<DOC>
[109 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:21922.wais]
S. Hrg. 109-51
STRENGTHENING BORDER SECURITY BETWEEN THE PORTS OF ENTRY: THE USE OF
TECHNOLOGY TO PROTECT THE BORDERS
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, BORDER SECURITY AND CITIZENSHIP
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 28, 2005
__________
Serial No. J-109-18
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JON KYL, Arizona JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN CORNYN, Texas CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
David Brog, Staff Director
Michael O'Neill, Chief Counsel
Bruce A. Cohen, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship
JOHN CORNYN, Texas, Chairman
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JON KYL, Arizona JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
James Ho, Majority Chief Counsel
Jim Flug, Democratic Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security
JON KYL, Arizona, Chairman
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JOHN CORNYN, Texas JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
Stephen Higgins, Majority Chief Counsel
Steven Cash, Democratic Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Page
Coburn, Hon. Tom, a U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma...... 5
Cornyn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas........ 1
prepared statement........................................... 66
Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona.......... 3
Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont,
prepared statement............................................. 78
WITNESSES
Aguilar, David, Chief, Office of Border Patrol, Customs and
Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, Washington,
D.C............................................................ 7
Evans, Kirk, Director, Mission Support Office, Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency, Science and Technology
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.. 9
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Responses of Mr. Aguilar and Mr. Evans to questions submitted by
Senator Grassley............................................... 37
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Aguilar, David, Chief, Office of Border Patrol, Customs and
Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, Washington,
D.C., prepared statement....................................... 40
American Immigration Lawyers Association, Kathleen Campbell
Walker, National Second Vice President, Washington, D.C.,
statement...................................................... 50
Evans, Kirk, Director, Mission Support Office, Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency, Science and Technology
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.,
prepared statement............................................. 69
Pew Hispanic Center, Jeffrey S. Passel, Senior Research
Associate, Washington, D.C., report............................ 79
Taylor, Henry F., Distinguished Professor of Electrical
Engineering, Texas A & M University, College Station, Texas,
statement...................................................... 90
STRENGTHENING BORDER SECURITY BETWEEN THE PORTS OF ENTRY: THE USE OF
TECHNOLOGY TO PROTECT THE BORDERS
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 28, 2005
United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and
Citizenship and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology
and Homeland Security, Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 3:00 p.m., in
room SD-138, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Cornyn,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security
and Citizenship, presiding.
Present: Senators Cornyn, Kyl, and Coburn.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF TEXAS
Chairman Cornyn. This joint hearing of the Senate
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship
and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland
Security will come to order.
I first want to express my gratitude to Chairman Specter
for scheduling this hearing. This hearing is the third in a
series of joint hearings that Senator Kyl and I and our
Subcommittees have had together to examine our immigration
system from top to bottom. And I want to express my gratitude
here publicly to Senator Kyl for his hard work and his
partnership in working with me and our staff on these issues.
As Senator Kyl and I announced a few weeks ago, we are
working closely together and will continue to work with other
Senators as well to identify and develop solutions to the
critical problems that affect our immigration system. I want to
express my gratitude as well to the Ranking Member of my
Subcommittee, Senator Kennedy, as well as Senator Feinstein,
the Ranking Member on the Terrorism Subcommittee, as well as
their staffs, for working with us to make these hearings
possible. To be successful, any effort to reform and to
strengthen our immigration system in the United States Senate
must be a bipartisan effort, and we look forward to continuing
to work with our colleagues to that end.
A few weeks ago, the Senate approved a broad, bipartisan
sense of the Senate resolution, a resolution introduced by
Senator Feinstein and myself. That resolution demonstrated to
my mind that there is a growing consensus across the partisan
and ideological spectrum that our immigration system is badly
broken and fails to serve the national interests of our
national security and our national economy and undermines
respect for the rule of law, and that in a post-9/11 world,
national security demands comprehensive reform of our
immigration system.
President Bush has articulated a vision for the
comprehensive reform of our Nation's immigration laws. I am
personally sympathetic to the President's vision, and I look
forward to the critical role that our Subcommittees will play
in the coming congressional debate.
No serious discussion of comprehensive immigration reform
is possible, however, without an overall review of our Nation's
ability and will to secure our borders and enforce our
immigration laws. We must provide sufficient tools and
resources to those whose job it is to protect our borders and
maintain our homeland security and identify those in our
country who should be apprehended and removed, including those
who should be deported.
Accordingly, today's hearing is the third in a series of
hearings focusing on identifying holes in our immigration
enforcement system, places where enforcement has been badly
deficient. Unfortunately, there are too many of those holes.
Our immigration laws have been poorly enforced for far too
long. That is because, in my view, the Federal Government has
simply not lived up to its obligation to provide the resources
and manpower in order to do just that. That must end and that
will end.
For example, at our last hearing, we examined challenges to
enforcement in the interior of our country. We respect the hard
work and efforts of our immigration investigators, detention
officials, and other professionals responsible for locating,
detaining, and removing those who remain in this country in
violation of our laws. Yet as that hearing made clear, our
deportation system is overlitigated and underresourced,
overlawyered and underequipped.
That hearing identified a number of specific problems,
including the extra layers of appeals granted specifically to
aliens who are deportable due to criminal activity and the
judicially mandated release onto our streets of potentially
dangerous individuals. Over one million aliens face deportation
proceedings this year, yet we only have approximately 19,000
detention beds to hold them. As a result, as many as 80 percent
of those ordered to leave the country never show up to be
removed.
At our first hearing, we examined the challenges to
enforcement along the border at the ports of entry. As that
hearing made clear, we need better training opportunities and
information provided to our front-line personnel, and we need
to improve the reliability of documents used for entry into our
country. National security demands we strengthen border
inspection, ensure document integrity, and combat document
fraud.
Today's hearing will focus on securing our borders in
between the authorized ports of entry. We will examine what
tools and resources are currently being employed and what
resources and tools may be needed to fill in the gaps along the
perimeter of our country. To put it simply, we must shut down
all of the routes used to enter our country outside of
authorized ports of entry.
Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. The U.S.
Border with Mexico runs almost 2,000 miles, while our border
with Canada runs roughly 5,000 miles. My home State of Texas
alone accounts for a majority of the Southern border, sharing
about 1,285 miles, or 65 percent of the Southern border.
In Fiscal Year 2004, the total number of arrests along the
Southern border totaled more than 1 million with approximately
330,000 of those apprehended entering Texas illegally. And, the
numbers are only increasing. Indeed, we have already surpassed
last year's number in the current fiscal year.
These numbers demonstrate the hard work and dedication of
our Border Patrol under the most difficult of circumstances,
but also indicate the tremendous challenges that they face
given the current staffing and resources that they have been
provided by the Government.
According to the Pew Hispanic Center, the U.S. averages
700,000 to 800,000 new undocumented aliens every year. We
simply must and can do better. We must explore the better use
of technology. The effective use of technology between the
ports of entry can serve as a force multiplier for our Border
Patrol agents and officers charged with securing our border.
And as we have heard time and time again, the same means of
entry that can be used for someone who wants to come to the
United States to work can likewise be used just as easily by
those who want to come here to commit crimes or perhaps acts of
terrorism.
Technology allows our agents, though, to conserve manpower
and efficiently respond when we identify breaches in our
border. But it is by itself no panacea. There will inevitably
be glitches in deployment and use of technology, and clearly,
technology is only as good as the men and women we have on the
ground who we must teach to utilize it and take advantage of it
to the maximum degree.
Accordingly, today we examine the existing technology used
along our border and used to secure it and learn a little bit
more about how it is actually deployed on the ground. We will
hear what problems have been experienced and what Congress
might be able to do to provide more support in this area. And I
hope that today's witnesses will give our Subcommittees a
better idea of what else this Subcommittee and the Judiciary
Committee and the United States Congress as a whole can do to
fully secure our borders in between the ports of entry through
the most effective use of technology.
[The prepared statement of Senator Cornyn appears as a
submission for the record.]
With that, I will turn the floor over to Senator Kyl, my
colleague and the Chair of the Terrorism Subcommittee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF ARIZONA
Chairman Kyl. Thank you, Chairman Cornyn. I join you in
welcoming everyone to this hearing today. We will be examining
today the use of technology to help secure the borders of the
United States between our ports of entry, as you noted, and our
two witnesses here today are obviously both very capable to
provide us information in that regard.
This hearing today is part of a larger commitment, as
Senator Cornyn noted, that his Subcommittee and mine will use
to help to educate our colleagues as well as put on the public
record the need to enforce the immigration laws of the United
States, how we can better do that in order to protect ourselves
from terrorist and criminal threats and to restore integrity in
the rule of law.
The name of my Subcommittee is Terrorism, Technology and
Homeland Security, so this hearing today is directly related to
the activities that we have been engaged in, and I am very much
looking forward to hearing from our witnesses today so that we
can better make the point to our colleague that the Federal
Government cannot continue to overlook its distinct and
singular obligation to maintain law and order on the border and
that we have got to fully commit ourselves to funding the
agencies that make up our immigration system so that these
agencies can effectively perform the work that we call upon
them to do as well as provide them direction and oversight.
We count on DHS, as always, to be very frank in discussing
the challenges it faces in enforcing our immigration laws. We
are always interested in learning about progress that you have
made, but also problems and needs that you have, what we can do
to help you secure the tools that you need in carrying out your
mission.
I just want to add to the formal statement that I have just
made this personal comment. In the sector that is the highest
use of illegal immigrant smuggling, the Tucson Sector on the
Arizona border that used to be the responsibility of the Chief
of the Border Patrol, David Aguilar, got a great deal of
national attention focused because of a group of private
citizens who chose to draw attention to the problems in that
part of the border by going there themselves and staking out
some territory along the 9- or 10-mile area, calling themselves
``the Minutemen'' and, as I have said, demonstrating that a
little bit more manpower in an area can help to control the
border.
Now, as to whether or not it was their presence that had
the effect, there are differences of opinion. But there are a
couple of things I think that are unassailable. One of them is
that the fact that the Mexican Government knew that they were
there and apparently had some concerns about them, about what
these people would do, concerns that have proven to be
unfounded in terms of any violence or harm brought to the
illegal immigrants. But because there were concerns, the Grupa
Beta, which is the police force south of the border responsible
for would-be immigrant safety, as it were, and perhaps other
Mexican agencies, attempted to dissuade people from crossing
the border. And it appears to have worked. The immigration in
the Tucson Sector appears to have dwindled to a trickle.
This was not due to any great technology application. It
was simply the threat that there were a bunch of Americans on
the north side of the border that might cause harm to these
immigrants, as a result of which the Mexican Government was
able all by itself to bring the immigration in that area to a
trickle, according to the statistics we have, which suggests
something else, and that is that better cooperation with the
Mexican Government in thwarting the illegal immigration would
be another force multiplier, that it should not be all the
United States playing defense, and that we ought to seek more
agreements with our friends to the South, the Government of
Mexico.
Chief Aguilar, I will be especially interested in your
testimony in this regard. You identify a great many different
agreements and partnerships and so on, all of which may have
some discrete and limited benefit, but which added together
amount to a drop in the bucket and, frankly, focus more on the
tougher cases, the drug smuggling and some of the higher-
priority cases that may potentially involve terrorism, for
example, but have very little effect on the run-of-the-day
normal illegal immigration problem that exists.
I will be very curious not only to focus on the kind of
technology that we could employ, but because of your
experience, anything you might add about ways in which we could
encourage the Mexican Government to stop encouraging illegal
immigration and start helping us by discouraging illegal
immigration. Again, slightly outside the burden of our hearing
today, but since your written testimony contains so many pages
of reference to how we have worked with the Mexican Government,
I thought it was an appropriate question to sort of
preliminarily ask you.
I am looking forward to the testimony that both of you have
to offer today, and I suspect that we can keep the record open
for either questions from our colleagues or additional comments
from the witnesses, if they would like.
Chairman Cornyn. Senator Coburn? I want to recognize our
colleague from Oklahoma who has been conscientious about
attending these Subcommittee hearings as well. We would be glad
to recognize you for a few brief opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM COBURN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
OKLAHOMA
Senator Coburn. Well, thank you both, Chairmen.
First of all, we had a discussion, and I think it is
important that you all hear this and take it back. The rules of
the Senate, although we do not have the rules formalized in the
Committee, is your testimony is to be here 48 hours before we
have this meeting. And there is a real good reason for that,
and that is so we can read what you have to say, think about
what you have to say, and formulate great questions so that we
can do the business of the people of this country. And I
understand it is not either of your fault that your testimony
did not get here because it goes through a filtering process.
And so I do not hold either of you accountable. But I do want
the Committee to know and I want it to go up the line that when
we do get our rules in the future, I will be making a point of
order and a formal objection to the continuation of any
Committee meeting where my staff or I are not able to be
prepared. We had one testimony arrive at 1:40 p.m. today for
this hearing. And, again, it is not of your fault. I know it is
not of your fault. But that message needs to be taken home.
The second point I want to make is to Chief Aguilar. Thank
you for your service and thank you for your leadership. You all
are not recognized right now. You are seen sometimes as the
problem, and you are not the problem. The fact is you just do
not have enough help and resources. And I want to publicly
thank you for putting your life on the line for the rest of the
people in this country. And the rest of the people in the
country get it. You all are important and vital to our national
security as well as our way of life. And this is a country of
immigrants, and we do not want that to stop, but we do want the
law. And what you do to enforce the law every day I want you to
know we appreciate from the bottom of our heart, and we
recognize that you put yourself and your own families at
sacrifice when you do that.
Finally, a comment that was made to me in private, and I
will not relate who it is, but it concerns me a great deal with
people within the administration are not allowed to give us
what they really think, that it has to be filtered. In other
words, a lot of people in this administration know what we need
to do, but it does not fit with what the plan is. And so,
therefore, the true thought and the true personal testimony
does not come to the Members of Congress.
And I just want to encourage you, when that happens, to be
bold enough to make sure Members of Congress know how you
really feel, even if it is in private, because we cannot make
decisions--and I think in the homeland security areas more than
anywhere else, I am picking up from individuals within the
administration that they are not allowed to tell us what they
really think, that they have to toe the line. And that is good.
You should be loyal. But the other thing is we really need the
information to make the best decisions.
So I would encourage you, if that happens, members of this
body, I guarantee you, you will be protected, but we need to
have all of the information, not just what they want us to
have.
With that, thank you for your testimony. I thank you for
holding this hearing, and I look forward to asking questions.
Thank you.
Chairman Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Coburn.
We are pleased today to have a distinguished panel from the
Department of Homeland Security, and I will introduce the panel
and then ask each of you to provide us with an opening
statement for about 5 minutes each, and then we will proceed to
some questions and answers.
David V. Aguilar has served as the Chief of the Office of
Border Patrol since May of 2004. As the Nation's highest-
ranking Border Patrol officer, Chief Aguilar directs the
enforcement efforts of more than 12,000 Border Patrol agents
nationwide. He brings us the knowledge and expertise gained
from more than 26 years of service in the Border Patrol.
Dr. Kirk Evans is the Office Director of the Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency. Dr. Evans has more
than 27 years of experience in program management and
acquisition of systems for surveillance and command, control,
and communications.
Gentlemen, we welcome both of you, and we would be pleased
to hear your opening statements. Let's begin, if we may, Chief,
with you. If you would provide us your opening statement for
about 5 minutes, then we will turn to Dr. Evans, and then we
will engage in hopefully some good conversation back and forth.
STATEMENT OF DAVID AGUILAR, CHIEF, OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL,
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir, thank you, Chairman. Chairman
Cornyn, Chairman Kyl, Senator Coburn, thank you for your kind
statements, and we appreciate that.
It is my honor to have the opportunity to appear before
this panel today and discuss the successes, the achievements,
and some of the remaining challenges that we have had in the
United States Border Patrol in securing our Nation's borders.
It is a challenge. Challenges remain. Our job is not done, but
I can assure this panel that the men and women of the United
States Border Patrol are continuing to do everything they can
within the resources that we have to make this Nation more
secure.
My name is David Aguilar, and I am the Chief of the Border
Patrol. I would like to begin this morning by giving you a
snapshot, a brief overview of the agency and how we operate out
there.
One of the very obvious things but I don't think it is
stated often enough is the following: that our primary mission
is, in fact, to detect, deter, and apprehend terrorists and
their weapons as they attempt to enter into the United States.
It is very critical to also point out that our traditional
missions that have come with us from our legacy organizations
remain and are still very important, and I will point out why I
think that is still very important today as we speak a little
later on. But those traditional missions of keeping out
narcotics, aliens, smugglers of any other contraband also
continue to be a very important and integral part of our
everyday job out in the field, out in the border, South, North,
and on some of the coastal waterways that we patrol.
We have spoken a little bit about the Southern border. The
Southern border is over 2,000 miles of border, the Northern
border is over 4,000, and we patrol over 2,000 miles of the
coastal or maritime sector that are taken up by our Miami, New
Orleans, and Puerto Rico Sector. Within that area of operation
along our Nation's borders, last year, during the fiscal year,
the United States Border Patrol agents apprehended over 1.1
million apprehensions last year. Of those 1.1 million
apprehensions, approximately 52 percent of those were
apprehended within the State of Arizona. Today as we speak,
this chart up here depicts that the heaviest flow is into, in
fact, Arizona and the New Mexico of operation. Approximately 61
percent of our apprehensions are occurring today as we speak
year to date in that part of the country.
Last year, fiscal year 2004, we apprehended over 1.3
million pounds of marijuana as it attempted to enter into this
country. Today as we speak, alien apprehensions are up by about
3 percent. We are down in apprehensions by about 10 percent in
the area of narcotics. Last year, we apprehended a total of
75,000 other than Mexicans crossing our Nation's borders. Today
as we speak, year to date we are at approximately 71,000 OTMs.
We are up by approximately 124 percent in the area of OTMs.
Now, we did this with about 12,000 agents, as the Senator
pointed out. We have, of course, remote video surveillance
systems strewn throughout the border, especially on the
Southern border, a total of about 246 camera sites as we speak
today. We have approximately 112 aircraft along our Nation's
borders out there, but the challenges continue to be there, the
challenges such as the urban-to-rural dynamics that I speak of.
When we started operations along the Nation's borders,
especially in El Paso, in 1993, it was a very urban-type
operation that we conducted out there. We moved from El Paso in
1993-94 to San Diego. The shift shifted over towards South
Texas. We went to South Texas, and then we ended up in Arizona.
Those were urban-type operations. They were easier than what we
are faced with today.
Today we are faced with very rural-type operations where
the dissipation of the criminal organization is out in the very
rural areas. Technology is absolutely critical in these rural
environments, and that is one of the reasons that I am very
glad that we are holding these hearings today.
The vastness, the remoteness. One of the other challenges
that we face that Senator Kyl knows very well is that of
environmental concerns out there. Just to give you an idea,
approximately 40 percent of our Southern border lands that we
are responsible for patrolling are federally managed,
environmentally protected, or environmentally sensitive; the
Northern border, approximately 27 percent. Again, this is
important to us because it requires us to be able to access and
be mobile laterally along our Nation's borders in order to
conduct national security efforts.
We have come a long way. We worked very closely with the
Department of the Interior, with the Department of Agriculture
to gain the latitude that we need in order to operate out
there, but, again, this is an area where technology is going to
help us tremendously.
The manner in which we deploy basically is based on the
criminal organizations. The Southern border is the
infrastructure that is south of us. The Northern border,
Canadian population, approximately 90 percent of the Canadian
population lives within 100 miles of our borders there. The
density of population is such that the potential metropolitan
targets, such as Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., New
York City, are the areas we concentrate on. On the Northwest,
also we have our Blaine Sector where the potential targets are
Los Angeles.
One of the things that is absolutely critical that I would
like this Committee to hear is that we have implemented a
revised National Border Patrol Strategy that has now been in
place for about 6 or 8 months. Key objectives: establish
substantial probability of apprehending terrorists as they
enter into this country; deter illegal entries between the
ports of entry; detect, deter, and apprehend aliens, narcotics,
and other contraband smugglers; leverage smart border
technology as a force multiplier for our personnel out there;
and reduce crime in border communities, reinvigorate the
economic vitality, and improve the quality of life of those
communities.
My time is out, I know, but I just want to make a statement
that I thank the Subcommittee for this opportunity to present
this testimony. I assure you that the men and women of the
United States Border Patrol are doing everything that they can,
and we will continue to be assertive and aggressive in
protecting and increasing this Nation's security.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Aguilar appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Cornyn. Thank you, Chief.
Dr. Evans, we would be glad to hear an opening statement
from you.
STATEMENT OF KIRK EVANS, DIRECTOR, MISSION SUPPORT OFFICE,
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Evans. Good afternoon, Chairman Cornyn, Chairman Kyl,
Senator Coburn. It is my pleasure and honor also to come before
you today to share our vision and progress in developing sensor
and information systems in support of the Border Patrol's
mission. The Chief has been far more capable in describing to
you the challenges and missions that the Border Patrol
undertakes. In discussions with the Border Patrol, it is clear
to us that the primary and the highest priority area they would
like us to work on in terms of technology is in the
surveillance or cueing mission.
To do this, we have two primary and large challenges. The
first is the magnitude of the area involved. Consider the
Southern border. It is 2,000 miles long. To develop an
electronic fence along that border, it is insufficient just to
have a magic line along the border. You have to have some depth
to that line. Consider the Southern border with a one-half-mile
zone in which we detect both vehicles and people crossing that.
If we were to use the kinds of ground sensors we have today
with, on the average, let's say, a 10-meter detection range and
we want to have a probability of detection of anything crossing
that border of 50 percent, that would require 3 million
sensors, 3 million sets of systems. That number goes to about
1,300 for 450-meter detection ranges. It goes to 375 for a 1-
mile type of detection range. So, clearly, in our sensors and
whatever we put on the border, sensor detection range is a
major, major factor.
Second is the false alarm rate. Assume that the Border
Patrol manpower along the Southern border--and that is a big
assumption on my part--allowed them to respond to four false
alarms a day along the Southern border. If we had those 10-
meter sensors, all 3 million of them, that amounts to a false
alarm rate for each sense of 1 in 2,000 years. That is just not
technologically achievable. For the 1-mile sensor, that gets
down to about a 90-day false alarm rate per sensor. That is
perhaps achievable.
If one were to think of a series of sensors along the
border, arguably we could think about a sensor capability of
detecting a person crossing the border at 1 mile with a false
alarm rate of 1 per 90 days, a field lifetime of a year, and a
per unit cost much less than the tens of thousands of dollars--
or $30,000. Today, that sensor does not exist.
In order to get that capability, that surveillance
capability, there are a number of technologies that we can look
at. This list I am going to give you is by no means exhaustive,
but it is a starting point.
Radars. The present radars that have been tried and tested
are principally mono-static--that is, it is the typical radar
you have seen in the World War II movies where you have got the
transmitter and receiver antenna are the same. We are
interested in looking at bi-static and multi-static radars that
user separate transmitters and receivers. They could have some
advantages along the border, a spread-out border such as we
have on the Southern border. One form is called passive
coherent localization. It uses ambient signals such as TV, cell
phone, direct broadcast satellite, and radio signals, with a
lot of multiple receivers to detect moving targets. This
technology has been developed for air defense by the military
over the last few decades. It has never been used in a ground
sense, although there have been some initial looks at it.
However, a technology testing and development effort is
required to fully understand the phenomenology for surface
targets and the required system parameters. Today we do not
know it will work, but it is worth looking at.
Fiber optics. There have been a number of fiber optic
concepts proposed, some with sensors attached to the fiber
every few meters, some which use the fiber itself as the
sensor. Although for most border applications that means
burying the fiber, that technology also has some intriguing
advantages.
Unattended ground sensors is one of the systems the Border
Patrol uses today. They are planning on doing upgrades to their
unattended ground sensors in the America's Shield Initiative,
and DHS Science and Technology looks to assist them in looking
at new sensors, alternative power sources, covertness, signal
processing, connectivity, power
Airborne sensors have an advantage of height of eye, can
look out over a long range, thus give excellent range. The
Border Patrol has successfully used UAVs in the Arizona Border
Control Initiative and shown that that has a definite force
multiplier. We would like to look at a combined sensor system
that has synthetic aperture radar, an EO/IR sensor suite, and
develop a payload in a manned aircraft, and that could then be
downsized for UAVs.
We are also interested in high-altitude or space-based
sensor systems, and a key piece of the technology is automated
scene understanding, that is, having machines do the detection,
at least the alerting to operators, thus saving a lot of
manpower.
Finally, we have a test and demonstration program ongoing
in the Arizona area starting up called BTSNet in which we are
trying to get connectivity and scene awareness to the agent in
the field.
In conclusion, there is not one silver bullet solution to
maintaining complete awareness and control of who and what
approaches our borders. What is required is a system of systems
approach that integrates multiple sensor and surveillance and
tactical systems and response systems into an information
network. America's Shield Initiative provides that overall
system of systems framework.
We will be providing key technology capabilities that can
be incorporated both at the beginning of ASI and over time as
technology matures. We are looking at the sensor types of
technologies I just described and scene awareness and
information processing.
That concludes my prepared statement. With the Committee's
permission, I request that my formal statement be submitted for
the record.
Chairman Cornyn. Certainly. Both of your formal statements
will be made part of the record, without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Evans appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Cornyn. Chief Aguilar, I think you just explained
the discrepancy we had on the numbers of apprehensions. The
numbers, I believe, that we were given indicate that year to
date for fiscal year 2005 it has been about 653,000
apprehensions. You mentioned that it is 1.1 million for the
last complete year of statistics, correct?
Mr. Aguilar. Fiscal year 2004, yes, sir.
Chairman Cornyn. And so far this year you have seen about a
3-percent increase.
Mr. Aguilar. Overall, yes, sir.
Chairman Cornyn. Do you have any idea or guesstimate of how
many people who come across our border we are unable to
apprehend because of lack of equipment, technology, or manpower
to do that?
Mr. Aguilar. We have been asked that question numerous
times, Senator, and the only manner that we have found to be
responsive to that is in the following: In those areas where we
are fully deployed, where we have the technology, the number of
personnel, the mix of resources that is appropriate to bring
operational control to the border, we can gauge it pretty
closely. We have areas where we feel very confident that we are
getting over 80, 90 percent of the attempted entries. We have
other areas where we just do not have the resources, the
manpower, or the technology out there to start even gauging.
We use what we refer to as a loose manner of intelligence,
if you will. I do not know if you are familiar with the term
``sign-cutting,'' but we go out and actually ride the line and
track any kind of incursion that has occurred--of course, that
is after the fact--and we try and count that. In areas where we
do have the technology, RVS systems, remote video surveillance
systems, or we use third-party indicators, community call-ins,
law enforcement call-ins, things of that nature, we have a
better feel for it. But, unfortunately, we cannot give you that
overall for the Nation.
Chairman Cornyn. I am curious. Why do you think it is that
your number of OTM apprehensions, other-than-Mexican
apprehensions, is up 124 percent over last year?
Mr. Aguilar. Senator, as you probably know, one of the
issues that we have, one of the concerns that we have is our
ability to detain those other than Mexicans that we do
apprehend, that the Border Patrol apprehends. Our sister
agency, ICE, is trying very hard to manage the bed spaces that
they have out there. But, unfortunately, it is not a good
system that we have in place in some locations, and by that I
mean the following:
We have one sector in particular, McAllen, which is in
South Texas, that has an OR rate, order of recognizance rate,
where we release these people on their own recognizance, that
goes upwards of 85 to 90 percent of the apprehensions that we
do make.
The one very good thing--and I can assure this Committee of
the following--is that before we release these people on a
notice to appear, order of recognizance, through technology and
the full integration of IAFIS and IDENT, we make sure through
every possible database that we are not releasing a person that
is going to be a problem to this certainly or, in particular,
has a nexus to terrorism.
Chairman Cornyn. When we get a chance, maybe in other
rounds, or maybe other Senators will get a chance to ask you
about IDENT and IAFIS and how that helps. But as far as the
reason we have seen such an uptick in other-than-Mexican
incursions, is there a specific reason why you think that is
the case?
Mr. Aguilar. One of the reasons we feel is because of the
fact that we are not able to detain as organizations under DHS
the amount of people that we are seeing coming into this
country.
Chairman Cornyn. Well, of course, the IAFIS and IDENT
systems are only as good as the data you have in those systems,
correct?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Chairman Cornyn. In other words, if you don't get a hit
based on the identity of the person who comes across, obviously
you are not going to detain them then for a criminal record or
for other reasons. Is that right?
Mr. Aguilar. That is correct, Senator. IDENT basically is a
legacy INS system that is a recidivist information-capturing
system. IAFIS goes into the master FBI criminal file. The one
thing that we have instituted as a matter of standard operating
procedures, if you will, is that our officers on the line, even
as much as the old law enforcement gut feeling that there is
something that needs to be investigated, we work very closely
with JTTF, FBI, and all the other associated law enforcement
agencies to ensure to the degree possible that we are not
cutting anybody lose that is going to be a threat to this
country.
Chairman Cornyn. I understand and appreciate the great job
you are doing considering the resources you have, but I just
want the record to be clear that just because somebody's name
does not appear in the IDENT or IAFIS database, it does not
mean that they are safe, that their presence in America is
necessarily something we ought to feel comfortable about. Would
you agree with that?
Mr. Aguilar. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Cornyn. And just so the record is clear, when we
say other than Mexicans, we are talking about people who come
up through the Southern border of Mexico from Central America,
maybe South America, but we are also talking about people who
fly from other continents to Central or South America and then
use those known routes of ingress into the United States as
well. Correct?
Mr. Aguilar. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Cornyn. For example, Chinese immigrants, Russian
immigrants, we are talking about people from the Middle East,
literally almost any country in the world, right?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir. The highest rate of OTMs that we
apprehend right now along our Nation's borders are in the
following order: Hondurans, El Salvadorans, Brazilians,
Guatemalans, and Nicaraguans. But there is a whole array of
other countries that we do interdict along our Nation's
borders. That is correct.
Chairman Cornyn. And I will just ask one last question
before I turn you over to Senator Kyl. We have heard during the
post-9/11 debates about our state of national readiness and
preparation that we have to be right 100 percent of the times,
the bad guys only have to be right once. And given that fact,
given the difficulties that we have controlling our borders,
identifying who is coming in and why they are coming in, do you
have serious concerns today that, given the nature of our
borders and our inability to control them because of lack of
resources, America is in danger?
Mr. Aguilar. I would answer that question in the following
manner, Senator, and that is that we have done a lot since 9/
11, resources have been added. Could we use more? Absolutely.
We are continuing to add, we are continuing to become more
efficient by adding technology, by adding infrastructure,
tactical infrastructure and things of this nature. We are now
up and running, for example, on IDENT/IAFIS. But, yes, the
concerns are there. That is why we continue to work very hard
to ensure that to the degree possible, within the resources
constraints that we have, we move forward and ensure the best
we can in the area of national security.
Chairman Cornyn. Thank you.
Senator Kyl?
Chairman Kyl. Thank you. I have some questions, Dr. Evans,
for you, but just to follow up with one final question, Chief
Aguilar. You have a category, in addition to the other-than-
Mexican designation, there is a category of countries of
special interest, I believe is the correct phrase. What does
that mean, and what is the problem there?
Mr. Aguilar. Special interest countries, Senator, are
basically countries designated by our intelligence community as
countries that could export individuals that could bring harm
to our country in the way of terrorism. And what that means is
that anytime that we encounter an individual from those special
interest countries, we pay particular attention to the
individual, his or her background, where they come from, where
they have transited to get to our country, and things of this
nature. We have an SOP on things that we ensure we do: JTTF
notification, FBI notification, run all the databases and
everything that we can.
As an example, the United States Border Patrol last year
apprehended about 400 aliens from special interest countries.
Chairman Kyl. And my understanding is that part of the
concern is that those numbers are going up. Is that correct?
Mr. Aguilar. At the present time, we have about a 10-
percent, approximately about a 10-percent increase at this
present time. Yes, sir.
Chairman Kyl. Thank you.
Dr. Evans, let me get right to the bottom line, and I mean
that literally, with respect to the budget for the kind of
technology innovations that your folks are working on, the
testing and acquiring of new technologies.
Chief Aguilar says we can always use more. That is evident,
I guess. The question is: Do you have enough money to
aggressively pursue the operational goals in the area of
technology? And do you think you can do an adequate job? And by
adequate, I mean to get the job done. Or could you use
additional resources? And if so, what particular areas and in
what quantities?
Mr. Evans. Senator, I usually answer that question, which
is sometimes a little loaded, with the fact that under way we
have this fiscal year the BTSNet, which is the information
networking efforts. We really start seriously looking at some
of the sensor technology in fiscal year 2006 with some early
first-cut looks this fiscal year. I just brought on board a
program manager for sensor systems.
We can always use--we will be funding-limited in what we
do. You know, sometimes you have programs which are just
technology-limited. No matter how much money you threw at us,
we could not do it any faster. In this case, the funding limits
the number of different kinds of things we can look at. But it
has got to be traded off against all the other priorities that
science and technology has and some very large threats.
We will start looking at some of the technology programs in
things like passive coherent localization this year and next
year. We have already done some in UAVs, but we do not have a
very large effort. We are looking to support it and to support
the ASI.
Chairman Kyl. And that is true both with respect to the
research as well as the actual application in the field. Is
that correct?
Mr. Evans. That is true with respect to the research and
what I would call the test and evaluation in the field. The
actual application and deploying in the field is the Chief's,
and he has that under the ASI initiative. So two separate parts
of our budget.
Chairman Kyl. Is that right?
Mr. Evans. Yes, there are two different appropriations: one
is RDT&E and one is procurement.
Chairman Kyl. Now, you mentioned the unmanned aerial
vehicles, and I will just--in fact, let me relate this
anecdote. I don't think he would mind. The successor to Chief
Aguilar in the Tucson Sector said that he really appreciated
the use of the unmanned aerial vehicle while it was flying in
the Tucson Sector. It was very helpful to them. And I think
everybody there wishes that we could have it redeployed.
There are also all of the usual resources of manpower,
vehicles, airplanes, sensors, cameras, radars, all of the
things that are in the arsenal or the toolkit, in effect, of
the Border Patrol. And there is a sense that if you have a
certain amount of money to spend and you have to engage in the
tradeoffs, as you mentioned, then you are better off going with
those lower-tech but proven capabilities as opposed to putting
all your money into the unmanned aerial vehicle.
I would like to ask both of you to speak to that, but, in
particular, Dr. Evans, if you could relate to what the costs
are, what is the value of it, and what would the decision
matrix be to decide whether or not to put the money into a
full-scale use of the UAVs rather than the pilot projects that
has now come to an end versus other kinds of capabilities.
Mr. Evans. We see the UAV, the unmanned aerial vehicles,
especially the class of vehicles that we have employed in ABCI,
as what I would principally call a tactical vehicle. It is not
something that is going to give you wide area surveillance
coverage across the entire border. It does significantly
enhance the Border Patrol's tactical operations. With that,
they are able to--keeping agents out of harm's way, they are
able to track aircraft, track people, come in, if you have some
other indication that there is something occurring, they can
get to it fairly quickly and get eyeballs on the situation.
There are any number of light-weight and medium-weight UAV
programs and airframe systems around. We in S&T and DHS do not
necessarily need to get into that development. The development
that we really need is both in ops concepts, but also in the
sensors. I believe the sensors that have been used so far in
UAVs in the border have been optical IR sensors. We need to
combine that with other types of sensors and put together a
sensor package. And I think the road to doing that in reducing
the risk in the sensor package is in doing that in aircraft
first and then downsizing the package. That is where the cost
comes in.
In the meantime, for the Chief to be able to UAVs and
operate them--whenever you introduce a new technology such as
the UAV, it has an impact on their concept of operations and
how they learn to use and operate it. And it will take them
time to learn how to most effectively operate it. So any
experience that they get using that type of vehicle will be
most helpful to them. In the meantime, we want to work
principally on the sensor sweeping package.
Chairman Kyl. Let me restate the question, even though the
time has expired. I would like to get a really specific answer.
You have a given amount of money--and this is for both of you.
I am told that the UAV was very good in the pilot project, that
they would really like to have it back. I am also led to
believe that there is not enough money, and so, in effect, we
put the question to him: Well, which would you rather have, a
lot more agents, some helicopters, some more horses and ATVs
and a few more cameras and radars and so on, or--or, not and--
the UAVs? And what I am trying to get at is your assessment of
whether we really need both, because we will not appropriate
the money unless our colleagues are convinced that the problem
is such that we do not gain by making that choice, we only gain
by providing the resources for both. But if we cannot tell them
that you have said, yes, you really need both, then we cannot
make the case.
So can you provide us a little more specific information
there, is what I was trying to get at.
Mr. Aguilar. Let me go ahead and take at least part of that
question, Senator, and I will answer in the following manner:
As I stated earlier, part of our new revised national
strategy speaks to obtaining the right combination of
resources. Those have been primarily identified as personnel,
infrastructure, and technology. It is that mix of resources
that we apply to the border that will ensure that we bring the
operational control that we need to bring there.
Now, having said that, CBP, Border Patrol, was, in fact,
the first law enforcement agency that applied UAVs in an
enforcement posture. It was a pilot program in order to learn,
to see what it could do for us. It proved to be very effective,
especially in the area of officer safety, cueing, and bringing
to resolution in some of these very remote places some of the
sensor hits that in the past it would have taken an officer to
respond 100, 120, 200 miles sometimes, to go check on that
sensor. Utilizing the UAV, we could send it remotely and bring
to resolution that hit out there, if you will.
Now, that being the case, we are evaluating that pilot
program that we had, and in addition to that, at minimal to no
cost to CBP, we are also doing everything that we can to
continue testing that type of equipment. Today as we speak,
commencing on the 20th, which is, I guess, about 8 days ago, we
are flying a Hunter UAV provided to us by the military in
Arizona to continue the testing process. It will be with us
until the 15th of May.
Now, one of the things that is critical here is that we
continue testing the technology attached to that, what is
referred to as the EO/IR sweep, the electric optical sweep that
is attached to them.
Do we need both? Would both help us? Absolutely. The Border
Patrol agent on the ground is key, but that force multiplier,
especially in some of these challenged areas that we talk
about, very vast, very remote, that combination of resources.
Do we need it across the Northern and Southern borders? I would
have to say a qualified probably not. But would it come in
handy in Arizona and some portions out there? Yes, as it has in
the past.
Now, as to how many, how many agents, that right mix of
resources, the technical sweep that is going to be applied to
it, that is what we are trying to identify right now.
I don't think that gives you the answer of yes or no, but
that is where we are at right now.
Chairman Cornyn. A vote was just called at 3:45, and,
Senator Coburn, why don't you proceed. And then what I will do
is I will go vote, and I will come right back and hopefully we
will all--
Senator Coburn. Fine. Thank you.
First of all, I would like to introduce into the record the
Pew Hispanic Center report, March 21, 2005, on the size and
characteristics of the undocumented population. They also
estimate that you stopped 1.2 million but 3 million came. So
the net increase of those that came and went home, the net
increase of our population, about 2 million people this year in
terms of illegal population.
I want to ask just a couple of questions. I know what your
answer is going to be, but I want it on the record. Is it
illegal to come here without a visa?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Senator Coburn. All right. Do the American people have the
right to expect that that law is enforced?
Mr. Aguilar. Absolutely.
Senator Coburn. All right. Is that law being enforced?
Mr. Aguilar. Within the resource capabilities that we have,
I believe it is, sir.
Senator Coburn. All right. Let's don't qualify it as to
resources. Are people coming here illegally because we do not
have the resources with which to control the border?
Mr. Aguilar. I think that is a correct statement, yes, sir.
Senator Coburn. So the question is--and you cannot believe
the number of times people in Oklahoma come up to me and say,
``When are we going to control the border? When are we going to
do it? Are we going to control the border?''
My question is somewhat along the same lines as Senator
Kyl. What do you need? Tell us what you need. You know, we have
19,000 retention beds. They need 50,000 retention beds. That is
another $1 billion to add those retention beds. It seems to me
if we put $1 billion on the border, we might need fewer
retention beds. And that is the same question the American
public is asking.
I know that the CBP--what they have to do, and I know what
ICE has to do. My question is: What do you need? Because the
people from Oklahoma and I think most of the country is willing
to make some sacrifices internally to give you what you need. I
want to know what you need. How many billions do you need?
I want an answer.
Mr. Aguilar. Okay. Let me answer in the following manner,
sir. Two years ago, a little over two years ago, when DHS came
into being, we were all brought together under Customs and
Border Protection, at least for us. That is one of the things
that we brought to the table. Commissioner Bonner has basically
asked us and we have put together a national strategy and an
implementation plan to address that national strategy.
One of the basic components to it is identifying the right
mix or the right combination of resources. Again, the resources
that we are looking at are personnel, technology, and
infrastructure, tactical infrastructure. Does this mean that we
need 2,000 miles of border along that Southern border? No. But
we need to be able to place it to where we believe it is going
to make the most good to stem that flow, to bring operational
control to the border. That has been prepared.
As you know, our Secretary is brand new. We are in the
process of briefing this to that level of Government, and that
is where we are at right now.
Senator Coburn. I would just tell you the American people
are dissatisfied with that, and you know it as well as I do.
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Senator Coburn. You know, we had what I call undocumented
Border Patrol agents last month in Arizona working, helping
you, and I don't know if that was a good idea or not, but I
think that we should pay very close attention to what that
means. That means there is a level of frustration out there
where we are not effectively carrying--we are not funding you,
we are not doing the oversight, we are not doing the direction
so that you can carry out what the American people know they
should have and expect.
And, you know, it is really not about illegal immigration.
It is really about the risk of terrorism.
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Senator Coburn. And the rhetoric is going to get way too
hot in this subject if, in fact, there is not a better response
from the administration. I can just tell you that. And then it
will not be on the basis of what we all want it to be, a
planned ascent to control the border. Then it is going to be on
ethnicity and things other than what it should be.
I would just hope that you would take back that we will
have the time that you want to make. We do not have the time to
wait 2 or 3 years for you to get the sensors that you want or
to add the people that you want. They need to be added now, and
we need an honest discussion of what it is going to take in
this country to give you the resources. We know you know how to
do it and we know you know how to create a layered and multi-
faceted approach to do this. The question is: Let's have it and
let's start responding to it so that the American people can
perceive it.
Let me tell you how personal this is. You know, our ERs in
the South are overrun with illegals for health care. Our public
schools are now overrun with illegals. We have this chain
migration where you come in pregnant and deliver and establish
residency because you now have a citizen of the United States.
That cannot continue to happen because the communities cannot
afford it anymore. So this is building.
I cannot impress--Dr. Evans, I would love to hear your
response to this. There is a level of frustration throughout my
entire State that says we are not doing what is supposed to be
done to enforce the law. And that does not mean you are not
trying. I am not saying that. But I want to send home to you
the importance of timeliness of response on this, because I
think this is not a good thing for the American people to be
this frustrated with the Federal Government. There are a lot of
other things they should be more frustrated about.
Dr. Evans?
Mr. Evans. I understand the frustration. In some of these
areas that I have talked about, we are talking about inventing
on schedule. That does not necessarily easily happen. We are
admittedly funding-limited not technology-limited in a lot of
the things we do to support Border Patrol and some of our other
BTS customers. That is a matter of priorities within the
administration, and that is above my labor grade.
Senator Coburn. But what was the request for increase for
Border Patrol and ICE this year? If that is one of the
priorities of the administration, what was the level of request
of the administration from Congress in the budget for an
increase for both the CBP and the Customs Border Enforcement?
Mr. Evans. Well, in the R&D that comes into a line which is
support of conventional missions for Science and Technology,
and that includes all of CBP, that includes emergency
preparedness response--
Senator Coburn. I understand. What is the percentage
increase that they asked for?
Mr. Evans. I think it was about 10 percent, but I would
have to go back--
Senator Coburn. Ten percent, and we know that you
intercepted 1.1 million, and we know another 2 million came in.
And I am just telling you, that is not acceptable. It is not a
policy of this administration to address that; otherwise, the
request would have been higher. What do we need?
Mr. Evans. I think in technology development, there are a
couple of key areas that we need. We need to look at things
that are--first of all, there are a number of fairly mature
products and mature technologies that are already out there.
For example, you know, I talked about radars. In the types of
scanning radars that are out there that we tested in Arizona
Border Control--
Senator Coburn. Let me interrupt you for a minute because I
am going to have to go vote. You said just a moment ago you are
not technology-limited, you are budget-limited.
Mr. Evans. Yes, I am--
Senator Coburn. Okay. So my point is--
Mr. Evans. I am not limited in the choices of technology we
can try to bring to bear to this.
Senator Coburn. That is right. And so if we have a layered
approach, multi-tactical approach, the question comes: What
would it take for us to do to control the border to allow Chief
Aguilar to have the resources so that he could tell the
American people, look, this is just a dribble now? Because that
is what they are looking for. This is a very compassionate
Nation. We will deal with the people that are here in a proper
way, and we will then have a national assessment about how many
people should come in. But we need to know from this
administration what is really needed to do it.
Mr. Evans. I do not have a number. I am not--
Senator Coburn. Okay. Would you commit to give to this
Committee from the administration, from DHS and from the
administration, the dollars required to achieve the goal? That
is what the American people want to know.
Mr. Evans. There are two parts to that, to answering that
question. The first is in the Chief's and he does and the
Border Patrol does what they are going to do for the major
systems procurements. That is ASI, and that is the number of
sensors and the number of people, the overall system. But for
developing the technologies for that, yes, we can answer that.
I cannot commit to the second part.
Mr. Aguilar. Senator, you asked at the very beginning that
we answer your questions, and I think I can do that in the
following manner very succinctly, and that is that illegal
immigration is a phenomenon that needs to be approached, I
believe, from several component aspects. We deal with the
enforcement aspect of it. We, I think, do a fairly good job of
identifying the type of technology that we need. We are in the
process of identifying the level of that technology, personnel,
infrastructure that we need.
I think there are other components that would also be
brought to bear, which I will not go into for obvious reasons--
that is not my expertise--that would absolutely help us also
bring control to the border by stemming the illegal immigration
flow.
Senator Coburn. Absolutely, and I understand that. I will
not put that as part of this. We understand the incentives that
need to be on the other side of the border, the economic
investment that needs to be done. I understand all those other
things. And the American people do, too. But what they know is
it is against the law, and we are charged to uphold the law,
and we are charged to give you the resources to do that. So it
seems obvious to me that the administration has to tell us what
is it going to take to get the job done. And we cannot wait 10
years to get the job done.
Mr. Aguilar. I would agree.
Senator Coburn. Because every day you cannot intercept who
you need to intercept that puts us at risk is a day that we put
our country and our children at risk. And it is not acceptable.
And if we are going to waste money in this country, the
American people are willing to waste it trying to control it on
the border. So we are willing to let you make some mistakes. We
just want to know what you want. And a 10-percent increase is
not enough if it is going to say we are going to intercept 1.4
million out of 3 instead of 1.1. It is not enough. We have to
know what it is.
I am going to recess this until Senator Kyl and Senator
Cornyn come back, and thank you so much for being here and
offering your testimony.
[Recess.]
Chairman Cornyn. We will go ahead and reconvene. Sorry
about the interruption, but Senator Kyl is planning on coming
back after he votes as well.
Chief Aguilar, let me start my questioning again with you.
I had the experience not too long ago of flying with a Border
Patrol agent in a helicopter in Webb County along the Rio
Grande River. And although I am very familiar with that part of
my State and that part of the United States, I was struck by
the huge expanse of area that our Border Patrol has to monitor.
And what I learned was that as a result of some of the build-up
of Border Patrol and the use of equipment in the Arizona area
because of the reasons that you have already discussed with us,
the large influx of immigrants across that border, we have had
to take some men and women and some equipment from other parts
of the border. Is that a fairly common phenomenon that you try
to move men and women and equipment around in order to meet
what you view as a more urgent or more overwhelming concern?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir. Yes, that is fairly common. That has
been historically common within the United States Border
Patrol. And let me just preface that with Webb County, Laredo,
Texas, is where I started my career, so I am very familiar with
that vast area.
But, Senator, one of the things that we do is we do take
our resources and try and apply them where they are more
needed, but not at the expense of the enforcement capacity from
the sending location, if that makes sense, and by that I mean
the following: that we ensure that when we take those
resources, when we draw down, when we detail into another part
of the country, there are enough resources in place to control
or maintain the level of operational control that we have.
Laredo, for example, in the last 7, 8 years has received
remote video surveillance systems, in fact, is building
tactical infrastructure right now, has gained greater
accessibility and mobility to the river, the Rio Grande. So
these are the things that basically make the sitting resources
more efficient that allows us to take some of those drawdown
and apply them on a temporary basis.
Chairman Cornyn. Has it been your experience, Chief, that
your adversaries, so to speak, the human smugglers and others
who try to penetrate our border, that they are pretty smart,
they know where you have moved your people and your resources
and they may try to exploit the weakness in our line?
Mr. Aguilar. Absolutely, sir. Very cagey, very smart, and
they have a very good counterintelligence system.
Chairman Cornyn. And I do not want you to misunderstand my
comments as being critical. What I am critical of is the
Federal Government's inability and unwillingness over the past
couple of decades, at least, to deal with this problem in a
comprehensive fashion. In an ideal world, you would have all
the people on the ground and all the equipment necessary in
order to secure our border as much as humanly possible. So
please understand where I am coming from on that.
The other thing I heard when I was last in Laredo was that
these human smugglers, the coyotes, the others who are bringing
people across, they learn how to use diversionary tactics
perhaps to get Border Patrol agents as a result of the tripping
of a sensor, maybe cameras going off and the like, to move in
to try to detain, let's say, a handful or one or two people
coming across the border. And just as the Border Patrol moves
to that location, then others break across at another location
and perhaps make a run for it, so to speak. Is that another
common or routine sort of tactic used to try to get people
across?
Mr. Aguilar. Very much so. Senator, what you just described
in the field is what we used to call sacrificial loads, where
the smuggling organizations would send a load out in one
direction while the real load was being put out in another
location, while our resources were being diverted out here. It
is very taxing on our agents out there. That is one of the
reasons why technology, I think, is so important to us to bring
to resolution as quickly as possible any kind of diversion of
resources, any kind of sensor alarm that goes off, things of
this nature, as quickly as possible.
I would like to touch on that just a little more because a
question was posed a few minutes ago about the Minutemen
situation in Arizona, and that is the following: that anything
that taxes our resources takes away from our capability to
secure our Nation's borders. In that area of the country, that
effort, if you will, was taxing on our resources because
sensors were being set off, technology was picking up movement
and things of this nature that we had to bring to resolution.
So that was indirectly--not meant to be, but it was taxing on
our resources also down there.
Chairman Cornyn. Well, ideally, we would not have to have a
situation where civilians felt obligated to move in and fill a
void that has been left in our border security enforcement. But
I appreciate what you are saying because when your sensors go
off, you do not really know who is setting it off, so you have
to deploy men or forces there to find out what is going on and
to deal with it, whatever the case may be.
One other thing I would like to explore with you. You know,
we talk about people breaching our border and coming into the
country, and we know that a given number of those are people
who have no hope and no opportunity where they live, and so
naturally, living next to the wealthiest Nation in the world,
they are going to go where they believe that they can get a job
and provide for their families. And I think every one of us as
human beings can understand that natural human impulse.
The danger really lies from my perspective in the fact that
the same means of breaching the border and coming across is
available to someone who wants to work in a restaurant or a
hotel or a construction site as somebody who wants to come
across to do us harm or somebody who is bringing illegal drugs
or engaging in other illicit activity.
Has it been your experience that some of the people engaged
in human smuggling are essentially just in it for the money? In
other words, what I have wondered about is whether the same
element that will bring people across the border are just as
happy to bring weapons, drugs, traffic in human beings, and
engage in other criminal activity for profit? Do you agree with
that generally, or what has been your experience? Maybe I will
just let you state it in your own words.
Mr. Aguilar. I do agree with that statement, Senator, and
our experience has been that we have seen a melding, if you
will, of these organizations in order to smuggle people,
narcotics, weapons, anything for money. That is the bottom
line. But that is why it is so critical that we continue our
partnership and partnership building with the FBI, JTTF, our
ICE agents. ICE, our sister agency, is concentrating its
efforts on the organizations, which is really where one of our
main problems is and where we should be concentrating our
efforts out there.
Chairman Cornyn. Dr. Evans, the organization that you are
the head of at the Department of Homeland Security, the
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, as I
understand it, that is the Homeland Security equivalent of
DARPA at the Defense Department. Is that correct or is that a
fair comparison?
Mr. Evans. First of all, Senator, I would like to thank you
for the promotion, but I am the mission support office of
HSARPA and--
Chairman Cornyn. You are welcome.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Cornyn. Thanks for the correction.
Mr. Evans. It shares it in name. It has some fundamental
differences. And I at one point in my misspent youth was a
DARPA program manager.
In DARPA, we were not anywhere near as driven as we are in
HSARPA by requirements. I have requirements set by the Border
Patrol, by the other agencies through portfolio managers, so we
are much more requirements-driven. In DARPA, DARPA was
essentially and is essentially sort of on top of the DOD
structure that was a special agency set to just go do high-
risk, high-payoff things, and there is no real boundary on what
you want to look at and do, other than DDR&E sort of sets some
general guidelines, do space this year, you know, do something
else. So that is the major difference.
The things that are common is we are a very program
management-oriented structure. We have a turnover of people
coming in and out so that we get technical refresh of people.
We tend to think of things in terms of programs of 2-, 3-, 4-
year time frames, and the program managers are both technically
capable as well as managerially capable. Those are the
similarities.
There is a similarity in the law in setting up HSARPA. It
referred back to DARPA in a number of ways, one of which was
some of the personnel ways. So there is some special category
of personnel that we hire.
Chairman Cornyn. Well, I appreciate that explanation. I
guess what I was really getting to is this: I serve also on the
Armed Services Committee, and I am familiar--actually on the
subcommittee that has oversight over DARPA, so I am familiar
somewhat with what they do in terms of research and
development, come up with new and creative technical,
technological solutions to some of our challenges in the area
of our defense requirements.
How much communication and cooperation across Government
agencies is there when it comes to some of the technology? We
have heard testimony today about the deployment of UAVs,
unmanned aerial vehicles, which became a matter of common
knowledge as a result of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq and
the technology being deployed there. We have talked some about
sensors, which, of course, are used commonly in a military
context.
Are there any restrictions or limitations or impediments on
the transfer of technology and science between Government
agencies like the Department of Defense and the Department of
Homeland Security? Is that something we ought to be concerned
about or ought to look into? Or is it working just the way it
should?
Mr. Evans. As far are I know, there are no limitations. In
fact, we rely on DOD, and most of us have come from DOD program
management R&D background, and so we tend to rely on DOD as
both a source of both ideas and also some technical agents. We
use technical agents, and we use, for instance, night vision
lab, the Army labs in some of the sensor areas that we are
starting to look at. We will look at the Air Force for passive
coherent localization. They have done a lot of work there, and
I use the Navy lab out in San Diego for container security, and
we are using them also in some of the BTSNet efforts.
Also, probably half of my program managers have come from
DARPA, so they bring along a head full of great ideas as they
walk in.
It is almost as a joke, but when someone comes on board,
one of the people when I have a staff meeting, you know, asks
two questions: Did you used to work in the Navy? And do you own
a dog? And we do not understand the one about the dog, but we
understand the one about did you work in the Navy.
Chairman Cornyn. Chief Aguilar, let me ask one last
question, and then I will turn it back over to Senator Kyl. I
have read some news reports recently that indicate that there
is some problem with the cameras that are being used along the
border, that they are frequently broken, that we do not have
the manpower to monitor the video feed, and other concerns.
Could you give us the straight story on that? Where do we
stand? Do you have concerns?
Mr. Aguilar. I can give you an answer on that by saying
that at the current time 90 percent of the cameras that are
deployed out there physically are, in fact, in working order.
There have been some problems in the past. We looked at--let me
begin again, Senator.
The cameras that are actually on site in the ground,
approximately 90 percent of them are fully operational as we
speak. Now, that was not the case as recently as a year ago,
but we have worked very hard to get these up and running.
As you are aware also, probably, the old ISIS legacy INS
system is being assimilated into the ASI program that we are
very much looking forward to. As a part of the ASI program,
that assimilation will be bringing up to speed those cameras
that are on the ground right now to ensure that they will be
able to be integrated into that ASI program. So we are now the
beneficiaries of money that has allowed us to bring these
cameras up to speed at a rate of about 90 percent.
Chairman Cornyn. ASI stands for what?
Mr. Aguilar. I am sorry, sir. That is the America's Shield
Initiative, the America's Shield Initiative that will be
basically an all-encompassing means by which to bring
electronic monitoring to the border. It is something that we
are looking forward to, going through a process right now. It
is a comprehensive integration and application of technology as
a means of bringing operational control to the border. And what
it is going to do is maximize and ensure that detection,
intelligence-building capabilities, identification, deterrence,
interdiction, investigation of illegal border incursions
occurs.
Chairman Cornyn. And when will that be stood up?
Mr. Aguilar. At the present time, we are going to through
the process of actually standing it up. Our next main point, if
you will, is what is known as key decision point two, which
will occur this May. And then subsequent to that will be an RFP
for an integrator. Once the integrator to integrate all of
these systems, both off the shelf and developing, will take
place, within 30 days of selection of that then the ASI
procurement will start taking place.
Third quarter of 2006 is when we anticipate at the present
time that this will commence.
Chairman Cornyn. Senator Kyl?
Chairman Kyl. Thank you. Let me just continue to follow
that ISIS matter. GSA was the agency that reported on the
deficiencies in the contract. Am I correct? That was not an
Inspector General or some other agency.
Mr. Aguilar. I believe--and I will have to check on this,
Senator, but I believe it was the GSA IG--
Chairman Kyl. It was the IG, Okay.
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Chairman Kyl. And my understanding is that they found
significant irregularities in the contract performance of the
supplier that resulted in an inadequate system being deployed
that was frequently down in many of its components, and that it
has taken some time and effort to get it back up to where it
should have been. Is that correct?
Mr. Aguilar. That is correct, yes.
Chairman Kyl. So there may be some repercussions for the
contractor that allegedly failed to perform properly, but in
terms of the system's capabilities today, it is now as capable
as you would expect it to be. Is that correct?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes. We are constantly trying to upgrade it
even from 90 percent, but one of the things that we became
beneficiaries of when we melded with CBP is that we also got
additional support from the existing technicians that were over
in CBP. So we have been able to augment our support capability
to that existing system.
Chairman Kyl. Okay. Now, what is it that has to be done to
``bring them up to speed?'' Do you have to develop some
communications links that enable you to transmit the visual
images to some other location than the monitoring station? Or
what is it?
Mr. Aguilar. Senator I am afraid I cannot give you a lot of
detail, but a lot of it was not the right equipment being
placed in the right place, obsolescence in some cases,
communications linkage in others. So it was a variety of things
that we needed to bring up to speed.
Chairman Kyl. Well, what do we need? I presume that because
this is such force multiplier that we are anticipating
continuing to deploy these cameras in as many locations as we
can. What is the plan, basically? Are we continuing to deploy
cameras in additional sites to put more cameras in the same
site, to build better monitors? What are we doing generally
with the video camera? And, by the way, some of these are IR,
some are video, optical, daytime. What is the mix and what is
the plan on deployment?
Mr. Aguilar. The mix in each one of these sites, Senator,
is such that it will give us day and night-time capabilities
24/7. Of course, our wishes are 365 a year.
Currently we have 246 operational camera sites. In addition
to that, for example, in California we are getting ready to go
up with another 11 sites, I believe. Arizona was the
recipient--and I am going from memory here, and if I am wrong,
I will get you the right information--I believe was the
recipient of another nine this past year. We have a total of
about 18 in the Douglas-Naco area of operation, another 15 in
Nogales, and we are getting ready to go into what we know as
the west desert area out there also.
Chairman Kyl. Now, that first number you gave us, a very
large number, are those mobile units? In other words, your
first number was a hundred and some? What did you say the
numbers were?
Mr. Aguilar. There are 246 camera sites.
Chairman Kyl. Okay, 246 sites?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir. A pole in the ground that has a
combination of cameras that will give us a day-night
capability, thermal--
Chairman Kyl. Okay, but there were 18 in the Douglas-Naco
area?
Mr. Aguilar. I believe that is correct.
Chairman Kyl. And you have another couple dozen in the
Nogales area?
Mr. Aguilar. I believe so. I will have to check on that,
but I believe--
Chairman Kyl. That is not nearly enough in those areas.
Mr. Aguilar. We continue to build up on these, Senator. One
of the things--
Chairman Kyl. Where are the 246? Are they in California and
Texas?
Mr. Aguilar. No, sir. Tucson Sector, for example, has 39,
Yuma has 18, Swanton has 6, El Centro Sector has 41, El Paso
has 27, 20 in Laredo, 29 in McAllen. I think what is critical
here, Senator, is for me to--I failed to explain, but each one
of these camera sites, each one of these poles has the
capability of looking in either direction about 6 miles.
Chairman Kyl. Right, but 18 in Douglas and another 20-some
in Nogales is not nearly sufficient there, so you need more
cameras in the Tucson Sector.
Mr. Aguilar. I would agree with that, yes, sir.
Chairman Kyl. So that is an area of deficiency that we need
to satisfy. What is being done to ask for the money to get the
cameras in those areas?
Mr. Aguilar. That is actually a part of the America's
Shield Initiative that we just described a few minutes ago.
Chairman Kyl. Is that in the 2006 budget request?
Mr. Aguilar. I am looking at my staff, $64 million? There
is $64 million in the America's Shield Initiative for 2006,
yes, sir.
Chairman Kyl. Okay. So part of that would be for upgrades
and additional cameras?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, both.
Chairman Kyl. Okay. One of the things that--and this has
almost become mythology, but I think it is true. In the early
years, a lot more resources were put into Texas, and especially
fencing, but additional resources in California, with the
result that a degree of control was obtained in both the Texas
and California areas, and that immigration began then being
funneled into Arizona, first in the Nogales area and then into
the Douglas area, and then to some extent now over in the Yuma
area, but it is still heaviest in the Douglas area, roughly,
part of the Tucson corridor.
Now, first of all, is that observation generally an
accurate observation?
Mr. Aguilar. I am sorry. Is that--
Chairman Kyl. What I just told you, everybody always says
that. Is that generally true?
Mr. Aguilar. That is generally true, yes, sir.
Chairman Kyl. Okay. Now, what was it that helped us to gain
relative control--and that is a term that I appreciate does not
mean total control, by any means--in Texas and California but
has not permitted us to gain that degree of control in Arizona
yet?
Mr. Aguilar. One of the things that I will point back to,
Senator, is what I talked about earlier, going from urban
operations to rural. When we dealt with urban operations,
infrastructure that was directly south of us, we were able to
bring it to quick control. There was a shift over to the rural
areas. This dissipated the criminal organizations on a much
wider array, if you will. Application was the same--personnel,
technology, and tactical infrastructure. The problem here is
that when we are dealing with the rural environment, rural
dynamic, it is a much broader scope of operations that we go
into.
Chairman Kyl. So, for example--do you mind if I just
continue with this for just a minute?
Chairman Cornyn. No. Please go ahead.
Chairman Kyl. For example, between San Diego and Tijuana,
first of all--you have got the ocean, which is one border--a
lot of fencing was put in, triple fencing. To my knowledge, no
one has ever gotten through the triple fencing. There have been
crossings through the port and around Otay Mesa, but not
actually over the fence itself. So because you had urban areas
there and you were able to fence that, and then, of course, put
monitors and Border Patrol there as well, the illegal
immigration except through the port itself has slowed to a
trickle in that particular area. Is that correct?
Mr. Aguilar. It has fallen dramatically, yes, sir.
Chairman Kyl. Whereas, in the Arizona desert, let's say on
the Tohono O'odham Reservation or the gunnery range or one of
the other Department of Interior jurisdictions along the
border, there are no communities, there are no towns, very few
roads, and it is some flat terrain, but a lot of mountainous
terrain as well. Is that an accurate description?
Mr. Aguilar. That is correct.
Chairman Kyl. Two or three hundred miles there, and that
dispersed area is a much more difficult area for the Border
Patrol to have the same kind of control that I described in the
California, San Diego area. Right?
Mr. Aguilar. Absolutely, yes.
Chairman Kyl. Okay. Now, Texas is a big place, and one
thing I have not understood is that certainly Texas is not all
San Diego. I know El Paso and Juarez and so on is, but you have
got a lot of area of Texas that is ranch land with the river in
between. That is not quite as remote and desolate as the
Arizona desert, but it certainly is big country, a lot of
space. How is relative control obtained there? And why can't
that be applied to the Arizona desert?
Mr. Aguilar. I think two major things come into play,
Senator, and one is that most of Texas is privately owned land.
We have easy accessibility to the border. We can also work with
the independent private landowners to gain accessibility and
build the tactical infrastructure, build the roadways, things
of this nature.
If my memory serves me correct, the border in Arizona,
approximately 92 percent of it is environmentally sensitive, so
we have to go through a multi-year process to even plant a pole
in the ground, for example, for an RVS camera, to build the
tactical infrastructure, to build the roadways and things of
this nature.
Second, one of the things--and I know that you and I have
spoken about this before, Senator--is the ability--or the
inability, I should say, for us to control the means of egress
out of the Arizona border by way of checkpoints. If we would
look at a map of the Southwest border and pinpoint the
checkpoints, we would have them throughout Texas, especially on
all the major roadways, 281, 77, 59, 359, 83, all of those
major roadways. We do not have that kind of capability in
Arizona, and controlling the means of egress out away from our
border is essential to bringing control to the immediate
border.
Chairman Kyl. Okay. I want to follow up on those direct
points, but--
Chairman Cornyn. Go ahead.
Chairman Kyl. Okay. And what are the key reasons why we
don't have those checkpoints in Arizona?
Mr. Aguilar. One of them, sir, is appropriations language,
wording constraints.
Chairman Kyl. Which says what?
Mr. Aguilar. Which says that we cannot build permanent
checkpoints anywhere within the Tucson Sector of the United
States Border Patrol.
Chairman Kyl. So in the Tucson Sector, is that any more?
You cannot build any more with appropriation funds, right?
Mr. Aguilar. We do not have any. We do not have permanent
checkpoints.
Chairman Kyl. So you are relegated to the use of temporary
checkpoints or mobile checkpoints?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir, mobile checkpoints that we move
around. Yes, sir.
Chairman Kyl. And ideally, what would the disposition be?
Would you have both or one or the other?
Mr. Aguilar. It would be a combination, but the majority of
the time we would have the permanency of the checkpoints in
order not only to man them but have the proper equipment to do
the job that is required at our checkpoints, to control those
means of egress.
Chairman Kyl. In contrast, what do you have in Texas?
Mr. Aguilar. Let me give you an example. Highway 35 coming
out of Laredo, one of the biggest ports of entry out there in
Texas, Highway 35 has an approximate 19,000 to 21,000 vehicle
flow through that. It is similar to our 19 checkpoint in
Nogales, Arizona. During that 24-hour period, people going
through the checkpoint in Laredo on 35 will have a four-lane
checkpoint approach, will have a separate bus approach, the
agents will have the use of forklifts, for example, to offload
a semitrailer if a canine hits for human or narcotics. We have
ability to cut into vehicles if the need is there if the canine
hits and we do not see anything obvious. All of these come
together.
We also have what we refer to as peripheral infrastructure
on either side of the checkpoints, permanent checkpoints. That
gives us the ability to basically get an idea as to what is
going around us by means of remote video surveillance systems,
sensors, fencing, tactical infrastructure, things of that
nature.
The 19 checkpoint coming out of Nogales, very similar
traffic flow and type of traffic; as you know, a lot of produce
semitrailers coming out of there. We do not have the--we have
got one lane to check the traffic coming out of there. Now we
have two because we are on the main line. We do not have a
means to run, in fact, sometimes even IDENT/IAFIS check. We
have to take the apprehended people back to the station to do
it out there.
Chairman Kyl. In other words, in the mobile unit, you don't
have any infrastructure associated with that?
Mr. Aguilar. Exactly.
Chairman Kyl. You have got to have battery-powered whatever
that runs on electricity. You do not have any holding areas and
so on. Right?
Mr. Aguilar. Exactly. Staging areas, detention centers,
things of that nature.
Chairman Kyl. Okay. So that is one of the impediments that
you have there.
Mr. Aguilar. Yes.
Chairman Kyl. And another impediment is the environmental
constraints because of the Federal ownership of the land. Any
action that you take out there becomes a major Federal action
subject to NEPA review.
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Chairman Kyl. An action such as putting in bollards to
prevent vehicles from crossing the border, adding fencing,
putting in a pole for a camera, et cetera. Is that correct?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Chairman Kyl. What kind of a delay do you end up with? And
how much impediment really is all of that?
Mr. Aguilar. In my own personal experience, Senator, when I
was a chief down there in Tucson, I immediately identified a
need for a specific type of technology out there. From the
point of identifying the need to getting a pole in the ground,
for example, for a remote video surveillance system was upwards
of 2, 2-1/2 years. We have been working on the Tohono O'odham
Nation now for vehicle barriers since about 3 years ago when I
was still down there. We have gotten the approvals, but we are
now working with the Tohono O'odham Nation. We are working with
the Department of the Interior, things of this nature.
On the Buenos Aires Refuge down there, we have established
a need to access and get mobility to the immediate border. We
have been doing that for at least 2-1/2, 3 years ago, and we
have not been able to get the requirements just to blade the
existing road and maintain it to get easier accessibility to
the border.
Chairman Kyl. In other words, there is no road along the
border, no regular road.
Mr. Aguilar. No regular road, no, sir.
Chairman Kyl. And so you have had to blade an area where
your vehicles can travel along there.
Mr. Aguilar. That is what we would like to do, yes.
Chairman Kyl. But you do not have permission to do it for
the entire area there.
Mr. Aguilar. That is correct.
Chairman Kyl. Do you have access to the hilltops or
mountaintops for your surveillance equipment, or are you
limited there as well?
Mr. Aguilar. Not on the Tohono O'odham Nation, sir. Every
elevated site is considered a sacred site, so we do not have--
Chairman Kyl. Do the smugglers or coyotes or others abide
by that same determination?
Mr. Aguilar. No, sir. They have access to them on a daily
basis, 24 hours a day.
Chairman Kyl. So these are some additional problems for
controlling those more areas?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Chairman Kyl. Now, another concern is simply being able to
go after the bad guys. I am going to take just 20 seconds,
Senator Cornyn. If you look at this from the air, it is just
honeycombed with little trails, and as you get closer down to
the ground, you see it is also honeycombed with trash, just
tons and tons and tons of trash. But here you have got a very
fragile desert environment where you run a track across there,
and it can be decades before it rejuvenates, the growth,
because it is very arid and only certain plants survive there.
So you have this honeycomb of trails used by illegal immigrants
both for vehicles and individuals and a great deal of trash. So
they clearly have access to the entire area here.
Does the Border Patrol have unfettered access as well to
all of these areas, to, in effect, if you see a group of
smugglers, drug smugglers or illegal immigrants going through
the desert, can the Border Patrol simply go after them, let's
say, with an ATV or a four-wheel vehicle?
Mr. Aguilar. No, sir. We are restricted against going
across open territory like that, especially in those areas.
Probably one of the most telling examples that I think I have
shared with you, Senator, is the area in Ajo that we know as
the Sweetwater Pass area. The Sweetwater Pass area, when I was
the Chief down there--this was about 3 years ago. We had a
beautiful canyon area, and the smugglers were utilizing it to
traverse because they knew we could not follow. We worked with
the other Federal agencies out there. We determined that we
could use--we could not use motorized vehicles. We could not
use bicycles because we would rut, even though the smugglers
were. So we ended up with horses. We deployed on horses. But
the only way that we could deploy on horses is that for a
period of 2 weeks we had to give them special feed so that the
droppings left by the horses would not bring in nonindigenous
plants.
Chairman Kyl. Now, please repeat that.
Mr. Aguilar. We had to feed the horses feed that would
ensure that the droppings would not bring nonindigenous plants
into the Sweetwater Pass area. And that was the only means that
we could deploy in there.
Chairman Kyl. Senator Cornyn, I have some more questions
along this line, but I think I will defer to you for 5 more
minutes.
Chairman Cornyn. Well, this has been fascinating.
Chairman Kyl. There is more. These guys have a tough job.
Chairman Cornyn. I know they have a tough job. This has
been very informative, and Senator Kyl and I have discussed the
geographic and other differences between Texas and Arizona that
make the challenges greater, and I have new appreciation,
particularly coming across Arizona, of the challenges that you
have. And I guess it also confirms the wisdom of people from my
State in 1845 when we were annexed to the United States, we
reserved the right to maintain that land as non-Federal but
State-owned land. And who knew it would turn out to provide us
a better means of securing our borders. But it has been very,
very informative.
Chief, you talked a little bit about the checkpoints and
how that has been helpful. But what I would like to explore
with you is what we are doing, to your knowledge, beyond the
checkpoints. How far are the checkpoints typically inland?
Twenty-five miles or so?
Mr. Aguilar. It varies. It varies, Senator. Under our
statutory authority, we can operate within 100 air miles of any
border of the United States. We have checkpoints that are
within 4 or 5 miles. The checkpoint in Laredo, for example--we
just built a new one--is going to be 32 miles north of the
border out there.
One of the critical aspects that you have hit on, sir, is
part of our new strategy, and that is a defense in depth of
which the checkpoints are absolutely critical to control the
means of egress away from the border. But this also means that
we will address the transportation hubs that are below and
above the checkpoint issues also, to keep those away from the
smugglers and utilizing them to impact upon migration into the
United States.
As a quick example, if you do not mind, sir, we now deploy
Border Patrol agents at Sky Harbor Airport in Phoenix. We have
also deployed agents at Las Vegas Airport and Los Angeles
Airport because we have found that when we take away smugglers'
ability to cross in certain parts of the border, what they do
is they try to get around us and make their way to these
transportation hubs. So, again, that defense in depth is
absolutely critical. Part of that is also working in
conjunction with ICE investigations to ensure that we do
everything possible to disrupt and dismantle the smuggling
organizations that are trying to continue to get around this on
a constant basis.
Chairman Cornyn. Did I understand you correct that you have
a statutory limit of 100 miles that you can operate in?
Mr. Aguilar. For checkpoints.
Chairman Cornyn. Just for checkpoints.
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir. We can operate anywhere in the
country.
Chairman Cornyn. Well, let me ask you a little bit about
that. My experience has been or my observation has been that
when people come across the border and if they are successful
in making the break through the border, then they typically
will go to safe houses.
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Chairman Cornyn. Where they are instructed to go, and they
will gather until someone comes to pick them up and drive them
just south of the checkpoint, somewhere south of the
checkpoint, let them out, give them water and provisions and
they will be instructed to meet up with other transportation
north of the checkpoint that will take them somewhere into the
interior of the United States. Is that a fairly common pattern,
to your knowledge?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, it is.
Chairman Cornyn. And so my point really gets to once people
get past the border, and particularly past the checkpoint, as
effective as they are, the smugglers take that into account in
arranging to get people out and around the checkpoints, if
possible. Once they get north of the checkpoint, that is, into
the interior, what sort of resources are deployed to actually
identify, detain, and deport people who come illegally into our
country?
Mr. Aguilar. As far as the Border Patrol goes, Senator, we
deploy beyond the checkpoints, if you will, into the interior
of the country whenever there is a nexus to border control
operations. As an example, Sky Harbor Airport, that is way
north of our checkpoints, but we feel it critical to take away
that facilitation of the smugglers.
Now, in addition to what the Border Patrol does specific to
border nexus operations, ICE has a tremendous responsibility of
working the stash houses, working the employed aliens, working
the criminal aliens and things of that nature. So we work in
conjunction with them, especially in the area of intelligence.
Chairman Cornyn. Is it a fair characterization to say that
once the immigrants make it into the country past the
checkpoint and are headed north, our chances of identifying
them, detaining them, and deporting them drops dramatically?
Mr. Aguilar. It does drop, yes, sir.
Chairman Cornyn. And that is simply because you are
outmanned in part, is it not? We do not have in the interior of
our country sufficient people or resources deployed to be able
to do that. Would you agree with that statement?
Mr. Aguilar. Senator, with all due respect, I think I would
leave that answer to my ICE counterparts that would have a
better idea of what it is their needs are in the interior of
the country. Do they need help? I would agree that they do,
yes, sir.
Chairman Cornyn. Well, we had our second hearing in this
series that dealt with interior enforcement. I understand your
wanting to defer to them, but my impression was that we do a
reasonably good job considering the resources that we have
committed at the border. But once someone makes it past the
border into the interior of the country, we virtually are
helpless in terms of our ability to identify, detain, and
deport illegal aliens. Thus, some of the programs that have
been put in place, a memorandum of understanding, I believe,
with the State of Florida, the State of Alabama, and I think
one other State. I read somewhere that California was
contemplating a similar MOU to provide local law enforcement
and State law enforcement with additional training and
resources in exchange for their agreement to serve as a force
multiplier in terms of interior enforcement. But it should, I
guess, come as a surprise to no one that one reason why we have
estimates in excess of 10 million people who are in this
country living outside of our laws is because once people make
it through the border, if they are detained, we do not have
adequate means to keep them until their deportation hearing
occurs. Once ordered deported, we do not have adequate means to
make sure that that actually happens. And once they get past
the checkpoint, they can literally just melt into the landscape
and become part of that 10 million-plus population.
Dr. Evans, let me ask you, if you had unlimited funds made
available to you by the United States Congress, what sorts of
things would you do with that money to further enhance our
homeland security and particularly our border security that you
are not able to do now because of limited funds?
Mr. Evans. Well, if I had unlimited funds, I outlined some
of the technology areas that we would be very interested in,
and let me preface this--this is in developing technology, not
deploying it. The Chief has by far the bigger problem. If we
come up with the magical camera, he is the guy that has to put
800 or however many of them out that are going to do it. But
developing the technology, unlimited funds, the areas I talked
about which included radars, looking at novel radar systems.
The problems that we have radars today are getting them up high
enough, getting towers for them. In the Coast Guard, looking at
similar things for the Coast Guard, we deployed some radars on
the coast, and the radar cost us $90,000; the tower cost us $1
million, plus the environmental issues, et cetera.
So we would look to try to really research and look at some
very novel types of radar approaches that had a fairly limited
footprint on the ground. That might be things such as
distributed multi-static radars we talked about, phased arrays,
smaller size multi-static types. So we would push a technology
program there, with in mind the fact that you are going to have
to go into very different environments, Northern border,
mountainous, desert, et cetera. Not one type of system will
work for all.
We talked about the UAVs, and so I would develop a combined
radar and EO/IR UAV package small enough to put into--light
enough and small enough but long enough endurance UAV. That is
something that the Border Patrol could afford in significant
numbers. There is a lot of technology out there both from--
principally from DOD that we can apply to that. DOD, however,
uses UAVs but they are pricey. They are a lot pricier than the
homeland security area, and one of the reasons for that, they
have a very different tactical mission in mind.
And I would go about doing that by looking at a series of
sensors, and as I talked about, I would put that on a manned
platform first in a test bed, see what works, you know, and
along with both the sensors themselves, just as important is
the signal processing that goes into that.
I would take a serious look at fiber optic sensors that are
buried. There may be long stretches that that could do fairly
well. My first look at it, I was very skeptical, but there have
been some pieces there that might work in particular areas.
That is not only the sensors themselves, the coupling into the
ground, how a sensor is actually coupled into the ground, and
both the sensing technology but also the signal processing
technology to really determine a footstep at a longer and
longer distance or determine a vehicle at a longer distance and
be able to track it. I think, you know, today we use fairly
unsophisticated methods for doing that, sort of see the thing
go along. In my former life, we did a lot of very sophisticated
signal processing to detect submarines, et cetera. So to look
at what signal processing can we get to bear to bring the
signal out of the noise.
We would look at novel sensors, at least, you know, things
such as acoustic things and other types of seismic sensors.
Added to that, start looking at automatic tracking, automatic
alertment in the visual sensor area, look at bolometers and new
technologies that are occurring in cameras and bolometers, plus
coupling that tightly with enhanced and better and better
signal and image and automatic scene understanding of the
camera itself. It could envision a fairly small set of cameras
on a tower, but on a smaller footprint tower than the Chief has
today, fairly autonomous. Today people have to watch the
cameras, but fairly autonomous that would just alert to
something occurring and see how far you could push that in
terms of--and then, lastly, I would start looking at more
airborne--we talked about the UAV, but look at sensors that are
even higher that would allow you to get a wider view and
particularly focal plane EO/IR types of sensors. Some of that
technology is classified in the national technical means, but
there are things we could do there.
That is sort of my list. I will think of something else
later.
Chairman Cornyn. I trust you will let us know.
And, Chief, finally from me, if you had unlimited
resources, what would you do with them that you cannot do now
because of limited resources that you think are important to
accomplishing your mission?
Mr. Aguilar. I think one of the most important things that
we would look at doing, Senator, is make sure that we integrate
the technology available as a systems package, as a systems
package to be able to integrate with the personnel resources
that we have out there; and then, in addition to that, take the
tactical infrastructure that we have now and that we want to
build out there to ensure that we deploy it in those areas that
will impact upon the smuggling organization's capability of
operating along our Nation's borders.
Chairman Cornyn. Thank you very much.
Senator Kyl?
Chairman Kyl. To follow up on that last point, my
understanding is that the use of the UAV, a very expensive
piece of equipment, was best achieved when it did not simply
fly along the border at a high altitude with people waving at
it but, rather, when it was relatively low so they could hear
it, and as soon as it flew over, somebody from Border Patrol
was right there. In other words, where the smugglers knew that
if they heard or saw the UAV, the Border Patrol was in the
area, integration of technology and the manpower. But if the
Border Patrol was not in the area, they figured, So what? Is
that, in fact--I mean, that is what your successor in the
Tucson Sector related to me about a month ago. Is that your
understanding of one of the utilizations and integrations of
the technology?
Mr. Aguilar. Absolutely, yes, sir. One of the things that
we actually took a look at when we flew the UAV out there was
removing the muffler system on it in order to make that noise
so that they could hear that it was in the area out there.
Chairman Kyl. But how much good would it do if they came to
appreciate there was not anybody around to stop them or to pick
them up, even if the UAV saw them?
Mr. Aguilar. It would depend on the area, Senator, and I
think you have asked a very critical question here, because to
create deterrence, the way that we explain it is that we create
a high-profile not necessarily a high-visibility presence on
that border, to the degree that when a person crosses that
border, makes an illegal incursion, he or she recognizes that
there is going to be an apprehension, interdiction, or
resolution of that illegal incursion, either right at the
border, which is preferable, or within a reasonable distance of
the border, which in some cases could be 25, 30 miles from the
border.
So that is the perception that we try to create. If the UAV
flies, the person sees it, he or she keeps on walking because
an agent is not around, but they keep being apprehended 20, 25
miles down the road, then we have created that high-profile
presence that will bring deterrence to that entire area.
Chairman Kyl. Right. I guess it could be anywhere from a
mile to 25 miles, but the bottom line is if it flies and
nothing ever happens to the people who are seen, then they
realize it is just for show.
Mr. Aguilar. Absolutely. The agents are key on the ground,
yes, sir.
Chairman Kyl. And both for Dr. Evans and you, I talked
about the fact that some of these hilltops were not available,
or actually Chief Aguilar talked about the fact that some of
the hilltops were not available. With respect to cameras,
lights, and radars and other--well, those three items, is it
much preferable to have a higher elevation from which to site
the particular piece of technology?
Mr. Evans. I can answer that. It is about 80 percent of the
problem.
Chairman Kyl. Is to get elevation.
Mr. Evans. Right. Topography, you know, ask an infantry
officer, topography is it. It really gets very, very--most
sensors or any kind of line-of-sight type of system or ground
clutter type of system are made ineffectual if you are going to
put them down in the middle of a valley. There are some
exceptions to that, but by and large, it is, you know, sort of
80 percent of the problem. I think you would agree.
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
Mr. Evans. Go to high ground and you can see.
Chairman Kyl. Now, finally, let me just conclude with Chief
Aguilar. I had mentioned the fact that your written testimony
refers to a lot of very interesting references to various
partnerships and agreements with different entities in Mexico
that have enabled you to go after the MS-13 group, for example,
and other potential terrorist organizations, sharing of
intelligence and a whole variety of cooperative agreements with
different entities in Mexico. But I said those were fairly
targeted kinds of agreements, and my perception was that with
respect to the typical kind of illegal immigration that occurs
at the border, there is very little cooperation from the
Mexican Government, and, in fact, the proof in the pudding that
such cooperation would actually bear fruit was the effort by
Grupa Beta--at least we have been informed it was Grupa Beta,
but it could be other entities as well that informed immigrants
that they really should not risk crossing in the area where
these Minutemen were because something bad might happen to
them. And my understanding is that the immigration dried up to
a trickle in that particular area for that reason.
So the question naturally arises: Why wouldn't similar
Mexican governmental warnings or admonitions to Mexican
citizens or other would-be immigrants not to cross the border
have a similar effect and what your experience has been in
trying to get the Mexican Government to work on that broader
type of illegal immigration?
Mr. Aguilar. Tough question.
Chairman Kyl. And let me preface it by saying you are not
the State Department and I appreciate that.
Mr. Aguilar. First of all, Senator, let me say that I agree
with you. The working relationships that exist now and are
being built on now are, in fact, as you put it, targeted
relationships specific to, frankly, our highest priority--
national security, terrorist, terrorist-related, terrorist
nexus and things of that nature.
Chairman Kyl. And the smuggling operations that are the
highest priority target.
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir, the criminal organizations that
operate south of the border either by way of intelligence,
working relationships and things of this nature. There are
several fronts that we are working on. For example, as we speak
right now, we are continuing to negotiate with the Government
of Mexico on the follow-up interior repatriation program, which
is a two-pronged approach. One is border safety to get people
out of these very dangerous areas in Arizona. The other one is
take them out of the queue, if you will, from the smuggling
organizations.
Beyond that, there is a reluctance. There is a reluctance
to engage in blocking, stemming that flow out there.
Chairman Kyl. Are you familiar with the Mexican town of
Altar?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir, very familiar with it.
Chairman Kyl. Describe it in 20 seconds or less.
Mr. Aguilar. The little town of Altar is south of the
border, south of Lukeville, Arizona, and it is about 60 to 65
miles south. It is a community that is very, very small in
nature. It has a floating population of aliens, of intended
aliens to come into the United States that has been measured
upwards of 20,000, 30,000 as a floating population, staging
there in order to make their way into the interior of the
United States, along with narcotics smugglers also.
Chairman Kyl. And so the sense is that if the Mexican
Government, for example, would go to a place like Altar and
say, Folks, look, we know you came here from a long ways away,
but you should not try to cross the border, and use the
authority of the Mexican Government to prevent it, it could, in
fact, significantly reduce the flow of illegal immigration
coming north, right?
Mr. Aguilar. I would agree with that statement, yes, sir.
Chairman Kyl. Well, I appreciate that is not your--well,
there are elements within your jurisdiction in which you have
been very successful in pursuing agreements, but as a general
proposition, I appreciate that that is not your primary
responsibility.
I know I share Senator Cornyn's gratitude for both of you
appearing here and taking this much time. There may be some
questions of a follow-up nature that we would want to submit to
you, and I hope you would be willing to answer those questions.
And some of our colleagues who could not be here today might
have some questions as well. But I thank you for your
testimony. There is so much more we could talk about, and I am
already 15 minutes late to another obligation, but I will have
the chance to visit with you both personally, I know, and I
appreciate very, very much that you were here today.
Thank you.
Chairman Cornyn. Thank you, Senator Kyl, and thanks for co-
chairing this important hearing.
Dr. Evans and Chief Aguilar, thank you very much for your
service to our Nation, and we know you have a challenging job,
and it is our job to try to make sure you have the resources
you need in order to be successful.
We will leave the record open until 5:00 p.m. next
Thursday, May the 5th, for members to submit additional
documents into the record or tender questions in writing for
the panelists.
And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:00 p.m., the Subcommittees were
adjourned.]
[Questions and answers and submissions for the record
follow.]
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