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Once information is available
to incident and safety managers, they must determine the relevance
of that information to responder safety and make judgments
on appropriate courses of action. Taking advantage of the
disparate sources of information available to them, particularly
in the early stages of a response operation, managers must
identify the critical areas where action can be taken to protect
the responders under their command.1
Their capability to effectively identify critical areas depends
on management tools and capacities in three main areas (see
Figure 5.1):
- Assessing Hazards. Access to guidelines or technical
expertise that provide a clear understanding of the risk
posed to responders by the hazard environment.
- Managing Risk. Knowledge of the response needs
to allow comparison of the potential benefit of response
actions to the risks they entail.
- Choosing Protective Options and Planning for Safety
Needs. Management tools and processes to provide up-to-date
information on available protective equipment and matching
protective options to the hazard environment.
During routine emergency response operations, the requirements
to make effective safety decisions are relatively well |
defined. In the course of their operational activities, responders
in all disciplines build experience with the hazards routinely involved
in their activities and develop methods to assess risk and appropriately
match protective options to safety requirements. The nature of disaster
situations, however, makes it difficult to assess safety issues or
to carry out this type of deliberative decision process.
Figure
5.1
Making Decisions and Assessing Options |
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• Performing hazard assessment
• Making risk management decisions
• Selecting appropriate protective measures |
RAND MG170-5.1 |
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Assessing Hazards: Judging the Level of
Risk Faced by Responders
Once hazard information is available to a safety manager, the data
must be assessed to evaluate the danger posed to responders. In
the earliest stages of response operations, this assessment will
be based on information that is immediately available to the first
responders at the scene. Although this initial “size up”
will guide safety management efforts during the early stages of
operations, the characteristics of disaster situations pose significant
challenges to the continuation of effective hazard assessment.
Large Geographic Scale. The scale of major disasters,
and the resulting magnitude of the safety concerns, can prevent
safety managers from effectively assessing hazards. Because of the
demands of the disaster, a single safety manager may be forced to
address more safety issues than he or she can reasonably manage.
Large Numbers of People Affected, Injured, or Killed.
The need to take immediate action when lives are at risk limits
the time responders have available to make decisions. Such time
constraints make it difficult for safety managers to effectively
assess hazards and the risks posed to responders.2
In the most intense situations, safety managers may even be “pulled
away” into operational activities, thus compromising efforts
to consistently assess safety hazards [Study Interviews].
Multiple, Highly Varied Hazards. The unusual hazards
in some post-disaster environments can make it difficult to translate
monitoring information into practical and actionable hazard assessments.
During day-to-day response activities, responders build considerable
experience with the hazards they routinely face. In disasters, most
responders face hazards that are unfamiliar and are more difficult
to assess. For some hazards—such as environmental pollutants,
unusual hazardous materials, or biological threats—hazard
assessment information may be highly technical in nature. In some
cases, there is no consensus on guidelines or regulatory requirements
to define what constitutes a dangerous level for particular hazards
[EPA 2002].
Wide Range of Needed Capabilities. The involvement
of many responder organizations in large-scale responses can also
complicate hazard assessment. If different organizations use different
criteria to judge whether the area is dangerous, serious confusion
can arise. At the World Trade Center site, for example, disparities
in the hazard assessment efforts of different agencies occurred
because differing standards were being applied [Lioy and Gochfeld
2002]. Different standards were used by various organizations measuring
asbestos, for example, leading to confusion about the results [Lippy
2002].3 Data sharing problems
among separate agencies can also complicate hazard assessment efforts.
Recommendation 5.1—Identify and Connect with Experts in Hazard
Assessment During Preparedness Planning
The nature of some hazards involved in disasters requires that
technical and safety experts from outside “traditional”
response organizations become involved in safety management decision
making. Hazard assessment is a process of identifying the hazards
present at the scene and determining their potential impact on responder
health and safety. While knowing the level of a hazard is a first
step, a safety manager also needs to understand how responders’
exposures are affected by their activities. All relevant variables
must be weighed in the context of the response situation to enable
sound decisions on how the hazards can be effectively managed. Because
disaster response operations are inherently time-limited environments,
these assessment decisions must be made rapidly.
Making these assessments for many hazards requires technical input
beyond simply providing information on the presence or level of
a hazard at the disaster scene. As a result, technical experts and
responders from safety-related organizations participating in safety
management need to provide safety managers with the context and
follow-up required for hazard information to be useful. In the case
of complex respiratory hazards, for example, hazard assessment requires
information beyond simply measuring the level of a contaminant in
the environment.4 Such information
includes the likely health effects of particular hazards, the applicability
of different protective options to reduce hazard exposures, and
the consequences on response operations and for responders from
potential safety actions. Such assessment is straightforward for
some hazards, such as the physical risks posed to responders by
debris at some disaster scenes. For others, however, where the biological
effects of particular materials are not fully understood or there
is no consensus on appropriate protective options, significant expert
input may be required for decision making.
To ensure that appropriate expertise is available after a disaster
occurs, relevant technical experts and organizations must be identified
as a component of preparedness activities. Response safety managers
must understand any procedural or legal requirements to call required
experts in after a disaster and how rapidly they can respond to
an evolving event. These experts could be drawn from federal, state,
or local regulatory or technical agencies, universities, nongovernmental
organizations, or the private sector. Depending on the nature of
the disaster, individuals with knowledge relevant to safety management
could range from military experts on unconventional weapons and
infectious disease epidemiologists to industrial hygienists or occupational
physicians. Integrating such assistance into decision making also
requires significant interagency coordination to foster the needed
exchange between operational responders and outside hazard experts.5
When there is no mechanism for this interaction to occur or barriers
between organizations get in the way of effective cooperation, critical
technical information for protecting responder safety may not be
effectively linked to safety and operational decisions.
Recommendation 5.2—Develop a Better Understanding of Relevant
Exposure Thresholds and Guidelines for Disaster Response Conditions
In project interviews and workshop discussions, responders indicated
that there are significant problems in defining the appropriate
regulatory guidelines and exposure thresholds to interpret hazard
data during emergency response.
Questions were raised about the appropriateness of existing occupational
exposure guidelines for shorter-term, potentially very intense exposures
during emergency response operations [Study Workshop; Lioy and Gochfeld
2002].6 Differences must also
be resolved between exposure thresholds defined for occupational
environments versus those for overall exposure of the public at
large [Study Workshop].
From the diversity of views observed, it is clear that there is
no current consensus on appropriate thresholds and standards for
interpreting monitoring data during disaster response conditions.
To improve overall understanding of hazard exposures, there is a
need for further scientific research and data collection to better
understand intense short-term hazards exposures, simultaneous exposure
to many hazards, and the potential long-term health effects that
can result. Because of the complexity of these areas, such a research
effort represents a long-term investment to improve understanding
in these areas.
In the short term, guidelines are needed to assist Incident Commanders
in making decisions as part of the overall risk-benefit analysis
of response operations. Development of these guidelines must involve
the full range of response organizations so technical disagreements
about hazard data can be addressed and, to the extent possible,
resolved as part of preparedness efforts. It is clear that such
technical disagreement cannot be successfully resolved during the
time-limited and high pressure conditions of an ongoing disaster
response.
Managing Risk: Balancing Risks and Benefits
in Response
Hazard information provides the basis for risk assessment—weighing
the need for decisive operational action against the risks involved
in doing so. Safety managers provide critical input on risks and
safety options that Incident Commanders consider in the context
of the practical needs of the response. Effective safety management
therefore requires a clear judgment on whether disaster victims
can still be rescued or whether response activities are in a recovery,
or cleanup, mode [Worker Education and Training Program 2002]. The
nature of disaster situations makes drawing this distinction particularly
difficult, however.
Large Numbers of People Affected, Injured, or Killed.
Because of the large number of individuals affected by a disaster,
it is often difficult to determine the potential benefit from continued
rescue operations. Although distinguishing between the rescue and
recovery phases of a response seems clear in principle, making the
distinction during particular responses is often problematic [Neal
1995]. Identifying extreme cases is straightforward. At the site
of the September 11, 2001, crash of Flight 93 in Shanksville, it
could be quickly established that there were no survivors and a
decision could be made to adjust response tactics [Grant and Hoover
2002]. Response activities at the World Trade Center site are an
example of a much more difficult case because circumstances prevented
local authorities from making a clear distinction between the rescue
and recovery phases.7
Wide Range of Needed Response Capabilities. The
involvement of multiple organizations in major disaster response
can also create other complications for safety decision making Organizations
from different response disciplines can have very different approaches
to risk management [Jackson et al. 2002]. Such differences in approach
can derive from the nature of their activities—e.g., law enforcement
responders have different practical concerns about some risks compared
with the concerns of emergency medical responders. Such differences
can result in organizations coming to different judgments about
appropriate risk levels.
Recommendation 5.3—Address the Transition Between the Rescue
and Recovery Phases of Disaster Response Operations in Preparedness
Planning
After a major event, making the decision that the diminishing chances
of rescuing anyone alive no longer justify putting responders at
an elevated risk is difficult. Views clearly differ on the right
approach to this issue. Some responders indicated that, since victim
survivability is so difficult to predict, it is important to maintain
rescue operations as long as any possibility exists. Others voiced
caution at that strategy, emphasizing the added risks involved in
the faster pace of rescue operations.
In the aftermath of a disaster, concluding rescue operations will
almost certainly be exceptionally difficult for responders and political
leaders alike [Study Interviews]. However, a decision not to address
such issues head on could have significant consequences for responder
safety, depending on the incident. Although there was no consensus
on the correct approach to solving this problem, it is clear that
the politically and emotionally charged environment after a disaster
is not an appropriate time to resolve such differences. Planning
for this transition, including how the decision will be made and
who will make it, should be included in pre-disaster preparedness
activities.
Choosing Protective Options and Planning
for Safety Needs: Supporting Effective Decision making in Responder
Protection and Risk Mitigation
A key component of safety management decision making is choosing
appropriate protective equipment and/or risk mitigating measures
in light of available hazard information. To make good decisions,
safety managers need a clear understanding of the equipment options
available to them, how to choose among them, and how to project
protection and resource needs as response efforts continue. However,
the characteristics of major disasters complicate making these protection
decisions.
Multiple, Highly Varied Hazards. The potential
for unusual hazards in the post disaster environment complicates
protection decisions. During the earliest phases of response operations,
detailed hazard assessment information is often not available to
guide selection among safety equipment options. Furthermore, shortages
of supplies may also mean that the best equipment for particular
hazards is not immediately available.
Wide Range of Needed Response Capabilities. While
many different responder organizations are needed to address the
operational needs of disaster response operations, various organizations
often come with very different equipment and safety related capabilities.
These variations can have a major effect on the range of safety
options available to safety managers. In addition, the number and
variety of individual responders involved make estimating equipment
needs for the response more difficult.
Influx of Convergent Volunteers and Supplies.
While different response organizations come to disaster response
operations with differing equipment and capabilities, convergent
volunteers often come without supplies or training in the use of
protective equipment. Donations of safety-related equipment, while
potentially important for both responders and volunteers, also challenge
decision making This perspective was highlighted as a serious problem
after both Hurricane Andrew and the Oklahoma City bombing [Study
Interviews; Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management 2000].
If such convergent supplies are not systematically inventoried,
managers do not know what are available and cannot integrate them
into safety management.
Recommendation 5.4—During Disaster Planning, Address Issues
Concerning Safety Equipment and Multi agency Coordination of Safety
Logistics
For safety managers to make good decisions among potential protective
options, they require accessible and accurate information about
the options available at the incident scene or from outside organizations.
Safety managers need to know what particular organizations bring
to an incident scene and where needed equipment can be obtained
when an event occurs. In some cases, other responding organizations
may be able to provide supplemental safety equipment. Pre positioned
supply caches maintained by federal agencies should also be integrated
into planning. In addition, safety managers may have to make arrangements
with private firms to provide needed supplies. The high-pressure
conditions immediately following a disaster are a difficult time
to pursue new supplier relationships or seek out equipment from
new sources.8
As a component of preparedness planning, responder organizations
should maintain up-to-date inventories of their own resources and
any external resources available through agreements or standing
contracts. These lists should also include information on any requirements
to activate mutual aid pacts, invoke interagency agreements, call
on federal resources, or purchase supplemental supplies [Lewis 1993;
NFPA 2000b]. To the extent possible, resource planning should also
seek to address equipment interoperability concerns that can prevent
most effective use of safety equipment in Multi agency operations
[Jackson et al. 2002]. It is also critical to plan for any training
needed for responders to use equipment effectively. If responders
are given equipment that is not properly fitted or are not instructed
in its proper use, its effectiveness could be reduced or eliminated
[Lippy and Murray 2002]. To the extent possible, these analyses
should also try to identify if multiple response organizations in
an area are relying on equipment support from the same external
organizations or vendors. If this is the case, supplemental capabilities
may not be available when a large-scale incident occurs.
Because disaster response operations may include organizations
from outside the immediate area, groups that are not included in
pre-planning activities may become involved in response operations.
Methods to address these groups must be included as part of the
planning process. Information on their equipment could be integrated
into decision making if they provide sufficient information to safety
managers when they arrive at the incident scene. Alternatively,
the credentialing systems discussed previously could provide safety
managers with information on responders’ equipment.
Promoting standardization and interoperability may be an effective
strategy to address Multi agency safety equipment coordination concerns
at large-scale incidents. If safety equipment is standardized and
interoperable, safety managers will no longer need to collect information
on different organizations’ resources since compatibility
could be assumed. This could significantly reduce the logistical
burden involved in providing supplies during an extended response
and could free up managers’ time and attention for other safety
concerns.
Recommendation 5.5—Develop Guidelines for Selecting Protective
Equipment to Use in the Early Phase of Response
During the earliest phases of response operations, before technical
expertise can be brought to bear or supplemental safety equipment
can be located, responders and safety managers need guidelines,
checklists, or other decision making tools to assist in developing
appropriate protection strategies. Such tools should provide guidance
for selecting equipment based on the initial “size up”
of the situation and processes to reevaluate protective options
as response operations continue and additional information becomes
available.9
Recommendation 5.6—Develop Guidelines for Estimating the Safety
Equipment Requirements for Disaster Response Operations
In addition to determining the type of safety resources needed
for a disaster response, safety managers (in coordination with the
logistics section of response management, see Figure
3.1) must also estimate the amount of various safety resources
that will be needed over the course of the response effort.10
To the extent that equipment needs can be defined, reasonable projections
of required equipment help to avoid oversights in resource requests
or, conversely, requests for supplies that are not needed, unnecessarily
complicating logistics operations. Because of the complexity of
large-scale, Multi agency operations, safety managers need better
methods to estimate resource needs to guide safety logistics efforts.
Summary
Safety management decision making faces a series of challenges,
exacerbated during the early phase of a major disaster response
when time pressures are severe and substantial uncertainty exists.
To effectively protect responders, safety managers need better guidelines
and technical support to carry out hazard assessment and clearer
risk assessment criteria as response operations transition from
rescue to recovery phases. To support effective decision making
on responder protective equipment issues, preparedness efforts must
ensure that safety managers can rapidly determine available equipment
options, have guidelines to assist in choosing equipment in the
absence of relevant or complete hazard information, and can reasonably
estimate safety equipment needs for large-scale and extended response
operations.
1 Other response decisions can affect responder safety.
The choice among response strategies can have safety implications,
and some operational actions may affect the presence or intensity
of hazards, e.g., when extinguishing fires. For the purposes of
this discussion, these decisions are considered operational in nature,
and although they would likely involve the input of safety managers,
they are not categorized as safety management decision making
2 Under time-constrained conditions, managers often
rely on cues from their earlier experience to allow rapid decision
making [Klein 1998]. Most response organizations, however, lack
experience in managing disaster-scale operations.
3 Responders indicated that similar problems occurred
in the Pentagon response [Study Interviews].
4 In project discussions, such data on levels were
often criticized for being “non-actionable,” since,
on their own, the data did not provide enough information to guide
safety decisions. On the other hand, when technical experts sought
only to provide the “correct answer,” i.e., what protective
equipment should be worn or what policy implemented based on their
hazard assessment efforts, the results might not sufficiently consider
the operational needs of the response. For example, at the Pentagon
response, some safety and health officials “pressed for a
strict policy that would guarantee protection under the most severe
conditions, including having all responders operate in Tyvek®
suits, regardless of their particular assignment”[Arlington
County 2002, A-68]. However, because of the heat stress risk involved
in having responders wear these suits for extended periods, this
strategy was deemed impractical. Instead, comprehensive decontamination
and cleaning of responder equipment was substituted as a safety
management strategy that struck a better balance between the operational
mission and safety needs of responders engaged in rescue operations.
5 This need for integration was one component that
drove the research team to consider the integrated, incident wide
approach described in Chapter Seven.
6 During the period that research for this study was
being performed, OSHA was also carrying out an evaluation of the
applicability of regulations and productive roles for regulatory
agencies in post-disaster environments.
7 Study Interviews with a number of organizations involved
in the World Trade Center operations, and examination of available
literature, produced no discernable consensus on when the site transitioned
from the rescue to the recovery mode [Study Interviews; NVFC (National
Volunteer Fire Council) 2002; Jackson et al. 2002, 47; Lioy and
Gochfeld 2002].
8 With respect to the private sector, responders reported
that close relationships with supplier organizations were critical
for supplying the response operations to the September 11, 2001,
attacks.
9 For example, RAND and NIOSH are involved in an effort
to develop guidelines of this type for protective equipment selection
for response operations after a major building collapse.
10 Such estimates must obviously be periodically revisited
as response efforts continue, circumstances change, or better information
is developed.
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