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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SCOWCROFT

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FM USDEL RIYADH  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 028  
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~~SECRET~~ USDEL RIYADH 0047

CONTROL: 3 9 6 3 Q  
 RECD: 15 DECEMBER 73 -  
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SECTO 126

SONNENFELDT

FOR PICKERING FROM EAGLEBURGER

EO 11652: XGDS  
 TAGS: OVIP  
 SUBJ: SECRETARY'S BILATERAL WITH PATRICIO

REF: A) STATE 245497 B) 245498

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KISSINGER-PATRICIO MEMCON. IT IS FOR YOU AND SECRETARIES RUSH AND PORTER ONLY, AND IS TO BE KEPT IN YOUR SAFE. I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY YOU DO NOT ALREADY HAVE IT, SINCE I CLEARED A CABLE SUMMARY BEFORE WE LEFT BRUSSELS.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

PARTICIPANTS: FOREIGN MINISTER PATRICIO  
 AMBASSADOR ARMANDO RAMOS DE PAULA COELHO

THE SECRETARY  
 MR. SONNENFELDT  
 MR. STOESEL  
 MR. VEST

THE SECRETARY

I'LL BE VISITING PORTUGAL SOON AND THEN WE CAN TALK IN MORE DETAIL, BUT I WANTED THIS VISIT WITH YOU HERE IN BRUSSELS TO SYMBOLIZE THE FACT THAT WE APPRECIATE YOUR SUPPORT DURING THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. I AM ONLY SEEING YOU, THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER, AND THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER.

PATRICIO

I LOOK FORWARD VERY MUCH TO YOUR VISIT TO LISBON. THERE IS MUCH OF MUTUAL INTEREST TO DISCUSS. I AM ALSO PLEASED AT THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO YOU TODAY TO OUTLINE SOME OF OUR CONCERNS.

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5  
 N2W01-250/271 10-412 8/16/06  
 By est Date 07/21/07  
 [10925] [11 04 7]

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-2- USDEL RIYADH 47

THE SECRETARY

YOU WILL FIND THAT WE ARE VERY SYMPATHETIC TO YOUR APPROACH AND WE WILL MAKE A REAL EFFORT TO MEET YOUR NEEDS.

PATRICIO

FIRST, I WANT TO SAY THAT WE APPRECIATE THE STATEMENTS YOU AND PRESIDENT NIXON HAVE MADE ABOUT PORTUGAL. AT THE SAME TIME, I SHOULD SAY THAT THESE HAVE SERVED TO CALL ATTENTION TO PORTUGAL'S ATTITUDE DURING THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT.

YOU ARE AWARE OF OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES TO PORTUGAL ARISING FROM OUR ATTITUDE. YOU WILL RECALL THAT WE IMMEDIATELY REPLIED TO YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 13. WE WERE VERY AWARE OF YOUR NEEDS BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES TO PORTUGAL AND THOUGHT IT APPROPRIATE TO TELL YOU OF THESE CONCERNS. THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD BY YOU, BUT I SHOULD SAY THAT WE WERE NOT TRYING TO PROFIT FROM THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. SOMEONE EVEN SAID WE WERE NOT TRYING TO PROFIT FROM THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. SOMEONE EVEN SAID WE WERE PLAYING POKER. EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE; WE WERE SHOWING ALL OF OUR CARDS TO YOU AND ASKING OPENLY FOR ALL OF OUR REQUIREMENTS. SINCE THEN, THE FACTS HAVE ONLY CONFIRMED SOME OF OUR CONCERNS. PORTUGAL HAS BEEN SINGLED OUT BY THE ARABS, TOGETHER WITH THE DUTCH, FOR SPECIAL CRITICISM. THIS WAS ALSO TRUE AT THE ALGIERS MEETING, WHEN THE ARABS SAID THAT THE PORTUGUESE ROLE HAD EXERTED A PARAMOUNT INFLUENCE ON THE CONFLICT. WE HAVE RECEIVED MESSAGES FROM THE ARABS SAYING THAT THE PROVISION OF THE LAJES BASE BY PORTUGAL WAS DECISIVE.

IN OUR MEMORANDUM, WE'VE SAID OUR CONCERN WAS NOT ONLY ABOUT OIL BUT ALSO ABOUT TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST PORTUGAL.

THE SECRETARY

I FEEL THEY ARE DOING THE MAXIMUM THEY CAN AGAINST YOU IN ANY CASE, AND THIS IS NOT BECAUSE OF HAT YOU DID DURING THE CONFLICT.

PATRICIO

[NEW 01-26/27] (2017)

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-3- USDEL RIYADH 47

THE PRESSURES ARE INCREASING. IN ALL CANDOR, I WOULD LIKE TO PUT TO YOU OUR REQUESTS FOR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT. WHEN WE APPROACH OUR NEGOTIATIONS FOR A BASE AGREEMENT, WE CAN'T BE CONTENT WITH WHAT WAS ACCEPTED IN THE PAST FOR THIS AGREEMENT; THIS IS NOT BECAUSE WE DESIRE TO PROFIT FROM THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES BUT BECAUSE THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED IN CONNECTION WITH THE THREAT.

THE SECRETARY

WE NEED THE BASE. AND YOU NEED US. IF THE AGREEMENT IS NOT RENEWED, WE WILL LOSE INTEREST IN YOU AND YOU WILL BE WORSE OFF. YOU HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE UNLESS YOU ARE PREPARED TO GIVE UP GUINEA BISSAU, ANGOLA, AND MOZAMBIQUE. YOU WON'T DO THIS AND WE ARE NOT ASKING YOU TO DO THIS. WE ARE WELL DISPOSED TOWARD YOU AND WE HAVE GIVEN YOU LESS TROUBLE THAN ANY PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE SINCE WE HAVE ABOLISHED THE POLITICAL SCIENCE DIVISION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THERE USED TO BE A SECTION FOR WORLD IMPROVEMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT, BUT WE GOT RID OF IT.

THE QUESTION IS WHAT WE CAN DO TOGETHER. IT IS NOT REALISTIC FOR YOU TO PRETEND THAT YOU CAN DO WITHOUT THE BASE. NOR CAN WE.

PATRICIO

THIS IS CORRECT. WE HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE.

THE SECRETARY

NOR DO WE.

PATRICIO

I KNOW I CAN'T BARGAIN WITH YOU. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO BARGAIN WITH YOU AND I DON'T DESIRE THIS. IT IS SIMPLY THE POSITION OF PORTUGAL THAT WE HAVE CERTAIN NEEDS WHICH ARE SO DECISIVE AND SO NECESSARY THAT THE QUESTION OF THE AGREEMENT IS NOT IMPORTANT.

IN THE PAST THE U.S. HAS SAID ABOUT THE AGREEMENT THAT IT COULD NOT GO FURTHER IN MEETING OUR NEEDS BECAUSE OF PUBLIC OPINION. WE ACCEPTED THAT AT THE TIME, ALTHOUGH WE FELT THAT THE

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-4- USDEL RIYADH 47

EMBARGO AGAINST EQUIPMENT WAS UNFAIR AND LED TO AN IMBALANCED SITUATION BECAUSE OF THE CONSTANT FLOW OF MODERN SOVIET EQUIPMENT TO OUR OPPONENTS.

HOWEVER, IN THE LAST TWO YEARS THE SITUATION HAS EVLOVED. NOW, WE CAN BE ATTACKED BY AIR IN GUINEA AND CABINDA. WE DEPEND ON CABINDA FOR OIL.

WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT TWELVE SOVIET MIGS WILL ATTACK GUINEA. THIS COULD BE A MILITARY DISASTER.

THE OPPONENTS KNOW THEY CANNOT WIN POLITICALLY. THEY NEED TO ESCALATE MILITARILY. WE HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION IN GUINEA. SIXTY PER CENT OF OUR MILITARY FORCE IS BLACK. WE HAVE ALL THE MEANS TO HOLD ON AND TO WIN POLITICALLY, BUT WE HAVE NO MEANS TO COUNTER AN ESCALATION WHICH COULD INCLUDE AN AIR ATTACK AND AN ATTACK BY TANKS.

THE SECRETARY

YOU NEED HAWK MISSILES.

PATRICIO

YES, WE NEED GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES. MILITARY DISASTER IN GUINEA WOULD CAUSE GREAT CONSEQUENCES IN PORTUGAL. THIS COULD LEAD TO A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN PORTUGAL; THOSE WHO ARE AGAINST THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT ARE ALSO AGAINST NATO AND THIS COULD MEAN THAT WE WOULD WITHDRAW FROM NATO. WE ALSO WOULD WITHDRAW FROM ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE. AS YOU KNOW, THESE AREAS ARE VERY IMPORTANT STRATEGICALLY. THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS ARE VERY IMPORTANT. THE SOVIETS ARE MOST INTERESTED IN ALL OF THIS AREA AND THEY ARE USING CONAKRY FOR SOVIET RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS.

THE SECRETARY

WE ARE FAMILIAR WITH THIS.

PATRICIO

A DEFEAT IN GUINEA WOULD BE VERY BAD. THE SOVIETS WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED.

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-5- USDEL RIYADH 47

IN YOUR MEMORANDUM YOU SPEAK OF THE AGREEMENT FOR THE BASE AS OUR CONTRIBUTION TO NATO. WE ALWAYS ACCEPTED THAT IN THE PAST. HOWEVER, WE ARE IN MORTAL DANGER. A MAN WHO IS DEAD DOESN'T NEED DEFENSE FOR HIS GRAVE.

THE SECRETARY

THE PRESIDENT MET WITH YOUR AMBASSADOR. WE HAVE A VERY COMPLICATED DOMESTIC SITUATION. WE CANNOT GIVE YOU GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES DIRECTLY BUT WE MUST FIGURE OUT SOME WAY TO GET THEM TO YOU INDIRECTLY. I AM SURE WE WILL SUCCEED.

PATRICIO

IT IS NOT MY STYLE TO BE DRAMATIC.

THE SECRETARY

NO, I THINK YOU'RE DOING VERY WELL.

PATRICIO

IF WE DON'T GET THE MISSILES IT WON'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE WHETHER WE HAVE THE BASE OR NOT.

THE SECRETARY

DO YOU CARE WHERE YOU GET THE MISSILES FROM?

PATRICIO

NO.

THE SECRETARY

WE'RE TRYING TO WORK IT OUT.

PATRICIO

WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT THERE MAY BE AN AIR STRIKE AGAINST BISSAU ON JANUARY 26. THIS WOULD BE A DISASTER FOR US. IT'S DIFFERENT IN MAZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA WHERE THE AREAS ARE VERY BIG. IN BISSAU, OUR HEADQUARTERS ARE CONCENTRATED. IF THERE IS A

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-6- USDEL RIYADH 47

STRIKE, WE COULDN'T TAKE THE SOLDIERS AWAY.

THE SECRETARY

WE WILL LOOK AT THIS PROBLEM AND YOU CAN BE SURE OF OUR SYMPATHY. WE MUST WORK OUT THE PROCESS OF GETTING YOU HAWKS.

PATRICIO

WE NEED THEM TO DEFEND THREE SENSITIVE POINTS: (1) BISSAU, (2) CABINDA, AND (3) CABORA BASSA.

THE SECRETARY

I FEEL WE CAN WORK THIS OUT. IF WE GIVE THEM TO YOU DIRECTLY, THE CONGRESS WILL FORBID IT. THEN IT WOULD BE USELESS FOR YOU.

PATRICIO

I DON'T KNOW ABOUT THE CONGRESS, BUT THEY SHOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT KEEP FRIENDS ALIVE.

THE SECRETARY

THE CONGRESS HAS PASSED LAWS THIS YEAR AGAINST OUR OWN U.S. INTERESTS. IT WILL BE NOTHING FOR THEM TO PASS LAWS AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. YOU SAW WHAT THEY DID ABOUT VIET-NAM.

PATRICIO

BUT THIS CONCERNS OUR SURVIVAL.

THE SECRETARY

CONGRESS DOESN'T UNDERSTAND THIS. THEY ARE ONLY INTERESTED WHEN IT IS A QUESTION OF THE SURVIVAL OF ISRAEL. YOU CAN BE SURE THAT WE WILL TIE PORTUGAL TO THAT.

YOU DON'T HAVE TO CONVINC ME. WE WILL DO WHAT IS HUMANLY POSSIBLE, EVEN IF I HAVE TO SHOOT A FEW OF MY COLLEAGUES IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

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[6047]

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-7- USEEL RIYADH 47

PATRICIO

THIS IS A QUESTION OF LIFE OR DEATH FOR US.

THE SECRETARY

I UNDERSTAND.

THERE IS A PROHIBITION AGAINST SENDING ARMS TO YOU IN AFRICA. WE COULD ONLY SEND THEM TO YOU FOR USE IN PORTUGAL AND THEN THERE IS A PROHIBITION AGAINST A DIVERSION. WE MUST SEND THEM INDIRECTLY.

YOUR AMBASSADOR IS TALKING TO THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON. THEY ARE TO MEET ON MONDAY.

KISSINGER

[NLN 01-25/27]  
[70A]

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