<DOC>
[108th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:92440.wais]
KNIVES, BOX CUTTERS, AND BLEACH: A REVIEW OF PASSENGER SCREENER
TRAINING, TESTING AND SUPERVISION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 20, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-117
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia Maryland
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Columbia
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas CHRIS BELL, Texas
WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota ------
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
Peter Sirh, Staff Director
Melissa Wojciak, Deputy Staff Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Philip M. Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on November 20, 2003................................ 1
Statement of:
Berrick, Cathleen A., Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, General Accounting Office; John DeMell, president,
Firstline Transportation Security; and James McNeil, chief
executive officer, McNeil Technologies, Inc., accompanied
by Mike Broida, site manager, Greater Rochester
International Airport...................................... 48
McHale, Stephen, Deputy Administrator, Transportation
Security Administration.................................... 17
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Berrick, Cathleen A., Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, General Accounting Office, prepared statement of... 51
Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Indiana, prepared statement of.......................... 112
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 117
Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia, prepared statement of................... 5
DeMell, John, president, Firstline Transportation Security,
prepared statement of...................................... 85
McHale, Stephen, Deputy Administrator, Transportation
Security Administration, prepared statement of............. 21
McNeil, James, chief executive officer, McNeil Technologies,
Inc., prepared statement of................................ 96
Ruppersberger, Hon. C.A. Dutch, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Maryland, prepared statement of.......... 12
Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of................. 114
KNIVES, BOX CUTTERS, AND BLEACH: A REVIEW OF PASSENGER SCREENER
TRAINING, TESTING AND SUPERVISION
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2003
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:45 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Tom Davis of Virginia, Shays,
Mica, Souder, Platts, Murphy, Carter, Janklow, Blackburn,
Kanjorski, Tierney, Watson, Van Hollen, Sanchez, Ruppersberger
and Norton.
Staff present: Melissa Wojciak, deputy staff director;
Jennifer Safavian, chief counsel for oversight and
investigations; Anne Marie Turner and David Young, counsels;
David Marin, director of communications; John Cuaderes, senior
professional staff member; Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Brien
Beattie, deputy clerk; Allyson Blandford, office manager;
Corinne Zaccagnini, chief information officer; Michael Yeager,
minority deputy chief counsel; David Rapallo, minority counsel;
Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa, minority
assistant clerk.
Chairman Tom Davis. Good morning. A quorum being present,
the committee will come to order.
We are here today to examine a key aspect of airport
security: passenger screeners. This is the committee's first
hearing into airport security issues, but it is a good bet it
will not be the last.
There is no alternative but success in securing our
Nation's air system. As such, it is critical that Congress, and
this committee in particular, be vigilant in our oversight
obligations. That is why last month this committee started an
extensive review of the Transportation Security
Administration's operations, with a specific focus on passenger
and baggage screeners. This review was prompted by the
discovery of weapons and other prohibited items on two
Southwest Airline planes on October 16th, as well as the recent
reports from the Department of Homeland Security's Office of
Inspector General and the General Accounting Office that cited
significant weaknesses in the testing and training procedures
for TSA airport screeners.
Approximately 1.8 million travelers a day pass through
checkpoints at more than 400 U.S. airports. The daunting task
of protecting America's transportation system could not be more
critical in today's threat environment. The good news is that
in just 2 years, TSA has made tremendous progress promoting
security by hiring and training 48,000 Federal passenger
screeners. The screeners are better paid and better trained,
and we are safer today because of it. I don't think we should
lose sight of that.
TSA passenger screeners have seized significant numbers of
prohibited items from passengers going through security
checkpoints. But despite this fact and the realization that not
all prohibited items will be detected at passenger checkpoints,
these recent security breaches have highlighted possible
weaknesses in the system that need to be addressed.
In six separate incidents, beginning February 7, 2003, and
ending September 14, 2003, Mr. Nat Heatwole, a 20-year-old
college student, was allegedly able to get prohibited items,
including box cutter blades, knives, and liquid bleach, past
airport passenger screeners and onto aircraft. Notes
accompanying the items he allegedly left on the aircraft
indicated that the items were intended to test the TSA
checkpoint security procedures. On September 15, 2003, TSA's
Contact Center also received an e-mail message from Mr.
Heatwole concerning the security breaches. However, the message
was not delivered to appropriate TSA officials until October
17, 2003, after some of the prohibited items had been
accidentally found, and after TSA ordered 7,000 aircraft to be
searched.
The delay in identifying Mr. Heatwole's September 15 e-mail
as an important message that required immediate action
highlighted problems with TSA's Contact Center. The committee
understands that TSA has identified the problems within the
Contact Center and has modified procedures by which messages
are handled at the Center. This last Friday I went on a tour of
the Transportation Security Coordination Center, out in
northern Virginia, which utilizes information from the Contact
Center, the Federal air marshals and other sources to take
action in cases of aviation security concerns. From what I saw,
the Coordination Center stands ready 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week to act on aviation emergencies, but it must receive timely
information to take action. We look forward to hearing the
steps TSA has taken to remedy the problem to ensure that future
security-related messages like Mr. Heatwole's are immediately
analyzed by TSA staff and that appropriate action is taken.
I understand that Mr. Heatwole has cooperated fully with
the TSA and FBI, and he has been forthcoming with this
committee in sharing his intentions behind these security
breaches. The public opinion of Mr. Heatwole's actions seem to
range from ``hero'' to ``criminal.'' It is up to the justice
system to determine the consequences of his actions. I
personally believe we need to discourage this sort of vigilante
behavior. It is counterproductive for TSA, law enforcement and
the airlines to waste valuable time and resources on similar
incidents when we need them to be looking for real threats.
Again, we have internal tests going on every day from the IG,
GAO, and other offices finding this. The results are being
relayed to TSA. But I do think we should acknowledge that Mr.
Heatwole's actions have provided us a chance to have a
thoughtful discussion on improving passenger screening.
Experience, no matter its cause or origin, is the best teacher.
In addition to hearing about TSA's reaction to the Nat
Heatwole incident today, we also have the opportunity to
discuss recent government work to review TSA training, testing
and supervision of passenger screeners. The investigation by
DHS IG found that TSA written tests for potential passenger
screeners on the operation of explosive detention system
machines were designed to maximize the likelihood TSA employees
would pass, rather than ensuring that only competent and well-
trained employees were responsible for passenger screening. In
essence, they have been teaching to the test. More
disconcerting was the DHS IG's covert testing of passenger
security screening operations. According to press articles, IG
investigators were able to bring knives, a bomb and a gun
through Boston's Logan International Airport without being
detected.
The GAO report cited deficient supervisory training
programs and a failure to collect adequate information on
screener performance in detecting threat objects. The report
also cited the need for recurrent training for passenger
screening, to ensure that screener skills are maintained and
enhanced as new security information becomes available. In
addition, the GAO report found that Federal Security Directors,
who are responsible for overseeing security at the airports,
have expressed concern that they have limited authority to
respond to airport-specific staffing needs. These needs include
daily and seasonal fluctuations in passenger flow. We look
forward to hearing more from GAO about their report during our
second panel of witnesses.
TSA has stated that new procedures for passenger screener
training and testing are in the works, including new written
tests to replace the tests criticized in the DHS IG report. In
addition, specific training courses designed for screener
supervisors are being developed to improve screener
performance. We are anxious to hear about these new changes.
There are currently five pilot program airports that use
private companies to provide passenger screener functions.
These private companies were responsible for developing and
implementing training for passenger screeners prior to the
Federalization of passenger screeners by TSA and therefore have
significant experience in the business of training, testing and
supervision. We are pleased to have representatives from two of
the private pilot program airports, the Kansas City
International Airport in Missouri and the Greater Rochester
International Airport in New York, on our second panel. We look
forward to their testimony and hope to hear about their
relationship with TSA, suggestions for improvements with the
new Federal work force, and how the pilot program has worked
with regard to passenger screener training, testing and
supervision.
The committee is mindful that the holiday season has begun
and that the traveling rush will inevitably result in longer
lines at checkpoints. TSA has the immense task of maintaining
adequate staffing levels for passenger screening over the next
month and a half. At the same time, TSA passenger screeners
will face additional pressure to process passengers quickly,
despite the fact that they are not permitted to allow
passengers into airport sterilized areas without resolving all
possible threats identified in both passenger and carry-on
baggage checks. But security measures at airports cannot be
compromised. As travelers, we need to be prepared for rigorous
security checks, and I hope that TSA can give us some advice
today about how travelers can smoothly proceed through
passenger screening checkpoints.
We look forward to a constructive hearing today, keeping in
mind that no system is foolproof. In fact, keeping prohibited
items off a passenger plane is but one layer of a multi-layered
aviation security strategy, which includes hardened cockpit
doors, additional Federal air marshals, and armed pilots. The
airlines have taken their own steps to increase the number of
layers, by training their flight attendants in self-defense,
for example. However, a chain is only as strong as its weakest
link, and we are hopeful that our oversight of TSA passenger
screener training, testing and supervision will improve overall
aviation security.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Tom Davis. Is there any Member on the other side
wishing to make an opening statement? Do any other Members wish
to make opening statements?
We will proceed to our first panel, Steve McHale, Deputy
Administrator of TSA. It is our policy here to swear in
witnesses. If you will rise and raise your right hand.
[Witness sworn.]
Chairman Tom Davis. Welcome. Thank you for being with us.
Before you go on, I am going to recognize Mr. Ruppersberger for
just a quick statement. The gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do represent
BWI Airport, and one of the issues--I have to leave,
unfortunately, to go to a funeral--but when TSA sits back and
looks at really where we are, what we are accomplishing, it
seems to me that what we have to analyze is the outsourcing,
the continued outsourcing we are talking about. Is that as
relevant as the actual training and making sure that we adjust
the formula for all of our employees or contractors, the
formula for what is safety? It has been said you can't have 100
percent, but we should try to reach that goal. That is really
an issue I would like to put out.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. We will try to
make sure that is answered.
[The prepared statement of Hon. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger
follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Tom Davis. Also I want to recognize that the
Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority is in the room, and
other airport authorities are here, too, because I think we all
share the concerns here and want to make sure we are up to
snuff for the holiday season. As I said earlier, we are much
safer today than we were a couple years ago, and despite what
we see with some of the headlines at this point and the fact it
is not a foolproof system, it is much improved.
Thank you very much. Go ahead.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN McHALE, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. McHale. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members.
Yesterday was the second anniversary of the legislation that
created the Transportation Security Administration, and I would
like to take this opportunity to inform the committee of the
major improvements in civil aviation security since the
creation of TSA and of our plans for continuous progress in the
months ahead.
Mr. Chairman, as you noted, I do have great confidence in
telling you that the civil aviation sector is much more secure
today than it has ever been, and it will be more secure
tomorrow than it is today. TSA and its many partners, the
airport authorities, the airlines and all of the vendors and
contractors, our contract screening companies and others, have
built an entirely new system of systems for aviation security
that is reflected on the chart over here on the left, which I
believe you also have copies of in front of you. This system of
systems does not rely on any one component. There are many
layers of our system of systems as illustrated on the chart,
but we have to always recognize that we cannot rely on any
layer to have a zero failure rate. If one layer is breached, we
must have other layers that will have to be overcome as well,
and that is our goal in building all the way through these
rings of security.
Since September 11, our ability to gather, assess and share
intelligence has dramatically improved. TSA keeps an around-
the-clock intelligence watch tied to all national intelligence
and law enforcement intelligence programs and maintains direct
connection with TSA's field operations and with the security
centers of major transportation stakeholders. That is perhaps
the most important relationship, the to-and-fro of information
between the private entities and the government. TSA's
Transportation Security Coordination Center provides tremendous
capability for prevention, response and mitigation. I am
pleased, Mr. Chairman, that you had the opportunity to visit
TSCC in person, and we invite other Members to tour those
facilities as well.
We have made major improvements in perimeter security,
conducted background checks on over 1 million air carriers and
airport employees with access to secure and sterile areas of
the airport, and implemented technological solutions to assist
screeners with detecting threats. On September 11, there were
only a few Federal Air Marshals. Today thousands are deployed
on high-risk domestic and international flights. Every month
Federal Air Marshals fly more missions than in the whole 20-
year history of the FAM Service prior to September 11. Aircraft
serving the United States are equipped with new, hardened
cockpit doors. By the end of the fiscal year, we expect to have
trained and equipped thousands of pilots who volunteered for
Federal Flight Deck Officer duty.
It may be valuable, Mr. Chairman, to step back and look at
all that has been accomplished in a very short time. The chart
on display tells a simple factual story of security screeners
then and now. Before September 11, contract screeners had no
national program of operating procedures or standards. Today
Federal screeners and our private contract screeners meet
consistent national protocols and must be annually recertified.
TSA screeners receive much more robust and comprehensive
training, and before September 11, screener attrition rates
were 100 to 400 percent a year. Today, the current attrition
rate at airports with TSA screeners is just 13.6 percent.
With all this in place, air travelers have good reason to
feel more secure, but I must caution that threats to aviation
still remain, and we must keep our security focused.
Intelligence reporting tells us that commercial aviation
remains high on the terrorists' target list. Last month alone
we intercepted 564,000 prohibited items at the Nation's
airports, including 1,900 box cutters and 41 firearms. We are
surprised that we continue to find such large numbers of
prohibited items carried by travelers and actively work with
our partners in the aviation industry to continue to educate
passengers.
As you are aware, there have also been highly publicized
incidents of smuggling prohibited items onto aircraft. These
incidents are the subject of ongoing investigation. But let me
be clear that TSA is well aware that our system has
vulnerabilities, and as we identify them, we take swift action
to address them.
TSA has changed the procedures at its Contact Center so
that e-mail, telephone calls and other communications are
filtered for security content, reviewed by a security analyst,
and, when appropriate, transmitted to the TSCC and other units
for action. We have changed procedures throughout TSA so that
all personnel are prepared to identify, document and report
potential threat communications.
TSA recently strengthened the preflight inspection
requirement for passenger cabins, increasing the thoroughness
of the search. In addition, the airlines are required to
contact the local Federal Security Director [FSD], and local
law enforcement immediately if anything suspicious, dangerous,
or deadly is located.
TSA conducts an aggressive covert testing program to
challenge screeners to detect threat objects at screening
checkpoints and in checked baggage using simulated terrorist
threat devices and techniques based on the latest intelligence.
We are conducting these tests at three times the rate of the
old FAA Red Team testing. We use the results of these tests to
provide specific feedback to screeners and FSDs at airports.
The results also drive change and improvement in our standard
operating procedures, training and technology. We are
constantly increasing the sophistication of these tests to
ensure that our screeners are prepared to counter evolving
threats to aviation security.
If our Red Teams do not get items through the checkpoints,
they are not trying hard enough. We challenge them to try to
get items through the checkpoint, and then we challenge our
screeners to try to stop them from getting through. It is a
constant push and tug in the testing process to constantly
improve our work force.
TSA conducted a screener performance improvement study to
determine the root causes for deficiencies in screener
performance found in covert testing. Well before the recent
incidents, TSA was already preparing a plan to enhance screener
performance. The nine elements of our short-term screening
improvement plan are highlighted on this chart that is being
displayed now.
Under TSA's plan, we will increase the number of
unannounced covert tests at airports to assess system and
airport-specific screening performance. Airports with below-par
performance on covert tests will receive special training.
Teams of industrial engineers, trainers, performance
consultants and technology and management experts will work
with the FSDs to design and implement solutions.
We are also enhancing recurrent screener training and
supervisory training. Recurrent training is needed to maintain
and enhance the skills of screeners, particularly in the area
of x-ray image interpretation, the search of persons and the
inspection of property. Supervisory training will enhance
leadership skills in our work force and provide the advanced
technical skills needed to better oversee the screening process
and resolve alarms.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like now to
show you a 30-second clip from one of an exhaustive series of
videos we are going to be using in training.
[Videotape played.]
Mr. McHale. A major initiative to improve screener
performance and accountability is enhanced through our Threat
Image Protection [TIP] system. TIP superimposes threat images
on x-ray screens during actual operations and records whether
or not screeners identify the threat object. This tool is
excellent for evaluating the skills of each individual screener
so they can focus directly on the areas needing skill
improvement and taking disciplinary action where necessary. By
regularly exposing screeners to a variety of threat object
images, TIP provides continuous on-the-job training and
immediate feedback. Today we have over 1,400 TIP-equipped x-ray
machines in place around our Nation's airports, and every
checkpoint lane will be equipped with TIP by the summer of
2004. TIP and other similar testing ensures that our screeners
have the right set of practical skills and are an appropriate
complement to our multiple-choice testing, which ensures that
screeners are well-versed in procedures and process.
Technology is an absolute necessity in detecting threats.
TSA has a robust research and development program to help make
our operations more effective, more efficient, less time-
consuming, and less costly. Extensive cooperation with the
private sector in the development of technology is a hallmark
of our program. TSA is testing two explosive trace detection
portals that analyze the air for explosives as passengers pass
through them. We are continuing to work on identifying the next
generation of explosive detection equipment for use in
screening carry-on and checked baggage.
In the aftermath of September 11, the screener work force
was Federalized to reassure the traveling public and to provide
uniformly high training and standards for screeners by
leveraging the resources of the Federal Government. TSA's
private screening pilot program provides a basis for comparing
the effectiveness of both Federal and contract screening. In
either case, TSA will continue to closely supervise the
screening operations and ensure that uniform standards for
screeners and equipment are maintained. We also are working
with the contractors to solicit creative and innovative ideas
for security. We have not denied any formal request for
additional operational flexibility that is permitted by law.
TSA also is moving forward toward implementation of the
second generation of Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening
[CAPS] II. CAPPS-II will greatly enhance our ability to
identify terrorists and other high-risk individuals before they
board commercial airplanes. It will help us focus our resources
on those that pose a higher risk to aviation security than the
general population, while reducing unnecessary screening for
low-risk passengers. We can and will achieve this benefit while
incorporating robust privacy protection measures for the
traveling public.
Another area in which we are making significant steps
forward is in air cargo authority. Just this week Secretary
Ridge announced the first building blocks in TSA's
comprehensive Air Cargo Strategic Plan. Air carriers will be
required to randomly inspect cargo on passenger aircraft and in
all cargo planes on both foreign and domestic flights in the
United States.
As we build new and strengthen existing security measures,
we must always keep in mind the customers, particularly the
traveling public, and as we start this busy holiday season with
the pickup in air travel, TSA is working hard to minimize the
long lines we normally see this time of year. Air carriers and
airports have been very cooperative in pre-holiday planning to
keep lines moving as quickly as possible. Airport and airline
personnel are stepping up to assist in non-certified positions
in airports when needed so that certified personnel can focus
on screening. Vendors and concessionaires are working with us
to schedule airport deliveries at off-peak times.
But, Mr. Chairman, as you noted, travelers can avoid the
secondary screening process by preparing for takeoff and save 3
minutes by placing loose items in a larger carry-on, taking
children out of strollers as they approach the checkpoint, and
by removing coats before they go through a checkpoint. TSA has
worked hard to reassure travelers by creating many hurdles in
the path of a potential terrorist, and we are continually
evolving our security systems to ensure we are always a step
ahead.
Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to answer any questions you
and the committee might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McHale follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Tom Davis. We have a series of three votes. I will
try to get a couple out of the way. I am going to start with
Mr. Platts.
Mr. Platts. Thank you. I appreciate your testimony and the
testimony you provided and the challenge your agency has. I do
realize it is one that is pretty formidable, and it is an
ongoing effort to try to keep up with the times of what the
threats are.
One of your statements, if you could expand on it, jumped
out at me. In the last year and a half, 1,500 firearms, 54,000
box cutters. What is defined as a box cutter? What is included
in that 54,000? That just seems like a staggering number, given
the box cutters being used in the terrorist attacks.
Mr. McHale. There are two common kinds we find. Usually it
is either a handle with a fixed razor blade in the handle for
slicing, or one with a retractable razor blade. But that is the
kind of implement we regard as a box cutter. It has a razor
blade in it usually.
Mr. Platts. Is there a common explanation of why somebody
has this, given the times we are in?
Mr. McHale. That is a question I ask all the time. The
answer is almost always, ``I forgot I had it.'' A lot of people
actually do carry box cutters as an alternative to a penknife
with them. A lot of people carry it for work and other things.
They are used to carrying it all the time. So they do say, and
I think perhaps often truthfully, that they forgot they had it.
It does strike me, given all the reporting on September 11,
given everything that has been going on, as remarkable that
people getting on an airplane don't think about what they have
in their pocket.
Mr. Platts. Is there any consideration at TSA of working
with the airlines, when you make a reservation, saying, ``Is
there anything else we can help you with today,'' of having a
one-sentence reminder that knives, box cutters, guns--a pretty
obvious statement to me, but apparently 54,000 occurrences, it
is not as obvious as I guess I would think it should be.
Mr. McHale. The airlines and the airports have been very
cooperative with us. They do help us with announcements with
the public address system, placing of signage. The airlines are
generally a little concerned about additional statements to
their interaction with passengers just because of time
considerations. But they have been very cooperative with us in
trying to find ways to communicate this message in a way that
works for them as well as us.
Mr. Platts. I thank you for your testimony and the efforts
of your Department and agency.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kanjorski, we have 6 minutes in the vote.
Mr. Kanjorski. I represent the Wilkes-Barre-Scranton
airport. Recently you had a RIF announced where you are
reducing 47 full-time employees to 26 employees, 2 full-time
and 24 part-time. I don't know how we expect 24 people to live
on 20-hour-a-week work, so it seems to me the quality and the
availability of those workers is going to fall precipitously.
Most of all, it sends an indication that this is the type of
airport that a terrorist should really go to because the
chances are that they are going to have less than professional
screening capacity and a significant turnover in employees, if
you are going to have 24 or 26 as part-time, 20-hour-a-week
employees.
The second part of my question is, I understand you are
contacting programs to get additional screeners, one just at a
kiosk outside of northern Virginia here, and it seems to me if
you are RIF-ing trained employees now at some airports, you
should have more than enough to relocate them to new
facilities. Why isn't this happening?
Mr. McHale. We have been reducing the number of screeners
following the direction from the Congress in our appropriations
act. But we have--just to answer your second question first, we
actually have quite an aggressive program for relocation,
giving displaced screeners the first opportunity to apply for
vacancies at different airports around the country. Obviously,
this involves moves, and we do find a lot of people don't want
to do that. They are committed to the area in which they live.
But where an employee is willing to relocate, we want to work
with them to achieve that.
On the first part, we actually have found good quality
people who are willing to work part time. It fits into other
schedules. So we haven't had a quality decrease as we have gone
out to seek part-time screeners.
The big question and the hard question for us really
throughout the last 6 months as we have gone through this
downsizing, rightsizing, at some airports it was actually an
increase, but largely across the country it was a decrease--the
big challenge we have had is working with our screeners and
explaining to them why we are going to a lower level.
I don't know the details of Wilkes-Barre-Scranton. I can
say, though, that at a number of regional airports there are
often large gaps during the day in which there are not flights.
Often there are a couple of morning flights and a couple of
evening flights, maybe one at lunchtime, one or two, whatever
it might be. The problem with that is with full-time employees,
we often have them literally waiting for 2 or 3 hours for
another plane to come in and really nothing for them to do in
that time. So we have looked at split-shifting and done that at
some places where they work 2 or 3 hours in the morning or 3 or
4 hours in the evening. We tried to accomplish that, but the
trouble with the peaks and valleys, just the nature of the
aviation industry, is we need people for 3 or 4 hours at a
time. That is why part-timing works better.
Mr. Kanjorski. Could you give me a report back,
particularly on the Wilkes-Barre-Scranton Airport and its
conditions?
The last situation, these 24 part-time employees, are they
going to have any benefits, or by going to part time are they
losing benefits and health care and all of that?
Mr. McHale. They will have benefits.
Mr. Kanjorski. They will maintain their benefits?
Mr. McHale. That is right. They will be proportionate to
the number of hours they work, but they get their benefits. In
terms of retirement, they accumulate that.
Mr. Kanjorski. And health care.
Mr. McHale. And health care.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. We are going to
recess. We will be back in about a half hour.
[Recess.]
Chairman Tom Davis. We will start the questions with the
gentleman from Florida, who is, as you know, very involved with
this in his other committee assignment as well and has taken a
leadership role in this. Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I'm glad that you're
conducting an oversight hearing on these issues that are so
important to the flying public. Let me just make a couple of
comments, and then I'll sort of transform this into a question.
But, as you may know, Mr. Chairman, I asked the GAO to
conduct a preliminary--well, to conduct a review of some of the
progress that we've made with our airport screening force, this
small army that has been put together. The initial response was
critical. Some of the public comments are in this--some of the
non-public comments to the performance are classified, but I
can tell you that the system is far from foolproof, as is
demonstrated by the college student.
What concerns me is two things: first, that we have not
made much progress, other than hiring an army of personnel, in
really being able to detect threats and secure the safety of
our passengers.
I see Mr. McHale is here, and I brought sort of a little
array of some common items. What I want to do for the committee
and for the record is to illustrate that this system that we
have is easily penetrated. While part of the responsibility for
not implementing steps to deal with this lies with TSA, part is
also the responsibility of Congress.
The technology that we have at our airports today is
basically, for the most part in passenger screening and
screening passenger luggage, is 1950's x-ray technology. Here's
a plastic box cutter. That equipment will not detect this
plastic box cutter. If it had a blade that was non-metallic,
the blade could be put in some other recess. So it's easy to
get through.
I put $50 million in the original TSA legislation
authorized and, unfortunately, Mrs. Murray from the State of
Washington--Senator--diverted part of that to a project for her
State. So it wasn't TSA's fault to not develop technology that
would detect this type of box cutter, which you can--I could
still take this through Washington National or any airport
right now. Their technology will not detect this.
Then if you take bleach, common household bleach, and I put
it into this--I can use that to--as a weapon, carry it on any
aircraft, and it is not detectable, use it against aircraft
personnel. There's no equipment that we have that will detect
that. This looks like a bottle of wine, but I've actually
filled it with flammable material; and, of course, if I had a
handkerchief, it makes a great fuse. Here's--while we ban--
we've confiscated things like fingernail clippers, here's a
lighter that can create an incendiary device to do a great deal
of damage, if not take down an air craft.
We put $70 some million in for advanced technology, $75
million, I believe it was. TSA turned back all but $62 million
in the fiscal year that just ended for salaries. So we don't
have equipment or technology that will really look at any of
these threats.
And I haven't even gotten into explosives. I didn't bring
any Play-Doh that would simulate explosives. But we have almost
no technology that would detect explosives strapped with duct
tape around a passenger such as Richard Reid did, but he did it
very expertly, concealed in the heels of his shoes. So I think
that this young man, while he may have violated the law, did
hopefully awaken us to the need to move forward.
Now the good news is there's some $200 million to get to
the next step of technology that will analyze matter and will
also determine what is in the contents, if it's liquid or other
material. Also, there is technology I've seen that will deter--
can look at shapes and other dangerous items. So we're far
behind. We've created a multibillion dollar mirage. You can
hire 200,000 screeners, they can be private or they can be
public, and we're still at great risk. The good news is we have
secured cockpit doors. We have armed marshals on many of the
aircraft, and we've also allowed pilots to be trained to defend
their aircraft and passengers.
But we need to go much further. This isn't--this little
display is just a small sampling of what can be done, and we
know terrorists as recently as this morning have shown that
they have very destructive intentions. Why this is important is
that if we take another hit with a commercial aircraft it not
only will devastate the aviation industry but also devastate
our economy. So TSA has done a good job in ramping up an army.
They have not done a good job in creating the technology
necessary to detect these threats.
So the only question I have, Mr. McHale, is how are we
coming on the development of technology to deal with some of
these threats?
Mr. McHale. I agree with you completely that the technology
we're using is somewhat better than September 11 but not a lot.
It is the same type of technology. We've replaced all the metal
detectors with the latest generation, but it is still the pre-
September 11 x-ray and metal detection technology; and it is a
technology that was developed to detect firearms, large bombs,
large knives. We're trying to use it--and we use it with some
success--but we're trying to use it to detect much smaller
items today. We do need to improve the technology and improve
the equipment that we have for our screeners.
We've made, actually, I think, substantial progress in the
development of explosive detection portals that will detect the
explosive vapors in the air around passengers as they pass
through the portal. I'm hoping that we will be able to deploy
some of those in a prototype to try to test them out in the
operational phase in the not-too-distant future and then move
forward to getting them throughout the system. That will
certainly help with the belt of explosives and that kind of
thing that a passenger might carry through on their person.
Some of the technology similar to that could be available
also to help us with explosive detection in carry-on baggage.
We're looking at that. We have problems with sizing that for
the space and making it operational. The technology is there.
Making it fit into the operational environment and the speed
with which we have to deal in the operational environment, the
equipment is just not there yet.
We have some very promising technology that we may deploy
very shortly that will help us with one of the items that the
General Accounting Office displayed to your committee, sir, and
will help us actually look inside some of those items without
having to remove them from the passengers. So that may be very
helpful to us.
We are constantly trying to figure out how to match the
technology to the emerging threat, and you are correct that the
threat changes, and the threat has changed dramatically in the
last couple of years, and we need to continue to find new
technologies. Perhaps the biggest challenge we do have--there
are a lot of good ideas out there, but getting them
operationalized into the airport setting is often a really big
hurdle.
Mr. Mica. Well, again, Mr. Chairman, I'm very concerned
about the lack of progress. When they turned back this year
some $60 plus million of $75 provided for getting us to the
next stage of technology, using that on personnel is not
acceptable. We will never address the terrorist threat. You
cannot deploy enough screeners and individuals to deal with
this threat unless you have the latest technology.
Finally, one of the things that disturbs me in this
incident--and I'm glad again that we have a chance to look at
this--is this young man also notified TSA, and TSA failed to
act. Now one of the things that we put in the TSA bill was we--
and as far as our screening employees and others involved in
this, we did not protect them with the protections of Title 5,
Civil Service protections. So I'd like to know, has that--have
those individuals been held accountable or have they been
elevated to some higher position, which is sometimes the custom
in our Federal agencies? But there are specific individuals who
had information about the threat or the actions of this
individual and did nothing about it. What's the status?
Chairman Tom Davis. Can I just interject there? Your time's
up, Mr. Mica, but we recognize your role over on the other
committee on this. This may be something, because it is a
personnel action, that you might want to communicate with him
individually on. I think you need to know that, but I----
Mr. McHale. I'd be happy to do that.
Chairman Tom Davis. All right. Go ahead. Any way you want
to do it. If you feel comfortable----
Mr. McHale. I will communicate with you about the personnel
actions taken off the record. But what I can say is that we did
set out, one, to develop a system. We get a large number of e-
mails into that system. It can take us some time to review
those e-mails and respond to them. So we've developed a system
to filter out and send up for review immediately any kind of
threat information that we find. So we send that immediately to
an intelligence analyst and security analysts to take a close
look at to identify the threat if there is threat information
in that and then to refer it to our operational side to take
immediate action, including referral to the FBI or whatever
else we have to do to deal with it. It was obviously a major
concern to us when it came to my attention on October 17 that
we'd had that e-mail since September 15, and we immediately
took steps to correct that. We've instituted training both for
the Contact Center--they've all been trained--and also for all
TSA employees, not only to recognize potential threat
information but to act on it and to know how to act on it and
where to send it to. The Contact Center was relatively new. It
was set up for consumer affairs, but it should have recognized
and should have been set up to recognize that it could receive
that kind of threat information, and we've taken steps to
address that.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your testimony, Mr. McHale. I'm also a member
of the Aviation Subcommittee and, of course, have followed your
work. As a result, I have followed your work very closely.
The recent transportation bill passed in the Congress took
away from the TSA an issue that the chairman will be as
interested in as I am involving this particular region, and
that is that, of course, it's the capital of the United States,
major business area, national capital, world capital, and you
can't bring a charter plane here. You can bring it to New York
where September 11 occurred. You can bring it to Dulles out of
which the plane that landed at the Pentagon came. But you can't
do it in D.C. I don't know what kind of message we were sending
out, whether the message was we're scared, we're incompetent.
But I have to give a great deal of credit to the chairmen of my
committees, including the one you just heard from, because what
we now have in that bill essentially takes it from the
Transportation Security Administration, and I want to
understand what your role will be, if any.
The bill says the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
develop and implement a security plan to permit general
aviation aircraft to land and take off at Ronald Reagan
National Airport. It says the Administrator of the FAA shall
allow general aviation aircraft that comply with the
requirements, etc., of the security plan to land here. It even
says that the President, if he suspends the security plan, has
to give the reasons for it to Congress within 30 days.
I mean, this tells you a lot about how fed up we are with
having general aviation taken from the capital of the United
States. Now I'm not blaming the TSA for this. In fact, we
believe that the FAA prepared a plan and that the security
types essentially become the decisionmakers in matters like
this. I would like to know, to what extent will the TSA be
involved, particularly given the role you have had with
commercial aviation?
Mr. McHale. That provision, I believe, is in the FAA
reauthorization bill.
Ms. Norton. It's the FAA reauthorization.
Mr. McHale. It's not quite passed yet but is, presumably,
about to be passed in Congress, and we're certainly expecting
it. We've worked with general aviation around the country to
develop security programs.
Ms. Norton. So you all have done it elsewhere and you are
going to do it here.
Mr. McHale. We definitely have it elsewhere in the country,
and we will work with them to establish an appropriate plan and
move that forward. I know you've had the intelligence briefings
on the National Capital threat and----
Ms. Norton. You know, if I may say so, just for the record,
the intelligence briefings were--if this is the way we do
intelligence in this country, then I tell you we all ought to
get under our tables and not come up from a long time because,
essentially, the intelligence briefing was your worst-case
scenario. You know, if in fact the world--if in fact everything
fails, if we are incompetent enough so that we don't know how
to protect those things, then maybe some monument or maybe even
the Capitol or some other such structure will be hit.
If anything, sitting in there was the chairman, from whom
you just heard, after that briefing which occurred about a year
ago, this is what you get. That's just how unconvincing dealing
with security on a ``the-sky-is-falling'' basis will get you in
a free society. What it means is you ought to close down not
only commercial charter or general aviation, you'd better close
down a lot more if that's the way we go about security.
Mr. McHale. Well, TSA has always taken its mission very
seriously; and its mission is not to shut down aviation, not to
shut down transportation----
Ms. Norton. That's why we want you involved, because you
have the only experience in this, Mr. McHale.
Mr. McHale [continuing]. But in fact it is to protect the
freedom and movement of people and commerce. And that mission
statement, I think, carries a lot of meaning and lot of
balance.
Ms. Norton. So you can assure me that, although we have
taken this from the Transportation Department, that TSA will be
involved.
Mr. McHale. We will continue to be involved, along with,
obviously, providing advice to the Secretary as he proceeds.
Ms. Norton. Mr. McHale, let me ask you to clarify very
serious allegations that have been made. We simply want to know
what the real deal is. It concerns the No-fly List. There have
been now repeated allegations by anti-war activists that they
are being targeted for scrutiny when they--because they have
exercised their first amendment rights, that somebody has their
names. Does the TSA have any records as a part of its No-fly
List of individuals who have engaged in protests or criticize
the government? Or do you have any way to find out who has
engaged in protest activity in criticism of the government? Do
you seek that information at all as a part of your work with
the No-fly List?
Mr. McHale. Criticizing the government is not a basis to
get on the No-fly List, and there is no one on the No-fly List
as the basis of criticizing of the government.
Ms. Norton. Or for engaging in demonstration of some kind?
Mr. McHale. What we look for is someone who has threatened
civil aviations, has been a terrorist. And obviously--or has
been--is associated with terrorists. Such--I mean, I want to be
careful how I answer this because I--we do not put somebody on
the list because they protested, but I don't want to say that
someone who is associated with the terrorists may not have also
protested. But you have to be associated with a terrorist or
you have to be a terrorist or a threat to civil aviation. Those
are the kinds of things that we look for to put somebody on the
No-fly List.
I've read the various newspaper allegations of these
individuals. None of the activities that they cite are--provide
any basis to put them on the No-fly List, and they would not be
on a No-fly List on that basis.
Ms. Norton. I appreciate that assurance.
One more question, if I might. I notice in your testimony
on page 3 in speaking about the October 16 incident at
Southwest Airlines, you found two types of prohibited items.
One of them, besides the box cutters that everybody talks
about, was liquid bleach secreted in a suntan lotion bottle.
This leads me to ask you to be concerned about biological
substances, chemical substances. Do we have any way to
protect--are we even looking to protect against chemical
substances, biological substances that could do harm on an
airplane?
Mr. McHale. Let me say yes to that, but let me offer an
off-the-record briefing on it, if I could, or a closed session
briefing.
Ms. Norton. I think we need one on that, particularly given
this incident.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Blackburn, you have a question I understand.
Mrs. Blackburn. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you
to our witness for your patience today as we are up and down
and about. I do have a couple of questions for you, and I would
like to really focus on some of the employee personnel
situations with you.
I think one of the biggest complaints we get in our office
is from people who go to one of the airports in our district
where there are tremendously long lines. They are running late
for a plane. There are TSA employees who are standing around
and there are screening areas that are not open, and so they
are left to stand and just steam. And the attitude of many of
the employees is, I guess you would say almost disrespectful.
They're not anxious to explain why there may be a delay or if
there's a problem with equipment or equipment not working. So
we hear a lot about that in our offices.
What I'd like to do is ask you how many total employees do
you have right now?
Mr. McHale. We have approximately 40--between 47 and 48,000
screeners on board, and then we have about another 8,000----
Mrs. Blackburn. And qualifications required of those
screeners? Do you have something you could send to my office
that would list the qualifications necessary?
Mr. McHale. Yes, it's actually set out very specifically in
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, what they have to
do.
Mrs. Blackburn. And education?
Mr. McHale. It includes at least a high school education or
experience as a screener.
Mrs. Blackburn. But no experience necessary in any kind of
law enforcement?
Mr. McHale. No, although there is a preference built into
the statute for that kind of experience as well as military
experience.
Mrs. Blackburn. And how heavily do you weight that
preference?
Mr. McHale. I'm sorry?
Mrs. Blackburn. How heavily do you weight that preference?
Mr. McHale. It gives them I believe a--pushes them to the
top of the line, but I don't actually know what the weighting
is on that.
Mrs. Blackburn. OK. And then could you provide that answer
to me, please?
Mr. McHale. Absolutely.
Mrs. Blackburn. Thank you.
OK. As you look at your recertification of these
employees--let me back up a minute. When you train them, then
you're putting them through 40 hours in the classroom and 60
hours on-the-job training before they're put behind the screen.
Mr. McHale. That's correct. About 44 hours in the classroom
and 60 hours on the job.
Mrs. Blackburn. OK. Thank you.
And then your recertification, how much time will they
spend going through this process and what is your expected cost
each year of your recertification?
Mr. McHale. There are three parts of the recertification.
There's a sort of a check on their current knowledge of the
standard operating procedure. There is a review of their
techniques in actually performing the screening, and then there
is a multiple----
Mrs. Blackburn. OK. Just a minute. Did you just say 3
years?
Mr. McHale. Three parts, I said.
Mrs. Blackburn. Three parts.
Mr. McHale. Three parts. The first part is essentially a
test of their knowledge of the standard operating procedure.
The second is a review of their techniques and conducting an
actual screening. The third is image mastery. They look at a
computer and have to identify threat images on that. That
basically requalifies them in all the skills they need to be a
screener.
I do not know the annual cost of that. I can get that for
you. The test is usually administered in those three parts
separately so we do not disrupt the screening schedule that
much. So that can actually take over a period of weeks to
complete the recertification. We will have recertified every
screener by March 1st next year, most of them well before that.
Mrs. Blackburn. OK. Thank you.
Now are you in the process of developing a separate system
for airports that want to opt out of the Federalized program
and go to a private program?
Mr. McHale. The testing and training procedure for the
screeners will be the same. We are, however, looking toward
November 19, 2004, to set up the process. We actually are doing
a complete evaluation at this point. We've just hired
BearingPoint as our contractor to help us evaluate the contract
screeners versus the Federal screeners and the contracting
system versus the Federal system. So that process works
through----
Mrs. Blackburn. Is BearingPoint going to develop your
benchmarks on that or will GAO do that for you?
Mr. McHale. BearingPoint will do that.
Mrs. Blackburn. BearingPoint will do that?
Mr. McHale. I think GAO is doing a related study, and we'll
certainly take that into account.
Mrs. Blackburn. Excellent. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Let me just ask a couple of questions, Mr. McHale. In your
testimony you talked about a sword that was hidden in a cane, a
gun that was found in a teddy bear and a knife that was
discovered in a sealed soda can. The circumstances surrounding
these instances--if somebody puts a knife in a soda can, they
couldn't be up to any good.
Mrs. Blackburn. I would not think so.
Chairman Tom Davis. A gun in a teddy bear. I mean, what
were the circumstances around that? Have we actually caught
terrorists as a result of this, or are these just bumbling
people who like to carry guns in teddy bears?
Mr. McHale. Well, there's a lot of people who believe that
they need to carry protection for various reasons and a lot of
reasons why people might try to carry a knife and a gun with
them other than terrorism. I don't think it would be fair to
say that we have actually found an item that we've associated
directly with a terrorist at this point. The gun in the teddy
bear is still a very strange incident and has been under
investigation. The limited amount I can say about it is that it
appears that the teddy bear was given to the child at a hotel
by someone the child did not know and then the child carried it
to the checkpoint and the gun was found in the teddy bear. A
very bizarre, truly bizarre incident. The sword cane was a
sword cane, and the person was carrying the sword cane, and
they've been referred for prosecution. And I believe that's the
same case with the knife in the soda can.
Chairman Tom Davis. But the gun in the teddy bear, as far
as you know, somebody gave to a kid?
Mr. McHale. That's correct.
Chairman Tom Davis. Did we find out who gave it to him?
Mr. McHale. I don't believe they've done that yet. That's
still under active investigation.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. We're going to hear testimony in
the second panel from private screening companies that
participated in the program that they're having problems
implementing screening procedures that are more stringent than
the current TSA practices. That's what they're going to testify
to. Can you give me your understanding of the TSA's position on
the flexibilities given to the private pilot program airports
in conducting the screening?
Mr. McHale. The screening standard operating procedure for
the private pilot airports and for the TSA airports is
identical. They use exactly the same SOP.
Chairman Tom Davis. What if they want to be tougher, if
they have something that's going to be a little more stringent
protocol? Are they barred from doing that?
Mr. McHale. They would be barred from doing that, or at
least they'd have to bring it to us and we'd have to review it.
Again, we always have to strike a balance here. You know, you
can have security at a level at which you'd completely deter
people from traveling. We need to strike the right balance. So
our standard operating procedure is designed to do that.
Chairman Tom Davis. You know, as I've traveled around the
country and talked to some of these screeners, some of them had
pretty good jobs and they really feel like they're on the war
against terror. They want to contribute, and they saw what
happened on September 11, and they want to be a part. I mean,
it's different in different areas, I guess. My impression is
it's been pretty good people for the most part, and it's our
job then to make sure that they're appropriately trained but
you're dealing with a good quality of people.
We have a huge travel rush coming up next week in this
country----
Mr. McHale. Right.
Chairman Tom Davis [continuing]. And it's very difficult
when you try to look at your priority, which is protecting the
airlines, making sure they're going to be safe and people who
are in a holiday rush with all of the other pressures that
holidays put on individuals and families and so on. Have you
talked to your people down the line? What are we doing to try
to make this week--do we have extra people coming in for
shifts?
Mr. McHale. What we're doing, we have a mobile screening
force we use to deal with problems at particular airports that
we keep ready at all times to dispatch, and they'll obviously
be fully dispatched over the Thanksgiving holidays to the
pressure points in the system.
In addition, we still have some airports that probably have
an excess of staff compared to other airports. We are
identifying those within each of the five areas that we divide
the country up in to and we will reassign that staff.
Obviously, there'll be overtime; obviously, there'll be some
leave restrictions over that period. We have to constantly look
at how we treat our screeners. As you said, they are very good.
They are very dedicated people. We want to hold on to them.
We had some real rough times the first year that we got
them up. We didn't have the infrastructure in place to support
them. We've corrected a lot of those problems now. I think we
are treating them better than they were treated in the past,
and we're trying to set up a lot of systems to listen to them.
Because they do have good ideas and they have very good ideas
about how to improve their jobs. So we're working with them to
do that.
For the holiday rush, obviously a lot of what we have to do
is educate people that there will be longer lines, educate
people as they approach the checkpoint to prepare and help our
screeners deal with the pressure because the worst thing that
can happen is for the lines to get longer, the passengers to
get upset, put more pressure on the screeners and cause some
security lapses. So we need to keep on working on that and make
sure our screeners understand that we will support them as they
do their job and that their No. 1 job is to keep threat objects
off----
Chairman Tom Davis. Again, if somebody's in the back of the
line and running late, do you have a way to try to get them up
to the front?
Mr. McHale. We work with the airlines on that. The airlines
usually try to take care of that; and if they'll bring somebody
up, we'll try to handle it.
Chairman Tom Davis. Great. Well, thank you very much for
being with us.
I'm going to hand the gavel over to Mr. Shays for a little
bit. I've got to run to another meeting but I will be back.
Thank you very much.
Mr. McHale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. McHale, for being
here. I think you and the chief administrator have one of the
most difficult and unwanted jobs you could have. I say this for
the simple fact that you could wake up tomorrow and six planes
could be blown out of the sky and you will be blamed for it
even though you don't yet have the capability to prevent it.
That's the reality. I know you can't tell people that can
happen, but that's the reality. But I can, as a Member of
Congress, say that we know; and when I fly, I know a plane can
be blown out of the sky.
I want to ask you--I do have a basic question that says,
you know, how safe are we to fly? And I think your answer--
basically someone else's--is we're a lot safer than we were.
We're a lot safer, and we continue to be safer each and every
day. But we don't feel as safe because we had a false sense of
safety before September 11. Do you disagree with anything I
have said?
Mr. McHale. I agree completely with what you said.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Let me ask you, when I look at--and
we're going to have--I want to just nail down a little better
what the attitude is of TSA as it relates to private security.
Are they being given the capability to prove their worth if, in
fact, you're the ones that are training them?
Mr. McHale. I think the answer to that is yes. The statute
is pretty prescriptive requiring them, for example, to have the
same training, the same qualifications, the same pay and
benefits, or similar--equivalent, I believe, is the word--
equivalent pay and benefits. So the statute puts a lot of
fairly tight restrictions around what they can do.
Obviously, when we set out to do this in 1 year, meet the
deadline both with the Federal screeners and the private
screeners, we didn't have a lot of opportunity to make five
separate little plans for the private screeners. So what we set
out to do was, we trained them all with our training contract
to the same standard. That way we know that on November 19 last
year and on December 31 last year, we had at every airport in
the country people who had gone through the same training
regime.
We are talking to the various contractors about proposals
that they may have to give them more flexibility within this
framework we have in the statute, but that could include things
such as taking on some of the training responsibilities and
that sort of thing. Obviously, we'd need to monitor that very
closely. But those are the kind of things we could look at.
Mr. Shays. But do they have the resources to provide
greater training if they choose to?
Mr. McHale. We'd have to modify their contract because,
right now, their contract doesn't reimburse them for that. So
that would have to be negotiated within the contract.
Presumably some of them have resources and some of them don't,
but that's something that would have to involve a contract
modification.
Mr. Shays. So to have greater training they'd have to just
do it out of their own pocket?
Mr. McHale. At this point, yes.
Mr. Shays. OK. As it relates to the issue, I think we've
covered a little bit the weapons brought on the plane by the
young student. I want to talk about the young man who put
himself in a box and basically sent himself from New York to
Dallas. Would there have been anything under our present system
to have prevented him from being wrapped in a bomb and our
being able to detect him? He still would have been in that box,
correct?
Mr. McHale. That's correct. There would have been--that's
correct.
Mr. Shays. He still, potentially, could have had some
firearms on him?
Mr. McHale. Yes.
Mr. Shays. So, I mean, it was a real breakdown. But the
breakdown was he was cargo, correct?
Mr. McHale. That's correct. He was on an all-cargo carrier.
Mr. Shays. Why should I feel any comfort--and that happened
to be by--in a sense, he could have possibly been put on a
passenger plane, correct? I mean, cargo is put on passenger
planes.
Mr. McHale. Cargo is. We do have more restrictions on cargo
that can go on all passenger aircraft, including things like
the ``known shipper'' program and other things.
Mr. Shays. Well, I'm not going to jump up and down with the
``known shipper'' program.
Mr. McHale. Right.
Mr. Shays. ``Known shipper'' is not screening. We call it
that, but it's not screening. It is just knowing the shipper.
We don't screen the packages of known shippers.
Mr. McHale. We do not do explosive-grade detection
screening on it; that's correct.
Mr. Shays. Do we do other kinds of screening?
Mr. McHale. Well, the statute does define, as you've noted,
that a known shipper is a screening program.
Mr. Shays. And so--but you and I aren't going to play that
charade.
Mr. McHale. Right.
Mr. Shays. Knowing who the shipper is does not mean you
screen the package.
Mr. McHale. I think most people, when we say screening,
think of some sort of physical screening of the package or x-
ray screening of the package. We do not do that.
Mr. Shays. Well, what do you think of it as?
Mr. McHale. By law, it's screening; and that is what we
have available to us given the type of technology that we have
in the operational environment. We have to continue to improve
that technology. We need to continue to work on it. But the
``known shipper'' program is a tool like a lot of our other
tools.
Mr. Shays. I'm going to say it's a tool. But I want to
really not have the record be unclear here. The law says we can
call it screening when we know who the shipper is. Is any of
the cargo screened by knowing who the shipper is? And the
answer is no.
Mr. McHale. By law, yes. That's--and obviously----
Mr. Shays. I'll use another word then.
Mr. McHale. OK.
Mr. Shays. By law, it is only because Congress made it that
way. Because it's like Congress passing a law that says that
it's sunny every day.
Mr. McHale. Right.
Mr. Shays. If we passed a law saying it's sunny every day
that doesn't mean it's sunny every day just because we passed a
law saying that, and it's about as absurd as saying that, and I
know why Congress did that and I think you doo too. But it is
misleading to the public because it implies that their luggage
is being screened. I'll tell you why I think the public is
being misled. I was misled because I thought we screened all
packages because I saw the word screening; and I learned,
frankly, from my colleague from Massachusetts, that we don't.
Mr. McHale. I think we have tried to be very clear, and we
have been certainly in recent months as we've turned heavily to
the air cargo area as we've developed our air cargo strategy to
make it clear what the ``known shipper'' program is and is not
and that it is not physical and technological screening. We
stressed that we need to do that screening.
Of course, the program we've announced this week will
require random physical or x-ray screening of the cargo on both
passenger and all cargo aircraft. The specific----
Mr. Shays. When?
Mr. McHale. We issued the directive this week.
Mr. Shays. That it will be done when?
Mr. McHale. I believe it's effective within 72 hours of the
issuance, so it's probably effective about now.
Mr. Shays. Are you saying all cargo is being screened
physically?
Mr. McHale. A random screening of the cargo.
Mr. Shays. So it's random, but it's not--and random is 1
percent, 2 percent?
Mr. McHale. That's in the security directive, which is
sensitive security information. I'll be happy to provide that
to you in closed session.
Mr. Shays. The bottom line is we do not physically screen
all packages that----
Mr. McHale. We do not physically screen all packages.
Mr. Shays. And so it is very possible that weapons, it is
very possible that explosives can be put on a passenger plane
via cargo that is placed in the passenger plane; is that not
correct?
Mr. McHale. I think the--I think I probably have a little
more faith in the ``known shipper'' program.
Mr. Shays. I didn't ask you about your faith.
Mr. McHale. That----
Mr. Shays. Mr. McHale, I don't care about your faith. I
care about reality. The reality is, it can be done; correct or
not correct?
Mr. McHale. There is no system of security that cannot be
evaded.
Mr. Shays. That's not what I asked. That's not what I
asked.
Mr. McHale. Well, then, Mr. Shays, the answer to that
question obviously is yes.
Mr. Shays. No.
Mr. McHale. The answer is yes.
Mr. Shays. No, but the--because--we both agree that you can
break through any system.
Mr. McHale. Right.
Mr. Shays. But at least when we check the baggage in an
aircraft we are checking every bag, correct?
Mr. McHale. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. Physically.
Mr. McHale. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. And so we make it a lot more difficult. If in
fact we are not checking what is cargo on an airplane that
could be on a passenger plane, if in fact that cargo, instead
of being on a cargo plane is put on a passenger plane, it is
physically unscreened, correct?
Mr. McHale. Unless it's subject to the random screening,
that is correct.
Mr. Shays. Right. How do you feel about that?
Mr. McHale. I'm told, actually the security directive is
effective in a little over a month. We've given them a month to
put it into effect.
Mr. Shays. I just want to know how you feel about the fact
that we don't physically screen----
Mr. McHale. I would like to have screening of every item
that goes on an aircraft. The fact is the systems are simply
not in place at this time. For us to require that we would have
to shut down large portions of the air cargo system. It's our
job to try to come up with a way to keep things moving as well
as secure. We don't want to hand the terrorists an unearned
victory.
Do I feel comfortable about it? No. I think we need to keep
on tackling the issue, keep on working the issue as hard as we
can, come up with the best ways we can to secure the cargo and
aircraft, but I don't think it would be appropriate at this
time to bar cargo from aircraft.
Mr. Shays. Why don't we do what we did when we did the
checking for baggage? I know this part of it because I refused
to vote for the TSA bill in November unless we had a deadline
for screening. We put the deadline for screening, the end of
2003, but in order to get my vote, they did that. And it passed
by what, how many votes?
Mr. McHale. I think it passed quite handily at the end of
the day, did it not?
Mr. Shays. OK. It was a close vote.
Mr. McHale. Oh, I'm sorry.
Mr. Shays. It was a close vote.
But let me ask you this. When it got out of the House,
that's what it was. My point, though, is we were told it
couldn't physically be done by the end of 2003. Then when it
came back from conference, it said the end of 2002. So I go to
my leadership and I say, well, if we couldn't do it by 2003,
how could we do it by the end of 2002? And the response I got
was that they did not want there to be more than 12 months or
14 months in which we were saying to the American people we
weren't going to physically screen all baggage. Well,
ultimately, when did we--do we physically screen all baggage
today?
Mr. McHale. Yes, we do.
Mr. Shays. And when did we meet that deadline?
Mr. McHale. December 31, 2002.
Mr. Shays. Right. Why shouldn't we put the same deadline on
cargo?
Mr. McHale. The difference is this: We obviously went to
extraordinary lengths to meet that deadline, and we did, and
I'm very proud of that. The technology was in place and in use
in airports to detect explosives in baggage. Very little of it,
but it was there. In 2000, 40 machines had been ordered
worldwide. We had to basically redesign the production systems,
which we did and we could do, to bring that total up to 1,100
bought and installed in 2002 to meet the deadline, plus 5,000
of the trace detection machines.
Cargo comes in all sorts of different shapes and sizes for
aircraft and it comes in all different varieties. It's a very--
it's a much more difficult problem to do explosive detection on
cargo than it is on baggage, and we do not have the machines in
place to do that. We do have machines that can x-ray cargo but
that doesn't detect.
Mr. Shays. What you just said, though, is something known
by the terrorists, so you didn't disclose anything.
Mr. McHale. I did not disclose anything to them.
Mr. Shays. Right. Then why wouldn't we--and we'll get on
here--but why didn't we--or why wouldn't you recommend or why
wouldn't you set your own deadline for saying that all cargo on
a passenger plane will be checked by a certain deadline?
Mr. McHale. We have an aggressive R&D program. Congress has
given us quite a lot of money for that this year. I believe
it's close to $150 million for the R&D program. And we also
have additional funds in the Department of Homeland Security
budget in the Science and Technology Directorate. We're going
to aggressively pursue that technology. Once we have the
technology, once we have the systems, then I think a deadline
is appropriate to drive them into the operational side of the
system. But if we don't have the technology, it's kind of--a
deadline makes it--you know, I'm not confident as to the--I
could not today tell you when we'll have the technology that's
available. We're trying to do it.
Mr. Shays. The problem is that we have an example of a
deadline that nobody wanted that we ended up having that we
met.
Mr. McHale. Right.
Mr. Shays. And I'm struck by the fact that what goes in the
belly of an aircraft that's a passenger plane is probably not
going to be as large as containers for cargo.
Mr. McHale. That's true. We do have a couple of programs
that we're doing. One is, for example, we are using canines to
detect potential explosives in mail that go in the passenger
planes. We've also got canines out there working with us on
inspecting some of the cargo in passenger planes, the smaller
packages. You know, dogs are pretty useful for a lot of things
but there are some types of cargo, especially palletized cargo,
where they're not all that helpful. But we're trying to bring
them online as well as the technology solution. We know dogs
work, so--and that's the technology that's there. They take,
obviously, a long time to deploy. But that's something that
we're working on, too.
Mr. Shays. Do we know when we have that it's going to go on
a passenger plane versus a cargo plane? Does TSA have a sense
of that?
Mr. McHale. We know that there's only certain cargo that
can go on passenger planes and we know what that is. But cargo
that can go on a passenger plane could also go onto an all-
cargo plane.
Mr. Shays. Right. Let me just--before getting to our next
panel, give me a sense of why I should feel comfortable about
the screening, the effort we do to protect our aircraft from
employees who work at the airport? I'm told, but it's basically
more rumor than fact so I'll say that to you, that we don't do
a particularly good job of checking who gets on the airplane,
workers who get on, that they have much freer access to the
field and that we leave ourselves vulnerable. Do you think
that's a concern?
Mr. McHale. I don't think it's as much of a concern as
perhaps has been suggested. We do have basically three types of
employee: employees who have access to the secure area, which
is generally the ramp, unescorted access on the secure area,
which is basically the ramp on which the aircraft are parked
and the aircraft; employees that have access to the sterile
area, which is the area beyond the checkpoint; and then
employees who have regular escorted access to aircraft or other
secure areas of the airport. All of those employees are
subjected to a background investigation which includes a check
of the terrorist data bases and intelligence data bases as well
as the criminal history records, and we update that
periodically. We have conducted over--we have updated all of
them since September 11. We've conducted well over a million
background checks in that area to understand that very--and
quite a few people have been removed as a result of those
background checks.
Mr. Shays. All right. Is there anything that you would like
to put on the record before we get to the next panel?
Mr. McHale. The only last thing, just on the air cargo,
just to note that we have been working very carefully with the
Aviation Security Advisory Committee. It's a committee that
consists not only of industry members but also consumer groups,
passenger groups, the victims of Pan Am 103, and other groups.
We have worked with them to develop a strategic plan. As I
mentioned, the security directives that we issued this week are
in fact beginning to implement the strategic plan, air cargo
strategic plan that we announced early this week.
Mr. Shays. Mr. McHale, let me just thank you for I know
what is a 7-day-a-week job, probably 24 hours a day; and I have
a feeling you don't sleep as well as some of us sleep.
Mr. McHale. I think that's correct.
Mr. Shays. And we thank you for your service to your
country.
Mr. McHale. Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Our second panel is Cathleen Berrick, GAO Director of
Homeland Security and Justice Issues; John DeMell, president of
FirstLine Transportation Security; and James McNeil, president
of McNeil Security, who is accompanied by Mike Broida, site
manager, Greater Rochester International Airport.
Anyone else who may be accompanying them who might be
called to respond to questions, we'd like you to stand as well
and we'll swear you in. Is there anyone that might be
accompanying you that you might ask to respond to a question?
If so, they can stand up and be sworn, and then if you're not--
if you don't end up speaking it would--it saves us the trouble
of swearing you in again. Is there anyone else? Are we all set?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Note for our record that our witnesses have
responded in the affirmative.
Ms. Berrick, we'll have you go and then Mr. DeMell and then
Mr. McNeil. We'll have you give your testimony, and then we'll
ask you questions.
Ms. Berrick. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Can you just suspend 1 second, please?
Ms. Berrick. Sure.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I'm sorry to interrupt. We'll start
all over.
Let me just tell you I'm going to give you 5, and then I'll
roll over, but I'd like you to finish in a minute or two after
that. So it'll be 5 minutes.
Ms. Berrick. OK. Certainly.
Mr. Shays. With a little bit of leeway.
STATEMENTS OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
AND JUSTICE ISSUES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; JOHN DEMELL,
PRESIDENT, FIRSTLINE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY; AND JAMES MCNEIL,
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, MCNEIL TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ACCOMPANIED
BY MIKE BROIDA, SITE MANAGER, GREATER ROCHESTER INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT
Ms. Berrick. Thank you. Thanks again for the opportunity to
participate in today's hearing on the security of commercial
aviation and, in particular, passenger screening.
Since the attacks of September 11, numerous changes have
been made to strengthen passenger screening, including the
Federalization of screeners and the enhancement of screening
operations. However, recent reviews and testing conducted by
GAO and others and recent media reports have revealed
continuing vulnerabilities in screening. My testimony today
focuses on three areas that we believe are fundamental in
strengthening passenger screening. These areas include
measuring the effectiveness of the current screening operation
through increased testing and collection of performance data;
second, strengthening screener training; and, third, assessing
the performance of pilot airports using contract screeners and
preparing for the potential transition of other airports to
private screening companies. These conclusions are based on our
preliminary assessment of TSA's passenger screening program. We
have an ongoing review assessing these areas in further detail.
We found that TSA has collected limited information on the
effectiveness of passenger screening but is taking steps to
collect additional information. For example, TSA's primary
source of information on the effectiveness of its screening
program is through covert testing conducted at security
checkpoints. However, we found that, as of August 2003, TSA had
only tested about 2 percent of its screening work force.
Another key source of screener performance data is the
Threat Image Projection system [TIP], which was deactivated
after September 11 and hasn't been fully redeployed. TIP places
images of threat objects on an x-ray screen during actual
operations to record whether screeners detect a threat object.
We also have found that TSA has not fully deployed an
annual recertification program for screeners that would provide
additional performance data. As I mentioned, TSA is taking
actions to begin collecting additional performance data,
including doubling its covert testing. Fully reactivating TIP
by the summer of 2004 is what they have planned as well as
establishing a screener certification program.
We also found that TSA should strengthen its recurrent and
supervisory training programs. TSA cited a lack of training and
effective supervision as primary causes for screening testing
failures during the covert tests. However, TSA has not fully
developed or deployed these programs. Recurring training is the
ongoing training of screeners on a frequent basis to enhance
their skills and introduce them to additional threat objects.
Some screening supervisors we interviewed also reported
that they had not received any specialized training to assist
them in their supervisory role. TSA is taking positive steps in
this area, including deploying some recurrent training modules
and tailoring an off-the-shelf supervisory course to meet the
needs of its training supervisors. However, we feel that they
could do more in this area. Finally, TSA wants to determine how
to evaluate the performance of the five pilot airports that are
using private screeners and prepare for airports potentially
opting out of using Federal screeners beginning in November
2004.
Both of these efforts will be challenging for the following
reasons: First, TSA recently issued a contract to begin
assessing the performance contract pilot airports. However,
since TSA has collected limited performance data on screening
operations, it will be difficult for the contractor to assess
how well the pilot airports have been performing. Second, since
the pilot airports have been granted only limited flexibilities
in running screening operations, this could limit TSA's ability
to effectively assess whether efficiencies could be achieved by
using private screening conditions. Third, TSA has not yet
established a process to evaluate airports that may apply to
opt out of using Federal screeners or determine the impact that
this may have on TSA's staffing and oversight requirements.
We are encouraged that TSA is taking steps to strengthen
its passenger screening program and believe that they should
continue to focus in on the areas of performance, management,
training, and contract screening. We will continue to review
TSA's efforts in these areas as we conduct our analysis of the
passenger screening program.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. I'd be
happy to respond to any questions at the appropriate time.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Did you take a breath during that
entire time?
Ms. Berrick. I wanted to get it in within 5 minute.
Mr. Shays. I know. But I didn't want you to feel you had
to. Thank you for your testimony.
Ms. Berrick. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Berrick follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shays. Mr. DeMell.
Mr. DeMell. Mr. Chairman, since November 2002, FirstLine
Transportation Security has provided predeparture screening
services for the TSA at Kansas City International Airport.
Under the PP5 pilot program, FirstLine must meet the same
overall hiring, training and security requirements as Federal
screeners. Our employees receive training from the TSA to
ensure that security measures are consistent with the TSA
procedures.
We firmly believe that FirstLine and the TSA must form a
seamless partnership. Make no mistake the TSA must continue to
provide supervision and accountability for overall safety
standards and hiring practices. However, the pilot site should
not be required to mirror every procedure used at non-PP5
airports for the sake of sameness alone. The second year of the
PP5 program should give private screening contractors
sufficient flexibility to implement private sector innovations
and creativity which could lead to higher passenger security at
the most efficient cost to the taxpayer.
To help measure progress, it is essential to recall how the
pre-September 11 screening process worked. Security was treated
just like any other airline contract or commodity, resulting in
a minimum wage work environment and atmosphere. The selection
of equipment used at checkpoints reflected budgetary caution
rather than safety concerns. Financial incentive clearly tilted
toward making checkpoint passenger screening just another line
item to be constantly squeezed into an already financially
challenged industry. All of this changed after September 11
with the creation of the TSA.
This new security screening model, which included the PP5
program, has not been without its challenges. On October 8,
2002, the TSA awarded FirstLine a PP5 program contract. Just 42
days later, right before the holiday rush, FirstLine assumed
control for meeting the staffing requirements for KCI
screening. It soon became evident that the PP5 program was not
at the top of the TSA's to-do list. FSDs were forced to
administer a new program, apparently without sufficient
headquarters direction or support.
One of the major problems we experienced is that the TSA
involved too many contractors performing too many tasks under
inflexible contracting arrangements. For example, FirstLine can
only hire individuals who pass TSA's assessment and training
criteria. This qualification process is run by TSA contractors
who appear to be limited to either the number of individuals
they can assess or train as well as to the amount of time they
can spend at KCI. It was a full 8 months before TSA's
contractors made a repeat assessment and training process
available to FirstLine. This inability to fill vacancies
severely frustrated our operations and continues to be an
unresolved hurdle.
Despite these challenges, we are particularly proud of the
work that our employees perform given an airport configuration
that requires 12 screening checkpoints. By comparison, Atlanta
Hartsfield has only four. The KCI layout also requires us to
double-screen many passengers who must leave the secure area
for restrooms or food. We have developed a close working
relationship with Richard Curasi, KCI's Federal Security
Director, to ensure that KCI security responsibilities are met.
His central focus on our shared security mission and his
personal efforts to foster a true partnership are critical to
the success of this evolving public-private screening level.
Our ability to bring private sector human services
management enhances the screening product we deliver. FirstLine
can provide enhanced pay scales, training and rewards for
exceptional performance and attendance in excess of government
requirements. Our Employee Advisory Committee allows management
responsiveness to employee concerns in real time, and we also
have the ability to discipline or offer corrective guidance in
a timely manner. At KCI, we remove the TSA's burden of day-to-
day resource management, allowing the Federal Government to
focus on security, safety and technology priorities.
Finally, there are a number of adjustments that could be
incorporated into the PP5 program that would in no way
compromise the high security standards we fully support. Two
examples include increasing local decisionmaking ability at the
FSD and contractor level regarding assessment, training and
passenger traffic scheduling requirements, all of which are
critical to maintaining appropriate staff levels and
controlling overtime; and providing funding support for
software management tools that enable maximum work force
utilization as well as maintenance of employee performance and
training records.
Mr. Chairman, our PP5 experience has convinced us that the
private sector has much to offer TSA and the Nation in our
post-September 11 screening approach. With appropriate
modifications to the PP5 program, these contributions could be
even more easily identified and measured in the coming year.
FirstLine is committed to ensuring that the second year of the
PP5 and our work for the traveling public at KCI continues to
enhance the security of our airline passenger system.
Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. DeMell.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DeMell follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shays. Mr. NcNeil.
Mr. McNeil. Mr. Chairman, McNeil Security, Inc., a
subsidiary of NcNeil Technologies, is pleased to testify before
the Committee on Government Reform.
McNeil Security has a contract with the Transportation
Security Administration to provide security screening at
Rochester International Airport in Rochester, NY. Rochester
Airport is a category II airport and is one of the five
designated pilot program airports. Although we were not
involved in commercial airport screening prior to the
establishment of the TSA, we have an extensive security
screening expertise providing access control and related
security services to a number of defense facilities.
All of our screeners employed at Rochester International
were selected using the same process and requirements as those
of airports with Federal screeners. The basic training program,
provided by Lockheed-Martin and Boeing, was identical to the
ones given to the Federal screening. The same on-the-job
training requirements and testing procedures leading to
certification were also used.
Staffing requirements, checkpoints and baggage screening
operation procedures and reporting methods are the same for
those at Federal airports. The daily operations are monitored
by the TSA screening managers. Scheduling and other duties
performed by TSA screening managers at Federal airports are
accomplished by McNeil Security supervisors at Rochester.
McNeil supervisors are assigned additional duties to their
TSA-mandated functions, such as training, supply procurement,
scheduling, and so on. This has enhanced the development of our
supervisors but also helped foster teamwork between TSA and
McNeil Security. One example of this was the development by
McNeil Security supervisors of a procedure and forms that
accurately catalogs various data TSA requires on a daily basis.
Training is a serious issue for McNeil Security. It cannot
be overstated that the training provided to one of the first
lines of defense in aviation safety must keep pace with the
resourcefulness of terrorists. This begins with basic training,
where customer service and security are held on equal planes.
While there is nothing wrong with encouraging screeners to be
polite, respectful and friendly, speeding passengers through a
checkpoint to avoid delays must never take priority over
security.
It is a fact that while numerous wait-time surveys have
been conducted, there has been little or no recurrent training
provided except which McNeil Security has provided. Screening
supervisors are given no additional training beyond the basic
screening training course. Until very recently, no TSA-
sponsored training for supervisors was available. Basic problem
solving, communications and other standard supervisor training
has not been offered. This is despite the fact that supervisors
have a myriad of duties outlined in the TSA SOP. The duties
referred to involve alarm resolution, explosive trace
detection, x-ray image interpretation, and other security-
related functions.
This is an area where training and interviewing techniques
and the recognition of deception will improve operations.
The recurrent and enhanced training provided by McNeil
Security, strongly supported by Commander Bassett, the Federal
Security Director at Rochester, is bridging some of the
training gaps. He has approved a variety of training programs
we have initiated for our screening force. These include hand-
wanding techniques, screening persons with disabilities, exit
lane procedures, report writing for supervisors, concealed
weapons, improvised explosive detection devices, recognition of
suspicious behavior, communications for supervisors, and
Operation Eagle Eye, which is recognition of suspicious
behavior, evaluation and preparation for supervisors,
leadership skills, explosive trace detection refresher ETD.
Those are all supplied by McNeil Security. Commander Bassett
also recently authorized a member of his own staff to conduct
IED recognition training at the checkpoints. There has been
discussion of a TSA on-line training initiative. While on-line
training can be helpful, role playing, actual demonstration and
other hands-on training is much more effective.
We would welcome some guidance and training in this
particular area. This test also points to the customer service
versus security dilemma.
Recertification testing was performed in August. McNeil
Security has repeatedly requested access to the scores. We are
interested in feedback about which questions were missed or any
x-ray images identified as threats or no threats. We have no
information on how the tests were validated.
In addition, without the aforementioned information, a
valuable training tool was lost. It is not possible to identify
those areas where screeners may need additional training.
Screeners were supposed to be ranked by their test performance.
This is important information for corporate actual performance
reviews. To date, this information has not been provided.
Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McNeil follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shays. What I am going to do is ask our counsel, David
Young, to begin the questions.
As I see this panel, we basically really have the private
folks who are involved in four airports. Mr. DeMell, how many
airports do you do?
Mr. DeMell. We do just the Kansas City International
Airport.
Mr. Shays. Before I go to Mr. Young, you said there were 12
separate entrance ways--I thought you said, Mr. DeMell?
Mr. DeMell. There are 12 passenger screening checkpoints.
Mr. Shays. You are not counting two machines side by side?
Mr. DeMell. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. That strikes me as quite significant.
Mr. DeMell. Kansas City, and we have a diagram in our
written presentation, has a very unique layout. Not only are
there 12 checkpoints and eight baggage screening stations, once
you get into a secured area or the gate area where you
typically sit to wait for your flight, if you have to use the
bathroom or would like a coke or cup of coffee, you have to go
out of the secured area and come back and get screened again.
There are no facilities inside of the secured area because of
the size and configuration of that airport.
Mr. Shays. You have a pretty unusual site.
Mr. DeMell. A very unusual site.
Mr. Shays. Is that typical of the other four sites? In
other words, did we choose to give the private sector the five
hardest sites, or does this just tend to be the only one like
this?
Mr. DeMell. Kansas City International is unique. The only
airport that may compare in some way would be LaGuardia. It is
a larger airport with some similar challenges. Kansas City is a
unique setup. There isn't another one like it that I am aware
of.
Mr. Shays. OK. Ms. Berrick, let me ask you this. Were they
chosen at random?
Ms. Berrick. TSA's methodology for selecting the five pilot
airports was to select one in each of the airport categories.
So there is a category of the airports that are the largest and
most at risk, down through category 4.
Mr. Shays. That would appear to make sense, correct?
Ms. Berrick. We didn't look specifically at their
methodology for selecting the pilots, but that seems to be a
reasonable approach.
Mr. Shays. I will jump in after--maybe jump in while--my
privilege--Mr. Young asks some questions.
Ms. Berrick, I will be wanting to ask you some questions
other than the private sector play in this issue. I will want
to know in general your assessments of port security and cargo
and so on.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know that you have all spoken in your testimony about the
need for flexibility with regard to the particular needs at
particular airports. The Federal Security Director is supposed
to be the focal point as the representative from TSA that is
there to manage the security issues for particular airports.
Understandably, there are standards that need to be met. There
are requirements, regulations and laws that obviously need to
be applied.
I am curious to hear from McNeil Security and FirstLine
Transportation Security about your relationship with your
Federal Security Directors, how you are interacting with those
directors in implementing TSA requirements and also how
difficult or easy is it to do extra things. Like, Mr. NcNeil,
you mentioned the additional training you have done, and, Mr.
DeMell, I know you have also done additional training at your
airports. So I am curious to hear what your experience is in
having localized additional either screening requirements in
terms of actual actions or practices that you all take and also
additional training that you do.
Mr. DeMell. I guess I can start.
In addition to the training that we have heard about that
is mandated via the TSA, in Kansas City we recently instituted
a program where every screener receives 3 hours of additional
training every single week. Now that is an initiative that was
put in place in conjunction with our Federal Security Director
that was not a TSA Washington-dictated action. Screener
supervisor training, we really have been given the latitude to
do the things we think we need to do to make our supervisors
better supervisors.
I will say, in the program as it is designed today, the
relationship between the private contractor and the Federal
Security Director is key. The program, in my view, was a bit of
an orphan program for several months and the FSDs were really
left out there with little direction and little help from
Washington in managing this program. I think it has just been
in recent months, the last 4 or 5 months, where things have
begun to change, and I think we now are in the process of
developing and have come a long way toward developing a true
partnership in meeting the mission at hand.
Mr. McNeil. We are very fortunate at McNeil Security in
Rochester to have a very good relationship with our Federal
Security Director. He has allowed us to establish new training
programs for our people that weren't originally prepared by
TSA. We have, I guess, instituted about four or five different
training programs for our people, including customer service,
as well as explosive trace detection that were not originally
offered. We also brought in some of the local police officers
to give us specific types of training on identifying explosives
as well as local military units to help us identify different
kinds of weaknesses we might have.
Some of the problems that we are actually encountering,
even though when we go to our Federal Security Director, there
are some times when he has to go up the line to get information
and get approval, and it is very difficult in fact for him to
get approval for us to do certain things. For example, on
recurrent testing, when we get people who have been tested, we
continue to get the results of the testing on our own people to
allow us to identify weaknesses in the test so we might be able
to design a training program to strengthen the areas in terms
of where they fail the tests. We are still trying to get
information in that regard. All in all, I think it has been a
very good relationship, but a very difficult one from the
standpoint of actually trying to get information from
headquarters.
Mr. Young. With your experiences with doing these extra
training activities, does TSA seek input from you all in terms
of ways to improve their own programs so that, if some of the
programs you are doing might be beneficial to TSA as a whole,
is there a mechanism for you to be able to transmit that
information to TSA?
Mr. DeMell. There is a mechanism that flows through the
local Federal Security Director as it relates to FirstLine's
experience, and we also are very involved with ideas from the
screener level up. We have an Employee Advisory Council that
meets bimonthly--I am sorry, twice a month--and part of their
responsibility is to offer suggestions for improving the
security function in Kansas City International Airport.
Mr. McNeil. The same has been true with McNeil Security. We
do also have ways of getting information up through the system
and getting approval. We also have an Employee Advisory Council
that provides feedback from the employees in terms of morale
and other things we can actually do to promote that.
The biggest difficulty I think we have is that the pilot
programs have been sort of ignored. No real attention has been
paid to them. I think most of the focus has been on the other
airports, opposed to saying this is separate and distinct and
how can we treat them that way.
Mr. Young. So you believe then that, although you are
sending up information, that TSA isn't taking the information
as seriously as they are taking it from other airports?
Mr. McNeil. In my opinion, if it is not part of the basic
training or the basic kinds of things they are doing for all
airports, then they don't really take it very seriously.
Mr. Young. Thank you.
Ms. Berrick, I know we have again talked about flexibility.
On the other hand, though, we do need to make sure there is
standardization because there are passengers that need to go
from airport to airport. They have to be familiar with the
different standards as well as airlines that have to deal with
the various rules. Has GAO thought of what the balance needs to
be or made any suggestions with regard to flexibilities with
that in mind?
Ms. Berrick. We are currently looking at the issue you just
mentioned in terms of what is the appropriate balance, and we
are going to be issuing a report on that subject in April. I
can tell you, based on the work we have done, obviously the
authorizing statute for the five pilot airports identified that
the standards have to be comparable, at least at a minimum with
the standards that TSA has in place, and pay and benefits have
to be comparable but we believe even within that makeup there
is room for some flexibility that TSA could afford the five
pilot airports to determine whether or not they could achieve
some efficiencies. As a part of--we issued a preliminary report
on this subject in September, and we did mention that we heard
some concern from some of the pilot airports that they weren't
given some of the flexibility they wanted in terms of doing
additional training, in terms of having additional testing at
their airports, and we are looking into those areas further as
a part of this review.
Mr. Young. It sounds like from our folks here that might be
improving a little bit in terms of their relationship with the
FSDs.
Ms. Berrick, coming back to you and moving a little bit
toward supervisor training, I know that you had mentioned that
GAO had some recommendations in terms of what TSA might be
looking at in terms of supervisor training in addition or
perhaps different from their current use of the USDA graduate
school basic manager course. Could you comment a little bit on
that?
Ms. Berrick. My first comment, again, is that we are
continuing to look at training as well so we will have some
additional information on this later. But the initial concern
that we had in looking at this area was that supervisors were
telling us there was no supervisory training and they really
needed that training in order to do their jobs. Also TSA's
Internal Affairs Office that does covert testing at the
screening checkpoints cited supervisory oversight as a problem
causing some of these screener testing failures. So we think it
is very important.
TSA has since taken some action to help correct that. They
are taking a USDA graduate school course, a general supervisory
course that they started giving some TSA screening supervisors,
and they are going to modify that course to meet the specific
needs of the screening supervisors. We think that is definitely
a step in the right direction. Still, the immediate problem is
that has to be going out to all supervisors within TSA. I think
TSA reported that 500 supervisors have gotten that training
system. However, we believe it needs to go out on a widespread
basis to make sure everybody gets that training. Then we are
looking at what will be some additional training that will be
useful for supervisors.
Mr. Young. Thank you.
For FirstLine Transportation Security and McNeil Security,
what kinds of training do you think are necessary for your
screener supervisors?
Mr. DeMell. I think they need the basic HR training that
every supervisor needs to develop the skills to manage people.
I might also add, in reflecting on Mr. McHale's testimony, the
TSA has two sets of problems. One-half of their plate is filled
with managing the work force, and I really think that is what
companies like FirstLine bring to the table. By enabling us to
handle all of the HR functions, the supervisor training, the
ongoing training, removing all of the HR issues from the TSA's
plate, we allow them to focus on process, procedure and
technology. I think that marriage of those two efforts brings
the completion of the mission at hand to a much better
conclusion in a positive way than the processes that are in
place today.
Mr. Young. Mr. NcNeil or Mr. Broida.
Mr. Broida. I will address that.
The supervisory training which TSA has not provided, there
are two important parts. What Mr. DeMell said is certainly
true. But, in addition, the SOP refers to many, many specific
duties of a supervisor in alarm resolution, for example. In
those cases, neither the SOP nor the training gives any
guidance to the supervisor of actually how to perform those
functions. In fact, I myself am a certified screener; and when
I went through the school I asked the question of the
instructor who said, ``Well, it says notify your supervisor. I
am the supervisor. What do I do?'' The instructor said, ``That
is it.'' You are the supervisor, and no guidance was given.
That has never been clarified since, and that was--I graduated
from screener school on November 15, 2002.
So our supervisors were sort of given only a half training,
and that has never been filled in. While the HR issues and
basic supervisor skills are indeed important and we at NcNeil
have provided some of those courses--we gave a training course,
an active listening course for our own supervisors--these types
of things in dealing with alarm resolution and the actual
supervisory duties of overseeing a security checkpoint are
completely lacking.
Mr. Young. Thank you.
I also know from some of the information, Mr. NcNeil, that
you spoke about some of your additional training with regard to
interview skills and those kinds of things. How helpful do you
think that is for screeners in terms of being able to not only
just be able to operate the machines but also to be able to
observe people and how they react to situations? I am just
wondering if you all have any examples of how that might have
been used or was helpful in a particular situation.
Mr. McNeil. Mr. Broida is going to answer that.
Mr. Broida. Earlier when Mr. McHale was testifying there
were questions about weapons that had been found and how people
say, ``Oh, I just forgot it,'' and things like that. We were
rather incredulous--and I have been actually on the job--with
the number of weapons people bring to secured areas and say
they just forgot about. Recently--well, in the course of our
experience at Rochester, there are two incidents in which
handguns were detected by our screeners at checkpoints. In both
of those instances, they were legally registered handguns and
the persons with them had pistol permits, New York State carry
permits, and their explanation was they simply had forgotten
they were in their various pieces of luggage.
However, the supervisor is the first person there and has
to begin asking questions. Do you know what is in your bag? Why
is it in your bag? Questions like this. Without any training
and interviewing techniques or the ability to detect deceptive
responses, our supervisors really do not have the ability to
begin that type of an investigation.
I think that basic interviewing techniques are of extreme
importance to all screening personnel. In Rochester, our
checked baggage system right now is an ETD system in the lobby,
a post-check-in system. Therefore, the passenger is present
when his baggage is screened. It is not uncommon to have ETD
alarms which can be caused by things other than explosives. I
can't comment on those things, obviously. But one of the things
that is done when such an alarm takes place is a resolution in
which the supervisor is supposed to ask--or the screener--a
series of questions without any training in how to ask those
questions and detect if the responses are deceptive.
Mr. Young. Thanks, Mr. Broida.
Just kind of to wrap up, Ms. Berrick, today the TSA, Mr.
McHale, spoke about the short-term screening improvement plan
that they have in terms of the things that they are going to be
working on and their priorities in terms of improving passenger
screener training, testing, supervising, all those kinds of
things. Does GAO have some kind of comment about TSA's approach
in terms of taking an immense problem that has existed even
before TSA even existed and given the fact that there have been
limited time periods that Congress has given TSA to handle and
hire lots of people and make sure they are ready? Can you just
comment a little bit about their approach in terms of looking
at the problem, trying to analyze it, and look at a road map
for solving those issues?
Ms. Berrick. Sure. We think we included this in our
testimony in some prior work that GAO did.
The first thing TSA really needs to focus in on is
measuring how well their passenger screening program is
performing, and that starts with establishing metrics from
which to measure and then determine whether or not they are
improving as they make all these enhancements to their
passenger screening program. One way to do that is through
increasing their testing program. That is a great way to get
data on how well they are performing, and TSA does have some
plans to do that. Another way to get additional performance
data is to put the TIP system, the Threat Image Protection
system, nationwide so you can collect a lot of additional
performance data that you are not going to be able to get
through screening. The annual screener certification program is
another way to get performance data on how well screeners are
performing. We think TSA needs to continue strengthening their
efforts to determine how well they are performing and, based on
that information, determine where they need to focus their
resources.
We think that the screener improvement program that they
went through was a great idea. We are looking at that right now
to see if they are developing action plans and how exactly they
plan to followup on the issues that they identified. But,
again, we think the focus should be on measuring their
performance and from there determining where their weaknesses
are.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Young.
Let me just ask the private sector here, give me the bottom
line as to what you think the issue is right now as we approach
the time in which airports can opt out of the public sector and
choose private sector.
Mr. DeMell. I think the real challenge is differentiating
the private contribution from the public-private contribution.
Because there has been little latitude and little flexibility
built into the system, we struggle to differentiate ourselves.
I think, as I stated earlier, that our contribution on the HR
side to the management of the work force has to be a prime
consideration in looking at the public-private partnership as
viable going forward. I think that is where we bring a lot of
tools to the table that possibly the Federal Government is not
able to bring or is not able to bring at the level that we are.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I would like both of you to respond.
Mr. McNeil. I would agree with Mr. DeMell from the
standpoint that if we were to allow more flexibility in terms
of staffing the jobs, in terms of determining what are the
staffing requirements that we have--because in some cases we
believe we could staff it with less people than required by TSA
to do the job. A little more flexibility in terms of being
creative, being innovative in some of the solutions that we
have.
We formed several focus groups in the organization, both on
the baggage as well as its passenger side, to identify ways we
can actually be more efficient in terms of how we do our jobs.
If we were able to have a little more flexibility in
implementing some of those--and then again, training, if we
could be just a little more flexible in terms of the training
we have offered. Most of the training we have offered has added
very little additional cost to our budget. We have sort of
eaten that in-house. But getting from local law enforcement
agencies that has the training professionals on staff, they are
eager to actually provide that training for us.
Mr. Shays. What I understand when you are talking about
flexibility, it is that you can train them to do anything, as
long as you are willing to pay the cost, correct?
Mr. McNeil. That is not correct. We have to get approval
before we can do any type of training, whether there are costs
incurred or not.
Mr. Shays. I would think once you did the training you were
required to do that you have met the test, and then any
additional training you still have to get approval?
Mr. McNeil. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Shays. When you seek to get that approval, do you get
it?
Mr. McNeil. Not always. In some cases it takes a very long
time for it to go up the chain and come back, and in some cases
it is denied. In some cases our Federal Security Director has
just said, ``I am just going to do it. I don't care what they
say. It is easy, it is reasonable, it makes sense. Let's do
this.''
Mr. Shays. Do I pronounce your name Broida? Did I
mispronounce it when I first----
Mr. Broida. It is Broida, sir.
Mr. Shays. I apologize.
Mr. Broida. Yes, what Mr. NcNeil said is certainly true.
There was a directive from TSA headquarters--I am sorry I don't
have it with me and I can't quote the date--but it addressed
the issue of private contractors offering screening outside
that which is offered by TSA. In sum and substance, it
basically said we could provide training that was non-security-
related any time we wished and they had no interest in that.
However, anything that approached security issues or SOP issues
had to be approved by TSA headquarters by going through the
FSD.
In those cases, for example, the IED training involving the
local law enforcement agency which we instituted. I brought
that to Commander Bassett, and he approved it on the local
level and then sent it up for upper TSA approval. I don't know
whether or not he ever received the official sanction, but,
fortunately, the Commander said, ``You know, it is important
training, let's just do it.'' It is a police agency. What is
wrong with that? We certainly appreciated that.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Ms. Berrick, it would strike me that they would set up
general task objectives for the private sector to meet and the
public sector, and it would strike me that you would then--if
they wanted to feel comfortable that there was basic training,
they would say you have to do all of the above. Tell me what
the logic is for--and I know I probably should have asked the
previous panel this, but what is the logic for needing that
approval to teach in addition?
Ms. Berrick. That probably will be a good question for TSA,
but just giving my opinion----
Mr. Shays. Not would be; it would have been.
Ms. Berrick. It would have been, correct.
Giving my opinion, I think TSA has mentioned in the past
that when you look at the authorizing statute for the pilot
program airports, there is some restriction in that statute
basically saying it has to meet, at a minimum, TSA standards
and also the pay and benefits have to be comparable. I think
they are interpreting that to the strict letter of the law. But
I believe that, even the way the statute is written, there is
some flexibility that could be afforded the pilot airports in
these areas. One of them is what you just mentioned in terms of
having minimal standards and let the pilots determine how they
are going to achieve those, with TSA's oversight. That could be
one way to do it, instead of saying all pilot airports have to
adhere to this specific program and you can't go beyond that.
Mr. Shays. There are only five airports we are talking
about, correct?
Ms. Berrick. Correct.
Mr. Shays. So it seems to me they could send a supervisor,
and if they objected to what was happening, they could note
that for the record.
What I would suggest for our staff is that we consider
writing a letter to--and I would like to think there is someone
from TSA here now--stating that we think we need--obviously,
the chairman would have to concur--I am struck by the fact that
there needs to be a little more flexibility to ultimately
assess the value of the private sector's participation. So I
think we will do that. Do you think that would be helpful?
Mr. DeMell. It would be very helpful. It is a frustration
that is shared not only on the private contractor side but by
our individual FSDs.
Mr. Shays. In other words, that even within airports done
by TSA that they should be allowed a little bit more
flexibility?
Mr. DeMell. In a lot of these areas, yes.
Mr. Shays. For instance, if LaGuardia wants to do something
above and beyond, they should be able to do that?
Mr. DeMell. That is what I am saying.
Mr. Shays. Nodding the head doesn't get us on the record.
Mr. DeMell. What I am really saying is our FSD--I can only
speak for the Kansas City Airport. When I say our FSD is
frustrated by some of the restrictions as we are, the private
contractor.
Mr. Shays. Let me put it in my language. The airport is as
frustrated as you are that you aren't given the flexibility.
Mr. DeMell. Correct.
Mr. Shays. What I am wondering, possibly even give a little
more flexibility within the public sector, if the folks at
LaGuardia feel they would like to see a little higher standard
or a little more flexibility or whatever, would they have the
capability to see a little bit of--not uniformity--in other
words, I am thinking intuitively that we want a uniform--we
want a minimum standard of capability, but if we have even
within the public sector a desire for an airport to go above
and beyond, do they have that capability and shouldn't they
have?
Mr. DeMell. I think, Mr. Chairman, that was one of the
ideas behind the public-private partnership, and that was
something that this partnership should have been able to design
and implement and put into place to be looked at by the rest of
the system.
Mr. Shays. OK. We know we have our work cut out here. It
seems to me we are not taking advantage of what we wanted to
have happen.
Just before we break, Ms. Berrick, I want to ask you, as it
relates to air cargo--first off, let me understand, in your
capacity in GAO you oversee Justice and--what aspect of Justice
do you oversee?
Ms. Berrick. I am about one of five directors in Homeland
Security in the Justice team, and I oversee all transportation
security work, including all the aviation work. So that would
include air cargo.
Mr. Shays. And what over in Justice do you oversee?
Ms. Berrick. My primary focus is aviation and
transportation security. I do some court and jail work within
the Justice side.
Mr. Shays. Talk to me about air cargo. I look at this sheet
here, the aviation rings of security, and I gather that when
they talk about airport perimeter and terminal that somehow
that must include employees that work within the airport but I
don't see it specifically mentioned. When I see 100 percent
baggage check, it is like there should be an exclamation point,
yet I realize that 20 percent of what is in the belly of an
aircraft is not checked, and that is cargo because cargo
represents about 20 to 21 percent of what is in the belly of an
aircraft. Is that correct?
Ms. Berrick. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. So help me understand why I should feel
comforted that 20 percent of the cargo in an airplane--20
percent of what is in the belly of an aircraft--is not checked.
Why should I feel comfortable about that?
Ms. Berrick. The security of air cargo is a vulnerability.
There is no question about that.
TSA, the way they are approaching that right now is through
the known-shipper program which we talked about a little bit
earlier. They are doing targeted inspections of air cargo. They
are also investing, I believe, $55 million for 2004 in R&D
looking at air cargo.
But, having said all of that, still 10 percent of air cargo
is not screened, and that is a vulnerability. Given the fact
that air cargo is on commercial aircraft with traveling
passengers, that just heightens the concern. But, I agree, it
is a vulnerability that needs to be addressed.
Mr. Shays. When we dealt with the vulnerabilities of
baggage not being checked, we put a deadline on it. What is the
negative of our putting a deadline on cargo screening for
passenger planes?
Ms. Berrick. I think the negative side of that is TSA not
having the means with which to meet the deadline in terms of
having the technology in place to do that.
Mr. Shays. But my understanding is that the luggage--excuse
me, the cargo on the passenger plane somewhat conforms to what
is the cargo--what is the baggage. In other words, it is at
least smaller containers, isn't that correct?
Ms. Berrick. I think it is of varying sizes. We are not
specifically looking at the air cargo issue right now. We have
done some work in the past. But my understanding is it is
varying sizes.
Mr. Shays. Guess what? We are going to ask you to do that.
Ms. Berrick. I will be happy to.
Mr. Shays. You can't come and testify here that it is a
vulnerability and then--I realize you have, but it is
something--I know the chairman is concerned about it.
Ms. Berrick. As I mentioned, GAO did do some work looking
at air cargo security about 8 months ago. It is somewhat dated,
but we did identify air cargo as a vulnerability.
Mr. Shays. Tell me why I should feel comfortable about what
we are doing to guarantee--``guarantee'' is a bad word, we
can't guarantee--but to help protect the traveling public by
what we do to ascertain the--let me back up. What do we need to
do to better protect the security of an airplane based on those
who work on those aircraft and those that move within the
airport, the employees?
Ms. Berrick. One way to do that is through strengthening
background investigations for airport workers, which was done
after the Aviation and Transportation Security Act was passed.
Another effort is to focus----
Mr. Shays. I am asking an unfair question right now. Let me
first ask it in a way that I think is fair to you. What studies
have you done--what studies has GAO done to look at security in
airports as it relates to the area of the airport and the
employees who work within it?
Ms. Berrick. We have two ongoing studies right now that
haven't been completed. They should be completed in the March-
April timeframe. One is looking at perimeter security and
access control, and specifically we are looking at requirements
that were spelled out in the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act and whether or not TSA has complied with those
requirements. We also have a review looking at the MANPADS
threats, including what the Department of Homeland Security and
TSA is doing to protect aircraft from MANPADS and what are some
countermeasures that could likely be used to protect the
aircraft. So, in answer to your question, we have two ongoing
reviews that haven't yet been completed in that area.
Mr. Shays. Now if you wanted to answer anything more on the
first question I asked, any recommendations of what needs to be
done?
Ms. Berrick. At this point, no, since the review is still
ongoing, but I believe we will when it is completed.
Mr. Shays. It will be done by when?
Ms. Berrick. April 2004.
Mr. Shays. Let me just ask Mr. DeMell and Mr. NcNeil, you
are working at two airports, but you must wonder sometimes as
to the security not related to passengers, the security of the
people who work there. Do you have a sense and can you make a
contribution to the discussion as to how secure our airports
are in terms of our employees and so on? Do you believe that we
need to make progress there and, if so, do you think we have
vulnerabilities in any particular area?
Mr. DeMell. I think we do need to make progress as it
relates to both cargo and workers who have access.
Mr. Shays. I guess what I am wondering is, as you seek to
make sure that the passengers that get on the plane don't
present a threat, do you sometimes wonder if the employees that
work at the airport have to go through the same kind of
screening and do you sometimes question if we may be more
vulnerable there? That is really what I am asking. If the
answer is yes, have you thought about what we need to do to
correct it? First off, I want to know if the answer is yes or
no.
Mr. McNeil. The answer for McNeil Security at Rochester
International is the airport workers go through basically the
same type of background investigation that our people go
through in terms of having their fingerprints through the FBI
and the rest. What really concerns us, though, is, as we check
baggage that goes on board the plane, someone that comes up to
the counter, drops off a small package, that same package has
no screening whatsoever, goes on board the plane. That is what
really concerns us a lot of the time.
Mr. Shays. Tell me how that happens? That is not cargo. Is
it called cargo?
Mr. Broida. Yes, sir. It is actually defined as cargo.
Several airlines have programs where, if you need to get
something to a certain place and it can't be Fed-exed in time,
you can bring it to an airport and it will be put on a
scheduled airliner to be taken to whatever that city is. That
is considered cargo and is not subject to screening.
As a matter of fact, this came to the fore in Rochester
when a NcNeil screener saw this occurring and thought that was
rather bizarre and asked if he could screen it anyway. He
volunteered to EDT screen it and was told he could not do
because that was not in the TSA SOP.
Mr. Shays. Let me get this straight. The passenger who goes
onto an airplane has to go through your system and their
baggage is checked. You are saying it is conceivable in some
airports that someone can come up to the front desk and present
a package as cargo and not only is it not screened, that when
you wanted to screen it you were not allowed to screen it
because it was perceived as not being the luggage of a
passenger, therefore not your responsibility and therefore you
did not have the right to look at it? Is that what you are
saying?
Mr. Broida. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Shays. Have you encountered anything as bizarre as
that?
Mr. DeMell. I have not.
Mr. Shays. Are you aware this may be happening?
Mr. DeMell. Yes, I am.
Mr. Shays. That literally someone can come to the airport
and drop off something as cargo and that it will be put on an
aircraft and may be not screened?
Mr. DeMell. As cargo or mail.
Mr. Shays. Cargo or mail, and it will not be screened?
Mr. DeMell. Correct.
Mr. Shays. So you have never asked to have it screened, so
you never had that experience. But you know as a fact it is put
on the plane unscreened?
Mr. DeMell. That is correct.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Chairman, it is great to get that
on national television and on the record.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chairman, you have the floor.
Chairman Tom Davis. Ms. Berrick, I know you have said you
have limited information on screener performance, but based on
the work that you have done do you have reason to believe the
current screeners are better, worse, or about the same as
before September 11?
Ms. Berrick. We really can't make that conclusion based on
the information that exists. GAO did look at the passenger
screening program prior to September 11 when the responsibility
fell under FAA, and we are currently looking at it right now.
What we are doing is looking at how TSA measures the
performance of its passenger screeners, and we are finding
there is really limited data out there that identifies how well
their screeners are performing. As a result, it is very
difficult to make any kind of comparison.
Surfacely, it looks like there have been lots of
improvements: The pay and benefits are better, there is less
turnover, etc. But in terms of concrete data on whether or not
they are detecting harder-to-spot threat objects, we haven't
seen that.
Chairman Tom Davis. Does GAO have an opinion on the current
staffing levels?
Ms. Berrick. We have an ongoing review that is looking at
staffing levels. We reported in September of this year that,
based on our preliminary assessments, some Federal Security
Directors did express concerns about staffing levels at their
airports in terms of having input into the staffing process. We
are encouraged that TSA has recently hired a contractor to come
in and assess their staffing model to get a second set of eyes
looking at it. But staffing is a big concern based on the
Federal Security Director we spoke with, and we are going to
continue to look at this as part of our review.
Chairman Tom Davis. Let me ask the private companies. Mr.
DeMell, are there any recommendations you would make to TSA
regarding staffing levels that could create cost savings
without jeopardizing security?
Mr. DeMell. Since we haven't been able to participate in
that process it is difficult, but we think that is an area
where the private contractor should be allowed to interact with
the local TSA in developing those staffing standards--not only
staffing standards but looking at the organizational charts of
the local TSA organization versus the private contractor,
looking for overlap in ways to save money where there is a
duplication of that effort in that end of it as well.
Chairman Tom Davis. Let me go back to Ms. Berrick. As a
general rule, are airports able to fully staff their airport
screener requirements?
Ms. Berrick. Not always. There are peaks and valleys we
found in terms of the Federal Security Directors not having the
staff they need to respond to those peaks and valleys. One of
the big things initially that the Federal Security Directors
told us was they would love to hire part-time screeners.
Recently, TSA has enabled the airports to do that, and that has
been a big help. But there still is a problem in staffing,
hiring the part-time screeners and making sure that the
airports have what they need when they need them, and we are
continuing to look at that.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Let me ask, what about the TSA
mobile units? How are those working out?
Ms. Berrick. I don't have a lot of specific information on
that. I believe one is deployed to Kansas, one of the PP5
airports, because there was a shortage there; and I don't have
much more information on that, other than I know they are in
use.
Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Let me close this hearing by just asking, is
there anything that any of the four of you would like to put on
the record, anything that you had maybe spent the night
thinking about that we didn't ask you that needs to be part of
the record?
Ms. Berrick. If I could make just one comment, we are
talking a lot about the five pilot airports. TSA recently hired
a contractor to assess the performance of the five pilot
airports. We think it is going to be challenging for that
contractor to do an assessment because of the lack of
performance data not only at the five pilot airports but
throughout all the commercial airports in terms of how well the
screeners are performing. So that is one thing that we are
going to be working with TSA in looking at in terms of how this
contractor is going to be able to assess the performance. Not
only because there is a lack of data but also because the five
pilot airports haven't been granted a lot of flexibility. So to
do a true assessment I think will be a challenge for them.
Mr. Shays. I am struck by the fact, though, wouldn't it
have been great if the TSA had allowed for innovation and not
one-size-fits-all at all the airports so we could even compare
within the public sector what might work better? Then obviously
we would have allowed for the private sector to have the
freedom to do a lot more things and to be corrective. That was
the whole point, so we could then do an evaluation. It strikes
me it is almost a study designed to fail because of that based
on what you are pointing out.
Mr. Chairman, are we all set?
Let me again thank all the witnesses and say that this
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[The prepared statements of Hon. Dan Burton, Hon. Henry A.
Waxman, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, and additional information
submitted for the hearing record follows:]
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