Winston
Churchill to Admiral Lord Fisher
8 April 1915
Admiralty
Secret
The probability that Italy will join the Allies within a few days
raises a question of great importance as regards the Dardanelles
attack. If the attack is a failure before Italy had definitely
declared war, the repulse of our attempt might have a most prejudicial
effect upon her conduct. If she does come in, we probably get the
whole of the Balkans in too, and the results need no discussion.
The question is--Is it worth while to risk the attack at this
moment? Is it not better to wait a few days, or to divert the attack
elsewhere?
If it is practically certain that Italy will come in within a
few days, and that she has now decided upon her attitude, I should
suggest that the attack be postponed. If, on the other hand, she
is waiting for the result of the attack before deciding, there
is another operation which we might undertake, which our sea command
enables us to do--attack Turkey elsewhere. The place I should suggest
is Haifa, to be followed by the capture of Damascus. She is still
entirely unprepared for a blow in that part, though she is said
to have been making ready at Haifa and Beirut. But as we have openly
announced that we are going to take the Dardanelles with our Army,
and as our preparations at Mudros and elsewhere can have left little
doubt that we are going to do so, it is there that the Turks have
now made their main defence, and nothing would be so utterly disconcerting
to them as the attack, with our 80,000 odd men in a wholly different
region. Hindenburg's strategic railway victories would not compare
with it. The success of it would be beyond doubt. Italy's decision
would then be placed beyond all shadow of doubt, and the Dardanelles
could be dealt with after the Turkish Syrian army had been starved
or destroyed. A rising Syria could be engineered to enable our
troops to withdraw, which they would do ostensibly for Egypt but
really for the Dardanelles, the resistance at which place would
be proportionately weaker.
The effect of this surprise blow would be prodigious in Europe;
and it is suggested that these two alternative courses deserve
the immediate consideration of the War Council.
Admiralty
I.S.L.
'And thus the native hue of resolution
'Is sicklied o'er by the
pale cast of thought,
'And enterprises of great pith & moment
'With this regard their
currents turn awry
'And lose the name of action'
'We are defeated at sea because our
Admirals have learned--where I know not--that war can be made without
running risks'
[Napoleon]
WSC
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