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Safety management is one aspect
of a multifaceted set of functions that need to be carried
out during the response to any emergency. Without effective
management of the overall operation, safety management cannot
be successful. As a response operation involves increasing
numbers of responders or response units, it becomes all the
more imperative to run the operation from an overarching strategic
perspective. Without such leadership, even responders from
a single organization are less effective in anything they
do, including protecting responder safety [Brunacini 2002].
At a major disaster, the magnitude of the hazards, the urgent
threat to public safety, and the involvement of scores of
organizations further amplify the importance of having managers
and structures in place to deal with the barrage of situations
and coordinate multiple responders. Even if conducted with
the best of intentions, efforts to respond to such incidents
in the absence of strategic management have been described
as “nothing more than well-meaning chaos” [Maniscalco
and Christen 2001, 25].
Recognizing this need, response organizations in recent years
have increasingly employed a comprehensive framework for |
managing the many different activities that organizations carry
out during a response operation. Called the “Incident Command
System” (ICS), it is broadly recognized within today’s
response community as the preferred approach to disaster management.
One of its hallmarks is its flexibility: Not only can it be used
in small-scale emergencies, it is also designed to be scaled up
as events increase in size and complexity. Accordingly, responders
have employed it during both local crises and major catastrophes.
Built into the ICS is an approach to managing the safety of responders.
Response organizations carry out the three functions of the safety
management cycle —gathering information, analyzing options
and making decisions, and taking action —within this framework.
Because the ICS is a recognized standard for managing emergency
response operations, we used the ICS approach to managing responder
safety as the baseline for our research. As we explored how the
emergency response community can build upon its existing strengths
and further expand its capabilities, we considered the ICS as the
benchmark.
Origins of the Incident Command System
Initial efforts to create a systematic approach to managing emergency
response operations grew out of the wildland firefighting community,
which historically had faced serious problems managing multiagency
participation in responses to major fires. These issues included
- lack of common command structures
- lack of common terminology and communications practices
- lack of a mechanism to effectively assign resources
- no means of coordinating functions and tasks
- lack of a clear leader
- unproductive competition for resources among responding organizations
[Maniscalco and Christen 2001; Christen et al. 2001].
In 1972, Congress charged a group of firefighting agencies named
the FIRESCOPE coalition “to develop a system for multiagency
coordination of complex emergencies that exceeded the capabilities
of any single jurisdiction” [Cole 2000].
In response, FIRESCOPE developed the ICS. Since its inception,
ICS has evolved considerably through a range of initiatives [Kipp
and Loflin 1996]:
- integrating command systems designed for smaller-scale, single
organization operations [Brunacini 2002]
- incorporating components to address the needs of different types
of operations —for example, multicasualty incidents, hazardous
materials response, highrise fires, and marine operations
- supplementing the core command system with training and doctrine
for particular types of operations [U.S. Forest Service 2003]
- codifying the system into standards and model practices [National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 2002c; National Fire Service
Incident Management Consortium (NFSIMC) 2000]
- adapting the system for use by different response disciplines,
such as law enforcement and hospital response operations [Christen
et al. 2001; Cardwell and Cooney 2000].1
How the Incident Command System Works
The ICS includes five major sections, each with a defined function
[FEMA 1998], as shown in Figure 3.1:
- Incident Commander and Command Staff
- Operations
- Logistics
- Planning
- Administration/Finance.
These operational sections provide a template for organizing activities
and resources during a response. By providing a standard organizational
structure, the ICS facilitates interagency coordination: Agencies
can “plug” their resources and assets into the appropriate
ICS sections and coordinate with other responder organizations as
they carry out their tasks.2
To accommodate the great variation in emergency incidents, the
ICS is flexible and scalable. The roles shown in Figure
3.1 are only filled as required during a response. For example,
at smaller-scale incidents, not every position will need to be staffed.
In contrast, given the scale and duration of major disaster operations,
all the elements of the command structure will likely be filled.
The four functional sections of the ICS—Operations, Logistics,
Planning, and Administration/Finance—can be subdivided as
needed into different branches, divisions, groups, or task forces.
Such breakdowns can be used to group types of resources or organize
resources that have been assigned to particular roles within an
incident response. By building in intermediate levels of management,
the ICS provides a mechanism to ensure that individual managers
have a reasonable number of individuals and responsibility areas
under their command. Maintaining a workable span of control is critical
for effective management.3
Figure 3.1
Incident Command System Structure |
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RAND MG170 |
Unified Command. To further facilitate multiagency
coordination, the ICS includes the concept of “Unified Command.”
This concept provides a mechanism for a response to be managed by
a command team of representatives from multiple organizations, rather
than by a single Incident Commander.4
In essence, a Unified Command team brings together Incident Commanders
from response organizations that have disparate jurisdictional or
other responsibilities.5 In
this way, a Unified Command provides a mechanism for response agencies
to determine a collective set of strategies, which ideally prevents
agencies from working at cross purposes and ensures that all available
resources are effectively applied to deal with the disaster [Auf
der Heide 1989].
Use of a Unified Command does not necessarily mean that all participating
organizations will be equally involved in all management decisions.
Depending on the nature of the incident, there will likely be a
lead agency with primary authority or responsibility.6
In that case, representatives from other agencies would defer to
the Incident Commander from the agency with primary authority and
responsibility at the incident [U.S. National Response Team, not
dated]. In other cases, different individuals might take on this
role of “focal point” of the Unified Command during
different phases of the incident [Kane 2001].
The National Incident Management System
On February 28, 2003, during the later phases of data gathering
for this study, the White House released Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD)-5, 2003. This directive aims to further institutionalize
a standard management approach to major incidents by establishing
a “single, comprehensive national incident management system”
[HSPD-5 2003]. The Secretary of Homeland Security is charged with
administering a National Incident Management System (NIMS) as part
of the National Response Plan (NRP). The NRP is intended to integrate
federal government activities involving domestic prevention, preparedness,
response, and recovery plans into a single, all-discipline, all-hazards
plan.
According to the presidential directive, the NIMS will provide
a nationwide approach that enables federal, state, and local government
agencies to “work effectively and efficiently together to
prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless
of cause, size, or complexity” [HSPD-5 2003, 2]. The NIMS
is expected to provide concepts, terminology, coordination systems,
training, and other features (including Unified Command) that will
encourage interoperability and compatibility among federal, state,
and local agencies.7 At this
writing, initial versions of the NIMS and NRP had been released.
Safety Within the Incident Command System
Responding organizations using the ICS assemble the overall command
structure at an emergency scene as needed. In the same way, they
put together the staff and structure for managing responder safety
as an incident evolves and needs become apparent. When a response
begins, responsibility for the entire operation—including
responder safety—lies with the Incident Commander. For small
and relatively straightforward incidents, the Incident Commander
may retain safety responsibility throughout the response. But for
larger, more complex incidents—though “the Incident
Commander’s first priority” ultimately remains “the
life safety of the emergency responders and the public” [FEMA
1998, 1–10]8—he
or she may simply be unable to devote as much attention to the task
as it demands. To accommodate such situations, the ICS provides
a mechanism for the Incident Commander to delegate authority to
an Incident Safety Officer (ISO).9
This ensures that sufficient attention is focused on the safety,
health, and welfare of responders.
Within the ICS structure, the ISO is part of the Command Staff
(Figure 3.2), reporting directly to the Incident
Commander.10 In this role,
the ISO serves as risk manager for the incident, with immediate
authority to stop unsafe acts or hazardous activities in order to
protect responders [FEMA 1999a].
As the risk manager, the ISO evaluates response activities in light
of the evolving hazard environment. This activity includes carrying
out all phases of the safety management cycle described above. Specifically,
he or she
- assesses hazards and reports them to the Incident Commander
- provides the Incident Commander with risk assessments
- communicates instances of injury, illness, or exposure to the
Incident Commander
- makes predictions about issues for responder safety that could
arise during the incident
- ensures that safety systems (such as personnel accountability/tracking,
rehabilitation, etc.) are in place and safety policies are followed
- monitors incident communications for events that pose safety
concerns
- confirms that needed hazard information is being communicated
effectively to all responders.11
Figure 3.2
Safety Responsibility in the Incident Command System |
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RAND MG170-3.2 |
By maintaining awareness of the overall scene and how its changing
circumstances affect responder safety, an effective ISO provides
a vital strategic-level view of the safety concerns inherent in
all the diverse response activities taking place at an incident.
However, the nature of disaster response situations significantly
increases the demands on an ISO and, in the absence of supplementary
resources and capabilities, makes it much more difficult to effectively
fill this role. The recommendations in the following chapters seek
to build the needed functional capabilities and organizational structures
to allow safety management to effectively scale up for large-scale,
multi organizational disaster response operations.
1 In some areas and jurisdictions, the ICS is referred
to as the incident management system [e.g., Christen et al. 2001].
The recommendations for improving safety management in this report
are intended to be relevant to all jurisdictions whatever terminology
they currently use.
2 While a common structure is a necessary condition
for effective coordination, it is not sufficient on its own. Also
required are common terminology; integrated communications; and
designated incident facilities, such as command posts and staging
areas, used by all responding organizations [FEMA 1998].
3 Span of control refers to each manager having a reasonable
number of individuals whose activities they are supervising. To
ensure effective oversight, managers should only have between three
and seven individuals under their command [FEMA 1998].
4 Participation in a Unified
Command does not take away the authority, responsibility, or accountability
of those organizations for activities in the response [FEMA 1998,
1–13].
5 The requirements to participate in an operational
Unified Command have been defined primarily in terms of legal responsibilities
for the incident. See USCG, 2001, for an exemplary set of such requirements.
6 The details of implementing a Unified Command in
response operations—such as organizational roles, responsibilities,
and relationships—can differ significantly from area to area
and among types of response operations. As a result, the details
must be defined during multiagency preparedness planning to ensure
that response operations can be managed effectively.
7 More specifically, HSPD-5, 2003, directs that the
NIMS include a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and
technologies covering the ICS; multiagency coordination systems;
Unified Command; training, identification, and management of resources
(including systems for classifying types of resources); qualifications
and certification; and collection, tracking, and reporting of incident
information and incident resources [HSPD-5 2003, 2].
8 See also NFPA, 2002a, p. 8.1.5.
9 “As incidents escalate in size and complexity,
the incident commander shall . . . assign an incident safety officer
to assess the incident scene for hazards or potential hazards”
[NFPA 2002a, 8.1.6].
10 The Command Staff also includes a liaison officer,
an information officer, and other command aides that support the
commander and contribute to protecting responder safety. The liaison
officer serves as the connection between the command structure and
supporting or cooperating agencies that are not under the ICS [USCG
2001].
11 Adapted from NFPA, 2002c, pp. 9–10; FEMA,
1999a; NFSIMC, 2000; and Kipp and Loflin, 1996.
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