CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF PEACEMAKING

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

United States Institute of Peace

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Contributions to the Study of Peacemaking

A Summary of Completed Grants Projects
Through April 1992

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Contents

Preface

The United States Institute of Peace is pleased to make available this second report summarizing the results of research projects sponsored by the Institute through its Grant Program. The projects here described represent some of the work completed by Institute grantees in the nine months following publication, in December 1990, of the first report in this series. A third report, outlining the outcome of education and training projects conducted by Institute grant recipients, will be published shortly. These reports are in keeping with the Institute's congressional mandate to provide scholars, practitioners, and the general public with information on the means to promote international peace and the resolution of international conflicts without violence.

Since the beginning of its grantmaking activities in 1986, the Institute has provided funding for 474 projects. Completed projects have yielded over thirty books and an equal number of manuscripts currently under review for publication. Hundreds of articles have been published by grantees in scholarly journals, magazines, and newspapers. Additionally, seminars and workshops for teachers, training programs for practitioners, and radio, television, and lecture programs for the general public have been produced with Institute grants.

It is not possible in a brief summary report to capture the full range and depth of grant-funded activities, nor to offer more than a glimpse of the products thus generated. Our purpose in producing this report is to provide a succinct overview that we hope will be of value to those working in the field of peace and conflict resolution.

The results of the projects featured here are available in their entirety in published form and in manuscript. It is our expectation that this report will lead to further examination of the complete record of these studies.

Samuel W. Lewis, President
United States Institute of Peace

Introduction

In establishing the United States Institute of Peace in 1984, Congress cited a need to promote research with regard "to the history, nature, elements, and future of peace processes, and to bring together and develop new and tested techniques to promote peaceful economic, political, social, and cultural relations in the world." The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the winding down of the Cold War have ushered in a new and more promising era in East-West relations. However, continuing crises in the Middle East and in other regions such as the Balkans, Western Africa, and the Transcaucasus have added new urgency to the task of promoting through research and analysis, as well as by other means, the peaceful resolution of international conflict.

The thirty five projects summarized in this report represent the work of both American and foreign scholars drawn from such disciplines as political science, sociology, history, psychology, economics, anthropology, law, and theology. They are the result of both individual and collaborative research. They are also emblematic of the Institute's effort to sponsor research that has both basic and applied components and as such helps to advance knowledge while also providing assistance of a more immediate nature to policy practitioners.

The projects are organized geographically and topically. They address such fundamental issues as the sources of conflict, approaches to conflict management and resolution, and reconstruction and peacebuilding after war. They approach these issues from a macro or systemwide level of analysis, such as the Pacific Forum conference on emerging social, economic, security, and political crises in the Asia-Pacific region, and by way of more limited, single-country or issue-specific studies such as Professor Robert Wirsing's analysis of the Siachen Glacier dispute between India and Pakistan and Professor Jack Barkenbus's examination of the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in arms control verification. Some of the studies offer new challenges to conventional thinking about strategies such as deterrence (Lebow and Stein) and about concepts such as the realpolitik model of international interactions (de Mesquita and Lalman; Goertz and Diehl), while others provide models for dealing creatively with ethnic conflict (Ra'anan) and with crisis management (Goldberg, Van Opstal, Barkley, et al.).

A significant cluster of projects may be characterized as instrumental, or as adding to the store of tools and techniques available to peacemakers. These include Professor Christopher Mitchell's look into the lessons of mediation efforts in the Horn of Africa, exploration of various conflict resolution techniques by the Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age, a catalog of extragovernmental "tracks" to peace compiled by Ambassador John McDonald and Dr. Louise Diamond, and various approaches to peacekeeping from the conference organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Several projects address war and peace from a more normative perspective. Professors Charles Kegley and Kenneth Schwab assembled a group of academics, clerics, and policymakers to assess the morality of deterrence; the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs produced a set of reports on such topics as ethics and intervention, the conflict in American, Israeli, and Palestinian values, and foreign debt and the limits of obligation; and Professors James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay explored Western and Islamic traditions with respect to war and peace, including the notions of just war and jihad. Finally, there is the University of Illinois treatment of the role played by Jane Addams as a peace advocate and as a champion of freedom, justice, and sexual equality. Of course a single project may, and many here described do, deal with a large set or subset of all these issues simultaneously.

General themes that emerge from this report include, first, the immensely positive impact of the end of the Cold War and the superpower rivalry, particularly on efforts to settle longstanding regional conflicts, such as those in Asia, Africa, or Latin America. Second is the reemergence in the post-Cold War period of a set of issues which can best be classified under the rubric of human rights. These include protection of minorities, ethnic and national self-determination, political representation, and democracy and the rule of law. A third theme is the importance of third parties, whether nongovernmental organizations, individual states, or multilateral organizations, in mediating conflict and in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, which in some cases involves economic reconstruction and political institution building. Last, and closely related to the other themes, is a deep appreciation of the importance of democracy to peace and stability. Given the perils of democratization in a number of key regions, there is also an understanding that success will depend in large part on political reform and economic modernization, both of which require significant assistance from the more developed countries.

Regional Conflicts

Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Professor Uri Ra'anan of Boston University has examined ethnic conflict and the crisis within the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. One outcome of his research is an anthology, entitled *The Soviet Empire: The Challenge of National and Democratic Movements* (Lexington Books, 1990), that analyzes the emergent national and democratic movements in the republics that once constituted the Soviet empire. The following themes guide this effort: (1) What is being witnessed in the region is a revolt against the "New Class," as identified by Milovan Djilas in describing the privileged caste that has ruled communist societies; and (2) the revolt is in most instances coming from two directions—reformers principally motivated by a desire for democratization and nationalists driven primarily by aspirations for self-determination. Where these themes are joined, as in Poland and Hungary, the ruling elite has been dramatically altered, but the very existence of the state has not been threatened. In other, less ethnically homogeneous, states such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, democratic and national forces endanger the existence of the state in its current boundaries.

The contradiction between national and democratic aims becomes most evident in Russia, according to Ra'anan: "Whatever may be the differences between them, among the non-Russian nationalities the democratic aspirations of the masses and the national aims of the intelligentsia tend to merge, since they share a common ethnic and cultural bond." This is not the case for the Russians, who as the *Staatvolk* of the USSR have not only a Russian identification, but an imperial one as well. Because of this factor, Russian nationalism—which borders on chauvinism in many cases—tends to be antidemocratic, since it denies the right of other nationalities to self-determination. Ra'anan further notes that the "territorialization" of the Soviet nationalities problem after 1986 represented a critical change with which the old order could not cope. Prior to that time the "nationalities question" within the USSR could be subsumed under the heading of human rights. This concerned the application of the Helsinki Accords in such cases as emigration and the cultural, religious, and linguistic rights of *individuals*; as such, there was not a collective threat to the structure of the Soviet system. However, this changed rather dramatically when the issue escalated from individual rights to the right to national self-determination in specific areas of the USSR.

Further complicating the nationalities question is the fact that, as Ra'anan writes, "the ethnic and administrative boundaries within the USSR simply do not coincide." This is a consequence of demographic changes (unintentional) as well as deliberate population transfers and the "gerrymandering" of boundaries of the fifteen Union republics and a score of autonomous republics. Today some 25 million Russians live outside of the Russian Republic. Approximately 10

million live in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus and close to 15 million live in the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Belorus. The movement of the Russian population has been away from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus toward the Baltics, Ukraine, and Belorus, creating in the latter regions a "Russian question" of serious dimensions. It is a question that divides many Russians, the extremes represented by such movements as *Pamyat* and *Rus* (nationalists) and the Interregional Group of Deputies and the Democratic Union (democrats). The Russian Republic suffers too by being caught in an ambivalent position of "desiring a degree of autonomy for itself while being antagonistic to enhanced self-government by Tatars, Bashkirs, and others within its borders." The conclusions of one contributing author to this study, Professor Roman Szporluk, about the future of nationalist movements in the former Soviet Union are being borne out by recent developments. According to Szporluk, "those nationalist movements in non-Russian republics which limit themselves to the defense of the status quo or which demand the restoration of a status quo ante will in all likelihood gradually become marginalized. Those movements will have a chance of succeeding which develop a critique of the existing system that appeals to modernity against those who hold power."

In a companion volume edited by Ra'anan and associates, entitled *State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies* (Manchester University Press, 1991), the focus is on lessons that may be drawn for contemporary multi-ethnic societies from the experience of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in its last decades. As noted by contributing author Peter Berger, "the two parts of the monarchy constituted a sort of controlled experiment for two very different policies regarding what was then called the 'nationalities problem'. The Hungarian elite understood its political entity as a modern nation-state *tout court*, the nation in question was the Magyar nation, and other nationalities (Slavs, Germans, Rumanians) were subjected to powerful pressures (a mix of coercion and cajolery) to 'magyarize'. By contrast, the Austrian half of the monarchy developed clearly in the direction of a multinational, multicultural political structure. It did so without a coherent theory, without political elan, in a muddle of half-hearted steps. Nevertheless, in retrospect it constituted one of the first cases of a modern state that could or can genuinely be described as a deliberately multinational polity."

The work of two influential early twentieth-century Austrian thinkers, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, form the central focus of this collection, in particular their idea of a "personal principle" wherein national rights are "accorded to individual persons rather than exclusively to territorial groupings." The basic notion is that "under certain circumstances, the concept of nationality might be divorced from the possession of a national territory, or be exercised outside such a territory," which is to say that Renner and Bauer "at least implicitly,

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challenged the axiom of modern nationalism that every nation must have sovereignty over a specific piece of real estate—or, as a 19th-century English wit put it, that every language must have an army." Under the personal principle, "individual members of an ethnic group, irrespective of their domicile, and without regard to whether they constitute a regional majority or are living as dispersed minority throughout the state as a whole, are joined together in an autonomous organization (not unlike the 'millet') that is then also constitutionally recognized as a legal entity; the autonomous organizations of the various nationalities coexist with the central government of the state and its local administration, but have the special constitutional prerogative and duty to carry out certain functions (or to act as monitors and 'ombudsmen' over their implementation by the regular central and local government organs)."

With Renner and Bauer providing the backdrop, various historical and contemporary cases of ethnic conflict are examined by the contributing authors. Ra'anan sums up how a political system might function in accordance with the Renner/Bauer personal principle as follows: "There would be essentially a three-tier structure: at the lowest level—municipal and rural councils—the citizenry as a whole, irrespective of ethnic affiliation, would vote and be represented. At the intermediate level, the representative organs of the various ethnic associations, elected by their respective memberships, would act both as the territorial authorities in the autonomous regions or provinces where their own nationality constituted a majority, and as watchdogs and helpers in areas where their ethnic group was scattered in small numbers. Finally, at the highest level—central government—leading members of the various ethnic associations' representative organs would work together, with a functional division of tasks between them, leaving each nationality with the last word on those matters that were of particular concern to it."

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In an attempt to understand the current political dynamics in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and to anticipate developments in U.S-Soviet relations, the Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies (PAWSS) based at Hampshire College, organized a conference under the leadership of Michael Klare and William Taubman, and subsequently edited the conference papers in the December 1990 volume of *PAWSS Perspective on Teaching Peace and World Security Studies*. The article contributed by Professor Pavel Machala of Amherst College, entitled "The Post-Communist Democracy: An Uncharted Territory," points out the complexity and difficulty of the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe because of the absence of a market economy. These post-communist revolutions have been primarily political in character, with democratically elected governments inheriting economic systems that are bureaucratically controlled. In the absence of totalitarian measures, bureaucratic control of the economy is politically irrational, particularly for democratic governments. But the economic

revolution which is required against bureaucratic control of the economy does not enjoy the consensus support that the political revolution enjoyed.

Machala believes that at the next stage of their maturity the new governments of Eastern Europe may not be reelected. By that time the movement phase of the post-communist revolution will have been exhausted. It is at that stage, he notes, that a multi-party system will develop. If numerous weak parties emerge to fragment the political will of the regime, it could lead to an unstable political system, a crisis-ridden economy, and a society susceptible to the appeal of a strongman.

As a means of increasing the potential for success of these democratically elected governments, Machala recommends the adoption of a presidential as opposed to a parliamentary system of government. A system with an executive and an independently elected legislature could manage to offset a weak party system and counter the potential for political instability.

Africa

Professor Christopher Mitchell of George Mason University has undertaken a comparative analysis of the various successful and unsuccessful conflict resolution initiatives undertaken in the complex set of interlocking conflicts in the Horn of Africa from 1960 to 1989. The project seeks to discern factors affecting the successful conclusion of conflict resolution initiatives on a case-by-case basis, as well as to investigate the manner in which

conflict mediation initiatives in one conflict affected and were affected by the course of such initiatives in other conflicts in the region.

As part of the data collection process, Mitchell has collected and published chronologies of conflict resolution initiatives in four countries: Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan. A soon-to-be published article entitled "Intra-National Mediation: Person or Process? Alternative Models of Third Party Involvement in Protracted Internal Conflicts," undertakes an analytic assessment of the mediation process and then applies this analysis to two Sudanese cases.

He concludes that different functions in the overall mediation process can be and frequently have to be conducted by different third parties and by different kinds of third parties. Rarely is mediation undertaken by a single actor. Even the notion that some mediation efforts are successful and others unsuccessful is misleading, since many of the so-called failed efforts often make important contributions to the total process. For instance, the efforts of the Movement for Colonial Freedom to mediate the Sudan civil war appeared to fail, but these efforts nevertheless contributed to the 1972 Addis Ababa accord mediated by the World Council of Churches and the All African Council of Churches. The "successful" effort is usually a culmination of the process to which several actors have contributed, including those involved in apparent "failures."

He further argues that the performance by an actor of one of the necessary

roles might disqualify that actor from playing certain subsequent roles. For instance, it is unlikely that an actor that helps to create a unified opposition with the long-term aim of enabling an implementable negotiated compromise will also be able to convene a set of negotiations between the two parties.

Mitchell observes that generally mediation processes have proceeded on "an almost totally ad hoc basis." Whether essential roles are fulfilled depends more on chance than on careful planning by any actor who is orchestrating the total process. He concludes that this lack of planning and coordination, or what he calls "randomness," helps explain the slow pace of dispute resolution.

Middle East

Retired State Department official and independent scholar Robert K. Olson has written a monograph manuscript entitled *Europe: Missing Link in the Peace Process,* in which he contends, writing in July 1990, that reform and revival of the peace process in the Middle East must reflect Western unity and an active role for Europe. No such effort on Europe's part has been made since the end of the 1973 war. Since that time Europe has attempted to maintain a balance between the Arab world and the United States. Europeans, consequently, work both to ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil and to encourage U.S. efforts to forestall the outbreak of another war.

European powers have generally rationalized their noninvolvement on the grounds that they are at the mercy of the Arab states, that they have no leverage over the Israelis and over the United States, and that they are not themselves united in viewpoint. Olson deplores this hands-off attitude and points out the substantial assets Europe could bring to the peace process, including the fact that the Arab states are as dependent on the economy of Europe as the Europeans are dependent on Arab oil; that European involvement would be welcomed by Arabs in general and by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) especially; that peace may ultimately depend on confederal arrangements among Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians and the Europeans have much experience in such matters; and that European participation would strengthen the hand of American diplomacy.

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Addressing issues of population density, environment, and international relations in the Middle East, Professor Nazli Choucri has written several articles as well as a book about Egypt entitled *Challenges to Security.* Of particular interest is the typology she develops in several of her articles which interrelates population, technological development, and environment. The typology, developed with particular application to the Middle East, is the following: (1) countries with low levels and rates of population growth and technological development; (2) countries with population growth greater than technological development; (3) countries with low density of population, with imported technology insufficiently internalized;

(4) countries with low population growth and advanced technologies; (5) countries which are technologically advanced and with high population density; (6) countries with large size and with technological development greater than population growth. For the world as a whole as well as for individual states, the interactions among population characteristics, technology changes, and patterns of resource use (especially energy) "provide both the context and the reality of security in all its dimensions."

Asia

The Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies convened a workshop of scholars and policy analysts from twenty research institutes in the Asia-Pacific region to assess the emerging social, economic, security, and political crises in the region and to develop an agenda for collaborative research. The conferees agreed on the following as the most important emerging issues in the region:

1. The changing security environment, with shifting roles for the principal actors in the region, particularly Japan and the United States.
2. The changing economic environment, and particularly Japan's ascendant economic role; the on-going trade friction between the United States and Japan; and the increasing economic role of the NIEs (newly industrialized economies) of Southeast Asia.
3. Policies for securing economic development and growth in the region, with particular attention to countries like the Philippines which are not enjoying economic growth comparable to that of their neighbors, as well as attention to the impact of the changing economic policies of the former USSR, North Korea, China, and Vietnam.
4. China's domestic and foreign policies, including the possibility of further political and economic instability.
5. The Indochina imbroglio.

Those participating emphasized the importance of a strong and healthy U.S.-Japanese alliance as critical to continued stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, they asserted that the United States must continue to play an active role in the region, but its friends and allies should share the burden of maintaining U.S. forces in the region. Every effort must also be made to break North Korean isolationism.

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Addressing a serious source of conflict between India and Pakistan, Professor Robert G. Wirsing of the University of South Carolina has focused on the Siachen Glacier dispute over border determination. In four published articles, which constitute chapters of his forthcoming book, Wirsing concludes that the various negotiations relating to the Siachen Glacier dispute ultimately brought the Indian and Pakistani governments close to admitting that the costs of military confrontation outweigh the benefits of military occupation. Although the negotiations did not make much progress toward delimiting a new mutually acceptable boundary between the two countries,

they did lay some useful groundwork toward an agreement on military disengagement. Moreover, "a prudent awareness of the potential rewards of conflict management had gained over impractical conflict resolution." The basic theme of Wirsing's work is that conflict management is probably the only feasible goal for these negotiations, and that resolution of the underlying conflict is beyond reach.

Several factors militate against resolution. One is the political drift and chronic instability that continue to plague the central governments of both India and Pakistan. Moreover, events in Kashmir have provided Pakistan with unparalleled opportunities for political meddling, and the Pakistanis have yielded to temptation, which has understandably angered India. Renewed Kashmiri nationalism and Muslim chauvinism have strengthened the forces of Kashmiri separatism.

On the other hand, the end of the Cold War and the scaling down of the security relationship between the United States and Pakistan "clearly removed at least some of the grounds for India's traditional deep suspicion of its neighbor's strategic motivations." The fear that the United States would intervene to aid Pakistan in the case of serious armed conflict with India no longer has foundation.

Resolution of the Siachen dispute, Wirsing contends, should not be seen as an essential step toward resolution of the larger Kashmir conflict. The Siachen negotiations should not be burdened with the weight of the larger issue, and the larger issue might ultimately be settled without resolution of the Siachen dispute. Wirsing concludes by stating, "The temptation to extract more from the Siachen negotiations than a modest experiment in joint management of a small and extremeley remote sector of the contested boundary needs to be consciously resisted."

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Negotiations leading to the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan is the topic of a book by retired Pakistani diplomat Riaz Khan, entitled *Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal* (Duke University Press, 1991). The Geneva Accords had implications far beyond the departure of Soviet troops. The negotiations leading up to the Accords had a significant impact on the UN, since these negotiations were the most prominent mediation activity undertaken by the UN during the 1980s. The Geneva negotiations helped keep hope in the UN alive, giving the UN the needed stimulus to pull out of the stagnation which it was suffering.

The negotiations also have important implications for the structure and operation of the UN. They have strengthened the role of the secretary general, which in turn has given the UN an operational maneuverability not seen since the mid-sixties. In addition, the "UN efforts to address the internal dimension of the Afghanistan conflict have secured for the organization a new flexibility in dealing with political entities not representing either member states or observers." This has helped break inhibitions and reduce procedural encumbrances.

Khan emphasizes the important role of the UN mediator Diego Cordovez in the Afghan negotiations and the value of innovative ideas he introduced. The settlement was not reached merely because of changes in the international environment. Khan concludes that the role of the mediator in international negotiations is frequently and unfairly undervalued.

The Afghan War had a profound impact on the Soviet Union, in that it "hastened the erosion of faith in the Soviet system and its infallibility." The Geneva Accords also enabled the Soviet Union to extricate itself from a disastrous policy quagmire. On the other hand, the Geneva Accords brought little relief to Pakistan, and Pakistan-Afghan relations cannot significantly improve until there is an internal political settlement. Only then will refugees depart and the opposition forces terminate the war which continues to proceed with Pakistan's intimate involvement.

Both military victory and an internal settlement will remain elusive until the heterogeneous Afghan Resistance can coalesce politically, and prospects for this remain slim. Moreover, obstacles to the emergence of a political consensus "have been compounded by fissures within the Pakistan body politic and the deepening shadow of Iranian-Saudi rivalry on the Afghan conflict." A peace effort must involve Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, but success is principally dependent upon the emergence of a viable coalition of Afghan political forces and a coalition which both attracts support from the major segments of society and eschews extremism.

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The Cambodian peace process is analyzed by Professor Michael Haas of the University of Hawaii at Manoa in a book which will soon be published by Praeger Publishers. Haas's principal conclusion is that a peace process developed over the past five years because the situation changed, not primarily because of a reordering of priorities. Both Cambodia and Vietnam achieved their major objectives of building up a Cambodian military capability and achieving some greater international recognition for the Hun Sen government. As a consequence, Vietnam withdrew its troops at the end of 1989. The other changed circumstance is that China, the Khmer Rouge, the Soviet Union, and the United States all had their desires to extend their power in Southeast Asia frustrated. Norodom Sihanouk decided to negotiate his way back to Phnom Penh, and he has kept maneuvering to achieve that goal.

The Soviet Union made dramatic revisions in its priorities that transformed its policies, leading to the termination of Soviet aid to Vietnam for use in Cambodia. The other countries changed their policies largely in response to two significant developments—the strengthening of the government in Phnom Penh and the renewed threat posed by the Khmer Rouge.

Haas contends that Vietnam served the function of expelling the Khmer Rouge and holding it at bay for a decade, as well as protecting the new regime in Phnom Penh. The final character of the regime in Cambodia, however, will depend upon

the outcome of the peace process now under way.

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Three projects have addressed serious on-going ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Professor Robert C. Oberst of Nebraska Wesleyan University is finishing a book manuscript on the sources of violence in Sri Lanka, particularly on the part of youth. With rapid population increase within the youth cohorts, with increasing educational opportunities but inadequate job openings, Sri Lanka's youth have become disenchanted and rebellious. Moreover, the older generation, particularly the political elite, has failed to meet its own high standards and values in terms of lifestyles and commitment to democratic values. Oberst writes: "In simple terms, the older generation has failed to resolve the economic problems of the country. This failure can become the basis of a rejection of the leadership of the older generation. They can be seen as having failed and therefore the new generation could do better."

Tamil youth are inclined to blame the Sinhalese-dominated government for the failure of the system. Moreover, the youth accuse the older generation of Tamils of failure to protect the Tamil population from exploitation and suppression by the Sinhalese majority. The use of extralegal means to combat political violence further undermines democratic principles as well as the commitment of Tamil and other youth to the existing governmental processes.

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Professor John Richardson of American University is also writing a book on ethnic conflict and violence in Sri Lanka. He has summarized his conclusions regarding the sources of violent conflict in Sri Lanka in a public lecture, the G.D. Mendis Memorial Lecture presented in Colombo in 1990, entitled *Understanding Violent Conflict in Sri Lanka: How Theory Can Help.* These are his principal conclusions:

Relative Deprivation

1. Feelings of relative deprivation are a major contributor to the potential for mass violence.
2. Feelings of relative deprivation are caused by a gap between expectations and perceptions about economic, social, and political conditions.
3. Poor economic performance, unequal distribution of economic benefits, and unequal opportunities accorded to ethnic groups are all major contributors to feelings of deprivation.
4. The more rapid the change in economic, social, and political conditions, the greater the impact on feelings of deprivation.
5. Expectations and perceptions—and thus feelings of deprivation—are influenced by political appeals and propaganda as well as by objective conditions.
6. Ethnic differences do not inherently produce feelings of deprivation or cause violence. When members of an ethnic group perceive themselves to be discriminated against, the resultant feelings of deprivation will increase the potential for mass violence.
7. Opposition groups, seeking power, will try to raise deprivation levels by raising

expectations and by calling attention to poor government performance, either real or fabricated.

Mobilization

1. Feelings of deprivation provide a basis for mobilizing legitimate opposition groups; a high potential for violence is likely to foster the formation of militant groups.

2. Economic, political, and social institutions that are perceived to offer no redress of conditions producing deprivation will strengthen the hand of the more radical and violent elements of the political opposition.

3. Deprivation resulting from ethnic-based discrimination provides a particularly strong basis for the mobilization and cohesion of both legitimate and militant opposition groups that are organized along ethnic lines and espouse an ethnic-based agenda.

4. When radical and violent elements cohere in one or more militant groups and those groups become strong, moderate elements favoring compromise and legitimate opposition groups begin to lose influence. At this point redress of original grievances and improvements in performance will no longer be sufficient to reduce the potential for violence.

The Participants in Violence

1. It is the young men of a society who disproportionately opt for violence as a political tactic and strategy. Their energy, physical strength, idealism, and freedom from entangling responsibilities all incline them toward violence.

2. Feelings of relative deprivation among this segment of society are particularly significant contributors to a high potential for violence.

3. Members of this segment of society, especially if unemployed or facing limited prospects, are particularly susceptible to recruitment by militant groups.

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The third Sri Lankan study is of the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord of 1987, undertaken by India-based independent scholar Dr. Ann Nirmala Chandrahasan. She is particularly interested in the intervention by outside powers to protect the interest of minority communities, with particular reference to Sri Lanka. She concludes: "The absence of any system of regional or universal protection for minority groups shows us that third [parties] still have a role to play in advancing the human rights of minorities and according them protection." In the case of Sri Lanka this was accomplished by a treaty: the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord.

Dr. Chandrahasan contends that treaties to protect ethnic minorities are appropriate and consistent with the UN Charter on two conditions. The first is that a treaty must be freely entered into by all signatories; concurrence must not be the consequence of coercion. The second is that the treaty must not have the purpose of or result in the suppression of ethnic minorities, but rather promote self-determination for minorities. She concludes that the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord satisfies these two conditions.

Despite the legitimacy of the treaty, Chandrahasan observes that the Indo–Sri Lankan Peace Accord has not brought tangible benefits to the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. She offers three explanations. First, the Tamils were not represented in the negotiations to draw up the terms of the treaty. If Tamils had participated in the negotiations, the treaty would have been more consistent with their interests and in turn they would have been more supportive of the Accord.

Second, the treaty made no provision for recourse to judicial settlement of disputes or for the supervision of an independent body to ensure implementation of the treaty's provisions. The creation of a human rights court for the Asian region with jurisdiction in mattters of minority rights would have been helpful.

The third problem is not unique to this treaty but characterizes all treaties relating to minorities, and that is the question of how minorities are represented and whether they have a legal personality. The collective identity of minorities needs to be recognized and a limited form of international personality accorded them.

Chandrahasan concludes: "So far states have been the main players on the international stage; it is time that the minorities within these states are also seen and heard, and some account taken of their existence at an international level. . . . The protection of the rights of minorities through a process of internal self-determination may be seen as an alternative way in which to contain nationalism, and avert the civil wars and internal conflicts which are often the outcome of attempts to suppress the legitimate right of all groups within a state, to equal rights and equal participation in the governance of their country."

Latin America

The Falkland/Malvinas War of 1982 is the subject of a study by Dr. Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse of King's College. She has written a book manuscript entitled *International and Inter-Agency Communication Failures in the Period Previous to and During the Falkland/Malvinas War*. Her research has revealed a very significant number of communcation failures between Britain and Argentina as well as communcation failures within each of these governments. Examples include the unclear character of the negotiating packages resulting from changes in the British position before and after 1968; misperceptions relating to the use of force and the threat of the use of force by both Britain and Argentina during the 1966-77 period; the negative impact on the negotiations that resulted from the Falkland Islands Pressure Group created in 1968 in Britain and the misperceptions in Argentina arising from the possibility of Chilean-British collusion in the South Atlantic; the nature of the New York talks of February 1982 and the divergent interpretations of their outcome; the complicated triangulation of communications among the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, Port Stanley in the Islands, and the Foreign Office in London; and the communications failures among Peru, the United States, Argentina, and the

United Kingdom during May 1 and 2, 1982.

Among the lessons she has drawn are the following:

1. The negative effect of breaking direct communications between parties in crisis and on the verge of war.

2. The negative impact of inaccurate perceptions of third parties in the negotiation of a dispute. In the absence of direct communication, Britain and Argentina turned to third parties, particularly the United States, to facilitate negotiations. But this proved to be unsatisfactory, both because they inaccurately perceived the capabilities of the third party and because they misperceived the nature of the relationship that existed between the United States and Britain on the one hand and between the United States and Argentina on the other.

3. Parties to a dispute that are unable to communicate their intentions clearly and directly are drawn to the use of token force to bolster the negotiations.

4. International organizations are often ineffective forums for settling disputes.

5. Domestic lobbies often have a negative impact on international negotiations.

6. There is need for effective interagency communication within governments during times of crisis to help overcome agencies' rivalries and communication failures.

Superpower–Third World Relations

A project on the relationships among the United States, the former USSR, and key states in the Middle East, directed by Professor Steven Spiegel of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation of the University of California at San Diego, has resulted in a book manuscript entitled *Conflict Management in the Middle East: A View from Four Sides.* In his chapter Professor Spiegel concludes that an essential variables which increased the likelihood of war in the Middle East during the 1945-90 period were superpower arms shipments, political meddling, and botched diplomacy. On the other side, "War did not occur in crises where the superpowers either did not involve themselves or they attempted to restrict the conflict." He reasons that the new era of good relations between East and West will reduce the prospects for war between Israel and the Arab states.

Professor Abu Amr of Birzeit University on the West Bank in his chapter reviews the history of American and Soviet perceptions of the Palestinian question. He asserts that both superpowers held similar views on the Palestinian issue from 1948 to 1967, with both emphasizing the problem of refugees. After 1967 the views of the superpowers diverged. The United States came to acknowledge the political component of the Palestinian issue, although it did not accept the notion of a Palestinian homeland. The Soviets began to see Israel more as an American ally and to accept the legitimacy of both the PLO and the right of Palestinians to have nationalist aspirations. Now U.S. and "Soviet" policies have once again converged as a consequence of Jewish immigration from the former USSR, increasing reluctance to tolerate Arab/Palestinian radicalism, the diplomatic rapprochement between Israel and the former USSR, and "Soviet" acquiescence to the Baker diplomatic initiatives. This renewed convergence of viewpoints could have positive consequences for peace efforts.

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Professor Karen Dawisha of the University of Maryland has directed a project which examined the role of the former USSR in Third World conflicts and the implications of changes in that role for the United States. At one of the three conferences convened by Dawisha, Georgiy Mirsky analyzed new thinking by the "Soviet" leadership on world problems. He concluded that "the feeling in the Soviet Union is that regional conflicts, more than anything else, tend to poison the international atmosphere and are likely to jeopardize the superpowers' efforts aimed at cooperation in solving global problems."

Writing in 1989, Mirsky suggested the following as central elements of new thinking as it applied to conflict in the Third World: (1) Substitution of balance of force by balance of interests. This recognized that each superpower had a legitimate sphere of influence. (2) Recognition of the fact that most Third World conflict had its origins in indigenous disputes, not in outside interference and conspiracies orchestrated by one great power or another. (3) Recognition of the fact that most Third World conflicts did not serve well the interests of any great power.

(4) Recognition that even if Third World conflicts did not become opportunities for exploitation by either superpower, it was in the interests of the great powers to help resolve such conflicts because they could undermine the new positive relationship between East and West. Multilateral forums, particularly the UN, should be used to resolve such conflicts whenever possible. (5) Rejection of the traditional uncritical attitude toward allies in the Third World enmeshed in conflict. (6) Rejection of the export of revolution and other actions intended to destabilize countries.

In a response to Mirsky's paper, Dr. Francis Deng of the Brookings Institution concurred that regional conflicts in Africa, where he focused his analysis, are of primarily domestic origin. He argued that the superpowers need to make every effort to help resolve these conflicts before they take on international dimensions. Stabilization of relations between the superpowers would not, Deng argued, necessarily lead to conflict resolution in the Third World. If the superpowers, and particularly the United States, stressed the importance of human rights and democratic reform, the impact would be felt in the Third World, and would contribute to the resolution of conflict.

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In the interest of promoting the reconstruction of countries torn by wars in which the superpowers have been involved, the Overseas Development Council has produced a book edited by Professor Anthony Lake entitled *After the Wars: Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Indochina, Central America, Southern Africa, and the Horn of Africa* (Transaction, 1990). The book identifies the danger that the superpowers will lose interest once the wars wind down and military assistance has been withdrawn.

In most of the cases discussed in the book the principal problem is one of construction rather than reconstruction, of building rather than rebuilding, both politically and economically. This requires heavy investments in training, building effective transportation systems, resettling refugees, focusing most developmental resources on agricultural development and rural public health, and giving special attention to the needs of women.

Fragile democratic institutions are developing in some of these countries. In recognition of their fragility and the need for political stability, the authors recommend that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund push their economic stabilization programs with caution and sensitivity. The authors also advocate that the peace dividend derived from the scaling down of military assistance by the superpowers be used for economic assistance. In addition, a broader aid effort could be organized in the form of an International Fund for Reconstruction, which could usefully be combined with debt relief. Aid could reasonably be conditioned on continued adherence to the accords that brought peace, the observance of human rights, and certain standards with regard to fiscal integrity.

Sources of Conflict

The role of the control and exchange of territory in the causation and settlement of international disputes is the subject of a book by Professor Gary Goertz of the University of Florida and Professor Paul F. Diehl of the University of Illinois entitled *Territorial Changes and International Conflict* (Unwin Hyman, 1991). Based upon the analysis of 770 cases of territorial changes dating from 1816, the authors draw several conclusions about the importance of territory as the source of conflict. They assert that realpolitik explanations of international behavior failed to predict over one-fourth of the instances of military conflict. The explanatory strength of realpolitik was even weaker for conflicts following World War I; territorial factors and factors internal to the state were of greater importance.

The authors assert that by looking at the importance of territory and evaluating its influence on decisions regarding the use of military force, the willingness of states to use such force can be better understood. Of particular interest to the authors is the causes of the recurrence of military conflict. It is critically important to settle initial conflicts lest the conflicts escalate to higher levels of violence, which often happens. Unfortunate, the transfer of territory, through peaceful means or otherwise, does not necessarily "signal the end of claims over the territory involved, nor does it necessarily mean that conflict between the two parties to the exchange is over."

International Conflict Management and Resolution

In the continuing effort to resolve international conflict, the question arises as to how much practitioners can learn from domestic dispute resolution techniques and theory. Professor John Vasquez of Rutgers University is editing a book to be called *Beyond Confrontation: Comparing Domestic and Global Conflict Resolution*. Vasquez asserts that the end of the Cold War has generated new opportunities for international conflict resolution. It is evident that for most global issues, power politics and coercion alone are not effective means of resolving differences. Moreover, regional disputes and ethnic-nationalist disputes now pose the greatest threat to peace. This has stimulated new interest in conflict management and prevention. Central to the practice of conflict management is the recognition that peace does not require the elimination of conflict, it only necessitates that the conflict be resolved nonviolently or with minimal force.

Vasquez draws several conclusions from the essays prepared for this volume. (1) Peace is learned and therefore can be improved upon. (2) Existing techniques of conflict resolution have positive things to contribute regardless of the setting or the level of application. (3) Progress in promoting exchange between domestic and international conflict resolution will require a concerted multidisciplinary effort to develop a unified theory of conflict resolution. (4) Systemic structure can either provide incentives or constitute barriers to the pacific resolution of conflict.

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The Iowa Peace Institute, in a project directed by Ambassador John McDonald and Dr. Louise Diamond, has explored the range of unofficial diplomacy used to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflict. In their book manuscript entitled *Multi-track Diplomacy: A Systems Guide and Analysis*, McDonald and Diamond identify nine different tracks of diplomacy:

1. *Governmental, or Peacemaking Through Diplomacy.* This is the world of official diplomacy, policy making and peacebuilding as expressed through formal aspects of the governmental process: the Executive Branch, the State Department, the Congress, the U.S. Trade Representative's Office, the United Nations, and others.

2. *Non-governmental/Professional, or Peacemaking Through Conflict Resolution.* This is the realm of professional nongovernmental action attempting to analyze, prevent, resolve and manage international conflicts by "non-state actors."

3. *Business, or Peacemaking Through Commerce.* This is the field of business, and its actual and potential effects on peacebuilding through providing economic opportunities, international friendship and understanding, informal channels of communication and support for other peacemaking activities.

4. *Private Citizen, or Peacemaking Through Personal Involvement.* This includes the various ways individual citizens become involved in peace and development activities through citizen diplomacy, exchange programs, private voluntary organizations and special interest groups.

5. *Research, Training and Education, or Peacemaking Through Information.* This track includes three related worlds: research, as it is connected to university programs, think tanks and special interest research centers; training programs that seek to provide training in practitioner skills such as negotiation, mediation, third party facilitiation; and education, including programs, kindergarten through Ph.D., that cover various aspects of global or cross-cultural studies, peace and world order studies and conflict analysis, management and resolution.

6. *Activism, or Peacemaking Through Advocacy.* This covers the field of peace and environmental activism on such issues as disarmament, human rights, social and economic justice and advocacy of special interest groups regarding specific governmental policies.

7. *Religious, or Peacemaking Through Faith in Action.* This examines the beliefs and actions of spiritual and religious communities and such morality-based movements as pacifism, sanctuary and non-violence.

8. *Funding, or Peacemaking Through Providing Resources.* This refers to the funding community, those foundations and individual philanthropists who provide the financial support for many of the activities undertaken by the other tracks.

9. *Public Opinion, or Peacemaking Through Communication.* This is the realm of the voice of the people; how public opinion gets shaped and expressed by the media—print, film, video, radio, and electronic systems.

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To explore various conflict resolution techniques, the Center for Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age organized a project directed by Dr. Paula Gutlove which produced a conference report and a workbook entitled *Facilitating Dialogue Across Ideological Divides: Techniques, Strategies and Future Directions.* The purpose of the workshop was to bring together twenty-four dialogue facilitators who subscribe to forms of conflict resolution which "feature third party facilitation of interactions between parties in conflict, emphasize building relationships of trust and understanding, and promote the collaborative creation of solutions that address basic human needs and are sustainable over time." The theoretical basis for this new form of conflict resolution is derived from family systems therapy, which facilitates dialogue among groups whose perceptions of each other may be distorted and are sometimes dangerously hostile. The workshop provided an opportunity for practitioners to share their experiences, consider ways that they could collaborate to advance the field, and determine the challenges facing the field. Participants also examined theoretical and technical issues using the problem-solving approach, in a workshop led by Professor Herbert Kelman, and the power and context approach, in a workshop led by Professor John Burton.

Security Systems and Arms Control

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University and David Lalman of the University of Maryland used an Institute grant to examine two competing theories of international interactions: the "Realpolitik/Unconstrained" model, whereby "immediate foreign policy objectives are determined by the structure of the international context in which nations relate to one another;" and the "Domestic/Constrained" model, wherein "national leaders choose courses of action intended to maximize their view of the nation's welfare, given that domestic political processes have first determined the goals or objectives to be pursued." Their findings strongly support the explanatory power of the latter model. Using a game theoretic approach coupled with statistical and case-history analysis, theirs is a perspective "that takes very seriously the consequences of domestic political choices on foreign policy actions." One of the study's central findings is that even in an anarchic international system, cooperation is a common response to disputes. There are indeed norms of behavior for states in this system that grow out of domestic factors, most notably constraints on leaders imposed by domestic opinion. The authors conclude that "international interactions follow a path of reasoned judgment. Even war is waged 'with reason' rather than without." Nevertheless, carefully and reasonably chosen paths of action can and do lead to undesired results. Other significant findings are as follows:

—A "conciliatory norm of dovish interaction guarantees peaceful, cooperative or harmonious relations if there is no uncertainty about the dovish intentions of one's rivals. Even pacific doves are prone to violence if they are uncertain about the intentions of their foes. Indeed, weak pacific doves apparently are more inclined to initiate violence—they have less to lose—than their stronger counterparts;

—if leaders *know* their adversaries are prepared to retaliate if attacked, then this too guarantees cooperation or harmony. Like the conciliatory norm, the self-defense or retaliatory norm also begins to break down under uncertainty; however, it is easier to detect whether a rival is prepared to retaliate than it is to detect dovish preferences;

—in contrast to the conciliatory and self-defense norms, a norm of reciprocation—do unto others as they have done unto you—is less likely to ensure cooperation;

—if everyone knows that everyone is *either* a dovish conciliator or a self-defender, but cannot tell one from the other, then there would be no assurance of cooperative or harmonious interactions. In such a world even doves may act aggressively and begin wars;

—some political institutions help foster beliefs, abeit not certainty, about the dovish inclinations of certain states. [The most significant example involves the behavior of liberal democracies, which] are unlikely to fight with one another, but are not unlikely to fight with non-democratic states. [This is because] the existence of democratic institutions are visible signs that the state in question is

fairly likely to face high [domestic] political costs for using force as a vehicle of its diplomacy. When both sides are democracies, the signal is that each actor is likely to be dovish, thereby encouraging in each the pursuit of negotiated solutions to differences. However, if one party is not a democracy, then the democratic adversary faces a greater danger of being exploited by a hawkish rival. To avoid this, the democracy is likely to launch a preemptive strike.

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A conference on security and stability in a changing world order sponsored by the U.S. Committee of the International Institute for Strategic Studies produced, inter alia, some eighteen studies, published in the *Adelphi Papers* series (nos. 256, 257, Winter 1990/91). Scholars such as Stanley Hoffman of Harvard University, Catherine M. Kelleher of the University of Maryland, Francisco Orrego Vicuna of the University of Chile, Rair Simonyan of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Moscow), and public officials, analysts, and journalists, including Yukio Satoh of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, John Roper of the Western European Union Institute of Security Studies (Paris), and Josef Joffe of *Suddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), examined such issues as the future of the Soviet Union, the U.S.–Soviet relationship after the Cold War, security in Europe, arms control, regional conflicts, and new security architectures.

With regard to "Soviet Futures," it was noted that at most the (Soviet) Union would be a loose confederation and that "even the possibility of a Ukrainian-Russian and Belorussian Slavic bloc was broken." Conferees were in general agreement that "the Soviet condition is critical," and that "the scale of the crisis is massive." In view of this, particular attention was given to the issue of nuclear weapons control, where it was concluded "a smaller professional army, dominated by the Russians, would have a chance of controlling [Soviet] nuclear weapons and preventing their falling into nationalistic hands." The "Soviet" relationship with the United States, it was agreed, would likely be one of greater cooperation; this, coupled with increased reliance on multilateral diplomacy, would be used to alleviate relative Soviet weakness and preserve a measure of influence in a world where only one "all-round global, power" now exists. For the United States, the chief concern may well be "in coping with an internal explosion in the USSR, rather than in managing relations with a reasonably stable government in Moscow." Overall, the prevailing sentiment was that in the post-Cold War era "the U.S.-Soviet relationship has lost its primacy in international affairs," and whereas that relationship "largely defined the international system," it is the system that will now define the relationship. Nevertheless, the nuclear arsenals of both sides will continue to render that relationship rather unique. More normalized relations do not necessarily preclude continuing competition, but both powers are seeing "increasingly convergent interests on issues ranging from the environment to regional conflicts."

In Europe, it was acknowledged that the American presence plays a stabilizing role as, among other things, "a counter-weight to German power." On a broader front, it was observed, "the U.S. and NATO Europe must develop a reconstituted military strategy and capability for the post-1995, post-CFE environment. This implies: a long-term investment strategy (R&D, procurement); a reservoir of mobilizable military and industrial resources; a dormant but prepared force structure; and a pre-planned decision-making process with identified response 'triggers' to ambiguous and unambiguous Soviet behavior. At the same time, the U.S. and NATO Europe must keep a smaller pool of strategically mobile ready forces for deterrence, crisis-management, war-prevention, and, if needed, intervention."

The future of arms control, particularly through the classic approach of comprehensive negotiations, was determined to be highly problematic. In the area of strategic arms control, one approach presented was "to consider further deep reductions in conjunction with confidence-building and transparency measures." Against this it was argued that significant reductions below some four thousand warheads could be destabilizing, particularly if a very quick mobilization/reconstruction process were necessitated by a dramatic shift in the current international political climate. It would be well to trim down first-strike strategic missiles but, it was pointed out, this may create greater economic strain, given the costs of alternative strategic force postures. "Therefore,

relying on the confidence-building and transparency measures may be a practical way forward and yield long-term financial savings." In sum, there was much emphasis on "the importance of maintaining a flexible relationship between regional and global approaches and of creating functional linkages between discussions of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons," with the added declaration that the "compartmentalized approach for managing these weapons systems in the past is less applicable in the current age of their proliferation."

While conferees agreed that it is premature to talk of new security architectures, several basic changes were discussed in some detail by Dr. Robert E. Hunter of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. First, with the end of the Cold War, "the United States can now disaggregate security around the world; there is no longer any need for, or existence of, 'linkage.'" The Cold War's end "also lets the United States be isolated or disengaged in some places and engaged in others without presaging a new isolationism." Hunter points to two special characteristics of this period: "One is the end of the overlay of ideology on strategy . . . the other is the evolution of common security in East-West relations." Whereas common security first meant "mutual responsibility for securing each other from nuclear war; later, this responsibility extended to preventing crises that could escalate to nuclear war; and now there is a common interest in one another's economic security. Thus, the West aids the USSR and it

helps to keep [countries like] Iraq from ruining the Western economy on which they depend for their future."

Second, there is the increased importance of "geo-economics," as evidenced by the prominence and growing international influence of Germany, Japan, the newly industrialized countries (NIC) and the European Community (EC). "Here, we see a development opposite to the one taking place in classical security issues: global aggregation rather than disaggregation." Third, deliberations about new security architectures will involve a far greater number of participants: "Unlike four decades ago, there can be no wise men and women deciding all for everyone." Definitions of security are in fact returning "to first principles, such as the primacy of political sources of conflict over the military artifacts of confrontation. This is a return to an older definition of security—submerged by the Cold War— in which politics and economics are most important." Last, in looking beyond Europe, "the United States will need to adopt a politically challenging pluralism of approach," keeping in mind that the challenges to come are in such areas as "proliferation, population, poverty and pollution." In view of this, Hunter sees "an inherent value in the UN, the rule of law, and multilateralism."

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The Program in Arms Control and Crisis Management at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has produced a book entitled *Avoiding the Brink* (Brassey's, 1990, Andrew Goldberg, Debra Van Opstal, James Barkley,

eds.) in which experts such as Joseph Nye, Robert Jervis, Paul Bracken, and the editors examine international crisis management within the context of superpower relations. In Section one of this two-part study, the authors provide an overview of the state of the field of crisis control in the policy studies communities. They note "a growing sense that the interaction of a turbulent environment and flawed organizational mechanisms can lead rapidly to corporate, social or national catastrophe is producing considerable diversity in the study of crisis management." Crisis control is recognized as a multifaceted phenomenon requiring a multidisciplinary approach; nevertheless, it is pointed out, with diversity often comes confusion and incoherence. Crisis management strategies depend heavily on past experience, but given the diversity of approaches to the study of historical "lessons," the body of available knowledge cannot in truth be characterized as an integrated discipline.

The authors find in organization theory and cognitive psychology two of the most promising approaches in the field. These disciplines have "different methodological concerns and theoretical perspectives, however, underscoring the difficulty of integration. "Neither discipline, on its own, provides sufficient explanatory power or comprehensive rules for successful crisis behavior." Other problems in extrapolating from past experience grow out of rapid technological and political change and, in the field of nuclear crisis management, a very limited store of cases for study. Finally,

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there is "the perennial gap between scholarship and policy practice." Although always intended to aid in actual policy-making, the literature of crisis management "is often so academic and stylized as to be rather unhelpful to the decision-maker in the midst of crisis."

In section two of the study the authors note that "the state of the field in super-power crisis management presents the U.S. with two main challenges. First, the traditional case study approach—the underpinning of much of the crisis management literature—has fundamental limitations for the analyst. Much of its is pre-nuclear in origin or precedes the era of strategic party . . . " Second, findings of research studies "are not easily incorporated into the decision-makers' environment." Practitioners often do not "have the time to read scholarly works, while cautionary 'rules of thumb' suggested by policy analysts may be forgotten in the heat of a real world crisis." Crisis-gaming is one way to address this problem. While noting some significant pitfalls, the authors, drawing on their experiences in conducting simulations, point to gaming as "an ideal tool for raising leadership awareness and identifying psychological or organizational impediments to effective crisis management." They go on to describe the technique of role-playing simulations and discuss in depth the benefits of simulations both as tools of analysis and as training devices.

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The topic of deterrence is one of the most significant and most intensely debated in discussions of security systems.

Professor Richard Ned Lebow of Cornell University and Professor Janice Gross Stein of the University of Toronto have produced a monograph entitled *When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know?* (Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Occasional Paper No. 8, 1990). The authors review the selection and coding of data used in major studies of deterrence and identify their several conceptual and empirical inadequacies. They then build on this critique to reformulate deterrence theory and elaborate a research program to test its propositions.

The authors contend that "the problems associated with case selection and coding of cases make it impossible to determine the frequency of deterrence success, in large part because it is impossible to identify the universe and, consequently, to draw a representative sample of cases of either general or immediate deterrence. Nor in the absence of valid and reliable information about a would-be initiator's calculations is it possible to avoid coding the outcome of these encounters in a highly subjective manner. In the analysis of general deterrence, this problem cannot be overcome even by access to good data."

Instead of asking how deterrence succeeds, insightful conclusions are more likely to result from asking how, when, and why it succeeds. Using this approach, the authors develop the following hypotheses:

"Deterrence is most likely to succeed when challengers are largely opportunity driven. It will be more likely to fail

when challengers are motivated by needs, and see these needs as expressions of vital state or political interests. The greater the motivating need, the more intense the challenger's challenge. Deterrence is most likely to succeed when an initiator envisages a challenge as a probe, is prepared to back down if serious resistance is encountered, and designs the challenge to minimize the costs of possible retreat. Deterrence will become more problematic as the risk acceptance of the challenger increases. It will be least likely to succeed in cases when the initiator 'burns his bridges' and makes retreat extremely costly or politically impossible. Self-deterrence is more effective than deterrence imposed from the outside, and the most effective deterrence is one which attempts to manipulate domestic costs and make them more salient in the mind of the challenger. Deterrence is more likely to succeed if it is attempted early, before an adversary becomes committed to a challenge."

"Reassurance (i.e., the attempt to reduce the incentives adversaries have to use force) is more likely to succeed when an adversary is driven largely by domestic political needs and/or strategic weakness. Reassurance is likely to encourage the challenge it is designed to prevent when an adversary is motivated primarily by opportunity. When adversarial motives are mixed, reassurance and deterrence are more likely to succeed when practiced in tandem. Deterrence is more likely to fail when the challenger and defender in an immediate deterrence encounter both perceive themselves to be the defender. Deterrence will be more likely to fail when challenger and defender both believe that they are acting in defense of legitimate national interests."

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Another project looking at deterrence assesses its morality. Professors Charles Kegley and Kenneth Schwab of the University of South Carolina have edited a book entitled *After the Cold War: Questioning the Morality of Nuclear Deterrence* (Westview, 1991), as well as producing a video, *Beyond Containment: The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence* (SCETV, 1990). Contributor Richard Perle's essentially realpolitik recommendations reaffirm the need for military preparedness and continued reliance on nuclear arms to keep the peace. This contrasts with the views of Paul Warnke, who argues that the doctrine of first use—the doctrine that would authorize a preemptive or retaliatory first strike—must be permanently rejected. In the middle, Sir Hugh Beach concludes that relaxed superpower tensions warrant reduced reliance on nuclear weaponry and on the threat to carry-out a nuclear attack. He nonetheless insists that peace is contingent on the retention of a nuclear capability.

John Mueller strongly contests the assumption that nuclear weapons have been the principal cause of the "long peace" among the great powers. While taking exception to the realpolitik assumptions on this issue, he nevertheless echoes the realist position that state behavior is not a fit subject for moral judgment. Kenneth Boulding points out the illogical

reasoning upon which the deterrence "myth" appears to rest: "What is perceived as an impossible war has to be perceived as possible if it is to be impossible." Bruce Russett focuses his discussion on the issue of "extended" deterrence, that is, deterrence of attacks on friends and allies, suggesting that most normative and policy-related problems with nuclear weapons arise from this. He argues for a restricted "counter-combatant" form of deterrence, which is targeting an adversary's nuclear retaliatory forces. Paul Kattenberg adopts a quite different view and argues that although the world is on the threshold of real change, the threat of nuclear weapons and the need for deterrence will continue, despite the implied illogic of deterrence (i.e., the morality of the ends justifies the apparent immorality of the means). He concludes by arguing that the time may have come for a superpower entente designed to deter conflict elsewhere by possessing a monopoly on nuclear weapons.

Joseph Cardinal Bernadin addresses the enormous consequences of the "historical fault-line marked by 1989." He reasserts the position of the Catholic Bishops' 1983 Pastoral Letter in support of a conditional acceptance of nuclear weapons, but hopes that the conditions are changing for the better. Janice Love reports findings from empirical research on the official positions of forty-seven Jewish and Christian governing bodies and concludes that there is a general consensus, at least in the short term, on the need for nuclear weapons in order to maintain political equilibrium, but an urge for disarmament in the long term. Finally, James Johnson addresses the applicability of traditional moral precepts regarding the just-war doctrine to the present post–Cold War era. He concludes that five types of armed conflict need to be included in the analysis of war, since changing times have altered the cogency of the arguments made on their behalf during the Cold War.

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On the subject of arms control, Professor Jack Barkenbus of the University of Tennessee has written an article manuscript on the International Atomic Energy Agency entitled "Arms Control Verification: A Role for the IAEA." Barkenbus concludes that there is no longer serious objection to use of on-site inspection, and some form of challenge inspection also seems acceptable. With the demise of the Cold War he believes ratification of arms control treaties of unprecedented magnitude is likely to increase, especially between the United States and the nuclear armed republics of the former USSR. It is logical that multilateral treaties be monitored, or verified, via multilateral institutions, with the IAEA being in the best position to do this. Utilizing this agency in future arms control treaties would help eliminate the increasingly artificial distinction between "horizonal" and "vertical" proliferation. As currently constituted, however, the IAEA could not take on the expanded responsibililty necessitated by verification. It needs more money to finance its safeguarding activities. Moreover, it needs to dispense with its other mandate of technical assistance and focus exclusively on the safeguarding function.

East/West Relations

The evolution of the Soviet-German relationship since the 1970s is critical to an understanding of the dynamics of contemporary East/West relations. This is the topic of a book, entitled *The Soviets, West Germany and European Security*, written by Dr. Robbin Laird of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. Laird identifies three phases, starting in the 1970s, of the development of Soviet policy toward Western Europe in general and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular. During the first phase, beginning with Brezhnev and continued initially by Gorbachev, the Soviets attempted to expand their influence in Western Europe while undercutting Western alliance institutions, accepting as a price the risk of greater Western European influence over Eastern Europe. The Soviets were betting that they could contain change in the East while promoting disintegration of the alliance in the West. The failure of this strategy became evident in the early years of the Gorbachev era, the recognition of which ushered in the second phase.

The second phase was introduced by Gorbachev's Strasbourg speech to the Council of Europe in July 1989. Although in that speech Gorbachev did not suggest either the end of socialism in the East or support for westernization of Eastern Europe and the USSR, he did call for overcoming the division of Europe by a new policy of detente. The new "European home" concept (revived from the old Gaullist concept of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals) was initiated. The "live and let live" nature of this approach came to an abrupt halt with the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

Phase three is ongoing and continues to evolve in the face of twin pressures of Westernization moving East along with pressures to create a new Russian and/or Soviet development model. Laird concludes his analysis with a discussion of the Soviet-German Treaty signed in December 1990, which served as a gesture of reassurance to the Soviets regarding German reunification. The treaty enunciated doctrinal shifts intended to emphasize the Western Alliance's defensive purpose, including a characterization of nuclear weapons as being reserved as a "last resort." It also called for a non-aggression pact with the Warsaw Pact nations and invited them to send observers to Brussels. Germany also agreed to serve as a lobby within Europe for what was still the Soviet Union.

Laird points out that these policy shifts by the Soviet government provoked mixed reactions from the populace, reflecting divisions among the reactionaries, conservatives, centrists, and reformers. Laird closes his work with the question: "Was German unification and westernization of the East the *quid pro quo* for the protection of the Soviet empire from outside interference?" If so, Laird states, Gorbachev failed on virtually every count.

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Edward L. Killham, an independent scholar and retired State Department official, has written a book manuscript entitled *Moscow and the Pan-European Idea*. He traces the history of relations between the Russians and the rest of Europe over the past fifteen centuries, citing the complicated interrelationships and the ebb and

flow of ties. Among the forces at work, often in conflicting directions, were cross-cutting ties among European and Russian royal families, differences between the Orthodox and Roman churches, pan-Slavic and pan-European sentiments, and in the present century the Leninist control of Russia, the rise of Nazism, the Cold War, and the growth of the European Community.

Writing in 1989 when the policy of *glasnost* was still in transition, Killham contended that Mikhail Gorbachev "has been making a concerted effort in recent years to 'play the European card' against the United States." Gorbachev frequently used the phrase "Europe—Our Common House" to set Europe, including the Soviet Union, off against the rest of the world, and particularly against the United States and Canada (for related discussion, see "phase two" in Laird study above).

Killham asserts that Americans usually fail to appreciate the importance of European-mindedness in international affairs, while Soviet leaders are well aware of the appeal of "One Europe" throughout both Eastern and Western Europe. Killham worried in 1989 that "a conjuncture of international trends may offer a fertile field for increased Soviet efforts to isolate the United States from its Western European Allies."

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Military doctrine shaping East/West relations in Europe has been heavily influenced in recent years by the concept of nonoffensive defense, which is explored in a manuscript entitled *German and Soviet Concepts of Non-Offensive Defense: Origins, Linkages and Security Implications for Europe,* by Dr. Robert Rudney and Dr. Marian Leighton of the National Institute for Public Policy. Nonoffensive defense is defined as the redesign of military forces to a nonprovocative, nonnuclear defense posture capitalizing on the natural advantages of the defensive to deter aggression and reinforce stability.

The authors trace the origins of these ideas to German military thought following the end of World War II. The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues headed by Olof Palme constituted an important later influence. Gorbachev became aware of these ideas through his own military theorists who had participated in the Pugwash talks between the Germans and Soviets.

Rudney and Leighton conclude, however, that the Soviet version of nonoffensive defense included preparedness for a shift to the counteroffensive. The authors also point to the structural impediments that existed within the Soviet context, making it unlikely that real nonoffensive defense was an option for the USSR. Not least among these was the necessity of deploying territorial militia as the embodiment of nonoffensive defense, which raised the specter of sanctioning national armies in the various republics.

The authors conclude that a policy of nonoffensive defense would never actually materalize in the USSR and may never be put into practice in Europe, but its advocacy has weakened NATO without offering a credible strategy or structure to replace it.

International Organizations and International Law

United Nations peacekeeping was the topic of a conference convened by London's International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Twelve papers were presented by an international group of scholars, policy analysts, and former senior government officials on such topics as broadening the UN's peacekeeping mandate, the superpowers as peacekeepers, Southern African peacemaking, peacekeeping in a modern war zone, proactive peacekeeping, "open skies" and peacekeeping, and enhancing peace-keeping operations. The papers were published in a special issue of the IISS journal *Survival* (Volume XXXII, No. 3, May/June 1990).

In an opening article, Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, discusses how in the new and conciliatory international climate, the UN Security Council may play a far more effective role in preventing aggression and guaranteeing security, in contrast to its more familiar function of diffusing and limiting crises after they have begun. Urquhart notes that such a role will require "a systematic watch on world events and regular meetings to decide what Security Council action is necessary. It will require a transition from the sheriff's posse to the beginnings of a regularly established, and respected, international police force, monitoring the implementation of international decisions and agreements." To be more proactive the Security Council will have to upgrade its peacekeeping operations.

Two issues of particular importance in this regard relate to sovereignty and the use of force. Urquhart points out that increased unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council will likely lead to "a considerable broadening of the range of situations in which the Council may agree on the use of peacekeeping operations. This range will probably now include international situations of sovereign countries, as in Cambodia." He adds that the limited curtailment of national sovereign authority resulting from such activism must be undergirded by negotiated legal agreements at every stage. With regard to the use of force, new functions may "inspire a far less diffident approach to irregular armed groups operating within sovereign countries," necessitating the reinforcement of "the authority and strength of peace-keeping forces." This is not tantamount, however, to the direct application of greater firepower: "The idea of a peace-keeping force shooting to kill is to some extent a contradiction in terms. It should be borne in mind that one of the great virtues of peacekeeping operations is their non-threatening, and therefore face-saving, character. The use of force, unless very carefully considered, will tend to destroy this characteristic and, along with it, the necessary cooperation of at least one of the parties in conflict." Instead, Urquhart argues for a greater show of strength as opposed to use of force. One way to achieve this would be through the upgrading of "both the mandate and the equipment and armament of peace-keeping forces. It might also now be practicable in some cases to consider the further inclusion of contingents of the permanent members

tween the realm of politics and the realm of religion.

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In recognition of the influential role that Jane Addams played as an advocate for peace, the University of Illinois organized a conference to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the founding of Hull House. The conference proceedings are summarized in two publications: *Women and Peace: An International Conference*, reproduced by the University of Illinois, and *Swords and Ploughshares*, (Volume III, No. 4) published by the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois.

Both these publications describe Addams's role as a pacifist during the initial third of this century and the contemporary implications of her pioneering work. Particularly significant in her crusade for peace was the role she played in organizing the Women's Peace Party in 1915, the 1915 International Congress of Women for Peace, and the International League for Peace and Freedom. These achievements were recognized when she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931. The conference reports illustrate the degree to which she remains a model for many present-day peace activists, particularly in terms of the interconnections she articulated between peace and economic welfare and the ties between peace activism and feminism.

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Pacifism and peace movements in Europe during the nintheenth century are topics of two articles written by Professor Sandi Cooper of the College of Staten Island.

The first article, entitled "Pacifism in France, 1889–1914: International Peace as a Human Right," to be published in *French Historial Studies* (Spring 1992), describes the French peace movement of a century ago as the most sophisticated and vigorous on the Continent. The peace activitists of the day defined their work "as the refinement of the human rights legacy of the French Revolution." They persuaded the international peace movement that a peaceful world, which would be relieved of both military expenditures and frequent international conflict, was a universal human right.

Despite the strength of the movement, which included approximately 300 different organizations totaling 300,000 French participants in 1905, the usual reception for pacifist ideas "ranged from ridicule to denunciations of utopianism." The days preceding the outbreak of World War I saw the peace groups at their most active, seeking to avoid war. But with the declaration of war between Germany and France, the international peace movement collapsed. French pacifists defended their nation against invasion. Remnants of the French peace movement nevertheless revived after the war to promote the creation of the League of Nations and French participation in international organizations.

A second article, "Peace Movements: The Rise and Decline of Private Peace Societies in Europe, 1815-1871," provides a comprehensive analysis of peace organizations and activities in nineteenth-century Europe. Material from both of these articles is included in Cooper's book, entitled *Patriotic Pacifism* (Oxford University Press, 1991).

of the Security Council in some operations in order to give them more weight and authority." Finally, given new unanimity in the council, strong incentives for conflict avoidance coupled with threatened penalties for noncooperation could be used to enhance peace.

The article concludes with a discussion of practical changes that would be necessary to affect a more systematic approach to peacekeeping. These include a larger staff at UN headquarters, creation of a basic logistical network, increased staff training and the earmarking of potential commanders and senior officers, strengthened information gathering and intelligence capacity, and a substantial peacekeeping fund (he notes that "$US 1 billion has been suggested").

In a companion article, Ambassador Alexander M. Belonogov, former Permanent Representative of the USSR to the UN, argues in favor of the use of preventive diplomacy as an alternative to crisis diplomacy. This would entail the establishment of a system for information gathering and for early warning of possible outbreak of conflict. Belonogav calls for an enhanced role for the Secretary-General and for broader cooperation among the Security Council's permanent members in manning UN forces and in providing material and logistical support for peacekeeping operations. He also raises the problem of the duration of UN operations, noting that unless peace-keeping operations are accompanied by equally concerted efforts to achieve political settlements, they have the potential to drag on indefinitely, thereby undercutting faith in the effectiveness of such measures as well as of the UN as a whole.

Two other articles examine, respectively, the possibility and desirability of the use of "Soviet" and of U.S. troops as UN reserves, noting that while "UN peacekeepers would continue to deploy in their traditional manner," in some circumstances "superpower military back-up would demonstrate international resolve"; and the role of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in the years leading to the Namibia-Angola Settlement of 1988, which, according to the author, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and Institute Board member Chester A. Crocker; (1) "underscores the sometimes indispensable role, in situations of deep polarization, of an institution whose involvement can legitimize a political process"; (2) "the importance of preventing UN organs from taking decisions or actions that prejudge the outcomes of future political processes"; and (3) offers "useful suggestions as to the distinction between the UN as a legitimizer and implementing agency of settlements and the role of great powers, individually or in concert, in making those settlements."

"Peace-keeping in a Modern War Zone" is an article that examines problems relevant to such operations. These include the safety of UN forces, obstacles against freedom of movement, inferior observation devices and means, supervision of disarmament and weapons limitations, leakages and interference in communications, weaknesses in the composition of

UN forces, tendencies to create fiefdoms, restrictions in armament and in the use of force, lack of reserves, and inadequate liaison and reporting. The article concludes with the admonition against mixing peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the former requiring minimum force and for defensive purposes only, and the latter, "a completely different concept" calling for "forces which are as frightening as possible," to deter and enforce. To assist forces in the field, analysts Michael Krepon and Jeffrey P. Tracey examine aerial surveillance as one tool that can be used during conflict "to learn more about the location of military units in the field, their state of readiness, as well as indications and warning of troubling developments," and during less hostile periods as "a means to reinforce positive trends and help establish conditions for the disengagement and reduction of military forces."

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In an effort to promote greater Japanese commitment to the UN, the United Nations Association USA convened a conference of Japanese and American scholars and officials. The conferees concluded that Japan is less reluctant than previously to assume a more active UN role. But Japan still lacks a full sense of what UN priorities are or should be. The conference concluded that steps should be taken to prepare both the Japanese and the rest of the world for Japan's playing a broader leadership role. Informal procedures could be developed to increase Japan's influence and presence internationally, in lieu of a permanent seat on the Security Council.

Japan's principal interest is in economic and social issues. Since the origins of regional conflicts are increasingly to be found in socioeconomic factors rather than superpower relations, Japan has an opportunity to play a leadership role through support for economic and social development activities. Japan is expected to play a larger role as a financial contributor to UN activities and to Third World development. But as Japan's financial role expands, it will have corresponding interest in leadership roles. Other nations may resist Japan's push for a leadership role. With memories of World War II still fresh, particular sensitivity regarding potential Japanese dominance exists among Asian states.

The conference concluded that it is very important for Japan to be able to point to symbols of its achievements as an economic power and a major political player. Recognition is not likely to be forthcoming at the UN, however, which may prompt the Japanese to turn to alternate ways of asserting themselves and of addressing political issues. The conferees urged the United States to bring Japan into decision-making circles, both through existing formal UN mechanisms and through ad hoc groupings.

Ethics, Religion, and Nonviolence

The Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs has produced a set of nine reports called *Case Studies in Ethics and International Affairs*. These include:
"Covert Intervention in Chile, 1970-73"
"Ethics and Intervention: The United States in Grenada, 1983"
"Chemical Arms Control: The U.S. and Geneva Protocol of 1925"
"A Case Study of Terrorism: Northern Ireland 1970–1990"
"Ethics and Emigration: The East German Exodus, 1989"
"Confronting Revolution in Nicaragua: U.S. and Canadian Responses"
"Values in Conflict: America, Israel, and the Palestinians"
"From Miracle to Crisis: Brazilian Foreign Debt and the Limits of Obligations"
"Development Strategies in Conflict: Brazil and the Future of the Amazon."

The approach taken is illustrated by the discussion of chemical arms control. Among the questions considered is: If war is in self-defense or is in pursuit of a just cause, is not any kind of weaponry legitimate? One argument used to justify the use of chemical weapons is that they have a low lethality rate. Moreover, defensive technologies have been developed to combat the effectivenss of most chemical weapons. And yet the intention of chemical weapons is to kill, not just to injure. Moreover, the harm done by chemical weapons creates a level of moral revulsion that places them in a special category. Chemical weapons are particularly objectionable because of the danger of accidental exposure and the difficulty of discriminating between combatants and noncombatants. Chemical weapons can cause unnecessary suffering, and in turn they can be considered "treacherous weapons." The use of these various ethical arguments is illustrated and their validity tested through the recounting of congressional debates on chemical arms control in both the 1920s and the 1970s.

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As was anticipated in the Institute's December 1990 Summary of Completed Grant Projects, two edited volumes exploring major themes in western and Islamic traditions relating to concepts of war and peace have been produced by Professors James Turner Johnson of Rutgers University and John Kelsay of Florida State University. The first volume, *Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition* (Greenwood, 1990) was summarized in the earlier report. The second volume, *Just War and Jihad: Historical And Theoretical Perspectives on War And Peace In Western And Islamic Traditions* (Greenwood, 1991), instructs "readers about the religious contexts that nurtured ideas regarding statecraft, international law, and the aims and limits of peace and warfare." The specific purpose of this volume is to advance dialogue between scholars of the just-war tradition and Islamicists. Chapter authors identify "the sources and basic themes of religious thought that influence the two traditions" and "address the more specialized issue of 'holy war,' or war fought for religious reasons, and the relationship of the two traditions to international law." The key issue for the Islamicists is the influence

not only of canonical sources, but of history, geography, and culture on Islamic conceptions of war. This parallels the thinking of the just-war scholars who argue that this tradition too "is never simply a religious or theological tradition," but "draws its material from legal, military, and historical sources."

The importance of history is further stressed in chapters on the place of jihad, "or effort in the path of God, in the context of the struggles of Muslims with Western" power. For example, "there are important differences between the rhetoric of jihad as used by resisters to European power in Morocco or Algeria and the formally similar rhetoric of Sunni jurist working in the context of Islamic imperial power during the period of the high caliphate." There is a similar concentration on power in discussions of Western and Islamic cultures and international law. Here, "contemporary Muslims show a good deal of ambivalence. . . . On the one hand, that international law appears to be a product of Western culture," and evidence suggests "that many Muslims recognize this, and it is (for some) a troubling fact." Their fear is international law may be another tool of Western imperialism. "On the other hand, Muslim governments recognize the authority of international law, and for good reasons. International law and the Islamic traditions are in agreement on a number of issues."

The importance of belief systems is by no means denigrated in these discussions of historical influences. As one commentator notes, the just-war tradition is more than its component parts: "Understood as a totality, it encompasses and represents attitudes, beliefs, and patterns of behavior from across the breadth of that culture over time." Similarly, "claims about the normative value of the Qur'an or the example of Muhammad are crucial to Muslim views about war and peace." Although agreeing that there are "important historical and theoretical asymmetries between Western and Islamic approaches to war, peace and statecraft," the authors of this volume also conclude that there are certain concerns that appear to be of a more universal nature and thus are shared by the two, for example, "that violence not be gratuitous, that wars be justified, and that conflicts be governed by a concern to distinguish the innocent from the guilty." As "human concerns, tied to the necessities of ordering social life," they are "deeply entrenched in the traditions of just war and of Islamic thought."

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Phyllis Zagano, an independent researcher, is working on a monograph entitled *Media Morality: An Analysis of American Religious Debate on Peace, Freedom, and Justice.* The monograph will summarize and analyze the major denominational policies and teaching documents on disarmament, economics, and foreign policy. She is particularly interested in the role of the media in relation to policy positions formulated by religious bodies. Zagano contends that churches are mixing religion and politics inappropriately, and the media is compounding the problem by confusing the general public as to the proper distinctions be-