Unit Objectives Identifysite planning concerns that can create, reduce, or eliminate vulnerabilities and understand the concept of “Layers of Defense.” Recognizeprotective issues for urban site planning. Comparethe pros and cons of barrier mitigation measures that increase stand-off or promote the need for hardening of buildings at risks. Unit Objectives Text Box: Understand the following critical issues: Need for keeping up with the growing demand for security design Benefits that can be derived from appropriate security design Unit Objectives Text Box: Understand the following critical issues (continued): Benefits of adopting a creative process to face current design challenges Benefits of including aesthetic elements compatible with security and architectural characteristics of building and s Layers of Defense FEMA 452, Figure 2-2: Layers of Defense, p. 2-3 Layers of DefenseBuilding yards many not exist in urban areasOverheadUnderneath Text Box: Survey Surroundings Access Points Sidewalks and Curbs Street Furniture Barriers and Bollards Yards and Plazas Gatehouses / Screening Parking Signage Security Lighting Sensors / CCTV Site Utilities Survey Surroundings / Data Collection: •360 degrees -all directions•Overhead –structures that can collapse and strike building of interest •Underneath –subways, roadway tunnels, and utilitiesFirst Layer of Defense Data Collection --use GIS to help determine: ..Approaches to site/building ..Personnel ..Vehicles ..Potential collateral damage near facility ..Buildings and infrastructure of concern nearby ..Important geographic and topographic elementsFirst Layer of Defense First Layer of Defense Access Points ..Ring of steel ..Temporary stand-off ..Road closure ..Temporary barriers / parked vehicles ..Work with local authorities Text Box: Access Points Text Box: Access Points Text Box: Text Box: Sidewalks and Curbs Text Box: Sidewalks and Curbs First Layer of Defense Sidewalks and Curbs Text Box: An alternate to visible barriers or bollards is collapsible sidewalks using low-strength concrete Text Box: Street Furniture Text Box: Street Furniture First Layer of Defense •Treatment of security elements should be compatible with existing elements•Perimeter barriers can go hand-in-hand with streetscape improvements and plantings•Appropriate design can blend security into existing streetscape; serving as amenities for tenants and neighborsStreet Furniture From US Army Field Manual 5-114, Engineer Operations Short of War, 1992 First Layer of DefenseBarriers and Bollards -Passive Source: YodockWall Company Text Box: First Layer of Defense From US Army Field Manual 5-114, Engineer Operations Short of War, 1992 First Layer of DefenseBarriers and Bollards-ActiveSource: Delta Scientific Corporation First Layer of DefenseBarriers and Bollards-Active First Layer of Defense Text Box: Rotating Drum, Drop Arm, and Rotating Plate Vehicle Barriers Department of State periodically issues list of manufacturers and model numbers certified in meeting prescribed testing criteria (March 2003) Check site utilities, water runoff, and other subterranean Conditions when installing bollards and barriers Rating Vehicle Weight (lbs.) Vehicle Speed (mph) Distance Past Barrier (ft) K4 15,000 30 <= 3.3 K8 15,000 40 <= 3.3 K12 15,000 50 <= 3.3 Text Box: First Layer of Defense Department of Defense periodically issues list of manufacturers and model numbers certified in meeting prescribed testing criteria (August 2003) Vehicle Weight (lbs.) Vehicle Speed (mph) Distance Past Barrier (ft) 15,000 30 <=3(L3)/20(L2)/50(L1) 15,000 40 <=3(L3)/20(L2)/50(L1) 15,000 50 <=3(L3)/20(L2)/50(L1) 10,000 50 0 to 50 10,000 15 50 to 100 Text Box: First Layer of Defense Text Box: Barriers and Bollards First Layer of DefenseBarriers and BollardsRetractable Text Box: If well designed, planters can be an element of beautification Ensure barriers are properly anchored to stop vehicles and configured to reduce fragmentationText Box: Barriers and Bollards Text Box: Avoid designing barriers that impair access by first responders: Intersection with driveways and gates Crossing of pedestrian paths and handicapped ramps Fire hydrants Text Box: Barriers and BollardsText Box: Ensure barriers are properly anchored to stop vehicles First Layer of DefenseBarriers and Bollards Text Box: Properly anchored barriers stop vehicles and reduce fragmentation during blast First Layer of DefenseBarriers and BollardsLong expanses of bollards should be carefully designed and sited to avoid monotonyBollard spacing should ensure no vehicles can get through PLAZA Second Layer of Defense ..Buildings with front yards ..Buildings with plazasYARD Small yard with wide pavement that provide some useful stand-offNarrow yard incorporating low stone wall and metal fence ..Generally small ..Usually provided for governmental & institutional buildingsBuilding YardSecond Layer of Defense High stepped yard on sloping site make a strong barrier Second Layer of Defense Building Yard Low planting makes a moderate barrier Text Box: Building Yard Plaza ..An expanded building yard ..Moved out from the controlled building access ..A developer provided public space ..A well designed plaza can provide visual interest at same time providing good stand-off Second Layer of Defense Second Layer of Defense Plaza with sculptured barrier forms Plaza Text Box: Gatehouses Text Box: Parking can be applicable to all layers of defense Text Box: Develop plan for delivery and queuing Coordinate with civic authorities as necessary Place barriers, guardhouse, if possible Avoid parking too close to building even after screening All Layers of Defense ..Restrict parking and access between buildings ..Consider one-way circulation in parking lots ..Well-lit, with security presence, emergency communications, and/or CCTV ..Open, observable, no hiding places ..Restrict parking underneath buildings ..Apply progressive collapse hardening to columns when parking garage is in building Parking All Layers of Defense ..Unless required, do not identify sensitive areas ..Minimize signs identifying critical utilities ..Warnings signs limiting access to control areas should be posted at all entrances ..Signpost may be hardened and included as part of the perimeter barrier ..The lighting of signage should enhance nighttime safety ..Warning signs should be posted in languages commonly spoken Signage Second Layer of Defense Continuous lighting ..Glare projection ..Controlled lighting (avoid glare) ..Compatible with closed circuit television (CCTV) Emergency lighting Security Lighting First Layer of DefenseSensors / CCTV ..When stand-off and hardening are not possible, security must rely upon sensors and CCTV ..Look for suspicious vehicles and people, especially those that seem to be profiling your building ..Monitor access to utilities serving the building ..Currently high tech monitoring systems need to be selected and placed by experts Second Layer of Defense Site Utilities Text Box: Concealed versus exposed Underground versus overhead Protect/secure versus accessible Surveillance if possible Campus/University Text Box: The following considerations can impact the site and layout design: Overall size and number of structures placed on site Massing and placement of structures Access/egress points, such as visitor entries, staff entries, and loading docks Campus/University First Layer of Defense (Uncontrolled) ..Personnel Access Control ..Vehicle Access Control & Inspection ..Vehicle Stand-offHigh Security BuildingThird, Second, and First Layers of Defense (Controlled) ..Personnel Access Control ..Vehicle Access Control ..HardeningSecond Layer of Defense (Controlled) ..Personnel Access Control ..Vehicle Access Control ..Vehicle Stand-off FEMA 426, Figure 2-15: Combined Multi-User Gate, p. 2-37 Text Box: Access Points..Reject vehicles beforefinal barrier ..Inspection area blast effects ..Pressure ..Fragments ..Reaction time to activate barriers FEMA 426, Figure 2-2: Clustered versus Dispersed Site Layouts, p. 2-8 Campus/University •Significant impact on making building visible or hidden to aggressors •Enhance surveillance opportunities of approaches and parking •Minimize views into building •Reduce blast effects FEMA 426, Figure 2-3: Clustering to Enhance Surveillance Opportunities While Minimizing Views into Buildings, p. 2-8 Text Box: Orientation Blocking Sight Lines FEMA 426, Figure 2-5: Blocking of Site Lines, p. 2-20 Text Box: Siting and View Relationships Text Box: Parking Figure 2-16, Summary of Site Mitigation Measures, p. 2-53 Minimize exterior signage or other indications of asset locationsLocate trash bins as far from facility as possible Eliminate potential hiding places near facility, provide an unobstructed view around facilityEliminate lines of approach perpendicular to the buildingMinimize vehicle access pointsLocate facility away from natural or man- made vantage pointsEliminate parking beneath facilitiesLocate parking to obtain stand-off from facilityIlluminate building exteriors or sites where exposed assets are locatedSecure access to power/heat plants, gas mains, water supplies, and electrical serviceBest Practices Unit IX Case Study Activity Site and Layout Design Guidance Background FEMA 426, Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist: screening tool for preliminary design vulnerability assessment Requirements: Vulnerability Rating Approach Assign sections of the checklist to qualified group members Refer to Case Study and answer worksheet questions Review results to identify site and layout vulnerabilities and possible mitigation measures