CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF PEACEMAKING

A SUMMARY

of COMPLETED

GRANT

PROJECTS

VOLUME 3

through

DECEMBER 1992

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

United States Institute of Peace

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created and funded by Congress to strengthen the nation's capacity to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflict. Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including grants, fellowships, conferences and workshops, library services, publications, and other educational activities. The Institute's Board of Directors is appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Board of Directors

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Distinguished Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington, D.C.

Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University

Thomas E. Harvey, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Corporation for Public Broadcasting

Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame

William R. Kintner, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

Christopher H. Phillips, former U.S. ambassador to Brunei

Elspeth Davies Rostow, Stiles Professor of American Studies Emerita, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas

Mary Louise Smith, civic activist; former chairman, Republican National Committee

W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio

Paul G. Cerjan, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army; President, National Defense University

Toby Trister Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research

John D. Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Walter B. Slocombe, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

Contributions to the Study of Peacemaking

Volume 3

A Summary of Completed Grant Projects through December 1992

United States Institute of Peace
Washington, D.C.

Contents

PREFACE

The United States Institute of Peace is pleased to make available this third report summarizing the results of research projects sponsored by the Institute through its grant program. The projects described here represent some of the work completed by Institute grantees in late 1991 and 1992. Another report, outlining the outcome of education and training projects conducted by Institute grant recipients, has also been published. These reports are in keeping with the Institute's congressional mandate to provide scholars, practitioners, and the general public with information on the means to promote international peace and the resolution of international conflicts without violence.

Since the beginning of its grantmaking activities in 1986 the Institute has provided funding for nearly 600 projects. Completed projects have yielded many books as well as manuscripts currently under review for publication. Hundreds of articles have been published by grantees in scholarly journals, magazines, and newspapers. Additionally, seminars and workshops for teachers; training programs for practitioners; and radio, television, and lecture programs for the general public have been produced with Institute grants.

It is not possible in a brief summary report to capture the full range and depth of grant-funded activities, nor to offer more than a glimpse of the products thus generated. Our purpose in producing this report is to provide a succinct overview that we hope will be of value to those working in the field of peace and conflict resolution.

The results of the projects featured here are available in their entirety in published or manuscript form. We expect that this report will lead readers to further examine the complete records of these studies.

Richard H. Solomon, President
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

INTRODUCTION

Since the grant program of the United States Institute of Peace began in 1986, it has supported research on a wide range of subjects, such as the nature of peace and conflict resolution and management; case studies and histories of the resolution of specific conflicts; and theory and practice of negotiation, diplomacy, and other avenues to prevent, manage, and end conflict. The Institute has identified a broad spectrum of subjects and disciplines from which to elicit insights and innovative approaches to peacemaking and peacekeeping and through its grants has supported projects in political science, history, sociology and anthropology, law, theology, psychology, economics, and other disciplines.

Dramatic international political changes over the past five years, particularly the demise of the Soviet Union and Communist hegemony in Eastern Europe, and the development of new roles for such multilateral organizations as the UN have begun to inspire the reassessment of many truisms of international relations and, happily, to urge new and imaginative approaches made possible as the scene changes. The fifty-five grant projects synopsized in this, the third in a series of Institute reports, reflect the changing circumstances of the late 1980s. Readers should keep in mind, though, that the lead time for this type of research project is often at least two years from beginning to finished product; because of the rapid rate of change in the status quo since 1989, some arguments may have been overtaken by events. Most, however, are general and comprehensive enough to offer useful lessons and advice that can be applied even though the particular cases may have changed.

Projects summarized in this report, the products of both individual and collaborative research, fall into several main areas. These areas include arms control, behavioral approaches to conflict resolution, and unofficial diplomacy and nongovernmental approaches, as well as the standard diplomatic, negotiation, and mediation approaches to conflict resolution. Other studies include analyses of economic development issues, human rights, ethnic conflict, international law, security issues, peace movements and processes, political systems, and cases of regional conflict.

Despite the wide variety of subjects, some interesting patterns or themes begin to emerge from this group of projects. For example, interest in the poten-

tial role of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), which help to demystify adversarial roles and reassure potential enemies, shows up both in the realm of arms control and in analyses of the Central American and Middle Eastern peace processes. Other themes that cut across disciplinary borders include the role of ethnic identity as it affects everything from democratic development to risk of conflict for minority populations.

Some projects reflect the transformation of the post–Cold War era, from the shift in arms control emphasis on East-West issues to concerns over proliferation and dual use of weapons, to the much-discussed explosion of ethnic tensions, to the possibility that the UN will need to revamp its traditional role and develop an easily deployed, standing troop of peacekeepers.

Other projects assess the implications of the end of the Cold War for settlement of regional conflicts in such places as Angola, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. Several books deal with the repatriation of refugees when regional conflicts terminate and the implications when former Communist states adopt economic systems based on free markets.

A number of studies look at the growing importance of ethnicity as a source of conflict, particularly in republics of the former Soviet Union. Three books or book manuscripts address the changing foreign policy and diplomatic style of Russia in the post–Cold War era.

The Central American peace process from 1983 to 1991 is analyzed in one book, and two others assess the role of nonviolence in initiating social and political changes in various parts of the world.

Democratization is given major attention. One book looks at the relationship between the process of democratization and adherence to human rights principles; another discusses how democracy is being introduced at the local level in Poland; a third book addresses the relationship between democracy and peace in the Middle East, particularly in Israel and the Occupied Territories; and a fourth undertakes a cross-cultural test of the hypothesis that "democracies rarely fight each other."

Studies of specific conflicts and the prospects for resolving those conflicts include one on the Western Sahara, another on the Falklands/Malvinas dispute, another on Yugoslavia, others on Cambodia and on Timor, and several on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This report was prepared by David Smock, senior program officer in the Grant Program, in collaboration with Barry J. O'Connor, program officer, and Rachel McCleary, program officer.

1

ARMS CONTROL

With the end of the Cold War, interest in arms control has shifted significantly from an East-West confrontation toward consideration of proliferation issues and control of the development and acquisition of both nuclear and conventional arms in other regions of conflict. Of particular concern is the need to control arms buildups and introduce confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the Middle East. That is the topic of *Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992), edited by Alan Platt and the product of a grant to the Henry Stimson Center. The authors of the various chapters in this book all conclude that current possibilities for comprehensive arms control in the Middle East are limited. Unless the peace process makes significant progress, there will remain serious constraints on what can be achieved in the area of arms control. And yet there are real possibilities for arms control in the Middle East, in the form of CSBMs. Moreover, the authors are optimistic that progress on these measures can be achieved without waiting for major breakthroughs in the formal peace process.

Benefiting from the experience with CSBMs developed between the East and West during the Cold War, Platt and his co-authors recommend for the Middle East such precursor CSBMs as holding informal seminars about military doctrine and setting up communications hotlines. By increasing transparency and mutual understanding, such measures could help reduce the risk of war. "Obversely, in the absence of any precursor CSBMs, various military activities in the Middle East could lead to miscalculation and serve as a catalyst to inadvertent war" (p. 5). Building on past regional experience with aerial inspection, new aerial inspection agreements are feasible and can help build confidence among the parties. Additional CBMs worth considering, say the authors, are information and intelligence exchanges, prior notification of missile tests, and limited exchange visits of defense production and space launch facilities.

The authors contend that formal negotiations aimed at achieving arms control negotiations are not timely, but precursor CSBMs, particularly if they are introduced in a step-by-step manner and build on previous similar successes in the region, can help build confidence and improve communication. In this regard, the present situation in the Middle East is comparable to the East-West situation dur-

ing the 1950s—the period from which lessons can be derived for the Middle East.

Platt concludes, "If we set modest goals for initial Middle East arms control efforts, if we try to pursue these efforts on a step-by-step basis, if we truly put our prestige behind initial acceptance of precursor CSBMs among the countries of the Middle East, if we try to take into account the security concerns of all the different nations of the region, and if we make this a consistently high-priority item on our foreign policy agenda, the United States can help build confidence and promote arms control in the region" (p. 7).

Contributors, who were participants in the Stimson Center project supported by the Institute of Peace, include Richard E. Darilek, Geoffrey Kemp, Michael Krepon, Peter D. Constable, W. Seth Carus, Janne E. Nolan, Charles Flowerree, and Brad Roberts.

* * *

In a separate project, also supported by the Institute, Cathleen Fisher and Jefferson Seabright of the Henry Stimson Center have written a monograph manuscript, "Divided States and Confidence-Building Measures: The German and Korean Experiences." This monograph attempts to derive lessons for the two Koreas from the confidence-building experience between the two Germanys. Significant recent progress in instituting CBMs for the Koreas came with the adoption in December 1991 of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchange, and Cooperation, in which the two states promised to respect each other's political system and to refrain from acts of terrorism, slander, or aggressive actions against the other state. This agreement includes a provision for a communications hotline between the respective military commanders, an agreement to provide prior notification of major military movements, and the creation of a joint military committee charged with carrying out steps to build military confidence and realize arms reductions.

The authors point out that even before this agreement there had been attempts at confidence building: the formation of joint teams to compete in the World Trade Tennis Championships and World Youth Soccer Games; a 1988 decision by Seoul to relax restrictions on commercial transactions with the North; and the establishment of the Inter-Korean Exchanges Fund, which provides monies to compensate South Korean firms for losses incurred in trading with the North and loans for cooperative projects and inter-Korean cultural, scholarly, and sports programs.

The military CBMs referred to in the December 1991 agreement have yet to be implemented. South Korea has argued that reductions in conventional and nuclear arms on the peninsula could lead to a number of important CBMs: reduction of North and South Korean forces to parity; withdrawal of U.S. nuclear forces; limiting zones of deployment of offensive forces; and verification agreements for arms control measures. But North Korea's holding back on the verification issue has delayed adoption of these other CBMs.

In their section on "ripeness," the authors develop a framework for determining when conditions have developed that will result in CBMs. They conclude, based on the German experience, that three preconditions must be met: First, each side must perceive some potential gain through bilateral efforts to manage or prevent unwarranted conflict. Second, both sides must have reason to believe,

based on past interactions, that the other side's interest in confidence building is genuine. Finally, negotiators must be willing to negotiate CBMs with the belief that the results will be accepted at home. The authors conclude that the first precondition exists in the Korean case, the second precondition only partially exists, and the third precondition exists in South Korea but not in North Korea. It is possible that conditions for militarily significant CBMs may not be ripe without a leadership change in North Korea.

The authors conclude by arguing that a Korean CBM strategy must be integrated, employing a variety of military and nonmilitary tools and incentives; bilateral efforts can and should be supplemented with multilateral initiatives; and all efforts should be reassessed regularly in light of North Korea's nuclear-related activities.

* * *

A detailed analysis of a single Middle East weapons program is the subject of a book manuscript, "The Libyan Chemical Weapons Plant Episode: A Case Study, a Theoretical Model, and a Set of Policy Recommendations for Decisionmakers," by Professor Thomas Wiegele of Northern Illinois University. The as-yet-unpublished book undertakes a comprehensive assessment of the reasons why Libya may have decided to construct the plant. It also delves into the question of German involvement in the project, and it evaluates the impact of U.S. policy—particularly the U.S. bombing of the plant and the American charge that German businesses contributed to the construction of the factory. Wiegele cites this weapons program in Libya as a case of "successful chemical weapons proliferation," despite the fact that it entailed a decade-long effort to clandestinely extract chemicals and chemical processing equipment from an international system that "was presumably predisposed to halting the proliferation of chemical weapons capabilities."

From analyzing this particular case, Wiegele formulates several policy recommendations. First, since a new agenda dominated by scientific issues will confront policymakers over the coming decades, and the vast majority of the world's leaders are trained in law and standard academic disciplines and are not prepared to handle scientific issues, he recommends that "methods should be found to ensure that political leaders, as well as academic specialists in diplomacy, have some knowledge, and preferably training, in the social and political impacts of science and technology." Although Wiegele's study contributes to understanding Libya's motives in constructing the chemical weapons factory, he advocates more research to increase understanding of why nations choose to acquire unconventional and mass destruction weapons systems.

Wiegele also recommends that if an outside power, like the United States, decides to intervene to halt the development of a chemical weapons production facility, it must have the will to pursue the process to a successful conclusion. "If this is not done, the lack of success will represent a demonstration to others that it is indeed possible to acquire a chemical arsenal." The Libyan case demonstrates the inadequacy of current export controls. Dual-use technologies, argues Weigele, allow nations clandestinely to acquire materials that can be put to military use, and there appears to be inadequate political will in the international system to close off these supply sources. The containment of biotechnologies

will be even more problematic than containment of chemical technologies. He argues that a vigorous international effort needs to be organized to solve this problem. His final recommendation is that the higher education curricula in international relations need to more adequately address issues related to chemical and biological conflict and the control of their proliferation.

* * *

Professor Frederic S. Pearson of Wayne State University and Michael Brzoska of the University of Hamburg have studied the impact of international arms supplies on the escalation or de-escalation of violence in various regional conflicts. They have produced "Fuel on the Fire," a book manuscript that focuses on several case studies: the India-Pakistan Kashmir war of 1965; the Bangladesh war in 1971; the Central American Football war in 1969; the Falklands/Malvinas war in 1982; the Yom Kippur/Ramadan war in 1973; the Israeli war in Lebanon in 1982; the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s; war in the Western Sahara, 1976–1991; the Ethiopia-Somalia war in 1977–78; and the Tanzania-Uganda war in 1978–79.

Based upon analysis of these cases the authors draw the following conclusions: Arms suppliers have relatively little leverage over the outcome of hostilities. Arms deliveries clearly were a factor in decisions to go to war, with the exception of Morocco in the Western Sahara. Arms deliveries during wars have generally prolonged and intensified the fighting. Embargoes, whether partial or total, had little chance of compelling warring parties to stop fighting or come to the negotiation table when it was not in their perceived interest to do so. Embargo effectiveness improved with high war attrition rates, high-technology warfare, and the inability of arms recipients to diversify weapons sources, although the embargoes must be combined with other sanctions. Arms supplies or their denial apparently affected the rate of attrition and the ability of combatants to forego negotiations for a time. The role of outside powers in promoting negotiations appears enhanced in stalemate situations as compared with those conflicts in which one side is gaining a decisive victory. Symmetrical resupply appears associated with the promotion of stalemated outcomes. Supplies to defending parties had much more telling effects on war outcomes than supplies to attackers. Conversely, embargoes or restrictions on arms to attackers also had greater effect than sanctions against defenders. Embargoes had their greatest effect on highly dependent arms clients, and particularly against attackers overextended by prolonged warfare. The two superpowers were more prone to use arms transfers to influence warring parties than were other suppliers. Arms supply or embargo decisions are intricately interwoven into the larger pattern of diplomatic efforts to halt wars, though they are seldom decisive in themselves.

Pearson and Brzoska conclude, "It certainly does not appear that the arrival of new arms averts or abates violence, or obviates the need for third party intervention. Indeed, it may enhance such perceived needs. Depending upon the type of stalemate produced, however, the prospects for negotiated settlements may ultimately be improved, but the process is likely to be long and difficult, and require other forms of diplomatic pressure. Supplies, embargoes, or supply restrictions afford distinct advantages to one side, particularly the defending side, tend to promote decisive war outcomes, and embargoes against dependent, over-extended, and ultimately poorly organized attackers stand the greatest chance of success in halting violence."

* * *

Patrick Glynn of the American Enterprise Institute offers a critique of what he terms the "arms control paradigm" in his book, *Closing Pandora's Box: Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War* (New York: Basic Books, 1992). Glynn contends that one of the most important lessons of the Cold War is the extraordinary lack of comprehension of power that democracies exhibit. Typically, democratic states disguise and diffuse power and, as a consequence, create for themselves endless difficulties in foreign affairs. In confronting the state of Hobbesian disorder that characterizes the world, democracies have demonstrated a poor understanding of power and its purposes. "Too often democracies, confronted with the challenge of raw power, have misunderstood the nature of this challenge and attempted to meet it by seeking arrangements of mutual interest, have treated external threats as though they could be solved by internal methods of conflict resolution. Disaster has often been the result" (p. x). The book studies how "liberal societies gradually attained a level of realism in foreign affairs, often only to lose sight of it and then to be forced by events to recover it again. It is the story of three major wars (WWI, WWII, and the Cold War); of how these wars originated and how they ended; and of the striking parallels among them" (p. xi).

Central to Glynn's argument is what he calls the "Sarajevo fallacy," which, he contends, has shaped much strategic thinking in the West. "Western strategy for much of the postwar era remained torn between two fundamentally opposing premises: the notion that military strength deters aggression and the competing belief that the arms race itself could be a cause of war" (p. 1). The Sarajevo fallacy arises out of a popular misconception that World War I originated from an arms race. Glynn contends that this misconception laid the theoretical foundations of modern thinking about arms races and arms control. The fallacy has given rise to the following assumptions: (1) Arms races spring from an action-reaction phenomenon; (2) this action-reaction spiral is inherently destablizing and produces mounting tensions; and (3) war is likely to arise accidentally in this climate of heightened suspicion as a result of critical misperceptions during a crisis. From these assumptions, people conclude that major wars could occur and have occurred by accident, and that arms races could cause such accidents.

Glynn asserts that the impact of this fallacy is immense, producing the disastrous disarmament movement of the interwar decades, which "tragically succeeded in disarming those nations that wished to disarm. These ideas were largely responsible for the debacle of Munich, the culmination of the British policy of appeasement that helped bring on WWII. They survived, in somewhat altered form, into the Cold War, coloring both policy thinking and academic literature about war and peace and the accumulation of military power" (p. 3).

Rather than being caused by an arms race, Glynn concludes, World War I was the product of a deliberate bid by the German leadership for European domination. He argues that British disarmament efforts actually stimulated the German buildup. Moderation did not breed moderation because "the substantive problem was not so much the arms race as the underlying political cause. Germany had hegemonic ambitions; as long as it had the power, it was inclined to pursue them, whether by military or diplomatic means" (p. 20). As has often been the case with

democratic powers, in the period before World War I Britain was not insufficiently accommodating to Germany, but was too accommodating. Britain failed to adapt its foreign policy to the exigencies of democratic rule, and Glynn argues that this problem recurs in present-day democracies.

In applying this reasoning to more recent events, Glynn contends that arms were never the cause of conflict in the Cold War, but always merely a symptom. Moreover, the only way to unmask the illusion of Soviet power was to disprove it. And the only way to disprove it was for the United States to build its military strength and challenge the Soviet Union. American reaction to "victory" in the Cold War is once again, says Glynn, the typical democratic response: a reversion to demilitarization, fueled by liberal and pacifist thinking and growing isolationism. "But the lessons of the 1920s were perhaps as germane to the post–Cold War era as the lessons of the 1930s had been to the era of the Cold War. The decline of Western militaries and the disappearance of American power from Europe and the Pacific in the 1920s had created a power vacuum for other states to fill. American withdrawal had proved to be a major blunder and an important cause of WWII. Would the pattern be repeated?" (p. 367). "The Cold War has proved an intense and often costly lesson in the logic of power politics and in the deterrent value of military strength. But whether in the closing decade of the century that lesson had been learned by the democracies was still far from clear" (p. 369).

* * *

Jonathan Dean and Kurt Gottfried of the Union of Concerned Scientists address the next steps they believe need to be taken to achieve arms control in *A Program for World Nuclear Security* (Cambridge: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1992). The monograph's authors note that although the danger of global nuclear war triggered by conflict in Europe or by Soviet aggression elsewhere has largely disappeared, the greatest danger faced by the United States from the former Soviet Union (FSU) is still the nuclear threat, albeit in a very different form than in the past. "The threat today is of dissolution of effective command and control over the 27,000 Soviet nuclear warheads and of instant proliferation—the replacement of stringent centralized control over nuclear weapons by as many as four new nuclear weapons states, each of them weak and unstable, in a situation of ongoing political and economic turbulence" (p. 7).

The authors note recent proposals designed to cope with the immediate problems—warhead custody and command and control—in order to reduce the danger of errors in judgment. But even if they are implemented, these proposals would leave large arsenals of strategic weapons in the hands of unstable successor states. The authors argue that the only definitive answer to the new dangers from the Soviet republics and to increasing nuclear proliferation is a breakthrough in worldwide control of nuclear weapons.

The "comprehensive nuclear arms control program" recommended by the authors has five components: (1) U.S. help to secure and disable former Soviet tactical-range nuclear warheads; (2) U.S.-FSU commitment to destroy the long-range warheads and missiles agreed to under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START); (3) U.S.-FSU agreement on reduction and destruction of strategic nuclear arsenals far below the levels mandated by START in order to create a

reserve nuclear force that will pose little risk of accidental use, generate no pressures to launch promptly in a crisis, and be too small to make a first-strike feasible or conceivable; (4) U.S.-FSU negotiation to reduce and restrict the arsenals of other nuclear powers, both declared and undeclared; and (5) stronger controls on the capacity of other countries to develop nuclear weapons and the creation of comprehensive mechanisms to enforce these controls.

Finally, the authors cite the benefits of their proposed program: (1) It would result in far smaller FSU nuclear forces. (2) The system of international controls recommended would restrain and monitor the nuclear programs of all nuclear-capable states and raise barriers against the efforts of other states to acquire nuclear weapons. (3) The proposed program would lead to substantial savings for the U.S. defense budget.

2

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND MANAGEMENT

Behavioral Approaches

In an effort to present a general theory of conflict and cooperation ranging from personal to international levels, Professor R. J. Rummel of the University of Hawaii has written *The Conflict Helix: Principles and Practices of Interpersonal, Social, and International Conflict and Cooperation* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publications, 1991). Rummel concludes that physical things or behavior are significant for conflict or cooperation only as they have meaning or relate to the values or norms of parties within a particular social context. That is, conflict and cooperation are wholly subjective. To understand them and the behavior related to them requires unpacking the mental fields of those involved. Objective things, such as income, race, social class, age, or poverty, social inequality and minority status, or a host of other objective factors presumably causing conflict and violence must operate through the mind. Rummel argues that how such factors are interpreted, what meaning people give to them, how they value them, and how the social context is perceived will determine whether in fact they result in conflict or peace.

A second theme developed by Rummel is that power is one of the most basic ingredients in conflict and its resolution, and is fundamental to peace and cooperation. Power is understood beyond simple force or coercion; it is a family of powers that includes coercion but also includes altruistic (loving), authoritative, and bargaining powers, among others. Virtually all socially relevant powers essentially reflect interests, will, and capability; hence, they are basically mental. Conflicts are then seen as equilibrating such powers—solving a simultaneous equation of mutual interests, capabilities, and wills—and cooperation as dependent upon the balance achieved. Social power enters into both conflict and cooperation.

Rummel argues that too often conflict and cooperation are treated separately, as though they are mutually exclusive or snapshots of social relations and behavior—once these people or nations were in conflict, now they cooperate with each other. Such treatment neglects the fact that social behavior is always a stream of actions, always ongoing, always with purposes and behaviors that meld into each other in time and space. Behavior is thus a social space-time field. And

within this field the conflict and cooperation between people, groups, or nations form a particular process. That is, conflict generally issues from and is embedded in previous cooperation, and this cooperation itself was born in and received its structure from previous conflict. Conflict and cooperation are intrinsic to continuing relationships among people and groups. One cannot be comprehended without understanding the other and the process connecting them, which means that explaining and predicting interpersonal and group behavior and resolving conflicts requires understanding the history of the relevant social relations and their contexts.

A related theme is that change in this process is discontinuous. Change in human behavior from conflict to cooperation and cooperation to conflict generally takes place in jumps. There may be long periods of relative harmony and peace, cooperation and solidarity, punctuated by bursts of conflict and perhaps even violence. And these jumps may be triggered by a minor event, unimportant in itself. For instance, after a generation of peaceful relations, two nations may lurch into war over the assassination of a minor official.

Rummel contends that this discontinuous process of conflict and cooperation—the conflict helix—is part of all our lives and of the relations among groups and nations. This is because the process moves upward helixically in mutual learning and adjustment through cooperation and conflict, achieving longer and longer periods of peace and cooperation, separated by bouts of increasingly milder conflict. Such a trend will exist, however, only as the conditions of a relationship remain largely the same. When dramatic change occurs, new conflicts result, and a new process of learning and adjustment to these changes must take place.

This theme relates to another in the book—conflict is a normal behavior, not a deviant one. It is as important to social relations as is cooperation and love. Moreover, conflict also enables people, groups, and nations to learn through trial and error and to adjust to each other. Indeed, conflict not only enables cooperative relations to occur, but determines and underlies them. Conflict and cooperation are treated as collaborative aspects of society that enable different people, each within their subjective universe, to live and work together.

Still another theme offered by Rummel is that the conflict helix and associated ideas underlie not only interpersonal and social relations but international relations, also. International conflict and cooperation involve the same process, which takes place in the minds of the participants; its history is essential to its understanding; and it is discontinuous, taking place in jumps, as we have seen since 1989 in Eastern Europe.

The final theme is that of conflict resolution, which is intrinsic to the conflict helix and crosses all levels of social behavior. The freedom of people, groups, or nations to "do their own thing," consistent with a like freedom for others, ultimately lessens extreme conflict and violence and fosters the resolution of conflict. Democratically free nations have had no wars beween them and virtually no violence; their domestic affairs are less violent than those of other systems. At the individual level, freedom eases the process of learning about and adjusting to others and achieving levels of cooperation most consistent with individual values and interests. Rummel contends that the freer people are, the easier is the move-

ment of their conflict helix toward less conflict and a more enduring relationship with others.

Unofficial and Nongovernmental Approaches

In an effort to promote conflict resolution between schoolchildren in Ireland and Northern Ireland, the Irish group Co-Operation North organized a program of interaction and mutual understanding. The Irish Peace Institute of the University of Limerick conducted a study to assess this program and has produced a book manuscript, "A Model of Managed Cooperation: The School and Youth Links Scheme Run by Cooperation North," by Joyce O'Connor. The program, School and Youth Links, brings children from the Irish Republic and from Ulster together to learn about each other and cultivate mutual tolerance and respect. The study was the first attempt to examine the effects and processes of these cross-border youth exchanges. The aims of the study were fourfold: (1) to assess the short-term effectiveness of the School and Youth Links programs; (2) to provide more precise understanding of the key elements that contribute to success or failure in managed cooperation; (3) to assess the degree to which the model of managed cooperation operating in Ireland is reproducible in other contexts; and (4) to provide feedback for the future planning and development of programs of managed cooperation.

The researchers drew several significant conclusions from their study. They concluded that stereotypical preconceptions of the other group prior to the exchange were predominantly negative. The study also demonstrated that, although one-third of the participants from Northern Ireland were Protestant, most of those interested in participating in the project were Catholic. Most of the northern participants had previously visited the Republic before the exchange, but for almost half of the southern participants the exchange visit represented their first visit to the north. The researchers also discovered that among the participants from the Republic, violence is the most common image of Northern Ireland. However, as the exchanges progressed more positive images of Northern Ireland and its population came to dominate. Also, as a consequence of the exchanges, northern images of the Republic no longer were dominated by thoughts of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Despite the negative images that some had toward the other group, all participants placed their northern or southern counterparts second in order of preferred people among six groups presented for response, whereas all participants placed the British only fourth or fifth in order of preference.

Diplomacy, Negotiation, and Mediation

In an effort to understand the principal factors shaping the management, de-escalation, and resolution of regional conflicts, Professor Daniel Papp of Georgia Tech University has written a book manuscript, "Resolving Regional Conflicts: Comparative Paths Toward Peace in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua." Papp drew his conclusions from a careful analysis of wars in the four case study countries. In looking at the causes of the conflicts, Papp concludes that

in all four cases ideological disagreements between the opposing groups were of central importance. Moreover, all four cases involved personal rivalry among the leaders of opposing sides. Finally, all four were rooted in domestic issues but these issues were intertwined with external ones and external actors.

Papp's first conclusion regarding the resolution of regional conflict is that all issues involved in the dispute must be addressed and settled for resolution to be achieved. Even though it is attractive for mediators to focus on a single issue, other unresolved issues will prolong a conflict if ignored. Second, "in its efforts to manage, deescalate, and resolve regional conflict, the international community must strive to create a complex web of international agreements, negotiating processes, external observers, domestic and international expectations, and global publicity so that the propensity of combatants to resort to warfare is decreased. The creation of this web is in itself a complex activity that may take an extended period of time. On the basis of the cases studied, the creation of that web will not be restricted to the negotiating process."

A third essential requirement for settlement is that external sources of arms must be eliminated, or at least substantially reduced. This outcome may result from the negotiating process or be separate from this process, but it cannot be avoided. Fourth, a "hurting stalemate" must exist that the combatants recognize. Both sides must realize that they cannot prevail militarily and that a negotiated settlement, even if it only partially satisfies their objectives, will be preferable to continuation of the fighting.

Finally, Papp concludes that politics remains preeminent in every effort to manage, de-escalate, or resolve regional conflict. "Although all of the above conditions are crucial to the achievement of conflict management, deescalation, and resolution, there is no formula that can be applied to guarantee that those ends will be achieved. Political persuasion remains the chief weapon in the arsenal of those who would manage, deescalate, and resolve regional conflicts. Negotiators must therefore persevere in the face of adversity and uncertainty, make judgment calls on how best to influence other negotiators to move toward a desired end, and carefully move the negotiating process toward negotiated settlements, more often than not across a range of issues on a number of different levels."

* * *

Compatibility of negotiating styles strongly influences the success of international negotiations, says Professor Paul Bennett of Mount Vernon College, who studied Soviet styles of negotiation under an earlier Institute grant. More recently, he has written an article manuscript entitled "New Russian Thinking About Negotiating: The Gorbachev Period." In contrasting the old and new styles, Bennett characterizes the old approach as having three key features: (1) to obtain unilateral American concessions; (2) to exchange the least for the most; and (3) to reduce the impact of Soviet concessions. Spurred by Gorbachev's new thinking about international affairs, new approaches to international negotiation were adopted during the final months of the Soviet Union and have been continued by Russian negotiators. One key factor in this transformation was the recognition that the long delays required by prolonged, hard bargaining were untenable if the negotiators were to move as quickly as they wanted. Moreover, the Soviet negotiators under Gorbachev were heavily influenced by "New Thinking," which can be sum-

marized as follows: "(1) international conflict resolution is an absolute necessity due to the need to avoid a suicidal nuclear war; (2) the development of trust between nations is essential for achieving cooperation and security; (3) the primary aspect of international relations is not a Marxist-Leninist class struggle but a struggle by all of humanity against the global dangers of nuclear war and environmental disaster; (4) Perestroika has made the Soviet Union [and Russia] appear trustworthy in the eyes of the U.S. and other countries." Moreover, international negotiation is taking on such new functions as joint problem solving, which requires striking a balance among the interests of all parties to the negotiation; hence, it is a significant change from the traditional Soviet negotiating process.

Another striking feature of the new atmosphere is the promotion of a variety of new models for "getting to yes" by Soviet (Russian) experts on negotiations. Among these are the concession/convergence model, the problem-solving approach, and the solution by joint analysis model.

Bennett concludes that the changes are obviously more thoroughgoing and extensive than just new thinking about negotiation styles. "The collapse of communism removed an ideological component which contributed to the confrontational and dishonest nature of the old Soviet style." The abandonment of this old style, along with the use of popular new problem-solving approaches, could prove valuable not only in negotiations between Russia and the United States, but also for critical negotiations occurring within the Commonwealth of Independent States.

* * *

The American Academy of Diplomacy, in a project directed by Lance Antrim and David Popper, organized two conferences and prepared the syllabus for a college course on the subject of how participants in multilateral negotiations can improve their performances. Conference participants identified ten features that characterize multilateral negotiations: (1) Large, multi-issue, multiparty negotiations tend to blur normal categories of influence. (2) Modern negotiations of all types, particularly multilateral negotiations, are complicated by the growth of new power centers. (3) In dealing with global issues, there are roles for both bilateral and multilateral negotiations. (4) It is increasingly difficult to bring national power to bear within the context of multilateral negotiation. (5) While economic and military power relationships have limited value within a negotiating conference, there are other sources of national power that are relevant to multilateral negotiations. (6) There are still issues to which bilateral channels make important contributions to the success of multilateral negotiation. (7) Coalitions form and shift for a variety of reasons. (8) Reaching agreement by consensus has attained new importance. (9) Participants in multilateral negotiations tend to develop informal hierarchies or "patterns of deference" within which individuals emerge as unofficial representatives of group views on particular topics. (10) Multilateral negotiation increases in difficulty as the number of parties increases and as the importance of widespread or universal acceptance of the agreement grows.

Conference participants emphasized the increased importance of multilateral negotiation, and the reasons why the United States is not well prepared for the challenge of multilateral diplomacy. One factor has been a remarkable increase

in interdependency among nations. Moreover, global problems exist that need global solutions. Multilateral diplomacy may be the only means for nations to pursue their national interests on many important issues. The executive branch of the U.S. government needs to improve its capacity to conduct multilateral negotiation by increased interagency coordination, increased interaction with Congress, and increased American opportunities for education and training in multilateral negotiation.

* * *

Professors George and Sylvia Modelski of the University of Washington have edited *Documenting Global Leadership* (London: Macmillan and University of Washington Press, 1988), a book of historical documents demonstrating how global powers have led the world over the past five hundred years. The editors argue that a long cycle provides the theoretical framework and justification for the global political system. The long cycle is the ordered movement of global politics through time, with each cycle comprising a succession of four phases—global war, world power, delegitimization, and deconcentration—that is repeated regularly. The world powers examined are Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. The purpose of the work is to record "a memory (or genealogy) of the problems experienced by those who dared to launch great global initiatives, and of the solutions that did (or did not) serve them well" (p. 1). The book is primarily a collection of historical documents that demonstrates the evolution of the global leadership roles assumed by these four powers. For the editors the essence of leadership is to set an agenda, organize coalitions, and address global problems.

The editors attempt to demonstrate that "the goals and activities of these world powers fit their description as acts of global leadership: acts whose impact, objectively, extends beyond the national or regional sphere and carries a wider significance" (p. 1). They further argue that "these were acts of leadership as they might be understood by observers, but also that those initiating them were aware of their global role" (p. 1).

* * *

A grant to the University of Pittsburgh provided partial support for the development of a series of case studies on negotiation of conflicts in Latin America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and southern Africa. The project, directed by Professor Martin Staniland, was primarily intended to generate teaching material on negotiations relating to international conflicts. The cases studied include Angola by Abiodun Williams, the Iran-Iraq War by Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Cambodia by Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, and Afghanistan by Rajan Menon.

The case study "Understanding Soviet Decisions in Afghanistan" by Menon of Lehigh University attempts to answer two questions: Why did the Soviet leadership decide to invade Afghanistan in December 1979 and why did they decide to withdraw their troops in May 1988? The case study begins with a synopsis of the political events in Afghanistan leading to the December 1979 invasion.

On April 27, 1978, a military coup deposed the government of Mohammed Daoud and paved the way for the establishment of a regime under the pro-Soviet, Marxist-Leninist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The

author gives three reasons for tacit Soviet approval of the coup. First, there was increasing concern over Daoud's move away from dependence on the Soviet Union and toward Iran, Iraq, China, and other countries. Second, the Soviet leadership was concerned over Daoud's proclamation of a one-party state. Third, the elimination of leftists from positions of power drew Soviet attention. Once the PDPA was in power, the Soviets increased commitments to economic aid and weapons. In December 1978 a Soviet-Afghan treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed and more Soviet advisers were sent to Afghanistan. By early 1979, however, rebellions were occurring in major cities. The armed resistance and civilian uprisings reflected widespread domestic opposition to the PDPA program. By fall 1979, notes Menon, the Soviet Union had become too closely associated with the PDPA not to act. The Soviets were also concerned about the effect an Islamic government in Kabul might have on its Central Asian populations that share ethnic and religious ties with the peoples of Afghanistan.

In attempting to answer the question of why the Soviets decided to withdraw their troops in May 1988, Menon cites several factors. First, in regard to the war itself, the greater military effectiveness of the *mujahedeen* made it difficult for Moscow and the PDPA to remain optimistic that the resistance could be overcome militarily. Second, in terms of Soviet domestic politics and the economy the war was draining Soviet resources, reducing military morale, and becoming increasingly unpopular with Soviet citizens. Third, the Afghan war created a political climate that obstructed Gorbachev's efforts to increase Western and Japanese trade and investment in the Soviet Union. The war also hampered progress on arms control negotiations and was a major barrier to improved Soviet-Chinese relations. But the role of the United States in pressuring and participating in the efforts leading up to the Geneva Accords was also critical to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The accords gave Moscow a dignified way out of the war. The pledges of nonintervention by the United States and Pakistan enabled Gorbachev to maintain that the Soviet Union was not abandoning an ally, but withdrawing under an agreement that protected the ally's interests. The author ends the case study by looking at the reasons why the accords did not end the fighting in Afghanistan.

3 Economic Development

In a project initiated in 1990 Nicholas Eberstadt of Harvard University examined the lessons of the American experience with foreign aid to new aid programs for Central and Eastern Europe. Eberstadt reported his findings in several articles and a monograph. In "How Not to Aid Eastern Europe," published in *Commentary* (November 1991), he points out that East European countries exhibit several unhealthy characteristics in terms of the condition and management of their economies: (1) their inability to manage external debt; (2) the nonconvertibility of their currencies; (3) the long-term deterioration of health conditions, which has resulted in a net decrease in public health; and (4) the absence of legal and political institutional structures that can stimulate economic growth and development.

Not even substantial American economic assistance is likely to help, says Eberstadt. "If the conditions of the present states of Eastern Europe cannot be distinguished by such meaningful economic and political criteria from those of governments that have been obtaining American funds and development advice these last few decades, why should U.S. aid be expected to help Eastern Europe evolve away from its current characteristics—much less in the direction of self-sustaining economic growth or open, liberal policies?" (p. 25). He continues by stating that an East European government seeking assistance from America's existing aid program "would be engaged in a singular act of faith, for there is little in the record to suggest that these programs contribute to economic liberalization or development, while there is considerable evidence to the contrary" (p. 26).

To argue his point, Eberstadt examines those aid and development programs that are most often cited as successes. These include the Marshall Plan for post-war Western Europe, the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas program for post-war Japan, and American assistance to both Taiwan and South Korea during the period 1949 to 1960. In all these instances, Eberstadt concludes, it was not development assistance per se that brought about economic success. Rather, it was such factors as the American security guarantee, the introduction of liberal democracy into Japan, the contribution of American military assistance to the local economies, and the push that the Marshall Plan gave to European integration that were the most important factors in the economic progress achieved by

these countries. But the most dramatic growth usually occurred once American economic assistance was withdrawn and dependency was avoided. "Reviewed as a group, then, the success stories of U.S. economic assistance do not seem to offer any immediate or obvious encouragement to the new initiatives now being contemplated for Eastern Europe" (p. 29).

Eberstadt emphasizes that the most serious obstacle to East European recovery is the underdeveloped state of the rule of law: "Economic historians are in general agreement that the rise of the Western world was directly and inextricably linked to the new institutional arrangements it developed, and perhaps none of those arrangements was more important than the framework of legal protections for individuals that included the right of enforceable private contracts. The populations of Eastern Europe have been separated from that framework for more than four decades. The majority have no memory of firsthand exposure to it, to say nothing of personal familiarity" (p. 29).

4

HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

In an effort to determine more clearly the relationship between human rights and peace, Professor David P. Forsythe of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln has written a book manuscript, "Human Rights and Peace." The manuscript addresses these questions: What is the role of human rights denial in producing internal violence? What is the link between this internal situation and international violence?

In terms of the relationship between human rights and international war, Forsythe concludes that the principal connection is that democracies do not war with democracies, "for reasons we cannot fully explain." Complicating the picture is the fact that highly developed states are reluctant to war with each other, whether they are democratic or authoritarian. "It may be the case that a broad rejection of overt international war is occurring because of its high costs and psychic disapproval, among developed authoritarians as well as among developed democratic states. It would be logical for authoritarians, having experienced major war, to want to avoid its repetition, even if they despised the notion of individual human rights." Forsythe hypothesizes that trends toward increasing civil-political rights, growing attention to socioeconomic rights, increased industrial and technological development, and "increased moral development and interdependence" may lead toward a more peaceful world.

Forsythe points out that although democratic states do not make war on other democracies, this trend does not inhibit them from making war on authoritarian states. American actions, like the invasions of Panama and Grenada, provide good examples of this fact. Other cases include the 1956 Suez invasion by Britain, France, and Israel, and Israel's initiating the 1967 Middle East war. Forsythe concludes that "the practice of civil-political rights at home does not necessarily block wrongful or other use of force abroad against authoritarians." Even the commitment of democratic states to the laws of war when fighting authoritarian states presents a mixed record, although on the whole democratic states adhere to international legal norms more rigorously than do authoritarian states.

Democratic states, while avoiding overt international war with each other, do nevertheless engage on occasion in covert and forceful intervention against each other. "Given the ideological predisposition to avoid overt force among democra-

cies, democratic policy makers may see covert intervention as the preferred path when they encounter elected governments, or their policies, that are disliked." For instance, the United States organized or aided six covert interventions involving violence against elected governments between 1947 and 1991.

In an effort to discover the relationships between human rights and peace in the sphere of domestic violence and revolution, Forsythe presents three case studies: Sri Lanka, Romania, and Liberia. Human rights factors played a part in all three of these cases, but a different role in each case. Moreover, human rights probably did not constitute the most significant factor in any of these cases. When human rights plays a significant role, economic and social rights are often more important than civil or political rights.

Forsythe draws four final conclusions: (1) "In an era of human rights rhetoric, particularly after the discrediting of European authoritarian socialism, I would surmise that legal-moral factors centering on human rights would increase in relative importance, both nationally and internationally, at least in the near future. . . . Increasingly, long-term domestic peace cannot successfully avoid fundamental human rights questions." (2) "Participatory rights lead to a need to tolerate and/or reward various groups, perhaps entailing creation of new states as a last resort. There is no general formula for appropriate tolerance or compromise." (3) "Civil and political rights do not survive well in a socio-economic context characterized by gross inequality." (4) "All repressive regimes lacking major sources of legitimacy in the view of large numbers of citizens face an uncertain future; growing attention to universal human rights exacerbates this."

* * *

With the winding down of many regional conflicts, the repatriation of refugees has become a major issue—particularly in the case of Afghanistan. The Refugee Policy Group has produced *Afghan Repatriation: An Issue of International Peace*, a report published in November 1991, before the collapse of the Najibullah regime in Kabul. At that time three million refugees remained in Pakistan, with an additional two million in Iran and two million more internally displaced within Afghanistan.

In late 1991 the return of refugees was inhibited both by the war and by the opposition of Afghan political leaders within the resistance movement. The refugees constituted almost the sole political base for those parties, so the leaders were reluctant to encourage the departure of their supporters. Moreover, although in Pakistan the refugees were seen as a domestic liability, they were thought of as an international asset in Pakistan's achieving strategic aims vis-à-vis the future shape of Afghanistan.

Decisions by refugees about whether to return to Afghanistan have depended on a combination of factors related to economic and social conditions there, including access to farm inputs and markets; ability to pay transport costs to return home; ability of the prospective returnees to support themselves upon return; availability of credit; kinship ties and support networks that might facilitate reentry; and access to their old land holdings, many of which have been taken over by others.

The report draws the following major conclusions regarding the situation in late 1991: (1) Many of the Afghans in Pakistan and Iran will stay there even when

peace comes. (2) As international assistance to countries of asylum is reduced, it is important that aid be targeted at the most vulnerable populations to ensure that their needs are addressed and that they are able to benefit from opportunities for return. (3) Aid to those seeking repatriation should include aid in crossing the border, returning to their villages, and reestablishing themselves. (4) Although aid within Afghanistan could be used to buttress the political positions of various factions, it should nevertheless be offered and be aimed at addressing basic humanitarian needs. (5) Development and reconstruction efforts should be directed toward establishing economic stability in war-affected areas. (6) Multilateral aid, preferably via the UN, should be promoted rather than bilateral assistance that is politically motivated. (7) It is crucial that nongovermental organizations (NGOs) play a significant role in these UN refugee-assistance programs.

5

ETHNIC CONFLICT

Professor Ted Robert Gurr of the University of Maryland has completed *Minorities at Risk* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993), a comparative study with worldwide scope on ethnic conflict. One of the major issues explored is the extent of socioeconomic disadvantage suffered by minority groups. Gurr concludes that discriminatory barriers are highest in Latin America and the Middle East, somewhat less in Africa and Asia, and markedly lower in the advanced industrial democracies and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The advanced industrial democracies have been as effective as the Socialist states of Europe in reducing political differentials, but less successful than the Socialist states in narrowing economic gaps among groups. One factor contributing to this difference is that the democratic states do not have the capacity or will to redistribute wealth and economic opportunities to the same degree as the socialist states did.

Among the Third World regions, intergroup differentials (cultural, political, and economic) are lowest in Africa. The most serious communal problems in Africa are concentrated in South Africa, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa. The greatest intergroup differentials and most severe discrimination occurs in South Africa. The archetypal minority in Asia is an indigenous group that has ethnonationalist ambitions for autonomy. Most of these groups live on the geographical periphery of Asian states. A smaller portion of Latin America's population is at risk than in any other Third World region, but those groups at risk experience the greatest economic differentials and the most severe economic discrimination found anywhere. The general pattern in Latin America is of serious inequality and pervasive social discrimination against those who do not assimilate to the dominant culture.

Gurr offers four generalizations regarding the mobilization of grievance by groups at risk: (1) Collective interests are not unitary. (2) Political organization is essential to the formulation and expression of collective interest. (3) Some political expressions of collective interest are more authentic than others. (4) Group interests and objectives change during the course of communal conflict.

Patterns of grievance vary in different world regions. Demands for political autonomy are greatest in Asia and the Middle East, and least in Africa and Latin America. Africa has the greatest concentration of minorities at risk (seventy-four

groups), according to Gurr, and these minorities constitute 42 percent of Africa's total population. Before the breakup of the USSR, Eastern Europe had the second largest percentage of minorities at risk (35 percent).

Of the various kinds of minorities, "ethnoclasses" such as Maghrebins in France and immigrant Chinese in Asian countries experience greater political and economic inequalities and discrimination than do other types of groups. Indigenous peoples face disadvantages nearly as great. Gurr concludes that different kinds of minorities seek different ends. Demands for autonomy occur mostly among ethnonationalists and indigenous peoples, both of whom have a tradition of political independence and sharp cultural differentiation from dominant groups. On the other hand, ethnoclasses, communal contenders, and militant sects usually demand greater rights within societies, including political and economic rights.

Gurr's research led him to conclude that all kinds of ethnopolitical conflicts have increased sharply since the 1950s. Nonviolent political action by the 233 communal groups studied more than doubled between 1950 and 1990, while violent protest and rebellion quadrupled. Indigenous peoples have had the greatest proportional increase in conflict.

Gurr asserts that violent protest is more likely to occur in authoritarian societies than in democracies. In movements for ethnonational rights, moves toward autonomy have usually helped dampen conflict. A shift toward pluralism, coupled with devolution of power to peripheral regions and indigenous peoples, can often be effective in responding to protests by minorities. Democratic forms of politics have the virtue of allowing the expression of minority interests and encouraging policies of accommodation. On the other hand, democratic politics are also susceptible to the politics of ethnocentric reaction.

Communal groups in Western societies, says Gurr, are shifting toward a preference for pluralism as opposed to assimiliation and hence give greater weight to the collective rights and interests of minorities. In addition to emphasizing multiculturalism, the focus on pluralism also means a shift from programs designed to enhance individual opportunities to programs that allocate entitlements and jobs on the basis of ethnicity. Politically, it means the institutionalization of ethnic politics. While this approach has considerable appeal, it also runs the risk of triggering political reactions from the majority community.

Power sharing is an alternative way of ordering multicommunal societies and characterizes the governing system in Holland (between Catholics and Protestants) and Belgium (between the Flemish and Walloons). Another approach to accommodating communal interests identified by Gurr is regional autonomy. He cites five examples (Basques, Miskita, Naga, Tripura, and Moros) in which accommodation was successfully achieved through regional autonomy and five cases (Tamils, Sikhs, southern Sudanese, Kachins, and Shan) in which attempts to introduce regional autonomy did not terminate rebellions. The four approaches of assimiliation, pluralism, power sharing, and regional autonomy all offer attractive possibilities, but all also carry risks of failure as well. None is a panacea.

Gurr concludes by asserting that the international community has an obligation to protect the collective rights of minority groups within a more pluralist world system.

* * *

Ethnic conflict within the former Soviet Union has created a dangerous and volatile situation that could very well become worse. In an effort to explore the parameters of ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union, two freelance writers who are specialists on these countries, Jerrold Schecter and Valery Chalidze, have written a book manuscript, "National Contradictions in the Soviet Union."

The authors state that the purpose of their study is "to analyze nationality problems . . . from a point of view of how to transform an empire that was historically built on conquering territories through violence, to a free federation of nations that, voluntarily, under the pressure of economic and political needs, agree to be part of this federation." The authors note that it is doubtful whether Lenin ever actually desired a federation of equal nations within the union, since the Marxist approach to social development has generally been antinational. Although concessions were made toward national feelings under Stalin, there was, nonetheless, "more repressive cultural policy and less respect for other nations than under the Tsars."

These conditions prevailed until the accession of Gorbachev, who was faced with an explosive dilemma in the wake of permitting freer speech on nationality issues. At the time the manuscript was completed in November 1991 of "the 23 borders separating one union republic from another, only three are not in a state of conflict: those between Latvia and Lithuania; Latvia and [Belarus]; and between [Belarus] and Russia." Gorbachev's policies, combined with a history during Soviet times of frequent relocation and shuffling of nations, has contributed significantly to the volatility of these conflicts. The result has been that earlier national activists turned out to be oppressors, willing to suppress the national minorities within their own republics as they themselves had been repressed as minorities within the union at large. And the Russians, where they suddenly became a minority, were no exception. "[M]any people of minority nationalities direct towards Russians as a whole their bitterness arising from the abusive treatment forced on them by the previous dictators."

Although the level of conflict increased under glasnost and perestroika, Schecter and Chalidze assert that the nationalities question was becoming more divisive even before that. They cite incidents in Georgia (1956 and 1978), Lithuania (1956, 1961, 1972, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982), and Estonia (1980 and 1982) as examples of "mass resistance to empire rule."

Schecter and Chalidze conclude that "there is a real hazard that the old prison of nations, which the Soviet Union used to be called, may be transforming itself into a new prison with separate cells. The threat is growing that at least some of the reincarnated republics will become dictatorships in their own right." Disintegration of the center has not magically dissipated ethnic conflicts. "Hatred between many of the nations within the country has collected for decades, and is accompanied by an absence of political culture and understanding of what democracy actually is. All of these factors combine to create a very real potential for dictatorship in the republics, and promote nazi-like tendencies in the suppression of minorities. The extreme violence in the Karabakh between Azeris and the Armenians, the fighting in Georgia between the Georgians and the Ossetins, the tension in Moldavia where the Gagauz and the Russian minori-

ties are arming themselves in expectation of conflict with the Moldavian majority, Latvian demands to deprive the Russian minority in Latvia of Latvian citizenship—this list of tragedies and potential human rights abuses can be as long as the list of Soviet nationalities itself."

* * *

Ethnic issues in the former Soviet Union were also the topic of a conference organized by Professors Zvi Gitelman, Ronald Suny, and Roman Szporluk and held in May 1991 at the University of Michigan. The conference was designed to explore the implications for peace of the rapidly evolving developments among the nationalities of the former Soviet Union (FSU). It focused less on internal developments among the nationalities than on external influences on them. These influences include other countries and co-ethnics and co-religionists outside the FSU. The conference also examined the construction and reconstruction of ethnic identity among some of the Soviet peoples. Like the analysis of external influences, this conference was an attempt to discover what forces drive ethnic assertiveness and how that assertiveness influences conflict and harmony in the world arena. The overall thrust of the papers presented at the conference is that ethnic identities are being constructed, reconstructed, and mobilized politically, but that there are so many contradictory interests and forces at play that one should not expect a clear-cut lineup of ethnic and religious groups struggling for well-defined goals. Rather, in the short term, newly conscious religious and ethnic groups in the FSU will be struggling to sort out who their allies and enemies are, and how they should act toward each other. In such a situation, external actors will have considerable influence on the nationalities in some cases, but not in all.

The first session of the conference dealt with the influence of East European states and peoples on some of the peoples of the FSU. Professor Irina Livezeanu of Ohio State University pointed out that while Romania is a magnet for Moldova and Moldova has long been a Romanian irredenta, a distinct Moldavian identity existed before the Soviet period. In the interwar years, said Livezeanu, "the reintegration of the Moldavians and the Romanians was anything but a natural or smooth process," and it is highly unlikely that it will be so in the 1990s.

There are probably two million Poles in the former Soviet Union today, although many are registered as being another nationality. Janusz Rieger of the Polish Academy of Sciences pointed out that a Polish national revival is underway in the FSU. The survival of historic hatreds and stereotypes is the main problem in the future evolution of the relations between Poles and other peoples within the FSU. Professor Ronald Suny of the University of Michigan asserted that for Armenians in the diaspora the revived memory of the 1915 genocide, the 1988 earthquake, and the struggle for Nagorno-Karabagh have both overridden issues dividing the diaspora and have linked it to the Armenian republic in a vital way. The Armenian diaspora "marks time, unable to settle old issues. . . . What is new . . . and most hopeful for the future, is the general consensus in the diaspora that the Republic of Armenia under its current government *is* the Armenian homeland, a legitimate state with which relations are to be maintained, a nation to be protected and aided" (emphasis in original). Mark Saroyan of Harvard's Russian Research Center argued that despite talk about an Islamic threat to the

republics of the FSU, there has been virtually no impulse toward unity among Muslims of the region. Rather, there is increasing fragmentation along ethnic, sectarian, and institutional lines. Islam does not exist in the abstract: its practitioners are molded by the circumstances in which they live, and they develop different understandings of Islam.

* * *

In order to generate wider understanding of the Holocaust and of genocide in all parts of the world, the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem has produced the most comprehensive annotated bibliography available on these subjects. This bibliography is also computerized so that it can be as widely accessible in electronic form as it is in published form. The bibliography contains in excess of 8,000 entries of published and unpublished materials from 1980 to 1990 on genocide and the Holocaust. The entry process continues and the bibliography will continue to expand. *The Holocaust and Genocide Computerized Bibliographic Database, 1980–1990* was prepared by Israel W. Charny, David Lisbona, and Marc I. Sherman.

6 INTERNATIONAL LAW

Two studies discuss international interdependence and the impact on national sovereignty. Harry Gelber, professor emeritus at the University of Tasmania, has produced a monograph manuscript entitled "Sovereignty Eroded." Gelber concludes that there has been a rapid and thorough globalization of information, data, news, money and capital, particularly among the G5 states (United States, Japan, Germany, Britain, and France). Events in one country have an almost immediate effect on other countries. Of particular importance for the near future is the rapid growth in cross-border broadcasting. There is also an increasing internationalization of nuclear missile capabilities, as well as an increasing spread of terrorism. World financial markets enable money to move almost instantly among widely separated centers. Cooperative financial programs have proliferated, and interest rates in one country immediately affect those in other countries.

Economic issues have increased substantially in political importance, says Gelber, and state diplomacy has a strong component of corporate involvement. Geoeconomics has begun to shape geopolitics. The desire for international economic competitiveness shapes many national policies, and the complexity of international economic relations also makes the formulation of foreign policies more difficult. In addition, the desire to promote free markets internationally constrains government intervention. These complexities necessitate maximum access to information. Gelber asserts, "The issue is no longer whether the phenomenon of interdependence has grown—it clearly has—or whether states need international organizations more than they did in order to fulfill their own aims—they clearly do—but what is the balance between the role of such organizations as a constraint upon states and state power and their utility as a tool for individual governments?"

International organizations are assuming increasing importance in handling such security issues as the breakup of the USSR and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Similarly, states must cooperate to confront terrorist activities and organizations. These developments naturally entail limitations on the sovereign powers of states. Supranationalism has proceeded farthest with the European Economic Community, where citizens can even sue their own governments before the European Court of Human Rights. Moreover, "the insatiable desire and need for

information and, ultimately, some control over the capillaries of complex modern societies, involves governments both directly and at arms length with an increasing variety of transnational and international organizations, arrangements, and fora."

Even more fundamentally, there is an erosion of respect for sovereignty and an accompanying change of social and political loyalties by individuals and groups. International businesspeople are more citizens of the world and of their own corporations than they are of particular states, and that is true of other persons as well.

Gelber argues that the state is also under challenge from the opposite direction: the rise of ethnolinguistic concepts of national solidarity, exclusivity, and self-determination. Moreover, borders are becoming increasingly porous.

Gelber concludes that "the upshot of all these various trends seems to be that many of the usual assumptions about the nature and extent of political and economic management by the state seem to have become more questionable." This statement elicits the question of whether the modern advanced state is "any longer capable of fulfilling its essential and classic functions of providing for the security and welfare of citizens. . . . We are, proverbially, between a world which is dying and another waiting to be born."

* * *

From his project "Rethinking International Governance," Professor Harlan Cleveland of the Hubert Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs of the University of Minnesota has written *Birthday of a New World* (San Francisco: Jossey Bass Publishers, 1993). Cleveland asserts that there should be a new world agenda "to make the world safe for diversity" and that it should contain the following five components:

- Radical disarming and durable deterrence of nuclear weapons—making sure that nuclear weapons of all sizes and shapes remain unusable and unused;
- deterring the use of other exotic instruments of "frightfulness"—chemical and biological weapons and missile delivery systems that are easier than nuclear weapons to come by and more readily usable in limited ways;
- organizing to anticipate, deter, and mediate regional conflict, manage crises, mediate ancient quarrels, isolate those that cannot yet be settled, stop wars when they break out, and restore peace when it has been broken;
- strengthening international systems for responding to humanitarian crises within, as well as among, countries—security threats to those targeted by terrorists, lured by drug addiction, caught up in human rights disputes, pushed from their homes as refugees, or visited by sudden disasters, natural and unnatural; and
- developing a wider and more flexible system of world leadership—a "club of democracies" whose members are willing to act in different groupings in different situations in dissimilar regions pursuant to the purposes, if not always using the procedures, of the UN charter.

Cleveland points out that parts of the world have become dramatically interconnected, and states that the electronic conquest of remoteness, the sheer speed and complexity of global telecommunications enhanced by fast data-processing, has transformed local markets into worldwide networks, widened local conflicts into world security issues, transmuted local poverty into a world development

problem, and enabled us to see how the behavior of individuals culminates into global environmental threats.

Cleveland also contends that the greatest hope for the management of world affairs lies in a club of democracies that would consist of the democracies, old and new, in Europe, the larger and more successful developing countries, the United States, Canada, and Japan. "This expanding fellowship, acting in shifting patterns of cooperation and competition, will mostly decide over the next generation what the formal organs of the UN will be empowered to do; what they will do together themselves, within the UN Charter but outside its procedures; how stability and fairness are to be reconciled in peacekeeping and peacemaking, in economic growth and social development, in using and protecting the Global Commons—in sum, whether and how they will work together worldwide for 'better standards of life in larger freedom'" (pp. 204–5).

7

National and Collective Security

Central to an understanding of the foreign and defense policies of a state is an understanding of its perception of foreign political and military threats. Professor William Garner of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University has written a book manuscript, "Soviet Perceptions of Threat," summarizing the results of his study.

Garner examines two broad hypotheses about Soviet threat perceptions under Gorbachev. The first is that "the Gorbachev leadership drew its mandate to embark on its innovative foreign policy on the basis of a leadership consensus that the Soviet Union faced overwhelming political, military and economic threats. The second is that the new Gorbachev foreign policies were based on a reassessment which radically lowered the Soviet assessment of western threats, and concluded that threats from the U.S.-led capitalist alliance were not only not implacable, but could be most effectively reduced by Soviet concessions and other political means."

In his discussion of Gorbachev's policies toward Eastern Europe, Garner demonstrates "how the earlier consensus of the Soviet leadership about the combination of a military threat from NATO and the ideological threat to communist rule from capitalist democracies was shattered by Gorbachev's almost revolutionary policy towards Eastern Europe. By 1989 the Gorbachev leadership had decisively fractured that leadership consensus by bringing about the realization of many of the very same threats from which its earlier policy was designed to escape. Communism in East Europe had fallen. Rather than renewing socialism, Gorbachev's westernizing policies of glasnost and perestroika undermined the legitimacy of communist rule everywhere. Gorbachev's policies not only discredited Soviet authority in Eastern Europe, but stranded half a million soldiers there and undermined the political mission of the Soviet military as an institution. Worse, they served to spark internal national antagonisms and liberation movements throughout the Soviet Union which have since brought about the virtual dissolution of both the party and the nation."

Garner analyzes the evolution of Gorbachev's foreign policy from its origins during the interregnum between Brezhnev and Gorbachev up to and through 1988. He attempts to explain "how Gorbachev's new policies related to changes

in the Soviet leadership's perceptions of threat." He categorizes three groups of people whose perceptions of threat were in competition: traditionalists, realists, and radicals. The traditionalists wanted to continue the pre-Gorbachev policies of Brezhnev; the realists wished to move toward an accommodation with the West in order to obtain a peredishka, "breathing space," in which to regroup. Unlike the realists, who did not disagree overall with the traditionalists about ends but about the means to obtain them, the radicals argued for profound, substantive changes in the structure of the Soviet system itself. According to Garner, the realist view prevailed during the period 1982–84 in response to the Reagan antidètente policies. From 1985 through 1988 the realist foreign policies were reflected in Gorbachev's "grand reassessment" of threat perceptions. Garner also notes the devastating radical critique of this assessment. He points out how both the traditionalists and radicals attacked the Gorbachev realists, forcing them to move toward the radicals' position "to the point of adopting the fundamental threat perceptions and political agenda of the radicals." Indeed, "the dominant Gorbachev group of 'realists' was essentially cornered into the 'radical' foreign policy in East Europe that would consciously realize the worst fears of the 'traditionalists.'"

* * *

In another assessment of diplomatic and military strategy in Europe, Edward Killham, a retired Foreign Service officer, completed a book *The Nordic Way: Path to Baltic Equilibrium* (Washington, D.C.: The Compass Press, 1993). Killham describes the "Nordic balance" by stating that "the membership in NATO of Norway, Denmark, and Iceland is balanced by Finland's special security relationship with the USSR, while Sweden's armed neutrality serves as a buffer between the Eastern and Western spheres of influence." Even the memberships of Norway and Denmark in NATO are qualified: no nuclear weapons or troops may be stationed in these countries; Norway has limited its force posture in the far north close to the Kola Peninsula; and Denmark's naval operations in the Baltic are defensive and nonthreatening. Sweden has invoked the Nordic balance to justify a vigorous interpretation of Swedish neutrality or nonalignment.

Killham argues that the Nordic balance can be seen as a fulcrum in the overall balance of power between East and West. In this role, Scandinavia "can continue to play a vital role in maintaining the European equilibrium, which has now preserved peace there for over forty years." Scandinavia demonstrates a preference for nonconfrontation in both foreign and security policies. "Determined to work toward better ways of dealing with and resolving international conflicts, the Nordic nations have sought to provide an example of how tensions can be muted and sometimes managed by the application of mutual restraint and cooperation."

Killham concludes by examining the future of the Nordic balance in light of the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. "As a result of the dramatic reorientation of Soviet foreign and domestic policy since 1985, and the concomitant collapse of the USSR's dominant role in Eastern Europe, the Nordic balance as we have known it in the post-war era is shifting dramatically. Its once delicately preserved equilibrium has lost much of its relevance to the makers of foreign and defense policy nearly everywhere, including Washington." He proposes that "the now outmoded model of the Nordic balance which prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s seems likely to be replaced by a new, more traditional bal-

ance. This new equilibrium would pose a resurgent Germany against a temporarily exhausted but potentially powerful USSR [Russia], whose enormous resources of population and other resources cannot be discounted forever."

* * *

The strategic relationship between the United States and Israel might be subjected to new pressures now that the Cold War is over. But *U.S.-Israeli Strategic Cooperation in the Post–Cold War Era: An American Perspective* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1992), a study by Karen Puschel, concludes that U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation is not likely to be significantly eroded by the fading of the Cold War. Despite public emphasis on the Soviet threat as the basis for strategic cooperation, the decision to initiate the program of cooperation in late 1983 reflected a variety of American concerns of which countering Soviet influence played a relatively small role. Moreover, with the actual implementation of strategic cooperation from 1984 on, the importance of the Soviet threat as a justification for policy diminished even further as both sides turned their attention to finding areas of practical cooperation that would benefit both the United States and Israel.

Puschel concludes that the institutionalization of that process helps to ensure its continued success. Even more important, strategic cooperation is now widely viewed as an essential element of the U.S. commitment to ensuring Israel's security. Thus, even if the United States wished to back out, it would be at the risk of undermining deterrence in the region and the concomitant strategic stability. This fact, combined with the fact that the program proved much less upsetting to the Arabs than predicted, seems to ensure that the policy of strategic cooperation is here to stay.

However, Puschel asserts that if the overall fact of strategic cooperation no longer seems at issue today, the nature or scope of the U.S.-Israeli relationship is subject to change as a result of largely indirect effects from the passing of the Cold War. For example, military assistance seems unlikely to increase signficantly given the post–Cold War emphasis on fiscal restraint in the United States. Moreover, no compelling political rationale exists today for expanding strategic cooperation. In the past, strategic relations between the United States and Israel tended to grow either as a result of progress on the peace front, which then led to increased U.S. commitments to Israel, or as a result of U.S. frustration with the Arab states, which led the United States to focus even more on Israel as the only likely venue for American influence in the region.

As Puschel points out, neither of these conditions exists today. The United States is in the enviable position of being the only superpower in the region and has many new options vis-à-vis the Arab states. And while peace would indisputably lead to a further increase in strategic cooperation, the painful peace process seems likely to put additional strain on the relationship. Indeed, from the U.S. perspective, strategic cooperation has never simply been about creating military possibilities in the region, but about creating an overall environment of security for Israel that would help to create possibilities for peace—both through deterrence and through Israel's willingness to engage in an active peace process. This subtle link between peace and strategic cooperation

constitutes one of the most important differences in the way the United States views strategic cooperation and the way that Israel views it.

This study finds that the United States never entered into the program of strategic cooperation with the idea of relying on Israel's military might in the region. Rather, there was the hope that a strong and confident Israel would be more willing to take risks for peace. There were also pressures that stemmed from domestic politics. Financially, there was the unalterable fact of Israel's strength in the region and the special friendship between the two countries that, over the years, had created an increasingly firm U.S. commitment to Israel's security.

Puschel argues that today it is this complex mix of motivations for strategic cooperation that serves as its great protection. Because there was no single imperative for strategic cooperation, there will likely never be a single reason for its decline. Strategic cooperation exists, in the final analysis, because of the extremely close U.S.-Israeli relationship committed to ensuring the security of the Israeli people. This commitment, in turn, rests on American identification and sympathy with the nation of Israel for historical, moral, and political reasons.

* * *

Richard H. Shultz, Jr., has conducted a project assessing the appropriateness of covert action as an instrument of American foreign policy. The product of this project is a monograph manuscript, "Covert Action and American Foreign Policy." In the concluding section of the monograph, Shultz recommends a set of policy guidelines.

First, he says, covert action should remain the clandestine component of policies that aim to ensure the security and interests of the United States and its democratic allies; keep off balance and undermine enemies that threaten American interests; contribute to international and regional stability; and, finally, promote democratic principles in places where they exist in embryo or not at all. Second, U.S. policy ought to be guided by a combination of interests as well as values. Third, covert action should be understood as a normal instrument of statecraft that is employed, in conjunction with other instruments, to support the interests and policy of the United States. Fourth, covert action is a neutral instrument of statecraft. It can be employed in the service of policy objectives that include the promotion of pluralism, rights, and related American values. Used in this fashion, covert action can be conducted within a framework that blends prudence and principles.

Fifth, continues Shultz, covert action must support policies relating to the important interests of the United States. Sixth, covert action should, if exposed, be explicable to the American public. Seventh, if a covert action supports a government that is involved in a protracted internal war, then that government must meet certain standards to justify U.S. support. Eighth, if covert support is provided to a resistance movement, it must be challenging a government that is seen to be illegitimate. Ninth, covert action can be used in coups only if a vital U.S. interest is at stake and the target of the coup has lost credibility with the local populace. Tenth, in the case of larger political actions, those forces assisted must enjoy political legitimacy with the local populace. Eleventh, in the case of counterterrorism, covert paramilitary operations have a role to play, but they must be

carried out consistent with the standards of discrimination and proportionality that apply to the overt use of force. Twelfth, if the United States provides covert assistance to a government, faction, or movement that is employing force, the assisted power should also comply with the standards of proportionality and discrimination.

8

PEACE MOVEMENTS, PACIFISM, AND NONVIOLENCE

As a resource both for researchers and practitioners interested in nonviolent resistance, Ronald McCarthy and Gene Sharp of the Albert Einstein Institution have prepared a bibliography that will be published as a book. *Nonviolent Action: A Bibliography* is a comprehensive, annotated bibliography of English-language publications on nonviolence. In addition, the Albert Einstein Institution, in collaboration with the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense at Harvard's Center for International Affairs, has published a monograph, *Transforming Struggle: Strategy and Global Experience of Nonviolent Direct Action* (Cambridge: Program on Nonviolent Sanctions, Harvard University, 1992), that summarizes seminar presentations over a nine-year period at the Program on Nonviolent Sanctions at Harvard. As stated in the introduction by Doug Bond, program director, "The Program's analytical choice to focus on nonviolent means of struggle neither assumes nor precludes a particular set of motivating values and beliefs. The underlying rationale accommodates and encompasses both principled and pragmatic perspectives" (p. 3). Four analytic themes emerged during the course of this seminar program: the technique approach, which emphasizes nonviolence as a technique rather than as a philosophy or moral system; strategy; defense and deterrence; and research issues. In addition to theoretical discussions, the presentations include case studies of actual struggles, both ongoing and historical.

Major attention is given to civilian-based defense. "Civilian-based defense may be thought of as a counterpart to nonviolent action. Whereas nonviolent action typically seeks to effect change in a status quo, civilian-based defense often seeks to preserve it, either from external aggression or occupation, or from internal dictatorship and tyranny" (p. 4). Bond goes on to assert that "anybody who took these seminars seriously since 1983 could not possibly have been surprised by the revolutions of 1989, nor by the successful resistance to the August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union. It is encouraging that Sharp's prescient contributions to civilian-based defense have recently been influential in the development of national defense policies for Lithuania and Latvia" (p.4). Bond asserts that the seminar reports demonstrate that nonviolent struggle is truly a global phenomenon, and cases are cited from Africa to Asia, from Eastern Europe to Latin

America, from the Middle East to North America and to Western Europe. In addition, there is strong evidence of cross-cultural learning. "Central to the dynamics of nonviolent struggle as framed in the present approach is a hypothesized process of devolution and decentralization of power both within and among parties to a conflict. . . . Nonviolent struggle transforms power relations; it empowers participants. . . . I would suggest also that nonviolent direct action may, eventually, fundamentally transform the way we perceive and deal with conflict. In particular, the widespread use of nonviolent struggle may stimulate a transformation of current conventional wisdom on violence, that is the view that violence constitutes the ultimate sanction. A more realist vision of violence would acknowledge fully its implications and restricted utility. Again, the limits and potential of nonviolent, transforming struggle beg to be specified" (p. 5). Nonviolence is categorized by the authors into three types: nonviolent protest and persuasion; noncooperation; and nonviolent intervention.

* * *

Paul Wehr, Heidi Burgess, and Guy Burgess of the University of Colorado have edited "Justice Without Violence," a book manuscript that is a collection of essays on the nature and effectiveness of nonviolent techniques in combating injustice in various parts of the world, including Africa, China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. In analyzing these cases, Heidi Burgess identifies factors that seem to influence the effectiveness of nonviolent action in combating injustice. In most cases a cause-and-effect relationship has not been established, but the variables that seem to be significant are the following:

- societal belief systems condoning or condemning violence;
- structural factors that inhibit either violence or nonviolence;
- intervention of outside powers;
- socioeconomic conditions in the country;
- the competence of a government;
- legitimacy of both the ruling regime and the challenging group's grievances;
- credibility of the dominant group's threat power;
- the challenge group's strategic mix of threats, exchange, and integrative mechanisms;
- timing and pacing of the struggle; and
- the size of the challenge group (large size appears more effective).

* * *

The Central American peace process from 1983 to the end of 1991 is the subject of a book by Professor Jack Child of American University. The book is *The Central American Peace Process, 1983–1991* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992.) Child concludes that in Central America the peace process brought not only the beginnings of peace through the process of mediation, dialogue, and compromise, but increased understanding among the nations of the region and multiplied the contacts between them. During the Contadora peace process the concepts of "peace verification" and "zones of peace" were introduced and, according to the author, can be applied beyond this specific situation to "influence the search for peace in other areas." The term "peace verification" refers to the effort of a neutral third party to assure an international organization

or a group of peacemakers that the conditions of a signed agreement are being met. The term "zones of peace" refers to extensive geographic zones in which CBMs have reached a point where the various parties to the conflict have significantly reduced their level of arms and external military powers have been persuaded to reduce their influence in the zones to a minimum.

For Latin America as a whole the Contadora process represented an attempt to find a Latin American solution to a Latin American problem—and more particularly a problem that involved the United States. Although such attempts have been made in the past, the scale of this attempt and the clash with U.S. policies and interests made it a benchmark in U.S.–Latin American relations. Involvement in the process changed relations among Latin American states generally, as well as with the United States and with key international organizations such as the UN. The process also led Latin American states to reexamine the hemisphere's security arrangements.

Child states, "For the U.S. government Contadora represented at best a well-meaning initiative which would eventually converge with U.S. goals in the region, and at worst a serious challenge to U.S. influence and hegemony, not only in Central America, but in the Western Hemisphere as a whole." Through the Contadora process the principal nations of Latin America were announcing to the world (and more specifically to the United States) that they wished to assume greater responsibility for their regional security in a manner that contrasted with the security system previously dominated by the United States.

For Canada the Contadora process was a great coming out for a power that has perennially been absent from hemisphere events. The term "helpful fixer" introduced into the peace process referred to the Canadians, who actively participated to mount an effective peacekeeping and peace verification process. Canada contributed its very considerable expertise gained in other parts of the world in international peacekeeping and verification programs.

Child asserts that Contadora initially was a threat to the Organization of American States (OAS), because it was organized out of the conviction that the OAS would not be able to respond to the needs of the situation. Nicaragua had a strong preference to work through bilateral relations or the UN, out of the belief that the OAS was under excessive U.S. influence. In the end the OAS became a partner with the UN in the verification process and assumed a major role in Contra resettlement.

Thus, for the UN Contadora represented the first UN involvement in peacekeeping and election monitoring in the western hemisphere. It changed the way many Latin Americans view the UN and opened up the possibility of greater UN involvement in the hemisphere in the future.

The roles that the inter-American security system and the Latin American military successfully played in the Contadora process suggest, says Child, that they might consider assuming a role in which they develop military confidence-building measures, and prepare for participation in UN or OAS peacekeeping or peace-observing missions, either in the hemisphere or elsewhere in the world.

Finally, Child asserts that the OAS might emerge from the Contadora experience a stronger organization. The new role that Canada is playing within the

OAS should be helpful to that organization, and the "OAS might be finally freeing itself from its historic domination by the U.S. and in the process become more truly representative of the hemisphere" (p. 164).

9 POLITICAL SYSTEMS: DEMOCRACY

In a project sponsored by the Human Relations Area Files at Yale University, Melvin Ember, Carol Ember, and Bruce Russett tested the widely discussed hypothesis that democratic states and societies are less likely to make war on each other than are undemocratic societies. While other researchers have examined this hypothesis in relation to large and modern states, this team was interested in a comparative study of the world's more primitive societies, paying particular attention to autonomous political units that enjoy broader political participation.

In an article, "Peace Between Participatory Polities: A Cross-Cultural Test of the 'Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other' Hypothesis" [*World Politics* 44, no. 4 (July 1992): 573–99], the authors begin by reviewing four possible alternative hypotheses that might explain the finding of less warlike behavior. First, they suggest democratic states are peaceful toward each other because they are bound by common ties in a network of institutions, including transnational ones. Second, most wars are fought between physically adjacent states, and until after World War II democracies tended to be relatively few and distant from each other. In addition, many democracies have a shared interest in presenting a unified alliance against a common enemy. And many democracies are so rich that the costs of conflict significantly outweigh the benefits. The authors demonstrate why they do not find these alternative hypotheses convincing.

In describing their own study, the authors define the various degrees of political participation in terms of the levels and forms of participation in decision making at the local or face-to-face level in isolated small bands, neighborhoods of dispersed households, villages, or precincts of towns or cities. Their determinants of participation include checks on the power of the leader; ease of removal of leaders; the degree to which leaders must consult or persuade; and the importance of a decision making body versus an individual leader, among other factors. The authors consider these variables especially relevant to conditions in which formal elections rarely occur and in which there may not be any full-time political officials.

From a potential universe of data regarding over 230 autonomous political units, the authors randomly selected thirty-seven cases on which they had com-

prehensive data on both participation and warfare. They conclude that the data support the conclusion that political units organized along participatory, nonauthoritarian principles are less likely to fight one another than are units not so organized. They also conclude, however, that external warfare is not a significant predictor of internal warfare or warfare within the social unit. Hence, participatory societies are not necessarily less likely to experience internal wars and violence.

* * *

The relationship between democracy and peace is of growing interest to scholars, and particularly the hypothesis that democratic states do not make war on other democractic states. Professor Edy Kaufman and Shukri B. Abed of the University of Maryland have sought to address this issue in relation to Israel. In *Democracy, Peace, and the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1993) edited by Kaufman, Abed, and Professor Robert Rothstein of Colgate University, the authors address two questions: Can Israel remain democratic while it faces recurrent wars and exercises political control through military rule over a large disenfranchised population and can the Palestinians become democratic when Arab countries generally have been the slowest in the world to move toward democratic rule? The authors do not consider democracy a precondition of peace between Israel and her neighbors, but maintain that there is an interrelationship between both domestic and external political processes. They believe that the development of democratic values and institutions could be a factor facilitating peace.

The first part of the book focuses on the relationship between democracy and peace, both at the theoretical level and in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The second and third sections look at specific aspects of the Israeli and Palestinian situations. Contributor Alon Pinkas assesses the impact of the military occupation on Israeli political institutions, showing how in Israel national security considerations are given greater weight than individual rights, particularly for Palestinians, who are accorded practically no rights by the Israeli state. Kaufman studies the erosion of pluralistic values and the decreasing willingness among Israelis to accept dissent from either individuals or groups. Charles Liebman looks at the Jewish orthodox community, and the relative lack of democratic values evident within it.

Turning to the prospects for democratization among the Palestinians, Abed assesses the degree to which historical, religious, and cultural obstacles to democracy evident in the Arab world apply to the special case of the Palestinians. Moshe Ma'oz provides an overview from a historical perspective of democratic practices and values evident within Palestinian leadership and society at large. Manuel Hassassian asks these questions in relation to the Palestine liberation movement. In the concluding chapter Rothstein raises many questions about the connection between democracy and peace in relation to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and challenges some of the conclusions drawn in the preceding chapters.

* * *

The prospects for democracy in Poland, particularly at the local level, provide the focus for "The Development of Local Democracy and Applied Conflict Resolution in Poland: A Dialogue," a book manuscript edited by James T.

Johnson and Denis Jones of Rutgers University. In the introductory chapter Johnson addresses the fundamental question of the project: whether, given the complicated and ultimately historic-specific nature of the democratic forms of any society, they can be shared in any meaningful sense with societies whose historical experience is different. Johnson discusses the theories of Michael Oakeshott and Lon L. Fuller in order to shed light on this question. Oakeshott, according to Johnson, takes the position that the values usually associated with liberal democracy are "the product of time and circumstance, not of the force of universal principles." Fuller asserts that "one must look at the aggregate, and one must look for not only practices but also for conscious fealty to previously identified principles." Johnson makes a case for a position that falls between those of Oakeshott and Fuller, contending that while Oakeshott is correct that the place to view democracy is through its practical functioning, Fuller is right that the way to find the principles that animate democratic practice is to distill them. Johnson says, "the purpose of these discussions over the development of local democracy in Poland is not to impose American forms [of democratic practice] on Polish historical life, but to share an experience of living democratically in a society that is dedicated to making that possible."

Introducing the concept of conflict resolution, Johnson links it with democratic decision making: "Local democratic forms of government in American society have developed importantly as examples of attempts to resolve conflicts democratically." The papers in the volume give special attention to the nature of democratic forms in Poland and the United States as they have developed in relation to history and culture; to conflict resolution in dealing with problems that may arise across the spectrum of local government; to the importance of respect for pluralism within democratically constituted polities; and to a particular aspect of democratic participation: the role of women. Johnson concludes, "American democracy is a standard for living, a commitment to dynamic resolution of the problems of living free while in community. Participation in this is the enterprise we hope to share with free Poles in a free Poland."

In his chapter Miroslaw Grochowski expresses pessimism about the chances for democracy in Poland. He concludes that present conditions, both external and internal, do not create the appropriate environment for effective and rational changes at the local level. He asserts that the disappearance of the Communist party from Polish public life did not result in the creation of a strong political base for the new Solidarity government. The majority of the population remains passive and inactive. In addition, the transition to a market-oriented economy turned out to be too much of a shock. Arguments about sacrificing today for the future are insufficiently compelling. Moreover, innovation is stymied in an atmosphere where the state is not there to mitigate possible failure. In light of these circumstances, he notes two possible strategies of response by local authorities: the survive-until-tomorrow perspective and the innovative perspective. Unfortunately, the former has become the more widely adopted strategy. Grochowski concludes that the situation in Poland demonstrates that "in post-totalitarian countries distrust and suspicion towards every political power and almost every authority is so deeply rooted that even democratically elected authorities have low social acceptance."

10 Regional Conflict and Security

Africa

The political and military conflict over the Western Sahara has extended over several decades, with the most intense manifestations coming since 1973. Professor Stephen Zunes of Whitman College has written "Western Sahara: Nationalism, Conflict, and Mediation," a book manuscript on attempts to resolve this conflict. The recent history commenced in August 1988 when the UN secretary general proposed a cease-fire and a referendum over whether the population of Western Sahara wanted independence or integration with Morocco. Both the Moroccans and the Polisario movement accepted the proposal. Zunes writes that the Polisario accepted because they thought they could win a referendum and acknowledged their failure to defeat Morocco militarily because of Morocco's strong support from powerful Western allies. "Morocco accepted the proposal because of the high costs of maintaining the [defensive] wall and its war footing; the fact that its diplomatic isolation meant the possibility of the UN adopting the referendum proposal anyway; that agreement to the peace plan would lessen their isolation and retard recognition of the SADR [Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic] by more states; and that the treaty's vagueness made possible means by which to gain some advantage."

The agreement spelled out the date of the cease-fire, the number of troops to be evacuated from the territory, the administration of the territory during the transition period, the role of Moroccan immigrants, the return of Sahrawi refugees, voter identification and electoral lists, and the costs of the referendum and the timetable. Although a major stumbling block had been Morocco's refusal to meet with the Polisario, this obstacle was resolved in January 1989 with a meeting by King Hassan and a high-level Polisario delegation in Marrakesh. Despite this and action by the Security Council, "the war and the regional arms race continued, and neither side had abandoned the hope that continued fighting would gain them a political advantage."

In April 1991 the Security Council voted to finalize the implementation and logistics of the plan and provided funding. However, Moroccan forces launched a major offensive just weeks before the cease-fire was to take effect. In addition,

the Moroccans effectively stalled implementation of the plan. Morocco maneuvered in numerous ways to create a situation that provided the greatest possible advantage. To sidestep the agreed reduction of Moroccan forces to 65,000, Moroccan soldiers "traded their army uniforms for civil police garb, and took on a number of civilian tasks, including taxi drivers and telephone operators, to keep better track of potential independence activities in the population." Just ten days after the cease-fire went into effect, the Moroccan government announced that it was organizing another mass migration into the territory, comparable to the 1975 Green March. By December 1991 arguments over voter registration finally led to the Polisario's pulling out of the referendum scheduled for January 1992. In the meantime, the Moroccans have decided to hold national elections, including the Western Sahara as a province.

Zunes concludes pessimistically that while he believes the peace plan is workable, the Polisario position continues to erode. "Not only is the Polisario overmatched militarily, but they continue to be overly dependent on Algeria, which is far too distracted by its internal crises to muster effective leadership at this critical juncture. A fair referendum, as sensible a solution as it is, is based on the premise of a more balanced power relationship than actually exists. Though most independent observers believe that a fair vote would go in favor of independence, the political balance is decisively in Morocco's favor." Zunes asserts that since 1981 King Hassan has given verbal support to the referendum but indefinitely delays its implementation, while enjoying assurance that the international community will not apply sufficient pressure to deter his refusal to implement the agreement.

Latin America

In *Toward Resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas Dispute* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1991), edited by Wayne S. Smith, the authors demonstrate that both the British and the Argentine positions on the Falklands/Malvinas dispute have merit. Moreover, there is no simple approach to a solution, in part because the dispute cannot be settled by the World Court or by international law. The dispute is deeply intertwined with the domestic politics of both countries. Moreover, the painful and bitter memories of the 1982 war make an amicable solution rather remote.

The authors conclude that Argentina is not fundamentally motivated by any economic advantage it might gain from control of the Falklands, particularly since few if any Argentines will ever agree to live there. But it is a deeply held Argentine conviction that the islands were illegally taken and kept by British force. The bottom line for Argentina is to "have the islands again colored blue on the maps and the Argentine flag to fly over them" (p. 123). To Argentina the nature of the regime that controls the islands is much less important than the question of sovereignty.

The islanders, on the other hand, want to remain on their remote island, and they want to maintain their British nationality and their way of life. In the 1970s the British government was prepared to consider a change of legal status for the islands because they are a drain on the British Treasury and a military burden.

However, lobbying efforts by the islanders in Westminster made the Falklands an emotional domestic political issue, and in recent years the British government has been unwilling to consider any significant change in their status.

The authors suggest that the best possible resolution of this impasse is for some agreement that would change the juridical status and legal sovereignty of the islands, but that would also permit the islanders to live as they do now, remain British citizens, and continue to collect fishing fees. The islanders would naturally be suspicious of such a solution, and as a consequence any such agreement would need to be guaranteed by more than just the word of the signatory parties.

One possible approach suggested by the authors is a leaseback, under which Argentina would enjoy sovereignty but the islands would be leased back to Britain. Another possible approach would be shared sovereignty. Various governing mechanisms are proposed to avoid having co-dominion end in conflict and stalemate. The islands might also become semiautonomous territories. Creating a UN trusteeship is the final possibility considered.

* * *

Rensselaer W. Lee III and Patrick Clawson of the Foreign Policy Research Institute have written an unpublished monograph on Latin American drug trafficking. "Peaceful Resolution of the Drug Problem" considers the feasibility of negotiating with the drug lords and various economic strategies to encourage Andean coca farmers to switch to legal crops. The authors conclude that drug negotiations are almost a political necessity in the Andean countries, but whether they will contribute to law enforcement objectives is less certain. Andean governments view negotiations more as a means of resolving conflicts with the cocaine industry and hence reducing societal violence than as a way to curb cocaine traffic per se.

Lee and Clawson argue that a negotiation strategy may nevertheless enable Andean governments to score successes in the mid or long term, especially at the refining and distribution end of the business. Negotiations might extend the reach and effectiveness of conventional law enforcement activities, since they can furnish strategic intelligence about the drug trade and conceivably enable the authorities to dismantle some elements of the cocaine business. However, the United States will have to persuade Andean governments to bargain in earnest with drug dealers and make lenient treatment contingent on the level of cooperation by the traffickers. In addition, the conditions for receiving antinarcotics assistance from the United States must continue to emphasize strengthening the criminal justice systems in the Andean countries. Credible laws, courts, and police forces will improve the prospects for using negotiations as a drug-fighting strategy. Bargaining strategies, the authors assert, are a politically essential element of drug fighting in the Andean countries. The United States must accept this political reality and attempt to guide Andean drug negotiations in directions that best serve U.S. narcotics control interests.

But dealing with the masses of peasants who now cultivate coca for a living is more problematic. Offers of inducements to peasants to abandon the cocaine business have not worked. The problem is not, as commonly supposed, that the profit margins for coca are vastly higher than those for any alternative crop. The authors demonstrate that, given different government policies, the income from

coca could be matched by those of some other agricultural ventures, although soil and climate conditions in some areas inhibit the cultivation of alternative crops. Rather, Andean peasants are locked into coca farming by a variety of constraints, including the high farm-to-market transport costs for other crops; government regulatory and tax policies that discriminate against legal agriculture (especially small agriculture); the programmatic hostility of Peruvian Marxist guerrillas to crop substitution policies; stagnating or declining economies in Bolivia and Peru that stimulate migration to coca-growing regions; and U.S. trade barriers that discourage expanded imports of Andean products. In fact, Andean governments exercise little direct control over the context of their negotiations with peasant producers of coca. The authors argue that economic and political conditions in the Andes will have to improve significantly before peasants can abandon coca farming on a mass scale.

Europe

As revolutions were occurring in Eastern Europe during 1989 and 1990, Richard F. Staar, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, gathered a group of experts to assess the evolving character of the relationships between the Soviet Union and the changing states in Eastern Europe. A volume entitled *East-Central Europe and the USSR* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), edited by Starr, was the result. Staar points out in his introductory chapter that each country in the region remains at a different stage of the transition process. East Germany is likely to make the most rapid progress, because of its integration into a reunited Germany. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary "belong to the West and should be the first to integrate with the European Community after a ten-year transition period" (p. 5). Romania will only gradually shift its thinking toward becoming a European nation. In February 1991, Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel identified two principal threats facing the new democracies. The internal threat involved both fragile governmental systems and shaky economies attempting rapid transformation. The external threat focused on the Soviet Union. As the threat of the Soviet Union recedes, the countries have tried to pursue a process of democratization. Free parliaments have been elected and free market economies are beginning to emerge; these steps were accomplished in the early stages with Kremlin acquiescence, if not full approval.

After an initial period of exhilaration, argues Staar, the 1990s will be a time for reviving bankrupt economies and creating new government systems patterned after those in Western Europe. Staar states that the needs of each country in the region differ and they will follow divergent paths, but they share "the dreadful legacy of almost half a century 'on the path to nowhere'" (p. 11). Of high priority is the need to develop a civil society based on the rule of law. Coalitions of intellectuals generally led the struggle against Communist rule, but these coalitions later fragmented and the early consensus will be difficult to reestablish. Staar asserts that the transition to a genuine civil society could be jeopardized if Eastern European intellectuals cannot rid themselves of their antipathy toward private entrepreneurship. Moreover, the population and par-

ticularly the working class must accept the inevitability of compromise in the political process. Initial low voter turnouts may signify a distrust of government or apathy.

Staar points out that the Soviet Union (Russia) "is no longer a power to be feared or emulated" (p. 12) and has neither the inclination nor the power to control or significantly assist the process of transformation now under way in Eastern Europe. Rather, Russia is likely to be influenced by the free market experiments now being tried in Eastern Europe. There is a real danger that a military dictatorship could reemerge in Russia; "let us hope that the pattern does not replicate itself throughout East-Central Europe" (p. 12).

* * *

In September 1990 the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Finnish Institute of International Affairs held a conference in Helsinki to assess the role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) within a changing European security order. A report on the conference, including the conference papers, has been edited by Kate Holder, Robert E. Hunter, and Paavo Lipponen as a monograph, *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: The Next Phase* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1991).

Of particular interest to the participants was the question of the role of the CSCE in conflict management and peacekeeping in Europe. Widely varying views were expressed. One school of thought advocated a small and highly flexible conflict resolution center with limited powers, subject to consensus rule and staffed by low-level bureaucrats. A second group supported a more developed structure with key decisions being made by a security council, enabling it to assert some autonomy beyond the positions adopted by national leaders. Another argued that conflict is inevitable in international relations and can play a constructive role in the settlement of international differences. Moreover, the process of conflict resolution is not well developed, and setting a goal of conflict resolution is unrealistic; it may be more meaningful to think in terms of conflict containment rather than resolution.

According to the conference report, CSCE's Conflict Prevention Center represents an initial modest step toward enabling the CSCE to play an effective role in handling disputes between states in Europe. Conference participants concluded that to be effective the center will need to be integrated within other CSCE institutions. Moreover, the center will need to rely heavily on the involvement of Europe's neutral states. In summarizing the discussion, Paul J. Cook reported that some conference participants asserted that the center must take on additional features if it is to play its intended role. For example, "there should be an arbitration service, whose rulings states could either accept or reject; member states should vest the CSCE with a greater role in verifying conventional arms control compliance and other cooperative measures; and due recognition must be accorded to the role that sub-regional groups can play in resolving regional tensions" (p. 27).

Participants emphasized that flexibility and simplicity of design are essential to build up the institution. Although at the outset the center will only be able to play a modest role in European security, over time it could attain greater legitimacy and earn greater trust among member states. At that time, the CSCE might

"begin to provide peacekeeping forces to contain violence in regional disputes" (p. 27). Participants concluded that the center could provide a forum for civil exchanges among parties in dispute, as well as undertaking fact finding. It could also serve as an arbitrating body and offer recommendations on the deployment of peacekeeping forces. Both NATO and Russia are looking to the center to assist with the development of CSBMs to raise the level of military predictability and transparency. Peacekeeping is potentially an important role for the CSCE, but the success of such initiatives will depend heavily on the will of statespersons. "Building a peacekeeping function into the CSCE requires leaders to articulate precisely the relationship between a conflict resolution center and any peacekeeping forces themselves. What body, for example, is going to select these forces and clarify their tasks? Moreover, integrating these forces will pose all the traditional problems of language barriers, equipment interoperability, training, and command and control. Can these problems be overcome, given the diverse nature of the countries assigning troops to such a force?" (p. 29).

* * *

The crisis in the former Yugoslavia is the subject of *The Yugoslav Conflict*, a monograph by John Zametica of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Brassey's for IISS, Adelphi Papers series, no. 270, Summer 1992). A significant section deals with the involvement and reactions of Yugoslavia's neighbors to the conflict. Writing in mid-1992, Zametica points out, "A new, potentially destabilizing situation was thus registered on Italy's eastern frontier with two states instead of one, with dissatisfied minorities on both sides of the frontiers, and the revival of a lingering territorial dispute which history had evidently not succeeded in burying" (p. 48). For Austria, the end of the Cold War and the revival of *Mitteleuropa* had a significant impact: its support of Croatia and Slovenia—both Catholic members of its former empire that Serbia had done a great deal to destroy—has been open and brazen. As for Hungary, the author points out that "before the Second World War Hungary was, along with Italy, the bitterest enemy of the Yugoslav state." Hungary has consistently favored the secessions of Slovenia and Croatia, seeing the issue as 30,000 Magyars in Croatia versus 340,000 Magyars in Vojvodina (in Serbia). Hungary "had legitimate, if somewhat exaggerated, grounds for worry about the minority Hungarian population; it had a mounting refugee problem; and it had every right to dislike Yugoslav jet fighters in its skies. But its policy was destabilizing in that, like Austria, it had encouraged secession and, in addition, promoted claims about and on behalf of the Hungarian minority in Serbia. Most serious of all, this policy had raised the spectre of territorial revision, even if the latter was devoid of any substance" (p. 51). Bulgaria, too, has been fixated on the disposition of Macedonia. Abhorrent as the prospect of Macedonian independence is to Serbia, it would be a provocation to war if Macedonia were to become some kind of a Bulgarian protectorate. Albania, too, saw its interests served in the breakup of Yugoslavia and the limiting of Serbian hegemony. The Albanians are particularly galvanized by ethnic Albanian minorities in Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. Kosovo in particular has witnessed increasing tensions between Serbs and Albanians.

Germany has played a pivotal role. "Until the war in Slovenia, Germany's policy in the Yugoslav crisis was very much in tune with the rest of the European

Community (EC): a peaceful solution within a single Yugoslavia . . ." (p. 63). But with the onset of hostilities, German official and public opinion hardened against the Serbs. The German decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia was, in fact, a breach of coordinated EC policy on that issue.

Only Romania and Greece have supported Serbia. Romania—economically, politically, ideologically, and religiously a natural ally of the Serbs—only reluctantly followed the EC decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. Both countries share borders with a potentially difficult neighbor (Bulgaria) and have large Hungarian ethnic minorities. As for Greece, the collapse of Yugoslavia has had severe consequences: 40 percent of Greek exports were transported to Europe by truck through Yugoslavia. Greece's telecommunications, electricity supplies, and tourist industry were all affected by its northern neighbor. "The stability of the federation was thus something in which the Greeks had a substantial stake, and it was with some dismay that they observed the break-up" (p. 54). In addition, they shared Serbia's concerns over the disposition of Macedonia. If Macedonia became a satellite of Bulgaria (possibly with Turkish encouragement), Greece would be sorely provoked. Finally, both Greece and Serbia share a deep aversion to all things Islamic and, particularly, Turkish.

In the concluding chapter, Zametica cites five lessons for the international community that can be learned from the Yugoslav experience. First, becoming a sovereign state continues to be seen by stateless nations as the panacea for their grievances and a vehicle for their ambitions. Second, the principle of national self-determination must not be applied selectively by the international community. Third, the ambiguities of when is a nation not a nation and when is a minority a nation must be eliminated. Fourth, the only way of resolving the fundamental tension between the internationally accepted principles of the inviolability of frontiers, on the one hand, and national self-determination, on the other, must be through subordinating one of the two principles. Frontiers, rather than self-determination, should be sacrificed; frontiers can and do collapse, but the will of a nation to build a state can only be temporarily suppressed. Fifth, the final lesson emphasizes the need for the international community to prepare early responses to ethnic flashpoints.

Asia

The 1975 civil war in East Timor precipitated Indonesian intervention, and a very difficult period has followed, with many lives lost and much international controversy generated. In "Civil War in Timor," an unpublished manuscript, Professor David Hicks of the State University of New York at Stony Brook assesses the causes of the civil war and of the coup that immediately preceded it. The first factor that generated the coup was a fear that the opposing forces would launch their own coup. Hence, the coup might be considered a preemptive strike. Moreover, the instigators of the coup were convinced that if the opposing left-wing party gained power, the Indonesian military would invade Timor. They also worried that the opposing party was increasing its electoral strength at their expense. Acrimony between the two parties intensified, and there was a growing belief that violence was inevitable.

Personal factors, particularly ambition and vanity, were also important. Leaders of both parties were eager to gain office as head of state of the new nation. At the same time they lacked experience in politics and government. Hicks states, "None of these 'instant politicians' had ever held any sort of political office—or run for any—nor had any of them lived in a society where democratic elections were accepted as a matter of course." As a consequence, naïveté and political clumsiness prevailed, and none of the political leaders was able to work out a compromise that would enable him to establish a regime acceptable to the Indonesian government. The warring traditions of the people may have predisposed them to conflict and bloodshed rather than to compromise and accommodation. In addition, the Portuguese colonial government had not prepared the educated elite for self-government, leaving the party leaders very inexperienced in party politics and government leadership. Moreover, the Portuguese administrative authorities abandoned the administration of the colony. "The unrealistic drive for quick change was entirely inappropriate for a people who had never been united into a nation and had no training in civic responsibilities, or even basic education. . . . Finally, since there was no institutional framework left to adjudicate personal animosities and political differences between leaders of the parties and force compromises upon them, the war of words turned into a war of blood, which also could not be resolved by any institutional mechanism, for none was left."

* * *

In an effort to untangle some aspects of the tragic story of war and genocide in Cambodia and to relate the developments there to U.S. policy, Michael Haas has written *Cambodia, Pol Pot, and the United States; The Faustian Pact* (New York: Praeger, 1991). Haas attempts to describe those events leading to U.S. support for the Khmer Rouge. He begins with Vietnam in 1945 and recounts those events that he believes relate to the creation of Kampuchea. These include failure of U.S. policy to differentiate between nationalism and communism; American support for the Sihanouk government in Cambodia as well as for its opponents, the Khmer Serei; Sihanouk's decision in 1973 to recognize North Vietnam in an attempt to outflank the Khmer Rouge, who were supported by China and North Vietnam at that time; the U.S. response to Communist victories in Cambodia and Vietnam in 1975 with economic embargoes; the war between Kampuchea and Vietnam (1975–78), in which thirty thousand Vietnamese died from Khmer attacks along the Vietnamese border; the invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnam and the defeat of the Khmer Rouge in 1978; U.S. rapprochement with China (1978–79) and China's invasion of Vietnam (1979); and the U.S. decision to aid the Khmer Rouge via China and Thailand (1981).

Haas also attempts to explain U.S. policy by looking at various rationales. First, he discusses what he calls the "Vietnam syndrome," in which Vietnam endangered Thailand and acted as a proxy for the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia. The United States hoped that Cambodia would constitute Vietnam's "Vietnam." China manipulated American Sovietphobia and Vietphobia for its own foreign policy purposes. U.S. policymakers decided to relegate Southeast Asia to secondary status in terms of strategic interest. China was its newly discovered ally in the region, and the only country that could counter Soviet influence there. Haas

argues that myths regarding Cambodia by 1979 went largely unchallenged through the 1980s and guided U.S. policy throughout this period.

* * *

In a book manuscript entitled "Transforming South Asia: An Analytical Study of the 1971 India-Pakistan War and the Creation of Bangladesh," professors Syedur Rahman of Pennsylvania State University and Craig Baxter of Juniata College present a history of conflict and conflict resolution between India and Pakistan with a focus on the Bangladesh war in 1971. The authors examine the hypothesis that India conspired to break up Pakistan and that India might have indirectly contributed to the events leading to the Bangladesh "holocaust." The authors conclude that this hypothesis may be plausible but not provable. After the holocaust, India became directly involved by providing a safe haven for refugees and permitting a Bangladeshi government in exile to be established on Indian territory; giving humanitarian assistance; and increasing its political involvement by allowing the freedom fighters to operate out of Indian territory. The authors speculate that India ultimately attacked Pakistan because it recognized that there was no political solution in the offing and a prolonged guerrilla war would adversely affect India. Rahman and Baxter analyze the Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan, describing each party's negotiating position and reasons for accepting the agreement. A discussion follows of the Tripartite Agreement among Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. Although such issues as POWs, war crime trials, and repatriation made the negotiations difficult, Pakistan eventually recognized Bangladesh.

In the concluding chapter the authors look at the various unresolved conflicts among India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. These disputes existed before the establishment of Bangladesh and continue to undermine good relations between India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, the creation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation has done little if anything to ameliorate these disputes. In recommending how the disputes might be resolved, the authors suggest third-party mediation in the case of the Ganges-Brahmaputra dispute, with Nepal and China included in the negotiations and the World Bank serving as the mediator. They suggest that the Bihari dispute be mediated by the Organization of Islamic Conference. Finally, they recommend that the nuclear proliferation issue be handled through a conference attended by India, Pakistan, China, Russia, and the United States. The Kashmir issue is the most intractable, and that is the issue upon which the great powers and the UN ought to focus their greatest attention.

Middle East

In an effort to assess the impact of an Arab-Israeli peace agreement on the economic prospects of the region, Patrick Clawson and Howard Rosen of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy have written a monograph, *The Economic Consequences of Peace for Israel, the Palestinians and Jordan* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute Policy Papers, no. 25, 1991). The authors analyze the economic effects of various scenarios, each a conceivable outcome of a peace process, without passing judgment on whether the economic benefits of

any given policy should outweigh the political costs. The peace proposals are classified into four families, based on economic, rather than political, criteria. The four are autarky, or little movement of goods or labor between Jordan and Palestinian areas as well as between each area and Israel; pre-1967, or free flows between Jordan and Palestinian areas but few flows with Israel; trade zone, or free movement of goods in the region without much flow of labor between Israel and other areas; and Benelux, or free movement of goods and labor among Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian areas.

Autarky would require that Palestinians raise billions of dollars to finance new infrastructure as well as create jobs for the Palestinians still working in Israel after the Gulf War. Yet, compared with no peace, autarky would have limited effects on the Israeli economy, especially since Soviet immigrants provide a ready source of alternative labor. Compared with the base case of no peace, autarky would have few effects on Jordan.

The Benelux model could bring greater prosperity to the entire region. However, the advantages will be small unless Israel and Jordan drop mercantilist policies that impede trade abroad, and ease the maze of regulations that stifle entrepreneurs at home. The benefits of the Benelux proposal would be greater for the smaller economies, especially for the Palestinian economy.

The effects of the other two scenarios, as analyzed by the authors, would fall somewhere in between, but be closer, in the final analysis, to autarky than to Benelux.

Should the parties opt for relatively open, Benelux-style economic relationships, the financing needs for peace would be small. Autarkic, or relatively closed, arrangements, on the other hand, would require over $10 billion if living standards in the Palestinian areas are not to drop farther than they already have as a result of the *intifada*.

The authors conclude that the overall contribution of peace to the regional economy would be particularly welcome because the prospects for the next few years are troubled. Because of Russian immigration, natural Arab population growth, and poor prospects for Arab emigration to the Gulf, the regional labor force will grow at a rate that probably cannot be absorbed. Israel has the best prospects in the next few years, and therefore needs a peace bonus less than do the Arab areas. In order to realize its potential, however, Israel will have to raise about $5 billion a year from abroad over and above the normal flow of about $5 billion. The outlook for Jordan is not good. Incomes will probably have to fall sufficiently to allow Jordanians to displace the 150,000 foreigners working in the country now. The outlook for the Palestinian areas is extremely poor; there is a serious risk that living standards will fall back to levels of twenty years ago.

The authors contend that in the interim, before any peace settlement, some cooperative steps could be taken to improve the welfare of Israelis, Palestinians, and Jordanians without prejudging the character of the settlement. Most of these measures would bring greater benefit to Palestinians and Jordanians than to Israelis, for the simple reason that the Israeli economy is much larger and is therefore less affected by relations with its neighbors. The monograph analyzes the pros and cons of seven steps: developing water policies to reduce Israeli depletion of the West Bank aquifer; storing more Jordan River water during the rainy win-

ter months; facilitating foreign capital inflow into the West Bank and Gaza; freely licensing West Bank and Gaza businesses; facilitating West Bank and Gaza exports; improving access for tourists; and permitting a more expansionary fiscal and monetary policy in the West Bank and Gaza.

* * *

Professor Gerald Steinberg of Bar Ilan University has written a book manuscript, "The Functional Approach to Middle East Peace: 1967–1973." The manuscript gives particular attention to the three-year period following the 1967 war and the policies instituted by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. Dayan attempted to reach out to the Palestinian community on the West Bank and build the basis for an enduring peace through strengthening relationships, as an alternative to formal negotiations. He opened bridges, promoted interaction and communication between Israelis and Palestinians, took steps to integrate the West Bank economy into that of Israel, and adopted other measures. But Steinberg concludes that this functionalist approach was unsuccessful. The most dramatic evidence of its failure is the violence that came with the *intifada* in 1987. Steinberg states, "While the functionalist measures were implemented, the dynamic processes necessary to transform the entire relationship, and to create the conditions necessary for political negotiations, were not developed."

Steinberg identifies several flaws in Dayan's approach. Although Dayan had great power and was able to take many initiatives with limited interference from others, he was largely alone in developing and implementing the functionalist strategy. This policy was never widely supported within the government, and there was much opposition, particularly to economic integration. Moreover, the specific goals of the functionalist strategy remained ambiguous. Without clear goals, it was not possible to measure the rate of progress or to determine whether success was being achieved.

Steinberg asserts that the confusion and ambiguity regarding policies toward the Palestinians were also evident in policies toward Jordan. Although Dayan was very eager to promote improved relations with the Palestinians, he did not see any purpose in cooperating with Amman. In fact the envisaged ties with the Palestinians were seen as an alternative to the previous Israel-Jordan links. Jordan was also seen as an obstacle to effective functionalist ties with the Palestinians. Dayan's policies regarding Jordan were "often contradictory and confused," although a central goal was to weaken the Hashemite regime's influence and power in the West Bank.

Steinberg contends that one reason for the failure of Dayan's functionalist program was that the initiative came totally from the Israeli side and was not reciprocated by the Palestinians. The prospect of some internal autonomy for the West Bank did not appeal to many Palestinians, since an independent Palestinian state was their goal and autonomy was not seen as a transitional stage toward statehood. The Palestinians were not interested in political cooperation during this period. Nor were the Jordanians interested, since such cooperation would have isolated them from their Arab brothers.

Steinberg concludes, "Thus, the evidence indicates that even had the implementation been better, throughout this period, the Palestinians and the wider Arab and Islamic world did not seek to establish the conditions for ending the

conflict with Israel. . . . The conflict is ideological and nationalistic, and, in this context, indirect measures and functionalism have not succeeded in changing basic attitudes." In addition, the inconsistencies and confusion evident in Dayan's approach sent unclear messages to the Palestinians and the Jordanians.

In terms of the current situation, Steinberg contends that confidence-building measures are not likely to succeed independent of and prior to major progress in formal negotiations. Moreover, such measures cannot be ambiguous and ad hoc. "The moves and expected responses must be carefully planned and part of a broad process, in which each step is chosen to lead to the next, and in which criteria for measuring success or failure can be determined. . . . The evidence presented in this study does not lead to an optimistic assessment of the prospects for success."

* * *

Professor Benjamin Miller of Hebrew University in Jerusalem has prepared several chapters to be included in a book on U.S.-Soviet cooperation in conflict management in the Middle East. Miller states, "Despite their intense ideological and geopolitical rivalry, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were able to tacitly cooperate in times of crisis, more from necessity than from choice." Tacit arrangements were developed for crisis management. Their shared fear of a nuclear war "created the need for a means for exercising power in a crisis that would be more powerful than mere verbal threats, yet short of large-scale violence." In various ways the two superpowers signaled show of force. "Short-of-war options enabled the U.S. and the Soviet Union to demonstrate resolve in defending their interest[s] and yet to avoid war by showing self-restraint. Hence, crises became a surrogate for war in the post-1945 era and a means for demonstrating resolve." Because of the dominance of bipolarity, tacit norms emerged that became effective in the coordination between the adversaries during crises. "The bipolar structure facilitated the communication of the show-of-force signals and helped to make them more credible and effective."

The Middle East allies of the superpowers were not so decisive to the balance of power that the superpowers would support the allies in all situations. The United States "lost" Iran in 1979, and the Soviets "lost" Egypt between 1974 and 1976. However, these switches did not make much difference on the world scene. "Moreover, the high dependence of clients on the superpowers' economic assistance, arms transfer, and diplomatic support made it easier for Moscow and Washington to restrain their allies, at least at the time when such structural asymmetries in relative capabilities should play the most critical role—times of crisis."

The superpowers repeatedly demonstrated resolve, as distinguished from recklessness and overreaction, in defending their important interests. This resolve brought about frequent superpower crises and hence might be interpreted as the source of instability. "Nevertheless, precisely the frequency of the crises in the initial period of the cold war, such as the Suez crisis, gave the global antagonists the opportunity to delineate their 'red lines' and to 'learn' the implicit rules through a process of signaling threats and promises. Hence, precisely because of their recurrent willingness to protect vital assets, it became easier for each superpower, in a world of only two great powers, both to identify and respect the interests and spheres of influence of their rivals in crisis situations."

This cooperation was largely tacit and the unintended outcome of unilateral

moves. The factors that generated these tacit rules were not, however, sufficient to produce the higher level cooperation that might have settled the Arab-Israeli conflict.

* * *

An assessment of the current Arab-Israeli peace process is the topic of a monograph by Barry Rubin of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *The Arab States and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Linkage or Disengagement?* (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 1991 issue of *Policy Focus*). Rubin contends that traditionally Arab states have been unable or unwilling to make peace with Israel for a variety of internal and external reasons—domestic instability and external weakness in the case of Jordan, ideological and strategic militancy in the case of Syria, domestic opinion and regional weakness in the case of Saudi Arabia, and an ideological quest for regional hegemony in the case of Iraq. Recent years have seen significant changes in the Middle East, with Egypt's return to a leading role, the waning of pan-Arab ideology, the Palestinian uprising, mass Soviet Jewish immigration to Israel, the end of superpower rivalry, and the coalition war against Iraq. While the Arab states have tried to respond to these new developments, Rubin argues that they have not been freed of the traditional constraints on their decision making.

Saudi Arabia, whose participation in the peace process is central to its success, is doing its best to accommodate the United States. Jordan, too, seeks good relations with the United States to balance its pro-Iraq tilt during the Gulf crisis, but has yet to fully formulate its own role vis-à-vis the Palestinians in the process. Syria, which is especially vulnerable because of economic problems and the loss of its Soviet patron, skillfully used the Gulf crisis to win United States support. Rubin concludes that Syria's involvement in the peace process is shaped by twin desires to please the United States and to exercise control over the process as a whole.

Rubin asserts that the United States should adopt a comprehensive strategy toward the Arab states, conditioning aid and political support on constructive behavior in the peace process, for example, by entering into good faith negotiations toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The changes in the region do offer hope for progress, states Rubin, but only if the power and presence of past inhibitions are taken into account.

* * *

Baruch Kimmerling and Sarit Helman of Hebrew University have written a monograph manuscript, "Paradigmatic War Rationality and the Constitution of the 'Different' Rationality of the Lebanon War," assessing the impact of the 1982 war in Lebanon on Israeli perceptions of war. They conclude that of all the wars Israel has been involved in, the invasion of Lebanon is perceived differently by Israelis. This social perception raises questions both about the war itself and about images of other wars Israel has engaged in. The authors conclude, on the basis of interviews with reserve soldiers, that the Lebanon war was different in the following respects. It was a military offensive against irregular military organizations whose bases were located near civilian settlements. The offense was initiated in response to years of activity against Israeli settlements on the part of Palestinian organizations. The level of Israeli military force used was greater than in previous retaliations against Palestinians. Broader Israeli objectives became

evident as the war progressed. These broader objectives exceeded the officially espoused and stated ones. A linguistic shift occurred as a result of the broader objectives. What was once referred to as Operation Peace for the Galilee became the Lebanon war. A change in Israel's doctrine of national security also developed as the war progressed.

From the seventy interviews conducted, the authors conclude that the Lebanon war, unlike the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War, failed to fit into the Israeli national understanding of war. The Lebanon war generated doubts about the idea of using war to reconstruct the nation. A sense of common destiny was missing, since this war was not seen as essential to Israel's survival. It was being conducted to solve the Palestinian problem and to shift the balance of power in the Middle East. The narrow interests of the political elites that motivated the Lebanon military offensive were not shared by the society at large. The breach in Israeli society precipitated by the Lebanon war gave rise to the possibility of new perspectives on war and peace in Israel.

11

RELIGION AND ETHICS

Religion has gained increasing prominence in international politics, and the role of religious nationalism in various parts of the world is the topic of *The New Cold War: Religious Nationalism in Confronting the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) by Mark Juergensmeyer of the University of Hawaii. Juergensmeyer points out that with the coming of independence to new nations in Asia and Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, there was widespread hope that Western secular political values and secular nationalism were becoming predominant forces and would set the trend for future political life throughout most of the world. More recently, the hope for a world of religiously neutral nations has waned. Over the past decade religious nationalism has found expression in Muslim, Buddhist, Sikh, Hindu, Jewish, and Christian movements. "Increasingly the world is forced to come to terms with the possibility that the ayatollahs, the radical bhikkus, the Bhindranwales, and the liberation priests will not quickly fade from the scene" (p. 194). Moreover, the cultural nationalism that has been evident recently in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union often has a religious component.

Juergensmeyer asserts that religious nationalism is a force that is here to stay and must be understood. The first step in taking religious nationalism seriously is to see it as a widely accepted and logically convincing point of view, one held by large numbers of sensible people in many parts of the civilized world. Religious nationalism does not simply consist of slogans generated by fanatical extremists and clever radicals. Even in places where hard-core militants are few in number, their philosophy often profoundly affects the political culture and leadership of the country. The appeal of religious nationalism often comes from the view that secular nationalism is a foreign import and that only through religious nationalism can the national soul find authentic expression. Moreover, the vision of religious nationalists is transcendent and "not as easy to gauge as are the more materialistic promises of secular nationalists" (p. 24). He points out that even if the more strident voices of religious nationalism fade and disappear, the movements with which they have been associated have shown that religion has an ability to move the masses, provide a rallying point for cultural identity, and instill a sense of national purpose.

While in some instances militants might be satisfied when they have had some modest impact on national life and have found their views assimilated by the ruling elite, there is also the possibility that this level of success will not satisfy the true believers and they will push for a more radical transformation of the political order. The early stages of religious nationalist movements have often had a negative, anti-Western character, with the leaders more clear about what they are against than what they are for. As the leaders of the movements mature, however, they need to become more pragmatic in their orientation and in their attempts to address national needs.

Juergensmeyer asserts that one of the principal sources of the appeal of religious nationalism is the need for discipline and a moral motivation for people to obey laws. Many believe, as Gandhi argued, that modern civilization and its nation states lack the moral rudder that can only be provided by religious values.

Juergensmeyer ends with the optimistic assertion that religious nationalism is capable of forging a new synthesis of religion-sanctioned cultural identity and the democratic spirit of modern Western nation states. "This combination can be incendiary, for it blends the absolutism of religion with the potency of modern politics. Yet it may also be necessary, for without the legitimacy conferred by religion, the democratic process does not seem to work in some parts of the world. In these places, it may be necessary for the essential elements of democracy to be conveyed in the vessels of new religious states" (p. 202).

* * *

George Weigel of the Center for Ethics and Public Policy and Professor John Langan of Georgetown University organized several seminars on the topic of religious and ethical questions regarding war and peace. Papers from the series appear in a book entitled *The American Search for Peace: Moral Reasoning, Religious Hope, and National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1991). In the preface, Weigel discusses the purpose that drew seminar participants together: the explosion of moral arguments in the early 1980s concerning U.S. national security policy. "Questions of 'ought' were regularly entangled with questions of 'is' in the ongoing debate over America's right role in world politics. The churches of mainline Protestantism and the Roman Catholic Church were fully engaged in the argument, often in tandem with secular political lobbies and pressure groups" (p. vii). Several major church documents resulted from this debate: the Catholic bishops' pastoral of 1983, the Presbyterian study of 1985, the Methodist bishops' pastoral of 1986, the 1986 *Guidelines* document of the National Association of Evangelicals, the 1987 report to the Episcopal Diocese of Washington, and so on. Weigel asserts that this new religious activism had a measurable impact on U.S. policy, but that the intensity of debate obscured some basic issues that were not addressed. The seminars offered an opportunity to deal with these issues more thoroughly. Weigel concludes, "The kinds of issues explored by the seminar—the relevance of the just war canons, the meaning of 'intervention,' the internationalist/isolationist debate over national interest and national purpose, the role of negotiations in world politics—are arguably of increasing importance and urgency in the world that will follow the Revolution of 1989" (p. xi).

In an essay entitled "Refocusing the Ethical Agenda: Political Settlement as an Alternative to the Use of Force," Langan and Harold Saunders of the Kettering

Foundation contend that the old realist-idealist dichotomy is no longer adequate because of three changes in the nature of international interaction and relationships. First, there are now more problems that no one state can handle alone. Second, there is a growing need to pay more attention to the political energies and interactions of communities of people rather than concentrating merely on states and governments. The revolutions in communication, transportation, and information have increased enormously the number of participants in international relations. Finally, the traditional instruments of statecraft, namely various forms of military and economic power, often do not accomplish what is expected of them. The two authors advance this proposition: "Substituting negotiation for force can be an important step toward a more peaceful world, but the even more important step is to know how to shape political environments that generate the changes that can then be crystallized in negotiated agreements" (p. 205). They then provide a detailed discussion of the concept of "relationship," the ethical implications of relationships, and the concept of "political settlement" and its relation to the negotiation process.

In an Afterword, Langan observes that the events in Eastern Europe in the latter part of 1989 "constitute a striking example of change in the social and political environment within which scholars, reflective practitioners, and the general public raise more questions about war and peace. These events have altered widely shared beliefs about the relationships between the superpowers, about the tenacity and irreversibility of Marxist regimes, and about the limited effectiveness of peaceful protest against such regimes" (p. 274). The ensuing economic and political transformations have been rich in irony. With the exception of China, the momentous results of peaceful protest were greatly underestimated. Nuclear weapons have been less relevant to the maintenance of the international political order than their proponents thought and less destructive than their critics predicted. Langan concludes that the landscape of the international political order has been permanently altered. The new road that America must take in negotiating its way through this landscape, he argues, is now even more dependent upon the careful and continued scrutiny of moral and ethical positions and theories. The applicability of these positions and theories to the present and future quest for a more just and peaceful world order must be tested.

* * *

Conflict generated by Muslim immigration to Europe and the United States is the subject of "Muslims in the West: Potential for Conflict and Ways to Avert It," a monograph manuscript by Daniel Pipes and Khalid Duran of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The authors conclude that considerable tension exists and tensions arise from both sides—the Muslim minority and the Western majority. "On the Muslim side, Islamism [fundamentalist Islam] is the major culprit; other sources of problems include violence, family issues, and financial scandals. On the Western side, nativism poses the deepest threat to comity." For Islamists, the authors assert, Islam is not merely a religion, but a political ideology. Frequently, Islamist leadership in the West does not reflect the views of Western Muslim communities, but it is very influential and is frequently directed and funded by radical Islamic states. Some Islamists see Europe as a safe haven to begin reviving the sacred law, especially those immigrants who come from more secular states.

According to Pipes and Duran, "radical Islamists in Europe and America stress three themes, each of which leads to conflict with the majority population: separatism, anti-Westernism, and Islamic supremacism." The separatist demands would create a kind of cultural apartheid. The presence of Muslims in the West generates a negative reaction among indigenous populations. "Almost everywhere in Western Europe, a majority within the original population complains about being flooded by hordes of impoverished foreigners, and Muslims especially. But a minority adopts nativist ideas, disregarding the individual in favor of the group and playing up the importance of skin color and ethnicity. Nativism has marked similarities to fascism."

The authors recommend the following steps to resolve tensions: (1) Western institutions and governments should support those Muslim individuals and organizations that are unambiguously committed to democracy and pluralism. (2) The Western public and its media must not lump Islamists and moderate Muslims together. (3) Authorities ought to take steps to reduce the Islamists' power. (4) Islamist antagonism to the West demands severe responses, which means decisively punishing illegal activities; unflinchingly confronting Islamist hate-propaganda; monitoring publications calling for the subjugation of non-Muslims and the conquest of the West; excluding foreign Islamists; and watching out for preparations for a revolutionary take-over or other subversive actions. Law enforcement circles must take Islamist transgressions more seriously. (5) European Islam needs urgently to be recognized by governments. (6) Voting rights and citizenship ought to be extended to the Muslim minorities. (7) Education has to stress ethnicity less and principles more. (8) Muslim leaders need to inculcate respect for Western ways. (9) Secularism needs to be given pride of place in the pantheon of civic virtues. (10) Churches should avoid Islamists and cooperate with more moderate and representative Muslim leaders. (11) Europeans need to adjust to the new reality of an immigrant society. (12) Local populations need to learn something about the civilization of Islam and about the composition, concerns, and attitudes of Muslim communities in the West. (13) There needs to be a massive educational campaign to understand the benefits that immigrants bring. (14) Those hostile to Muslims need to be made aware that their prejudice parallels anti-Semitism. Jews and Muslims would both profit from closer cooperation. (15) Interreligious dialogue offers one of the most effective means to defuse the potential for conflict, but Islamists need to be kept out of the dialogues.

12 TRANSNATIONALISM

In an effort to assess the impact of unofficial contact and interaction between Taiwan and China in peacefully resolving the differences between Beijing and Taipei, Professor Richard Clough of the School for Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University has produced a book manuscript, "Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait: The Uses of Track-Two Diplomacy." Clough groups the forms of track-two diplomacy into three categories: informal, people-to-people contacts; informed exchanges of views; and authorized private negotiations. Most of those engaged in people-to-people contacts do not regard their interactions as contributing to their country's strategy of unifying China. Yet the flow of people, particularly from Taiwan to the mainland, has grown to the point that it has greatly moderated tension and hostility between the two sides of the strait. Taiwanese officials worry that their citizens are becoming "psychologically disarmed" by this interaction. On the other hand, Taiwan officials "have considerable confidence that this interaction not only reduces the risk that Beijing might resort to force, but also that it instills in people on the mainland admiration for Taiwan's accomplishments and a desire to emulate them, which, in the long run, will help make China more susceptible to the currents of capitalism and democracy now sweeping the world." Mutual economic advantage is the most important factor in inhibiting any reversal of the policies permitting movement of people between the two places. "The stakes of people on both sides of the Strait in these links are growing daily."

In facilitating informed exchanges of views, many individuals and groups have traveled from Taiwan to the mainland to discuss relations between the two sides of the strait. Some of these discussions are concerned with the basic issue of unification, while others involve other policy issues. "None of these persons was specifically authorized by the Republic of China government to negotiate with the other side, but some of them had close enough ties with the government to be regarded by their PRC [People's Republic of China] interlocutors as reliable expositors of official positions." Although these discussions have not resulted in any changes in policy by either side, they have helped each to understand better the position of the other, as well as speculating about the other's probable future policies.

Within the past three years both governments have authorized organizations to conduct negotiations on their behalf with the other party. These negotiations now take place between these two "unofficial" organizations, maintaining the myth that the two governments do not negotiate directly with each other. Yet, several sensitive issues have been handled in recent years by these two organizations and they have succeeded in reducing tension.

While these three types of interactions have not fundamentally altered the policies of the two countries, they have significantly reduced tensions and have opened channels of communication that will most likely have a significant and positive impact on future relations between the two governments.

13 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

"Waiting for the Millennium: The United Nations and the Future of the World Order," a book manuscript by Professor Martin Rochester of the University of Missouri, addresses issues of UN reform. In the manuscript Rochester argues that there is an increased need for global institution building and also an increased possibility for engaging in such institution building. The UN and its affiliated agencies are the only candidates for the job. The growing inability of individual states to address their own problems and global problems, combined with the existence of an effective dominant coalition of national governments, suggests that the opportunity may exist for significant reform. "What has been lost in power concentration has been more than offset by the reduced rigidity of alignments and increased convergence of interests allowing more creative possibilities for an enlightened concert of power approach to international governance." The first requirement is to achieve a common understanding of the UN's mission.

Rochester recommends an eleven-point reform program. (1) More attention needs to be given to the competence and the independence of the people employed by the UN Secretariat. This step ought to involve more systematic use of competitive exams. Overall movement should be made toward greater professionalization and the depoliticization of the international civil service. (2) In place of several dozen under secretaries general and assistant secretaries general, there ought to be a small number of superdepartments in the UN Secretariat. (3) The secretary general needs to be given a high degree of independence in recruiting policy-level and professional staff. Each of the superdepartments ought to be headed by a deputy secretary general who is appointed or removed by the secretary general. (4) The process for selecting the secretary general needs to be widely perceived as fair and responsible. The secretary general's role and the selection criteria ought to be depoliticized as much as possible. (5) Greater logic and rationality needs to be achieved in the allocation of responsibilities among UN agencies and departments, with a particular aim of avoiding much of the current duplication and overlap of functions. (6) The lead agency concept is useful, such as that accorded the UN Environmental Programme, but lead agencies need to be allocated sufficient resources to undertake the tasks assigned to them. (7) "The problem of various UN units tripping over one another can be dealt with fairly readily through the

formation of several operations boards for disaster relief and other specific functional areas, each headed by the chief official from the lead agency recommended by the Secretary General and so designated by the General Assembly." Reform of the UN's budgeting process can assist this process as well. (8) A relatively small group containing significant representation from those states that constitute the UN's principal sources of support could set budgetary priorities and funding ceilings for a biennial budget, which would then be sent to the Fifth Committee for review and ultimately to the General Assembly plenary. (9) The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) could play a valuable role in setting out programmatic goals and budgetary guidelines for the UN system. (10) "New scheduling routines would have to be developed so that ECOSOC recommendations contained in its annual report transmitted to the General Committee could be put on a 'fast track' for General Assembly consideration, tied to the Assembly's appropriation process." (11) Consideration needs to be given to what new international regimes might be created but also to evaluate how existing regimes are working and whether they might be improved, both in terms of their scope and content.

* * *

Any reform of the UN system will relate directly to the changing role of the UN's secretary general. The secretary general's role is the topic of "The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary General," a book manuscript edited by Professor Benjamin Rivlin of the Ralph Bunche Institute on the UN at the City University of New York. The main argument of the manuscript is that one should draw only cautious and conservative conclusions regarding the likelihood of change in the role of the secretary general.

In his chapter, Alan James concludes that "there is no one 'world' out there, awaiting a secular messiah. Instead there is a fractured political world, constituted of sovereign states who show little wish generally to be led, in high political matters, by the UN Secretary General." James does concede that different personalities will serve in the capacity of the secretary general in varying ways; each secretary general will have his or her own style. Moreover, there is scope for creative independent action by the secretary general. But there are strict limits to the effectiveness of such action, and these limits are not set by the credentials of the officeholder, "but by the character of the international system within which he has his political being."

In his chapter on the role of special representatives, Donald Puchala concludes that the role of the special representative within the office of the secretary general has developed to the point that is a "well-developed and practiced pacific settlement mechanism the likes of which has never before existed in international relations." As the mechanism has developed, the secretary general's special representatives have grown in stature and accomplishment, constituting a significant new development in the role played by the secretary general and his or her staff.

Lawrence Finkelstein is not optimistic about the prospects for the secretary general to become an effective coordinator of the various UN agencies. In the past, too much effort has been invested in attempts to coordinate, and the achievements have not been commensurate with the effort. Finkelstein concludes that one of the best possibilities open to the secretary general to enhance his or her power and influence could come through the development of a net-

work of nongovernmental supporters. "The Secretary General might well decide . . . to single out for special attention the leaders of major NGOs with political clout to bring to bear on the particular issues on which support is needed. Some kind of inner circle of non-governmental associates of the Secretary General might prove a helpful instrument." According to Finkelstein, for the secretary general to try to assert his or her powers too energetically in an effort to promote coordination among UN agencies would run several risks. Such an effort could easily exceed the secretary general's authority. Moreover, it would "run some risk of succumbing to the allure of majority decision processes," which flies in the face of the emphasis on consensus procedures. Moreover, it fails to recognize the veto power that so many members and regional groups possess, either formally or informally.

James Sutterlin asserts, "In looking to the future the question must be faced: Is it realistic to think that effective executive management can be realized under the restrictions to the power and freedom of action of the Secretary General? One can expect with considerable certainty that member states will continue to pressure the Secretary General to accept candidates of their choosing for the most senior Secretariat positions. The General Assembly's control of the budget will not change and in all likelihood it will continue to inject itself into the formulation and implementation of personnel policy. In the absence of some major reform of the UN system, the heads of the specialized agencies will continue to resist control by the UN, and within the Secretariat (as in any bureaucracy) heads of departments will do battle to retain their turf. . . . No Secretary General will be able to overcome these daunting circumstances completely. More will have to be accomplished by persuasion than by power. . . . And he or she must be willing to use the power of chief administrative officer with determination and force where that power exists. If these qualities of leadership are present, they can counter to a substantial degree the adverse effect of the limitations on the Secretary General's freedom of action in the effective management of the Secretariat and, to a certain extent, his or her ability to coordinate programs of the UN system as a whole. The latter, however, will remain primarily dependent on a basic restructuring of the system, something which is beyond the authority or capacity of any Secretary General."

* * *

A project to assess the feasibility of a standing UN military force with capabilities for deployment as a deterrent or as a response to aggression has generated *To Unite Our Strength: Enhancing the United Nations Peace and Security System* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1992), written by Timothy W. Stanley, John M. Lee, and Robert von Pagenhardt of the International Economic Studies Institute. The authors conclude that with the end of the Cold War, the opportunity to reconsider UN enforcement activity by military means has never been so promising. "Continued outbreaks of violence around the world show no lessening of the need for common action to 'maintain international peace and security,' the first UN purpose proclaimed in the Charter . . ." (p. 1). The authors conclude that there is no need for revision of the UN charter's military provisions in order to accomplish what is needed, which is the

development of organizations, relationships, and practices to allow the UN to conduct military operations effectively. To meet these problems, the authors recommend improvements in military direction and command, and the provision of forces, facilities, and support.

The authors offer the following recommendations regarding how to proceed: (1) Five of the ten rotational members on the Security Council should be permanently assigned to five pairs of regional powers. Only one would serve at a time, and alternates would switch biannually. (2) A peace management committee should be established as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council. Important issues of peacekeeping and/or peace enforcement would be considered initially by the committee, whose recommendations would then be reviewed and formally acted upon by the council. (3) In certain instances the council might appoint the head of government of a member country as its executive agent in a peace and security crisis. (4) The secretary general needs an assessment capability and situation center that handles crisis management and operations involving enforcement actions in progress. (5) The Secretariat should be reorganized into eight primary departments, generally parallel to the main committee of the General Assembly. Each ministerial area of responsibility could be headed by a deputy secretary general, with one under and up to two assistant secretaries general. (6) A UN chief of staff should report directly to the secretary general and his or her top deputies. He or she would be the overall commander to whom subordinate military commanders would report. (7) The Military Staff Committee should be reactivated as a potential source of professional military advice to the council and a forum for exchanging views at the levels of chiefs of staff or their senior representatives. (8) The UN chief of staff would require an unusual international military staff within the Secretariat. It would deal with assessments, planning, personnel, doctrine and training, operations, logistics, communications, and the like. It would help senior political officials negotiate special agreements with countries for forces and facilities called for by Article 43. (9) Additional force commanders would have to be appointed. (10) Peacekeeping forces and operations should be brought under the operational umbrella of the new system, which includes a standing military capability under the secretary general and available directly to the Security Council. A prearranged system of alerts and extensive contingency planning conducted by the UN and national military staffs should be implemented. Quick reaction forces should be established as well as other, larger forces. And national military conventional forces and assets, which countries are willing to declare but not willing to earmark for UN purposes, should be established. (11) The establishment of regional security arrangements through such organizations as NATO, WEU, CSCE, OAU, and OAS should be implemented. (12) Funds should be provided for the new system by giving the UN the authority to charge interest, deny participation to members in serious default of dues, and borrow in financial markets or from financial affiliates, such as the World Bank and IMF.

* * *

The Council for Inter-American Security Foundation undertook a study of the inter-American security system and prepared a book manuscript on the OAS entitled "Re-examining the Inter-American Security System." The manuscript was written by Norman A. Bailey, L. Francis Bouchey, William Perry, Nester

Pino-Marina, and L. Ronald Scheman. One topic addressed is the role the OAS can play in securing democracy and stimulating economic development. Four threats to democracy in the hemisphere are identified as in need of OAS attention—coups d'etat; narcotics trafficking and the undermining of civic authority; poverty and despair; and interstate conflict. In order to effectively address these threats, argues the book, the OAS must be more flexible and broaden its base of participation. Several changes to the OAS structure are recommended: It should (1) establish mechanisms whereby national interparliamentary entities can report to the OAS, and be better informed about the issues; (2) strengthen the authority of the secretary general and the relevant organs of the OAS to take informal action when an interstate conflict begins to surface; (3) restructure the OAS machinery for dispute resolution on a more informal level to be invoked on an ad hoc basis for fact finding and to help disputing parties define mutually acceptable solutions; (4) review the functions and roles of the Inter-American Defense Board to provide an effective instrument to train the military for its role in protecting democracy; (5) consider the wider use of subregional accords under the aegis of the OAS to deal with more localized issues; and (6) reconsider the mechanisms for inter-American security forces to act in special situations, such as the defense of the Panama Canal.

Various aspects of collective defense and security are examined: the Rio Treaty, the Inter-American Defense Board, and the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, which reformed the OAS charter. Two deficiences in the three juridical structures are identified. First, existing procedures do not allow for the distribution of the Defense Board's documents relating to the collective defense of the hemisphere to the General Secretary and Permanent Council or to the special commissions of the OAS. This deficit leads to formulation of vital military and security policy without direct input of information and analysis from the Defense Board and staff. Second, there are no provisions in the OAS Charter or the Rio Treaty for the development of comprehensive regional mechanisms for the integration of all-source intelligence during peacetime.

The authors conclude that although a strong juridical base exists for the implementation of effective collective measures by the OAS, it has not been done for two basic reasons. First, Latin American countries distrust U.S. motives when the United States offers to intervene in Latin America. Second, Latin American perspectives on what constitutes security threats differ from those of the United States. To effectively address such security threats as drug trafficking, democratic instability, military missions, and arms proliferation, the authors recommend three changes in the OAS: the establishment of an OAS Security Council similar to the UN Security Council; placing the Inter-American Defense Board under the OAS Permanent Council; and permanent or periodic activation of the Defense Consultation Committee.

Although the authors conclude that the OAS has, for the most part, been ineffective in terms of keeping peace in the region, it does have some successes to its credit: (1) observing regional elections; (2) participating in efforts to secure peace in Nicaragua and El Salvador; (3) caring for needy demobilized Contras and their families by helping them resettle in Nicaragua; (4) working to improve judicial systems in the region; and (5) controlling precursor chemicals and

money laundering related to the drug trade.

The authors conclude that the OAS may be reinvigorated and its effectiveness enhanced if efforts are made to

- strengthen the Inter-American Defense Board as an effective advisory body in security matters;
- develop the OAS's ability to act in a timely and effective fashion in response to security crises in the hemisphere;
- amend the Rio Treaty to address contemporary collective security problems;
- develop an economic policy with regard to the U.S. Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and other regional efforts at liberalization and integration;
- assume a higher profile political presence and generate a positive image for itself; and
- generate new ideas and take on new tasks that facilitate practical and mutually beneficial cooperation among member states.

* * *

The regional organization for Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), is analyzed in a book manuscript by Frank Tatu of the International Center entitled "ASEAN Comes of Age: A Successful Model of Regional Conflict Resolution." The author explains that ASEAN was created in 1967 "to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region. . . ." Particular emphasis was placed on educational exchange. Tatu points out that ASEAN was created as a politically neutral organization. In 1971 the foreign ministers of the member states declared Southeast Asia to be the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality. As a consequence, ASEAN has no military component. In 1984 ASEAN declared Southeast Asia to be a nuclear-free zone with the SEANWFZ treaty. There is a strongly articulated conviction among members of ASEAN that they can manage regional cooperation and economic performance without the intervention or assistance of the West. In searching for an ASEAN identity, the Filipinos in particular have sought to distance themselves from the United States. Not all Southeast Asian states embrace ASEAN; Vietnam and Laos have criticized ASEAN as an expression of American imperialism.

The success of ASEAN has been remarkable, particularly in light of the periodic tensions among members and the linguistic and religious differences that separate them. One key factor in ASEAN's success has been that the relationship among members has been based on equality, regardless of the size or strength of each state. Moreover, the intricate network of ASEAN's committees and organizational mechanisms have contributed significantly to the effectiveness of ASEAN.

14

TERRORISM AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

J. L. P. Thompson of Columbia University has undertaken a statistical analysis of the impact of changes in government policies and economic conditions on violence in Northern Ireland over the period 1800 to 1990. The conclusions of his analysis are reported in a monograph manuscript, "Political Conflict, Political Violence and Genocide: A Study of Polarization Processes," which concludes that the current outbreak of violence is the most severe since the beginning of the nineteenth century, both in terms of numbers of fatalities and of the severity of incidents. The violence has also become more "popular," in the sense that it is generally committed by civilian populations and not by security forces. In addition, in terms of the level of fatal violence, Catholic violence exceeds that of the Protestants and the security forces. The image of the Provisional IRA as the beleaguered victim of military power is a myth. Protestant violence matches Catholic violence during some periods, but not overall, and the security forces are the least violent of the three. In general, the actions of each group tend to perpetuate more violence through retaliation, usually within one month. Thompson argues that there is no evidence that unemployment causes or increases violence, or that violence increases unemployment.

In an examination of the impact on escalation of four security actions (internment, Bloody Sunday, and the two "shoot-to-kill" incidents), four political initiatives (power sharing, the Constitutional Convention, the New Ireland Forum, and the Anglo-Irish Agreement), and two Republican actions (the Provisional IRA cease-fire of 1974–75 and the hunger strikes of 1981), Thompson draws three conclusions. First, the increased Catholic violence that internment and Bloody Sunday generated soon produced a massive Protestant response—and the most serious overall escalation in violence to date. Second, political initiatives (with the exception of power sharing, which provoked a violent Protestant response) had little effect on the killing by any of the groups. Finally, the Republican cease-fire did initially reduce Catholic violence, and the hunger strikes increased Catholic violence somewhat, but had no impact on Protestant violence.

Thompson poses the question, "Why have the political initiatives been either irrelevant to the violence, or even downright counterproductive?" To address this

question, he tests the hypothesis that there has been appreciable movement in a genocidal direction in the current round of the conflict. He defines genocide in terms of the percentage of victims who are noncombatants: the higher this proportion, the more genocidal the conflict. He concludes that "high proportions of the fatalities are civilians, and normal protections of workplace, social gatherings, home and church are violated to a large degree for both civilians and members of the security forces." In other words, the violence has reached genocidal proportions even if it has not been sustained over time.

In the concluding chapter, Thompson notes four major implications of his findings: (1) Economic measures, although vital for the welfare of Northern Ireland, cannot be relied upon to reduce the violence. (2) Political initiatives so far have not alleviated the violence. (3) If the goal is to reduce violence, security policy that results in killings is often shortsighted and counterproductive. (4) Genocidal violence has most often been instigated by extremist groups: the Provisional IRA and Protestant paramilitary organizations.