<DOC> [108th Congress House Hearings] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access] [DOCID: f:94837.wais] HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM: THREAT CODES AND PUBLIC RESPONSES ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ MARCH 16, 2004 __________ Serial No. 108-166 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house http://www.house.gov/reform ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 94-837 WASHINGTON : DC ____________________________________________________________________________ For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512ÿ091800 Fax: (202) 512ÿ092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402ÿ090001 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California NATHAN DEAL, Georgia C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER, CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan Maryland TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Columbia JOHN R. CARTER, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee ------ ------ PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio ------ KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont (Independent) Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director Rob Borden, Parliamentarian Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio DAN BURTON, Indiana DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio TOM LANTOS, California RON LEWIS, Kentucky BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER, TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Maryland ------ ------ JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts ------ ------ Ex Officio TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Analyst Robert A. Briggs, Clerk Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on March 16, 2004................................... 1 Statement of: Connor, Charles D., senior vice president, communications & marketing, American Red Cross; Michael Wermuth, senior policy analyst, RAND Corp.; Dr. James Jay Carafano, senior research fellow, defense and homeland security, Heritage Foundation; and Kenneth B. Allen, executive director, Partnership for Public Warning............................. 67 Hughes, General Patrick, Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Randall Yim, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team, U.S. General Accounting Office; and Shawn Reese, Analyst in American National Government, Congressional Research Service.................................................... 6 Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Allen, Kenneth B., executive director, Partnership for Public Warning, prepared statement of............................. 112 Carafano, Dr. James Jay, senior research fellow, defense and homeland security, Heritage Foundation, prepared statement of......................................................... 98 Connor, Charles D., senior vice president, communications & marketing, American Red Cross, prepared statement of....... 70 Hughes, General Patrick, Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, prepared statement of............................................... 8 Reese, Shawn, Analyst in American National Government, Congressional Research Service, prepared statement of...... 42 Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3 Wermuth, Michael, senior policy analyst, RAND Corp., prepared statement of............................................... 85 Yim, Randall, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of............................................... 19 HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM: THREAT CODES AND PUBLIC RESPONSES ---------- TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2004 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Shays, Turner, Schrock, Ruppersberger and Tierney. Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy analyst; Robert A. Briggs, clerk; Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk; and Andrew Su, minority professional staff member. Mr. Shays. The Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations hearing entitled, ``Homeland Security Advisory System: Threat Codes and Public Responses,'' is called to order. After a series of vague warnings and alarms, the utility of the Homeland Security Advisory System [HSAS], is being questioned by State and local officials, first responders and the public. Even Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge recently acknowledged the need to refine the code, five- color scheme that seems to me to be losing both its credibility and its audience. Seeing no difference between a perpetually elevated state of risk, code yellow, and a high risk of terrorism at code orange, Americans risk becoming color blind to the signals that are supposed to prompt public awareness and action. Since inception of the alert system 2 years ago, the threat level has been raised and lowered five times, flashing between yellow and orange whenever the volume of intelligence on al Qaeda went up or down, but the lack of specificity as to the time, place or nature of the perceived threats provided no basis upon which to calibrate appropriate public or private responses. As a result, governments and critical industries broadly increased security measures and incurred substantial costs. At the same time, exhortations to carry on as usual in the name of economic normalcy dulled any sense of urgency in the public at large. The Homeland Security Act charges the Under Secretary for Infrastructure Protection to administer the HSAS and to provide specific warning information and advice about appropriate protective measures and countermeasures to the public. The current system does not yet appear to meet the statutory requirements for specific information or specific advice. Whether due to an excess of caution about intelligence sources or a reluctance to ask for changed public behaviors and sacrifices, the codes and warnings in use today may be a better barometer of political realities than public safety risks. When a blizzard or hurricane is forecasted, the public is not advised to be brave for America and stay in the eye of the storm, but when the threat of terrorism is elevated, citizens are advised to go about their lives as if no real peril approached. We need to make terrorism alerts at least as targeted and accurate as storm projections. This week, the Select Committee on Homeland Security will consider legislation to improve Federal preparedness grants. A subcommittee of that bill directs the DHS Secretary to revise the alert system to include with each warning more specific designations of regions or economic sectors at risk. But other refinements could also add to the immediacy and the utility of any publicly disseminated terrorism threat codes. So we asked our witnesses--and we're very grateful to all our witnesses--to discuss the principles of effective risk communication that should guide public alerts and warnings and to suggest how to improve the Homeland Security Advisory System. We appreciate their being here today, and we look forward to their testimony. At this time, the Chair would recognize the distinguished vice chairman, Mr. Turner. [The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.002 Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I want to thank you for your continued efforts on reviewing the preparedness of our country and its appropriate response for the continuing terrorist threat that we have. I appreciate you holding this hearing on an issue that is very important not just for first responders or those who have responsibility such as at our airports for looking at the issues of security but also for everyday Americans who look at the system for guidance. I would characterize that most of the responses that I have received from airport security personnel, first responders or even people just out in the community or businesses that might have responsibility for protecting important infrastructure is that, as they look at this system, their question continues to remain, now what do we do, and I think that it is important for us to have the discussion as to how the system can be better correlated given a nexus, if you will, to specific responses from the community. Thank you. Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. At this time, I would ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the record, and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered. I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their written statements in the record. And without objection, so ordered. At this time I would recognize our first panel: General Patrick Hughes, Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Randall Yim, Managing Director of Homeland Security and Justice Team, U.S. General Accounting Office; and Mr. Shawn Reese, Analyst in American National Government, Congressional Research Service. What we'll do is we will start with you, General Hughes, after I swear you all in, and just say that I'm really looking forward to this first panel. I particularly appreciate, General Hughes, your candor when you testified before the Select Committee. I found your testimony on the issue that we're discussing very helpful, and I appreciated that, and I appreciate you being here as well as Mr. Yim and Mr. Reese. As we do with all our witnesses, if you would stand, raise your right hands. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Shays. Thank you. Note for the record all our witnesses have responded in the affirmative. The way we'll proceed, General Hughes, is that we have a 5- minute clock. We will roll it over to the second 5 minutes and I would hope that you would stop sometime in between that second if you haven't within the first, but technically we allow 10 minutes for your testimony but hope it will be a little less. Thank you. General Hughes, you're recognized. STATEMENTS OF GENERAL PATRICK HUGHES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; RANDALL YIM, MANAGING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; AND SHAWN REESE, ANALYST IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE General Hughes. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Turner. I'd like to thank you very much for the opportunity to appear here today. I do think this is an important topic. On March 11, 2002, President Bush created the Homeland Security Advisory System [HSAS], as a tool to improve coordination and communication among all levels of government and the private sector and, most importantly, perhaps, with the American public in the fight against terrorism. The advisory system is binding on the executive branch and suggested, although voluntary, for State, local, territorial and tribal governments and the private sector. The advisory system is the foundation for building a comprehensive, flexible and effective communications structure for the dissemination of information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks and protective measures to all levels of government, homeland security professionals and the American people. The system, created by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 and now, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, administered by the Department of Homeland Security, identifies a flexible framework for communicating, addressing and mitigating terrorist threats to the Nation utilizing a threat-based but risk-managed system. During periods of heightened concern, the framework provides the ability to change the threat condition on a national level but also affords the opportunity to target communications to particular geographic locales, industry sectors and other affected entities. The latitude provided by HSPD-3 allows the Department to address unforeseen situations and continue to refine the advisory system as the need arises. This flexibility is critical to the success of the advisory system and essential to its effective implementation. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003, the advisory system evolved into a framework that married the analytic assets of the intelligence community, which includes the Department of Homeland Security, with the Department's unique responsibility to assess the Nation's vulnerabilities and implement protective measures. Since its creation on March 11, the HSAS threat condition has been changed on five separate occasions. In each instance, the condition was raised from yellow to orange, but the circumstances surrounding each decision to elevate the threat condition varied. We recognize that a decision to change the threat condition has significant economic, physical and psychological impacts on the Nation. Therefore, decisions made by the Secretary, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, to change the threat condition are made only after careful consideration and close coordination with other Federal agency heads, including other members of the Homeland Security Council. In the future, as the Department matures and our implementation of the Homeland Security Advisory System continues to evolve, we will work diligently to provide information that best suits the needs of Federal, State and local officials, the private sector and the public. We look forward to working with the Congress on ideas to improve the system. HSAS is simply a tool, one of the many means to an end we're all working toward, which is to secure the homeland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'll be pleased to answer any questions you may have. Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, General. [The prepared statement of General Hughes follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.003 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.004 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.005 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.006 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.007 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.008 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.009 Mr. Shays. Mr. Yim. Mr. Yim. Chairman Shays, Vice Chairman Turner, members of the subcommittee, I thank you for this opportunity to participate in this hearing examining the Homeland Security Advisory System. On February 4, 2004, Admiral Lloyd, the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, described the advisory system as a blunt instrument and a work in progress, pointing out for the first time this past December that the advisory system specifically identified economic sectors and geographical regions subject to heightened alerts. He and members of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security agreed that such specificity was critical to maintaining the credibility and usefulness of the system, and these remarks are consistent with the comments we at GAO have received from State and local governments and the private sector. We last testified before this committee on February 3rd, describing the key characteristics of effective national strategies for homeland security and comparing and contrasting the extent to which several national homeland security strategies contain such characteristics. Our purpose was to assist in continual improvement and refinement of these strategies. Just as with our previous testimony, we hope that our preliminary observations of the advisory system will identify key characteristics of effective public warning systems, issues and factors to be considered and balanced when determining what information is to be disseminated and assist in continued refinement of the system. As with the national strategies, the true value of the advisory system will be the extent to which it is useful as guidance for, and actually used in implementation of prevention, vulnerability reduction, response and recovery measures by the relevant parties, including the general public. Of course, as General Hughes noted, the Homeland Security Advisory System is not and should not be considered the only means by which threat and response information is disseminated. It is but one of many tools, as he said, used to increase our national preparedness. We hope that our testimony will be useful in sharpening this edge and increasing its effectiveness. Specific threat and vulnerability information is received by Federal agencies and used by the executive branch in determining when to raise or lower the threat advisory systems. The key issues then are to what extent, when and with whom such information should be shared. In your request, this committee suggested a link between sharing information and the ability of the recipients to act upon this information. While each threat advisory reflects a unique fact and circumstance influencing the what, the when and with whom issues, risk communication strategies that have evolved in numerous contexts have common characteristics that may be useful in assisting evolution of the advisory system. Effective risk communication can and should not only assist in prevention, but also in implementing actions to reduce vulnerabilities, prepare for enhanced response and recovery should an attack occur. On the other hand, poor risk communication can lead to complacency, misallocation of valuable limited resources and be disruptive and expensive for the affected parties. Preservation of credibility and public confidence are important considerations in any refinement of the advisory system. My written statement describes the operations of the system, but, per your request, my oral remarks will focus on the types of information that should be conveyed to the general public. Terrorist threats, as I said, present unique facts and circumstances and are still relatively unfamiliar to the general public. This uniqueness and unfamiliarity must be acknowledged and recognized in devising refinements to the system. If these terrorist threats are unique, then unique or specific information should be provided to the extent that it's available. Most would agree that the refinements in the system this past November were more useful, focusing on specific sectors and geographic areas, but unlike more familiar advisories about weather, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, or infectious disease, specific terrorist threat warnings may allow terrorists to alter their tactics or targets in response or increase general anxiety in the public for those clearly not at risk. So we must acknowledge and account for the fact that some information available will not be widely distributed. Further, due to the nature of terrorist organizations and the types of threats, threat information may be vague, may be limited or simply unavailable. Thus, the general public needs to be educated so that they understand that false alarms arise from inherent uncertainty rather than from poor professional practice, that to a certain extent false alarms are inevitable, and we must guard against a cumulative apathy among the public during what I would term prolonged periods of preparedness. Finally, we have to acknowledge a fact of life, that, despite everyone's best intention, the threat of terrorist activities will cause both rational and not-so-rational responses. So, despite our best efforts, there will be unintended social, psychological and economic consequences. But, as an important point, when designing effective risk communication strategies, that we understand and acknowledge that these effects will occur and design our strategies accordingly to convey information to those receptive, and have the ability to act upon that information, while at the same time understanding that some will receive this information and act or not act upon it in less than optimal ways. So what does this mean for refinement of the advisory system? As this subcommittee and the chairman has acknowledged, we want to convey information that will increase our national preparedness. That is, we expect some action as a result of our warning. There has to be, then, some connection, some nexus between the information to be shared and the ability and receptivity to take positive action, forcing our planners not only to be intelligence and fact-based providers but, to a certain extent, social and psychological scientists, quite a difficult task. Risk communication experts generally agree that effective warnings should specify the nature of the threat, when and where it is likely to occur and over what time period, provide guidance or actions to be taken and perhaps, above all, assure that the information is consistent, accurate, clear and provided frequently. This is much easier said than done for terrorist warnings, but if we focus on the nexus between information and the ability to act and the receptivity to act upon it, then some patterns emerge, such as more specific information can and should be provided to those specially trained to receive and act upon the information such as firefighters, emergency responders, and we've seen that in the hazardous materials area where much more specific information is provided to firefighters in case they must enter a building that contains potentially toxic materials. For the general public and the private sector, State and local governments, the same principles can apply. Specific information that is useful in making risk management decisions should be conveyed so that the resources and intentions are focused on the highest priorities, and the capabilities of these parties to act are enhanced. For example, there may be vague threat information about a public sporting event. An individual may still wish to attend, but take some simple precautions such as notifying others that they are attending, carrying contact phone numbers or just simply thinking about the evacuation or escape routes in the event of an emergency. A private business may wish to review and update its emergency shutdown procedures or be sure that people are current on the evacuation routes. These are all examples of sharing information that is useful for, linked to the capability of the recipients to receive and act upon that information, resulting in what Admiral Lloyd calls a tactically actionable product. The linkage then between information and capability to act appear to be what other risk communication experts in the second panel discuss when they talk about the psychology of risk and risk management perception related to control, to choice, the potential for personal impact, the risk benefit tradeoffs and trust and a focus on the link on capabilities between information. I think it really affects the trust issue, trust that the information is accurate and useful, trust that the information is being conveyed to those with expertise and the ability to act upon it, like the law enforcement and emergency responders, and trust that the false alarms are due to inherent uncertainty in dealing with terrorist threats rather than a lack of competence. As I said, the credibility is of utmost importance to maintain. In closing, let me end with a few suggestions. If we want to foster a closer link between information sharing and capabilities, then we need to do a better job of capability assessment. We do not have a good inventory on the types of infrastructure, equipment, people skills that can be brought to bear in a major homeland security emergency or for the major missions of prevention, response and recovery vulnerability assessment, either horizontally across the Federal Government or vertically between the Federal, State, local and private sector. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 was not designed to make changes in the advisory system. However, it mandates that the Department and other Cabinet agencies inventory, use high techniques to map and model, again, to get a basic understanding of the capabilities that the existing infrastructure within the country can be brought to bear should a crisis arise or we wish to prevent a terrorist attack. That type of modeling inventory should be combined, again, as one of many tools with refinements of the Homeland Security Advisory System. Finally, if we focus on capabilities, let us not underestimate the capabilities of the general public. I, like many others, continue to be astounded and grateful for the capabilities demonstrated by the public during September 11th, during the days following, from acts of heroic rescue to incredible acts of kindness during response and recovery, to heroism in preventing even greater acts of terrorism. So I would close by just noting that the capabilities of the general public may be much greater than we think, so let's not shortchange the public by assuming too little about the types of information that are useful for increasing our collective national preparedness. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I'd be pleased to answer any questions. Mr. Shays. I thank you. First, the substance of your statement, as was the substance of General Hughes, was quite outstanding, but I have never in my 16 years looked at a statement so well organized and so consumer friendly the way you have done it. I'm going to take this statement and give it to my staff as an example of how I would like to see its work done. It's really extraordinary. Mr. Yim. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays. Very, very helpful. Mr. Yim. I give great credit to my staff. I'm just the spokesperson. Mr. Shays. Well, I understand, but you all have developed a system of trying to make things clear, and it's very helpful and an excellent statement as well. [The prepared statement of Mr. Yim follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.010 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.011 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.012 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.013 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.014 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.015 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.016 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.017 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.018 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.019 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.020 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.021 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.022 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.023 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.024 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.025 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.026 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.027 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.028 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.029 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.030 Mr. Shays. Mr. Reese. Mr. Reese. Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Turner and members of the subcommittee, I thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. The committee asked me to discuss four points concerning the Homeland Security Advisory System: the process the Department of Homeland Security uses in determining the threat level; the notification process that the Department uses to disseminate a change in the threat level; the information provided to the public when the threat level changes; and the lack of protective measures for States, localities, the public and the private sector. As General Hughes said, Secretary Ridge, then Director of the White House Office of Homeland Security, announced the establishment of the Homeland Security Advisory System on March 12, 2002. This advisory system has five threat levels. At each threat level the system prescribes protective measures that are mandatory for Federal agencies but only recommends them to State and local governments. Since the inception to the present, the system has never been lower than elevated or yellow, and has been raised to orange five times, with the Nation being at orange for a total of 87 days. If I correctly understand it from statements by Secretary Ridge, the process DHS uses in determining the system's threat level has three steps: First, DHS receives intelligence reports from a variety of entities within the U.S. intelligence community. Second, upon receiving these reports, the Department considers the following: whether the information is credible, whether the information is corroborated, whether the reported threat is specific and imminent and the gravity of the potential consequences of the threat. Third, in consultation with the Homeland Security Council, the Department decides whether the threat level needs to be raised or lowered. Once the decision is made to raise the threat level, DHS notifies State and local governments, the public and the private sector through a variety of communications systems. State and local governments receive notification through such systems as the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System and conference calls to Governors, State homeland security advisers and mayors of selected cities. Selected major industries receive notification through such systems as the critical emergency operations communications link; and, finally, the public is notified through a DHS public statement. These public statements provide general reasons for the change in threat level, but they do not offer specifics. The Department has said that intelligence reports indicate an increased probability of a terrorist attack. In the written statement I submitted, there is a table that lists the reasons and dates of the five changes from yellow to orange. The only time DHS has provided specifics on possible targets was on February 7, 2003, when the Department stated that intelligence reports suggested possible al Qaeda attacks on apartment buildings, hotels and soft-skinned targets, but no geographical location was identified. This leads to my final point, which is what some say is a lack of clear guidance on protective measures for States, localities, the public and the private sector. As I noted earlier, the advisory system has mandatory protective measures for Federal departments. These measures, however, are only recommended for States and localities, but these measures do not address the issue of what actions the public should take during heightened threat level. The only recommended actions the public received during the five orange alerts was to remain vigilant, report suspicious activities to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to carry on with their daily lives with a heightened sense of awareness. In summary, the advisory system in its present form does not provide specifics on why the threat level has been changed, nor does it provide clear guidance on actions States, localities, the public and the private sector need to take during a heightened threat level. I thank you, Mr. Chairman and I will welcome any questions you or the committee might have. Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Mr. Reese; and we appreciate the work of the Congressional Research Service. [The prepared statement of Mr. Reese follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.031 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.032 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.033 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.034 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.035 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.036 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.037 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.038 Mr. Shays. General, I particularly want to thank you for participating with this panel instead of just asking to be separate. That is very appreciated. I think we'll be able to understand this issue better because of it. We are going to recognize Mr. Turner, Mr. Schrock and then myself for 10 minutes, 5 minutes and then a rollover for 5 additional minutes. If someone is asked a question and you want to respond to it as well, even if you were not requested to answer, please feel free to jump in as well. OK. Mr. Turner, you have the floor. Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Being a former mayor, I talk a lot to individuals who are responsible for local protective functions, police, fire or important infrastructures such as water systems. Also, the security personnel at the airport. What I hear from them, which is echoed in many of your statements, is the lack of direction upon the elevation of the threat level. In the materials that we have there are obviously some protective measures that are listed, but many times there is a lack of specificity as to what one should do that has responsibility for important infrastructure. For example, local water authority. The threat level was raised. They know they need to increase their security. They need to do something, but they don't really know what necessarily to do. They don't know if enough, if it's not enough. Also, then they worry when the threat level is lowered that lessened security during a time of lowered threat may not really be in the best interest of protecting the community or in responding to the threat. While one of you acknowledged that the lowest we had gone is yellow, which is elevated--but even in looking at the protective measures between yellow and orange, orange says restrict facility access to essential personnel. Yellow doesn't necessarily provide that. Mr. Yim and Mr. Reese, could you please talk for a moment about the issue of that lack of nexus, Mr. Yim, that you had mentioned for advice to the local officials and their important infrastructures, if you have knowledge of some of the things that they're doing and the lack of direction that they're receiving on what they should be doing. Because I know this is very troubling to them. Then, General Hughes, if you could speak as to, you know, why don't we have more specific standardized recommendations to them, more specific direction that--as this code goes up and down, where they might feel that, one, they're rising to the obligation or, two, that they have, you know, a greater direction as to what it means. Mr. Yim. Mr. Yim. Thank you, Mr. Turner. I think the general perception is that the color-coded system is too generic; and, as a result, it's not refined enough to be able to provide that specific information. So as we evolve the system, we can conceive of different people with different expertise receiving different information instead of everyone receiving exactly the same. That would go a long way toward curing some of the specificity issues. So, for example, as we mentioned, if there is to be some link between the types of information you receive and your ability to react and respond to it, then we can or should be providing more specific information to the firefighters, to the first protectors, that are trained to use that information, allocate the resources appropriately and to act upon it. I'm sure that we can devise some manners when we have security issues surrounding how much information to disclose, if we're limiting the recipients, that perhaps the Federal Government would be a bit--feel a bit more comfortable conveying more specificity to those targeted-type groups. I think it's important, however, that one of the reasons that we tend to default to more general warnings is often we don't have a good sense of what exactly are the capabilities of the recipients of that information to respond. As I said, we have not done a good assessment nationally of the capabilities of the respective State and local governments to not only respond, but also to prevent terrorist attacks, to assess their vulnerabilities and reduce their vulnerabilities. So I think, to a certain extent, both the assessment and the warnings will evolve hand in hand as we have a greater sense of the capabilities that the State and local and private sector and public can bring to bear in prevention and response. As that capability evolves over time, as people get more sophisticated in what they need to do, then I think the warnings also need to evolve and provide greater information to them. We're clearly not there yet. We don't have a good sense, and we default then to, as I said, this generic warning system, which almost universally people feel is not that useful. The only other point I would make on specificity is that let's not go too far in specificity in limiting the recipients of that information. We should not presume who would find the information useful. For example, if we want to target geographical areas and limit the information to just those residents of New York, we may miss people that are doing business via IT or remotely with New York or who are planning a trip to New York that may want to make risk-management decisions based on threats to other geographical areas. So there is going to be a difficult balance between providing generic information that raises the country's general sense of alert, because we can't always anticipate who would be affected by that information, and providing specific information to those trained to use their resources wisely and to act upon that information. Mr. Reese. As we've all stated, numerous State and local officials have said that the information that's been provided to the threat level change has been generic. Secretary Ridge has also stated that sometimes the information has seemed generic but there has been a need to provide information to the general public and to selected critical infrastructure and the private sector and State and local officials. There is a need to announce a change in the threat level. I am not privy to any information that the Department sends out other than what is sent in the public statements to the public, so I will just kind of focus on that. There seems to be a desire to get a one-glove-fits-all situation, or protective measures that if it works well in New York then it should work well in Los Angeles. I would say the disadvantage to DHS giving specific protective measures or information would be that it doesn't foster State and local governments possibly to do their own threat and risk assessments. So I think, on one hand, we do want more information to be sent out so people can properly prepare, but on the other--and, as you know, CRS, we try to do the advantages and disadvantages. We want to ensure that we don't hamper State and local officials. Another issue that State and local officials bring up is when the threat level goes up there's an increase in cost that the government incurs. So if it's a specified threat that is geographically targeted, then, naturally, we'll--and we'll use New York City as an example. If New York City is targeted, naturally, we wouldn't want Los Angeles to incur costs more than they need, but it is universally--with the State and local officials and individuals that work in emergency management, there does seem to be a lack of information that causes people to question what they're supposed to do and when they're supposed to do it. Mr. Turner. General Hughes. General Hughes. Well, first, I found Mr. Yim's and Mr. Reese's comments to be instructive in several ways. I thought they were very good. But the issue that I'd like to point out to you is the struggle to try to find balance between greater specificity and broader information available to the public on the one hand and on the other hand generating some kind of a reaction in the official State and local, private sector environment and, by the way, in the American public that is broad enough to encompass the general threat; and that's what we strive for at the Department of Homeland Security. I will just make the flat statement that, as we now administer this system, it is specific, and we do communicate specifically with places that are specifically targeted. We do not do that in the public domain in general for obvious reasons. If we did that in the public domain, we would then give away our knowledge base and we would probably end up disclosing some of our protective and defensive measures. In my view, that would be a very foolhardy thing to do, so---- Mr. Turner. So, General, are you saying that communities that don't have a specific directive with respect--should consider themselves lucky in that they are not faced with the imminent threat that you're obviously trying to manage? General Hughes. Once again, I urge you to have in your minds somehow a balance. But, generally speaking, I think what you just said is right, that the nature of the threat that's communicated to the country at large versus the nature of the threat that is communicated specifically to places, times, circumstances that we have information about are sometimes very different. But if I may explain two issues here. The nature of the threat can be specific and often is and not rise to the level that requires us to change the broader threat condition. That is, in effect, this morning there are threats in the United States today about specific cities, specific places, specific events and specific conditions, but this morning they have not risen to a level of concern and to a due consideration for broader change across the country. When they do, as they did in December 2003, then after due consideration we need to make the broader change. And I have to explain the last piece of this idea, sir. When something is threatened in New York City, the idea seems to be that you can divorce that from events in Seattle, but you cannot. The two are inextricably interconnected now electronically, by transportation, by the features of our social order. We are interdependent; and, indeed, the vector that the threat comes from may not be precisely known. In some cases, when we have to raise the nature of the threat to encompass the Nation, the country, we're doing so because we may lack specificity, but we have enough general information to cause us to rise to that level of concern. I'd like to just close my answer on this issue by stating that the idea that these colors, the threat conditions that we use here, stand alone without any interior specific actions is a flawed viewpoint. We do have many different variations on the theme of specific, direct communication and coordination and specific activities that we can undertake within any of these general threat conditions here on this chart. So I just--I wanted to get that point across, that the basic premise here and some of our conversation seems to me a little flawed. Mr. Shays. Can you make that last point again? I'm missing it. General Hughes. Yes, sir. We seem to refer to these colors and the conditions they represent as if they are singular, and they are not. Each of them has a complex background, some of it based upon judgment and specificity of the conditions. So if Secretary Ridge, as an example, in due consultation reaches a decision to raise the threat level from yellow to orange, there are very specific acts based on intelligence that cause that to happen. There may also be a broad general condition that results from that. The color level is an example, manifestation of the broad general condition, but the specificity interior to that change is very precise. We talk to people directly. We give them the knowledge that we have in some form. Often, by the way, right now especially in this last raised alert condition, we were able to give information that is very closely held in the Federal Government to State and some local authorities for the purposes of explaining what was going on; and they knew in far greater detail than they had in the past what the threat was about. Mr. Shays. I would just make a point to you that you're basically saying to us that this code system is based on substantive determination, and that I can accept. But what I'm going to be wrestling with when I have a chance to talk to you is what does the public have a right to know? In other words, you're saying to us when you went to code orange, which is elevated, you in essence were saying something pretty significant and people better listen, because it wasn't based on a best guess. Then the question is, what does that really mean to the public? Mr. Turner, your time had run out, but do you have any closing comment you want to make? Mr. Turner. Thank you for asking, actually. I thought the General's point was very important when he indicated about the vector of a threat. For example, we know in the World Trade Center that the threat to New York did not emanate in New York, and I think that's very important. That's an issue that, in just reading these materials and looking at specific threats versus general threats, that we might not all be aware; and it was I think a very important point. Mr. Shays. Mr. Schrock. Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your indulgence, I'd like to have an opening comment. Then I have a couple of questions. First, let me thank General Hughes, Mr. Yim and Mr. Reese for their efforts in enhancing the security of our Nation. Ensuring our Nation maintains maximum security and vigilance while protecting our liberties is a challenge and responsibility for which we are all accountable. This task must be accomplished in a reflective manner of efficiency, expediency and comprehensiveness; and I recognize that this is an unprecedented task. As we proceed, our growing pains will be felt and the learning curve will be challenging. Progress will come from innovative ideas, innovative technologies, technological improvements and old-fashioned American ingenuity. However, in our desire to have in place the very best security advisory system we can, there is a dangerous risk in waiting for the perfect system. It is incumbent upon us to provide the resources and material support for the growth and continued improvement of this system. I've heard your testimony, read the reports and am becoming educated as to the difficulties you are encountering. I sympathize with the regulatory, physical and even the logistical obstacles that you face. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, we witnessed American resolve as we had never seen before. On all fronts, Americans were thinking outside the box. Americans know how to make things happen, and we succeed when we're challenged. Americans have an inherent right to be informed of the threats we face and should be provided sound information and accurate and available intelligence. With the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3, the American public is assured of that right, be it through Federal, State or local authorities. It is our obligation to see that right is provided. Secretary Ridge himself has correctly expressed concerns over the credibility of the system. We are all remiss if day by day efforts are not made and implemented which enhance the system's credibility. God forbid this country should sustain another terrorist attack in the future, but the reality is we had better be prepared. We have had 2\1/2\ years since September 11 and have made incredible leaps forward, but we are not there yet. I fear there has not been sufficient education of the American people regarding our advisory system. I would encourage a variety of public service announcements to educate Americans. As a kid, I remember the air raid sirens and the blank TV screens hissing the tests of the emergency broadcast system. I think the General and I can relate to that. We knew what that meant, and we were informed. Perhaps we need to make a similar outreach effort in this age of global terrorism. We must not be a government that cries wolf, but we must be a government of leadership and accountability. I have no doubt that your continued efforts will be successful. I wish to express my thanks to the witnesses again and the many dedicated personnel who have kept this country free from further attack. Their work is to be commended and your continued efforts to be encouraged. Question, besides the patent answer of give us more funding, what is it that Congress can do for you to help improve the Homeland Security Advisory System? If more money is the only answer, please lay out for us why, and I mean specifically, what that additional money will buy for the taxpayer. General, Mr. Yim, Mr. Reese. General Hughes. Well, thank you very much. I really appreciated the reference to the Civil Defense System and the long-ago insignia of the triangle on the circle. That's certainly a very poignant memory for me. Mr. Schrock. We knew what it meant, and we remembered. General Hughes. We did remember, and I still do to this day. I think the nature of the threat then, of course, primarily couched in terms of the former Soviet Union and the larger national strategic threat, is still a national strategic threat but couched in a much different way, kind of an ill-defined, fuzzy, nonpolitical entity out there that is striking us now as opposed to potentially striking us. So I see the threat as very imminent in many ways. With regard to your direct question, what can you do for us, well, I think what you're doing in the course of your work is vital. You are, by holding these kind of hearings and by engaging with us, assisting to inform and educate the American citizenry, and I think that's vital. I don't think I am in a position to tell you that we need more money. We need your support, and we need your understanding of the difficulty of operating this system, and I appreciated your comments in that regard. I think that your approach here to try to clarify the system is the same as the Department of Homeland Security's. We have made changes, and that term is kind of interesting. We have not radically changed the system, but we have made small tune-ups. We have identified procedural mechanisms that we have changed or put into use, and other steps have been taken, and, in some measure, some of those steps may have been informed or motivated by your work. So I would just like to say I can't tell you we need any resources right now. Your understanding and your involvement are critical, and I appreciate it and thank you for it. Mr. Yim. Thank you, Mr. Schrock. I think, with all due respect to all of the difficult tasks the Department faced, one of the things that the Congress can do is really hold the Department's feet to the fire in terms of doing vulnerability and capability assessments and making those assessments complete within a reasonable period of time. The new Homeland Security Presidential Directive gave a year deadline for the Department to do these critical infrastructure assessments and to set national preparedness goals. The Congress needs to be an integral part of the development of those national preparedness goals, assessments of the capabilities, not only at the Federal level but at the State and local and the private sector so that Federal programs can be designed--they are grant programs or tax policy or whatever programs--to stimulate enhancement of those capabilities. As we improve the capabilities of the various sectors to respond, then I think, as I said before, we will continue to evolve then the usefulness of the information that can be provided that would link the type of information to the capabilities of the recipients of that information. So I think there is a public education component, but there's also a tremendous oversight component I think, and that's GAO's role on behalf of the Congress but also in terms of designing Federal programs to stimulate the desired behavior. Because I think it will be absolutely clear that the Federal Government cannot own or fund 100 percent of everything that will need to be done in the Nation for homeland security. Mr. Schrock. I think I've heard you say that before. Mr. Reese. Mr. Reese. Sir, as you know, CRS doesn't make policy recommendations, but in my written statement I did provide some options should Congress decide that they would want to refine the Homeland Security Advisory System, and it's basically the two identified in my written statement. What I'd like to identify now is vagueness of warning and lack of protective measures. Some options for vagueness of warning would possibly be have DHS just provide general warnings, not to use the Homeland Security Advisory System, which they've done twice last year. On September 4, 2003, and November 21, 2003, DHS released public statements, general warnings. They were via public statements, and the system's warning was sent out to State and local governments. This addresses the concerns that have been asserted that it causes misunderstanding at the local level, but it would not address the issue raised by those who say DHS does not give enough specificity in the terrorist attack warnings, because, again, it's just a general warning, not a specific warning. The second option for that would be increased specificity of warnings when the threat level is raised. This is something that DHS says is a goal. They want to be able to issue high alerts to designated cities, geographical regions and industries and critical infrastructure. Next issue would be lack of protective measures. Some cities have already--some regions and cities, when going to orange, have already adopted some protective measures on their own. Surveillance cameras are activated. Law enforcement officers are granted--not granted time off, and so on. There's two policy options that Congress could look at. One would be just continue as is, allow the State and local governments to decide, conduct their own threat and risk assessments and decide what they need to do; and then the other one would be Federal guidance for State and local governments to the public and the private sector. The American Red Cross has a list of protective measures for the public schools, businesses, neighborhoods, at the different threat levels. This could be something that DHS could look at but, again, may not be as effective. If DHS were to provide specific guidance to State and local, the public, it may not be as effective if it was done at the State and local level. Mr. Schrock. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. Let me just make one more comment to our witnesses. This is a huge, huge issue with me personally. I represent the port of Hampton Roads, Norfolk, VA, area; and I worry about what they could do to our massive commercial port and the largest naval facilities in the world. Then I see what happened in Spain the other day and what the, ``knee jerk reaction was at the polls.'' I really worry about that. Because what that election told me was the terrorists won, and we simply cannot allow that to happen anywhere. So anything we can do to enhance this not only for this country but share with other countries as well will be most appreciated. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Tierney has agreed that I can go next, and then I'll recognize him. One thing I do know is that the folks in the Department of Homeland Security want a system that works well. I think they know it is a work in process. For me, the testimony that we have from Kenneth Allen, when he says in his testimony, the most important point that emerged from the PPW workshop, the workshop they had in 2002, was the conclusion that the Homeland Security Advisory System is a threat assessment system and not a complete warning system. The five colors tell the public that something may happen, but it does not identify what and where, and it does not warn citizens when an attack is imminent. Would any of you disagree with that statement? General Hughes. In my written testimony I address that issue and in the verbal testimony I gave you today I addressed that the Federal Government, the executive branch, especially the Federal Government, takes the homeland security advisory mechanism as directive in nature, and it compels us to act, but the State, local and private sector take it as suggestive, that is, the system that we currently operate under. So we do not compel the State and local and private sectors under this system to take specific actions by law. I think that's somewhat constructive. By the way, my experience so far is that we receive very good cooperation under this system from the State, local and private sector. I certainly know that there are complaints about some of the issues associated with the system. Mr. Shays. I think you're speaking, General, more of what I'm asking. I'm not asking whether the government is compelling anyone to do anything, whether it's Federal, State or local. What I'm asking is whether you agree that it's a threat assessment system and not a complete warning system. General Hughes. Well, I think that goes to exactly the issue that I tried to reply to. To me, if it were a complete system, this system might have some compulsory effect throughout our country in all of the levels of our social order. Mr. Shays. Yes. But even if we went one level down and didn't compel action--I realize in a storm warning we can tell people they've got to get off the Outer Banks, but in the system we have, we don't even warn people to get off the Outer Banks. General Hughes. We do, sir. Mr. Shays. Not in this system. General Hughes. With regard to the Homeland Security Advisory System? Mr. Shays. Yes. General Hughes. I think--first of all, I think drawing a parallel--direct parallel between the weather warning or alerting system and the homeland security system is a little bit different. I mean, the nature of the terrorist threat is about a direct attack on some critical feature of our government, our country, our culture, versus the kind of indirect and uncertain work of Mother Nature with regard to a large storm or natural effect. Mr. Shays. See, I feel in a way that the weather threat is more certain than the terrorist threat. General Hughes. Indeed, at times it may be. I guess the issue is whether or not the Department of Homeland Security should be in the business of engaging in warning the country about weather and about devastating storms that are approaching. Mr. Shays. And we do that---- General Hughes. We do that in general terms. Mr. Shays. No, we do that in very specific terms, I think, General. We anticipate a storm. We anticipate it is going to be in this area. We would not only tell the law enforcement folks and the first responders about it, but you, the general public, should take specific action. You need to leave this area. You need to board up your house, you need to do the following. I don't see any of that in the system that we have as it relates to terrorism. General Hughes. Sir, if I may just say--by the way, I kind of mixed the message there. I meant, we, the Department of Homeland Security, don't do that in specific ways about the weather. Mr. Shays. But can I back up a second? FEMA is part of---- General Hughes. FEMA is part of that. It is a response mechanism. But the National Weather Service---- Mr. Shays. Fair enough. That part you are saying is Commerce. General Hughes. In direct answer to your question, though, I think we do have exact parallels to what you are talking about. We do change actions, the actions of people, everyday people at airports, at ports of entry, at transit points. We change the condition in which they act often in connection with threats to the homeland. To me, it is very similar to asking people to evacuate. Mr. Shays. I am not sure we do it consistently then. When we went from--and let me say that one of the challenges that I have, which is--I understand why the colors confuse people. Green is low. Blue is guarded or general. Yellow is elevated or significant. Orange is high. Red is severe. In other words, you have--under threat risk, you have green, you say is low, blue is guarded, yellow is elevated, orange is high, red is severe. We are only going between elevated and high. General Hughes. So far. Mr. Shays. Yes. But, you know, there are some parts of the country that probably should be guarded or low, frankly. I mean there are. And you have some--probably places in Montana, you know, and they intuitively know that. And there are some places in Montana that may be the other way, depending on--but what I wrestle with is, when I am told as a Member of Congress what the threat is, I am thinking to myself, whom do I tell? I know what the threat is. I know we are concerned about a dirty bomb. I know that we are concerned that it may be exploded in four or five cities. I know that it may happen at a point in which there is a large gathering of people. So I process that information and I say, you know, I don't know if I want my daughter going there. And I also know that we were concerned that there might be a hijacking of a plane with some pretty horrific results, from Europe. Now, I know that. So when I had school kids' parents call me and up and say, we are thinking our school kids are going to Europe, I have to wrestle with whether what I know, I warn them; or whether I just say, no, just do what you normally would do. Well, I know I am not letting my daughter go there. She can go to South America, she can go to Asia, she is not going to Europe, at least with my recommendation, while you are at code orange. And you know why I am saying that? And what I also know is that others who had the same warning told me that they would react the same way, and they told their friends. So we told our friends what not to do, but we didn't tell the public. Walk me through why the public doesn't have a right to know what we are concerned about. General Hughes. Well, first, I think the premise that I would like to begin on is that our issue is to warn the public to the degree that judgment dictates that we warn the public, but not to incite the public to unnecessary actions. We try to do that in the system by carefully characterizing the nature of the threat and carefully administering it. I would just like to say that I am from Montana, by the way. Mr. Shays. I saw you smile. General Hughes. The nature of the modern environment here is that some group or person can originate from a place distant from the point of attack like, perhaps, Montana, and could indeed, if the vigilance and alertness and warning level were high enough in Montana, be found out before they get to a point of attack elsewhere, let's say, Los Angeles as an example. And so the nature of this is, when the condition seems to rise to a level of national concern, we apply these gradations that you talked about here on the chart. Mr. Shays. But let me just be candid with you. There are no gradations, in my judgment. We just go from one to the other. There is a yellow and an orange. We aren't using the others. We aren't. General Hughes. Well, I see it differently. In my view, we are going from an elevated condition to a high condition. And in the English language that is a relatively reasonable gradation. Higher means that you are at greater imminence. Mr. Shays. OK. It seems to me, but what it says to me is-- we are already at elevated and we are going to high; that says something to me in the general public that I am being told by the Department to discontinue doing what you normally do. General Hughes. Once again, sir, that is the specificity I was talking about with the way we administer the system. In broad, general terms, in the most recent case where we went from yellow to orange, there was no need for us to give specific guidance to the broad population of the United States beyond what we did in raising the threat level condition. But we did give, sir, much specific guidance to those places, those sectors, those elements of our culture which were specifically affected with regard to the threat information we had. Mr. Shays. Let me ask you this then. What you are really suggesting is that our system is so good that if you tell the authorities, the public that has no need of concern because it is a foolproof system, that they will catch whoever is going to do it. I don't think the Department would want to be in the position of making that statement. General Hughes. I hope I didn't say that. I am trying to illustrate to you the problem we have, and I do think it is a challenge, which Mr. Yim and Mr. Reese have talked about, too, finding balance in this presentation to the American public. What I would like to say is that I think we have done a good job in the most recent case especially. We are learning as we go along. I think Mr. Turner and Mr. Schrock both noted the evolution of this. We are indeed learning as we go along about how to administer this system. Mr. Shays. Let me just say this--and, Mr. Yim, I am over my time, and I thank Mr. Tierney. But what I want to say to you is, if in fact we went to code orange, as we did based on a dirty bomb and some other things, and if in fact there was a dirty bomb explosion and people had been gathering in a public place, to what extent would the Department have been--not duplicitous--to what extent should it be held responsible? If my child had gone to a public place that ultimately had what we were concerned might happen, who would be at fault? General Hughes. Well, I think that we would, if we have information about that specific place. But we did not have that kind of specific issue in most cases. You speak there of a period of time and of a place and of a condition or event. In some few cases, we have had that kind of tactical information. But in most cases we had a broad, general kind of threat condition, actually coming from different sorts of--we use the term ``information streams,'' and they are characterized differently. But collectively, when those streams are brought together, the broad threat condition here in the United States during December and January was complex enough and high enough for us to change the color and issue specific instructions, in some cases, you may recall. Mr. Shays. But only to the authorities, not to the general public. To the general public, they were told to do what they normally do? General Hughes. Yes. In some cases the general public may have been the beneficiary of the actions of the official government without generally knowing if there was a great threat to them. Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Yim. Mr. Yim. Mr. Chairman, I think there are two quick points I would like to make, because I do generally agree that it is more the threat advisory, a threat assessment, than a warning system, for, I think, some subtle reasons. First, we often consider the color code as a point-in-time warning system or assessment system when, in fact, an effective warning system is a process, as I think some of your witnesses following us will say. It is not just a point-in-time warning. There are obviously differences between the weather and terrorists. But if you think about how we handle weather advisories, if a storm is very far off the coast, you are very vague in the information about the landfall and points of impact. As we develop more information, we can develop more specificity and give greater information to those that are potentially affected without needlessly warning or needlessly causing anxiety to those that are going to be outside the path of a storm. The problem that we have, often, with the terrorist threat advisory is, it is either on or off. It is either yellow or orange, on or off, rather than considering it as a process. And I think, as it evolves, more specificity can be given during periods of orange alert. It is not just we declare orange alert on May 17th, here is the information; you are not going to hear from us again until we lower the alert level. I think that process needs to be recognized. The second point is, we tend to aggregate that. It is clearly a question of balance, as General Hughes points out. But it is also the danger of aggregating data. One of the things that the Department uses when it determines whether to go to orange alert is, they assess both the potential--the risk, the potential of the threat, the probability of the threat, and the severity of the risk should it occur. We probably shouldn't blend that data together. Those are two bits of information that are important for people to know. So if you have a low consequence, a low probability event, but a tremendously high consequence, you may take certain types of preventive action. If you have a fairly high probability of occurrence, but the consequence is relatively low, it is not a weapon of mass destruction, you may take different types of preventive or response measures. The aggregation of those two concepts into the decision to raise from yellow to orange, I think, exacerbates the problem, making it worse. Mr. Shays. I am going to say, there is no way, Mr. Tierney, you are going to get the floor right away, just after this statement. I don't pretend this is an easy issue. For me, I stay up at night thinking what I would do, General Hughes, if I was in your circumstance and we firmly believed that there was the potential of a nuclear attack in a city and that there was a potential cell that we thought had a weapon, material, and that they were somehow planning in a city. I mean, if you tell the public, there could be a horrific exodus that would kill literally tens of thousands of people; and yet, if it happens and 100,000 people are killed, there would be hell to pay. And I don't know the answer. But I do know we've got to talk about it. And ultimately the public has to have some sense of what these warnings mean. They can't just be for the law enforcement folks. So we have to find a way to have it make sense. And I would also say, it just seems to me that we should try--and I think the second panel is going to say this--we should try somehow to have the warnings in natural disasters as well as the terrorist disasters somehow have some uniformity in terms of words, in terms of warnings that--and again, I think you are going to learn from some of the second panel. I hope your folks, as well as the first--and your own comments, and maybe from us, I hope they take the information from this hearing and process it. Mr. Tierney. General Hughes. May I just make one comment about your statement there, Mr. Shays? I think that what you had to say was very important. I don't know how to explain this, but I take this very personally, since I am the intelligence officer who delivers the information to make this decision. And the thing that keeps me literally awake and on edge was what you described, a catastrophic strike against the United States that goes unwarned. And there are no easy answers to this, but I would just like to let you know that I appreciate very much your recognizing and verbalizing that point. And that is not procedural so much as it is a matter of judgment, a matter of the heart, a matter of feeling, a matter of intellect and analysis, and a matter of condition and circumstance. It is a vital piece of work that has been given to me to do, and I treat it very, very seriously. Mr. Shays. Thank you, General. Mr. Tierney, thank you for your patience. Mr. Tierney. You know, when you talk about all of this--and I think the comments that the chairman made about what individuals are supposed to take from this are well taken. But if you put yourself in the position of the local law enforcement or fire fighters or responders on that, what is the status right now of our system in terms of a situation where you go from yellow to orange, what specifically might, say, a police chief in a coastal community like Newburyport, MA know to do with respect to any given asset if it just goes from yellow to orange? Is he to protect the seaport and against a nuclear power plant just north of him, as well as chemical facilities, other things that matter; or is there enough specificity in there that he knows where to marshal his resources? General Hughes. Currently, we would deliver specific information to the police or to first responders or to other officials about a given location, a given sector of endeavor, such as a nuclear power plant's operation, or other conditions that we have specificity about, if we have it--if we have it. And we would do that relatively precisely, and we would not generally do that in public because to disclose that kind of knowledge in a public environment would, first, give away the fact that we have the knowledge and, thereby, potentially put how we got that information at risk; and it would also contribute to a broad, general feeling that would be unnecessary, in my view. We would accomplish the work of the authorities or the safety of the citizenry in the specificity that we treat that information with. Mr. Tierney. So you are saying, if you went from yellow to orange nationwide, that--and you had information that it was something that might relate to a nuclear power plant in the northeast, that is the information you would give to all interested law enforcement and other first responders across the country, so that others would not be in the same type of cautionary situation as would those people in the northeast? General Hughes. That is one way to put it. The other way to put it--which is, I think, a little bit less palatable, but it is the way in which we have to do it--we would give that information only to the locale that we had specific information about. Mr. Tierney. So here is the thing that I am talking about. That you give an alert from yellow to orange nationwide. Then you let the people in Oregon know that there--you have information specifically for them. My police department is running around taking care of everything--putting people on overtime, calling the Coast Guard for support over there, calling the National Guard for some other facilities or whatever. Are they right or wrong to react like that? General Hughes. They are right. And this is one of the complex issues here. And I think I would like to use Madrid as an example here. We are now under a condition of what I would refer to as simultaneity. We cannot depend upon an attack to come in a single place at a single time. Mr. Tierney. I was talking about an incident where the only information you had about any attack was with some specificity. General Hughes. Yes. Mr. Tierney. That is--the answer is still, you don't communicate that to responders across, so that the Oregon people are really heightened, and the other people can take a different, more nuanced look at that, and they have to go full out? General Hughes. Yeah. I understood your question, sir. I guess the issue for me is that maybe the premise here is a little bit further than I would care to go. If we had specific information about a problem in Oregon, we would talk directly to the authorities in Oregon and not raise the national threat condition, depending upon the nature of the information. Mr. Tierney. If you had information that related to nuclear power plants, let's say---- General Hughes. Then we would talk to the nuclear power plant sector. Mr. Tierney. And not the others? General Hughes. OK. Mr. Tierney. So when you go from yellow to orange nationally, then you have less specificity, you are doing that because you have some information, but you are not certain of the extent. General Hughes. Before you came in, I explained in the case of the December-January timeframe, we had both specific information about specific issues of threat, and the threat condition generally rose to the level that we decided we needed to make a national change in the threat advisory system. And that probably will occur again in the future. And I might just say, sir, that in that case, generally it would not be a single piece of specific information, but several in different places. Mr. Tierney. When you notify the local officials on that, what communications system are you using now? General Hughes. There are a variety of communications systems to use. For State and local, we have the JRIES system-- -- Mr. Tierney. I was interested in looking at that. In fact, that was going to be my next question, what is the functionality of the JRIES system and how widespread is its use? And how sophisticated are we in that technology? Because I am aware of similar systems being used in the military, developed out of MIT with General Myers and General Kellogg; and we have looked at those extensively, and they are working quite well in connecting military bases. Now, I know they are being tried elsewhere. Are you familiar with that? Is that the type of system that JRIES is going to evolve into, and where are we in that evolution? General Hughes. Indeed, sir, JRIES grows out of the military system. It was begun by the military, and we have begun to adopt it. We are proliferating it as rapidly as we can. We intend to encipher some of it, especially to the States and major cities, at the Secret level as rapidly as we can do so, so that they have a greater body of knowledge available to them. Mr. Tierney. Simultaneously? General Hughes. I think the answer that I would like to give you is, we are not limited by the systems we can use, there are so many, to include, by the way--and I thank my colleagues for mentioning this--the fact that Secretary Ridge and other officials of government do make public statements using our national media to communicate the position of the government. Mr. Tierney. I understand. It was the simultaneity that I was thinking of, of being very effective and very useful. And the JRIES system, if we can raise that to the level that I believe that it can accomplish, to me that is a powerful tool; and you can get on there to address the people that you want, with the specificity that you have, and people have a much more detailed idea of what it is that they have to respond to, just what knowledge that you have, you can keep it to a secure group. So if I am allowed, Mr. Chairman, just one last? What is the status of that now in terms of your use? How long--how far along the chain is JRIES? General Hughes. I hate to give you a percentage of fielding, but it is very far along. We are proliferating it very rapidly out to the States and the major cities especially, and to some local organizational entities. We have a plan to go to the county level in perhaps not every county in the United States right away, I don't want to make you think that this is going to happen overnight, but over the long term we will evolve to the county level. We have other alternatives, other communications alternatives that are in being now, that go especially to the State and some localities and, by the way, to the private sector. An example would be SIPRNET, the National Guard communications systems, the national telephone system, which we can use. We have provided secure telephones to State and local officials in many cases, especially in major cities, and often in the private sector those kinds of secure communications means are available. We can use the Internet, and we do for general information. We really are not limited here. We are trying to make a coherent system that everyone can understand and depend upon. And in my view, I am the key player in that issue, and I would say that by the end of this calendar year, we will achieve a very coherent and very robust, broad system of communications and interaction here in the United States that will not only go from the government to our State, local, private sectors, tribal and other territorial responders, but it will come back to us from them, with their views, their local knowledge, their input. That is, I think, a vital piece of this. Mr. Tierney. Who is your principal contractor in the JRIES? General Hughes. I don't think we have a principal contractor for JRIES, because it is a governmental-owned system. But we do have contractors associated with putting it in place, a number of them. Mr. Tierney. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. We are going to go to our next panel, but I want to say this and get some kind of response here. I don't believe, General, that anyone here is questioning whether we should have gone to code orange. I don't even think--and so I am convinced, trust me, I am so convinced that I responded differently based on the code orange. It meant something to me. What I would like you to do is just comment on what Mr. Yim talked about in terms of risk communication experts generally agree that effective warnings should be specific--the nature of the threat, when and where it is likely to occur, and over what period of time, provide guidance or actions to be taken, and perhaps, above all, assure that the information is consistent, accurate, clear and provided repeatedly. I guess the issue that I wonder about is, do you disagree with this recommendation, so it is--you shook your head so you don't disagree? General Hughes. No, I don't. Mr. Shays. So the question is how we move forward? Is that the issue? General Hughes. Yes. I think--once again, I hate to use the word ``evolution'' or learning and doing all the time, but I think it is the right way to characterize this. I think Mr. Yim's characterization with those words you just voiced are generally right. I do think--once again, we do find ourselves juxtaposed against the need to secure some of the information we have and to communicate it so that it can be used by appropriate authorities and not alarm or unnecessarily excite the general public. This is a matter of great judgment at times and can be second-guessed and criticized. As you said, you gave us credit for doing the best that we possibly can, and we are certainly trying to do that. We will learn, using Mr. Yim's construct here, more about how to communicate specificity out to the larger country than we have in the past. However, the point of protection of the information probably revolves around the degree to which we can be specific and, at the same time, make sure that we don't further endanger our public by giving away to those who would strike us some kind of information that would allow them then to find a seam or a gap and hit us where we did not expect. Mr. Shays. I understand it is a fine line. But I would suggest this to you, that it was known from almost day 1 that we were having a problem with flights from Europe. We knew it, the terrorists knew it, and the general public was hearing about it kind of indirectly. And I would just suggest to you that some of what we knew, since the terrorists knew and the government knew, the only thing you can argue is that we wouldn't want to disclose sources and methods. But I don't think you necessarily have to disclose sources and methods to disclose information to the public that would then get them to decide whether or not they want to do something. I just make this point to you. If, in fact, we thought that large--we were reading it in the newspaper and the newspapers were correct, but it wasn't coming from Homeland Security that large public gatherings were a very real target, then unlike the way I responded publicly, which I would do differently, I think the public would at least need to know that they should make choices, that we think we protected this large public gathering, that we are confident of what we have in place, but you need to know it is a target, and so when you go, you go with some risk--if it is to raise the flag, show you are brave, whatever, but it might tell a parent, maybe they are not going to send their 14-year-old child. And then I want to tell you why I think this is important. If, in fact, something does happen, you have more credibility the next time. I will tell you, there will be hell to pay if the public isn't warned about something that everybody else knew about in government. Then they will never believe you. I will just illustrate it this way. When we were warning right after September 11th that we could deal with smallpox, that we had all of the resources necessary to deal with it, I knew that was simply a lie. It was not true. When I confronted--and I will say it more generally, I just simply knew it was not true. When I spoke to the individual involved, he said we were trying to make the public feel more comfortable and to lower their anxiety. My comment to him was, though, if there was an outbreak and there was this lack of ability to deal with it, they will never believe you forever, and then--no matter what the government says. So I guess truth in this process is important too. And let me just close by saying, first, is there any panelist that wants to make a comment? Is there anything that you felt we should have asked that was not asked that you want to put on the record? Anything based on what you have heard said today that you want to put on record? Mr. Yim. Just a 10-second comment, if I could, Mr. Chairman. I think we should err on the public's right-to-know side, because the public has a great appetite for information. I have a great appetite for information. If I am not going to get it from a credible source, I may get it from a source with much less reliable information. I would rather receive it from the Department of Homeland Security than receive it from the Internet. Mr. Shays. OK. Any other comments? General, you are great to be here. Thank you for participating in this panel. It has been very helpful. And we know that you clearly want to make this system work better. I believe in the system, the process, I know it has to work better though. Mr. Reese, thank you as well. Mr. Yim, thank you. We are going to announce our second panel: Mr. Charles D. Connor, senior vice president, communication and marketing, American Red Cross; Mr. Michael Wermuth, senior policy analyst, RAND Corp.; Dr. James J. Carafano, senior research fellow, defense and homeland security, Heritage Foundation; and Mr. Kenneth B. Allen, executive director, Partnership for Public Warning. All four of you, if you would, stay standing. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Shays. Note for the record, our four witnesses have responded in the affirmative. You have all been here for the questions and responses and statements of the first panel. Feel free to incorporate that in your statement; feel free to depart from your statement. That will be part of the permanent record. And I want to let you know that we really thank you. We think this is a very significant issue, and we appreciate your participation in our trying to understand it better. We will start, as you are sitting, with you, Mr. Connor, first. STATEMENTS OF CHARLES D. CONNOR, SENIOR VICE RESIDENT, COMMUNICATIONS & MARKETING, AMERICAN RED CROSS; MICHAEL WERMUTH, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, RAND CORP.; DR. JAMES JAY CARAFANO, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY, HERITAGE FOUNDATION; AND KENNETH B. ALLEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC WARNING Mr. Connor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, for your gracious invitation to testify this morning. My name is Chuck Connor, and I serve as senior vice president of communication and marketing at the American Red Cross national headquarters here in Washington. The American Red Cross is a nationwide network of nearly 900 chapters and 36 blood services regions dedicated to saving lives and helping people prevent, prepare for and respond to emergencies. With 1.2 million volunteers and 32,000 employees, the Red Cross annually mobilizes relief to families affected by nearly 70,000 disasters. We also train almost 12 million people each year in life-saving skills. The Red Cross is the largest supplier of blood and blood products to more than 3,000 hospitals across the Nation. We also assist victims of international disasters and conflicts at locations worldwide. One of our most important partnerships is government at every level--Federal, State and local. Government relies on the American Red Cross to address the huge challenges of public preparedness, particularly in the all-hazards environment we spoke of today. We believe that everything the Red Cross can do in this important area relieves some of the burden on government agencies and first responders. As the Department of Homeland Security has assumed the huge responsibility for domestic security, it has correctly focused on operational procedures. Conversely, it is our responsibility at the Red Cross to prepare the American public. In January, Red Cross president and CEO, Marty Evans, issued a strong wake-up call to the American public to get prepared. Despite growing concerns about terrorism and man-made disasters, Americans have generally failed to take the most basic steps to ensure their own safety. According to a study the American Red Cross commissioned last year, close to 60 percent of Americans, fully 175 million of our fellow citizens, are entirely unprepared for a disaster of any description. In February 2003, the Red Cross launched the Together We Prepare Campaign. This program challenges individuals and communities to take responsibility for their safety and that of their families at home, in school, and in businesses and neighborhoods. By following five basic steps we can all move toward greater safety. Those five steps are: make a plan, build a kit, get trained, volunteer, and give blood. Mr. Chairman, please mark your calendars, our next blood drive in the House is scheduled for April 15th. We believe that the more empowered and self-sufficient you and I feel, the more immediately effective we can be in a crisis situation. The bottom line, regardless of the responsibilities of government, in the end, all of us must take charge of our own destinies. The strategic direction of the Red Cross is to be America's partner and a leader in mobilizing communities to help people prevent, prepare for and respond to disasters and other life- threatening emergencies. A critical part of this effort includes public education regarding the meaning of each alert level within the Homeland Security Advisory System, and the immediate actions required to ensure safety and security. As you know, the White House issued Homeland Security Directive 3 in March 2002, which established the five threat conditions for a possible terrorist attack. General explanations were given for preparedness activities for each level, but these were intended mainly for government agencies. However, across the country, there arose questions of, what does a condition yellow mean to me or my family? What does this mean for my business or my children's school? Working with the Office of Homeland Security at the time, the Red Cross developed and released specific disaster readiness guidelines for individuals, families, neighborhoods, schools, and businesses. Each color-coded threat category was further expanded to provide recommendations for each of these different audiences. These Red Cross-developed guidelines have been incorporated into the Department's own public communications. As part of our expanding preparedness and response role, we are continuing to keep America informed of the Department's terrorist threat level recommendation and the appropriate actions to take if the level is raised or lowered. And I believe you will see the chart on the wall there, which is germane to what we are talking about here. Once notified of a status level change, the Red Cross implements procedures and protocols to ensure that the organization can provide a swift, efficient and supportive response in case of an incident. Similarly, the public looks to the Red Cross as a primary source of emergency preparedness information. When a change in status takes place, the Red Cross communicates practical emergency preparedness information to the public through national news releases and the communication resources of our Nationwide Disaster Services Network. Preparedness information empowers all of us who use it to be more responsible for our own security and that of our family. This vital education effort befits our stature as America's premier disaster response organization. In a world where the forces of nature and man too often collide, the Red Cross is truly a beacon, showing Americans the way to safety. We owe it to ourselves, our families, our communities to prepare for the unexpected. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to appear before your panel. I would be pleased to answer questions later. Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Connor. [The prepared statement of Mr. Connor follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.039 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.040 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.041 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.042 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.043 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.044 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.045 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.046 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.047 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.048 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.049 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.050 Mr. Shays. Mr. Wermuth. Mr. Wermuth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, committee members, for the opportunity to be here today to address this important issue. Mr. Chairman, according to my count, this is the fourth time I have had the pleasure of being before this committee in that many years. I would also say that before September 11th, I could have counted on both hands the number of people who were providing national leadership on this issue, and of course, the chairman ranks among those people before September 11th. My remarks today are going to be focused on relevant research and related activities in connection with the congressionally mandated advisory panel to assess domestic response capability for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, also known as the Gilmore Commission. In accordance with its statutory mandates, the advisory panel delivered its fifth and final report to the President and the Congress on December 15th of last year. The strategic visions, themes and recommendations in that report were motivated by the unanimous view of the panel, that its final report should attempt to define a future state of security against terrorism, one that the panel chose to call America's New Normalcy. In developing that report, panel members all agreed at the outset that it could not postulate as part of its vision a return to a pre-September 11th normal. It was the panel members' intention to articulate a vision of the future that subjects terrorism to a logical place in the array of threats from other sources that the American people face every day, from natural diseases and other illnesses to crime to traffic and other accidents, to mention just a few. That report focuses on conceptualizing a strategic vision for the Nation that in the future has achieved in both appearance and reality an acceptable level of capabilities to cope with the uncertain and ambiguous threat of terrorism as part of dealing with all hazards. In developing that strategic vision, the advisory panel was guided by the recognition that the threat of terrorism can never be completely eliminated and that no level of resources can prevent the United States from being attacked in the future. The panel believes that the Nation is achieving a critical understanding of the risk posed to America by terrorism, an understanding that derives from America's inherent strengths, the strength in our Constitutional form of government and, in particular, the strength of our people. As a group of American citizens with broad experience in government at all levels and in the private sector, the panel members can see from those national strengths an ability to respond to the threat of terrorism with firm resolve and through concrete actions across the full spectrum of awareness, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. Its goal was to articulate a strategy to achieve a steady state 5 years into the future, a vision shaped by a broad and well-grounded American perspective on the threat of terrorism and focused particularly, because of this panel's mandate, on State and local response entities. As part of that vision, the panel depicts a desirable state 5 years in the future in a number of specific areas, including, among them, State, local and private sector empowerment; intelligence, information sharing; and enhanced critical infrastructure protection. Of course, a true national alert system will have an impact certainly in those four areas; and potentially in what the panel addressed. But as you have heard from other witnesses, the Homeland Security Advisory System, any true alert system or warning system, however you would like to couch it, is only one piece of a much more involved and complex process of intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination, and information sharing. As was mentioned by the previous panel of witnesses, the actual status of response capabilities, the assessment of vulnerabilities, which are part and parcel of what the Department of Homeland Security is doing, as well as those at the State and local level and the private sector, and the responsibility and the authority to act. After the panel described a future vision that included the words, ``The national warning system has been refined to provide more geographically and sector-specific information, based on the actual or potential threats, as its vision of the future.'' It went on, in a following section that it called a Roadmap for the Future, to articulate a specific recommendation based on the following conclusions. The panel said, ``The Homeland Security Advisory System has become largely 'marganilized,''' was the term that they used. ``This may be attributed to a lack of understanding of its intended use as well as the absence of a well orchestrated plan to guide its implementations at all levels of government and within the public. The Governor of Hawaii chose to maintain a blue level in February when the Federal Government raised its level to orange. And the Governor of Arizona announced that his State would likely do the same thing based on particular threats.'' Organizations surveyed by RAND for the panel had a number of suggestions for improving the Homeland Security Advisory System. Between 60 and 70 percent of State and local organizations suggested providing additional information about the threat type of incident likely to occur, where the threat is likely to occur, and during what time period, to help guide them in responding to the change in threat. And I have included, for the committee's information, an actual extract of that survey of some 1,200 State and local response organizations, as well as the tabular information on how they responded based on their own disciplines. The panel specifically said, ``We recommend that DHS revise the Homeland Security Advisory System to include using, one, a National Alert System to notify emergency responders about threats specific to their jurisdiction; two, providing training to emergency responders about what preventive actions are necessary; and three, creating a process for providing specific guidance to potentially affected regions or sectors when threats are changed.'' All of that just affirms what you have heard from other witnesses this morning. But several points are really worthy of consideration here. First, an alert process of this type is neither a total solution nor a single point of failure. Second, it is, by its own title, advisory. It does not require anything. Most importantly, most importantly, any alert system will only be as effective as the intelligence upon which it is based, making that function especially critical. And without delving into continuing deficiencies in the whole intelligence and information collection, analysis and dissemination, I respectfully call the panel's attention to the extensive discussion of that subject contained in the advisory panel's fifth report. Mr. Chairman, State and local governments, as you well know, and as other members of the subcommittee know, have a threshold responsibility for public safety and health. And they must do things that they determine are best for their own jurisdictions within their own existing resource constraints. With better assessments, with better alerts, based in large measures on more comprehensive and focused threat information, they will be able to make more well informed decisions. As the committee has already heard this morning, there have been changes in recent days. Over the end of the year holiday period, the flights from Europe that the chairman talked about earlier, all of those, in our opinion, are steps in the right direction. I would even venture to say that perhaps the advisory panel might not have been as specific in its recommendation now as it was in the fall of last year, because there are improvements that are headed in the right direction. But the Federal Government still needs to do a better job. It needs to do better about engaging States and localities and the private sector in part of that process. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center [TTIC], may--and I stress ``may''-- prove to be a valuable tool in that direction, but only time will tell. Some States and even some major cities have taken more upon themselves to be able to make valid risk assessments based on information that they derive from a lot of sources, and the private sector is becoming more involved as well. So, in conclusion, I would say that progress is being made. DHS has indicated a new amount of flexibility and innovation in the way that they are now handling the advisory system. There are probably some other fairly significant things that could be done. I did not include any specific recommendations beyond the panel's recommendation in my testimony, but I do have an opinion or two about maybe some specific things that could be done if anyone would like to ask for that during the question- and-answer period. Mr. Chairman and members, again, thanks for the opportunity to participate. I look forward to your questions. Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Wermuth, thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Wermuth follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.051 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.052 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.053 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.054 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.055 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.056 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.057 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.058 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.059 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.060 Mr. Shays. And, Dr. Carafano, thank you. Dr. Carafano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting me to speak on this important topic. I have a lengthy statement for the record which I will submit. I would like to briefly summarize the high points of that, which are why I think this is an important subject; the good things I think which are going on, which I don't think have been touched on enough; some concerns about the current system; and then, I think, a look to the future of what we really need to think about for the long term. I think it's worth just reviewing and why this is important is four reasons: First and foremost is, I think the HSAS could be a key tool for welding the disparate national, Federal, State and local systems we have into a national system, which I truly think is the Federal role, is getting the resources where they need to be, when they need to be, for what they think needs to be done to protect American citizens. The second is, I do think that a properly run system can have an effect in terms of preventing, deterring and mitigating terrorist acts. I think that is an important fact. The third one, which has already been touched on, is there are enormous physical implications for this. It is widely reported it costs the Federal Government $1 billion a week to let the system--the Conference of Mayors says it costs about $7 million dollars for local jurisdictions to do this. So every time we change the level, the physical implications are really large, and those need to be taken into account. And, fourth, I think we really need to look at the long- term psychological impact that this system will have on the Nation. I strongly encourage further research in that area to determine how Americans are really going to react to this system over the long term. Just very quickly in terms of the good things that are going on, that I think deserves to be mentioned. The Homeland Security Council is playing an increasingly important role. They meet each time the level is changed. I think there is good coordination, at least from the outside, across Federal agencies in terms of coordinating Federal efforts to respond to the changing alerts. I think that is important. I think at the deputies level behind the scene, there is an improving increase in coordination. I think that is good. I think the Homeland Security Operations Center that the Department of Homeland Security has established, is an important asset. It plays an important role in managing the implementation of the system. It is a credit to the Department that they have stood it up, and the role that it plays. And I do think the announcement that Secretary Ridge made of the Homeland Security Information Network, which was mentioned in the last panel, is important and most important because I think it will provide a collaborative tool at a classified level that allows key people at Federal, State and local levels to communicate with each other, which in the end is really important to making the advisory part of this system important. I do have several concerns. On the Federal level, my primary concern is with the TTIC, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, and that I think in the future the TTIC should play an increasingly important role in implementing HSAS, in determining when it should be implemented and how it should be implemented. As I talked about before, I am concerned that TTIC is not under the Department of Homeland Security, I don't think that is what the intent of the Homeland Security Act of 2002--I don't think it allows the Secretary to actually fulfill his role. I mentioned a number of recommendations in the report. I think in the end the IA portion of IAPA in TTIC need to be fully integrated. I think they need to be under DHS. I think the Secretary of DHS needs the legislative authority over the TTIC similar to the kinds of things that the JCS has over who can participate in the joint staff, that were implemented in the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. I do think that the problem with the system is at the State and local and public level. I understand what DHS has said, but the perception is that the HSAS is the key risk management communication tool to the Nation. And the general consensus is that it lacks useful guidance to actually be that. I mean, you can say what you want, but the research shows that if a warning is credible, specific, understandable and actionable, it is not a warning. I would recommend delinking the color code from the warnings that we give to State and local and the public. I think, as mentioned before, the State and local warnings need to be regional and functional in nature. As I mentioned, I think DHS has been moving in that direction. After we changed back from code orange at Christmas, they kept a specific alert on for the airline industry and certain airports. I think that is a sign that they are moving in the right direction. I think the other key piece to this is, we really need national performance standards, because State and local governments are never going to be able to act appropriately unless they know what is expected of them. And I am very supportive of the Cox-Turner Bill. I think that would be a step in the right direction, in putting in a requirement for these standards to be in place, because I think they are a key part of what we need to do to have a good system. The public system, I think we need to move to a simple, two-tiered system, a watch-and-warning system similar to what we do for weather alerts. People are already conditioned to that. I mean, we need a simple standard. We need to tell people what we can when we can. We need to provide specific directions and specific actions; otherwise, these warnings are simply not meaningful. I also think we need to have realistic expectations about what we can expect. The research shows that, by and large, unless people are conditioned to a disaster, if they have had experience in a forest fire or earthquake or something, that they tend not to prepare. And so we can put out all the warnings that we want, but unless we have a really serious education system in this country, it is unlikely that people are going to do much with these warnings. And even if we do have an extensive education system, it is really questionable what kind of large impact it is going to have in terms of raising public preparedness. And I just--I--as we look to the future, one of the most important things you need to think about is the back end of the system. We don't spend near enough time on that. We are talking about getting alerts to people, but what we need to do is start training the next generation of leaders at the State and local level and private industry, who know how to react to these alerts. One of the things I did in preparing for this testimony is, I screened about 100 Web sites from State and local governments and various industries, and the results are uniformly disappointing. Most people take the Federal color code system, and they just put that page up on their Web site. They say, here is what to do. So we are not training the next generation of leaders who can really react to nuanced warnings officially. And I have a series of recommendations in my testimony which I will be happy to go into. With that, I will conclude my statement. Thank you. Mr. Shays. Thank you, Doctor. [The prepared statement of Dr. Carafano follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.061 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.062 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.063 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.064 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.065 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.066 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.067 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.068 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.069 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.070 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.071 Mr. Shays. Mr. Allen. Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. My name is Kenneth Allen. I am the executive director of the Partnership for Public Warning. I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to talk about the Homeland Security Advisory System, but most of all, I want to talk about the public. The objective of a public warning system is to provide people at risk with timely and accurate information so that they can take protective action. Effective public warnings can save lives, reduce property losses and speed economic recovery. Public warning empowers citizens by providing them with the information they need during times of emergency to make informed decisions and take protective actions. Four years ago, the President's National Science and Technology Council issued a report concluding that many in our society are at risk because we do not have an effective national public warning system. That message was confirmed on September 11, 2001. On that terrible day, not a single national public warning system was ever activated. The Partnership for Public Warning was established in January 2002 by concerned emergency management officials from around the country. Because public warning is an issue that encompasses all levels of government and relies upon a private-sector infrastructure, PPW was created as a nonprofit, public-private partnership. We are the only national organization addressing the issue of public warning. And let me emphasize that many of our members and many of the proponents of the creation of PPW were the local and State officials and emergency managers involved in this issue. In fact, the chairman of our board is the director of the Florida Management Agency, so we are truly a public-private partnership. Less than 3 months after our creation, the government proposed the Homeland Security Advisory System. We provided comments on the initial proposal and have continued to monitor it and evaluate the system. In June 2000, we hosted a 4-day workshop with experts from government, industry and academia to look at the proposed system. The most significant finding was the one that the chairman noted earlier, this is not a complete warning system. It is merely a threat advisory system. It tells us that something may happen, but it doesn't tell us what, where or when. The best description I have heard of the HSAS is that it is America's ``mood ring,'' and even a mood ring probably comes with more specific actions such that if it is black, you need to get help. We need to address that issue. As a result of the workshop, we provided recommendations in 2002 to the Office of Homeland Security. Last November, as people began to look at the HSAS and Secretary Ridge talked about making changes, we decided that someone ought to ask the public and local and State government what they thought about it; and we initiated our own request for public comment. The comments we received included the following points: The current system is too vague. It is inconsistent with existing alert and warning scales. It would be more effective if it used standard terminology and message formats. When there is a change in the threat level, State and local officials should be notified before the public is notified. One color does not fit all. Advisories should be tailored to specific geographic regions, industry sectors and other potential targets. A terrorist warning system should be developed to complement the advisory system. It should be linked to existing alert and systems such as the emergency alert system, and NOAA weather radio. And most of all, we should employ a multitude of technologies to reach people when there is a risk. After almost 2 years of operation under the HSAS, I think it is clear from the record and this hearing that changes are needed. A more useful system, an effective system, can and should be developed. We are not here today to criticize those who developed the HSAS. This is a complex and difficult challenge; and we believe that the system in place has been a good first step, and the Department of Homeland Security is to be commended on its efforts. It is time for us to work together, however, on a more effective solution. In my testimony, I have some of the elements of an effective public warning system. Applying those elements to the HSAS, we have the following recommendations: one, make the threat advisory scale consistent with other existing threat scales; two, refine the system to provide information on a local, regional and industry-specific basis; three, provide more guidance regarding the protective actions that citizens should take; four, develop a public warning system for terrorist threats to complement the threat advisory scale; five, integrate the HSAS with existing public alert and warning systems and move toward the national public warning capability; and six, collaborate with State and local government, the private sector and the public on the development of a more effective terrorist alerting system. The last two recommendations are the most important. Americans do not expect their government to preserve and protect them from all risk. The public, however, does expect the government will at least provide timely and effective information on imminent risk. Many, if not most, Americans believe that an effective national warning capability exists. It does not. Existing national alert and warning systems are fragmented and uncoordinated. Individuals at risk often fail to get timely information, fail to understand or act on the information, and often do not know where to go for additional information. Those not at risk who receive warnings of little relevance may come to view the system with skepticism if not distrust. The HSAS is an example of this fragmentation. Instead of building upon existing alert and warning capabilities, we have created another system and layered it on top of what we already have. The solution is a national integrated public warning capability that can be used to alert the public during all types of the emergencies, from terrorism to national disasters to accidents. We have done some work in that area, and I would be glad to talk to the committee if you wish to pursue that. But our final and most important recommendation is the need for cooperation and partnerships. Protecting our Nation's security must be a collaborative effort in which government, industry and the public work together. This is especially true if we were to develop an effective Homeland Security Advisory System. The Federal Government cannot develop an effective system on its own; no organization or individual has all the answers. Moreover, local and State governments, private industry and the public must understand and implement a terrorism warning system. To do so effectively, those stakeholders should be part of the process to design and operate the system. We urge the Department of Homeland Security to participate in a collaborative forum with all of the stakeholders. September 11th taught us that the unthinkable can happen. Future tragedies, whether natural or manmade, are not a matter of if but when. Lives can be saved and losses reduced through effective public warning. Americans expect their government to protect them and believe an effective warning capability exists. It doesn't exist today, but we can put it in place quickly if we work together. There is no excuse for further delay. This is an important issue. We commend the committee on its leadership in this area and look forward to working with you. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Allen follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.072 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.073 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.074 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.075 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.076 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.077 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.078 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.079 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.080 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.081 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.082 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.083 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.084 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.085 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4837.086 Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. One of my staff in hearing the issue of, you know, we are taking steps in the right direction, said it is hard to be satisfied with steps in the right direction. As former Senator Nunn points out, a gazelle being chased by a hungry cougar is taking steps in the right direction. Survival is a matter of velocity, speed, not vector direction. And I guess it is a combination of a lot of things, but interesting. Mr. Schrock. How do I top that? Thank you all for being here. I want to start with Colonel Carafano. You mentioned that the TTIC, you thought it should fall under the Department of Homeland Security, but as a DOD function. Its product and analysis is integrated with the DHS Homeland Security Advisory System. If Secretary Ridge consults with his council before raising or lowering color codes, why yank it out of DOD? Dr. Carafano. TTIC, now as I understand it, is statutorily run by the Director of Central Intelligence, and it is actually--it is an interagency group, obviously. It has DHS members. It's mostly CIA members. I think they're going to potentially go to about 250, and over half of those will be CIA. I think the intent of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is that the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for the integration and dissemination of terrorist threat information. It just seems to me that unless we have somebody that we can put a finger in the chest and say, ``You are responsible for this,'' unless he is in charge of the resources of the organization and the membership of the organization, what the organization does, that we haven't truly met the intent of the law. And I know Mike has a different interpretation on who ought to have the rose pinned on him for this. I will let him chime in. Mr. Schrock. Colonel Wermuth. Mr. Wermuth. Jim and I have had this discussion before. Mr. Schrock. Obviously. Mr. Wermuth. I think the TTIC is appropriately placed somewhere other than within a single department. In the first place, the Department of Homeland Security doesn't own everything, even at the Federal level. More importantly, it's our experience in studying issues like this that when an entity becomes part of a single department, that's how it's viewed. It's part of that department. It doesn't tend to be viewed as something that can provide services outside the department, and clearly, the Department of Justice, Department of Health and Human Services, DOD itself and other Federal entities, much less States and localities, need some of the product that is generated from an organization like a TTIC. So I would suggest that a TTIC-like entity does need to be placed not directly under a particular department of the Federal Government but more freestanding to do the broader strategic approach to fusing intelligence information, if you will, fusing it and analyzing it and disseminating it. At the same time, Jim is absolutely right that the Department of Homeland Security needs more capability to take that information, maybe to take information from a lot of other sources, and process it, analyze it and disseminate it and make it actionable within DHS's own mission, which is of course to provide better alerts, better warnings, better advisories across this entire spectrum to States, localities, the private sector and perhaps the public at large. It's the level that, from my perspective, it's the level you're talking about. We need a broader, strategic, accountable organization like the TTIC; DHS needs an operational organization to do the same kinds of stuff for the execution of its own mission, both. Dr. Carafano. If I could just add one point, one point on which we both agree is--I think it's a great recommendation in the commission report--there should be strong State and local representation in the TTIC so when we implement these alerts, we have people who understand what State and local people do and we can translate that quickly into language that State and local people can act on. I think that's a good recommendation. Mr. Schrock. Mr. Allen, Colonel Wermuth talked about marginalization in the Gilmore Commission report, that the Advisory Panel states, ``The Homeland Security Advisory System has become largely marginalized.'' Do you all believe that, and what actions should DHS take to make this system more credible? Mr. Wermuth. Well, for the reasons that the panel stated in much more detail than I did in the testimony, it has become marginalized because people now are not necessarily taking it seriously or taking different kinds of action that you might anticipate that they would take, for whatever reason, whether it's resource considerations or just local politics. I mean, there are reasons why States and localities might decide to choose to do something or not to do something just based on political realities. I said in my remarks I didn't have any specific recommendations beyond what the panelists said, but now I'll offer one in response to Congressman Schrock's question. I think we need two systems or maybe two components of a system, and it has been talked about here already, but we need a system that is a warning system for the people who have, as I referred to it in my remarks, the authority and the responsibility to take action. We need a system that is directed to States and localities and those elements of the private sector that are involved in critical infrastructure protection that really provides a more targeted, more focused, more specific level of threat information for those entities to take specific action. Then it would seem we need a more general system--and Jim talked about this as well--that is directed to the public, that says to the public--he said two tiers; I might suggest three, a lower and a medium and a high one--that would say, at the low end, ``You, the general public, are not expected to do anything.'' We have governments and the private sector that are taking actions in connection with certain things, one that is a little bit higher than that, that says, ``You need to be more aware of your surroundings and, perhaps, take some specific actions,'' and a third level that says, ``Gee, at this level, you really need to consider not traveling, doing things, you know, to be more observant, more vigilant of your surroundings.'' But it seems like this broad five-tiered system that applies to everybody--all of the witnesses this morning have agreed--that's probably not a good idea, that there has to be more specific things focused on the segments of our society that have both the authority and the responsibility to act, governments and those elements of the private sector that we've identified, the public at large, and I'm not sure you can devise a single system that would apply across that spectrum. Now, having said that, we ought to tell the public if we have different processes, and we probably will eventually have different processes. As some different processes have already started being applied, let's tell the public about those, so it doesn't look like we're telling governments and selected people one thing and telling the public something else. Let's describe all of the processes to our public and let them take that information on board and do what they will with it, but it doesn't seem to be helpful to expect the public always to react to a change in threat levels when it really doesn't affect the entire public. Mr. Allen. If I could just add to that, I would agree. One of the lessons of the risk communication is that different audiences respond differently to different warnings, and we are not--this is not one audience. State and local officials are one. Private industry officials are another. The public is another. Even the media is an important audience we should be dealing with, and we need to recognize and develop a system that can communicate with each of those effectively. Second of all, and again, I will reiterate this again, we need to integrate this with other systems. We have between 10 and 20 different threat scales in this country for different hazards. Even in terrorism, the FBI has a four-tiered level, and we had DOD Threatcon. It's very confusing for folks to know which system applies. Third, collaboration. Let's let State and local governments work with DHS and the private sector to develop a system that works for all of us. And fourth and finally and a point that you made earlier is, we need public education. When we grew up in the 1950's and we had all of those civil defense programs and we practiced getting under the desk, we knew what to do in the event of an emergency. When the Iron Curtain came down, somehow we lost sight of all of that, and it's time, perhaps, to spend a little bit of effort teaching the public simple things such as what does a siren mean if you hear one go off. In different parts of the country, it means different things. So public education is a key part of what we need to do. Mr. Schrock. Let's follow on to HSAS for a minute. Since the creation of the HSAS, a number of issues have arisen and two, I think, that stand out: the vagueness of the warnings and the system's lack of protective measures. And various recommendations have been to refine the system, adding specificity to the alerts, and developing protective measures for the public. Mr. Allen kind of touched on this, but how can we add more specificity about the nature of the threat when alert levels rise, and why don't we have recommended, standardized protective measures for State and local governments, private businesses and the public? As Mr. Allen said, a siren going off in my hometown means there's a fire. In Kansas, it could mean a hurricane--I mean, a tornado. So how can we put that all together? Because there are so many things out there, nobody knows what to believe. Consequently, everybody ignores everything. Mr. Allen. You're absolutely right. And of course, in some places, a siren means gather all of the volunteer firemen. Mr. Schrock. True. Mr. Allen. Clearly you don't want to reveal sources of intelligence, and I don't think anybody is asking for that, but there are a couple of ways to deal with the issue. One is to create a codified process that the public understands. In other words, that we understand and the State and local officials understand how decisions are being made about raising or lowering the threat levels, what are the protocols and criteria used in that process, what are the protocols for communicating with people. Right now the raising and lowering of the threat level is a black box to most in the public. We don't know what goes on inside that black box. We don't know what goes into that decision, and then we aren't sure what's going to be communicated and when. So you can deal with a lot of the problem by providing more information right up front about how decisions are made, how and when they are going to be communicated. And then as you get down the road, you do need to put a process in place to share information with the public. We know from history that people generally do not panic, that they would prefer to have more information than less information. And most of all, as somebody said, let's not underestimate the intelligence of the American public, and let's share with them as much as we can. Mr. Schrock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Ruppersberger. Mr. Ruppersberger. I'd like to get more into the TTIC issue and where the information goes. Are you familiar with the analysis and coordination centers that certain States have developed? It just so happened last week I visited the Maryland analysis and coordination center, and I think, from my observations, it's working very well, because what you have there, it's more like a strike force concept. You don't have to worry about the bureaucracy and who is in charge, but you have FBI. You have CIA. You have NSA. You have State and local. You have Customs. You have Immigration. You have all of these groups. And what has been effective, I think, is that it's up and down. Information is flowing up and down. Now, how would you analyze that--and that was really put together, I believe, out of necessity, because there was a lot of frustration, especially on the local level, that information was not coming from the hierarchy of the Federal level. How would you analyze that operation? And I understand Maryland's operation, I think, was one of the first, but it's being looked at and being implemented in other States. How would you analyze that as it relates to TTIC? Mr. Wermuth. I would say that certainly Maryland's effort is great. California, of course, has one that they call their California Terrorist Integration Center. The city of New York, of course, is another example of how a major municipality is handling the issue. I would just say that all of those are important pieces of this entire process. A lot of them have been developed, as you said, Congressman, as a matter of necessity, because States and localities felt like they were not getting enough information, and they had to do a better job at either the State or local level for coordinating it. But it goes back to the recommendation that the advisory panel made about the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. That's why it's important from the panel's perspective, why, in our view, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the Federal-level entity that looks at this strategically, has to have representation from organizations like the Maryland analysis center, like the California center, like New York, embedded into their staff on a day-to-day basis so that you have this complete perspective, not only from the Federal level but also from the State and local level. Mr. Ruppersberger. But do you see a duplication of effort occurring between that and this group? Mr. Wermuth. Not at all, because when you divide this, if you will, in military terms--strategic, operational and tactical--you need all of the elements. And the New York operation is tactical. The Maryland operation tends to be both operational and tactical, because it's working with the Maryland community. Same thing in California. So all of these are complementary efforts. It's my same opinion about the TTIC being separate and independent so that it serves all of the customers, but other entities needing their other capability at the operational level inside departments. The Department of Treasury just formed a new intelligence and analysis center for money operations, for financial transactions by terrorists. I think all of those things are important, not duplicative but complementary depending on what the level of activity that you're talking about, tactical, operational or strategic. Mr. Ruppersberger. Let's get--yes? Dr. Carafano. If I could follow on that. I really think the State and local analysis centers are essential, and they're really the missing piece of the puzzle and the piece that will allow us to get away from the blunt instrument we now have. Because what you need is--if you have these analysis centers that can really take the information and interpret it to understand what should be done in that local situation, then DHS can move away from the blunt instrument, and they can pass more focused analysis to the regional and the functional areas, and then they can do their analysis to interpret if it's applicable for them. So I think these are complementary with TTIC, and I think something like HSIN, the Homeland Security Information Network, which could provide a bridge between TTIC and DHS and these other organizations so they can talk collaboratively, will really allow us to have a much, much more nuanced system. Mr. Ruppersberger. You said that you think those systems like the one that I visited in Maryland are very good, but there are some concerns about TTIC. What would your recommendation be? Is it because you don't have one boss, because you have a combination of FBI, CIA? And yet, in the analysis center, you have the whole group together. What would your recommendation be to make it more effective so that Secretary Ridge could be in a position to make the proper recommendations and get the right intelligence? Dr. Carafano. First of all, I think TTIC will always have to be an interagency organization. It should never be anything but an interagency organization. Mr. Ruppersberger. Yes. I agree. Dr. Carafano. And second, I think you have to have one guy in charge, you have to have one guy responsible, and I really think that should be the Secretary of Homeland Security. My third recommendation would be to then give him the tools to ensure that the other pieces of the Federal system cooperate appropriately, and the model I would use is what we use for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When we passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act and said the Joint--the chairman gets to decide who is on his staff, and you have certain education requirements. You have certain experience requirements. You have certain accreditation requirements, and then he has certain budgeting authority. So if he has all the tools to make the other Federal agencies, then I think you've built a system for the long term and, most importantly, you have a chest that you can put your finger in and say, ``This is the guy that's responsible for bringing it all together, connecting the dots and telling everybody what they need to know and when they need to know it.'' Mr. Wermuth. The only point of disagreement there is in the placement of the TTIC, as I mentioned earlier. The Advisory Panel believes the TTIC ought to be separate and independent from my Department. And in fact, if you want to pin the rose on a single person, this panel recommended that what it calls the National Counterterrorism Center, that we think probably will help serve as a model for the TTIC, really ought to report not to the Director of Central Intelligence but directly to the White House. So clearly you can pin a rose directly on an individual there, the guy in charge of all of the Federal---- Mr. Ruppersberger. Where is the funding going to come from, the White House? You're going to have to have the resources. Where are the resources going to come from? Mr. Wermuth. You might very well have to have a separate appropriation for an organization like this. You could do it as part of intelligence authorizations. Because it's an interagency organization, it could also be part and parcel--as it is right now, with the TTIC--it could be part and parcel of other agency appropriations that help to fund an entity like that. Mr. Ruppersberger. Let's get to the--is the light still green? Mr. Shays. We did another one. Mr. Ruppersberger. The issue as far as--is it information coming in and not properly analyzed? Is it information that's there and not getting to the right people? Let's focus on what the real issue is with TTIC. Mr. Wermuth. It's all of the above. Before the TTIC, before other perhaps similar types of interagency entities, various agencies were collecting information, analyzing information in some cases, disseminating information without either having a willingness to share or having an understanding of what needed to be shared with other entities. Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me get back to my original question because of the time. Why is the coordination centers--why do they seem to be working very well while there are still issues with TTIC? Would you analyze the two and why you feel one is working better than the other right now? Dr. Carafano. I think, quite honestly, if you talk to most State and local governments, they will say that there's more information going into the system than coming out. And there are lots of reasons for that, connectivity, security clearances. How do we share information? It's a learning process. I'd be reticent to say there's one reason why we're not communicating down as well as I think we're communicating up, and I think that all of these things are really going to have to be addressed before you see a marked improvement. Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me get to another area. I was a former county executive, during September 11, and went through sending our police officers into overtime to synagogues and FBI buildings, Social Security buildings, those type of things. I see the U.S. Conference of Mayors reported last year that it cost U.S. cities approximately $70 million per week in extra overtime, security, personnel costs, and I think the Heritage Foundation estimates that it costs the Federal Government $1 billion per week. Do we need--what would you recommend as far as a procedure, as it related to geography and specificity? Now, again, I know that there is a lot of different intelligence, there is a lot of chatter, but in the end, our intelligence is pretty strong in a lot of areas. The issue of specificity and locale, for instance transportation versus an issue involving an airplane issue or whatever it is, that we need to continually--when we hear the chatter, when things go up--to throw it out to the whole country. And that is No. 1. And second, then what would the recommendation be, if we could get to a geographical issue or specificity, how would you implement that? Through code colors or what? Mr. Allen. I don't have the specific answer for you, because I think it's going to depend on the region and the sector. Industry sectors might---- Mr. Ruppersberger. My question is for the whole country, is it--do you think it would work to declare a certain area in the East Coast and not declare California? Because then all of a sudden---- Mr. Allen. I think it would work the same way the State Department can advise you that certain nations of the world are unsafe to travel in or travel to them at your own risk. I think if we develop a specific system targeted at specific geographic and industrial sectors and we educate the public as to what it means--I mean, I think a lot of this comes from the confusion on the part of the public as was discussed here. What does it mean when the threat level goes up? Does it mean everyone is affected the same? I think we can develop a much more effective system that's targeted at the specific threats because---- Mr. Ruppersberger. Automatically, all local jurisdictions and most States, they are spending millions of dollars that maybe we don't have to spend. Mr. Allen. Well, one of the things we heard today, for example, is that DHS does try to communicate with State and local governments, and where they have specific information, as I understood, what they were saying was, ``After we send out the general notice, we will call those where we have specific information.'' So maybe it's a matter of putting a protocol in place that if you're a local community and you don't get a call within the hour, you know that there is no specific threat targeted at your jurisdiction. Mr. Ruppersberger. But most people will cover themselves by doubling up and pulling the people in overtime. It happens. Believe me, that's reality. The numbers are there. Mr. Allen. It is reality, but remember, no system is going to be mandatory, but each community and each citizen, all we can do is provide them with as much information as possible to make informed decisions. Mr. Ruppersberger. You can keep talking. I can't. But the specificity--I'm just asking--well, fine if we can. It depends on who the chairman is. He's a good chairman. What I'm getting to, is it realistic to think that we could come up with a plan that would deal with the issue of specificity, geography so that if in fact we know--and we can have, our intelligence is a lot more specific in certain arenas--that California, as an example, doesn't have to spend overtime when in fact you might need to do that on the East Coast, that's kind of what I'm--is there--do you all feel that there's a possibility to come up with a system like that? Would that be confusing? Would that--because once it goes, believe me, all--you know how elected officials always want to be re- elected. They are going to make sure they cover their bases. Mr. Wermuth. It will never be perfect but better than it is now. Because of the ambiguity of terrorist threats, you'll never be able to devise a 100 percent system, but we can do it better and less costly at the State and local level, absolutely. Dr. Carafano. I would just like to say, I think it's important to de-link in the minds of the public and the State and local governments the HHS color-coded system from what they do every day. I think it works fine at the Federal level because you're coordinating centralized agencies, but I think we need to get people to think we're organizing the Federal Government effort; and for State and local governments and the public, we need to provide them watches and warnings that are applicable to them, and I do think that is an achievable system. Mr. Allen. I agree, it is achievable. Collaboration and education are the two key components, but we can do that. Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. Mr. Shays. I thank you, gentlemen. I'm going to ask all of you this question, including you, Mr. Connor, but I'm going to also have a specific question for you, Mr. Connor. I want to know how you transform from a threat assessment to a real warning system. I mean, I know we've been talking about it and it's in your testimony, but I want you to give me the first and second, say, the third most important steps DHS can do. I want you to think about that, and first ask you, Mr. Connor, you had mentioned in your testimony the work of the Red Cross in preparedness lessens the burden on Government agencies and first responders and yet the organization relies primarily on charitable donations to perform this important work in support of Government at all levels. I want to know, what additional resources do you need to continue to be successful in your effort to prepare the American public and to respond to the 70,000 disasters in any given year? Mr. Connor. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Red Cross, through its nearly 900 community based chapters nationwide, is on the scene with first responders immediately following disasters, both natural and manmade, and as part of the first-response community, we provide direct support to fire, police, EMS, and we are integrated into State and local disaster preparations and training. Yet we are unable currently to apply directly for first-responder funding to meet these requirements we discussed. We must rely currently on local municipalities to include us in their grant applications. Mr. Shays. And why is that? Mr. Connor. Pardon me, sir? Mr. Shays. Why is that? Mr. Connor. I am advised that this is currently, if I'm not mistaken, the DHS interpretation of the statute. They've had-- they have a narrow interpretation of first responder, and it is, as I understand it, fire, police and EMS, if I'm correct in that. And so they are the entities that have the eligibility to apply directly for grants and not Red Cross, currently. Mr. Shays. How do you describe your relationship with the Federal Government? Mr. Connor. We are a Federal instrumentality. The President appoints our chairman. We have several Cabinet members who are ex officio members of our board of Governors but we are not a Federal agency. We rely, almost to the 100 percent extent, on donations of that nature. Mr. Shays. Yet you have an actual specific role to play when disasters---- Mr. Connor. We do. We are listed, if I may--we are in the National Response Plan, and we have the role for mass care, which is spelled out in the Federal---- Mr. Shays. And of course, you wouldn't want to change that, but the issue is, should you be allowed to---- Mr. Connor. Correct. Our point is, we have a lot of work to do. We are committed to be partners with DHS at the national level and the local level. We really want to do this. It takes resources. And to the extent we could be eligible for grants directly, that would be helpful---- Mr. Shays. So the issue is not that you would get a grant but at least that you would be eligible---- Mr. Connor. That's correct. That's correct. Mr. Shays. No. That makes sense. Mr. Connor. Thank you. Mr. Shays. Let me have all of you, including Mr. Connor, let's start with you, Mr. Allen--I mean, first off, we basically all agree here that we have a threat assessment, but we don't really have a warning system yet, and that's the nodding of heads--can't be recorded, is all yes. OK. Now, so how do we move from threat assessment to a real warning system? Tell me the first few steps. Give me two. You can give me one. You can give me four. Mr. Allen. Can I give you an example, Mr. Chairman? Let's say that there is a threat that there's going to be an anthrax attack or a dirty bomb here in the Washington, DC area, and the government has elevated the level to severe, and then they get more information that it is a real likelihood that something is going to happen. In a warning system, some of the steps you would go through in the decisionmaking process, the first might be to notch it up by notifying the local officials to keep an eye out for this sort of behavior or to watch this sort of activity and provide them specific information to the extent you can. But let's say, again, that, at some level, you're going to go and say you have to notify the public. Currently, there is no capability within the HSAS or within the DHS threat system to provide an actual public warning to the public. In other words, if they were going to notify us, there's not even a linkage between the HSAS and the NOAA weather radio or the Emergency Alert System, our two national warning systems to get information out. There should, at a minimum, be a linkage--if there's going to be a public warning, that we have a process and a procedure to notify citizens over television and radio via EAS and NOAA weather radio. We do not have that. Second of all, we need to have decided in advance what are we going to tell citizens to do. It's no good warning them if you don't tell them what you're going to do. Do you want them to shelter in place? Do you want them to evacuate? So we need a plan prior to any of this happening. But the first step would be to develop that linkage between the threat assessment and the threat warning and the systems that we already have in place to communicate with the public in times of emergency. That would be the first step. And there's a lot more we could do, but let's keep it simple. Mr. Shays. Thank you. We intend, as this committee, to write a report on what we're going to recommend to DHS because--and we are going to use a good deal of what we've learned from the first and second panel. You've provided some rich information. I do want to encourage you to feel free to continue to dialog with the committee, all of you, in terms of recommendations. That would be helpful. Doctor. Dr. Carafano. I would establish a public system, a two- tiered system of watches and warnings. In order to issue a watch or a warning, you would have---- Mr. Shays. Let's start again. You're talking too quickly. Dr. Carafano. I would establish a public system that would consist of a two-tiered system of watches and warnings, and in order to issue a watch or a warning, you would have to provide information that was credible, specific, understandable and actionable. If you couldn't meet those four criteria, then issue a press release or something else. Mr. Shays. I'm going to come back to your comment. I'm going to give you a specific example, and tell me what you would want the public to know. Mr. Wermuth. There needs to be some distinctions made between threat assessments and warnings. Unfortunately, the lexicon, even within the Federal Government, about what really is a true threat assessment is different depending on which agency you talk to; so in the first place, we need better definitions. But I would offer that we need various types of threat assessments to start with, strategic threat assessments, who are our enemies, what are their motivations, what are their capabilities. And then with that information, you can make some more strategic decisions about the application of resources. Warnings, on the other hand--and I think Jim and I agree here. In fact, I think from what I've heard, all of us would agree warnings have to do with actionable intelligence, something that causes you to say not only is there this threat but it is this specific and here is what you ought to be doing, perhaps within a range of various activities depending on who your sector is. So to me, a threat assessment is something at a higher level. A true warning system has to be based on something more current, more actionable, more tactical, if you will, than broader threat assessments about who our enemies are and what they intend to do and what they have the capabilities to do, so that then you can overlay that with your vulnerabilities in performing a good risk analysis for the application of resources and other kinds of activities. Mr. Shays. I'm going to come back, Mr. Wermuth, and want to know how specific they would have to be in an example I'll give you. Mr. Connor. Mr. Connor. Mr. Chairman, the Red Cross's emphasis is on preparing the public for all hazards, kinds of affairs, and we understand this debate, and we think it's properly left in the Federal arena. Whatever the outcome is, we want to be helpful to DHS in whatever system is---- Mr. Shays. Well, let me ask you this, though, do you think the public needs to be warned about potential terrorist threats, or do you think it should just be threat assessment? Mr. Connor. Mr. Chairman, I don't think that is a question for the Red Cross. Mr. Shays. Fair enough. I'm comfortable. So now, let me give you a specific example. Let's just suppose that we believe that the Europeans aren't doing a good enough job of making sure terrorists are able to get onto airplanes. Let's assume that they may use a biological agent on the plane and that we think that is a very real possibility. Let's also assume that we're concerned about a dirty bomb being detonated when a large group of people are gathering and that we surmise that it may be in 5 to 12 cities. And we have decided to respond by warning all the officials about this concern. We are asking the Europeans to put marshals on airplanes. We are asking them to do a better job of checking. Let's assume that we are going into our cities to try to determine whether there is in fact any hint of radioactive material and that we are particularly guarding those larger events. Let's also assume that we have such a concern that there might be an outbreak, that we even have sharpshooters at large public gatherings. Now, tell me, if I'm being told that and that's what I know as well as a Member of Congress, what do you think the public has the right to know? Mr. Allen. Mr. Chairman, well, you didn't pick an easy example. Mr. Shays. I thought I picked a damn realistic one. Mr. Allen. But a very realistic one. From the point of view of the partnership, we would err on the side of telling the public more information than less, enough to let them make informed decisions about whether or not they want to go to a large crowd gathering. Mr. Shays. Or travel at your own risk. Mr. Allen. Or travel at your own risk. We would also hope that the decision on releasing that information or not is made collaboratively in a process in which State and local government officials also have a right to play a role and that it's just not DHS and the Federal Government making that decision. But we think that--we believe that it's the basic precept of our society. The public has a right to know, and unless there's a reason from an intelligence perspective not to, we would err in sharing it with the citizens and letting them make their own decisions. Dr. Carafano. I think everything you just stated would be the perfect basis for a usable warning to the general public, certainly much, much more useful than going from one color to another. Everything that you describe, there are things where individuals can take actionable things on their own behalf to protect themselves, and I think that would be a foundation for a perfectly valid announcement. And I would add, I think DHS's press announcement where they talked about concerns about airlines in late February and stuff, I think that came closer to the kind of thing that we would be looking for, but I don't think there's anything that you just said that wouldn't be perfectly appropriate in an announcement. Mr. Wermuth. Let me use your examples to explain what I think is the difference between threat announcements or threat analysis and warnings. In the airline example, I think we could and should tell the American people, on a regular basis if necessary, that we know that terrorists are still interested in commercial airliners and that we think some of our European allies are not providing enough security measures at airports to prevent them from getting onto airplanes. That's kind of a threat advisory. Right? People can process that information and make decisions about whether to travel or not. It rises to a warning level when, as we did around the holiday season and again around the first of February, say we have specific information that terrorists may be trying to board flights out of Heathrow and out of Paris coming in this direction. That rises, to me, to the level of a warning that says, ``You may really want to consider not flying on some of those routes, because we have specific actionable intelligence.'' That's the distinction between the two. But I would agree with my colleagues here on the panel, that I think the public has a right to know. In the dirty bomb instance, you don't have to tell the people exactly how many people you have as sharpshooters, for example, what kinds of weapons that they have, but perhaps you ought to say we're concerned enough that we're providing additional security forces that have the authority to interdict potential terrorists, including the possible use of force at arms. I just think that information is important enough to disseminate to the public and then let them make a decision. They may still decide to go to that sporting event or that public gathering, whatever it happens to be, but tell them enough where they can make an informed decision without necessarily talking about either intelligence sources or methods or for that matter enforcement methods, on the other hand. Mr. Shays. I'm just struck by the fact that you're basically saying what seems to logical to me and so respectful of the public, and yet that was really a real life example. That wasn't a made-up example. That was a real-life example that occurred in the last few months. Mr. Ruppersberger, I'm going to have a few more questions, so if you want to join in? Mr. Ruppersberger. I want to get back to TTIC, because I know it's important, and it's just not working as well as it should. Is there anything that you would recommend to us as far as legislation is concerned on how we might be able to fix TTIC? Mr. Wermuth. That it be a mandate: full-time representation in the TTIC from State and local entities of the Maryland type, of the California type, of the New York type. Whether you allow States and localities to pay for that or whether you provide direct Federal funding through grants or otherwise, that would allow some of these entities to provide their full-time representation, I don't think that entity is ever going to have the full picture, is ever going to be as effective as it could be, unless it has that kind of representation; and it can't be a quarterly meeting with a few State and local representatives coming to the TTIC and sitting around the table. It has to be full-time, every day. As one person described it, you'll learn more when you're talking to your colleagues around the coffee pot than you will in exchanging pieces of paper or having advisory meetings. Mr. Ruppersberger. From a legislation point of view, do you think there's a need for legislation to reform it or to dictate something? Mr. Wermuth. It may very well be that it would require very specific legislation or at least broader authority for Federal grants to be used by States and localities, if they choose to do so, to send representation to the TTIC, particularly those States in major metropolitan areas that perhaps are at higher risk, from everybody's viewpoint at higher risk, and we could sit here and name some of those. Mr. Ruppersberger. Dr. Carafano. Dr. Carafano. I would legislate the requirement for State and local participation in TTIC. I would legislate something similar to the Goldwater-Nichols requirements for JCS for participation in TTIC. I would do all of the funding for TTIC through the DHS so that DHS got basically a go/no-go on how the funds and other agencies participating in TTIC will be spent. And then finally, I would do a technical amendment to the Homeland Security Act of 2002. I would take TTIC, and I would take the IA portion of IAIP, merge them into one organization and put them under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Homeland Security. Mr. Shays. Thanks, gentlemen. I'm not going to keep you here much longer, but I need to--this doesn't seem as difficult for me as I think it probably is, because I just start with the basic premise that the public has a right to know. But what I do wrestle with is, then, when don't they have a right to know or when would I cause more harm than good. Tell me, if you were in the position of having to do not only an assessment, a risk assessment, but a warning, what would become the most difficult tradeoffs for you that would maybe suggest that the public would not have a right to know? And you all have had to have thought about it. I mean, it just--you're in this line of work. Mr. Wermuth. That one, of course, is difficult, but all I can do is to say, without having a specific example, there are not many scenarios that I can think of where you wouldn't want to tell the public something. I know the situation you're talking about right after September 11th when the question was asked, ``are we prepared for biological attacks,'' and what the answer was to that question on national television--I think the rationale behind not telling the public in that case is absolutely the wrong rationale. We have to trust the American people to take this information on board and process it. Whether it's natural disasters or emerging natural infectious diseases or a deliberate attack, I think we can tell them what you would, as a citizen, want to know without necessarily disclosing intelligence sources and methods or perhaps all of the steps that governments at all levels are taking to help protect them, because that might disclose things to the bad guys. You have to tell them what the threats are and what that means to them in terms of risk. I think it's wrong to take any other approach. Mr. Allen. General Hughes said that making those decisions about what to share is a balance, and I would agree with him to an extent, but I think the balance needs to be shifted a little bit. Hopefully, we will never be--have the difficult decisions that I guess they had during World War II in the bombing of Coventry when they decided not to share that information in order not to divulge the source of the intelligence. Mr. Shays. That's a great example, isn't it? Mr. Allen. It is a great example. And the only example I could think of when you wouldn't share it is when the potential loss to the Nation is greater from sharing it than not sharing it, and I truthfully can't conceive in 99 times out of 100 where that would be the case. So I think that the balance, again, needs to be shifted to the side of informing the public, letting them make their own decisions about their lives and their families. The President said we're at war on terrorism, but unlike other wars, where we had an ocean between us and the battlefield, it's here, and I think we're all combatants in that war. And I think, as combatants, we all have a right to know whatever we can to protect ourselves and our communities. So I would err on informing people. Dr. Carafano. I agree. I think that the two concerns are, one, compromising sources or methods and, two, doing something that might facilitate a terrorist attack and might make it easier. I think those would be my two primary concerns. Mr. Shays. You all, again, are such experts, I want to ask you this. Could what happened in Spain happen in the United States? Mr. Wermuth. Certainly. It's part and parcel of this entire public information, education process. I think governments at all levels have an obligation to tell people we cannot protect you against everything all of the time. You will never be 100 percent secure in any number of contexts within our society, whether it's within your freedom of travel, whether it's within your ability to communicate with each other through increasingly sophisticated communication systems. We ought to be explaining that to the American people. It really is the basis of what the Advisory Panel described as its new normalcy. Be straightforward with the American people. We can't protect you against everything. Yes, there are risks with train travel in the United States, but just because we're vulnerable, as this panel would say, doesn't necessarily mean that there is a threat out there that exists to exploit that vulnerability. Could it happen here? Yes. But that's what makes intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination so critically important. It's not just because we're vulnerable or the things that scare us to death. It's understanding who the enemy is, what their motivations are, what their capabilities are and being able to take action on that depending on what the threatened attack is at any point in time. But to me, the answer to the question is, sure. Mr. Shays. Dr. Carafano. Dr. Carafano. I agree. Mr. Shays. And the answer is, yes, again? Dr. Carafano. Yes. I would agree. Mr. Shays. OK. Mr. Allen, as well, is saying he would agree. I would also put into perspective we lose about 120 people every day in automobile accidents. It blows me away every time I think about it. You know, the number last year was 440,000, and so we do know there are a lot of things we do at risk. It's just nice to know it, and, I mean, nice--I just think it's important to know it. Let me ask you, is there anything that we should have asked that we didn't? Is there anything that you would have liked to have responded to that we didn't ask? Anything you want to put on the record? Mr. Connor. Mr. Chairman we would love to put in the record our thanks to Mr. Ruppersberger for his great support of the Red Cross and his statement on the floor of the House last week for March as Red Cross month. Thank you. Mr. Shays. That's probably the most important thing that happened all day today, that you thanked him. Dr. Carafano. I'd just like to reiterate a call that I think we need to pay much more attention to educating the next generation of State and local and Federal leaders on how to do preparedness better, how to do response better, and it's a serious education challenge that I don't think we've fully taken on. Mr. Allen. I just want to commend the chairman and this committee for addressing this issue, the whole issue of public warning. I think it's because so many people are involved, and nobody has been in charge of it. And somebody needs to pay attention to it, and we commend you for doing so. Mr. Shays. Thank you. We're not going to let up on it, and we do know we have people of good will, but we do think politics is kind of interfering, in some cases, with good judgment, regretfully, and I just think that we just need to keep plugging away at it, and I thank you all for providing us tremendous data and information and opinion. Thank you. This hearing is now adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] <all>