions for us and the American public. We
deserve to know the information we're getting in these kind of
recalls and replacements is, indeed, totally valid information,
unfettered by any kind of personal disputes that may be going
on between these two very large companies.
In that regard, I also wanted to clarify with you your
comments regarding the information our staff has developed on
replacement tires. We obviously are deeply interested in
getting your take on the information we've developed from the
raw data we received, and my understanding is that you've
committed to this committee to begin immediately reviewing it,
analyzing it.
Mr. Jackson. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. We will start
tonight. We'll look at the data we take home with us, and we'll
meet first thing in the morning and whack away at it.
Mr. Stearns. Would the gentleman yield? They indicated they
might have something for us tomorrow.
Chairman Tauzin. That would be excellent. Obviously, it's
not--it's our intent, obviously, to get this information out as
rapidly as we can, but we wanted to be real and meaningful, and
you can, again, help us make sure we're not a party to
confusing Americans about some of this data, which has been my
big concern.
I also want to point out, however, that--in a question you
may have answered to Mr. Upton as to when you all found out
about this, that NHTSA itself supplied us with data indicating
some of these concerns. For example, you supplied us with data
on the Goodyear Wrangler HT that is used on the F-150,
Expedition, and Bronco. That has a 13.7 per million claims
ratio, which is in excess of a five claims per million that
Ford used as a benchmark.
You also submitted to us information that the General
Grabber APXL manufactured in Charlotte, admittedly a small run
of only a half million tires, but nevertheless, a nearly 11 per
million claims rate, indicating that yours--and both of these
are replacement tires. So information we have--that has
troubled us has come, in part, from you. I don't want you to
think that we just pulled it out of the air. This is data you
submitted to our staffers indicating that at least two of these
replacement tires have claims ratios in excess of the five per
million used as a benchmark by the Ford Motor Company in its
recall decision. Are you aware of that?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir. We acknowledge that some of the data
that's been discussed here as part of this conversation is data
that NHTSA has also obtained and has shared with you and your
staff. To go to the larger question we need an architecture of
how to pull together the relevant variables that will help us
assess this data in a coherent and clear way, and that's what
we propose to try to give you a summary of in the morning or in
the afternoon tomorrow.
Chairman Tauzin. You should also know that our staff's
evaluation went beyond the years 1993 to 1998 in which you had
information on one of those tires on the years 1995 to 2000 as
you had on another tire. We supplemented that with some of the
raw data that we've obtained, and we've, again, analyzed
different numbers over the stretch, but numbers again that we
would like you to look at----
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir.
Chairman Tauzin. [continuing] and to come back to us on.
Again, it's critical--I want to make sure everybody understands
this. It's critical that you help us resolve what these numbers
mean. If a replacement tire is in fact safe, despite these
numbers, if, for example, the claims data is all about minor
property damage rather than injuries and deaths, that makes a
difference.
If, on the other hand, this claims data is accompanied by
personal injury and death claims, it may have a much larger
significance, and you have a lot of that information, and we
obviously are counting on you to wrap that around the
information we'll give you so that we can get a clear picture
of this.
One final thought, and I'd like your response on this. We
have obviously focused in the TREAD Act on the notion that the
more your agency does in the kinds of testing that Ford says it
did, extensive pressure heat, psi speed testing to take these
tires to the limit, so that the American public knows in
advance that a tire is either safe or potentially not safe, so
that we're not relying upon post mortems in making decisions on
recall, is a vital part of the reforms we initiated. I simply
want your response on that. Is the agency properly gearing up
to do what Ford Motor Company apparently felt a need to do on
its own? And the answer I hope you give me in a second is more
important because of what we've seen in this Ford recall,
because if we're going to count on the companies to do it,
we'll never know how accurate and how comparable and how fair
and how unbiased some of these tests and reports are when
companies are running tests out of their own labs and
challenging one another as to accuracy. We have to depend upon
your agency, and so I'm asking you, are you gearing up, will
you be in good position to begin doing this instead of us
having to rely upon Ford tests and Firestone tests to make our
decisions here?
Mr. Jackson. Mr. Chairman, absolutely we are committed to
this, and absolutely we have launched this type of work. The
work that we're doing now on the Firestone tire investigation
is the most comprehensive, complex and sophisticated analysis
that NHTSA has ever undertaken on a tire-related issue. So
we're working it now, and I want to take this chance to say to
you in person and public how much we have appreciated the
resources and the tools that you've given to us in the TREAD
Act, and we are committed to implement those tools on time and
to work--you have my personal commitment and that of Secretary
Mineta that this is a priority of the Department of a
significant order, and I'll be watching it, and he will too.
Chairman Tauzin. Well, for a guy named Michael Jackson,
you're singing a good tune.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired. The
gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Your agency
needs a lot more money, doesn't it, Mr. Jackson, a lot more
people to meet, all these deadlines, and to do a lot more
things that come to your attention, what this committee might
not know about?
Mr. Jackson. Congressman Markey, we have a very important
set of responsibilities at this agency, and some of those we
have not pursued as quickly as I would like to see us do, and
where we need some more resources, this administration is not
going to be bashful about coming to the Congress and telling
you exactly where we need them and what we have to do with
them, but I do hope to accelerate the pace of our regulatory
work, which is absolutely indispensable to the country.
Mr. Markey. The problem that I think many of the committee
members have is that while you, speaking for the
administration, say that you won't be bashful, on the other
hand, there hasn't been an administrator named for the first 5
months. So you can imagine the confidence coefficient that our
committee has looking at this agency in administration at this
point is at an historic low point, because obviously we would
want this agency to have had a gold star put over its forehead,
given what had just transpired in the preceding year and all of
these rulemakings, which have to be finished over the next
couple of years. For example, it's my provision that calls for
a dynamic test to be done.
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Markey. Now, there's a 2-year window that you have to
get it done, but obviously if you can get it done in 1 year,
then that many more people's lives would be saved, injuries
avoided.
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir. This is--if I may say, this is my
second tour of duty at the Department of Transportation, and I
have a sense, honestly, of the depth on the bench that we have
among the career people who are doing this type of analytical
work. I want to assure you that from the very beginning of his
tenure, Secretary Mineta has had to focus on these issues. In
fact, one of the reasons that we have not had an administrator
in place yet is that we launched a very extensive, nationwide
search in cooperation with the White House to find an
extraordinary candidate for this job, and the President
announced his intention to nominate such a man yesterday. But
in the interim, there has been no slacking off or resting on
our laurels or sitting around on the core questions, and
particularly the question that you----
Mr. Markey. When will the dynamic testing----
Mr. Jackson. We will meet or beat the statutory requirement
for implementing that rule.
Mr. Markey. So 2 years is not your goal? It's a shorter
time period than that?
Mr. Jackson. I will tell you that I'm an impatient man. I
want to beat every single one of them that we have on the
books, and that that is the approach that we're taking in our
conversations to get this done quickly. These are urgent and
important things to do.
Mr. Markey. A lot of members of this committee side, on the
Republican side especially, want to put real deadlines on the
Federal Communications Commission. They have to approve or
disapprove every merger within 60 days. Every rulemaking has to
be completed within a very brief period of time. I would like
to see--then there nobody dies, you know, if a cable service is
delayed an extra 30 days, you know. Here I think there's a real
urgency----
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Markey. [continuing] that attaches to the work that you
do.
Mr. Jackson. Absolutely.
Mr. Markey. And I would hope that you would ensure that it
happens faster than 2 years.
Mr. Jackson. I have a 6-year-old daughter at home that
rides around in the type of vehicles that we've been talking
about today here, sir, and I believe in my bones that this is
an absolutely indispensable and urgent focus for us to take on
in this safety mandate that we have and----
Mr. Markey. Well, here's a question that I'm sure every
American who owns one of these vehicles and is now driving
around in it, having purchased it with the notion that they
could strap their children into the back seat and it would be
safer than in some small vehicle. When it turns out ironically
that the children are more vulnerable, because of this rollover
propensity and the fact that there are no roof crush
regulations that are on the books.
Why doesn't NHTSA begin a proceeding to put tough roof
crush standards so the roof just doesn't collapse in on these
family members? It's a 30-year-old standard that we're all
living with and dying with now in the United States. It was
before the advent of the SUV, and so now we have this vehicle
that's out there. Now one in four vehicles coming out in the
road or more are SUVs, and so all of these families are putting
their children into vehicles without any roof crush or rollover
or crash worthiness standards that are on the books.
Mr. Jackson. Congressman, I asked this same question, and
we----
Mr. Markey. Who did you ask?
Mr. Jackson. One of my colleagues at NHTSA when I got to
the department, and we have been working on this for some time,
and I'm jumping the gun a little bit, but happy to tell you
that this summer we will be publishing a notice in the Federal
Register that summarizes the data, the information that we've
gathered about the roof crush issue and solicits in a formal
way input that could lead to a formal review of those standards
and issues.
Mr. Stearns. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Markey. May I, Mr. Chairman, just have 30 additional
seconds?
Mr. Stearns. Absolutely.
Mr. Markey. I think he has just made big news here today,
Mr. Chairman, if I may, in terms of an advance that I don't
think anyone anticipated coming into today's hearing room. So
do you anticipate that that will lead toward the promulgation
of a rule dealing with----
Mr. Jackson. We're going to get that data in, and we will
assess it, and I would not like to forecast or speculate about
the choices or options that we would make, but it will
certainly create a public record that helps us evaluate, in a
reasonable amount of time, this issue.
Mr. Markey. And, again, knowing that there hasn't been an
upgrade of this standard in 30 years, is it fair to say that
you believe it's time for us to review that standard and to
update it?
Mr. Jackson. I think it's time to do exactly what we're
going to do, get this conversation going in the public arena
with the information that we have on the table suggesting to us
that we need to take a very, very careful look at it.
Mr. Markey. He's made less news than I thought he was
making, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. Sounds like a----
Mr. Markey. I will listen more carefully the second time
and----
Mr. Jackson. I'm not trying to--market.
Mr. Markey. And I'll say this. I think it's a mistake that
you're not doing it. I think you could do it on your own. We
now know that thousands of lives could be saved if you put this
standard on the books and the industry had to meet it, and we
know that if they could increase the weight in these vehicles
from 5,000 to 5,600 pounds over a 5-year period. It's not that
they're afraid to add extra weight to the vehicles, because we
know they're not concerned about fuel economy standards.
They're the least fuel-efficient vehicles on the road. They're
just packing it with all this additional weight. But all we
need is a bar over the head of these families, so that when the
vehicle rolls over because of its propensity, that their lives
aren't going to be unnecessarily lost. So I think you should do
it. I think you're making a big mistake if you don't and you're
going to be held accountable.
And second, if it's a cost issue, if you don't have the
money, you should ask us for the money. We'll give you the
money to put something this important on the books. I
appreciate the fact that you're commencing. I can see from your
testimony today the sincerity of your interest on the subject.
I hope that we can help you to be successful inside your
administration and----
Mr. Jackson. Thank you, and we'll seek that help.
Mr. Chairman, if I just may, on this issue I am not trying
to equivocate or be cute. I am trying to be responsible and
tell you that this really is an important issue to look at and
to reserve judgment about exactly how to proceed once we launch
this conversation publicly.
Mr. Markey. Then I take that, Mr. Jackson, as a good faith,
you know, promise to the committee, and I thank you for
volunteering that information.
Mr. Jackson. And I know of your interest in it. If you
would like me to keep you personally involved and informed
about what we're doing, then I would be happy to do that.
Mr. Markey. I would appreciate that. Thank you, sir.
Appreciate it.
Mr. Stearns. All right. The gentleman, Mr. Sawyer, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Chairman, some day I hope to be able to
stretch 5 minutes as well as my colleague from Massachusetts.
Let me just say, first of all, thank you very much for your
testimony here today and for all of the work that you have been
doing. I have to confess that I am both troubled and comforted
by what you've said here today. I am comforted by your
willingness to go beyond what you have been requested to do to
look at the questions of vehicle interaction with tires, and I
think that's important for you to do. I'm troubled, in that you
seem to operate from the presumption that it is the tire that
fails and therefore causes the difficulty with the vehicle. I
think that may well be true. But it is also true that the
behavior of the vehicle affects the performance of the tire and
may, in fact, be a causal factor in the failure.
It is--it is true that the tire standards have not changed
since 1968, and the change in technology has been enormous.
Simply going from bias to radial technology has been enormous.
It seems to me that the testing protocols that go with that
change in technology need to change as well and that the kind
of in-depth analysis that you've listed in your testimony, the
shearography, the sectioning, the adhesion testing, the rig
testing on drums, important dynamic testing in its own right,
but not vehicular dynamics. Chemical analyses and other
physical measurements are all important, but we simply need to
get to an understanding of the way each of the products affect
the performance of the other.
If I could only suggest--you talked about the importance of
the relevant variables. If you simply look at the difference in
weight distribution between the Explorer and the Ranger, it
seems to me that there may well be a reason to understand the
difference in rear tire performance because of the polar moment
of inertia that comes at the loss of adhesion. It's critically
important.
Let me just turn in conclusion to--and then if you want to
comment on any of this, please feel free to. If--when you were
asked about any advice that you might give to the American
people, I hope that the next time you're asked that, you will
reply, inflate your tires; check them regularly; it has a
profound affect on their life and their performance, and it may
have a profound affect on your life as well. Any comments?
Mr. Jackson. I couldn't agree more with that.
Mr. Sawyer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns. I thank my colleagues. We are now at the end
of this hearing that has lasted almost 7\1/2\ straight hours. I
want to thank the staffs on both sides for an excellent job of
preparation. I want to thank you, Mr. Jackson, and your
colleagues for waiting through this period. I think we've had a
very thoughtful hearing. You've indicated you have the
resources so that you can go ahead and accomplish what needs to
be done. I also believe we've posed important questions for the
American public by hearing both sides of these issues.
And in the end, you are the impartial body. You are
responsible to make sure that the real answers come forward and
not us on either side. So we're relying on you, because
ultimately, the vehicles and the tires are going to be safe
because of your work. So it's a very serious project you have
before you. So I want to again thank you. I also want to thank
my chairman, Jim Greenwood from Pennsylvania for his
cochairmanship. And with that, the----
Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Stearns. Yes.
Mr. Sawyer. I just wanted to thank you very much for the
opportunity to participate. Because it has been so long, I'm
even more grateful for the chance to----
Mr. Stearns. Well, we particularly appreciate your staying
through the whole 7\1/2\ hours.
With that, the two subcommittees are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
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