June 18, 2003
Jonathan B. Tucker, Senior Fellow
Biosecurity: Assessing Strategies to Prevent the Misuse of Dangerous Pathogens
Introduction
As shown by the anthrax letter attacks of fall 2001, terrorist acquisition of dangerous biological pathogens is a serious threat. Is the international community doing enough to prevent a bioterrorist attack? On June 18 the Institute hosted a presentation by senior fellow Jonathan Tucker on "Biosecurity: Assessing Strategies to Prevent the Misuse of Dangerous Pathogens." A former United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) biological weapons inspector in Iraq, Tucker directed the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies before coming to the Institute in 2002. He has also served as a specialist on chemical and biological arms control at the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment.
The director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute since 1996, Tucker has worked on a wide array of security issues regarding chemical and biological weapons. In 1995, he served on the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses and investigated alleged chemical and biological weapons exposures during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. He is also a member of the Board of Editors for Scientific American. Tucker has done numerous radio and television interviews regarding biosecurity and authored an assortment of articles, op-eds, and books on the subject. His most recent book, Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001), was selected as a Washington Post Best book of the year. During his tenure at the Institute, Tucker has been investigating prevention-oriented strategies for countering bioterrorism.
Report Summary
A scientist from the Illinois Department of Public Health tests for the presence of anthrax. Courtesy: Illinois Department of Public Health
Bioterrorism, long a hypothetical threat, became a harsh reality in the fall of 2001, when letters containing a refined preparation of dried anthrax spores were sent through the U.S. mail, infecting more than twenty people and killing five. Although the October 2001 anthrax attack was fortunately limited in scale, it hinted at the mayhem that could result from the deliberate release of "weaponized" disease agents. In his project report, "Biosecurity: Assessing Strategies to Prevent the Misuse of Dangerous Pathogens," Institute senior fellow Jonathan B. Tucker explored current national and international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring dangerous pathogens and argued for the establishment of a set of global biosecurity standards.
To date, most of the emphasis in countering bioterrorism has been on the medical and public health response to an attack, rather than on prevention. Tucker noted that while improved disease surveillance and medical countermeasures such as new drugs and vaccines are important, it is also desirable to invest in reducing the risk of an attack. He then distinguished between the concepts of biosafety and biosecurity. Whereas biosafety refers to measures to prevent the accidental release of pathogens, biosecurity involves measures that guard against the deliberate release of pathogens for malicious purposes.
However, most national and international legislation to date has focused on biosafety and not biosecurity. In a belated effort to improve security at microbiological laboratories and biological suppliers, the U.S. Congress passed a bioterrorism bill in 2002 that tightened controls over dangerous pathogens and toxins stored, used, and transferred within the United States. Nevertheless, according to Tucker, the international dimension of the biosecurity problem remains to be addressed. No uniform global standards for laboratory security currently exist on which individual states can base national legislation and regulatory structures. This lack of harmonization, Tucker said, has given rise to gaps and vulnerabilities that must be addressed as part of a coordinated global strategy to prevent bioterrorism.
The United States is only one of many countries that conduct research on infectious disease agents and maintain collections of dangerous pathogens. According to Tucker, one area of particular concern is the legacy of the Soviet offensive biological warfare program. Today, many former bioweapons-related facilities—now located in the independent states of Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia—have been converted to civilian activities. Nevertheless, they continue to possess collections of highly dangerous pathogens that could potentially be stolen or diverted for military, terrorist, or criminal purposes. Although improved security for collections of dangerous pathogens in the former Soviet Union is urgently needed, many laboratories—such as those associated with the network of Anti-Plague Institutes and field stations—lack the necessary financial and technical resources to implement these measures.
Tucker cautioned that the former Soviet Union is not the only area of concern. Several countries now operate maximum-containment (Biosafety Level 4) laboratories designed for work with the most dangerous and incurable pathogens. Security risks are also associated with roughly a third of the 1,500 state-owned and commercial culture collections worldwide that possess, exchange, and sell samples of microorganisms and toxins for legitimate scientific and biomedical research. Culture collections vary widely in size and content, ranging from large organizations such as the non-profit American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) in Virginia and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's collection of plant and animal pathogens in Ames, Iowa, to small "boutique" collections of microbial strains at universities, federal agencies, and private companies. Numerous culture collections outside the United States are not adequately secured and controlled, making them potentially vulnerable to theft by proliferators and terrorists. In addition, trade in microbial cultures is poorly regulated, both within countries and among them.
In order to address this problem, several countries in addition to the United States have passed legislation relating to laboratory security. Nevertheless, Tucker argued, national biosecurity regulations must be reasonably uniform to prevent terrorists from stealing deadly pathogens from poorly protected facilities in those countries where laws or enforcement are lax. Relying exclusively on uncoordinated national standards would lead to a patchwork quilt of regulations, creating pockets of weak implementation or enforcement that terrorists could exploit as targets of opportunity. Only global biosecurity standards, Tucker stressed, would place significant obstacles in their path.
Recently, a few international organizations have launched initiatives in the biosecurity field, including the World Federation for Culture Collections, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Union, and health ministers from the Group of Seven plus Mexico. While these initiatives are useful steps in the right direction, they remain uncoordinated and incomplete. Tucker stressed that truly global biosecurity standards would reduce the risk that terrorists could obtain dangerous pathogens from foreign sources, and would facilitate collaborative research to develop protective vaccines and drugs. For this reason, the international scientific community and the security community should work closely together to develop practical and cost-effective approaches to biosecurity.
Tucker offered a roadmap for the negotiation of global biosecurity standards, suggesting that they should include the following basic elements: (1) registration and licensing of facilities that work with dangerous pathogens, (2) guidelines for the physical security of these facilities, (3) measures for the accountability of dangerous pathogens and other biohazardous materials, (4) background investigations to ensure the suitability and reliability of laboratory personnel, and (5) an emergency response plan in case of breaches in biosecurity. Given that model legislation is problematic because countries have incompatible legal systems, Tucker suggested that a technical working group be established under the auspices of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) to develop detailed guidelines for national legislation. In addition to representatives of BWC member-states, this group might include experts from the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Organization for Animal Health.
To ensure a degree of uniformity and accountability in national implementation of the voluntary standards, Tucker also proposed that an international oversight mechanism be created. This mechanism, which might be coordinated by a small secretariat, would invite the participating states to submit written reports on implementation of the biosecurity standards and to attend annual meetings at which they can raise concerns about possible gaps in biosecurity in other countries and apply political pressure to ensure their correction. Tucker concluded his report by stating that the negotiation of global biosecurity standards would provide a concrete means of reducing the risk of bioterrorism, while strengthening the international legal norm against the acquisition and use of biological weapons by both states and terrorist organizations.
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