<DOC>
[109 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:27869.wais]
S. Hrg. 109-718
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD'S ROLE IN BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
APRIL 6, 2006--WASHINGTON, DC
__________
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__________
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri TOM HARKIN, Iowa
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
CONRAD BURNS, Montana HARRY REID, Nevada
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire PATTY MURRAY, Washington
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
J. Keith Kennedy, Staff Director
Terrence E. Sauvain, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Homeland Security
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
TED STEVENS, Alaska DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho PATTY MURRAY, Washington
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah HARRY REID, Nevada
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
Professional Staff
Rebecca Davies
Carol Cribbs
Shannon O'Keefe
Nancy Perkins
Mark Van de Water
Charles Kieffer (Minority)
Chip Walgren (Minority)
Scott Nance (Minority)
Drenan E. Dudley (Minority)
Administrative Support
Christa Crawford
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Opening Statement of Senator Judd Gregg.......................... 1
Prepared Statement of Senator Thad Cochran....................... 2
Statement of Vice Admiral Thad Allen, Chief of Staff, United
States Coast Guard............................................. 2
Managing Challenges in a Post 9/11 Environment................... 3
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Thad Allen.................... 4
Statement of Senator Robert C. Byrd.............................. 10
Resources Required to Secure Maritime Avenues.................... 11
Funding Required to Complete Deepwater Acquisition............... 14
Cargo Inspection at Foreign Ports................................ 14
Securing Waterways and Coastlines From Illegal Migration......... 15
Rapidly Declining Condition of Coast Guard Assets................ 15
Coast Guard's Role in Northern Command........................... 16
Updating the Loran Navigational System........................... 18
Closing the Operational Gap for Patrol Boats..................... 19
Funding Reductions to Coast Guard's Traditional Missions......... 19
Vessel and Facility Security Plans............................... 20
Facilities Subject to MTSA/ISPS.................................. 20
Maintenance for New Assets....................................... 21
Maritime Border Security Between Alaska and Asia................. 21
Patrolling the Maritime Boundary Line............................ 22
Additional Committee Questions................................... 23
Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg........................ 23
Access to the US VISIT database.................................. 23
Intelligence Reports............................................. 23
USCG's Role in Detecting and Responding to WMDs.................. 24
Armed Aircraft................................................... 24
Review of Options Related to Deepwater........................... 24
Success of Deepwater Program..................................... 25
Intelligence's Role in Maritime Security......................... 25
Bandwidth Challenge.............................................. 25
Intelligence Resources........................................... 26
Dubai Ports World Issue.......................................... 27
Radiological Materials at Sea.................................... 27
USCG's role in WMD Efforts with Other Organizations.............. 27
Acceleration of Program Completion by 10 years................... 28
Expedited Procurement of Aircraft................................ 28
Unique Maritime Security Capabilities............................ 28
Impact of Tightening Land and Air Security....................... 28
Evidence of Entrance............................................. 28
Known Maritime Terrorist Threats................................. 29
Connection Between Migrant and Drug Smugglers and Terrorists..... 29
Security of Maritime Borders..................................... 29
Highest Maritime Risks........................................... 29
Closing the Gap: Policy Issue or Funding Issue................... 30
IC Database Access............................................... 31
USCG as the Lead in Maritime Security............................ 31
Lead in Maritime Intelligence.................................... 31
Overlap Issues: Interoperability or Redundancy................... 31
Maritime Borders................................................. 32
Needed Resources for Maritime Borders............................ 32
USCG's Role in the Intelligence Community........................ 33
Improvement of Maritime Border Security.......................... 33
Potential Overlap Between FBI and USCG........................... 33
Annual Flight Hour Gap........................................... 33
Response Capabilities............................................ 33
Maritime Border Security Operations.............................. 34
110 Foot Patrol Boats............................................ 34
Port Inspections................................................. 34
Implementation of AIS............................................ 35
Maritime Border Security Operations.............................. 35
Deployment of US VISIT........................................... 36
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby................. 37
Utilization of Fiscal Year 2006 Resources........................ 37
Utilization of Resources......................................... 37
Resource Requirements............................................ 37
Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Justification............................ 37
Deviation From the Fiscal Year 2006 Bill......................... 38
Timeline for MPA Operations...................................... 38
Timeline for Outfitting and Operation............................ 38
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd.................... 39
Maritime Patrol Aircraft......................................... 39
Expediting Full Operating Capability............................. 39
Potential Inland River Threats................................... 39
Maritime Air Patrols............................................. 39
Go-Fast boats.................................................... 40
Drug Enforcement Mission......................................... 40
110 Foot Patrol Boats............................................ 41
Port Security Plan Review........................................ 41
Design Review of the Fast Response Cutter (FRC).................. 41
Maritime Domestic Awareness...................................... 42
UAVs Along the Southern Border................................... 42
Installation of Receivers........................................ 42
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran...................... 43
Deepwater Recapitalization Program............................... 43
Response to Congressional Direction.............................. 44
Status of HH-65 Helicopters...................................... 45
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD'S ROLE IN BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Homeland Security,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Judd Gregg (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Gregg, Stevens, Allard, Byrd, and Murray.
opening statement of senator judd gregg
Senator Gregg. We'll get started here. Senator Byrd is on
his way. When he gets here, we'll yield to him for an opening
comment.
The hearing today involves the Coast Guard. We appreciate
Admiral Allen coming by to talk to us about the status of the
Coast Guard.
We all admire the work of the Coast Guard. It is an agency
which has done many wonderful things, extraordinary things in
our national defense and in the protecting of people at risk on
the seas; and it probably--was the one agency of the Federal
Government--or maybe the Federal, State, and local government--
which requited itself extraordinarily well during the Katrina
events, and, as a result, enhanced even further its reputation
for getting things done and doing them well.
The issue which we want to talk about today is the role of
the Coast Guard in border security. The Coast Guard had to take
on a large new responsibility here, as have a lot of other
agencies in the post-9/11 world. And the question is, What does
the Coast Guard need in order to succeed in that
responsibility? And our view is that we should give you the
resources you need, because you seem to handle the tasks which
you're assigned extraordinarily well; but what we need is to
know what those resources are.
The problem, of course, is that, as well as having to do
this new responsibility, you have to continue to do what has
been your traditional role; and that has dramatically expanded
the burden and the cost of operating the Coast Guard. How can
we make sure that sort of tooling up and expansion is done
without wasting money, but, rather, making sure it's
effectively used; this is a critical issue for us as a
committee.
But I do want to reinforce the fact that we greatly admire
what the Coast Guard does, and the fact that you've assumed
this new responsibility of protecting our Nation from potential
threat, especially coming by--over sea, in a very positive and
constructive way.
And, with that, should--when Senator Byrd comes, we'll take
a break and hear his thoughts, but we should proceed with you,
Admiral.
Senator Cochran submitted a statement to be entered into
the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Thad Cochran
Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding this timely hearing this
morning. For over a week now, the members of the United States Senate
have been debating border security and immigration reform. Despite our
differences of opinion on immigration policy, effective border and
maritime security are concerns shared by many.
I look forward to hearing from Admiral Allen today, as he discusses
the Coast Guard's important role in border and maritime security.
I want to thank him for his service to the Gulf Coast Region as the
Principal Federal Official overseeing the relief and recovery efforts.
I also want to thank the entire United States Coast Guard for its
service to the Gulf Coast Region in those most difficult first hours
and days after Hurricane Katrina. Members of the Coast Guard valiantly
rescued people from rooftops and cars and trees, many times in complete
darkness. Admiral Allen, on behalf of the State of Mississippi, thank
you for your leadership in those efforts.
As this Committee and the full Senate begins the fiscal year 2007
Homeland Security Appropriations process, I ask the members of this
committee to carefully consider Admiral Allen's comments and responses
to questions regarding Coast Guard funding and asset recapitalization.
I look forward to working with Chairman Gregg and Senator Byrd to
address these important national concerns.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL THAD ALLEN, CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Admiral Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate the
opportunity to be here today. And it's a pleasure to discuss
the Coast Guard's role in border security. We appreciate the
committee's interest in border security.
Since Alexander Hamilton called for maritime security, in
Federalist Paper 12 in our founding, in 1790, this has been a
primary focus of the Coast Guard, and it's part of our military
and maritime multi-mission service and the value we've provided
to this country for over 200 years.
I would tell you that effective border security necessarily
includes effective maritime border security. But we face
considerable challenges, and we have to manage risk as we move
forward. And, with your permission, I do have a statement for
the record, but I'll make a few brief opening comments, and
then go to the questions, if that's all right with you, sir.
Senator Gregg. That would be good. We do have a vote
scheduled at 11 o'clock. And I know Senator Byrd's going to
want to comment and ask questions, so that would be a good way
to approach it, I think.
Admiral Allen. Thank you, sir.
I might just start off by making a couple of comments.
First of all, the maritime domain presents a fairly unique
set of challenges, not only for the Coast Guard, but for
everybody in the world right now. The oceans are our last
global common. It's basically an interconnected framework of
legal structures, with diverse uses, and, quite frankly,
unfettered access. By ``legal structures,'' I mean structures
that have evolved over thousands of years, concepts like right
of innocent passage, access to ports, force majeure, and so
forth. On the diverse uses, obviously we have trade and natural
resources, transportation, and even recreation. And by
``unfettered access,'' what I really mean is, we are bounded by
our oceans, but we're really not protected by them. There are
no bright lines in the water, like there are for our land
borders, and access is not limited to technology. We're not
restricted to railroads, roads, or airports to enter this world
of work, and it makes an extremely challenging environment.
If you look at the chart over here, sir, you look at the
juxtaposition of the maritime border with the land border. Now,
we've rounded out those lines to make it about a little over
12,000 miles constituting the maritime border of this country.
If you were actually to follow the bays and the curves and the
Great Lakes and the rivers of this country that are navigable
waterways, you would have about 95,000 miles.
When we look at the risks associated with securing our
maritime borders, there are basically three elements of risk
that we look at, sir: threat, vulnerability, and consequence.
On the threat side, it could be anything from a jet ski
with an improvised explosive device to an LNG tanker. It could
be underwater swimmers. It would be something from the land
side, in terms of a truck- or a vehicle-borne explosive device.
And, as we found out on 9/11, even an air event can be a
maritime event, as we were instrumental in the response on 9/
11, and especially in evacuating the people who were trapped in
Lower Manhattan.
Regarding vulnerabilities, you can already see the extent
of our coastline. Notions like freedom of navigation allow
vessels to pass very close to our coastline without any
requirement to notify us, and without any means for us to know
they're there, and we're taking steps to change that.
Regarding consequences, 95 percent of all foreign trade
comes into this country by vessel, and constitutes $750 billion
a year, related to the GDP. An article that ran the other day
in the press said that if the L.A./Long Beach Port was closed
down for any length of time, it would constitute a loss of $115
million a day.
Managing these challenges is one of the main duties of the
Coast Guard in this post-9/11 environment, and we are about
doing that.
MANAGING CHALLENGES IN A POST 9/11 ENVIRONMENT
Right now, we're basically breaking that task down into
three different functional areas. One is awareness, trying to
understand what's out there. It started right after 9/11 by
improving our advanced notice of arrival, our awareness of
vessels that are calling in this country. We set up a National
Vessel Movement Center to do this. We now have requirements for
automated identification systems for large vessels approaching
this country. We've significantly improved our intelligence
infrastructure with Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers and
Field Information Intelligence Support Teams at the port level;
and we are partnering with the Navy.
We're also developing a domestic international security
regime. Most of this is pursuant to the provisions of the
Maritime Transportation Security Act and the new International
Ship and Port Security Code.
And we're also trying to increase our operational presence.
We've fielded 13 Maritime Security Safety and Security Teams.
We have a number of new small boats out there. We have improved
radiation detection, new patrol boats, and patrol boats that we
got from the Navy.
Our new Deepwater acquisition, which is attempting to
replace our legacy assets with new, better, more effective
platforms for our people to use, are part of this. Our
Deepwater assets are part of a layered defense. It allows us to
project capability far offshore to intercept, board, and defeat
threats at the greatest distance from the United States.
We are enhancing our communications and our sensor
packages. It improves our ability to communicate. We now come
up on SIPRNET chat rooms to coordinate drug seizures; where,
before, it took us minutes, and sometimes hours, to do voice
relays to make one of those takedowns.
And, finally, we've approved--we've incorporated post-9/11
requirements into our Deepwater baseline, including improved
force protection; chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear protection for our large cutters. We have an increased
intelligence capability. And we're including airborne use of
force in our Deepwater assets.
However, even as we're doing this, we need to constantly
adjust the timing and delivery of our capability to reduce
operational gaps. And if I could point you to these two slides
here, these are included in reports that were recently
submitted with our budget to the Congress. We are attempting,
at this time, to fill two gaps that are significant in our
ability to not only defend our maritime borders, but to mount
effective responses offshore.
Up to the upper left is a patrol-boat gap. As you can see,
historically, we had dropped down below that, and we have
anticipated, through the Deepwater Project, to move to our
baseline of 174,000 hours. Our original plan was to accelerate
the design of the fast-response cutter. And that was based on a
composite design. We are now having some problems with that
design, and I think we need to look at an alternative to fill
that gap sooner.
In the aviation gap, the solution ultimately will be the
CASA-235 airframe. We need to move that in as fast as we can,
but we're also looking at a manned covert surveillance aircraft
to help mitigate that gap. But in the long run, our new CASA
aircraft will be the major source of those hours, sir.
Be happy to entertain any questions at this time, sir.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Thad Allen
Introduction
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
committee. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast
Guard's role in border security. Senator Byrd, on behalf of the entire
Coast Guard, please accept our sincere condolences on the recent loss
of your wife.
Thanks in great part to the attention of this committee and the
particular interests of Chairman Gregg and Senator Byrd, securing our
borders has become a top priority initiative. This hearing is a
testament to the continued priority this committee places on border
security, and a recognition of the reality that the Coast Guard is at
the nexus of port and border security.
Effective border security depends on maritime security
Securing the borders of the United States is a multifaceted
challenge ranging from the remote deserts of Arizona and the rugged
hills of Montana to the vast expanse of ocean off American shores. As
aggressive steps are taken undertaken to secure the land border,
smugglers and migrants--and potentially terrorists--will undoubtedly
look for other points of entry to exploit. Effective border security
requires an integrated approach that crosses land, air and maritime
domains, lest one door be closed only to open another.
The United States is intrinsically connected to and immensely
reliant on the oceans. The maritime domain under U.S. jurisdiction is
larger than its total landmass, and provides the shipping lanes,
fisheries and energy resources that sustain our Nation. The maritime
domain is also an avenue for those wishing to smuggle people and
illicit drugs into our communities--and an avenue that could be
exploited as a means to smuggle weapons of mass destruction and/or
terrorists into our country. In 2005 alone, the Coast Guard:
--Intercepted 9,500 undocumented migrants attempting to enter the
United States illegally by sea, a 100 percent increase over
2001; and
--Prevented more than 338,000 pounds of cocaine (an all-time maritime
record) and more than 10,000 pounds marijuana from reaching the
United States.
The U.S. maritime domain is unique in its scope and diversity. With
more than 350 commercial ports and 95,000 miles of coastline (including
bays, lakes and rivers), the challenge in distinguishing between
legitimate and illicit activity is complex to say the least. We are
bounded by the oceans but we're not protected by them. There is no
single fence, sensor or screening technology adequate to ensure
maritime safety and security. The maritime domain is dynamic and
requires an integrated, layered approach to security. This entails
efforts across all operating areas, from ports and coastal areas to
extended offshore operations, and must include extensive domestic and
international partnerships.
The thick blue line in figure 1 shows the expanse of our maritime
borders.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
The Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for securing our maritime
border
The Nation has built a Coast Guard able to operate successfully in
this complex and unique environment. Single-purpose agencies such as
the Revenue Cutter Service, the Lifesaving Service, and the Lighthouse
Service have been integrated over the last century into the uniquely
effective and efficient Service we are today. The Coast Guard you
exercise--the Coast Guard that we have collectively built--has a
relatively straightforward purpose: exercise authorities and deploy
capability to guarantee the safety and security of the U.S. maritime
domain. That is who we are, what we are charged to do, and represents
the core character of the Service. We are military, multimission and
maritime.
Maritime risks
Secretary Chertoff has emphasized that the three variables of
threat, vulnerability and consequence serve as the appropriate model
for assessing risk and deciding on the protective measures we undertake
as a Nation. I agree and in terms of threat, vulnerability, and
consequence, the maritime realm presents unique challenges.
--Threat.--While the 9/11 Commission noted the continuing threat
against our aviation system, it also stated that
``opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in
maritime or surface transportation.'' From smuggling to piracy,
suicide attacks to the threat of weapons of mass destruction,
the threats are many and varied. Much of the current public
discourse focuses on container security, which is appropriate
given the recent headlines. However, a container is only as
secure as the ship and crew that carries it. In fact, the
greatest observed maritime threat remains smuggling. There are
a wide variety of maritime threat scenarios and vectors beyond
the confines of a single container. For example, a formal Coast
Guard risk assessment revealed that small boats actually pose a
higher risk. These small boats, traditionally used to smuggle
drugs and migrants, can also be used to carry out Cole-type
attacks on United States interests, bring in weapons of mass
destruction (and other types of weapons) and/or to sneak
terrorists into our communities.
--Vulnerability.--Our Nation is vulnerable to seaborne infiltration.
There are dozens of nations in Central and South America and
the Caribbean close enough that maritime trafficking of
migrants, drugs, or other illegal commodities remains a
constant threat. As on land, we know that there are numerous
professional migrant smuggling rings that operate in the
maritime realm. Some operate in the Caribbean or from nations
further south such as Ecuador. Meanwhile, Haiti and the
Dominican Republic are the launching point for thousands of
illegal migrants each year; and Cuba, one of the designated
State Sponsors of Terrorism, sits just south of the Florida
Keys. There are no highways or deserts to cross between Cuba
and the United States--only 90 miles of ocean, easily crossed
in two hours or less in a high-powered speedboat--and we see
hundreds of such smuggling attempts every year. The proximity
of U.S. population centers to the maritime domain and the
diversity of maritime users present significant and wide
ranging vulnerabilities. Effectively addressing these
vulnerabilities requires maritime strategies that detect and
defeat threats as far from the U.S. shores as possible.
--Consequence.--Contributing nearly $750 billion to the U.S. gross
domestic product annually and handling 95 percent of all
overseas trade each year--the value of the U.S. marine
transportation system and the consequence of any significant
attack cannot be overstated. Neither can the range of maritime
terrorist attack scenarios we can envision--whether it's the
recurring consequence of migrant and drug smuggling, to more
severe events such as attacks on commercial vessels or ports,
the infiltration of terrorists or their sympathizers into our
Nation, or in the worst case, delivery of weapons of mass
destruction into our communities. The economic consequences to
any disruption would be severe. A recent Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) study estimated the economic consequences (to
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) of a one-week shutdown of a
single major port to be as much as $150 million per day.
The Coast Guard has put in place a variety of systems to
methodically assess each of these components of risk such that we can
target resources appropriately. It is also these broad risks and the
complexity of the global maritime environment that led the President to
issue in September 2005 the National Strategy for Maritime Security
(NSMS). This strategy is unprecedented in its dedicated focus on the
maritime domain and the necessity for its global security. The NSMS
addresses the full range of maritime threats and is not limited to
terrorism.
Securing the Maritime Border Now and in the Future
Leveraging its longstanding partnerships and unique maritime
authorities and capabilities, the Coast Guard has significantly
enhanced nationwide maritime security. Significant challenges remain
and much more work needs to be done, but we're focused on the right
priorities:
--We are More Aware.--Before 9/11, we had no mandatory ship-tracking
requirement for large commercial vessels. Since 9/11, vessel
reporting requirements have been expanded, we have forged an
international agreement to accelerate the requirement for
Automatic Identification System (AIS) capability, which
provides real-time information on vessel positions and
movements, and established a National Vessel Movement Center to
coordinate the screening of vessel and crew arrival
information. The Coast Guard has also become an integrated
member of the intelligence community--strengthening our organic
capability with Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers and Field
Intelligence Support Teams, while also strengthening our
partnership with the Office of Naval Intelligence.
--We have Implemented a Comprehensive Domestic and International
Security Regime.--Before 9/11 we had no formal international or
domestic maritime security regime for ports, port facilities,
and ships with the exception of cruise ships. Partnering with
maritime stakeholders, we now have both a comprehensive
domestic security regime and an international security
convention in place.
--We have a More Effective Operational Presence.--Before 9/11 we were
shorthanded and could not have met today's mission requirements
without our Reserves and Auxiliary. Since 9/11 we have:
--Established 13 Maritime Safety and Security Teams;
--Deployed more than 80 new small boats (RB-S) and boat crews;
--Provided radiation detection capabilities to our boarding teams;
and
--Acquired 15 Coastal Patrol Boats and accepted transfer of five
Navy 170-foot Patrol Crafts to increase operational
presence in our ports.
Our overarching strategy is to, through a layered security
architecture, ``push out our borders.'' Our unambiguous goal is to meet
threats far offshore in order to avoid hostile persons, vessels or
cargoes entering our ports or coastal regions. In the maritime realm, a
goal line defense is no defense at all. This principle is exemplified
daily as we intercept drug and migrant laden vessels as far away as the
Galapagos Islands and last spring, when Coast Guard units, working with
an interagency team, intercepted a suspect cargo ship over 900 miles
east of Cape Hatteras, NC. In this case, the threat was determined to
be unfounded but our ability to push the borders out is an essential
element in protecting our homeland.
The Coast Guard faces challenges in the maritime domain similar to
the Border Patrol in securing the land border--with a limited set of
resources, locate amid vast geographic areas and huge amounts of
legitimate activity those seeking to do us harm. The phrase ``finding a
needle in a haystack'' is an apt description of the challenge. The
foundation of our maritime strategy relies on three key priorities:
--Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness;
--Establish and Lead a Maritime Security Regime; and
--Deploy effective and integrated operational capability.
These are not stand-alone goals, but rather part of an active
system of layered maritime security. For example, the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) led to the establishment of domestic
and international AIS carriage requirements for certain commercial
vessels. But without investment in systems to collect, analyze and
disseminate the AIS signals we lose the opportunity to assess threats
early. Similarly, the detection, identification and interdiction of
small vessels (that certainly do not advertise their position) used by
smugglers throughout the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific requires
persistent surveillance capabilities. In the end, Coast Guard assets
must be capable of mounting a dependable response to identified threats
lest we have information but not the capability to act. Put another
way, having airborne sensors identify and track suspicious vessels is
of little use without surface forces able to respond.
Coast Guard assets and systems are required to operate across a
diverse operating area including within our ports, in the littoral
region, and far offshore. Thanks to the strong support of the
administration, Congress and this Committee in particular, a number of
initiatives are underway to transform Coast Guard capabilities. Several
are worth highlighting as each will have a broad and substantial
influence on our ability to mitigate current and future maritime risks.
Integrated Deepwater System.--The centerpiece of the Coast Guard's
future capability is the Integrated Deepwater System, recently revised
to a 25-year $24 billion acquisition program and reflective of post-9/
11 mission requirements. The Integrated Deepwater System was designed
to secure the Nation's maritime borders just as the newly-announced
Secure Border Initiative will help deliver a system to secure the land
borders. In the end, they will complement each other in delivering a
comprehensive system of border security.
A critical dimension of the Deepwater Program's assets and systems
is their ability to fill operational gaps. As was addressed in the
Coast Guard's operational gap analysis report submitted to Congress
with the fiscal year 2007 budget request, the action plan to deliver
the operational capabilities and requirements specified in the revised
Deepwater implementation plan is a 25-year effort. This long-term plan
requires a fine balance between removing legacy assets from service to
realize system cost savings while maintaining sufficient system
capacity so as to not exacerbate current operational gaps. The plan
results in modest near-term operational hour shortfalls followed by the
steep, long-term gains in operational capability and capacity as new
Deepwater assets enter service in greater numbers.
--For example, figure 2 shows the current gap in patrol boat hours;
it is affected most adversely by the difficulties encountered
in the 123-foot conversion program. Unfortunately, the
conversion of our legacy 110-foot patrol boats has not provided
the bridge to the future Fast Response Cutter (FRC) that we had
hoped. As a result, we have taken steps to advance the design
and construction of the FRC order to restore this critical
capacity as quickly as possible.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
--Similarly, figure 3 shows the pre-existing Maritime Patrol Aircraft
(MPA) gap. The revised Deepwater implementation plan strives to
mitigate this gap by keeping more legacy C-130H aircraft in
service longer while adding new Maritime Patrol Aircraft (CASA-
235's) to the Coast Guard air fleet. Additionally, the Coast
Guard and Customs and Border Patrol are working together to
fill the gap with a manned covert surveillance aircraft
projected to serve as a surveillance platform in the Caribbean
risk vectors.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
The Coast Guard will continue to mitigate operational gaps in the
near term, while striving for the future Deepwater fleet that will
exceed current legacy capability and capacity. The requirements and
capabilities reflected in the post-9/11 revised Deepwater
implementation plan will be delivered methodically and prudently over
the next 25 years.
Just as important as building capacity to fill the operational gaps
cited above is ensuring these assets are able to serve as the ``eyes
and ears'' to allow the Nation to see, hear and communicate activity
occurring within the maritime domain. The Coast Guard's sustained
presence along our maritime borders is unique. More capable Deepwater
assets, linked to each other and multiple agencies through Deepwater's
net-centric command-and-control system will significantly improve
information sharing, collaboration, and interoperability in the
maritime domain.
Vessel Tracking.--Securing our vast maritime borders requires
improved awareness of the people, vessels and cargo approaching and
moving throughout U.S. ports, coasts and inland waterways. The most
pressing challenges we now face involve tracking the vast population of
vessels operating in and around the approaches to the United States,
and detecting and intercepting the small vessels used for migrant and
drug smuggling, which can easily be used by terrorists seeking to do us
harm. It is against this threat that we need to continually improve,
and we are taking significant steps in the right direction. The Coast
Guard needs as much information as possible about vessels operating in
the maritime domain, particularly their location and identity, in order
to enable effective and timely decisions and identify friend from foe.
In support of this requirement, the Coast Guard has:
--Established the Automatic Identification System (AIS) to provide
continuous, real-time information on the identity, location,
speed and course of vessels in ports that are equipped with AIS
receivers. AIS is currently operational in several major U.S.
ports, and the Coast Guard's Nationwide Automatic
Identification (NAIS) project will expand AIS capabilities to
ports nationwide; and
--Initiated development of a long-range vessel tracking system to
receive information on vessels beyond the scope of the existing
and planned AIS system. Long-range vessel tracking systems are
designed to extend tracking capabilities up to 2000 nautical
miles offshore.
Personnel Security and Credentialing.--The Coast Guard has made a
number of critical improvements to the security and vetting procedures
surrounding the issuance of merchant mariner documents. This effort has
been bolstered with funding provided in fiscal year 2006 to restructure
the merchant mariner licensing program by centralizing security and
vetting functions in a new, enhanced National Maritime Center. Future
efforts will focus on:
--Working on an accelerated schedule with the Transportation Security
Administration to draft rules on implementing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC).
Enrollment in TWIC is expected to begin on September 1, 2006;
and
--Continuing to explore technologies that will allow Coast Guard
boarding teams to access existing databases and information
sources such as US VISIT.
Maritime C4ISR Enhancement.--Existing Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and operational concepts must be
reoriented and integrated with current and emerging sensor capabilities
and applicable procedures. Similar to the Nation's air space security
regime, the maritime security regime must integrate existing C4ISR
systems with new technologies and national command-and-control systems
and processes. For example:
--The Common Operating Picture (COP) and corresponding Command
Intelligence Picture (CIP) must continue to grow and expand to
Federal, State, and local agencies with maritime interests and
responsibilities. The COP provides a shared display of
friendly, enemy/suspect and neutral tracks on a map with
applicable geographically referenced overlays and data
enhancements. The COP is also a central element of the
Deepwater solution tying Deepwater assets and operational
commanders together with dynamic, real-time maritime domain
information. This link is essential to ensure effective command
and control of all available Coast Guard assets responding to a
myriad of border security threats.
--An expansive and interoperable communications network is critical
for maritime security operations and safety of life at sea. In
the coastal environment, the Coast Guard's Rescue 21 system
will provide the United States with an advanced maritime
distress and response communications system that bridges
interoperability gaps, saves lives and improves maritime
security.
--Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrated the need for robust and
resilient port and coastal command and control. Through test-
beds at command centers in Miami, FL, Charleston, SC and
elsewhere; and joint harbor operations centers established with
the U.S Navy in Hampton Roads, VA, and San Diego, CA; the power
of partnership, technology and co-location has been proven. The
Coast Guard will continue working to expand on these successes
and export them to other ports nationwide.
WMD Detection and Response.--The Coast Guard is an active partner
and ardent supporter of the Department's Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office for their work in identifying new technologies to enhance our
seaborne radiation detection capabilities. Similarly, many of the
capability enhancements included in the revised Deepwater
implementation plan are designed specifically with this threat in mind.
We know the trauma that infiltration of WMD could cause our Nation, and
intend to remain as vigilant as possible in preventing this from ever
happening. Since 9/11, the Coast Guard has outfitted all of its
boarding teams with personal radiation detectors, and we have in our
inventory hand-held isotope detectors and other equipment that can be
employed depending on the nature of the threat. We work closely with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Customs and Border Protection, and
the Department of Energy to respond immediately to any indications of
radiation encountered aboard a vessel at sea or in port. Of course,
this is really a last line of defense.
As I mentioned in my introductory remarks, there is no single
solution to maritime border security. It requires a layered system of
capabilities, established competencies, clear authorities, and strong
partnerships. The cost of allowing blind spots in our awareness,
security regimes or operational capabilities is too high.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, we can and should be proud of the positive steps
we've taken to enhance maritime security. I credit the innovation,
resourcefulness and devoted service of Coast Guard men and women for
much of our progress to date. They have made tremendous strides with
assets and systems designed for a different era. I am convinced we can
do even better as we deliver more capable and reliable operational
assets and systems. If we give Coast Guard men and women the training
and equipment to do the job, they won't let us down.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will
be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Admiral.
We're joined by Senator Byrd. If you would like to make an
opening statement, and then questions, we have a vote at 11
o'clock.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
Senator Byrd. Good morning, folks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank our chairman for holding this hearing today. I
would agree with him on almost anything----
We both agree that, in order to have effective border
security, the Department of Homeland Security should be
focusing its resources not only on our land borders, but also
on our relatively undefended coastlines and rivers.
I welcome the next Commandant of the United States Coast
Guard. And I thank him for leading the hurricane recovery
efforts on the gulf coast. We know that, as security at our
land borders is tightened, illegal aliens, drug runners, and
terrorists will turn to our waterways for entry into this
country, our homeland.
According to Coast Guard statistics, the flow of illegal
aliens through our waterways has more than doubled in the last
10 years, and will continue to grow. The administration has
concluded that international migration, quote, ``will be one of
the most important factors affecting maritime security through
the next 10 years, and that a significant commitment of
security resources is necessary.''
Now, the budget does not match this rhetoric. What is known
as the Secure Borders Initiative is being promoted, but the
initiative makes no mention of securing our wide-open waterways
and coastlines from illegal migration.
The Coast Guard is facing a crisis in its ability to
maintain assets that perform border and maritime security
missions. Recent budget requests by the administration have
allowed this crisis to fester. The condition of Coast Guard
ships and planes is declining rapidly. These assets spend more
and more time out of service. For example, total patrol-boat
hours in 2004 were 25 percent lower than in 1998. Current Coast
Guard maritime patrol airplanes can only provide half of the
hours required to meet operational commitments.
At the same time, funding constraints require maintenance
on these aging assets to be deferred more and more every year.
From fiscal years 2001 to 2005, the Coast Guard deferred over
$121 million in maintenance needed for its naval fleet and $159
million in maintenance needed for its air assets.
The President says that we live in a post-9/11 world.
Frankly, the Coast Guard's fleet of ships and planes is fit for
the last century. To properly secure the maritime domain, the
Coast Guard needs a fleet fit for this century.
And so, I was troubled to learn that the fiscal year 2007
Deepwater budget is flat as far as the eye can see. Deepwater
won't be completed until 2026--I won't be here--20 years from
now--only in spirit. If we do not invest in the Coast Guard
now--now--it could become the FEMA of 2010.
Admiral Allen, my dear wife's mother was an Allen from
Virginia. You've heard of Sidney Allen, haven't you? He shot up
the courthouse down there, huh?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
RESOURCES REQUIRED TO SECURE MARITIME AVENUES
Senator Byrd. All right.
Admiral Allen, we are here today to discuss the resource
requirements that the Coast Guard needs to secure our maritime
avenues. In 2004, Commandant Collins characterized the Coast
Guard's assets as being in a declining readiness spiral.
Your testimony on operational gaps indicates that the Coast
Guard continues to face significant challenges. I look forward,
with our very able chairman, to an open and frank discussion on
the assets you need to carry out your mission as it relates to
border and maritime security.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Senator.
And I agree with the Senator from West Virginia, as I often
do. He's very generous to me. But he's absolutely right on his
assessment, I believe, of where the Coast Guard is. And my
concern is the same as the Senator from West Virginia, which
is--it doesn't appear to me that what we've got in the pipeline
for you is what you need in order to do your job, and the
charts sort of explain that.
I guess my first question to you is, How much of that is a
function of resources that you need? And how much of it is a
function of the things like the cutter issue, which is that
you're changing design midstream? So that even if you have the
resources, you can't buy the ships, because you haven't decided
what type of ship you want--or, in this case, boats--I guess
they aren't ships. Well, they started out as boats, maybe
they're going to turn out as ships. But, in any event--so,
break that out for us. You've got these charts here that show
us what we need to add in capital investment. And I look on
capital investment as something we should be able to do around
here fairly simply, because it's just buying things that you
need, to make sure you can do the job right.
So, tell us what you need in resources, on top of what is
in the budget, as proposed, and in the supplemental, as passed,
where you receive some additional funds--or, not as passed, but
as it came out of committee. And then, tell us what the
difference is between additional money and resolving some of
these issues around what the character is of the item you're
buying, whether you're agreeing on the type of cutter, the type
of aircraft.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
You characterize the problem exactly right. It's an issue
of resources, and it is an issue of requirements. And a couple
of things have happened simultaneously that bring us to where
we're at today.
As you know, the original Deepwater contract was awarded
based on requirements that were suitable for 1998. And we know,
in a post-9/11 environment, our cutters and aircraft have to
operate in a much more--different area and operational threat
environment regarding force protection, CB--chemical,
biological, nuclear weapons, and so forth. What we have tried
to do is rebaseline those requirements.
I think the requirements are fixed now. We submitted a
report last year. We certainly don't intend to have any great
deviation from those requirements in the future. And it's more
of an issue of how you take those requirements and build those
in to the current plan, and have those reflected. And that's
what's causing some of the problems. As we've gone in and asked
for these requirements to be included in designs, that's
created some challenges for our integrated Coast Guard systems
partners. Most notably, we're currently looking at the fast-
response cutter composite ship that was supposed to increase
speed, give us a stern launch boat capability, increase our
sensors and communications capability. Those are the new
requirements, that don't exist in our current fleet, that we
need. However, that design that we're looking at right now has
some issues with it, and we'll complete a review in another 3
to 4 weeks on it.
Notwithstanding that, there is a gap in those patrol boat
hours. And whether it's the fast-response cutter or some other
craft that can meet those requirements, we do need those
resources now.
Regarding funding, it was originally envisioned, when this
contract was awarded, that we would be working with about $500
million a year to source this program. We are now up close to a
billion for the foreseeable future, so there has been an
increase in resources provided to the program. That has allowed
us to simultaneously bring new assets online, and also conduct
maintenance on the older ones, especially the 210 and the 270
fleet, which are undergoing mid-life renovations at our Coast
Guard Yard. So, it's a matter of balancing the additional money
against the repair of the legacy cutters, but bringing those
new requirements in as fast as we can, sir.
Senator Gregg. Well, how much additional money would you
need so that we could get this done, so that Senator Byrd could
be here in charge of launching the last ship----
Admiral Allen. Well, I think----
Senator Gregg [continuing]. With the Deepwater Program?
Admiral Allen [continuing]. In the current year, sir, not a
lot of additional money is needed. I think some key decisions
have to be taken. And one is whether or not we're going to
proceed on the current course with the fast-response cutter or
go with some kind of off-the-shelf design and get something
with the money we already have appropriated and what is planned
and requested for 2007 on target, if you will, for the right
platform we need.
Senator Gregg. Well, you know, the--as Senator Byrd
mentioned, it's going to take until 2026, I think he said, to
build out the Deepwater Program. I mean, that just doesn't seem
reasonable. How do we accelerate that? What do you need for
resources to----
Admiral Allen. Well, sir, we previously answered that
accelerating the program would actually cut the overall cost of
the program by a couple of billion dollars a you move it toward
2016. That would get those resources in faster. The current
program does what we need it to do, but it does it over a
longer period of time. It can be shortened, and we could bring
the assets on faster, sir.
Senator Gregg. So, give us a number.
Admiral Allen. I can provide it for the record, but I think
by moving it up to around--and I would like to make sure I've
got it right for the record, but I think by moving this
completion up closer to 2016, you actually move the cost down
between $1 and $1.3 billion--$1 and $3 billion, because you're
spending the money sooner, and you're getting those assets
online quicker, you're not involving the costs of extending
the----
[The information follows:]
Funding Required to Complete Deepwater Acquisition
A preliminary estimate of $21 billion in funding would be required
to complete the Deepwater acquisition within the next 10 years. The
required funding levels for fiscal year 2007 and future years are
provided in the table below.
[Millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Required
Fiscal year Funding
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 & prior............................................ 3,128
2007.................................................... 934
2008.................................................... 1,569
2009.................................................... 2,890
2010.................................................... 2,440
2011.................................................... 2,480
2012.................................................... 2,086
2013.................................................... 2,077
2014.................................................... 1,999
2015.................................................... 864
2016.................................................... 577
---------------
TOTAL............................................. 1.004
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Gregg. Well, I think that's what I would like to
do. I know it's what Senator Byrd would like to do. And if it's
within the resources of this committee, we will do it. So, we'd
need that number----
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Gregg [continuing]. If you can get it to us.
CARGO INSPECTION AT FOREIGN PORTS
Secondly, and then I'll turn to Senator Byrd and then to
Senator Allard, how are we doing on inspecting cargo as it
leaves the ports around the world and heads toward us, and then
capturing cargo before it hits us----
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. Well, that's----
Senator Gregg [continuing]. That's dangerous?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. As you know, the responsibility
for that largely lies with the Customs and Border Protection
Service, and largely through their Container Security
Initiative, which places inspectors in foreign ports at the
point of embarkation to make sure we know what's manifested in
those containers. It allows us to screen the cargo and the
other manifest data through the National Targeting Center to
single out containers that might be of an issue. In addition to
that, through the International Ship and Port Security Code,
the Coast Guard are conducting assessments of foreign ports to
make sure they're compliant with the national standards.
Yeah, I'm sorry.
Senator Gregg. What's your assessment of what--how we're
doing in this exercise, in determining whether cargo headed
towards us is safe?
Admiral Allen. Well, I think we're doing better than we
were, but we can do better, sir. I think the more we can put
into the Container Security Initiative and advanced clearance
of those manifests and dealing with the containers issue at the
point of embarkation, the more the Coast Guard can go in and
look at these ports and make sure they're in compliance with
the International Ship and Port Security Code, we'll all
enhance that now, that's all based on the resources we have
right now. It could be accelerated, with more resources, sir.
Senator Gregg. Senator Byrd.
SECURING WATERWAYS AND COASTLINES FROM ILLEGAL MIGRATION
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, as I indicated in my opening
statement, the administration is now promoting what it is
calling the Secure Borders Initiative. However, the initiative
makes no mention of securing our wide-open waterways and
coastlines from illegal migration. When we strengthen security
at the land borders, those who wish to enter this country
illegally will pursue other entry points.
The Coast Guard needs a 21st century fleet of ships and
planes. Unfortunately, today the Coast Guard has a fleet fit
for the last century. The Coast Guard's fleet of cutters is
currently the 37th oldest of the world's 39 like-sized naval
fleets.
The charts in your testimony compare Coast Guard asset
performance to a 1998 baseline. The President says that we live
in a post-9/11 world, but the Coast Guard is measuring its
performance against a pre-9/11 baseline.
Admiral Allen, why are you using a pre-September 9/11
baseline?
Admiral Allen. Well, sir, that was the baseline when the
contract was awarded. That was adjusted last year to reflect
post-9/11 requirements, and that currently has been
memorialized in the plan, as reported to Congress with our
budget in fiscal year 2007. As I stated to the chairman, the
challenge now is to getting those new requirements designed
into those holes that were already scheduled to be built, so
that we--when those hours come out there to fill that gap,
they're more effective hours. In other words, it's not the same
vessel that we would have bought in 1998; it's a vessel we need
for 9/11. You're absolutely correct, sir.
The challenge right now is to make sure those requirements,
by a technical means, are included in the contract and then put
into those designs so we have those platforms out in the hands
of our people to make them more effective. And that is the
challenge before us today, sir, and that's the one we're
working hard on.
RAPIDLY DECLINING CONDITION OF COAST GUARD ASSETS
Senator Byrd. The condition of Coast Guard ships and planes
is declining rapidly. These assets spend more and more time out
of service. For example, total patrol boat hours in 2004 were
25 percent lower than in 1998. Current Coast Guard maritime
patrol airplanes can only provide half of the hours required to
meet operational commitments. At the same time, funding
constraints require maintenance on these aging assets to be
deferred more and more every year.
From fiscal years 2001 to 2005, the Coast Guard deferred
over $121 million in maintenance needed for its naval fleet and
$159 million in maintenance needed for its air assets. The
Coast Guard's 110-foot patrol boats, which you use to interdict
illegal aliens and drugs, are in a ``declining readiness
spiral,'' according to Commandant Collins. Coast Guard patrol
boats are operating in theater less today than they were in
1998. Total patrol boat hours were only 75,000 in 2004,
compared to the 1998 baseline of approximately 100,000 hours.
Under the Deepwater plan, this gap won't be closed until 2012,
at the earliest. The administration's National Strategy for
Maritime Security calls for a, quote, ``significant commitment
of security resources,'' close quote, to deal with illegal
seaborne immigration.
Admiral Allen, the Coast Guard is facing a crisis. The
fiscal year 2007 budget pushes the development of the fast-
response cutter to the right. Indications are that the five
patrol crafts that are on loan from the Navy will be returned
in 2008. Six 110s are operating in Iraq and may not be
returned.
You have an opportunity at this hearing to tell us what can
be done right now to turn this situation around if additional
resources were to become available. Now, new 110-foot patrol
boats help the short-term gap that you that have discussed in
your testimony?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. I agree with you completely. The
patrol-boat gap has to be addressed. And, currently, the design
of the FRC won't get us there on time. And, you're right, it is
scheduled to move to the right. I think we need to address this
near-term crisis on patrol boat hours with some unique and
innovative thinking. I think we need to go for some kind of a
Paracraft design or a design that can be manufactured more
quickly and put in the hands of our people. And we fully intend
to explore that with our integrated Coast Guard systems
partners shortly. We should receive a complete technical
evaluation of the design issues with the FRC sometime in the
next 3 to 4 weeks. But it is our intent right now to proceed
very aggressively to look at an alternative bridging craft to
get us through this period, and get it online as fast as we
can.
And to the extent that there is money that is available for
the FRC, I think that money needs to be applied to get that new
patrol boat out there as soon as we can get it, sir.
Senator Byrd. So, you've said sometime in the next 4 weeks.
Admiral Allen. That's for the final technical evaluation of
the FRC. We're not precluded, nor have we stopped going ahead
to discuss what we might do to fill the patrol boat gap. We do
need some kind of candidate craft that will fill that gap, sir,
and we intend to do that.
Senator Byrd. All right.
Have I more time? Yes.
I thank you. And--thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gregg. Thank you.
COAST GUARD'S ROLE IN NORTHERN COMMAND
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I find this
hearing fascinating. It's been a few million years since we had
a coastline in Colorado, the State I represent. But I would
tell you that the image that I have of the Coast Guard--and I
think most people in Colorado--is that you do a great job, and
we appreciate your sacrifice and effort to help secure the
borders of this country.
I--we also have located, in Colorado, Northern Command----
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Allard [continuing]. Which is the military joint
command to secure our country. What role does the Coast Guard
play with Northern Command, if any?
Admiral Allen. Well, sir, we play a significant role, but,
I might add, before I answer, that we have some very dedicated
Coast Guard auxiliarists and reservists that live in your State
that----
Senator Allard. You do.
Admiral Allen [continuing]. Contribute greatly to the Coast
Guard.
Senator Allard. You----
Admiral Allen. I'd be glad to give you a brief, at some
time, if you'd like that, sir.
Senator Allard. Yeah. And I think I've met some of those
individuals. We have a few people in the Navy, too. And I
always love to ask them if they anticipated being stationed in
Colorado or Nebraska.
But, no, they're great professionals.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Allard. Yeah. Go ahead.
Admiral Allen. Thank you.
We have had a very close relationship with U.S. Northern
Command since it was founded. Immediately following 9/11, as
you remember, the homeland defense mission in this country was
given to the Joint Forces Command, down in Norfolk. At that
time, I was the Atlantic area commander, in command of our
forces on 9/11, and I actually worked collaboratively with
General Kernan and General Eberhart as they put together the
terms of reference to actually build NORTHCOM. We detailed
officers into the staff that actually put together the plans to
stand it up. I provided a Coast Guard liaison officer very
early on, and we now have Coast Guard people out there that
jointly staff U.S. Northern Command, and we have a very good
working relationship.
While I was exercising my duties as principal Federal
official for Hurricane Katrina response, I was in touch
constantly with Admiral Keating and Lieutenant General Inge
regarding the requirements I had down there in my dealings with
General Honore. So, I can tell you, we have a very close
relationship with NORTHCOM, and we certainly will continue to
do that, sir.
Senator Allard. Well, I'm glad to hear that. A lot of
technology involved with Northern Command.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Allard. A lot of it is satellite driven and
whatnot. Do you feel that you have adequate technology there to
work with the military in meeting your requirements, or your
responsibilities that might be delegated through Northern
Command?
Admiral Allen. Well, we're--by statute, the Coast Guard has
to be interoperable with the Navy, so, in a time of war, if we
need to be shifted, we could. So----
Senator Allard. Yes.
Admiral Allen [continuing]. We do have interoperability,
from a communications standpoint, with our DOD forces.
One of the interesting things that the Deepwater solution
is going to bring to the Coast Guard is some of the even
higher-level technologies that are commonly used by DOD right
now, and put them right on our cutters at sea out there, and
things like SIPRNET chat rooms, ability to transfer a common
operating picture, so you could virtually have Coast Guard
headquarters, Northern Command, and a CO of a Coast Guard
cutter in the Caribbean actually looking at the same screen at
the same time, sir.
Senator Allard. Yeah.
Admiral Allen. And that's one of those----
Senator Allard. Well, that----
Admiral Allen [continuing]. The things we're really trying
to bring onboard with the Deepwater Project.
Senator Allard. Yeah. And I come off Armed Services
Committee, and I know we've been working and trying to use the
satellite system, provide that type of technology for the
soldier on the field, as well as the boat or the ship on the
waters.
Admiral Allen. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Allard. And I think it's----
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
UPDATING THE LORAN NAVIGATIONAL SYSTEM
Senator Allard [continuing]. Fabulous technology, and I
think it will help us do a good job.
On the navigational side, we have a company in Colorado
called Loran, which is your older navigational systems. And I
think pretty much that sort of technology is getting outdated.
And I think you're replacing it with a GPS system, which I
think has to be done. But do you--do you need to keep Loran
around for a backup system, or do you think you--the
technology's got enough backup and--the new technological
systems has enough backup in there that you don't need to have
Loran anymore as a backup system? What is your thoughts on the
technology changes that are going on navigational equipment?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. And it's an excellent question.
Our current Loran-C system has been around since the early
1960s. Quite frankly, GPS provides superior positioning
systems.
Senator Allard. Sure.
Admiral Allen. There was some residual discussion about
whether or not the use of Loran signals to--for timing
purposes, universal time, might have some residual value. We
have discussed that within the interagency and the Federal
Government, and I think the consensus is that it's time to go
ahead and decommission the Loran system in the country. GPS
provides an adequate navigation system in place of that.
Sometimes it's hard to do away with those things you've
been doing for a lot of years.
Senator Allard. Exactly.
Admiral Allen. I was the commanding officer of a Loran
station in Southeast Asia right at the end of the war, but
that's how old that technology is. And some of the stuff still
runs on vacuum tubes. And the cost it would take to upgrade
that technology, when there is a more effective means of
providing navigation services, probably dictates that we not do
that, sir.
Senator Gregg. Senator----
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gregg. Thank you. There is a vote on. Senator Byrd
asked courtesy of being able to ask questions so he'd get
started towards the vote. Is that all right with you, Senator
Murray? And then we'll go to Senator Murray.
Senator Byrd. I thank the Senator.
CLOSING THE OPERATIONAL GAP FOR PATROL BOATS
Senator Gregg. Go ahead.
Senator Byrd. Quickly, thank you.
Admiral, you have said that you are aggressively pursuing a
new native craft to close the operational gap for patrol boats.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. What would it cost to add additional patrol
boats now?
Admiral Allen. Well, I think we need to look at the current
plan in Deepwater and how much money is available for patrol
boats. But my guess is that we can get something down in a
fairly affordable range working with our ICGS partners in a--
using the design that's already been proven out there. And I'm
talking about driving this thing down to something where we can
get a patrol boat for somewhere between $20 and $30 million,
max.
Senator Byrd. Thank you.
Admiral Allen. Excuse me?
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Admiral. We want to help.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gregg. Thank you.
Senator Murray.
FUNDING REDUCTIONS TO COAST GUARD'S TRADITIONAL MISSIONS
Senator Murray. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know
there's a vote on, and we need to get over to the floor, but I
wanted to come--I was in another hearing--and just thank you,
and all the men and women in the Coast Guard, for the
tremendous job they've done. And your leadership has certainly
been noted. And I know you're going to become Commandant in
May, and you're coming at a time when we need you. And I think
you're going to be doing an excellent job. I look forward to
working with you on that.
I did want to come to this committee, because I am
concerned--and I think we all learned from Katrina, the
tremendous multiple missions that the Coast Guard has. And I
remain concerned that, although the Coast Guard funding looks
pretty good in the budget, under the President's budget request
there are more than $230 million in cuts to Coast Guard's
traditional missions, maritime safety, including search and
rescue, important to my end of the world, cut by $143 million;
natural resource protection, cut by $56 million; maritime
mobility is cut by $32 million.
Admiral, I know this hearing is focused on border and port
security, but if the budget doesn't provide you with proper
funding for all your missions, we're simply asking the Coast
Guard to do more and more with less and less. And if you could
share with this committee, if it turns out that you need more
funding for these traditional missions, would Homeland Security
funds be used, or do we just do less in those mission areas?
Admiral Allen. Thank you for the question, Senator.
The way we portray those costs in those budget is through
an algorithm. We take historical hours that are applied to
missions, and then we have a way, through what we call a
mission cost model, to actually load those hours. We actually
keep track of every hour that an airplane, a small boat, or a
cutter operates, and then we're able to load the costs onto
that. And so, these are projections based on historical data,
how we might spread the budget, as it's presented. I can tell
you right now that we will not diminish our search-and-rescue
readiness posture. Our field commanders are empowered out there
to apply resources to the highest need available. And they know
search and rescue comes first. So, while we spread these
algorithms out for costing purposes in the budget, I can commit
to you right now, there will be no diminution in our search-
and-rescue missions.
Now, beyond that, our field commanders are allocated
resources, and are given the autonomy to apply those to the
highest need within their areas of responsibility. And you're
very familiar with--in our 13th District, how that happens. So,
while we project those things in the budget, that is just a
projection, and it may not bear the exact same reality of how
we actually execute those hours out there.
But, overall, it's a tradeoff that our field commanders
make. We know search and rescue's going to come right off the
top. And so, to the extent that you're operating in a
constrained environment, the rest of the missions are going to
be debited somewhat to make sure you hit the top line.
VESSEL AND FACILITY SECURITY PLANS
Senator Murray. Okay. And, really quickly, under the
Maritime Transportation Security Act, Coast Guard was charged
with ensuring the implementation of 3,500 vessel security plans
and about 10,000 facility security plans. I did not see, in
your written testimony, any reference to that. Can you please
update the committee on the progress of those plans across the
country?
Admiral Allen. We sure can, ma'am. And I can tell you right
now, we have about 1,200 people that are on task, both looking
at facility plans, vessel plans, and the inspections, to make
sure those plans are complied with, sir.
Senator Murray. Are they being regularly reviewed, then,
by----
Admiral Allen. They're reviewed on an annual basis, and
then there are spotchecks conducted.
Senator Murray. Okay.
I would appreciate that. And if you can give us any
additional information, Mr. Chairman, I will submit my other
questions for the record, as I see Senator Stevens is here, as
well.
But, thank you, and please pass on my thank you to the men
and women of the Coast Guard. They do an excellent job.
Appreciate it.
[The information follows:]
Facilities Subject to MTSA/ISPS
The Coast Guard has identified 3,064 facilities subject to MTSA/
ISPS requirements. All of these facilities have approved facility
security plans in place and during the 2005 calendar year each facility
was visited under the Coast Guard's annual facility security inspection
program.
There were 11,000 Coast Guard approved security plan submissions
for vessels subject to MTSA/ISPS regulations. As part of annually
required inspected vessel safety inspections, approximately 8,500
security verification exams were conducted between July 1, 2004 and
April 1, 2006. The Coast Guard intends to complete security
verification exams on all MTSA regulated U.S. vessels by 31 December,
2006.
Admiral Allen. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Gregg. I'm going to head--I have to vote.
Senator Stevens has some questions, and he'll wrap this up.
Admiral, again, thank you. Thank you for your service.
Thank you for the extraordinary job you did in Katrina, and
that your team did in Katrina.
And at some point, I'd like to get a written response as to
whether or not we've straightened out, between you and the FBI,
who's in charge when your SWAT teams go onto a--into a
situation like occurred in the exercise in Connecticut.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. I would just respond briefly that
I am personally working with John Pistole, the Deputy Director
of the FBI, and I can tell you we are much closer than what it
would appear in the press.
MAINTENANCE FOR NEW ASSETS
Senator Stevens [presiding]. Well, Admiral, I had a call
from my staff to tell me I could call you and tell you're
nomination is cleared. I decided to let you find it out in
normal course, but I'm delighted we finally got those people
straightened out that were holding up your nomination.
I have a couple of questions. One is this. In the recent
years, a large portion of your budget has gone to maintain
legacy assets. And the question is, What about new assets? And
I would like to ask you to give us a reply to this question,
What percentage of the fiscal year 2007 Deepwater budget will
be used for legacy asset maintenance? Is it going to continue
to increase? is what I want to know.
MARITIME BORDER SECURITY BETWEEN ALASKA AND ASIA
Second--and I've talked about this before, but we have a
very large maritime--long maritime border. We harvest 60
percent of the fish consumed by the Americans comes from that
area. This is an area that needs protection. And when 9/11 took
place, the Coast Guard vessels disappeared, went down to
protect Los Angeles and San Francisco. My people tell me that,
while you have some assets back, the emphasis and the primary
focus of the Coast Guard is still upon the southeast and
southwest borders, and not upon the maritime border between
Alaska and the nations of Asia.
Now, what is being done to secure those borders? Are we
going to bring some of these assets back and restore the
patrols? Are we going to use the Predator or some means of UAVs
for the future?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. I'll start from the back and work
forward, if I can there. As you know, we've done two Predator
tests in Alaska in the previous two summers. We're doing
another Predator test this coming summer; and that will be in
conjunction with Customs and Border Protection, to see if we
can come in alignment with the joint requirements as regards to
unmanned aerial vehicles. So, we continue to have----
Senator Stevens. Let me interrupt you. Those are
dissimilar. One is onshore, the other is out there on the
maritime border. As far as keeping the vessels that are
invading our waters--these enormous vessels now coming in,
harvesting the fish of the deep ocean, those are the assets
we're interested in.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. And we are, too. We feel that
unmanned aerial vehicles are a way to give us better coverage
up there, so we can detect those incursions. We also, as you
know, are decommissioning the Storis and putting a 378-foot
cutter in Kodiak, which is a much more capable platform, also
helo capable, to be able to more effectively work the boundary
line and also the Gulf of Alaska. It's our intent to maintain
the commitments for the footprints we have with the cutters
that are already up there, and sustain our presence up there,
sir.
Senator Stevens. All right. Well, I want you to know, I'm
going to seek your help. I intend to go to the United Nations
and talk to them about some way to control these marauding
international vessels now that are fishing in the deep waters
of the ocean. They are really vacuum cleaning the bottom,
they're intersecting our migratory fish. And I do believe that
it's time that we tried to get some international cooperation
in that regard, as we did with the drift nets. Now, your agency
was very helpful to us in identifying the drift nets when they
came across the maritime boundary into U.S. waters. I want to
start getting some statistics on how many of these vessels are
coming into our waters and how long they stay in our waters.
They're not coming to our shores. They're just coming into the
waters, international waters on our side of the maritime
boundary; and we believe they're intersecting our migratory
fish, particularly the salmon.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. We need a restoration of this--the
security forces on that border. I think it's as important to
the country as what you're doing with regard to individuals
coming into the country illegally. These vessels are coming
into areas we've declared to be the exclusive U.S. zone for
fishing. And we need some enforcement of that zone. That's all
there is to is.
So, I'd look forward to working with you on it. But I would
like to know, What will be--for the record--What will be the
assets that are available for the maritime boundary in Alaska
for this year?
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir. If I could, I'd provide that for
the record, sir.
[The information follows:]
Patrolling the Maritime Boundary Line
The following Coast Guard assets will be available for patrolling
the maritime boundary line (MBL) in Alaska this year.
Coast Guard assets based within Alaska:
--High Endurance Cutters.--CGC \1\ Alex Haley (WHEC-39)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ CGC MUNRO is scheduled to move homeports from Alameda, CA to
Kodiak, AK in the third quarter of fiscal year 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--Medium Endurance Cutters.--CGC \2\ STORIS (WMEC-36)--CGC ACUSHNET
(WMEC-167)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ CGC STORIS is scheduled to be decommissioned in fiscal year
2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--Number of C-130 aircraft.--4.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ AIRSTA Kodiak remains programmed for five C-130's, but one is
currently located in Elizabeth City, NC and being used to prototype the
SELEX airborne radar. This fifth AIRSTA Kodiak C-130 is scheduled to
return on or about September 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coast Guard Pacific Area assets based outside of Alaska:
--High Endurance Cutters.--10.\1\
--Number of C-130 aircraft.--9.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Admiral Allen. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. Appreciate your courtesy, Admiral.
Admiral Allen. Thank you, sir.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg
ACCESS TO THE US VISIT DATABASE
Question. What would it cost to make the database accessible to
boarding teams?
Answer. The costs are unknown at this time. As the Coast Guard
learns more about the requirements for the US VISIT/IDENT system during
the operational prototypes, we will have a better understanding of
costs.
Question. Does the Coast Guard currently have access to the US
VISIT database?
Answer. Yes. However, the equipment currently available is not
designed for use in a maritime environment, thereby limiting its
effectiveness. We are working with US VISIT program managers to improve
the equipment.
Question. What is needed to make the USCG's access to this system
seamless?
Answer. Coast Guard units conducting patrols need improved database
connectivity and better portable equipment to use the US VISIT/IDENT
system. We are working with US VISIT/IDENT to improve the at-sea
connectivity and portable equipment so that Coast Guard boarding teams
have seamless access.
Question. Why does the USCG need access to this system?
Answer. Currently, the Coast Guard has no electronic means of
identifying people who are trying to illegally enter the country via
maritime routes. Having the ability to collect biometrics and access US
VISIT/IDENT, will enable the Coast Guard to identify and stop felons
and potential terrorists from entering the United States.
Question. Do the boarding teams? Why not?
Answer. Yes, a few boarding teams are prototyping the equipment.
There are some unique challenges for the Coast Guard in using the US
VISIT/IDENT equipment and database. Having real-time access to the
database requires T1 line connectivity. Coast Guard units patrolling on
the water have limited data connectivity, making real-time access to
the US VISIT/IDENT database challenging. Additionally, there are
limited technologies for biometrics collection in a maritime
environment (i.e. challenges in obtaining rugged, compact, water proof,
transportable equipment).
We are working with US VISIT/IDENT to resolve equipment and
database connectivity issues.
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
Question. How does the Coast Guard share its intelligence reports
with other parts of DHS and the rest of the Intelligence Community?
Answer. The Coast Guard has standard connectivity through telephone
(both classified and unclassified systems), standard Internet
connectivity, video teleconferencing and connectivity at secured levels
of classification. Coast Guard intelligence products are routinely
posted and shared with other DHS and Intelligence Community members
through these means.
In addition, the Coast Guard is an active member of the DHS
Information Sharing and Collaboration (ISC) Program. As a member of
this program, we are part of the overall initiative within the
Department that seeks to improve information sharing and collaboration
within each of the directorates of the Department, DHS elements, across
the cabinet level departments and agencies, and with our State, tribal,
territorial, local and private sector partners responsible for securing
the people and infrastructure of this country.
Question. Do you share or post your entire reports or just their
conclusions?
Answer. It is common practice for the Coast Guard's Intelligence
Coordination Center (ICC) to share intelligence reports with other DHS
agencies and the Intelligence Community through messages and/or posting
on a web-site, accessible through various classified systems. These
products are generally posted in their entirety, typically including
analysts' comments and conclusions.
USCG'S ROLE IN DETECTING AND RESPONDING TO WMDS
Question. What is Coast Guard's role in detecting and responding to
WMDs?
Answer. The Coast Guard has a non-redundant radiological and
nuclear material detection program that is tailored for the maritime
environment and has the ability to detect, localize, characterize and
identify radioactive and nuclear materials at sea through the use of
personal portable search tools.
Alarm and detection resolution procedures include utilization of
Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Laboratory Scientific Services
(LSS) and Department of Energy--Radiological Assistance Program
regional response teams. Response to a WMD incident would be conducted
in accordance with the National Response Plan.
The Coast Guard works with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO) in protecting our Nation from WMDs that are radiological and
nuclear (RadNuc). The Coast Guard is key in domestic maritime
interception and investigation of illegal transport and usage of RadNuc
materials. Working with DNDO and its interagency network including CBP,
the Coast Guard plays an active role in determining appropriate action
when a vessel with WMDs approaches the United States.
ARMED AIRCRAFT
Question. When do you anticipate arming your entire fleet?
Answer. The Coast Guard plans to modify all helicopters to support
Airborne Use of Force (AUF) missions in a plug and play manner,
however, not all helicopters will be actually armed at all times. To
conserve costs, the Coast Guard intends to train and arm regional units
which can deploy nationwide to support AUF missions in a matter of
hours. The Coast Guard's AUF plan is planned to be fully implemented by
fiscal year 2010.
Question. I understand that aircraft armed with the airborne use of
force package are 100 percent effective in stopping smuggling vessels.
What percentage of your aircraft is currently armed?
Answer. The percentage of currently armed Coast Guard helicopters
is as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Operational Armed Percentage
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HH-60J.......................................... 41 34 9 22
HH-65........................................... 95 84 .............. ..............
MH-68 (HITRON).................................. 8 8 8 100
---------------------------------------------------------------
CG TOTAL.................................. 144 126 17 11
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. If more funds were available, could the process of arming
the fleet be sped up?
Answer. Yes.
REVIEW OF OPTIONS RELATED TO DEEPWATER
Question. The Coast Guard is currently reviewing its options
relative to contract renewal, competition, or in house management.
Describe for me the advantages and disadvantages of using an
integrator.
Answer. The Deepwater Systems Integrator (Integrated Coast Guard
Systems (ICGS)) provides several notable advantages relative to
Integration, Contract Management, Private Sector Expertise, and Buying
Power. Some examples are:
--Integration.--A System Integrator ensures discipline by enforcing
commonality across the system. A review of system level
requirements reveals 85 percent commonality in C4ISR alone.
This permits all assets to share near real time information
through a Common Operating Picture.
--Contract Management.--In 2003, a crisis in the safety and
reliability of the HH-65 required the acceleration of the HH-65
re-engining plan. Under expedited circumstances, ICGS obtained
replacement engines, installation kits, and re-engining
expertise that led to the first re-engine operational aircraft
in less than 8 months and a plan, now being executed, to re-
engine all 84 operational aircraft by June 2007, approximately
2 years before the originally scheduled delivery of the first
MCH.
--Private Sector Expertise.--ICGS is a partnership of Northrop
Grumman and Lockheed Martin. These defense industry powerhouses
apply both ``state-of-the-art'' and ``state of the market''
(i.e. non-developmental) technological expertise to Coast Guard
requirements.
--Buying Power.--ICGS can take advantage of economies of scale with
commonality and volume purchases of equipment and subsystems
across asset lines that position the Coast Guard for lower life
cycle operating costs due to standardization.
A System Integrator takes a ``Top Down'' approach that leverages
cooperation and coordination across the System of Systems, instead of
the traditional ``Bottom Up'' approach that looks at each asset
individually. Without a Systems Integrator, interoperability across the
enterprise would be extremely difficult to achieve. Interoperability is
a key foundation of the system's ability to meet mission performance
requirements. Independent development of architecture and interfaces
would result in assets (cutters and aircraft) that would not be able to
effectively communicate with each other. Such an asset-centric approach
invariably introduces increased costs and reduced efficiency.
SUCCESS OF DEEPWATER PROGRAM
Question. Given some of Deepwater's design flaws, delays, mission
requirements changes, etc., how would you rate the success of the
Deepwater program to date?
Answer. Overall the Deepwater Program has been successful. There
have been some challenges that both the Prime Contractor and the Coast
Guard have worked hard to overcome, but the successes have outweighed
the challenges. In fact, recent GAO testimony cited the Coast Guard's
continued improvement in the management of major acquisitions, foremost
of which is the Deepwater Program. Visible operational successes
include the 300 people saved by the re-engined HH-65 helicopters after
Hurricane Katrina and the record drug seizures that were greatly
facilitated by the C4ISR upgrades to the Coast Guard's fleet of legacy
assets. In addition, the first Maritime Patrol aircraft just rolled off
the production line and the first National Security Cutter, our largest
asset, is approximately 49 percent complete and is scheduled for
delivery in early 2008. As asset design and production timelines
continue to advance, the successes will continue to multiply.
INTELLIGENCE'S ROLE IN MARITIME SECURITY
Question. What is the role of intelligence in maritime security?
Answer. The role of intelligence in maritime security is to enhance
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and provide information on actual or
potential threats relative to terrorism, drug trafficking, alien
smuggling or other unlawful activity in the maritime realm.
The Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations program
collects, processes and analyzes information from around the United
States and abroad in order to provide actionable intelligence to field
commanders and enable informed decision making by the Coast Guard and
other government agencies.
Program activities have been enhanced to assist in identifying
maritime threats. These include:
--Creation of Field Intelligence Support Teams (FISTs) in various key
U.S. ports;
--Development of a Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC) under
each Area Commander, to provide actionable intelligence to
Coast Guard operational commanders, while also sharing that
analysis with interagency partners;
--Development of a joint support effort, COASTWATCH, with the Office
of Naval Intelligence, to screen arriving ships and crews; and
--Permanent presence on the FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force
(JTTF) and select regional JTTFs.
BANDWIDTH CHALLENGE
Question. Admiral, during a recent ship visit my staff was
impressed by the ingenuity of your staff in creating an integrated,
interactive common operating picture. However, it seems that the crew's
ability to access this information was limited by bandwidth.
Is the bandwidth challenge a technical issue, a funding issue, or a
combination of both?
Answer. Bandwidth limitations are due to a combination of both
funding and satellite availability. Currently, the Coast Guard uses
commercial satellites for underway connectivity because of the limited
availability of Department of Defense satellite bandwidth in certain
areas of operation. Satellite technology is costly. Because of this,
the Coast Guard closely monitors and strategically allocates available
bandwidth to best support critical underway operations.
Question. What would it cost to increase bandwidth and what would
be the resultant impact on Coast Guard operations if the ships were
equipped with greater bandwidth?
Answer. The Coast Guard Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) C4ISR
Implementation Plan provides for a common C4ISR design for all IDS
assets that will improve the Coast Guard's overall Surveillance,
Detection, Classification, and Identification capabilities. Therefore,
full funding of the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2007 request of
approximately $60.8 million for deepwater C4ISR upgrades is critical to
achieving more timely information sharing between Coast Guard cutters,
DHS, DOD and other law enforcement entities. Improved information
sharing will improve awareness permitting more effective identification
and prosecution of all maritime threats, as well as improving our
overall disaster and threat response capability.
INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES
Question. What are the specific resource shortfalls?
Answer. A critical element of the assets and systems making up the
Deepwater program is their ability to fill operational gaps. As was
addressed in the Coast Guard's operational gap analysis report
submitted to Congress with the fiscal year 2007 budget request, the
action plan to deliver the operational capabilities and requirements
specified in the revised Deepwater implementation plan is a 25-year
effort. This long-term plan requires a fine balance between removing
legacy assets from service to realize system cost savings, while
maintaining sufficient system capacity to not exacerbate current
operational gaps.
The plan results in near-term operational hour shortfalls followed
by the steep, long-term gains in operational capability and capacity as
new Deepwater assets reach full follow-on production capacity. The
current gap in patrol boat hours has been complicated by the
unsatisfactory results of the 123-foot conversion program.
Unfortunately, this solution of converting our legacy 110-foot patrol
boats has not provided the bridge to the future Fast Response Cutter
(FRC) that we had hoped. As a result, we have taken steps to advance
the FRC by 10 years from the original plan in order to restore this
critical capacity as quickly as possible.
The Coast Guard will continue to mitigate operational gaps in the
near term, while striving for the future Deepwater fleet that will
exceed current legacy capability and capacity. The capabilities call
forth in the post-9/11 revised Deepwater implementation plan will be
delivered methodically and prudently over the next 25 years.
Question. I understand that USCG is not able to act on all
actionable intelligence because of a shortage of resources. Is this
true?
Answer. Given the variety of missions the Coast Guard conducts on a
daily basis, there are periods when the Coast Guard does not have
enough cutters and aircraft patrolling to respond to all drug and
migrant smuggling intelligence reports.
Question. What percentage of your actionable intelligence are you
not able to act on?
Answer. The Coast Guard receives numerous intelligence reports on a
daily basis across all missions areas with varying degrees of
reliability and credibility. For this reason, it is challenging to
determine the percentage of actionable intelligence reports the Coast
Guard is unable to act on. However, Coast Guard operational commanders
use these intelligence reports daily to make risk-based decisions on
how and where to utilize all of their assets.
For the counter-drug mission alone, the number of actionable events
is collected in the interagency Consolidated Counterdrug Database
(CCDB). The CCDB information indicates that detection and monitoring
assets (primarily Maritime Patrol Aircraft) detected 31.5 percent of
known smuggling events in the Transit Zone between January 2000 and
June 2005.
Question. How do you prioritize which intelligence reports you act
on and which you do not?
Answer. The Coast Guard attempts to act on all tactical
intelligence reports. However, Operational Commanders must make risk-
based decisions using their professsional judgement and considering the
reliability of the intelligence, available assets, other missions and
timeliness of the required response.
Question. What activities are we not interdicting due to a lack of
resources?
Answer. Under the leadership of the Administration and Congress,
the Coast Guard has significantly enhanced nationwide maritime
security, leveraging its longstanding partnerships and unique maritime
authorities and capabilities. However, ``you don't know what you don't
know'' and hence challenges remain for the Nation in maritime border
security.
There are dozens of nations in Central and South America and the
Caribbean close enough that maritime trafficking of migrants, drugs, or
other illegal commodities remains a constant threat.
As on land, we know that there are numerous professional migrant
smuggling rings that operate in the maritime realm. Some operate in the
Caribbean or from nations further south, such as Ecuador. Meanwhile,
Haiti and the Dominican Republic are the launching point for thousands
of illegal migrants each year; Cuba, one of the designated State
Sponsors of Terrorism, sits just south of the Florida Keys. There are
no highways or deserts to cross between Cuba and the United States--
only 90 miles of ocean, easily crossed in 2 hours aboard a high-powered
speedboat--and we see hundreds of such smuggling attempts every year.
The proximity of U.S. population centers to the maritime domain and the
diversity of maritime users present significant and wide ranging
vulnerabilities. Effectively addressing these vulnerabilities requires
maritime strategies that detect and defeat threats as far from the U.S.
shores as possible.
DUBAI PORTS WORLD ISSUE
Question. In the wake of the Dubai Ports World issue, are you
making any changes to the way Coast Guard intelligence is handled?
Answer. While the Coast Guard Intelligence Program is committed to
continuous improvement, our after-action review of the intelligence
support provided with respect to the proposed acquisition by Dubai
Ports World (DPW) did not indicate a need to change any significant
aspects of our process.
RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS AT SEA
Question. What is the Coast Guard doing to locate WMDs, in
particular radiological materials, at sea?
Answer. The Coast Guard has the ability to detect, localize,
characterize and identify radioactive and nuclear materials at sea
through the use of personal portable search tools. Alarm and detection
resolution procedures include utilization of Customs and Border
Protection's (CBP) Laboratory Scientific Services (LSS), co-located at
the National Targeting Center (NTC). Department of Energy--Radiological
Assistance Program regional response teams provide 24/7 follow-on
expert response if needed.
The Coast Guard is working with DNDO in developing the latest
detection equipment to improve the capability to optimally detect,
locate, and identify radiological and nuclear (RadNuc) materials that
may be onboard a given vessel. The Coast Guard uses its ability to
locate RadNuc materials at sea, in conjunction with the DNDO
interagency partners, to detect and deter the illegal usage and
transportation of radiological material.
USCG'S ROLE IN WMD EFFORTS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
Question. How do the Coast Guard's WMD efforts relate to those of
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office? Customs and Border Patrol? The
FBI? The Department of Energy?
Answer. Coast Guard WMD procedures and capabilities are uniquely
designed and intended for operating in the maritime environment; they
were developed in close coordination with Customs and Border Protection
to ensure complementary efforts. In addition to providing training
assistance, the Department of Energy--Radiological Assistance Program
regional response teams serve as the Coast Guard's 24/7 follow-on
expert response capability if needed. Four Coast Guard Liaison Officers
are detailed to the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office; Coast Guard
response protocols include notification and interagency coordination
procedures for interacting with the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
all WMD/terrorism-related incidents.
In addition, DNDO is assisting the USCG by looking at the
development and testing of next generation RAD/NUC detection equipment
and specifically looking at that equipment's potential performance in
the maritime environment.
ACCELERATION OF PROGRAM COMPLETION BY 10 YEARS
Question. If funding were available to accelerate the Deepwater
program toward a 2016, rather than 2026, completion date, how would
Coast Guard spend those additional funds in fiscal year 2007?
Answer. It is estimated that at least $1 billion per year would be
needed to accelerate the program to a 2016 completion date. The
additional funds would be allocated among the various Deepwater
acquisitions projects to build the system in the most efficient manner
possible. The administration does not have any specific plans for
spending additional funds on the Deepwater program, however, and
believes the funding level for Deepwater requested in the President's
2007 budget represents the best acquisition strategy for the Coast
Guard in light of competing homeland security priorities.
EXPEDITED PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT
Question. Could procurement of aircraft be expedited if additional
resources were available?
Answer. Additional aircraft could be procured if additional funds
were available. The EADS CASA production facility has the capacity to
build more aircraft to Coast Guard specifications.
UNIQUE MARITIME SECURITY CAPABILITIES
Question. What unique maritime security capabilities does the Coast
Guard bring to the table among Federal agencies?
Answer. Serving as the Nation's maritime 9-1-1 emergency service,
defender, regulator and ``cop on the beat,'' the Coast Guard is unique
in the Federal Government. Using its Title 10 and 14 authorities, the
Coast Guard can function in a national defense or law enforcement role.
The Coast Guard has a vast array of highly skilled personnel,
assets and infrastructure to leverage in maritime security. Its vessels
range from small boats to patrol boats to large, flight-deck equipped
cutters. Its aircraft include shipboard and land-based helicopters, as
well as fixed-wing aircraft. It is converting many of its helicopters
to include Airborne Use of Force (AUF) capability. The Coast Guard also
has a robust command and control network across the Nation, ensuring
Coast Guard units are ready to respond at a moments notice.
The Coast Guard has also added special capabilities specifically
for maritime security, such as Maritime Safety and Security Teams
(MSSTs) and the Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT). Embedded within
these deployable teams are specialized sub-capabilities, including:
Integrated Anti-Swimmer systems; Explosive Detection Dog Teams; Close
Quarters Combat capability; and surface interdiction capability.
During the response to Hurricane Katrina, the Nation saw the value
of a ready, aware and responsive Coast Guard. Rescuing more than 33,000
people in a 2-week period, Coast Guard men and women from around the
Nation contributed to this historic operation. Of course that was the
most visible Coast Guard achievement in 2005; from record-breaking drug
interdictions to continued implementation of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act, the Coast Guard again demonstrated
tremendous value to the Nation.
No one can predict the timing of the next catastrophic event akin
to Katrina, or whether it will be natural or man-made. Nonetheless,
history tells us it will come. When it does, it will be vital that we
have done all we can to build a Coast Guard that is prepared to answer
the call, supremely aware of the maritime environment and poised for
dependable response.
IMPACT OF TIGHTENING LAND AND AIR SECURITY
Question. What is the likely impact of tightening land and air
security on maritime security?
Answer. Most criminal actors, whether terrorists, smugglers or
others, will exploit the path of least resistance. In this case, if air
and land security are perceived by actors as more difficult to overcome
than maritime security, they are more likely to consider and use the
maritime domain to advance their criminal ends.
EVIDENCE OF ENTRANCE
Question. Do you have any evidence that terrorists have tried or
are currently trying to enter this country by sea?
Answer. Yes. An unclassified example is Ahmed Ressam (AKA Bennie
Norris the ``Millennium Plot'' bomber), who entered the United States
on Dec. 30, 1999 via ferry from Canada. Additional examples, relating
to known or suspected terrorists or associates of terrorists attempting
to enter the United States by sea, can be provided in a classified
response.
KNOWN MARITIME TERRORIST THREATS
Question. Will you describe the types of known threats and targets
that exist in the maritime domain?
Answer. Maritime threats typically involve some type of
exploitation of the maritime environment by terrorists, criminals, or
other adversaries for criminal or other prohibited enterprises.
Examples include: smuggling (all types, including black market),
piracy, hijackings, environmental crimes, living marine resource
exploitation, illegal seabed exploitation, etc. The threat may also
consist solely of using maritime conveyances to transport people,
weapons, and/or materials to a location ashore where a terrorist or
other criminal act is planned. Maritime targets are generally people,
conveyances, cargos, and/or critical infrastructure in or near the
maritime realm.
Examples of maritime terrorist threats and their targets include:
--Bombing a passenger vessel--Superferry 14 which was bombed by
elements of the Abu Sayyaf Group.
--Small boat attacks on off-shore oil facilities--Attack against Kwar
Al Amaya oil terminal and Al Basrah oil terminal in Iraq.
--Small boat attacks on maritime security/naval forces--Attacks by
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam against Sri Lankan Navy
forces, attack on U.S.S. Cole, and targeting of U.S. vessels by
Jemaah Islamiyah in Singapore.
--Small boat attacks on commercial vessels--Attack on the French
Supertanker LIMBERG.
--Raids and kidnap for ransom operations on Island resorts--Abu
Sayaaf group attacks on dive resorts in Indonesia and the
Southern Philippines.
CONNECTION BETWEEN MIGRANT AND DRUG SMUGGLERS AND TERRORISTS
Question. What kinds of connections do you see between migrant and
drug smugglers and potential terrorists?
Answer. There are strong connections between drug smugglers and
several South American groups currently designated as terrorist
organizations, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia
(FARC) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC). There have
also been isolated instances of individuals with potential connections
to Islamic extremists using maritime conveyances controlled by
traditional migrant smuggling organizations.
SECURITY OF MARITIME BORDERS
Question. As you may know, I have been a strong advocate of
tightening up our land border security so that we know who is coming
into and leaving this country.
What gaps do you see in the security of our maritime borders?
Answer. Our maritime borders are vulnerable to exploitation by
criminal or other enterprises. Examples include: smuggling (all types,
including black market), piracy, hijackings, environmental crimes,
living marine resource exploitation, seabed exploitation, etc.
Intelligence gaps exist within the maritime borders. In addition to
the obvious challenges of securing over 95,000 miles of coastline, bad
actors have traditionally been extremely innovative in adapting their
modes of operations in response to tightening of security within the
land boarders. Some of the most critical maritime gaps include:
subsequent movement of people and drugs in response to changing
security conditions; the use of small recreational vessels for illegal
purposes; and the dependency on self-reporting by the maritime industry
to provide the majority of the information available on the crew and
cargo of commercial vessel traffic.
HIGHEST MARITIME RISKS
Question. What are some of the highest risks in the maritime
domain?
Answer. Transfer scenarios dominate the strategic terror-related
risk map. These scenarios involve the movement of terrorist actors and/
or weapons of mass destruction though the maritime domain/across the
maritime border by large commercial vessels or small commercial/
recreational vessels.
The Coast Guard conducts an annual terror-related risk assessment,
taking threat inputs from the National Intelligence Community through
the Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, target vulnerability
and consequence data from its Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model
(MS-RAM) and other sources. As part of this process, the Coast Guard
identifies critical risk scenarios (in general, those involving the
potential loss of more than 1000 lives or similar magnitude damages).
The Coast Guard identified over thirty such scenarios, which distill to
these nine ``meta-scenarios:''
--Transfer of terrorists into the country via the maritime domain
--Transfer of weapons of mass destruction into the country via the
maritime domain
--``U.S.S. Cole-Style'' attacks on specific types of large vessels
--Attacks on assets protected under other plans (dams, locks and
levees)
--Aviation attacks on maritime assets (small aircraft used as a
weapon)
--Stand-off weapons attacks against specific ships (anti-tank
missile)
--Vehicle born improvised explosive device attacks on ``roll-on,
roll-off'' type ferries
--Biological attacks (smallpox on a cruise ship)
--Rogue ship threat against offshore petroleum terminal
This year's assessment is ongoing. Major changes are not expected;
transfer/exploitation scenario dominance is expected to continue.
The Coast Guard is also about to embark on its second biennial
National Maritime Strategic Risk Assessment cycle, addressing risk
across the entire spectrum of Coast Guard mission performance.
CLOSING THE GAP: POLICY ISSUE OR FUNDING ISSUE?
Question. Is closing these gaps and addressing these risks a policy
issue or a funding issue?
Answer. As we have witnessed since the terrorist attacks of 9/11,
addressing maritime security risks requires both policy and investment
efforts.
Border security is a national effort. The challenges of border
security require significant policy coordination between Federal
stakeholders, as well as meaningful and productive engagement with
State, local and tribal authorities. Adaptive threats will invariably
reapportion to exploit our weaknesses, necessitating holistic and well-
coordinated border security solutions. An integrated approach to policy
and strategy will assure appropriate, balanced security risk
management. Hard choices must be made. The choices must be informed by
good risk management practices from objective setting, to assessment,
to analysis of alternatives, to management selection based on expected
risk-reduction return-on-investment, to implementation and monitoring.
As Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for maritime homeland security, the
Coast Guard is leveraging its relationships with other Federal, State,
local and tribal authorities, as well as international, industry,
academic and think-tank partners, to evolve toward a smarter, more
coordinated approach to maritime and border security policy.
Funding an effective maritime security strategy is also a
significant issue. With over 12,000 miles of coastal border to secure
and a strategic imperative to push out the border--to identify, meet
and defeat threats as early and far away as possible--the Coast Guard
is moving aggressively to shore up the foundations of our maritime
strategy:
--Achieving Maritime Domain Awareness
--Establishing and Leading a Maritime Security Regime
--Deploying an Effective Operational Capability
Well-coordinated risk management policy will help ensure border
security performance success, appropriate readiness, and responsible
resource allocation and use.
Question. If a funding issue, what do you need to tighten up our
maritime borders?
Answer. With over 12,000 miles of coastal border to secure, and a
strategic imperative to push out the border--to identify, meet and
defeat threats as early and far away as possible--the Coast Guard is
moving out aggressively to shore up the foundations of our maritime
security strategy.
Funding at the level requested in the President's Budget will
support major Coast Guard competency, capability, partnership and
capacity-building initiatives. The following list illustrates major
initiatives funded in the 2007 budget for each of the Coast Guard's
priorities:
--Achieving Maritime Domain Awareness
--Maritime C4ISR Enhancement (several programs)
--Vessel Tracking Initiatives (including Nationwide AIS)
--Maritime Awareness Global Network
--Counter-Intelligence program
--Establishing and Leading a Maritime Security Regime
--Personnel Security and Credentialing (including Transportation
Worker Identification Credential)
--Maritime Transportation Security Act initiatives and programs
--Deploying an effective operational capability
--Integrated Deepwater System
--Integrated Command Centers (Command 2010)
--Specialized deployable counter-terrororism capabilities
--Maritime Security Response Teams (MSRTs)
--Airborne-Use-of-Force capabilities
--Boats to meet ports, waterways, and near-coastal security demands
(Response Boat--Medium)
IC DATABASE ACCESS
Question. Does the Coast Guard have access to all appropriate
Intelligence Community databases, like the FBI's Guardian program, US
VISIT, etc? If not, why?
Answer. The Coast Guard has direct or second party access to a
variety of law enforcement and intelligence community databases; the
scope of Coast Guard access has been expanding in ways that improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of our Intelligence Program.
There are databases the Coast Guard does not have direct access to
due to legal or policy restrictions and/or IT connectivity reasons.
Whenever the Coast Guard identifies databases important to analysis,
indications and warnings to which that we do not have access, we seek
to obtain appropriate access by coordinating directly with the agencies
managing the databases.
USCG AS THE LEAD IN MARITIME SECURITY
Question. In addition to FBI, the Coast Guard works closely with
CBP and others.
What makes the Coast Guard best suited to be the lead Federal
maritime agency?
Answer. The Coast Guard is the only Federal agency focused by
statute, regulation and longstanding policy on law enforcement and
security operations in the maritime domain. This role is reflected in
numerous Congressional enactments.
As both a military Service and a Federal Law Enforcement agency,
the Coast Guard possesses the appropriate capability, capacity,
competencies and authorities to lead U.S. maritime security efforts.
Additionally, the Coast Guard projects a credible presence throughout
the maritime domain, and it has longstanding relationships with other
Federal, State and local agencies, as well as with the maritime
industry itself. Its position as a member of the Intelligence Community
further adds to a unique mix of attributes that the Coast Guard brings
to maritime security.
LEAD IN MARITIME INTELLIGENCE
Question. Does Coast Guard have the lead Federal role in maritime
intelligence?
Answer. There has been no designation of a lead Federal role in
maritime intelligence. The Coast Guard, Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI), National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and many
other departments and agencies all play important roles in the maritime
intelligence realm.
Together with ONI, however, the Coast Guard has been developing the
foundation of the Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII)
capability, leveraging existing facilities and shared tools at the
National Maritime Intelligence Center in Suitland, MD. This effort will
lead to more collaborative efforts in maritime intelligence.
OVERLAP ISSUES: INTEROPERABILITY OR REDUNDANCY
Question. What areas do you see where interoperability could be
approved or where overlap should be eliminated among Federal agencies?
Answer. The Coast Guard regularly works with our interagency
partners to improve interoperability and coordination. For example, two
DHS/DOD Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) have been signed which will
facilitate the exchange /transfer of DOD and USCG assets as appropriate
during Maritime Homeland Defense and Maritime Homeland Security events.
The interim Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan also
represents a giant leap forward, by clearly delineating
responsibilities related to security threat response in the maritime
domain. Codifying MOTR in its final form would permanently
institutionalize these interoperability and coordination improvements.
Another opportunity for improvement is in the area of integrating
command centers, either USCG /DOD integration (e.g., Joint Harbor
Operations Centers), or integrating various Federal and/or State/local
agencies into Coast Guard Sector Command Centers.
MARITIME BORDERS
Question. What could the Coast Guard do to tighten our maritime
borders and better track the migration of folks into this country
immediately?
Answer. The U.S. Coast Guard is tasked by Executive Order 12807 to
interdict undocumented migrants as far away from U.S. territory as
possible. To accomplish this, the Coast Guard places assets in areas
with historically high migration activity; primarily the Florida
Straits, Windward Passage (between Cuba and Haiti), and the Mona
Passage (between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico). Larger
cutters capable of holding up to 300 migrants are positioned further
away from the United States, while smaller patrol boats form a second
tier of defense closer to shore.
When operationally required, the Coast Guard will surge assets for
a short duration to tighten our maritime borders. This is routinely
done to counter and deter higher activity of migrants during seasonal
or other fluctuations. The Coast Guard also surges resources to deter a
mass migration when there are indications and warnings that point to
the likelihood of such an event (e.g., in February 2005, following the
ouster of President Aristide in Haiti). However, we can not maintain
such a surge for an extended period without having a negative effect on
other missions.
Continued support for technology improvements and assets that
improve Maritime Domain Awareness is critical for migrant interdiction
and border enforcement. The following list provides a few examples:
Technologies:
--Biometrics.--The Coast Guard, in conjunction with our DHS partner
agencies, is pursuing biometrics capabilities to better track
and identify undocumented migrants interdicted at sea. However,
this project will take some time as it is challenging to find/
develop a system that can both function at sea and be
interoperable with existing DHS and FBI systems.
--Vessel Tracking.--The most pressing challenges we now face involve
tracking the vast population of vessels operating in and around
the approaches to the United States, and detecting and
intercepting the small vessels used for migrant and drug
smuggling, which can easily be used by terrorists seeking to do
us harm. The Coast Guard needs as much information as possible
about vessels operating in the maritime domain, particularly
their location and identity, in order to enable effective and
timely decisions and identify friend from foe.
Assets:
--Deepwater.--The Integrated Deepwater Program will deliver more
capable cutters, aircraft, and sensors to the Coast Guard that
can be used over a number of mission areas.
--Integrated Command Centers.--Through test-beds at command centers
in Miami, FL, Charleston, SC and elsewhere; and joint harbor
operations centers established with the U.S. Navy in Hampton
Roads, VA, and San Diego, CA; the power of partnerships,
technology and co-location has been proven. The Coast Guard
will continue working to expand on these successes and export
them to other ports where feasible.
needed resources for maritime borders
Question. What additional assets and resources would you need to
accomplish this?
Answer. With over 12,000 miles of coastal border to secure, and a
strategic imperative to push out the border--to identify, meet and
defeat threats as early and far away as possible--the Coast Guard is
moving out aggressively to execute our maritime security strategy.
Funding at the level requested in the President's Budget will
support major Coast Guard competency, capability, partnership and
capacity-building initiatives. The following list illustrates major
initiatives funded in the 2007 budget for each of the Coast Guard's
priorities:
--Achieving Maritime Domain Awareness
--Maritime C4ISR Enhancement (several programs)
--Vessel Tracking Initiatives (including Nationwide AIS)
--Deploying an effective operational capability
--Integrated Deepwater System
--Integrated Command Centers (Command 2010)
--Continued research and expansion of biometrics capability.
USCG'S ROLE IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Question. What is the Coast Guard's role in the Intelligence
Community?
Answer. The Coast Guard has been a member of the Intelligence
Community (IC) since 2001 pursuant to the National Security Act of
1947, as amended. The program's overall goals are to optimize organic
Coast Guard resources and leverage other national capabilities to
provide tailored, actionable and decisive information in furtherance of
Coast Guard missions, and contribute to the information requirements of
the President, the Department of Homeland Security and our partners in
the intelligence and law enforcement communities.
In general terms, the Coast Guard's role in the IC is to:
--Collect, retain and disseminate foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence to meet homeland security objectives;
--Provide input into the IC decision making process on collection and
analysis/production issues; and
--Provide unique access to intelligence and law enforcement
information, and share amongst IC and law enforcement partners.
IMPROVEMENT OF MARITIME BORDER SECURITY
Question. Which aircraft would you choose to expedite to improve
maritime border security and how much would that cost?
Answer. Acquisition of CASA-235 MPA aircraft provides a rapid
capacity and capability increase to maritime border security. The
current cost to acquire CASA-235 aircraft is $44 million per aircraft,
which includes missionization, initial sparing and logistics.
POTENTIAL OVERLAP BETWEEN FBI AND USCG
Question. The Department of Justice Inspector General and the FBI
seem concerned that the Coast Guard Maritime Safety and Security Teams
(MSST) might duplicate FBI Hostage Rescue Teams and SWAT teams.
Admiral, would you care to comment on this assertion of overlapping
responsibilities between the Coast Guard and the FBI and the unique
role of the Coast Guard's MSST?
Answer. The Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST) were created
following the terrorist attacks of September 11th to provide enhanced,
tailored force packages for maritime homeland security operations,
ranging from being the maritime ``cop on the beat'' to emergency
response in our port and coastal regions. MSSTs periodically conduct
local training and operations with regional Coast Guard commanders, FBI
units and other interagency partners. They are a very flexible and
agile force for maritime homeland security operations.
Additionally, the Coast Guard's Maritime Security Response Team
(MSRT) was developed with Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
support and oversight. This team not only meets DHS requirements as an
interoperable unit, but also serves as a supporting unit to the
Department of Defense for its maritime homeland defense mission and to
the FBI for operations in the port, coastal and offshore environments.
Using the Coast Guard's unique Title 10 and Title 14 authorities, the
MSRT provides the Nation a robust maritime response force for maritime
homeland defense and security missions.
ANNUAL FLIGHT HOUR GAP
Question. How do you plan to address the 17,000 to 27,000 annual
flight hour gap over the next 9 years?
Answer. As always, the Coast Guard will carefully assess and manage
risk to employ available air assets to the highest mission priorities.
Your full support of the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request
which funds the purchase of the sixth CASA MPA aircraft and the
missionization of MPAs 4, 5, and 6 is critical to filling the MPA gap
as soon as possible. Once operational, these aircraft will each
contribute 1,200 annual MPA flight hours. Additionally, the pending
procurement of up to 3 Manned Covert Surveillance aircraft as provided
in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006 appropriations will provide
additional needed MPA hours to apply toward this gap.
RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
Question. Do you have enough cutters and aircraft to respond to all
intelligence reports of drug trafficking or illegal migrant activity in
the maritime regions?
Answer. Given the competing priorities of mission demands on the
Coast Guard's daily operations, there will always be periods when the
Coast Guard does not have enough cutters and aircraft patrolling to
respond to all drug and migrant smuggling intelligence reports.
MARITIME BORDER SECURITY OPERATIONS
Question. How will the significant lack of patrol boats affect
maritime border security operations?
Answer. Maritime border security is conducted everyday by our
cutters, boats and aircraft deployed in ports, coastal zones and on the
high sea. One element of overall service efforts, patrol boats serve as
the ``cops on the beat'' within the maritime domain.
As you know, the Coast Guard has identified a capacity gap within
our patrol boat fleet. As this gap is filled through our existing plans
and the implementation of Deepwater, additional capacity will be added
and deployed, improving our presence and providing additional
capabilities. Until that time we will make the best use of our existing
patrol boat fleet, along with major cutters and boats, to maximize our
patrol efforts.
Question. If additional funds were available to address this gap,
how would you use those funds?
Answer. If additional funds were available to address the patrol
boat gap the Coast Guard could use it to accelerate acquisition of new
patrol boats. We have issued a Request for Information (RFI) from
industry to see what existing proven Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS)
patrol boats designs are available to meet our patrol boat needs, and
anticipate spending a portion of unobligated partol boat appropriations
on acquiring some of these vessels. We expect to receive responses to
this RFI by mid May 2006.
110 FOOT PATROL BOATS
Question. Would it make any sense to buy more 110 foot patrol boats
since you already have a good working design, especially if there are
questions about the FRC design?
Answer. Acquiring additional 110 foot WPB's would not meet the full
range of current operational requirements. While the 110 foot WPB has
been a successful asset, it does not possess the space to provide a
robust C4ISR suite. The small boat launch and recovery system is labor
intensive and the small boat does not meet current operational
requirements. A Request for Information (RFI) has been issued to
evaluate commercially available patrol boat platforms. This information
would determine if other existing patrol boat designs could meet
current operational requirements.
PORT INSPECTIONS
Question. The Coast Guard is currently on target to inspect foreign
ports every 4 years.
Is that time cycle appropriate?
Answer. The Coast Guard visits countries to ascertain whether the
country is maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures in its ports.
The current pace of country visits is consistent with the Maritime
Transportation Security Act and current funding levels.
Question. How do you determine which ports you inspect on any given
year?
Answer. The Coast Guard prioritized all countries with which it
trades with to determine the general order in which countries should be
visited. The prioritization was based on the amount of maritime trade
the U.S. conducts with the country and the general maritime security
situation regarding the country. When determining the ports to visit
within a country, the Coast Guard attempts to view a representative
sample including small, medium and large ports; ports that conduct
substantial trade with the United States; and ports with a variety of
activities (e.g., container, liquid bulk, dry bulk, passenger, and
general cargo).
Question. What role does intelligence play in your port
inspections?
Answer. Coast Guard inspections in the ports are done for a number
of different reasons related to the maritime safety, security, and/or
environmental protection. Inspections involving a security purpose may
be based in whole or in part on information provided by the Coast Guard
Intelligence Program. Moreover, intelligence generally informs the
situational awareness of all Coast Guard personnel conducting
inspections, patrols or other activities in port areas.
Coast Guard Intelligence conducts Port Threat Assessments (PTA).
PTAs provide the local Sector Commander threat analyses for the
Nation's military and economic strategic ports compiled from foreign,
national and local intelligence reporting and from law enforcement
information, incorporating everything from criminal enterprises to
environmental activists and extremist/terrorist-related activity.
PTAs involve a qualitative evaluation of classified intelligence
reports, interviews with Federal and local law enforcement officials,
and interviews with private sector security managers. Threat analyses
are based on a compilation of national and domestic security
intelligence along with criminal database information.
PTAs are prepared by the Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination
Center (ICC). They are the most complete and up-to-date local domestic
port threat assessments available to field commanders for use in
critical planning and resource allocation. We utilize open source
material, as well as classified information provided by the Coast
Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center and the Area Intelligence
staffs, to assist with the prioritization of port selections. In
addition to assisting in the prioritization, this information helps to
identify security issues for which to be alert when conducting port
visits. It also provides situational awareness to help maintain
personnel safety.
IMPLEMENTATION OF AIS
Question. The testimony States that AIS has been implemented at
several major ports.
What is your timeframe to expand AIS nationwide?
Answer. The Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS)
project is pursuing a three increment implementation approach so
maritime security stakeholders will begin receiving useful capability
to fill in current operational gaps as quickly as possible.
Upon DHS approval of Milestone Two, targeted for 4th Quarter,
fiscal year 2006, the first increment will capitalize on existing
preliminary and prototype efforts installed in 2005 and 2006 to expand
receive only AIS capability (vessel tracking) in all critical ports
identified in the fiscal year 2007 budget justification.
The current estimated schedule [Initial Operating Capability (IOC)
and Full Operating Capability (FOC) dates] for implementation of the
individual increments is as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increment 1 2 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description.......................... receive only at receive and transmit long-range receive
critical ports and nationwide.
coastal areas.
IOC.................................. 1st Quarter, fiscal 4th Quarter, fiscal 1st Quarter, fiscal
year 2007. year 2009. year 2010
FOC.................................. 4th Quarter, fiscal 4th Quarter, fiscal 4th Quarter, fiscal
year 2007. year 2013. year 2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What resources are required to fully implement this
system?
Answer. The total Acquisition, Construction and Improvement (AC&I)
cost estimate for Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS), as
reported in the fiscal year 2007 to 2011 Five-Year Capital Investment
Plan is $196,200,000.
MARITIME BORDER SECURITY OPERATIONS
Question. Patrol boats are an integral part of the Coast Guard's
fleet and are critical to maritime border security. USCG is currently
short several boats, due to the Iraq mission and 123-conversion
problems and may be plagued with further shortfalls if the rumors are
true and the Navy asks for its 5 Patrol Coastal craft back in 2008 and
if the FRC is further delayed. USCG is already operating with fewer
patrol boat hours than it had in 1998, and at about half the number of
hours called for by the Deepwater Plan to meet the mission
requirements.
How does the USCG plan to address this shortfall?
Answer. The USCG plans to address this shortfall through continued
negotiations with the Navy in an effort to extend the current WPC-179
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) beyond fiscal year 2008. If agreed upon
with the current number of PC-179s, this would reduce the patrol boat
hour gap by 12,500 hours per year.
Also, when the six 110 foot WPBs serving in southwest Asia in
Operation Iraqi Freedom are returned to the continental United States,
they will provide an additional 12,000 patrol boat hours per year.
The Coast Guard has submitted an Industry Request for Information
for proven patrol boat designs. Once the responses to this request are
received in May 2006, we will consider this information for a risk
mitigator to filling our patrol boat gap.
Accelerated schedule for implementing TWIC
Question. The testimony States that you are working with the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) on an accelerated schedule
for implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC). As you know, this Committee has supported the TWIC program but
has been frustrated by implementation delays.
After years of delay, when do you expect that this program will be
ready for implementation?
Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
is a top Departmental priority, and I have directed my team to move
forward with the program as quickly as possible. The Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) recently published a ``request for
qualifications'' seeking firms who are appropriately experienced and
interested to help deploy certain components of the TWIC program. This
is a first step toward operational deployment of the TWIC program that
will require workers with unescorted access to U.S. port facilities and
vessels to undergo security threat assessments and obtain a biometric
TWIC credential. This deployment will follow completion of an
accelerated rulemaking conducted jointly by TSA and Coast Guard.
Question. What is the Coast Guard's role in this program?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration and the United
States Coast Guard (USCG) are cooperating in a joint rulemaking that
requires all workers requiring unescorted access to secure areas of
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) regulated facilities and
vessels to apply for and obtain a Transportation Worker Identification
Credential.
The USCG would be responsible for enforcing this proposed rule at
the MTSA regulated facilities and vessels.
DEPLOYMENT OF US VISIT
Question. Why is only one maritime port equipped to handle exits?
Answer. US VISIT's biometric exit process is at 2 seaports: San
Pedro and Long Beach terminals in Los Angeles, California; and Miami,
Florida. These seaports were part of the pilot program for the exit
solution. Upon approval to proceed with the national deployment of the
Exit Solution, US VISIT will deploy at all remaining ports where US
VISIT is currently operating for entry (excluding preclearance
operations at foreign airports).
Question. Which kinds of maritime ports are currently subject to US
VISIT? Cruise ship ports? Fishing ports? Ferry ports? Yachting ports?
Answer. Under the law, all sea ports are subject to US VISIT.
However, several issues pose challenges to the deployment of US VISIT
at all sea ports of entry. Unlike airports, there are no regulatory
requirements for a Federal Inspection Services (FIS) inspection area
for sea ports of entry. Additionally, a number of ports lack
connectivity necessary for accessing government databases. Therefore,
we are currently only deployed at those cruise ports and ferry
terminals that been upgraded to include an FIS area.
For those terminals not covered by US VISIT, Customs and Border
Protection officers will board the ship and conduct an inspection
onboard. US VISIT, in conjunction with Customs and Border Protection,
is exploring the use of new mobile devices that could perform the
biometric and documentation screening functions. Subject to funding, US
VISIT plans to use these devices to expand coverage to the cargo crew
population
There are a number of small, private and community seaports
(yachting) where US VISIT is not in operation. These smaller ports do
not have pre-existing infrastructure to support the technology
necessary to conduct biometric entry processes in the same manner as is
now done at the cruise terminals. US VISIT believes any mobile devices
developed for the larger sea ports of entry could also be used in these
smaller seaports.
Question. I understand that US VISIT is deployed in several ports
of entry and only one exit port. What percentage of maritime ports is
currently covered in the program?
Answer. US VISIT's biometric entry process is at 13 sea ports of
entry, including: Galveston, Texas; San Pedro/Long Beach, California;
Miami, Florida; Port Canaveral, Florida; San Juan, Puerto Rico; Seattle
(2 terminals), Washington; Tampa, Florida; Vancouver, Canada; Victoria,
Canada; West Palm Beach, Florida; Port Everglades, Florida; New York
City Seaport, New York; and Port Canaveral (2 terminals), Florida.
There are 64 sea ports of entry, and US VISIT entry procedures covers
20 percent of those ports.
US VISIT's biometric exit process is at 2 sea ports of entry: San
Pedro/Long Beach terminals in Los Angeles, California; and Miami,
Florida. There are 64 sea ports of entry, and US VISIT exit procedures
covers 3 percent of those ports. For further statistics on volume and
types of ports (cruise vs. cargo), please consult Customs and Border
Protection.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
UTILIZATION OF FISCAL YEAR 2006 RESOURCES
Question. Specifically, how you, and the Deepwater Contractor
intend to utilize the fiscal year 2006 funding?
Answer. The $68 million appropriated in fiscal year 2006 will be
utilized to procure two aircraft (aircraft number 4 and 5) and
missionization and logistics required to place the aircraft in a
``mission ready'' status.
UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES
Question. If the funds will not be dedicated to the acquisition of
the fourth and fifth MPA, why not?
Answer. The fiscal year 2006 funds will be dedicated to the
acquisition of the fourth and fifth MPA.
RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
Question. The President's fiscal year 2007 budget continues funding
for the important Integrated Deepwater Systems program to update the
operational ability of the United States Coast Guard. This essential
program will bring the Coast Guard's capabilities in line with 21st
century technology and equip the Coast Guard with the necessary tools
to protect our Nation's coast line and shipping channels.
My question is whether this year's funding request by the President
is sufficient to carry out this retooling and refitting in a timely
manner.
Answer. The fiscal year 2007 budget request of $934 million
represents a nearly 25 percent increase from fiscal year 2005. It is
consistent with the $24 billion/25-year implementation plan presented
in the revised implementation plan report submitted to Congress.
Question. Does Congress need to accelerate the funding of Deepwater
to accomplish its mission sooner?
Answer. The administration believes the funding level for Deepwater
requested in the President's 2007 budget represents the best
acquisition strategy for the Coast Guard in light of competing homeland
security priorities. Furthermore, GAO and other studies and have shown
that accelerated funding for an acquisition project as large and
complex as Deepwater will generate only marginally better results
relative to the significant additional costs of acceleration.
Question. Specifically within the Deepwater program is the CASA CN-
235 300M, Maritime Patrol Aircraft. This plane is a crucial piece of
the Coast Guard's overall mission. It will bring state-of-the-art
technology to any aerial mission the Coast Guard undertakes. The
communications, navigational and surveillance capabilities of this
plane will allow the Coast Guard to monitor high interest vessels,
locate distressed mariners, interdict drug traffickers, and monitor
environmental disturbances as well as a host of other tactically
important situations.
Seeing the critical nature of this aircraft, is the Coast Guard
being sufficiently funded to get this plane missionized and ready for
operation?
Answer. Yes. The Deepwater fiscal year 2007 Plan Update provided to
Congress balances several important considerations, including current
priorities and operating expenses to employ these assets when
delivered. To ensure the aircraft are ``ready for operations,'' factors
such as time to train the flight crews and maintenance personnel, as
well as to prepare the air stations to host the aircraft when they
arrive must be addressed. The plan provides the funds to be ``ready for
operations' in the most effective manner.
FISCAL YEAR 2007 BUDGET JUSTIFICATION
Question. In fiscal year 2006, the Coast Guard was appropriated $68
million for the acquisition of two additional aircraft for a total of
five. However, I am now hearing that these funds may be used for the
acquisition of one aircraft, rather than two, with the additional funds
to be used for spare parts and other missionization requirements. I am
concerned about this change in direction, particularly given that the
fiscal year 2007 budget requests funding for one plane as well as
funding for spare parts and other missionization requirements for the
previously acquired aircraft.
Therefore, the purchase of only one plane with the fiscal year 2006
funding seems inconsistent with the fiscal year 2007 budget
justification.
Answer. The $68 million appropriated in fiscal year 2006 will be
utilized to procure two aircraft (aircraft numbers four and five) and
one mission system. Since this appropriation did not include the spare
parts essential for safe and efficient operation of an MPA fleet, the
$77.7 million requested in fiscal year 2007 will support the
procurement of spares for six aircraft, mission system for the fifth
aircraft, and a sixth aircraft with mission system. The funding
requested in fiscal year 2007 complements the funds appropriated in
fiscal year 2006, ensuring we will have six ``ready-to-fly'' aircraft.
DEVIATION FROM THE FISCAL YEAR 2006 BILL
Question. Could you explain for me the deviation from the fiscal
year 2006 bill for the acquisition of two planes?
Answer. The Coast Guard intends to procure two Martime Patrol
Aircraft with fiscal year 2006 funds, which does not deviate from the
intent of the 2006 appropriation.
TIMELINE FOR MPA OPERATIONS
Question. Following on that line of questions, when should we
expect the full compliment of aircraft to be under contract?
Answer. We expect to have aircraft four and five on contract by the
end of fiscal year 2006.
Question. When should we expect the first MPA to be operational?
Answer. The first MPA should be operational in early 2007 (calendar
year). This initial aircraft will be assigned to Aviation Training
Center Mobile in order for Coast Guard personnel to become familiar
with the aircraft, develop and refine training curriculum, and
establish the CASA MPA Training Branch in preparation for training
future CASA MPA aircrews.
Question. Is there a timetable for the additional four aircraft to
be fully missionized and operational?
Answer. The planned schedule for CASA MPA aircraft availability is:
--Aircraft #1 Delivery (missionized)--2nd QTR fiscal year 2007
--Aircraft #2 Delivery (missionized)--3rd QTR fiscal year 2007
--Aircraft #3 Delivery (missionized)--4th QTR fiscal year 2007
--Aircraft #4 Delivery (not yet on contract)--3rd QTR fiscal year
2008
--Aircraft #5 Delivery (not yet on contract )--4th QTR fiscal year
2008
--Aircraft #6 Delivery (not yet funded)--2nd QTR fiscal year 2009.
TIMELINE FOR OUTFITTING AND OPERATION
Question. If the CASA CN-235 300M is so crucial to the Coast
Guard's mission is the timeline for its outfitting and operation
adequate for your needs?
Answer. Coast Guard mission execution is dependent on adequate MPA
hours to cue end-game prosecution. As a result, the current MPA hour
shortfall (between hours available and hours needed to satisfy mission
requirements) is of key concern and will remain a focus of our
recapitalization priorities. The CASA CN-235 300M replaces existing
assets, provides the needed MPA capability, and is being implemented on
a timeline consistent with the Revised Deepwater Implementation Plan.
Question. Does the Coast Guard need this aircraft sooner?
Answer. The revised Deepwater implementation plan reflected in the
President's fiscal year 2007 Budget Request reflects the best balance
of capital asset acquisition within available resources.
Question. Is the funding laid out in this plan satisfactory for the
operational needs of the Coast Guard?
Answer. The funding stream supporting the current implementation
plan will deliver the Deepwater ``system'' of assets and capabilities
by 2027. When complete, it will satisfy the totality of current and
reasonably foreseen operational needs. Until that time, the Coast Guard
will continue optimizing available resources to recapitalize and
modernize its fleet as quickly as possible, while avoiding degradation
to mission performance.
Question. Should this timeline be accelerated to properly ensure
the security of our critical shores and waterways for the safety of
commerce and the protection of our citizens well being?
Answer. Our strategic goal and imperative, as outlined in the
President's National Strategy for Homeland Security, is to detect,
identify and intercept threats as far from the U.S. homeland as
possible. In the maritime domain, the Coast Guard's Deepwater assets
and capabilities are a critical centerpiece of that effort. With the
post-9/11 revised implementation plan, the Deepwater acquisition will
deliver a system of maritime capabilities much better suited to the
current and future threat environment. The revised implementation plan
will deliver that system by the year 2027 based on current funding
levels.
The administration believes the funding level for Deepwater
requested in the President's 2007 budget represents the best
acquisition strategy for the Coast Guard in light of competing homeland
security priorities. Furthermore, numerous studies and have shown that
accelerated funding for an acquisition project as large and complex as
Deepwater will generate only marginally better results relative to the
significant additional costs of acceleration.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT
Question. Would additional maritime patrol aircraft improve your
detection capacity in the transit zone?
Answer. Yes, Maritime Patrol Aircraft are critical to successful
counter-drug operations.
EXPEDITING FULL OPERATING CAPABILITY
Question. Could you reach full operating capability faster if
additional resources became available?
Answer. The fiscal year 2007 request reflects the project's funding
needs for the current acquisition phase. Once the Nationwide Automatic
Identification System (NAIS) project transitions to the production
phase, the project will pursue deployment and funding strategies to
implement AIS capability, as quickly as possible, consistent with
service priorities across all capital acquisitions projects.
POTENTIAL INLAND RIVER THREATS
Question. The Port of Huntington in West Virginia is the largest
inland river port in the United States and the 6th largest of all U.S.
Seaports in terms of tonnage. Fifty percent of all cargo types entering
the port are hazardous and there are hundreds of chemical, energy, and
other critical infrastructure facilities along the waterways. The
Mississippi River system extends well into the interior of the United
States and potentially could provide access for someone wishing to
threaten a city or facility that lies on the waterway.
What capabilities does the Coast Guard have to track the movement
of people and cargo and to detect or deter potential threats on the
inland rivers system?
Answer. The Coast Guard's Inland Rivers Vessel Movement Center
(IRVMC) in Huntington, WV, was established to track the movement of
barges carrying Certain Dangerous Cargoes (CDC) through High Density
Population Areas (HDPAs) of 100,000 or more people. Twenty HDPAs and
over 3,000 miles of navigable rivers are monitored by IRVMC. In
addition, the Vessel Traffic System (VTS) in Louisville, KY also
provides vessel tracking capability.
Threat detection and deterrence activities within the inland river
system are a part of the Coast Guard's homeland security mission. These
activities include: aerial surveillance of activity in and around
militarily and economically strategic ports, enforcement of waterborne
fixed and mobile security zones around critical infrastructure, and
vessel escorts of some certain dangerous cargo (CDC) movements.
Further, Coast Guard assets operate everyday on the inland rivers.
For example, our River Tenders operate throughout the inland river
system performing the Aids to Navigation mission. The personnel that
operate these assets are local experts who know and operate daily on
the river system. Additionally, our boarding teams and response boats
conduct waterside facility inspections, enforce security zones, and
respond to emerging threats as well. As the maritime ``cop on the
beat,'' these small boats deter threats and patrol as directed by the
three Coast Guard Sector Commanders that oversee operations along the
entire inland river waterway system.
MARITIME AIR PATROLS
Question. How about Maritime Air Patrols?
Answer. Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S) is
responsible for detection and monitoring operations in the transit
zone, including Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) requirements and
scheduling. The Coast Guard, along with other U.S. agencies and foreign
governments, provides both surface and air assets to support JIATF-S
detection and monitoring operations.
The Coast Guard has increased MPA support to the JIATF-S over the
past several years. In fiscal year 2002, the Coast Guard provided less
than 3,000 hours; in fiscal year 2005, we provided over 4,000 hours.
Maintenance problems and availability issues of MPA provided by other
agencies, particularly P-3s from Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and
the United States and Dutch navies, have resulted in an overall
decrease in MPA available for the counter-drug mission even though
Coast Guard mission hours for JIATF-S have increased.
Currently, the Coast Guard has approximately 32,000 total MPA hours
available for all missions annually, including JIATF-S counter-drug
support. The Coast Guard's Deepwater plan will provide approximately
61,000 total MPA hours which meets the current and future MPA
requirements for the Coast Guard.
Full funding of the Deepwater project within the fiscal year 2007
President's Budget Request is critical to closing the MPA gap. The plan
funds the acquisition of a sixth CASA CN-235 medium range MPA, and
equipment to support active operations of CASA's 3 through 6. This
year's request includes, in particular, funding to support the stand up
of a second CASA-equipped Air Station.
GO-FAST BOATS
Question. The Coast Guard should be commended for their work in
counter drug operations. In fiscal year 2005, the Coast Guard and
Customs and Border Protection exceeded results from previous years by
removing over 338,000 pounds of cocaine from the Caribbean and Eastern
Pacific Ocean transit zones.
However, the drug flow problem is far from solved. The Government
Accountability Office recently reported that the Joint Interagency Task
Force-South (JIATF-South) ``has detected less than one-third of the
known and actionable maritime illicit drug movements in the western
Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean.''
According to the recent GAO report, Coast Guard and CBP officials
believe that budget constraints and other homeland security priorities
will result in a reduction of assets in the transit zone.
I understand that you rely on 33 foot Go-Fast boats, 110 patrol
boats, and maritime airplanes to interdict drugs. What is the optimal
number of Go-Fast boats and how does that compare to your current
fleet?
Answer. Coast Guard small boats are vital to our maritime border
security mission, providing a layer of security in our ports and
coastal regions. Currently, our 33 foot boats (manufactured by SAFE
Boats International) are primarily used to intercept smuggling vessels
in selected locations along the U.S. southern border. As important as
small boats are to Coast Guard missions, they are not the primary
assets used for counter-drug operations due to their operational
limitations in the high seas transit zones.
The Coast Guard's overall counter-drug strategy focuses on the
transit zone which generally encompasses known transit routes from
source countries in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean. Joint
Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S) is responsible for monitoring
these operations; the Coast Guard provides major cutters (Deepwater),
airborne use of force helicopters (AUF), maritime patrol aircraft (C-
130/HU-25), and law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) embarked on United
States and Allied Naval vessels to support these operations. The Coast
Guard's Deepwater project sets forth the service's way forward in
achieving the optimal asset mix for the future.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT MISSION
Question. Based on the Coast Guard's latest mission hour report
provided to Congress, Coast Guard emphasis on drug enforcement
continues to decrease. Today, the number of hours the Coast Guard
spends on its drug enforcement mission is approximately 38.5 percent
less than pre-September 11. Your fiscal year 2007 budget for drug
interdiction is $18 million below current levels.
Why is your budget for Drug Interdiction going down in fiscal year
2007?
Answer. The challenge of aging cutters and aircraft, coupled with
the increasing demands of homeland security missions, require the Coast
Guard to develop an allocation of its resources to ensure the most
effective mitigation of risk in executing each of its 11 mission
programs.
Despite the fact that funding and resource hours allocated to Drug
Interdiction has gone down, the Coast Guard removed 338,206 pounds of
cocaine (including nearly 303,662 pounds seized) during fiscal year
2005, a new record for drug seizures in the maritime environment. While
actual time spent on the mission has remained relatively static, the
Coast Guard has been able to improve performance by achieving
operational efficiencies in excuting its Drug Interdiction operations
The Coast Guard continues to have unprecedented success in the
counterdrug mission by pursuing the three principles of its 10-year
Strategic Counter Drug Plan known as STEEL WEB:
--Pursuing more tactical, actionable intelligence, then responding
with flexible intelligence-driven operations;
--Leveraging technology by fast tracking new tools and bringing more
capable assets to the fight; and
--International engagement with our counterdrug partner nations,
which speeds up the seizure and disposition process and gains
U.S. jurisdiction to help feed the intelligence cycle.
These methods have not only allowed the Coast Guard to be more
successful in its efforts to deter drug smuggling into the United
States, but also made these efforts to more efficient.
As the new Deepwater assets come online, this upward trend in
seizure success will continue even further, while also allowing for the
success in other mission areas as well.
110 FOOT PATROL BOATS
Question. The Coast Guard's 110 foot patrol boats, which are used
to interdict illegal aliens and drugs, are in a ``declining readiness
spiral,'' according to Commandant Collins. Coast Guard patrol boats are
operating in theater less today than they were in 1998. Total patrol
boat hours were only 75,000 in 2004 compared to the 1998 baseline of
approximately 100,000 hours. Under the Deepwater plan, this gap won't
be closed until 2012 at the earliest. The Administration's National
Strategy for Maritime Security calls for a ``significant commitment of
security resources'' to deal with illegal seaborne immigration.
The Coast Guard is facing a crisis. The fiscal year 2007 budget
pushes the development of the Fast Response Cutter to the right.
Indications are that the five patrol crafts that are on loan from the
Navy will be returned in 2008. Six 110s are operating in Iraq and may
not be returned. You said that you could procure an off-the-shelf
patrol boat for $20-30 million a piece.
How many are needed in the short-term to close the operational gap?
Answer. Assuming that any replacement patrol boat was able to
operate 2,500 hours per year, the Coast Guard would require five such
boats to close the current gap. If we return the U.S. Navy PC-179s at
the end of fiscal year 2008 per the current Memorandum of Agreement and
do not simultaneously gain back the 6 110 foot patrol boats currently
deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, we would experience an
additional loss of 12,500 patrol boat hours.
PORT SECURITY PLAN REVIEW
Question. Secretary Chertoff has stated repeatedly that it is
important to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the
United States by eliminating threats before they arrive at our borders
and ports. Yet, there are only 34 Coast Guard employees to review
foreign port security plans in the 140 countries that conduct maritime
trade with the United States. The Coast Guard estimates that it will
take four to five years to audit all 140 foreign port security plans.
Earlier this week, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved my
amendment to add $23 million to the fiscal year 2006 Emergency
Supplemental to hire additional Coast Guard inspectors to review
domestic and foreign port security plans.
How will this funding help you accelerate the review of port
security plans?
Answer. This funding would result in a temporary increase in the
level of effort of foreign port security assessments, domestic port
security assessments, as well as implementing spot inspections of MTSA
regulated facilities.
DESIGN REVIEW OF THE FAST RESPONSE CUTTER (FRC)
Question. The Coast Guard recently made the decision to postpone
the design review of the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) and review whether
to continue with the development of the FRC or procure another ship to
replace the current fleet of patrol boats. Admiral, the Coast Guard has
already pushed the production schedule for the FRC to the right by one
year during a time when the capabilities of your existing patrol boats
are in a declining readiness spiral.
What implications does postponing the design work on the FRC have
on the $41.5 million requested in the fiscal year 2007 budget?
Answer. The Fast Response Cutter (FRC) schedule requires the FRC to
be ``ready for operations'' in 2009. Continuing with the current ``new
design'' FRC will likely change the schedule for ``ready for
operations'' to 2010. That is one of several reasons the Coast Guard is
currently exploring options (i.e., an off-the-shelf design) to keep the
FRC on schedule to be ``ready for operations'' in 2009. Implementation
of this accelerated option is critically dependent on the $41.5 million
requested in fiscal year 2007 in order to achieve that delivery date.
MARITIME DOMESTIC AWARENESS
Question. The Coast Guard's Deepwater program includes the use of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. UAVs provide a wide-area of surveillance
capabilities and operate at a fraction of the cost of manned aircraft.
However, under the current budget plan, the Coast Guard won't
acquire UAVs until 2016, at the earliest.
Why is the Coast Guard waiting such a long time to acquire an asset
that can improve your capability to enhance maritime domain awareness?
Answer. The Coast Guard plan calls for the acquisition and
employment of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) well before 2016. The
Deepwater plan calls for the use of two types of UAVs. The delivery of
the Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VUAV) is scheduled to complete
Operational Test and Evaluation in December 2011, and will operate off
the National Security Cutter and the Offshore Patrol Cutter. The second
unmanned aviation asset, the High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (HAEUAV), is scheduled for delivery in 2016. The HAEUAV will be
a land-based UAV with high altitude and long endurance capabilities.
UAVS ALONG THE SOUTHERN BORDER
Question. In fiscal year 2006, this Subcommittee included funding
for Customs and Border Protection to utilize UAVs along our southern
border.
How would the Coast Guard best use UAVs if funding became
available?
Answer. The best use of funds for a UAV in the Deepwater program
would be to support continuation of the VUAV acquisition which is
currently in System Design and Development. The goal is to fund the
VUAV so that it can be completed and utilized as a component of the
National Security Cutter force package. The concept of operations calls
for the National Security Cutter to be employed with a Multi-Mission
Cutter Helicopter (MCH) and VUAV. While the Coast Guard and Customs and
Border Protection have some similar UAV requirements, a critical
difference is for the maritime UAV to have a vertical launch and
recovery capability in order to operate with Coast Guard cutters at
sea.
INSTALLATION OF RECEIVERS
Question. The Maritime Transportation Security Act, which President
Bush signed on November 25, 2002, required vessels entering U.S. ports
to have an Automatic Identification System (AIS) on board by the end of
2004 that would identify the ship, the size of the ship and the type of
cargo on the ship when they arrived at U.S. ports.
Many of our strategic ports still do not have technology to receive
these signals.
Your testimony indicates that we need to ``push out our borders.''
The AIS system represents an important cog in a layered security
architecture. Yet, your budget for AIS in fiscal year 2007 is only
$11.2 million, less than half of the amount provided in fiscal year
2006. The total acquisition cost to outfit all strategic ports is
estimated to be $230 to 250 million. Less than a third of the total
cost has been funded to date.
According to a March 10, 2005 Coast Guard report on efforts to
install a shore-based universal Automatic Identification System in
ports nationwide, full operating capability would be achieved in fiscal
year 2008. Yet, your fiscal year 2007 budget now indicates that the
project will not be completed until 2011.
Why is the Coast Guard moving so slow to install these receivers?
Answer. The implementation approach and timeline currently being
planned by the Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS)
project is based on meeting operational requirements, with due regard
for technical, cost and other risk factors required for a complete
command, control, communication, computer and information technology
project. A three stage incremental implementation is being pursued so
that maritime security stakeholders will receive useful capability that
begins to fill in operational gaps more quickly than would be otherwise
possible. Upon Milestone Two (alternative selection approval from DHS)
targeted for 4th Quarter, fiscal year 2006, the first increment will
capitalize on existing preliminary and prototype efforts installed
during 2005 and 2006 to expand receive only AIS capability (vessel
tracking) in all critical ports identified in the fiscal year 2007
budget justification. With the first increment underway, the fiscal
year 2007 budget request of $11.2 million, along with existing
unobligated project funding, will be used to award a NAIS contract in
fiscal year 2007 to initiate design, logistics and deployment of
follow-on increments that provide a more robust, fully interoperable
AIS capability with complete coverage of all U.S. waters and
approaches. Previously reported project completion dates were based on
preliminary project management estimates. As the final requirements
have matured and more has been learned, the project schedule was
updated to reflect realistic timeframes for project completion.
Currently, full system operating capability is expected to be delivered
by 2013.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
DEEPWATER RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM
Question. What affect would a decrease in funding from the
President's Budget Request of $934.4 million have on the continuation
of this recapitalization program?
Answer. The following Deepwater projects are categories in the
fiscal year 2007 budget. Each requires full funding to ensure success
of the recapitalization program. A key to success is the
synchronization of asset acquisitions to produce ``force packages''
connected by a common network. This enables a synergy of operational
system performance as depicted on the enclosed graphic. If the planned
synchronization is delayed due to less than full funding in fiscal year
2007, then the planned capabilities will be have at least a one year
delay, will be more costly to acquire in the future, and the
operational performance improvements planned for the near term will be
lost. More specifically:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget category Inaequate funding impacts
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AIR:
CASA MPA.............................. Would delay ``mission
ready'' status of
aircraft's 4 & 5, delay
delivery and missionization
of MPA #6; and further
delay two air stations from
receiving post 9/11
capabilities.
VUAV and MCH (HH-65C)................. Will delay delivery of
assets, limit major cutter
``force package''
capabilities, limiting
surveillance capability to
that achieved by legacy
surface assets.
HH-60 projects........................ Any project under funded or
out of sequence will delay
the entire upgrade and
conversion sequence of the
HH-60; this medium range
helicopter is larger and
more capable than the CG HH-
65s.
AUF projects.......................... Delayed funding for Airborne
Use of Force upgrades means
that Homeland security
patrols will continue to be
conducted largely by
unarmed aircraft that lack
the capability to respond
appropriately on
``actionable
intelligence''.
C-130H Conversion projects............ The C-130H will continue to
operate with aging,
obsolete avionics and a
troublesome radar that has
provided degraded
reliability for several
years.
C-130J Fleet Introduction............. Will delay delivery of
asset(s) or prevent
``mission ready'' status--
prolonging the shortage of
maritime patrol aircraft
operating hours.
SURFACE:
NSC................................... Each day of delay means NSC
has an opportunity cost of
not surveilling 42,500
square nautical miles
compared to legacy WHEC-
378.\1\
FRC................................... Delay/loss of enhanced
operational capabilities of
the patrol boat fleet
required by the post 9/11
requirements.
Mission Effectiveness Project for With no Offshore Patrol
Legacy 210 Foot and 270 Foot. Cutter (OPC) in the current
budget, 210- and 270-foot
cutters have to be extended
until OPC is delivered.
Inadequate funding will
likely result in decreased
legacy asset operational
availability.
Cutter Small Boats (Long Range Small boats are part of the
Interceptor and Short Range Cutter ``force package''
Prosecutor).. providing intercept and
boarding capability from
the parent cutter. Delayed
funding decreases ``force
package'' operating area.
C4ISR................................. Will delay delivery of
assets--some components are
essential to asset
operation.
C4ISR is the key to being
AWARE in the maritime
region. Reduced awareness
increases the Nation's risk
for possible attacks from
terrorists and more
criminal activities.
Logistics................................. Unable to operate as
designed will mean higher
annual operating costs.
Readiness will be lower.
Suboptimal ``homeports'' due
to lack of shore
facilities; forcing use of
``Ports of Convenience''.
Systems Engineering & Integration......... Higher risk for lack of
synchronization of
Deepwater assets . . . will
not operate together.
Higher risk that optimal
contractor testing will not
be conducted. Uncertain if
OT&E will detect . . .
increased risk of failure
during future operations.
Program Management........................ Unable to accomplish
inherently government work
necessary for success.
Increased risk of failure
during operation and delay
in deploying due to
insufficient planning.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ All flight deck capable cutters will benefit from VUAV/MCH force
package surveillance capabilities.
The graphic below illustrates the synergistic linkages between
assets in the Deepwater system highlighting how reduced funding in any
one area reduces overall system performance outcomes. The full success
of the major projects is dependent on the assets in these budget
categories being fully funded.
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
Question. In fiscal year 2006, Congress provided $933.1 million for
the Coast Guard's Deepwater recapitalization program. The President's
fiscal year 2007 Budget Request proposes $934.4 million for the
Deepwater program.
How important is full funding of the President's Request to the
continuation of this recapitalization program?
Answer. It is critically important that full funding for the
Deepwater recapitalization program be provided. Any reduction will
cause a delay in one or more assets or systems that the Coast Guard
needs to accomplish the responsibilities that DHS expects. Reduced
funding will mean reduced readiness; our Nation needs a mission-ready
Coast Guard.
RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTION
Question. How will the Department and the Coast Guard address
Congress' frustration with the Coast Guard's poor responsiveness to
congressional direction?
Answer. The Coast Guard has internal processes in place to track
all Congressional deliverables, to include reports, Questions for the
Record (QFRs), Questions and Answers (Q&As) and all other direction
from Congressional staffs, ensuring all are responded to in a timely
and effective manner. In addition, the Coast Guard and DHS have
condensed their turnaround times allowed for all inquiries to further
ensure timely responses.
One example as a result of the Coast Guard's improvement in this
arena was in the submission of the fiscal year 2007 President's
request--four Congressional Reports (Deepwater Implementation Plan
Review, Operational Gap Analysis, Patrol Boat Availability and Report
on Maritime Security and Safety Teams) were submitted in concert with
the President's request--a significant effort to execute, but done
successfully as a result of greater cooperation and efficiency between
DHS, OMB and the Coast Guard.
Other examples of the Coast Guard's efforts to alleviate Congress'
concerns include more granularity in the fiscal year 2007 budget
submission (the fiscal year 2007 request grew by over 175 pages from
the fiscal year 2006 submission, providing more justification on usable
segments within AC&I projects, greater detail on new initiatives such
as the National Capital Region Air Defense mission, and so on).
The Coast Guard has also been more proactive in providing status
reports of continuing initiatives through Congressional Staff
briefings, substantial interaction between Congressional staffs and the
Coast Guard's own Congressional Affairs staffs, and sponsorship in
field unit visits.
STATUS OF HH-65 HELICOPTERS
Question. Could you update the committee on the progress of the re-
engining of the 95 HH-65 helicopters?
Answer. Twenty-nine re-engined HH-65s have been delivered as of
March 2006; 5 each to CG Air Stations Atlantic City, Savannah and New
Orleans; 3 to Air Station San Francisco; 8 of 9 to Air Station Miami; 1
to Aviation Training Center Mobile; 1 to Air Station Los Angeles; and 1
to NAVAIR.
Completion date of the 84 operational HH-65s remains June 2007.
This date was changed from the earlier projected delivery date of
February 2007 primarily due to extraordinary Hurricane rescue and
relief efforts in 2005 that caused unforeseen wear and tear on our
rotary wing aircraft. Aircraft inducted for the re-engining project
have needed additional depot-level maintenance caused by this increased
wear and tear. The remaining 11 non-operational aircraft (aircraft on
the programmed depot maintenance line at Coast Guard Aircraft Repair &
Supply Center, Elizabeth City, NC) are scheduled to be completed by
November 2007.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Senator Stevens. This will terminate the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., Thursday, April 6, the hearing
was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]
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