Unit Objectives Explainbuilding security design issues to a building owner for consideration prior to a renovation or new construction. Explainthe identification process to arrive at the high risk asset-threat/hazard pairs of interest. Justifythe recommended mitigation measures, explaining the benefits in reducing the risk for the high risk situations of interest. Hazardville Information Company Company ..Functions ..Infrastructure Threats/Hazards ..Design Basis Threat ..Levels of Protection Vulnerabilities ..Impact ..Mitigation Report Hazardville Information Company (HIC) FEMA 426, Figure 2-1: Example of Using GIS to Identify Adjacent Hazards, p. 2-5 HICHazardville Information CompanyIT services and support ..130 employeesTwo-story building in small corporate office parkLocated in suburban area of major metropolitan city“Neighbors”include: ..Offices ..Industry ..Road, Rail, Air traffic - 5-Mile Building Radius FEMA 426, Figure 2-1: Example of Using GIS to Identify Adjacent Hazards, p. 2-5 Local Imagery Site Imagery HazMat Sites Emergency Response Functional Layout Hazardville Information Company Car Bomb Blast EffectsPotential Blast EffectsRed Ring (20 ft) –Structural DamageOrange Ring (100 ft) –Probable Lethal InjuriesYellow Ring (150 ft) –Severe Injuries from Glass Truck Bomb Blast EffectsPotential Blast EffectsRed Ring (100 ft) –Structural DamageOrange Ring (500 ft) –Probable Lethal InjuriesYellow Ring (1,000 ft) –Severe Injuries from Glass Truck Bomb Blast EffectsPotential Blast EffectsRed Ring (35 ft) –Structural DamageOrange Ring (190 ft) –Probable Lethal InjuriesYellow Ring (350 ft) –Severe Injuries from Glass Building DataInfrastructureStructural ..2 Story steel frame with brick façade ..Annealed glassMechanical ..HVAC ..Gas ..Fire SystemsElectrical ..Primary ..Back-upIT ..Data Center ..TelecomPhysical Security Mechanical Systems Mechanical Systems Mechanical Systems Electrical Systems Mechanical and Electrical Room Information Technology Physical Security Emergency Response Source: Mine Safety Appliances Company Threats/Hazards Text Box: Threats include: Terrorism No direct threat to HIC Government, military, industry in the area Intelligence Collection Crime High threat in metro area, lower in suburbs Threats/Hazards HAZMATS- R-USHAZMATS- R-USHAZMATS- R-USHAZMATS- R-US Text Box: Threats (continued): HazMat Many facilities nearby Fuel farm and pipeline Interstate highway Rail line Natural Hazards Hurricanes – Infrequent Tornadoes – Almost every Spring Earthquakes – Infrequent Lightning - Frequent Computerized Elevation Looking Northwest Computerized Elevation Looking Northeast Design Basis Threat Explosive Blast:Car Bomb 250 lb TNT equivalent. Truck Bomb 5,000 lb TNT equivalent (Murrah Federal Building class weapon) Chemical:Large quantity gasoline spill and toxic plume from the adjacent tank farm, small quantity (tanker truck and rail car size) spills of HazMat materials (chlorine) Biological:Anthrax delivered by mail or in packages, smallpox distributed by spray mechanism mounted on truck or aircraft in metropolitan area Radiological:Small “dirty”bomb detonation within the 10-mile radius of the HIC building Levels of Protection GSA Interagency Security Criteria Level II Building –between 11-150 employees; 2,500 to 80,000 sq ft ..Perimeter Security ..Entry Security ..Interior Security ..Administrative Procedures ..Blast/Setback Standards Levels of Protection FEMA 426, Adapted from Table 4-1: DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for New Buildings, p. 4-9 Text Box: Potential Injury Text Box: DoD Antiterrorism Standards Levels of Protection Adapted from DoD Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC), “DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for New Buildings”, UFC 4-010-01, 31 July 2002 Text Box: DoD Antiterrorism StandardsStand-off Distance or Separation RequirementsBuilding CategoryLocationInhabited BuildingControlled Perimeter or Parking and Roadways without a Controlled PerimeterApplicable Level of ProtectionConventional Construction Stand-off DistanceEffective Stand-off DistanceApplicable Explosives WeightVery Low25 m82 ft10 m33 ftCar Bomb Levels of Protection Building Entrance LayoutStandard 12Windows, Skylights, and Glazed Doors Standard 11Exterior Masonry WallsStandard 10Building Overhangs Standard 9Structural Isolation Standard 8Progressive Collapse Avoidance Standard 7Parking Beneath Buildings or on RooftopsStandard 6Access Roads Standard 5Drive-Up/Drop-Off AreasStandard 4Unobstructed Space Standard 3Standard 2Minimum Stand-off Distances Standard 1UFC 4-010-01 APPENDIX BDoD MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS FOR NEW AND EXISTING BUILDINGSExterior Doors Levels of Protection (continued) Mass Notification Under Building AccessStandard 22Equipment BracingStandard 21Utility Distribution and Installation Standard 20Emergency Air Distribution ShutoffStandard 19Mailroom VentilationStandard 18Air IntakesStandard 17Overhead Mounted Architectural Features Standard 16Roof Access Standard 15Mailrooms Standard 14Standard 13UFC 4-010-01 APPENDIX BDoD MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS FOR NEW AND EXISTING BUILDINGS Unit XII Case Study Activity Finalization and Presentation of Group Results Purpose ..Groups finalize their assessments ..Decide on high priority risk concerns ..Determine appropriate mitigation measures ..Present findings to class Requirements Based on findings from previous activities, complete the worksheet table Prepare to present conclusions and justify decisions to class in a 5-to 7-minute presentation Vulnerability/Mitigation Basis of Mitigation Measures Recommendations ultimately require an understanding of benefit (capability) versus cost to implement Blast Modeling ..Various scenarios run at Tier III level for comparison using Design Basis Threats ..Truck bomb is worst case ..Car bomb also analyzed for comparison ..Some interesting and unexpected results ..More analysis required for final design Vulnerability/Mitigation Basis of Mitigation Measures Plume Modeling (CBR or HazMat) ..Tier II / Tier III performed for selected Design Basis Threats external to building ..Additional Tier III analysis required inside building ..Understand internal pressure changes during building operation ..Understand how HVAC and other changes implemented in response plans affect building ..Supports design of CBR measures Vulnerability/Mitigation Basis of Mitigation Measures Cost Estimates are ROM (Rough Order of Magnitude) ..Assumes 10% Overhead and 10% Profit ..Assumes Area Cost Factor of 1.0 (DoD) or 100 (RS Means) ..DoD Range: 0.84(Huntsville AL) to 1.67(Anchorage AK) ..RS Means Range: 82.5(Baton Rouge LA) to 131.9(New York NY) ..Adjusted for July 2006 ..Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection equipment and construction costing information is still immature Vulnerability/Mitigation Site / Vehicle Bomb Maximize available stand-off ..Front side along sidewalk to prevent direct approach into building and ensure stand-off –100 LF ..Due to straightaways on front and back of building, need K12 stopping power ..Planters -$22.3K ..Plinth wall -$50.7K ..Landscaping (boulders) -$19.5K Vulnerability/Mitigation Building Envelope / Vehicle Bomb Harden windows (balanced envelope) ..Fragment Retention Film ..Not costed --could not meet performance required for upgraded stand-off ..Laminated glass --56 windows ..½”laminated interior pane with 0.060 PVB interlayer, air gap to 0.25 inches, and retention of exterior pane -$170.8K Window Hardening Original GlazingLarge DBT –1,136 ftSmall DBT –338 ftHardened GlazingLarge DBT –422 / 579 ftSmall DBT –29 / 150 ftBetween the two hardened glazing distances glass blows OUT of building Vulnerability/Mitigation Building Envelope / Vehicle Bomb Harden exterior --Close in overhang ..Brick bonded to 4" Reinforced Concrete Wall, #3 rebar @12 inches each way -$64.2K ..Brick backed with truck bed liner -$34.6K ..Deduct window hardening if overhang enclosed – ($85.4K) Infill Hardening Overhang Infill –Brick OnlyLarge DBT –1,210 ftSmall DBT –88 ftHardened Overhang Infillw/ R/C Backup WallLarge DBT –422 ftSmall DBT –32 ft Infill Hardening Overhang Infill –Brick OnlyLarge DBT –1,210 ftSmall DBT –88 ftHardened Overhang Infillw/ Spray-On LinerLarge DBT –213 ftSmall DBT –17 ft Vulnerability/Mitigation Building Envelope / Vehicle Bomb Harden walls (balanced envelope) ..Vermiculite in wall cavity -$23.5K ..Spray on truck bed liner -$43.4K Wall Hardening Cavity Wall –CMU OnlyLarge DBT –1,022 ftSmall DBT –230 ftHardened Cavity Wallsw/ Vermiculite in gapLarge DBT –371 ftSmall DBT –31 ft Wall HardeningCavity Wall –CMU OnlyLarge DBT –1,022 ftSmall DBT –230 ftHardened Cavity Wallsw/ Spray-On LinerLarge DBT –171 ftSmall DBT –42 ft Vulnerability/Mitigation Site / Vehicle Bomb Protect site from truck bomb by establishing controlled perimeter ..Chain link fencing along main road –K8 with two aircraft cables -$50,500 ..Vehicle pop-up barriers –K8, 3 entrances -$181.7K ..Pre-screening away from building Facility (Pre-Engineering Building) -$35,000 Manpower/year -$187.2K Vulnerability/Mitigation Architectural / Vehicle Bomb Strengthen overhead anchorage elements ..Heaters -$2.1K Vulnerability/Mitigation Site / Armed Attack (Physical Security) Controlled Perimeter ..Fencing on three sides of site not on main road - $66.0K ..Upgrade Security Ops Center (security managers office) –digital CCTV, digital video recording (DVR), and cameras for complete building coverage - $55.0K Vulnerability/Mitigation Architectural / Mailroom Separate front lobby from interior office space ..Harden wall between lobby and office space - $22.9K ..Harden door between lobby and office space - $4.4K ..Separate HVAC system -$4.4K ..Total $31.7K Separate Mailroom, hardened with separate HVAC - $40.0K Vulnerability/Mitigation Utilities / Mechanical Systems / Vehicle Bomb Natural gas meters / pressure regulators ..Bollards, K12, 3 total -$2.3K ..Fencing (access control) -$0.20K Utilities / Electrical Systems / Vehicle Bomb Electrical transformers ..Bollards, K12, 6 total –$4.6K Vulnerability/Mitigation Mechanical Systems / Fire Alarm Systems / General Vulnerability –Redundancy Fire Alarm / Suppression ..Install annunciator panel -$3.5K ..Fire detection zones for HIC corporate space with dual detection in Data Center -$81.0K ..Convert Data Center to clean agent to supplement water (check local code) -$137.5K Chilled Water ..Install backup piping to primary air handling units - $26.0K Vulnerability/Mitigation Electrical Systems / General Vulnerability – Redundancy Increase size of generator fuel tank ..2,000 to 3,000 gallons (30 hours at full output) - $17.0K ..3,000 gallons of diesel fuel -$8.7K ..Total $25.7K ..Arrange multiple suppliers for daily deliveries under worst case conditions Conduct full and extended load test of emergency generator and UPS system to confirm performance Vulnerability/Mitigation Mechanical Systems-HVAC / CBR Attack ..Protect outside air intake -$21.0K (architecturally compatible) ..Emergency shut down switch -$10.0K ..Upgrade filters to MERV 11/13 (gasoline plume and radioactive particulates) -$25.0K (filter assembly only) to -$500.0K (upgraded air handling) Fire Plumes –Smoke & CO10 micron particulatesCarbon MonoxideHIC fireHIC fireSmoke ParticlesCarbon Monoxide Vulnerability/Mitigation Mechanical Systems-HVAC / CBR Attack ..Evaluate carbon filters for chlorine type spills -$130.0K ..Evaluate UVGI -$8.0K Plume ModelingIDLH10 PPMERPG 23 PPMTanker Truckturns over on the interstate ½mile south of HIC bldg. A 6 inch hole in the tank releases 5100 gallons (30 tons) of chlorine Summer conditions: Wind: S @ 7 mphTemp 70oFPartly cloudyNo inversion HIC Chlorine Release Parameters •Rapid release yields a large plume •IDLH four miles long and over 1 mile wide •Slow release reduces plume size •IDLH less than 2 miles long and 0.5 miles wide *Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health –maximum concentration that allows 30 minutes exposure without serious or irreversible health risk * Emergency Response Planning Guide (1 hour exposure guidelines) 1 = mild symptoms, 2 = moderate symptoms, but without irreversible damage and not incapacitating Chlorine Release FootprintsRapid Release (2 minutes) Slow Release (1 hour) ** * ** Chlorine Concentrations at HICInstantly FatalRapid Release (2 minutes) Slow Release (1 hour) •Rapid spike outdoors at HIC from 6 –12 minutes later•Instantly fatal concentration levels for this short period•Indoor concentrations remain low during plume passage•Evacuees likely to become fatalities from 0.5 to 4 miles downwind during typical evacuation times (5-30 minutes) particularly absent clear/proper evacuation instructions •Rapid spike outdoors at HIC begins at 6 minutes and continues for over an hour but at 100x lower levels•Short exposures at 20-30 ppm (2xIDLH) for any lengthy period could cause serious or irreversible health problems•Indoor concentrations remain below IDLH for > 1 hour and below ERPG 2 for > 0.5 hours Rapid Release (2 minutes) Slow Release (1 hour) Chlorine Dose at HIC Text Box: Vulnerability/Mitigation IT Communications Systems / Utility Systems / Cyber Attack -Redundancy Identify alternate telecom carrier circuits and availability Vulnerability/Mitigation Emergency Operations & Response Post shelter and evacuation procedures -$900 Identify rally points (A, B, C) at sites away from building - $900 Conference Room for shelter-in-place (130 people) [Sealing and Overpressurization] –$177.4K Personal protective evacuation hoods -$180 / person - $23.4K