UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1.	OCCURRED	8.	CAUSE: X EQUIPMENT FAILURE					
	DATE: 08-MAR-2005 TIME: 2015 HOURS		HUMAN ERROR					
2	OPERATOR: Hunt Oil Company		EXTERNAL DAMAGE					
۷.	OFERATOR: Hunt OII Company		SLIP/TRIP/FALL					
			WEATHER RELATED					
	REPRESENTATIVE: Penny Plumlee		LEAK					
	TELEPHONE: (214) 978-8447		UPSET H20 TREATING					
3.	LEASE: G23933	OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID OTHER						
	AREA: ST LATITUDE: 28.34938602							
	BLOCK: 242 LONGITUDE: -90.66869893	WATER DEPTH: 159 FT.						
4 .	PLATFORM: 1		DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 50 MI.					
т.			WIND DIRECTION: ENE					
			SPEED: 17 M.P.H.					
5.	ACTIVITY: X EXPLORATION(POE)	12.	CURRENT DIRECTION: W					
	DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION		SPEED: 1 M.P.H.					
	(DOCD/POD)	13.	SEA STATE: 6 FT.					
6.	TYPE: FIRE							
	EXPLOSION							
	X BLOWOUT							
	COLLISION	16.	OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE/ SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:					
	INJURY NO. 0 FATALITY NO. 0		Sonny Lane					
			CITY: Dallas STATE: TX					
	POLLUTION	CIII. Dallas SIAIE. IX						
	 OTHER	TELEPHONE: (214) 978-8620						
7.	OPERATION: PRODUCTION R DRILLING		CONTRACTOR: Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc.					
	☐ WORKOVER		CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/					
	COMPLETION MOTOR VESSEL		SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:					
			Carl Knippers					
			CITY: Houston STATE: TX					
	☐ PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.		TELEPHONE: (281) 492-5300					
	OTHER							

MMS - FORM 2010 PAGE 1 OF 4 25-MAY-2005

17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED

On March 8, 2005 after squeezing the 9-5/8" X 13-3/8" annulus with cement and pumpin barrels of sea water, the crew starting displacing the cement with 4 barrels per minute (bpm). At 1930 hours, with barrels into the barrel psi on the annulus, one of the wear bushing/casing hanger lock down dogs blew out of the port/forward quadrant of the 16" wellhead, giving an uncontrolled release of mud, water, and cement through a 1 1/4" threaded port to a distance of 50-75' out away from the rig, below the main hull and into the water. The crew closed the 16" casing valve. An attempt was made to slow the flow coming out of the port by opening the choke and kill lines through the choke manifold and taking returns back in the trip tank. Full flow was obtained out of the choke and kill lines, but was not enough relief to observe the point of discharge. An attempt was made to pull the casing hanger up against the landing profile to help slow the flow but there were no results. The rig was evacuated and the crew were transported to a nearby rig.

On March 9, 2005, well control personnel and Hunt representatives assessed the flow by crew boat. They found the flow was 100% salt water.

On March 10, 2005, personnel landed on rig by helicopter. They replaced the casing head valve handle. They installed a pressure gauge on the casing head and it read 1 psi. The flow was still 100% salt water.

On March 11, 2005 personnel boarded the rig. The kill hose was disconnected and the HCR valve was opened to vent pressure from the flow. After five minutes, the flow bridged. A nipple was welded into the hole in the wellhead. A 2" valve was installed on the nipple and closed. The well was secured at 1245 hours. The choke and kill lines were full of cement from the personnel initially opening the lines to try to slow the flow.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The probable cause of the accident was equipment failure. Hunt believes the lock dow dog in the wellhead flange blew off during an annular squeeze. They are not sure if the lock down dog blew off or became unscrewed because of sand erosion on the flange while the annulus was flowing.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Annular flow after cementing caused the initial pressure situation.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Hunt has proposed the following items to prevent this from happening again. Wellhead serviceman should inspect position of lock down dogs before running casing. Pressure test the wellhead before running casing. Utilize lower fluid loss cement slurry to avoid flow after cementing. Hold nominal pressure on annulus while waiting on cement

PAGE 2 OF 4 MMS - FORM 2010 25-MAY-2005 21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

wellhead, choke and kill hose, manifold all these items were plugged with cured lines and valves

cement

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

\$308,500

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

Due to the specific nature of this incident, the Houma District has no recommendations to the Regional Office.

- 23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO
- 24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE

n/a

- 25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION
- 26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Amy Gresham /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Michael J. Saucier

APPROVED

DATE: 04-MAY-2005

PAGE 3 OF 4 MMS - FORM 2010 EV2010R 25-MAY-2005

BLOWOUT ATTACHMENT

1. 1	WELL NAME:	001	WELL NO.:	177	164032800)	LEASE	: G239	33	
2. 0	OPERATION: X	DRILLING		COMPLETI		ON				
		WORKOVER		П	PRODUCTION	ON				
2		TRANSCONS IN DRO	ACDECCO NO	Ш						
		ERATIONS IN PRO				DDC				
		ATER BASE MUD	METO	GHT:		PPG				
5. BOP STACK CONFIGURATION: Annular, Pipe Ram, Blind Ram, Spool, Pipe ram							16.			227
		· -				PRESS	RATING:	50	000 E	?SI
6. 1	BOP STACK - LAS	T TEST DATE PRI	OR TO INCID	ENT:	27-FEB-	-2005	PRESSURE:	: 50	00	PSI
7.	LAST CASING STR	ING SET:	FT	SI	ZE:		IN			
8.	SIZE OF DRILLIN	G/WORKOVER STRI	ING IN HOLE:			IN				
9. 1	KICK SIZE:	BBLS								
10.	FLUID KILL WEI	GHT:	PPG							
11.	INITIAL S.I.C.	P.: I	PSI							
12.	S.I.D.P./W.S.P	.:	PSI							
13.	PRIOR HOLE PRO	BLEMS? NO								
14.	WELL CONTROL E	QUIPMENT INITIA	ALLY ACTIVAT	ED:						
	ANNULAR B	so scss	SV							
	☐ PIPE	SSV								
	BLIND	K OTHE	ER none, lea	ak o	curred b	elow B	OP			
	BLIND SHE	2A								
15.	EVACUATION: 1	NO								
16.	DIVERTER SYSTE	M VALVE SIZE: LINE SIZE:			21. SS	SSV TYP	E:			
		∇	SINGLE SPOO)T						
		Ϊ	DUAL SPOOL	ш	DA	ATE LAS	T TESTED:			
17.	WAS WELL DIVER	TED? NO			22. TR	REE: ON	OFF	x		
18.	. BOTTOM HOLE ASSEMBLY:					JRFACE QUIPMEN	SAFETY T IN SERV	ICE? NO)	
					24. WE	LL TD:		TVD		MD
					25. OP	EN PER	F? NO			
19.	DRILLING DEPTH	TVI	D	MD						
20.	DATE LAST FORM 23-FEB-2005	ATION INTEGRITY	TEST:							

MMS - FORM 2010 PAGE 4 OF 4
EV2010R 25-MAY-2005